Nuclear Winter, Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Risk
Abstract
In this essay, we strive to explain the long-standing practice of intentionally ignoring the potential for nuclear winter in the formulation of US nuclear strategy. To do so, we explore the critical relationships between (1) nuclear winter and (2) nuclear strategy and nuclear risk. We consider the multiple roles of nuclear weapons and how perspectives on nuclear winter affect these roles. We distinguish cases in which neither, only one, or both sides in an adversarial relationship believe nuclear winter would be cataclysmic. Our analysis reveals two primary reasons for ignoring nuclear winter in US nuclear strategy. First, any single nuclear state can only do so much by itself to reduce nuclear winters consequences. The second, largely unspoken, reason is that the side believed to be more concerned about the risk of nuclear winter may be at a disadvantage in nuclear crisis management, deterrence, and warfighting. Nevertheless, we argue that prudence dictates we revisit current nuclear strategy. As the risk of nuclear war grows, it is increasingly apparent that we can no longer completely rely on the continued success of deterrence. We must also hedge against its possible failure. The risk of catastrophic nuclear winter must be weighed against the potentially detrimental effects that acknowledging and ameliorating its consequences could have on nuclear strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2023
- Accession Number
- AD1201181
Entities
People
- James Scouras
- Lauren Ice
- Megan Proper
Organizations
- Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory