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**U.S.-INDONESIA NAVAL COOPERATION:
THE EVOLUTION OF EXERCISE CARAT, 2005–2021**

by

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THE EVOLUTION OF EXERCISE CARAT, 2005–2021**

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ABSTRACT

Since 1995, the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise has been the most important joint naval exercise between the U.S. and Indonesia. CARAT aims to strengthen relationships and interoperability among navies. Currently, CARAT Indonesia is less developed compared to the annual U.S.-Indonesia army exercise, Garuda Shield. This thesis examines the changes in the U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation and the changes in CARAT from 2005 to 2021 to answer the following questions: How much has CARAT changed over time? Has CARAT fallen behind on U.S.-Indonesian commitments? By comparing the size, complexity, duration, and location of each year's exercise, this thesis finds that despite both countries' defense cooperation improvements after 2005, CARAT has not steadily improved. This thesis argues that when both countries have shared interests at the national level, CARAT has improved its size and complexity. Moreover, the limitations of readiness and capabilities of both navies hinder the advancement of CARAT. Consequently, while CARAT has been effective in sustaining bilateral ties, it has turned into a symbolic routine with a lack of significant improvements in naval interoperability improvements. This thesis offers several recommendations to improve the CARAT exercise: the U.S. Navy should continue to use high-end training equipment, both navies should increase the number of participating units, and CARAT should be transformed into a multilateral exercise.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAW	Anti-Air Warfare
ASuW	Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CENTRIXS	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMATT	Expendable Mobile Anti-Submarine Training Target
ENCAP	Engineering Civic Action Program
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GPOI	Global Peace Operation Initiative
gunnex	Gunnery Exercise
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HSMST	High-Speed Maneuver Surface Target
IMET	International Military Education and Training
LCS	Littoral Combat Ship
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MIOEX	Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise
MNEK	Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MRLF	Multi-Role Light Frigate
NEA	Naval Engagement Activity
NSS	National Security Strategy
OTHT	Over-the-Horizon Target
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific Exercise
SCS	South China Sea
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian Armed Forces
TNI AL	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut/Indonesian Navy
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
VBSS	Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Defense cooperation between the United States and Indonesia has grown steadily over the past 15 years. This cooperation is reflected in the bilateral army and navy exercises that the two countries have conducted annually. In recent years, however, army exercises appear to have become larger and more complex, while navy exercises have not. For example, in August 2021, both armies held their largest joint exercise ever. Garuda Shield 21 involved approximately 3,000 personnel and lasted for two weeks. The exercise was located at three different sites: Batu Raja (South Sumatra), Amborawang (East Kalimantan), and Makasilung (North Sulawesi). Exercises were conducted simultaneously at these sites, and the long distance between sites allowed for complex exercise.¹ By contrast, one month later, in November 2021, the U.S. Navy and Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) held the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise that involved only a few warships, consisted of simple maneuver exercises, and took place in the same area as previous years, the Java Sea.² Compared to the army exercises, what the navies did was far less.

For the last 15 years, the trajectory of U.S.-Indonesia relations has been positive, but there are many more opportunities for further developments in maintaining maritime security within the region. Surprisingly, naval exercises have not kept pace with the army exercises even though both countries have prioritized maritime security efforts for more than a decade. Indonesia's two most recent Presidents, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014) and Joko Widodo (2014–present), have supported military modernization and professionalization efforts. Both administrations also tried to defend Indonesia's extensive

¹ U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Indonesia, "U.S. and Indonesia Strengthen Partnership with Garuda Shield 2021 Military Exercise," U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, August 2, 2021, <https://id.usembassy.gov/u-s-and-indonesia-strengthen-partnership-with-garuda-shield-2021-military-exercise/>.

² COMDESRON 7 PA, "U.S., Indonesia Commence Bilateral Exercise CARAT Indonesia," United States Navy, November 1, 2021, <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2828209/us-indonesia-commence-bilateral-exercise-carat-indonesia/>.

maritime domain against threats that range from illegal fishing to Chinese incursions into Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).³ Similarly, U.S. Presidents since Barack Obama have emphasized the need to strengthen allies and partners and improve maritime security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. These priorities were reflected in the Obama administration's "pivot to the Pacific" policy, as well as the Trump-era National Security Strategy and the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy.⁴

How much has naval cooperation between the United States and Indonesia changed over the past 15 years, and why? Has naval cooperation fallen behind the commitments that the two countries have made? To answer these questions, this thesis will examine the evolution of CARAT, the most important naval exercise conducted annually by the Indonesian and U.S. navies. CARAT has reflected both navies' commitment to Southeast Asia's maritime security. Indonesia's participation in CARAT began in 1995 and has been held nearly every year.⁵ This thesis will explore the impact of national interests and service-specific capabilities on changes in the size and complexity of CARAT.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The significance of this thesis is twofold. First, it is important to find and describe the changes of CARAT in terms of the size and exercise complexity over the 15 years to optimize the U.S.-Indonesia future engagement to benefit both parties. Indeed, both Indonesia and the United States consider each other a valuable partner. The United States' stature as the most substantial naval power significantly impacts maritime security within the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the TNI AL's growth requires considerable support from its partner. Understanding how the exercise has changed will help both navies plan and advance in future engagements. Providing clear information on the CARAT exercise

³ Vibhanshu Shekhar and Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi's Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead," Brookings, November 7, 2014.

⁴ Charles Edel, "What to Expect from the Biden Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy—United States Studies Centre," accessed February 24, 2022, <https://www.usssc.edu.au/analysis/what-to-expect-from-the-biden-administrations-indo-pacific-strategy>.

⁵ *Naval Today*, "CARAT 2018 Kicks Off in Indonesia," *Naval Today*, August 10, 2018, <https://www.navaltoday.com/2018/08/10/carat-2018-kicks-off-in-indonesia/>.

will also help both navies find the flaws that hinder interoperability, which is essential to overcome imminent threats and hence protect both countries' interests.

Second, the importance of this thesis is to find how the national interests affected the naval exercises, so it helps to understand the motivation of both countries to cooperate. Currently, concerns about Chinese regional domination to defy international rules and regulations are recognized by both the United States and Indonesia. Geopolitical competition has been Washington's critical concern in developing an effective strategy to stop or delay China's rise.⁶ A potential military conflict with China over the North Natuna Sea makes China a serious threat to Indonesia. Indonesia, however, has no desire to engage in armed hostility due to the differences of military power and China's massive economic influence.⁷ By understanding the differences and similarities in U.S. and Indonesian interests, and their impact on naval engagement, naval officials will be able overcome future diplomatic challenges while maintaining close naval engagement.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews the literature on two important areas essential to this thesis: the changes in U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation and the factors that affected defense cooperation in the last 15 years. These areas will help the understanding of what happened in terms of cooperation at different levels and the issues that constrain or promote cooperation.

1. U.S.-Indonesia Defense Cooperation Evolution

Scholars believe that defense cooperation between the United States and Indonesia has increased over the last 15 years, bringing improvement in various fields such as military exercises, arms sales, and military personnel education and training. The development in defense cooperation is inseparable from the diplomatic relations between the two countries, which have improved gradually. Although there was a "bad decade" from 1995 to 2005

⁶ Weixing Hu and Weizhan Meng, "The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and China's Response," *The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press*, The China Review, 2022, 150.

⁷ Jonah Blank, *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021).

when the U.S. Congress sanctioned the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) for human rights abuse in East Timor, the defense relationship has improved dramatically since then. Nowadays, Indonesia is militarily closer to the United States than any other great power.

The improvement of defense cooperation between the United States and Indonesia started in the early 2000s when both countries were fighting non-traditional threats such as terrorism and piracy, which threatened the security and stability of the Southeast Asia region. Despite U.S. sanctions on the TNI, the intensity of bilateral security cooperation accelerated throughout the George W. Bush administration after the 9/11 attack. Muhibat emphasizes that through the “war on terror” campaign, the United States made counter-terrorism cooperation with Indonesia a priority, which aided in reviving the relationship at the turn of the 21st century.⁸ Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Defense gave \$4.2 million to help educate Indonesian military and intelligence agencies on counter-terrorism techniques and methods.⁹

The increase in defense cooperation can be observed when the United States assisted Indonesia to tackle piracy and sea robbery. Khalid shows that several extra-regional states, particularly the United States, played an important role in assisting Southeast Asian countries. In 2006, the United States funded a chain of coastal radar stations situated along the important straits of Indonesia: Malacca Strait and Makassar Strait.¹⁰ The United States also extended its support for maritime domain awareness by providing training and equipment to Indonesia. Like Khalid, Storey acknowledges that the United States actively supported Indonesian efforts to fight piracy. He remarks that under the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), Washington has helped Southeast Asian countries to build “a shared maritime domain awareness architecture that will help countries share

⁸ Shafiah F. Muhibat, “Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration: Still Under the Radar?: Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 8, no. 1 (January 2016): 142.

⁹ Muhibat, 143.

¹⁰ Nazery Khalid, “With a Little Help from My Friends: Maritime Capacity-Building Measures in the Straits of Malacca,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 31, no. 3 (2009): 424.

information, identify potential threats, and work collaboratively to address common challenges.”¹¹

In 2010, the Indonesia-U.S. “comprehensive partnership” was launched to demonstrate the growing level of collaboration between the two countries. Muhibat believes that the signing of this framework by President Obama and President Yudhoyono explicitly showed the desire to take the bilateral relationship to a higher level. The two nations agreed to improve bilateral defense and security collaboration through the establishment of a Defense Framework Arrangement and increased cooperation on non-traditional threats to regional security under the partnership’s political and security cooperation pillar.¹² According to Muhibat, the bilateral relationship with Indonesia became a key part of the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, which expressed the United States’ interest in collaborating with Asia Pacific states. In October 2015, the U.S.-Indonesia cooperation was advanced to a “strategic partnership.” As a result of that agreement, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Indonesian Foreign Minister now engage in yearly ministerial-level meetings.¹³

Despite President Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, the establishment of the National Security Strategy (NSS) framework also benefited U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation. Tatsumi emphasizes that referring to Indo-Pacific as the first on the list of “The Strategy in Regional Context” indicates that the U.S. government considers the Indo-Pacific region the most strategically significant geographical area.¹⁴ The Indo-Pacific region looks to be more important than the Middle East, which had been the focus of previous U.S. administrations.¹⁵ Similar to Tatsumi,

¹¹ Ian Storey, “Addressing the Persistent Problem of Piracy and Sea Robbery in Southeast Asia,” no. 2016 (2016): 8.

¹² Muhibat, “Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration,” 144.

¹³ Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia,” [whitehouse.gov](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia), October 26, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>.

¹⁴ Yuki Tatsumi, “The U.S. National Security Strategy: Implications for the Indo-Pacific,” *The Diplomat*, December 21, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/12/the-us-national-security-strategy-implications-for-the-indo-pacific/>.

¹⁵ Tatsumi.

Harding and Natalegawa emphasize that throughout the Trump administration, security was a focal point of the partnership. The regular meeting between the Indonesia Minister of Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense shows how much both countries were concerned about defense issues.¹⁶ According to Harding and Natalegawa, Secretary Mattis made clear his commitment to strengthening defense ties with Indonesia.¹⁷

Scholars also recognize the increase in defense cooperation since both Indonesia and the United States continue to participate in various joint military exercises. After bilateral security cooperation further normalized in the early 2000s, some restrictions of the United States military's interaction with designated Indonesian military components were removed. Muhibat states that in 2010, the United States began the process of re-engagement with Kopassus (Indonesian Army Special Forces) and lifted the restriction on participating in joint exercises.¹⁸ Moreover, Murphy highlights that in 2010, the United States and Indonesia managed to organize approximately 140 joint exercises, including the participation of the Indonesian military in the Cobra Gold exercise.¹⁹ On the subject of naval exercise, Sari emphasizes that two decades of the TNI AL and U.S. Navy engagement through CARAT exercises have developed an understanding among the United States and TNI AL personnel.²⁰ Furthermore in 2014, for the first time, the TNI AL sent its warships to take part in the biggest maritime multilateral exercise held by the United States Pacific Fleet, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).²¹

Indonesian access to U.S. professional military education has grown during the last 15 years. One example is the revival of the International Military Education and Training

¹⁶ Brian Harding and Andreyka Natalegawa, "Enhancing the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership," *CSIS Briefs*, 2018, 4.

¹⁷ Harding and Natalegawa, 4.

¹⁸ Muhibat, "Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration," 143.

¹⁹ Ann Marie Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32, no. 3 (2010): 377.

²⁰ Angguntari C. Sari, "Continuity in Indonesia's Strategy in the South China Sea Under Joko Widodo," *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 8, no. 3 (December 2021): 363.

²¹ Rhsukarsa, "Pertama Kalinya TNI AL Kirim Kapal Perang Ikuti Latma RIMPAC Di Hawaii," *Berita HanKam*, May 31, 2014, <http://beritahankam.blogspot.com/2014/05/pertama-kalinya-tni-al-kirim-kapal.html>.

(IMET) program, which helped Indonesian military officers gain a better understanding of American strategy. Inkiriwang emphasizes that after the “IMET Ban” period, the United States resumed the IMET program in 2005, which contributes to the improvement of Indonesia’s military tactics and doctrines.²² Moreover, Hiebert indicates that the IMET program’s aid from the United States has become more consistent. Indonesian IMET financing climbed from \$721,000 in 2005 to about \$2 million in 2012, “placing it second only to the Philippines’ IMET aid in the Asia Pacific.”²³ Since then, more Indonesian military personnel have received education and training in the United States.

In terms of foreign military sales (FMS), scholars find that Indonesia’s procurement of U.S. military equipment has increased. Despite Indonesia’s tendency to keep the widest option available by procuring arms from various sources, for the last 15 years Indonesia’s annual purchase of U.S. weapons has risen significantly. Hiebert emphasizes the increase of Indonesia’s FMS from \$14 million in 2006 to almost \$40 million in 2011.²⁴ Indonesia’s procurement of U.S. weapons also exponentially increased in 2012, reaching \$700 million.²⁵ Indonesia’s FMS reached its highest point in 2017, for \$224 million.²⁶ Hiebert further concurs that Indonesia’s increased military budget and need for modernization of its military equipment boost the procurement of U.S.-made weapons, hence demonstrating the increase of defense cooperation.

Several scholars agree that U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation has grown in various ways in the last 15 years. Despite increasing interest in defense cooperation and agreement on the need for maritime security cooperation, naval cooperation seems to have advanced slowly. Although the first CARAT exercises were held nearly 30 years ago, there has never been a study of how these exercises have evolved, let alone their impact on U.S.-

²² Frega Wenas Inkiriwang, “The Dynamic of the US–Indonesia Defence Relations: The ‘IMET Ban’ Period,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 74, no. 4 (July 3, 2020): 14.

²³ Murray Hiebert, “A U.S.-Indonesia Partnership for 2020: Recommendations for Forging a 21st Century Relationship” (Washington, DC: United States: CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies, n.d.), 10.

²⁴ Hiebert, 10.

²⁵ Hiebert, 10.

²⁶ Security Cooperation Agency United States Department of Defense, “Historical Sales Book,” 2021.

Indonesia defense cooperation. Currently, few studies highlight the naval cooperation trends, especially regarding the CARAT exercise. The existing literature only indicates the number of naval exercises; it does not indicate the size, complexity, or development of naval exercises.

2. Factors That Affected U.S.-Indonesia Defense Cooperation

Despite the increasing trends of U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation, scholars observe several factors that have both promoted and hindered defense cooperation over the last 15 years. Some scholars argue that when both countries share similar national interests, such as regional stability, they boost cooperation between both countries. Some experts, however, acknowledge that the national bureaucratic practices hindered further collaboration.

A group of experts support the idea that shared interests led to increased defense cooperation. For example, as Murphy emphasized, in the early 2000s Indonesia's democratic transition and strong counter-terrorism strategies established the foundation for closer cooperation with the United States. A few years earlier, several policymakers in Washington were concerned that Indonesia might eventually turn into another failed state, posing a danger to regional stability.²⁷ Indonesia, on the other hand, was able to overcome its difficulties. As Murphy points out, the post-New Order governments restored macroeconomic stability, challenged the notion that Islam and democracy cannot coexist, and recognized Indonesia's vital role in maintaining regional stability.

Murphy further explains that "the dynamic of U.S.-Indonesia relations is a function to which Indonesian domestic and foreign policies are congruent with U.S. strategic doctrine: cooperation and amity prevail when they are."²⁸ Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia was elected to play an active role in the U.N. Security Council, the Human Rights Council, and the G-20. Murphy finds that Indonesia's domestic achievements and international ambitions led the U.S. to broaden Indonesia's political reform, economic recovery, and

²⁷ Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia," 363.

²⁸ Murphy, 364.

counter-terrorism agenda. She also notes that while the U.S. was fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington focused on Indonesia as a model for a democratic Muslim-majority country. In March 2006, the Bush administration introduced “strategic partnership” with Indonesia for the first time. This term illustrated that Indonesia was considered as a counterpart by the United States for promoting Asia-Pacific stability.

Currently, concerns about Chinese motives for regional hegemony and its tendency to ignore international norms are shared by Indonesia and the United States. Scholars argue, however, that Indonesia’s political strategy curtails further defense cooperation with the United States. Sebastian and Chen argue that Indonesia’s tradition of nonalignment, which is reflected in its commitment to a “Free and Active” foreign policy, have conflicted with the idea of forging alliances and remains suspicious of the intentions of any foreign power.²⁹ Likewise, Sulaiman emphasizes that despite Indonesia’s growing concern of the South China Sea (SCS) aligning with the United States interest, leaders in Jakarta maintain under-balancing policy against China because of Indonesia’s strategic culture.³⁰ Both Yudhoyono and Jokowi tried to continue the country’s economic growth to preserve domestic political stability, and this approach has limited Indonesia’s ability to establish a more assertive strategy in the SCS.³¹ Therefore, Sebastian, Chen, and Sulaiman agree that even though security cooperation between Indonesia and the United States is increasing, Indonesia remains very careful in taking further actions not to upset the Chinese.

Despite Indonesia’s cautious steps towards great power rivalry in the SCS, scholars find that Indonesia remains vigilant to maintain its defense cooperation with the United States compared to China. Inkiriwang emphasizes that Indonesia’s defense policy has been influenced by the great power competition between China and the U.S.³² He also mentions

²⁹ Leonard C. Sebastian and Jonathan Chen, “Indonesia’s Foreign and Maritime Policies Under Joko Widodo: Domestic and External Determinants,” *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 8, no. 3 (December 2021): 287–303.

³⁰ Yohanes Sulaiman, “What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South China Sea,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 11, no. 4 (October 2019): 618.

³¹ Sulaiman, 618.

³² Frega Wenas Inkiriwang, “‘Garuda Shield’ vs. ‘Sharp Knife’: Operationalizing Indonesia’s Defence Diplomacy,” *The Pacific Review* 34, no. 6 (November 2, 2021): 22.

that the annual bilateral “Garuda Shield exercise become the largest bilateral exercise for the Indonesian Army,” which shows that Indonesia continues to increase its strategic engagement with the United States.³³ Conversely, Indonesia discontinued the Sharp Knife exercise with the Chinese due to several incidents in the North Natuna Sea.

Regarding the navy-to-navy relations, Blank argues that bureaucratic tradition and strategic alignment limit the TNI AL’s further cooperation with the U.S. Navy. He finds that numerous elements of the U.S. security engagement strategy encounter institutional barriers in Indonesia, which include “low levels of military funding, a security policymaking bureaucracy that is not designed for quick decisions, and a tendency to make security policy on an ad hoc rather than a doctrinal basis.”³⁴ Blank asserts that interoperability with the United States is extremely problematic due to Indonesia’s nonalignment policy, and this situation is not likely to improve anytime soon. Blank quotes a discussion with an unnamed U.S. defense representative in Jakarta in April 2019, “Indonesia doesn’t do ‘mini-lats’—multilateral is everything. They’ll do a mini-lat on something site-specific, like the Sulu Sea or Malacca Strait, but they won’t sign up for anything long term: For them, that would feel too much like an alliance.”³⁵

While several possible explanations support and delay the increase of U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation, the following section will present hypotheses to answer why naval cooperation has not increased as much as defense cooperation in general.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESIS

Two potential hypotheses describe changes in the CARAT exercise over the last 15 years. The first hypothesis is that the size and complexity of CARAT have increased because the United States and Indonesia have prioritized similar interests. In the early 2000s, after the 9/11 attacks, terrorism and piracy were the main priority for both countries. Subsequently, since the early 2010s China’s claim over the SCS has raised concern of both countries. Hence, both sides agreed to strengthen military ties, which resulted in the growth

³³ Inkiriwang, 21.

³⁴ Blank, *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia*, 8.

³⁵ Blank, 17.

of joint naval exercise. The second hypothesis is that the size and complexity of CARAT have not increased because the United States and Indonesia have limited equipment readiness and naval capabilities. When one or both navies experienced readiness and capabilities limitation, the joint naval exercise did not grow.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis will present a comparative study of the U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation in general and naval cooperation in particular. Data and information from academic journals, news media reports, and official reports from both the U.S. and Indonesian Navies and Armed Forces are used to better understand the changes in defense cooperation, naval engagement, and execution of the CARAT exercise. Significantly, the data of the type of exercise serials, number of personnel, and result of activity from official reports each year will be used to measure whether this naval exercise is stagnating, experiencing setbacks, or progressing as expected. Furthermore, comparing CARAT exercises between the U.S. Navy and the TNI AL over the last 15 years will reflect the development of both countries' cooperation in general.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis aims to explain the change over time of U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation overall as well as the CARAT exercise specifically. The thesis also seeks to reveal the underlying factors behind these trends. Chapter II will focus on details of Indonesia-U.S. defense cooperation since 2005. This chapter will identify the most significant changes and the most important causes of those changes. Chapter III will present the comparative data on CARAT exercises that have occurred over time in order to identify trends in naval cooperation as well as the causes of those trends. Finally, in Chapter IV, the thesis will present the conclusion whether the naval exercises that has been held by both navies is sufficient and as expected. Furthermore, this chapter will assess implications of the findings for the future naval exercise as well as the trends in U.S.-Indonesia defense relations.

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II. U.S.-INDONESIA DEFENSE COOPERATION

Since the 1990s, there have been changes in the level of defense cooperation between the United States and Indonesia. Before 2005, the embargo of U.S. weapon sales to Indonesia due to the conflict in East Timor epitomized the lowest point of U.S.-Indonesia defense relations. Despite the partially lifted embargo in 2002 and additional cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts, the defense cooperation of both countries before 2005 remained low and stagnant. Unsurprisingly, the U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation in general directly affected the naval cooperation of both countries. Lack of Indonesian naval capabilities and less U.S. interest constrained the efforts for further cooperation. Starting in 2006, however, when both countries aspired to a comprehensive partnership, their defense cooperation has grown significantly, including naval cooperation. The first part of this chapter presents the underlying cause of low defense cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia prior to 2005. The second part of this chapter discusses the factors and events that led to the growth of defense cooperation since then.

A. U.S.-INDONESIA DEFENSE COOPERATION BEFORE 2005

Several factors contributed to the low degree of defense cooperation between the United States and Indonesia prior to 2005. The East Timor crisis in the early 1990s, Indonesian political instability due to the democratization process starting in 1998, and the 9/11 attacks on the United States are the events that most strongly affected the defense cooperation of both countries. Furthermore, the limited Indonesian capabilities and lower interest from the United States to cooperate impeded further cooperation between the two navies.

In the early 1990s, the United States suspended military ties with Indonesia due to human rights concerns. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States prioritized the human rights issue in both its international and domestic affairs. The U.S. Congress began to criticize the Indonesian approach to East Timor due to several allegations of human rights abuses by TNI personnel. The East Timor conflict intensified in November 1991, when Indonesian Army personnel opened fire during a demonstration in Dili that killed

and wounded civilians—this tragedy was also known as the “Santa Cruz” massacre.³⁶ In response to the infringement of the Indonesian military, the U.S. Congress halted all IMET training for Indonesian officers. Additional restrictions were enforced in 1994, 1998, and 1999, following violence in East Timor by pro-Indonesia militants supported by the army.³⁷ Furthermore, President Bill Clinton terminated most remaining ties with Indonesia, including sales of weapons and military equipment.

The Indonesian democratization process, better known as “reformasi” created an unstable political and security condition that hampered Jakarta’s further cooperation with Washington. The massive demonstration and public pressure of the national government across Indonesia resulted in the fall of the Suharto New Order regime in May 1998. The turmoil caused political and economic instability. Consequently, Indonesia had reformed from a militarized and centralized authoritarian country into an open and democratic state. The “reformasi” era of Indonesia has been marked by several changes including a fundamental restructure of the Indonesian state, rebalancing of power among government branches, and introducing a new system of check and balance.³⁸ Regarding the military reform, senior military officials wisely reacted to the anti-military sentiment of the anti-New Order rallies by withdrawing the military from political practices. After the fall of the Suharto regime, the military rehabilitated its credibility and maintained influence in the new reformed institutional structures by agreeing to the termination of legislative privileges and activities that restricted its participation in politics.³⁹ The “dual function” of the Indonesian military was officially removed.

While the government and public were struggling to bounce back from the economic crisis that hit Asia in the early 2000s, several domestic security threats emerged throughout the archipelagos. Separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, as well as religious

³⁶ James Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” *Survival* 43, no. 1 (2001): 134.

³⁷ International Crisis Group, “Resuming U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties” (International Crisis Group, May 21, 2002), 1.

³⁸ Dan Harris and Martha Foresti, “Indonesia’s Story: Indonesia’s Progress on Governance State Cohesion and Strategic Institutional Reform” (London: United Kingdom: Overseas Development Institute, 2010), 3.

³⁹ Harris and Foresti, 5.

conflicts in Ambon and Poso, together with numerous terrorist attacks are the examples of domestic security crises that arose during the early reformasi era. While most of the political leaders were dealing with the crises, the Indonesian military continued to struggle in accepting its new limited role in Indonesian politics. The economic crisis surely affected the Indonesian defense budget, which resulted in limited weapons readiness and military capabilities.

Furthermore, the U.S. State Department recognized that the Indonesian public has been extremely upset with restrictions on the IMET programs and the procurement of U.S. military equipment. The growing stigma within the Indonesian society was that America had placed a broader trade embargo on Indonesia.⁴⁰ Due to their focus on domestic crises, Indonesian civilian and military leaders showed little interest in establishing relationships with other countries, particularly the United States. On the other hand, the U.S. Congress and human rights activists concerned about Indonesian military human rights abuses greatly reduced American officials' willingness to cooperate with Indonesia.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon suddenly changed U.S. interest over Indonesia. Soon after 9/11, terrorist attacks were widely spread within the Southeast Asia region, particularly in Indonesia. Between 2000 and 2005, a series of bombing attacks targeted public places and foreign embassies and consulates across the country. Indonesia gained U.S. attention within its Global War on Terror (GWOT) campaign not only because Indonesia was perceived as a "model moderation" of democratic nation within the Muslim world, but also as the origin of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the terrorist group responsible for several attacks within Southeast Asia that had alleged ties with Al Qaeda.⁴¹

Within the framework of the GWOT, there was a rising desire to restore defense cooperation between Indonesia and the United States. Despite U.S. Congressional opposition, the purpose of combating terrorist threats prompted numerous measures to

⁴⁰ Anthony L Smith, "A Glass Half Full: Indonesia-U.S. Relations in the Age of Terror," *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, December 2003, 459.

⁴¹ Smith, 449.

reestablish defense cooperation with Indonesia. Through a variety of aid and initiatives, the United States supported Indonesian law enforcement agencies—including TNI—to reform, become more transparent, and expand their capabilities. TNI, however, criticized the U.S. approach of linking military assistance to domestic political and military reform. In June 2002, soon after he was appointed by President Megawati as TNI Commander, Lieutenant General Endriartono Sutarto insisted that “the military aid, should not involve interference in our national affairs.”⁴² Furthermore, to deal with limitation of U.S. military equipment, in 2004 Indonesia purchased Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft—instead of the U.S. F-16 fighter. Many of the Indonesian Air Forces’ best fighter pilots were sent to Russia for the training on the newly procured fighter aircraft.

Despite several grievances from the Indonesian side, the U.S. continued to support Indonesia. In early 2002, the Bush administration requested congressional approval of \$8 million as the initial budget for defense cooperation with Indonesia. In August 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell proposed a \$50 million aid for Indonesia’s security forces to combat terrorism, half of which would go to the police.⁴³ Since most of the aid from the U.S. went to the police for the counter-terrorism efforts, the Indonesian military felt that they were ignored by the Americans. Despite U.S. determination to rebuild the relationship, domestic bad stigma about the trade embargo grew significantly among the Indonesian public and politicians. Furthermore, TNI reluctance to accept U.S. intervention in Indonesian domestic politics and preference to aid the police—rather than the military—impeded further defense cooperation before 2005.

Overall, the stagnation of U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation before 2005 was driven by U.S. concerns about Indonesian military human rights violations in the East Timor conflict. Additionally, Indonesia’s unstable domestic political and economic environment led to several crises that threatened its national security. Even though the U.S. GWOT campaign paved the way for better cooperation, the lack of Indonesian military and

⁴² “Mega Installs Endriartono as TNI Chief to Replace Widodo,” *The Jakarta Post*, June 8, 2002.

⁴³ Smith, “A Glass Half Full: Indonesia-U.S. Relations in the Age of Terror,” 459.

defense policymaker desire for rapprochement with the U.S. created an unfavorable condition for further defense cooperation.

B. U.S.-INDONESIA DEFENSE COOPERATION AFTER 2005

Several factors led to the growth of U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation after 2005. More stable political conditions, the shift of U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region, the growing threat of China, and the increase of TNI capabilities have been the main drivers of increasing defense cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia.

Since 2005, under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, Indonesia has been more stable. Yudhoyono became the first president to be directly elected by the people through relatively peaceful and democratic election in 2004 with more than 60 percent of the vote. In 2009, he also won the presidential election with a similar margin. During his two presidential terms, Indonesia's democracy has been stabilized. The transition from 1998 to 2004 has experienced several violent conflicts as well as an economic crisis that disrupted national stability. The early years of Yudhoyono's presidency, however, were marked by peaceful settlement of conflicts and economic growth that helped Indonesia reemerge as one of the major economies in the region. The signing of the Aceh peace agreement and the re-establishment of social relations between people in Ambon City showed that Indonesia was more stable since the *reformasi* era. Per capita income tripled over a decade, the economy grew at an average of 5%, and Indonesia became one of a few countries in the world to have a GDP in excess of \$1 trillion.⁴⁴ Additionally, Yudhoyono's "million friends and zero enemies" foreign policy is perceived as the prospect of Indonesia becoming a reliable partner in global governance—an unprecedented Indonesian effort. For example, Indonesia was appointed as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007–2008 and the first member of the Human Rights Council in 2006, while continuing to play an important part in the G-20.⁴⁵ Consequently, the United States

⁴⁴ Marcus Mietzner, "Has Indonesia Strengthened or Stagnated under SBY?" ANU College of Asia & the Pacific (The Australian National University, September 18, 2014), <https://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/news-events/all-stories/has-indonesia-strengthened-or-stagnated-under-sby>.

⁴⁵ Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia," 374.

expanded its relations as a result of Indonesian domestic accomplishments and international ambitions.

By 2006, not only had Indonesia begun to draw Washington's attention, it also had established a strong footing with the countries within the Indo-Pacific region. The George W. Bush administration recognized the rising significance of the region because China's growing economy and arbitrary claims over the SCS have threatened U.S. hegemony over the region.⁴⁶ Obama's "Pivot to Asia" advanced American focus of the region by allocating greater diplomatic, economic, and military resources.⁴⁷ Trump's National Security Strategy concept acknowledged the importance of the Indo-Pacific more than that of the Middle East.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the Biden administration is committed to improve "U.S. long-term position and commitment" to the Indo-Pacific region.⁴⁹ As one of the biggest democratic countries within the region, all four administrations agreed that Indonesia has been a promising and reliable partner for the U.S. to achieve its goals in the region.

Indonesia is inevitably vulnerable to geopolitical changes and security issues, despite its enormous economic growth prospect. Gindarsah argues that great power competition in the Indo-Pacific hampered Indonesia's ambition of peaceful geopolitical development within the region. Indonesian "free and active" foreign policy constrained policymakers to be perceived as non-aligned to any great powers. Despite its impartiality, however, Jakarta believed that the U.S. military presence was essential for maintaining the balance of power within the region.⁵⁰ In order to maintain its strategic hedging in defense diplomacy, Indonesia decided to enhance military capabilities and domestic strategic industries through bilateral defense diplomacy, including with the United States. In this

⁴⁶ Bruce Vaughn, "U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Congressional Research Services*, January 22, 2007, 2.

⁴⁷ Kenneth G. Lieberthal, "The American Pivot to Asia," *Brookings* (blog), December 21, 2011, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/>.

⁴⁸ Tatsumi, "The U.S. National Security Strategy."

⁴⁹ "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States," The White House, February 11, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/>.

⁵⁰ Iis Gindarsah, "Strategic Hedging in Indonesia's Defense Diplomacy," *Defense & Security Analysis* 32, no. 4 (October 2016): 350, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1233695>.

manner, Indonesia attempts to mitigate the impact of geopolitical shifts while preserving the nation's military capabilities against external unpredictability.⁵¹ Moreover, even though Muhibat argues that U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation was still “under the radar,” she emphasizes that the limited interaction provided a strong foundation for further positive cooperation. The U.S. capability of assisting military capacity building was aligned with the TNI's ambition and reinforced the basis for more defense cooperation between both countries.

The increased U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation manifested in several programs starting from 2006. The U.S. has continued to support Indonesia's involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations through the Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI). Among Southeast Asia nations, Indonesia has been the top contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions.⁵² As a GPOI partner starting from 2006, the U.S. and Indonesia have participated in yearly peacekeeping training exercises. The U.S. also provided assistance to deliver TNI's armored vehicles to support its peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.⁵³ Other U.S. efforts for further cooperation with Indonesia were recognized when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a trip to Indonesia in July 2010. He announced the removal of the restrictions on cooperation with Kopassus, although he said that the U.S. would not become fully involved immediately but would instead implement a progressive and restricted program.⁵⁴ Despite strong resistance from Congress, the removal of the ban was an important step toward normalizing military-to-military interactions and sending a message to Indonesia that the U.S. wanted a long-term partnership free from the burden of the past.

Since the two nations rekindled their dormant security ties, the security cooperation program has developed vastly. In June 2010, the two partners reached a significant milestone when top defense officials from both nations signed Defense Cooperation

⁵¹ Gindarsah, 351.

⁵² John B Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, “Rebuilding the U.S.-Indonesian Security Relationship,” *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, March 26, 2009, 2.

⁵³ Haseman and Lachica.

⁵⁴ Murphy, “US Rapprochement with Indonesia,” 376.

Agreement (DCA), that lays out the goals and components of the bilateral defense partnership in writing.⁵⁵ The U.S. also welcomed TNI's aspiration to restore its aging aircraft fleet—particularly the C-130 transports and a variety of transport helicopters. In 2010, Indonesia pledged \$50 million to new and current FMS cases that offer spare parts and technical support for aircraft manufactured in the United States.⁵⁶ Eventually, during President Obama's visit to Jakarta in November 2010, both countries officially launched "the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership," which elevated relations to a higher level.

The signing of the Comprehensive Partnership in 2010 brought a new dimension and become the foundation for enhancing U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation. Before the signing of the agreement, much of the Indonesian public perceived the U.S. as an anti-Muslim country not only because the U.S. invaded Iraq and Afghanistan but also because it supported Israel against the Palestinians, all of which were sensitive issues in Indonesia. Furthermore, the embargo of weapons also fueled anti-American opinion among the Indonesian public. Those suspicions were greatly reduced after Obama became President and Yudhoyono's "million friends and zero enemies" policy was introduced. Furthermore, since both national leaders agree to sign the Comprehensive Partnership, the bad stigma of America was also rehabilitated. The United States was perceived as the reliable partner that can assisted Indonesia in maintaining regional stability, hence increasing the military capability to overcome security threats.

The U.S. and Indonesia have shared interest in preserving regional stability and prosperity, but there was a change of interest during the 2010s decade. In the early 2000s both countries had shared interest in combatting terrorism, while in the 2010s China's claim of control of the SCS caught both Washington's and Jakarta's attention. Nevertheless, there was a divergence in their vision of the Chinese threat. The United States perceived the Chinese claim as a significant threat to the freedom of navigation within the

⁵⁵ John B Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, "The U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership: The Security Component," *CogitASIA CSIS Asia Program* (blog), n.d., <http://www.cogitasia.com/the-u-s-indonesia-comprehensive-partnership-the-security-component/>.

⁵⁶ Haseman and Lachica.

region. On the other hand, Indonesia did not perceive China as a substantial threat to its sovereignty. While Indonesia argues that it is not a claimant state in SCS conflicts, Jakarta has significant disagreement regarding the implementation of Beijing's nine-dash line claim, particularly as they overlap with Indonesia's EEZ in the North Natuna Sea.⁵⁷

Furthermore, in 2015, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership, with collaboration expanding to regional and global issues of concern.⁵⁸ This strategic partnership represents the ambition of the two nations to pursue deeper and broader collaboration, expanding on the Comprehensive Partnership signed in 2010. Within the strategic partnership framework, President Joko Widodo and President Obama reaffirmed their willingness to expand collaboration.⁵⁹ Responding to the new partnership level, both Ministry of Defense also signed the Joint Statement for Comprehensive Defense Cooperation in October 2015. The joint statement honors current defense cooperation, recognizes recent developments, and will serve as a framework for expanding future defense cooperation. This statement addresses the five principals of defense cooperation: "maritime, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, defense modernization, and countering transnational threats."⁶⁰ This arrangement allows further engagement in defense procurement and technology, as well as in cyber security.

On December 2017, the Trump administration introduced the NSS. Arguably, this strategy could have halted the progressive growth of U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation because it explicitly identified China as an adversary that aimed to "challenge American power, influence, and interests."⁶¹ The great power rivalry between the U.S. and China has raised concern among the Indonesians. Considering the Chinese economic importance,

⁵⁷ Jeffrey Ordaniel, "The United States and Indonesia: Re-Converging Security Interests in the Indo-Pacific," Issues & Insight Conference Report (Pacific Forum International, September 2021), 1.

⁵⁸ Ordaniel, 5.

⁵⁹ Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia."

⁶⁰ Pentagon Press, "Readout of Secretary Carter's Meeting with Indonesian Minister of Defense Ryamizard," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, accessed July 27, 2022, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/626125/readout-of-secretary-carters-meeting-with-indonesian-minister-of-defense-ryamiz/>.

⁶¹ Tatsumi, "The U.S. National Security Strategy."

Indonesia has no interest in becoming caught in the middle of the great powers.⁶² Despite Indonesian leaders' growing concerns about China's action in North Natuna Sea, maintaining a balance between the great powers is a crucial aspect of Indonesian foreign policy.

The transformation of TNI is also essential to the development of U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation. Aligning with the Indonesia reform, internally TNI also carried out "reformasi" and several significant changes, including the development of readiness and capabilities to carry out its missions. The enactment of Law 34/2004 regarding TNI emphasized the importance of professional soldiers in defending the country's sovereignty. This law defines a professional soldier as one who adheres to "principles of democracy, civil supremacy, human rights, and the provisions of national law and ratified international law."⁶³ Internal changes within the TNI organization had gradually increased the overall performance of the military. Furthermore, since 2005, Indonesia has enjoyed significant economic growth that resulted in the growth of the defense budget. Those changes resulted in the improvement of TNI readiness as well as procurement of advanced weapon systems, which in turn allowed TNI to participate in more military engagement—especially joint exercise—with its U.S. counterpart.

Soon after Washington fully lifted the military restrictions, several U.S.-Indonesia joint exercises began to develop. According to TNI AL representatives, after being discontinued in 2000, the Indonesian and U.S. navies staged their first joint exercise in the Java Sea in July 2005.⁶⁴ Starting from 2005 until now, annually both navies have carried out joint naval exercise CARAT. Another engagement of both armed forces is the army exercise Garuda Shield. First established in 2007, initially Garuda Shield was aimed to

⁶² Ordaniel, "The United States and Indonesia: Re-Converging Security Interests in the Indo-Pacific," 4.

⁶³ "Act of Republic Indonesia No.34/2004" (2004).

⁶⁴ Agence France-Presse, "Indonesia and U.S. Navy to Hold First Joint Exercise in Four Years," *Agence France-Presse*, March 29, 2005, Access World News, <https://infoweb-newsbank-com.libproxy.nps.edu/apps/news/document-view?p=AWNB&docref=news/10924D89956EB681>.

enhance TNI capabilities in peacekeeping operation. Gradually, Garuda Shield has evolved into an army multilateral exercise that involves several countries.⁶⁵

Apart from CARAT, both navies also participated in multilateral naval exercises hosted by each country. These include Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK) a biennial exercise hosted by Indonesia, and RIMPAC, a biennial exercise hosted by the USPACOM. The U.S. Navy sent its warships to participate in MNEK in 2014, 2016, and 2018. The TNI AL sent its ships and marine personnel to RIMPAC for the first time in 2014⁶⁶ and again in 2016, 2018 and 2022, while declining to participate in 2020 due to the COVID pandemic. The involvement of both navies in multilateral exercises hosted by each country demonstrates that both navies have shared interests in enhancing capabilities and interoperability that support the shared national interest of preserving regional stability.

Overall, prior to 2005 U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation experienced the period of stagnation. Several domestic changes in Indonesia manifested in more stable political and substantive economic growth, however. This was followed by the successful "reformasi" of TNI that resulted in the development of Indonesian military capabilities and convinced the U.S. to lift sanctions on the Indonesian military. Furthermore, Indonesian domestic achievement and global ambition aligned with the U.S.'s shifting perception of the Indo-Pacific region and resulted in the substantial increase of defense cooperation of both countries. This cooperation growth manifested in the increase of Indonesian procurement of U.S. weapons and the continuation of U.S. assistance in developing TNI professionalism as well as the execution of various joint exercises. Overall, since 2005, U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation has grown significantly and further accelerated after the signing of the Comprehensive Partnership in 2010.

⁶⁵ Inkiriwang, "'Garuda Shield' vs. 'Sharp Knife.'"

⁶⁶ Indra Wijaya, "*TNI AL Kirim Kapal Perang Ke Pearl Harbour*," Tempo.com, May 30, 2014, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/581231/tni-al-kirim-kapal-perang-ke-pearl-harbour>.

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III. CARAT INDONESIA 2005–2021

The CARAT Exercise is the main U.S.-Indonesia joint naval exercise. Both countries agreed to start CARAT in 1997 and continue to hold it annually today. This naval exercise was postponed at the request of TNI AL in 2003 and 2004 due to the deteriorating diplomatic relationship between both countries.⁶⁷ In 2005, however, as defense cooperation resumed, the countries agreed to begin holding the exercise again. From that time, CARAT has been the main and the most important U.S.-Indonesia naval engagement, especially at the tactical level.

The first part of this chapter elaborates the importance of naval exercises in U.S.-Indonesia defense cooperation. The second part presents the changes in CARAT Indonesia from 2005 until 2021 to identify the trends of CARAT Indonesia in the size, complexity, duration, and location of the exercises. Subsequently, the third part discusses the factors that influence these trends.

The analysis that follows in this chapter shows that the CARAT exercise has fostered bilateral relations and has enhanced TNI AL capabilities but has not effectively improved the interoperability between the U.S. and the Indonesian navies.

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL EXERCISES IN U.S.-INDONESIA DEFENSE COOPERATION

After the end of the Cold War era, to achieve a variety of objectives in the complex game of global power politics, many militaries were deployed far beyond their conventional and specialized skills.⁶⁸ The objective was to engage international partners on defense issues and build a credible presence overseas, therefore, leveraging a stronger connection between the military and diplomatic spheres.⁶⁹ Thus, the joint naval exercise is one of the activities that is held to achieve the goal. Joint exercises between military forces

⁶⁷ Navy NewsStand, “CARAT Indonesia Underway in Surabaya,” July 26, 2006, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/07/mil-050726-nns04.htm>.

⁶⁸ Juan Emilio Cheyre, “Defense Diplomacy,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 371, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0021>.

⁶⁹ Cheyre, 371.

are an important part of military cooperation and help to build strong ties with other countries. This kind of cooperation also helps to improve strategic security relationships and address common concerns about security.⁷⁰

The U.S. Navy has extensive knowledge in operating in diverse seas, as well as combat experience in a broad variety of missions. This potential can thus be utilized to assist other nations through various exercises that seek to forge stronger military ties and mutually beneficial bilateral interactions. The U.S. Navy is currently the largest navy with the most global resources. Through the constructive use of defense resources during peace time, the U.S. Navy can promote transparency and confidence in the military field as well as develop stronger engagement with other navies. In addition, military cooperation in peace time acts as a tool of not only communicating a nation's security concerns and views but also fostering a conducive security environment.⁷¹ Countries also use the joint exercise to achieve their own goals, including trust building, interoperability, and military modernization.⁷²

Moreover, the U.S. Navy acknowledges that “our capabilities are strongest when they support, and are supported by coordination and synchronization with allies and partners.”⁷³ Consequently, exchange of personnel, information sharing, collaborative planning, maritime engagement, and naval exercises have strengthened and expanded U.S. Navy collective operational and combat capabilities.⁷⁴ Through various engagements, the U.S. Navy is “able to demonstrate both naval might and national character.”⁷⁵

For its part, Indonesia has intensified its defense diplomacy initiatives in recent decades. As part of the democratization process, Indonesia has intensified the use of certain military and defense instruments in its diplomatic activities. Joint exercises have also been

⁷⁰ B.S. Sacharn, “Cooperation in Military Training as a Tool of Peacetime Military Diplomacy,” 2003, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_jul03/sa_jul03sab01.html.

⁷¹ Sacharn.

⁷² Sacharn.

⁷³ U.S. Navy, “Naval Doctrine Publication 1-Naval Warfare,” April 2020, 63.

⁷⁴ U.S. Navy, 63.

⁷⁵ U.S. Navy, 71.

an important aspect for Indonesia's defense cooperation because joint exercises contribute to addressing Indonesia's security issues.⁷⁶ The Indonesian Defense Ministry and TNI have greatly contributed to the building of relations with other nations—notably United States, which is a great power nation—with incentives to generate concrete actions by several joint exercises. Since Indonesia is an ASEAN member, it is also important to emphasize that ASEAN, as a regional organization, has endeavored to preserve its neutrality or nonaligned posture among the world's great powers.⁷⁷ This stance also aligned with Indonesia's "free and active" foreign policy. Therefore, notwithstanding its foreign policy stance, Indonesia continued to pursue its national survival and prosperity by cooperating with other nations, including the great powers. The tendency to not jeopardize its "free and active" policy, however, remains high when it comes to defense cooperation, let alone joint military exercises.

Both the U.S. and Indonesia agree that the CARAT exercise aims to "address shared maritime security priorities, strengthen maritime partnerships, and enhance interoperability among participating forces."⁷⁸ Since CARAT restarted in 2005, however, it has focused on maintaining the relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia, while the goal of enhancing naval interoperability has been often neglected.

B. TRENDS OF CARAT INDONESIA FROM 2005 TO 2021

In 2005, CARAT exercises between the U.S. Navy and TNI AL resumed after a two-year absence. Both navies celebrated this as the symbol of reestablishment of naval cooperation that had been impeded due to the U.S. policy of restraining military ties with the Indonesian military because of the East Timor conflict. From 2005 until 2021, however, there was lack of significant improvement to enhance interoperability that had been carried out. The Civic Action Programs such as Engineering and Medical (ENCAP and MEDCAP,

⁷⁶ Inkiriwang, "'Garuda Shield' vs. 'Sharp Knife,'" 2.

⁷⁷ Koh Swee Lean Collin, "ASEAN Perspectives on Naval Cooperation With India: Singapore and Vietnam," *India Review* 12, no. 3 (July 2013): 187.

⁷⁸ Task Force 73 Public Affairs, "U.S. and Indonesia Strengthen Maritime Partnerships during CARAT 2015," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, August 3, 2015, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/611919/us-and-indonesia-strengthen-maritime-partnerships-during-carat-2015/>.

respectively) are the only serials that have been constantly executed during the last 15 years. Despite both countries having similar interest in maintaining regional security stability through defense cooperation, they made no substantial progress regarding their naval interoperability.

Furthermore, this section describes and explains the main trends of CARAT Indonesia from 2005 to 2021. The description of CARAT Indonesia trends over time is determined by comparing the size, complexity, duration, and location of CARAT Indonesia from 2005 until 2021. The size of the exercise is defined by the participating units, especially the warships, aircraft, and other naval operational units such as marine battalions, divers, special forces, and construction battalions. To measure improvements in interoperability, the numbers of exercise serials and their complexity are compared over the years. Furthermore, the duration and location of the exercise are also essential to assess whether the exercise was increasing or not.

Since it restarted in 2005, CARAT had set a high standard of joint naval exercise between the U.S. Navy and the TNI AL. From 2007 to 2010, however, the exercise experienced a setback. From 2011 up to 2016, CARAT Indonesia had gradual growth, yet stagnated from 2017 until the last exercise in 2021.

1. CARAT Indonesia 2005–2006: The Restart of the Engagement

CARAT Indonesia 2005 successfully marked the resurrection of naval cooperation among the U.S. Navy and TNI AL. Even though it was only a three-day exercise at sea, approximately 800 U.S. Navy and 850 TNI AL personnel participated in the various events of the exercise. Several symposiums and the harbor phase took place in the TNI AL Eastern Fleet Command in Surabaya. The ENCAP, MEDCAP, marines exercise, and diving exercise were located in Situbondo, East Java, while both navies' warships steaming in the Java Sea carried out several naval exercise serials.

The gunnery exercise (gunnex) was the most complex exercise carried out by both navies. Gunnex is considered as a complex serial because within this exercise, ships need to carry out several precautions and preparations to ensure the safety of firing live ammunition. Within this exercise, both navies must establish good communication because

it is essential for the safety of the exercise, especially during the range clearance and prior to firing the main gun. Consequently, through gunnex, both navies can improve interoperability. Apart from gunnex, the sea phase only consisted of simple communication and other synthetic exercises. Consequently, even though both navies had set a high standard in joint naval exercise, this year's opportunity to improve interoperability was limited. The only important exercise serial was gunnex, whereas other exercise serials were not complex and, hence, had insignificant impact on interoperability.

In 2006, CARAT Indonesia was again carried out in the vicinity of the Eastern Fleet Command. The seven-day exercise's most significant serial was the amphibious landing exercise in Banongan Beach, Situbondo. Based on the exercise's complexity and difficulty, it is important to acknowledge that CARAT Indonesia 2006 was bigger and more complex compared to the previous year. Amphibious landing required complex planning, preparation, and execution. Hundreds of personnel from both navies and from both marine forces successfully carried out the landing operation exercise.⁷⁹ The amphibious assault by marine personnel using amphibious landing craft launched from warships required well-established coordination and well-prepared personnel to carry out the tasks.

Furthermore, the exercise introduced the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) for the first time. This enhanced communication safety and procedures marked progress toward greater interoperability.⁸⁰ CENTRIXS is "a global data network enterprise for U.S. and partner forces to share classified operational and intelligence information, for combined planning, unity of effort, and decision superiority in operations."⁸¹ A well-established, secure, and practical communication is significant for the safety and the accomplishment of the exercise. The

⁷⁹ Government Press Releases (USA), "U.S., Indonesian Navies Partner for CARAT," *Government Press Releases (USA)*, July 12, 2006, Access World News.

⁸⁰ Government Press Releases (USA), "CENTRIXS Enhances Communication Between Indonesian, U.S. Navies," *Government Press Releases (USA)*, July 19, 2006, Access World News.

⁸¹ Jill L. Boardman and Donald W. Shuey, "Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS): Supporting Coalition Warfare World-Wide" (Florida, United States: Defense Technical Information Center, April 2004), 10.

use of CENTRIXS throughout the exercise not only introduced the TNI AL to the technology but also to the communication procedure of the U.S. Navy.

Overall, the restart of CARAT Indonesia had successfully enhanced both navies' engagement. Both navies resumed the joint naval exercise and set a high standard of interaction, which is significant to increase the relationship and interoperability of both navies, as well as TNI AL naval capabilities. The gunnery, landing operation exercise, and employment of CENTRIXS were the essential factors in improving interoperability that marked the first two years after the reestablishment of CARAT Indonesia.

2. CARAT Indonesia 2007–2010: The Phase of Decline

From 2007 to 2010, the name of the exercise was changed from CARAT to Naval Engagement Activity (NEA). Neither side issued an official statement to explain why the name was changed, but the name change seems to reflect a reduction in size and complexity of the exercise. Also, within this timeline, very little information regarding the exercise was published, in contrast to previous years (2005–2006) when nearly all news outlets in both nations covered the CARAT Indonesia exercise. Furthermore, within this timeline no source mentioned the participating warship units from TNI AL.

Mainly marine exercises; symposiums; and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) exercises were held in Jakarta for NEA 2007.⁸² In 2008, the exercise took place in Surabaya and was almost the same as the previous year: marine exercise, symposiums, ENCAP, and public affairs activities were the main events.⁸³ In 2009, the activities took place in Bekasi for the marine exercises and ENCAP. The harbor phase took place in Jakarta, and the sea phase in the Java Sea. Both navies conducted anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and anti-

⁸² States News Service, "NEA KICKS OFF IN INDONESIA," August 9, 2007, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4PD0-12H0-TX4V-24D4-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁸³ Milcom Monitoring Post, "U.S., Indonesian Navies Begin Naval Engagement Activity," *Milcom Monitoring Post* (blog), July 24, 2008, <http://mt-milcom.blogspot.com/2008/07/us-indonesian-navies-begin-naval.html>.

submarine warfare (ASW) exercises during the sea phase.⁸⁴ In 2010, however, the exercise started to be normalized. The exercise took place in the vicinity of Eastern Fleet Command, while both navies and marines carried out an amphibious landing operation exercise in Karang Tekok, East Java.

Overall, even though the 2007–2010 NEA might have fostered a better relationship between both navies, but these exercises did not reflect the purpose of CARAT to promote naval interoperability, since most of the activities were marine exercises and civil action programs. There was no gunnex, ASW, ASuW, or anti-air warfare (AAW) exercises during this period. The only amphibious landing exercise was held in 2010. Consequently, the sea phase exercises were so insignificant that they had no real impact on the improvement of interoperability.

3. CARAT Indonesia 2011–2016: The Phase of Improvement

Starting in 2011, both navies agreed to resume using the term “CARAT” for the designation of the exercise. After changing the name back to CARAT, the exercise had several significant improvements. Furthermore, from 2011 until 2016, CARAT Indonesia gradually became more complex and bigger, although the 2014 exercise was an exception.

Compared to the previous year, plans for CARAT Indonesia 2011 indicated significant expansion of the exercise. During the planning phase, both delegations agreed to carry out an amphibious landing operation in the province of Lampung. This operation was canceled, however, without official statements from both parties explaining the cancellation’s cause. Furthermore, the gunnex and cross-deck helicopter landing exercise were also cancelled due to several technical problems on the TNI AL side.⁸⁵ Notwithstanding the cancellation of several exercise activities, both navies executed a maritime interdiction operation exercise (MIOEX). MIOEX was important in improving

⁸⁴ Commander Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Lily Daniels, “Second Phase of CARAT Indonesia Underway,” *U.S. Department of Defense Information / FIND* (Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, LLC, August 24, 2009), 190382665, ProQuest Central.

⁸⁵ Rhsukarsa, “Latihan Komando Gabungan TNI AL-US Navy Kurang Maksimal,” *Berita Hankam* (blog), accessed July 11, 2022, <http://beritahankam.blogspot.com/2011/05/latihan-komando-gabungan-tni-al-us-navy.html>.

interoperability to combat piracy, which was a concern for both countries at the time due to the increasing frequency of pirate attacks in Indonesian waters, particularly in the Malacca Strait. This exercise involved two Indonesian warships, KRI Diponegoro (Sigma Class) and KRI Imam Bonjol (Parchim Class). Despite the cancellation of several important parts of the exercise in 2011, the U.S. Navy Commander of the 7th Fleet stated that both navies had agreed to “grow CARAT in scope and depth in the future, while looking for new opportunities outside of CARAT to work together.”⁸⁶

The 2012 CARAT showed several improvements in the size and complexity due to the successful execution of several exercise serials. Within the four days of the sea phase, both navies conducted several serials such as the gunnery and different types of ASW exercises, which are significant for the improvement of naval interoperability. During the ASW Exercise, TNI AL personnel could train in underwater detection by using the Expendable Mobile Anti-Submarine Training Target (EMATT). At that time, TNI AL did not have ASW training instruments such as EMATT. Furthermore, within the ASW air serial, TNI AL officers onboard the ship were also allowed to control U.S. Navy P-3C Orion to carry out ASW operations, which was a special opportunity, because TNI AL had not yet operated any aircraft for ASW missions. TNI AL aviation personnel also had opportunities to be onboard the P-3C during the exercise. This activity enhanced the familiarization and knowledge about ASW missions from the aviation point of view. Apart from the ASW exercise, both navies also successfully conducted a landing operation exercise in Banongan, East Java.⁸⁷

CARAT Indonesia 2013 did not demonstrate any significant progress compared to the 2012 exercise; it mostly repeated the previous year’s exercise serials.⁸⁸ In 2013, both navies also conducted an ASW exercise using the EMATT, and the execution of the

⁸⁶ States News Service, “7TH Fleet Expands Partnership with Indonesian Navy,” June 17, 2011, [https://advance-lexis-com.libproxy.nps.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5341-2WC1-DYTH-G2FC-00000-00&context=1516831](https://advance.lexis-com.libproxy.nps.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5341-2WC1-DYTH-G2FC-00000-00&context=1516831).

⁸⁷ Solomon, “CARAT Indonesia 2012.,” accessed July 11, 2022, <https://www.snafu-solomon.com/2012/06/carat-indonesia-2012.html>.

⁸⁸ “USS Tortuga Arrives in Indonesia for CARAT Exercise,” U.S. Pacific Fleet, accessed July 11, 2022, <https://www.cpf.navy.mil/News/Article/2751359/uss-tortuga-arrives-in-indonesia-for-carat-exercise/>.

exercise was similar to the previous year. During the planning phase, both navies agreed to carry out an anti-air missile firing from the TNI AL ship, while the U.S. Navy provided the aerial target. During the 2013 CARAT, the author was the gunnery officer assistant onboard KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda. The entire ship was eager and ready for the anti-air missile firing exercise, as it was the first time for TNI AL ships to fire this type of missile. The U.S. Navy prepared BQM-74—an aerial target drone—for the anti-air missile firing target. Due to bad weather, however, the target fell down shortly after the launch. After two tries and both drones being unable to fly properly, the missile firing serial was cancelled. Furthermore, the gunnery was using a High-Speed Maneuver Surface Target (HSMST), which required greater agility and reliability of the gun operator. This was the first and the last time CARAT Indonesia used the BQM-74 and HSMST as the target since the other exercises had used Killer Tomato, a static floating target. Consequently, it was a rare opportunity for TNI AL to be provided with several firing targets, because in 2013, TNI AL did not possess those kinds of targets.

The 2014 CARAT was an exception to the overall trend of increasing the exercise's size and complexity. This year's exercise was only a diving operation and a simple passing exercise.⁸⁹ In early June 2014, both navies' divers conducted diving exercise on the wreck of the USS Houston in the Java Sea.⁹⁰ At the end of the month, USS Pinckney and KRI Slamet Riyadi carried out a passing exercise in the North Natuna Sea. The exercise took place while both vessels steamed in the southernmost portion of the SCS. According to an official at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, the president of Indonesia had requested the U.S.-Indonesia joint naval exercise be conducted as a passing exercise in the North Natuna Sea. The relatively few exercise serials and participating units indicates that CARAT Indonesia 2014 was an exception to the trends of improvement.

After a quiet and simple exercise in 2014, the 2015 CARAT Indonesia exercise showed significant improvement. The 2015 exercise was the first time that the U.S. Navy

⁸⁹ "U.S., Indonesian Navies Conduct CARAT Passing Exercise," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, accessed July 11, 2022, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/564291/us-indonesian-navies-conduct-carat-passing-exercise/>.

⁹⁰ *CARAT 2014 in Indonesia*, Video, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEuRljKkK8c>.

Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class participated in the exercise. Additionally, this was the first and only occasion that a TNI AL submarine participated in the exercise. This year's exercise was a complete set of exercises in terms of enhancing naval interoperability. There was a gunnex, ASW exercise, ASuW exercise, and amphibious landing exercise.⁹¹ This year's exercise also aimed to prepare TNI AL personnel who were going to participate in the 2016 RIMPAC exercise that would take place in Hawaii in August 2016. Furthermore, the 2015 CARAT Indonesia was the biggest exercise in terms of participating units. The U.S. Navy sent four ships while the TNI AL sent five ships including a submarine. Moreover, it was also the first-time deployment of the TNI AL's newly a Multi-Role Light Frigate (MRLF) to participate in the CARAT exercise.

In CARAT Indonesia 2016, in response to TNI AL submarine involvement in the previous year, the U.S. Navy deployed a Los Angeles Class submarine to participate in the ASW exercise. Furthermore, from the aviation side, the modern maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operated by the U.S. Navy, the P-8 Poseidon, and the newly commissioned TNI AL MPA CN-235 also participated kinetically, carrying out surveillance, ASW operations, and range clearance during the gunnex. This year's exercise also included a Special Forces Flash Iron Exercise between U.S. and Indonesian naval special forces (USN SEALs and TNI AL Kopaska). Furthermore, the harbor phase consisted of ENCAP and MEDCAP, several symposiums, a diving and salvage exercise, and public affairs activity. Various significant exercises such as amphibious landing, combined anti-submarine exercise, and gunnex were carried out during four-day sea phase in the Java Sea.⁹²

Overall, from 2011 until 2016, the size and complexity of CARAT Indonesia developed gradually. The deployment of various naval forces such as the TNI AL's and U.S. Navy's newly commissioned warship and submarines, as well as the P-8 Poseidon and CN-235, proved that the exercise was growing in size. Furthermore, the use of

⁹¹ Prashanth Parameswaran, "US, Indonesia Kick Off Naval Exercise to Boost Maritime Cooperation," accessed July 12, 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/us-indonesia-kick-off-naval-exercise-to-boost-maritime-cooperation/>.

⁹² Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, "U.S. and Indonesian Navies Enhance Maritime Partnerships, Advance Training Objectives Duri," Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, accessed July 12, 2022, <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/886285/us-and-indonesian-navies-enhance-maritime-partnerships-advance-training-objecti>.

equipment such as EMATT, BQM-74, and HSMST, as well as the execution of various new serials such as ASW and AAW exercises, demonstrated that the exercise became more complex.

4. CARAT Indonesia 2017–2021: The Stagnation Stage

Following several years of CARAT Indonesia improvement, the exercise experienced insignificant development from 2017 to 2021. Lack of U.S. Navy combatant warship deployment in the 2017 and 2018 exercises and the duplicating of previous years' activities illustrated CARAT Indonesia's stagnation in this period.

The 2017 exercise was a step back compared to the previous years' exercises (2011–2016). Having executed numerous important serials such as ASW and amphibious landing exercises in the preceding three years, the 2017 exercise was comparatively quiet. Submarines were not involved, and the U.S. Navy only sent one of its Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transport Ships—no combatant units such as destroyer, frigate, or LCS participated. The most significant exercise that enhanced interoperability was a sea surveillance exercise and an over-the-horizon target (OTHT) VBSS. Within both serials, there was the combination of MPA surveillance with the surface ship and special forces to carry out a maritime operation, which is significant in improving anti-piracy capability.⁹³ Despite challenging issues under the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, CARAT remained a symbol of the naval cooperation between both nations.

The 2018 CARAT Indonesia exercise did not show significant improvement compared to the 2017 exercise. While there was an amphibious landing exercise, the U.S. Navy did not involve any combatant ships again. Even though U.S. Navy Commander of Destroyer Squadron 7 said that “This year's CARAT demonstrates a continued commitment by both navies to increase the complexity and sophistication of

⁹³ U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Indonesia, “U.S. and Indonesian Navies Embrace Long-Standing Partnership during CARAT,” U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, September 7, 2017, <https://id.usembassy.gov/u-s-indonesian-navies-embrace-long-standing-partnership-advance-training-objectives-carat/>.

exercises...,”⁹⁴ the reality on the sea was completely different. There were no significant changes of complexity and serials in the 2018 exercise compared to the previous year.

In 2019, CARAT Indonesia was only a symbolic routine exercise that “copy-pasted” the prior year’s activity. The only difference was that the U.S. Navy included a combatant ship in this year’s exercise, USS Montgomery, an Independence Class LCS.⁹⁵ The only significant exercise in 2019 CARAT Indonesia was the gunnery, but it did not use a moving target. Moreover, there was neither a landing operation, ASW, or AAW exercise.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, most of the 2020 joint military exercises were cancelled, including the 2020 CARAT Indonesia. After the Covid-19 pandemic started to subside, both navies agreed to carry out the CARAT 2021 exercise. Held in Surabaya, in a pandemic situation, there were no significant improvements compared to the 2019 exercise. Furthermore, the MH-60S Seahawk onboard USS Jackson had technical difficulties, so it was incapable of conducting the deck landing operation and photo exercise. The technical readiness of participating units has a significant impact on the exercise’s execution. In 2021, however, both navies used Seavision as the monitoring and communication software to replace CENTRIXS. Both navies agreed to use Seavision in the exercise because it is more user-friendly, but replacing CENTRIXS with Seavision was a step back because it is less secure than CENTRIXS.

Overall, due to the lack of improvement and frequent resemblance of the exercises that were held from 2017 to 2021, this period marks the stagnation of the CARAT Indonesia exercise. From 2017 until the latest exercise in 2021, there were no significant changes in size or complexity of the exercise, especially in enhancing interoperability. Furthermore, the absence of U.S. Navy combatant ships in the 2017 and 2018 exercises led to a lack of complex exercise serials that could be carried out.

⁹⁴ Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, “Rushmore Arrives in Jakarta, Kicks-Off 24th CARAT Indonesia Exercise,” Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, accessed July 12, 2022, <https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1598431/rushmore-arrives-in-jakarta-kicks-off-24th-carat-indonesia-exercise/>.

⁹⁵ Navy Recognition, “US, Indonesia Begin CARAT 2019 Cooperation Afloat Readiness And Training Exercise,” Navy Recognition, accessed July 12, 2022, <http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2019/august/7349-us-indonesia-begin-carat-2019-cooperation-afloat-readiness-and-training-exercise.html>.

5. Summary of CARAT Indonesia Trends from 2005 to 2021

The revival of CARAT Indonesia in 2005 has represented increased naval cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the TNI AL. In the 2005 and 2006 exercises, both navies presented a high standard of naval exercise in size and complexity, not only improving naval interoperability but also developing TNI AL capabilities. The name change from CARAT to NEA in 2007–2010 reflected a reduction in size and complexity of the exercise. Despite its importance in fostering better relationships, a lack of complex exercises in this period hindered interoperability development. From 2011 until 2016, however, CARAT Indonesia showed gradual improvement in size and complexity. The deployment of various naval forces and various training equipment as well as the execution of new exercise serials marked the improvement of CARAT Indonesia from 2011 to 2016. Furthermore, from 2017 to 2021 CARAT Indonesia stagnated because it kept repeating the previous year's exercise activities with lack of improvements. Consequently, the next chapter concludes the factors that affected these trends of CARAT Indonesia from 2005 until 2021.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Prior to 2005, the U.S. and Indonesia were at a significantly low level of defense cooperation. The low degree of defense cooperation before 2005 was mainly caused by the allegations of human rights violations by the Indonesian army, which resulted in the embargo of U.S. weapons to Indonesia and in turn created a bad perception of Americans among the Indonesian public as well as the military. Furthermore, Indonesia's unstable political and economic conditions resulted in the decrease of TNI capabilities and lack of U.S. interest to cooperate with Indonesia. Starting in 2006, however, defense cooperation between the countries has grown substantially. The main drivers of the increased cooperation were the more stable Indonesian political condition and vast economic growth, the shift of U.S. interests to the Asia Pacific due to the growing threat of China, and the increasing capabilities of TNI.

The recommencement of the CARAT exercise in 2005 marked the re-engagement of naval cooperation of the U.S. Navy and the TNI AL. Although CARAT has succeeded in fostering both countries' defense relations, it has been not enough to continuously improve interoperability of both navies. By comparing the size, complexity, duration, and location of the exercises, this thesis finds that CARAT improved in 2005–2006, declined in 2007–2010, experienced significant improvement in 2011–2016, yet stagnated in 2017–2021. The next section discusses factors that led to the changes of trends in CARAT Indonesia from 2005 until 2021.

A. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE TRENDS OF CARAT INDONESIA FROM 2005 TO 2021

This section identifies the main factors that affected the trends of CARAT Indonesia from 2005 to 2021. Chapter I proposed two hypotheses to explain these trends. The first hypothesis suggested that the size and complexity of the CARAT exercise would increase when the U.S. and Indonesia prioritized similar interests. The evidence presented in previous chapters supports this hypothesis. The evidence revealed that shared interests such as the rehabilitation of their relationship, the signing of a “comprehensive

partnership,” and rising concern about China’s arbitrary actions in the SCS led to reestablishment of CARAT in 2005 and an increase in the size and complexity of CARAT Indonesia between 2011 and 2015.

On the other hand, the second hypothesis suggested that the size and complexity of CARAT would not increase when the United States and Indonesia have limited equipment readiness and naval capabilities. The evidence presented in the previous chapters provides some support for this hypothesis. In particular, the limited capability and readiness of the TNI AL before 2010 impeded the improvement of CARAT Indonesia. Furthermore, the aging fleet of TNI AL and budget constraint of both navies also impeded further development of the exercise. During 2007–2010, TNI AL’s limited naval capabilities and readiness strongly affected the decline of the exercise. Moreover, in 2017–2018, the absence of a U.S. Navy combatant ship resulted in the stagnation of the exercise. The next two sections explore these findings in more details.

1. Shared Interests Increased the Size and Complexity of the Exercise

In 2005, the U.S. started to reestablish its defense cooperation with Indonesia. After 9/11, Washington placed a higher priority on ensuring that Indonesia could be a successful partner in the GWOT campaign than on addressing human rights violations.⁹⁶ Furthermore, improving U.S.-Indonesia relations were enabled by the U.S. government and American citizens who led and funded massive humanitarian assistance operations in response to the tsunami that struck Aceh in 2004. In the aftermath of the tsunami, U.S. and Indonesian military personnel worked together for the first time since 1992.⁹⁷ After the tsunami, the U.S. restarted educating TNI personnel, resumed interaction with the Indonesian military leaders, and established foundations for collaboration in disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism, and maritime security.⁹⁸ Moreover, in 2005, the two navies

⁹⁶ Abraham M. Denmark, Rizal Sukma, and Christine Pathermore, “Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Era of U.S.-Indonesia Relations,” June 2010, 15.

⁹⁷ John B Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, “Toward a Stronger U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship” (United States–Indonesia Society, August 2005), 2.

⁹⁸ John B Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, “The US-Indonesia Security Relationship - Next Steps” (United States–Indonesia Society, January 2009), 6.

decided to resume the CARAT exercises that had been postponed in 2003 and 2004 due to TNI AL request. Consequently, the shared interest of both countries, which was prioritizing rebuilt defense cooperation, resulted in the restart of CARAT.

Next, the shared interest of both countries was marked with the signing of a “comprehensive partnership” agreement by both countries’ presidents in 2010. Political stability and economic growth under President Yudhoyono’s administration led to Indonesia’s growing role as a reliable partner of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” policy enhanced both countries’ relationship. Consequently, both presidents signed the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement in November 2010. This agreement emphasized cooperation in education, trade, and the environment, but its security aspect was considered its “progenitor and model.”⁹⁹ The size and complexity of CARAT Indonesia grew gradually after the signing of the agreement. Various exercise serials that had never been executed before and the use of various equipment to support the exercise are evidence of the development of the exercise.

Chinese arbitrary claims in the SCS have raised the concern of both the U.S. and Indonesia. Notwithstanding the fact that Indonesia is not a claimant state, the SCS conflict poses a threat to Indonesia’s EEZ rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.¹⁰⁰ The U.S., on the other hand, perceives China as a threat to the freedom of navigation and U.S. hegemony within the region. Even though the U.S. and Indonesia have different approaches to this conflict, both countries have a shared interest in preserving regional security, stability, and prosperity. Furthermore, the evidence that both countries had shared interest was presented in the signing of a Strategic Partnership in 2015. Despite TNI AL officials’ denial of a connection between the CARAT exercise and the SCS conflict, the 2015 and 2016 CARAT exercises are considered as the biggest—in terms of size and complexity—and had the most significant impact on the interoperability of both

⁹⁹ Haseman and Lachica, “The U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership: The Security Component.”

¹⁰⁰ Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki, “Explaining Indonesia’s Under-Balancing: The Case of the Modernisation of the Air Force and the Navy,” *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 8, no. 3 (December 2021): 391–412, <https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970211039645>.

navies. The exercise included the deployment of naval forces that have never participated before, such as submarines and MPA such as the P-8 Poseidon and CN-235.

2. Limited Capabilities and Readiness Decreased the Size and Complexity of the Exercise

The political reform in 1998 also led to the military reform in Indonesia. The end of the military's dual-function doctrine, which had allowed officers to play economic and political roles, significantly undermined the navy's dominance in maritime security arena. The army domination of the TNI leadership also curtailed the navy aspiration to grow. Furthermore, a major economic crisis in the early 2000s had limited the defense budget, which in turn impeded not only several modernization projects and organizational reorganization but also basic fleet maintenance.¹⁰¹ TNI AL was compelled to reduce its defense activity, transforming its patrol into a "waiting system" in which naval operations were undertaken mainly "on demand."¹⁰² The limited readiness of TNI AL warships until the late 2000s impeded the development of the early stage of CARAT Indonesia until 2010.

The procurement of various naval forces significantly improved TNI AL readiness and capabilities, which in turn resulted in the growth of the exercise after 2010. In the early 2000s, the TNI AL announced the procurement of four SIGMA corvettes from Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding in the Netherlands. The first these corvettes, KRI Diponegoro, was delivered in July 2007; KRI Sultan Hasanuddin was delivered in January 2008; KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda was delivered in December 2008; and the last ship KRI Frans Kaisiepo was delivered in March 2009. These new ships were acquired by TNI AL to strengthen its eastern fleet, which is based in Surabaya. The first SIGMA class participation in CARAT Indonesia was in the 2011 exercise, when KRI Diponegoro deployed for the exercise. From 2011 until 2019 (except for 2014), at least one SIGMA class ship was deployed for each CARAT exercise. Furthermore, the procurement of three ex-Brunei MRLF warships in 2013 also enhanced TNI AL capabilities. The MRLF participated in the 2015 and 2016 exercises. Moreover, the collaboration of Damen Shipbuilding with

¹⁰¹ Jun Honna, "Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi," October 2008, 70.

¹⁰² Honna, 71.

Indonesia's national shipbuilder PT. PAL resulted in the production of two units of Guided Missile Escort (*Perusak Kawal Rudal*/PKR), the Martadinata class, which is based on the Dutch Sigma 10514 design. The PKR, the latest and most modern warship in the TNI AL, started to participate in CARAT Indonesia in the 2021 exercise. Additionally, in 2009 TNI AL ordered the CN-235, which is made by the state-owned PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PT DI),¹⁰³ to replace its aging MPA. From 2015, the CN-235 participated in the CARAT exercise. Consequently, beginning in the late 2000s when the TNI AL acquired numerous new naval forces equipped with cutting-edge technology, TNI AL's capabilities increased, and this contributed to the development of the CARAT exercise.

Not only the TNI AL, but the U.S. Navy also experienced limited readiness of warships to participate in CARAT Indonesia. From the U.S. side, the absence of a U.S. Navy combatant ship in the 2017 and 2018 exercise resulted in the stagnation of the exercise. From 2005 until 2016, the U.S. Navy always sent at least one of its combatant ships such as a destroyer, frigate, or LCS.

B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings in this thesis are important for both navies to recognize that CARAT—the largest and most frequent naval exercise between Indonesia and the U.S.—has not completely accomplished its goal. CARAT has strengthened the relationship between both navies, but in terms of enhancing interoperability, it has fallen short. Furthermore, naval exercises (CARAT) also lag significantly behind the two countries' annual army exercise (Garuda Shield) in terms of size, complexity, and duration. These findings should encourage both navies to improve the CARAT exercise.

Unless the two navies are able to enhance their interoperability, it will be difficult for them to counter China's enormous naval force expansion in the SCS. To balance China's hegemony within the region, it is important for the U.S. to enhance interoperability with the regional armed forces, particularly the navies. Despite Indonesia's status as a non-claimant state in the SCS, Indonesia's strategic geographic location and its strong influence

¹⁰³ Evan A Laksmana, "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force," in *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (London: Routledge, 2014), 178.

in ASEAN make it a vital partner for the U.S. in balancing against China in the SCS conflicts. Even though Indonesia's "free and active" foreign policy stance may impede future naval joint operations, it is not impossible for such operations to occur if the dispute in the SCS continues to escalate and threatens Indonesia's sovereignty. Furthermore, the increase in interoperability is coinciding with the enhancement of TNI AL capabilities. Increasing naval interoperability and TNI AL capabilities is important to prepare for future possibilities. It will be possible to conduct effective naval operations in the future if the U.S. Navy and TNI AL possess a high level of interoperability.

This thesis also offers several recommendations to further enhance the development of CARAT exercise in the future. First, the U.S. Navy should continue its support for developing TNI AL capabilities by providing high-end training equipment such as EMATT, BQM-74, and HSMST. Currently, due to its budget limitation, TNI AL is focusing its funding on acquiring new naval forces but lacks modern training equipment, which is essential in enhancing naval capabilities. On the other hand, the U.S. Navy has the resources to provide such training equipment, thereby improving TNI AL naval capabilities and enhancing interoperability with the U.S. Navy.

Second, increasing the number of participating units in the exercise would lead to the improvement of CARAT. More participating units—especially the combatant units—would enable the two navies to conduct more complex exercises. For example, the deployment of submarines within the exercise would enhance its complexity by focusing on the challenge of undersea warfare. It is even more important, however, that the U.S. send surface warfare vessels to the exercise every year, so that the two navies avoid the stagnation that occurred in 2017 and 2018 and encourage continual development of interoperability between their surface fleets.

Third, CARAT can be utilized to support the shared interests of the two countries. When Indonesia was facing a piracy problem, the U.S. Navy helped TNI AL to enhance its capabilities for combatting piracy through the CARAT exercise. The same is possible when Indonesia is facing Chinese claims over its EEZ. The U.S. must understand that Indonesia's "free and active" policy is not a barrier to a bigger exercise; conversely, it is a boost for larger scale of exercise because Indonesia is free to engage with any partners and

is active in ensuring its own security based on its interest without foreign intervention. The Super Garuda Shield exercise in 2022 can be a turning point for CARAT.¹⁰⁴ Since it has evolved from a bilateral army exercise to a multilateral army exercise, it is possible for CARAT to do the same. In fact, since CARAT has been conducted for decades with countries in the region, now is the time for the U.S. and Indonesia to promote the concept of a multilateral CARAT exercise to enhance regional navies' capabilities and interoperability.

Finally, ensuring national leaders' cooperative behavior is also important in enhancing defense and naval cooperation. President Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy boosted both countries relationship, but President Trump's policy to retreat from the TPP agreement created doubt about U.S. motives in the region. Despite President Biden's "Indo-Pacific strategy" announced last year, there were no direct approaches to Indonesia regarding this strategy. The Indonesian public and leaders need a "symbol" to ensure U.S. support to Indonesia. In order to ensure Indonesian support to the U.S., it is important to "renew" the agreement. That is why whenever there is an administration change—since the U.S. possesses more resources—the U.S. must be willing to approach the Indonesian public and leaders to renew and, if possible, enhance the partnership.

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Indonesia, "Super Garuda Shield 2022 Showcases Multinational Partnership and Joint Interoperability," U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, August 3, 2022, <https://id.usembassy.gov/super-garuda-shield-2022-showcases-multinational-partnership-and-joint-interoperability/>.

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APPENDIX. CARAT OVERVIEW 2005–2021

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
2021	August 1–11, 2021	Surabaya, Java Sea	USNS Millinocket	Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transport	KRI Raden Edi Martadinata	REM Class	Air Defense Exercise (ADEX) Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX)
			USS Jackson	Independence Class LCS	KRI Diponegoro	Sigma Class	Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise (MIOEX)
			MH-60S Seahawk	ASW Helicopter	KRI Ajak	FAC Torpedo	Anti-Asymmetric Warfare Exercise (AASYWEX)
			P-8 Poseidon	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	CN-235	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) Screen Exercise (SCREENEX)
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		Flashing Exercise (FLASHEX)
							Symposiums (Medical, EOD/Minex, Landing Ops, MDA, Legal, Aviation)
							EOD Exercise Divex/Salvex
2020	POSTPONED DUE TO COVID PANDEMIC (Latest activity was the IPC conducted in Jakarta, on March 31, 2020)						
2019	July 29–August 9, 2019	Surabaya, Java Sea, Karang Tekok (Marines), Gresik (ENCAP)	USNS Fall River	Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transport	KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda	Sigma Class	Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS)
			USS Montgomery	Independence Class Littoral Combat Ship	KRI Nala	Fatahillah Class	Division Tactics (DIVTACS) Photo Exercise (PHOTEX)
			USCGC Stratton	Legend Class CG Cutter	KRI Sampari	FACM 60m	Air Defense Exercise (ADEX) Flashing Exercise (FLASHEX)
			P-8 Poseidon	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	CN-235	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	Publication Exercise (PUBEX) Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX)
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Forces		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		Replenishment at Sea Approach (RASAP)
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC)
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX)
							Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise (MIOEX)
							Marine Live Fire Training

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
							Symposium (Legal, MDA, Medical, Aviation, CENTRIXS) ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
2018	August 1–18, 2018	Jakarta, Java Sea, Bali Strait (LandOps)	USS Rushmore	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock	KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda	Sigma Class	Diving Exercise/Salvage Exercise (DIVEX/SALVEX) USS Houston site Java Sea
			P-8 Poseidon	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	KRI Banda Aceh	Landing Platform Dock	Cross-Deck Helo Landing Exercise Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX)
					BO-105	Surveillance Helicopter	Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC)
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Forces		Batalion Infantri Marinir Jakarta		Screen Exercise (SCREENEX)
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		Sea Surveillance Exercise (SEA SURVEX)
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX)
							Photo Exercise (PHOTEX)
							Replenishment at Sea (RASEX)
							Flashing Exercise (FLASHEX)
							Amphibious Landing Operation Exercise
							SOF Exercise (Boarding, VBSS, Force Protection)
							Symposium (Legal, MDA, Medical, Women Leadership, Aviation, CENTRIXS) ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
2017	September 1–13, 2017	Surabaya, Java Sea, Situbondo (Marines), Pasir Putih (Divex)	USNS Fall River	Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transport	KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda	Sigma Class	Symposium (Medical, MDA, Logistics, Aviation, Legal)
					KRI Surabaya	Landing Platform Dock	MIOEX, ISR, VBSS, Sensitive Site Exploitation, Combat Craft Medium (Kopaska-USN Seal)
			P-3C Orion	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	CN-235	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	Diving Exercise/Salvage Training (DIVEX/SALVEX) USS Houston site Java Sea
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Forces		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		VBSS (Ships)
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
							Cross-Deck Helo Landing Exercise Flashing Exercise (FLASHEX) Publication Exercise (PUBEX) Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) Sea Surveillance Exercise (SEA SURVEX) OTHT VBSS (combined MPA, Helo, SOF) Replenishment at Sea Approach (RASAP) Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP)
2016	July 18–August 9, 2016	Surabaya, Java Sea, Sidoarjo (ENCAP), Pasir Putih (Divex)	USS Spruance	Arleigh Burke Class DDG	KRI Usman Harun	Multi-Role Light Frigate	Flash Iron Ex (Special Forces Exercise, Navy Seals and Kopaska), EOD Training and Force Protection Symposium (Medical, MDA, Logistics, Aviation) Shipriders Sea Surveillance Exercise (SEA SURVEX) VBSS Exercise Amphibious Landing Operation Exercise Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise Cross-Deck Helo Landing Exercise Flashing Exercise (FLASHEX) Publication Exercise (PUBEX) Combined Anti-Submarine Exercise (CASEX) Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise (MIOEX) Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
			USS Buffalo	Los Angeles Class Submarine	KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda	Sigma Class	
			USNS Millinocket	Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transport	KRI Surabaya	Landing Platform Dock	
			USNS Montford Point	Expeditionary Transfer Dock			
			P-8A Poseidon	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	CN-235	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	
					Bell-412 and BO-105	Surveillance Helicopter	
			U.S. Navy Seal		Kopaska, Penyelam		
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Forces		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		
2015	July 28–August 11, 2015	Surabaya, Java Sea, Karang Tekok	USS Preble	Arleigh Burke Class DDG	KRI John Lie	Multi-Role Light Frigate	Symposium (Legal, Medical, MDA, Logistics, Aviation, ASW)

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
		(Marines), Banongan (LandOps)	USS Fort Worth	Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship	KRI Diponegoro	Sigma Class	Special Forces Exercise, Navy Seals and Kopaska Exercise Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise VBSS Exercise Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) Cross-Deck Helo Landing Exercise Amphibious Landing Operation Exercise Sea Surveillance Exercise (SEA SURVEX) Divex/Salvex ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
			USS Germantown	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock	KRI Sultan Hasanuddin	Sigma Class	
			USNS Safeguard	Rescue and Salvage Unit	KRI Makassar	Landing Platform Dock	
						Submarine	
			P-3C Orion	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	CN-235	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	
					Bell-412 and BO-105	Surveillance Helicopter	
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion Five		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		
		U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam			
2014	June 23–24, 2014	North Natuna Sea	USS Pickney	Arleigh Burke Class DDG	KRI Slamet Riyadi	Van Speijk Class	Passing Exercise Damage Control Exercise Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) Flashing Exercise (FLASHEx) Publication Exercise (PUBEX) Photo Exercise (PHOTEx)
2013	May 16–26, 2013	Jakarta, Tanjung Pasir, Banten (Divex/Salvex and ENCAP), Antralina Banten (Marines)	USS Momsen	Arleigh Burke Class DDG	KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda	Sigma Class	Symposium (Submarine, Medical, Legal, Mutual Operation, CENTRIXS/FIST) Divex/Salvex Marines Exercise VBSS Exercise ASW Exercise (EMATT) Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) Cross-Deck Helo Landing Exercise Photo Exercise (PHOTEx) ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
			USS Tortuga	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock	KRI Oswald Siahaan	Van Speijk Class	
			USNS Safeguard	Rescue and Salvage Unit			
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Jakarta		

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
							Anti-Air Missile Warfare Missile Live Fire Training Exercise (FAILED, because of bad weather, strong wind, and heavy rain, the target fell into water shortly after launch)
2012	May 27–June 7, 2012	Surabaya, Java Sea (Sea Phase), Banongan (Marines), Kwanyar Madura (ENCAP)	USS Vandegrift	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate	KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda	Sigma Class	Symposium (Aviation, Submarine, Medical, Legal, VBSS, CENTRIXS/FIST, Engineering) Divex/Salvex VBSS Exercise Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) ASW Exercise (ASW Procedure) Flashing Exercise (FLASHEX) Publication Exercise (PUBEX) Amphibious Landing Operation Exercise Cross-Deck Helo Landing Exercise Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) ASW Exercise (EMATT) Damage Control Exercise (DCEX) ASW Exercise (Air EMATT) Photo Exercise (PHOTEX) ASUW Exercise ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
			USS Germantown	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock	KRI Banda Aceh	Landing Platform Dock	
			USCGC Warsche	Legend Class Cutter			
			P-3C Orion	Maritime Patrol Aircraft			
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		
			USN Riverine Squadron One		Kopaska and Penyelam		
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		
2011	April 25–June 1, 2011	Jakarta, Java Sea, Bogor (ENCAP), Antralina Banten (Marines)	USS Howard	Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer	KRI Diponegoro	Sigma Class	Symposium (Aviation, Medical, ASW, ASuW, Amphibious Warfare, Mine Countermeasure) Divex/Salvex VBSS Exercise Gunnery Exercise (GUNNEX) Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise (MIOEX) Screen Exercise (SCREENEX)
			USS Reuben James	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate	KRI Imam Bonjol	Parchim Class	
			USS Tortuga	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock			
			P-3C Orion	Maritime Patrol Aircraft			

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Jakarta		Amphibious Landing Operation Exercise (CANCELLED) Marines Exercise (Marksmanship, Jungle Survival, Urban Warfare, Combat Lifesaving) ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
			U.S. Marines 3 rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Jakarta		
2010	May 26–June 1, 2010	Surabaya, Java Sea, Lamongan (ENCAP), Situbondo (marines)	USS Vandegrift	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate			Symposium (Aviation, Medical, Amphibious Warfare, CENTRIX) Divex/Salvex Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise (MIOEX) Amphibious Landing Operation Exercise Marines Exercise (Marksmanship, Jungle Survival, Urban Warfare) ENCAP and MEDCAP (Engineering and Medical Civil Action Program)
			USS Tortuga	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock			
			USNS Salvor	Rescue and Salvage Unit			
			USCGC Mellon	Hamilton Class CG Cutter			
			P-3C Orion				
			U.S. Marines 3 rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		
2009	July 20–July 24, 2009 (1st Phase)	Bekasi (ENCAP), Antralina Banten (Marines)	U.S. Marines 3 rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		ENCAP and MEDCAP (Engineering and Medical Civil Action Program) Marines Exercise (Force Protection, Jungle Warfare) ASuW Exercise ASW Exercise Symposium (Aviation, Legal, Military Operation)
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		
	August 24–27, 2009 (2nd Phase-Sea Phase)	Jakarta, Java Sea	USS Russel	Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer			
			USS Crommelin	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate			
			USS Harpers Ferry	Dock Landing Ship			
2008	July 21–25, 2008	Surabaya, Java Sea, Situbondo (Marines), Tuban (ENCAP)	USS Tortuga	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock			Symposium (Medical, Aviation, Military Observer, Aviation, CENTRIXS) Divex/Salvex Coast Guard Training
			USS Ford	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate			

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
			USS Jarret	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate			Marines Exercise ENCAP (Engineering Civil Action Program)
			USNS Safeguard	Rescue and Salvage Unit			
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		
2007	August 6–10, 2007	Jakarta	USS Harpers Ferry	Dock Landing Ship			Symposium (Amphibious Raid, Riverine Ops, Law of Armed Conflict, RoE, HADR, CENTRIXS) Marines Exercise (Marksmanship, Air-Ground Task Force, Expeditionary Unit Ops, Medical Combat) Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise (MIOEX) VBSS
			USS Ford	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate			
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Jakarta		
2006	July 11–19, 2006	Surabaya, Java Sea	USS Tortuga	Whidbey Island Class Landing Ship Dock	KRI Karel Satsuit Tubun	Van Speijk Class	Symposium (Legal, Aviation, SAR, CENTRIXS) VBSS Divex/Salvex Maritime Interdiction Operation Exercise (MIOEX) Cross-Deck Helo Landing Exercise ASuW Exercise Amphibious Landing Operation Exercise Marines Exercise (Marksmanship, Martial Art, IED, Medical Combat) ENCAP and MEDCAP (Engineering and Medical Civil Action Program)
			USS Crommelin	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate	KRI Nala	Fatahillah Class	
			USS Salvor	Rescue and Salvage Unit	KRI Fatahillah	Fatahillah Class	
			USCGC Sherman	Hamilton Class High Endurance Cutter	KRI Pandrong	FPB	
			P-3C Orion	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	Nomad N-22	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	
			MH-60S Seahawk	ASW Helicopter	BO-105	Surveillance Helicopter	
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		
2005	July 26–29, 2005	Surabaya, Java Sea, Situbondo	USS Rodney M. Davis	Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate	KRI Karel Satsuit Tubun	Van Speijk Class	Symposium (Amphibious Ops, Security, Legal, Aviation)

YEARS	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	U.S. NAVY PARTICIPANT		TNI AL PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
		(ENCAP, Divex, and Amphibious)	USS Harpers Ferry	Dock Landing Ship	KRI Nala	Fatahillah Class	VBSS Sea Surveillance Exercise (SEA SURVEX) Minefield Transit Dronex Gunnex VBSS AAROFEX Flashex Divex/Salvex Screen Exercise (SCREENEX) Photo Exercise (PHOTEX) ENCAP and MEDCAP (Engineering and Medical Civil Action Program)
			USS Safeguard	Rescue and Salvage Unit	KRI Hiu	FACM	
			P-3C Orion	Maritime Patrol Aircraft	KRI Pandrong	FPB	
			U.S. Marines 3rd Expeditionary Brigade		Batalion Infantri Marinir Surabaya		
			U.S. Navy Seal and USN Diver		Kopaska and Penyelam		
			Navy Mobile Construction Battalion		Batalion Zeni Marinir Surabaya		

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