



Research Report

MOLLY DUNIGAN, MICHELLE GRISÉ, KIMBERLY JACKSON,
JOHN J. DRENNAN, SANDRA KAY EVANS, ASHLEY L. RHOADES,
ERIC ROBINSON, MEAGAN L. SMITH, JONATHAN WELCH

Gaining the Edge

Identifying and Leveraging Frameworks for
Enabling Army Contributions to Competition



For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA1235-1.

About RAND

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. To learn more about RAND, visit www.rand.org.

Research Integrity

Our mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the open publication of our research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. For more information, visit www.rand.org/about/principles.

RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

© 2023 RAND Corporation

RAND® is a registered trademark.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN: 978-1-9774-0872-3

Cover: Benjamin Wilson/U.S. Army.

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

About This Report

This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled *Identifying and Leveraging Frameworks for Competition*, sponsored by United States Army Futures Command. The purpose of the project was to develop an interagency organizational framework, with an analysis of necessary accompanying authorities, to strengthen the United States' ability to succeed in the competition space and “win without fighting.”

This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army.

RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the *Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law* (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND's Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for the assistance of a number of individuals across the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. military services who took the time to speak with us for this project. Although we cannot name them publicly, we are indebted to them for sharing their expertise with us. The Futures and Concepts Center of U.S. Army Futures Command deserves special thanks for funding this research, and we would especially like to thank BG Stephanie Ahern and Elrin Hundley for the guidance that they and their team provided over the course of this research. We are also grateful to Katherine Kidder for providing key insights to support our analysis of Army talent management issues during her time at RAND. We thank

Mark Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Paula Thornhill and Lisa Harrington of RAND for their thoughtful feedback on earlier versions of this report. We sincerely thank Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Watts for their management support of this research effort, Rebecca Sepich for her administrative assistance, and a number of RAND subject-matter experts for their intellectual and substantive contributions throughout the course of the project.

Summary

The research reported here was completed in October 2021, followed by security review by the sponsor and the U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, with final sign-off in March 2023.

With the emergence of strategic competition with near peers as the defining U.S. national security priority in recent years, the U.S. Army has had to rethink its roles and responsibilities. Competition and campaigning to disrupt the objectives of competitors require strategies, approaches, and missions different from those for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, which were the focus of the past two decades. Many Army missions and capabilities have relevance for competition, but for the Army to succeed in competition against near peers, it must work in an integrated fashion with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. government entities.

To ensure that the Army is best positioned to contribute to broader DoD and interagency competition efforts, the Futures and Concepts Center of Army Futures Command asked RAND Arroyo Center to assist in this endeavor by studying areas in which DoD and Army processes and organizations would benefit from evolution or modification in the context of great power strategic competition, helping inform the center's understanding of existing Army capabilities that enable the United States to effectively compete, and determining how to communicate the utility of such capabilities in this realm. Because this project was conducted prior to the release of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, we frequently refer to the Army's role in *competition*, rather than using the term *campaigning*, but our analysis yields insights relevant to campaigning in a competitive setting. The results of this project are intended to directly support Army efforts to operate more effectively within and across DoD and to communicate with other stakeholders the procedural and organizational changes and authorities necessary to allow the Army to better contribute to DoD's response to competition challenges.

Research Approach

We took a multidisciplinary, multimethod approach to this research. This approach consisted of a multidisciplinary series of literature reviews; a review and analysis of existing authorities, statutes, and policy; process tracing; semistructured subject-matter expert interviews; comparative historical case studies; and systematic analysis of overlaps between the existing supply of Army capabilities and the demands of competition below the threshold of armed conflict. Our analysis of the sufficiency of Army processes, in particular, relied primarily on interviews with subject-matter experts and practitioners to capture the current strengths and drawbacks of these processes rather than on assessments found in existing literature.

To inform our analysis of Army processes and capabilities, we developed a framework for understanding and assessing Army contributions, and potential contributions, to competition. This overarching framework, which we call the *framework for competition*, consists of two main components. The first is an *objectives framework*, which identifies and categorizes six primary strategic and operational aims of competition and entails three separate lines of effort (LOEs). The objectives framework, shown in Figure S.1, served as a baseline against which to assess demand for Army capabilities in competition. We leveraged the Army Universal Task List to identify the capabilities supplied by the operational Army, while also considering the capabilities of Army-funded executive agents and Army commands. We then conducted a mini-Delphi exercise to compare the *supply* of Army capabilities with the *demand* for specific capabilities to succeed across the three LOEs in competition.

The second component of the overarching framework for competition is an *imperatives framework*, which identifies six key imperatives that align with current DoD and Army guidance for *how* various DoD organizations are directed to operate to best achieve the objectives of competition:

- **Agility:** An *agile* organization achieves both stability and dynamism through networked teams that operate in rapid learning and fast decision cycles.

FIGURE S.1
Objectives Framework



NOTES: FMF = Foreign Military Financing; FMS = Foreign Military Sales; LOE = line of effort; MISO = military information support operations; PSYOP = psychological operations; OCO/DCO = offensive and defensive cyberoperations; OPE = operational preparation of the environment; RS&OI = reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; IPoE = intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

- **Innovation:** An *innovative* organization is one that fosters processes of ideation and the development and implementation of new or improved products or programs.
- **Resilience:** *Resilience* refers to the ability of an organization to maintain operations and endurance in the face of adversity or disruptive events. In addition, the other imperatives support organizational resilience, i.e., an organization that excels at the other imperatives may in turn be more resilient.
- **Integration:** An *integrated* organization is one in which different departments work in coordination.
- **Efficiency:** *Efficiency* refers to the use of resources to achieve an organization's goals. *Organizational efficiency*, a related concept, focuses on the extent to which processes add value in an organization.

- **Proactivity:** *Proactivity* consists of certain behaviors, such as taking charge and initiating change.

Notably, these six imperatives, highlighted throughout key guidance documents, align with established organizational best practices that are prevalent in the management theory literature. This framework serves as a baseline against which to assess Army and DoD success in reorienting and adapting existing key processes to enable the United States to compete effectively. Four sets of DoD and Army processes are under examination here:

- security cooperation planning processes
- FMS acquisition processes
- Global Force Posture and Global Force Management processes
- Army talent management processes (including professional military education).

These processes were selected from a larger list of DoD processes in consultation with the project sponsor.

Each of these two frameworks—competition objectives and competition imperatives—provides a conceptual basis for significant portions of the analysis in this report. However, even beyond the assessments we conducted for this research effort, these frameworks are tools in their own right. We would encourage policymakers to adapt these tools for their own needs and to use them to assess their progress in strengthening the U.S. ability to engage effectively in strategic competition.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Findings

Overall, we found that relevant Army organizations are not always incentivized to tailor their contributions to support broader DoD competition activities. The best opportunities for the Army to contribute to competition efforts, moreover, may not be in its areas of historical focus or competency. Finally, an analysis of historical examples of organizational change provided insights about organizational adaptations, including that the use of working groups and incubators, inclusive and collaborative processes, and

a willingness to learn from past failures may contribute to successful organizational adaptations.

In addition to these overarching findings, we derived the following findings related to the selected processes:

- **Security cooperation processes:** The integration and agility of security cooperation processes could be improved. There is no clear lead security cooperation agency within the Army, and there is confusion over the overlapping roles of the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation. This makes it difficult to integrate Army security cooperation activities into broader U.S. government competition efforts. Existing security cooperation authorities are not well aligned with the pace of competition or competition objectives, which impedes the efficient provision of security assistance as a mechanism of competition.
- **FMS acquisition processes:** Our analysis identified gaps in the agility, proactivity, and efficiency of FMS processes, but critiques of FMS processes center on the slow pace of execution, both across DoD and in terms of Army FMS processes specifically. This slow pace contributes to the perception that existing policies and authorities hinder efforts to build partner capacity to enhance the U.S. competitive edge. While FMS processes are slow by design, it is advisable for the Army and DoD to remedy certain inefficiencies in these processes and related authorities. In addition, FMS is not emphasized as a competitive tool, which means that it is not always fully leveraged in competition efforts.
- **Force posture processes:** Force posture processes are insufficiently agile to support the demands of competition. While these DoD-wide processes work well below the threshold of armed conflict, they may not be tailored for agile transition along the competition continuum into an active conflict. In particular, they may not allow quick responses to rapidly changing threats. Modifying these processes to promote greater agility would allow stakeholders, including Army stakeholders, to adapt to emerging threats in the competition space more quickly.

- **Talent management processes:** Issues inherent in the Army’s service culture represent the most significant challenges for Army talent management processes. In addition, although these processes have benefited from innovative reforms in recent years, their agility could be improved. These processes remain oriented toward developing the traditional conventional warfighter rather than developing soldiers who have strong skills tailored for competition activities. Similarly, professional military education is not tailored to producing strategic, innovative “competitor” soldiers. Moreover, joint and broadening assignments that might enhance key leaders’ innate knowledge of the competition space are disincentivized in current Army promotion processes, hindering organic routes of communicating the relevance of Army capabilities to competition. The Army should consider updating existing, relevant authorities to provide additional flexibility in the recruitment and promotion of officers with in-demand, competition-relevant skills.

These four processes align with the six imperatives we identified to varying degrees. As part of our interview protocol, we offered definitions for each imperative and then asked respondents to identify the imperatives that appeared particularly relevant for the respective processes. Each process will be discussed in depth in Chapters Three through Six, but Table S.1 summarizes our findings. Interviewers identified the imperatives shaded in gray in the table as being less applicable for the respective processes.

Finally, we found that the Army has significant capabilities to contribute to competition but that current incentive structures seem to interfere with the Army’s ability to fully leverage these capabilities.

Recommendations

We recommend that Army leaders and other policymakers consider the actions described in this section to improve the process- and capabilities-related shortcomings highlighted earlier. Before turning to our recommendations, note that our analysis suggests that there is a lack of agreement across the U.S. government on the meaning of *competition*. This hinders Army efforts to specify how its capabilities might contribute to competi-

TABLE S.1
Summary of Processes’ Fulfillment of Competition Imperatives

Process	Agility	Innovation	Resilience	Integration	Efficiency	Proactivity
Security cooperation	●			○		
FMS	○				○	○
GDP and GFM	○				◐	◐
Army talent management	○	●				

NOTES: GDP = Global Defense Posture; GFM = Global Force Management. Shaded cells indicate imperatives that reviewers considered less applicable for the given process.

- Largely does not meet imperative
- ◐ Partially meets imperative
- Mostly meets imperative

tion. Clarifying this definition would facilitate the implementation of our recommendations.

Identify Opportunities to Streamline Key Processes

The Army and DoD as a whole should identify opportunities to streamline and tailor key processes to enable quick responses to the rapidly changing threats that may characterize the competition environment. This is particularly true of DoD-wide defense posture and force management processes, which are useful tools for strategic competition because they enable deterrence of adversaries but are not ideally tailored for timely responses to threats that could arise quickly and simultaneously from multiple sources. Leaders across the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the geographic combatant commands, and Headquarters, Department of the Army should thus emphasize speed and agility in force posture and management decisionmaking processes. Similarly, while FMS processes may be slow by design, there may also be opportunities to streamline these processes and reduce delays in the provision of equipment to foreign militaries, which may decrease the likelihood of foreign militaries turning to U.S. competitors for equipment. While efforts to improve and streamline talent management processes are ongoing, it is important to formalize these improvements and provide institutional support. The Army should undertake a review of

processes that support competition activities to identify opportunities for improving the efficiency and agility of these processes.

Review and Update Core Authorities to Ensure that They Are Tailored to the Demands of Competition

The Army should also undertake a comprehensive review of core authorities pertaining to competition-relevant activities to ensure that they are tailored to meet the demands of competition. This review should include an examination of the day-to-day implementation of core authorities, with a focus on identifying necessary updates to these authorities. For example, our analysis suggested that authorities related to talent management, technology transfer and exports, and security cooperation may need to be updated to facilitate the recruitment and retention of soldiers with competition-relevant skills, allow the U.S. government to export advanced technologies to allies and partners in support of competition objectives, and enhance relationships with partners in regions in which near-peer competitors seek to gain influence.

Create a Named Operation for Competition

DoD should examine whether the statutory framework for named operations would permit the creation of a named operation for competition and consider the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach, including whether a named operation would accelerate the provision of needed resources and remedy inefficiencies in existing authorities. Currently, for instance, there are a variety of Army and DoD-wide efforts intended to achieve competition objectives by working with and enabling regional partners. These include the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility and the European Deterrence Initiative in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility. Building on these existing initiatives through a named competition operation would allow unity of effort across DoD and allow the Army to more easily identify opportunities to contribute to competition objectives.

Consider Modifying Existing Personnel Incentives to Prioritize Joint Tours or Other Broadening Assignments for Officers Across All Echelons

Broadening assignments, such as joint, interagency, and Office of the Secretary of Defense tours, can help Army leaders better understand competition requirements and the Army, DoD, and U.S. government processes that must be navigated to meet these requirements. At present, participation in such broadening roles can negatively affect officer promotions, and an individual's suitability for participation in such roles is not necessarily prioritized in recruitment decisions. The Army should closely examine potential changes to both its recruitment and promotion systems that would incentivize key broadening assignments, including ways to maximize the advantages of such changes while minimizing the opportunity costs.

Contents

About This Report	iii
Summary	v
Figures and Tables	xvii

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction	1
Background	1
Objectives and Approach	6
Organization of This Report	13

CHAPTER TWO

Frameworks for Assessing Army Contributions to Competition	15
Developing a Framework for Competition	16

CHAPTER THREE

Security Cooperation Processes	25
Overview and Purpose of Process	25
Relationship to Competition	26
Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships	28
Army's Current Role in Security Cooperation Processes	29
Adapting Security Cooperation Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition	30

CHAPTER FOUR

Foreign Military Sales Processes	37
Overview and Purpose of Process	37
Relationship to Competition	38
Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships	40
Army's Current Role in FMS Processes	41
Adapting FMS Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition	43

CHAPTER FIVE

Global Defense Posture Planning and Global Force Management

Processes	53
Overview and Purpose of Process	53
Relationship to Competition	57
Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships.....	58
Army’s Current Role in GDP and GFM Processes	60
Adapting GDP and GFM Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition	61

CHAPTER SIX

Army Talent Management Processes..... 67

Overview and Purpose of Process	67
Relationship to Competition	71
Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships.....	72
Current Army Role in Talent Management Processes	73
Adapting Talent Management Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition.....	75

CHAPTER SEVEN

Army Capabilities in Competition 81

The Supply Side: Understanding the Full Range of Army Capabilities....	83
Assessing the Army’s Contributions to Competition	85

CHAPTER EIGHT

Key Findings and Recommendations 97

Findings	97
Recommendations	100

APPENDIXES

A. Imperatives for Competition	109
B. Analysis of Relevant Authorities	119
C. More on Army Capabilities in Competition	133

Abbreviations	145
----------------------------	-----

Bibliography	149
---------------------------	-----

Figures and Tables

Figures

S.1.	Objectives Framework	vii
1.1.	The Competition Continuum and Associated Activities	3
1.2.	Army Strategic and Doctrinal Adaptation Over Time	4
2.1.	Objectives Framework	17
4.1.	Overview of the Foreign Military Sales Process	39

Tables

S.1.	Summary of Processes' Fulfillment of Competition Imperatives	xi
1.1.	Interviewees, by Organization	10
1.2.	Interviewees, by Process	11
2.1.	Frameworks for Assessing Army Contributions to Competition	16
2.2.	Imperatives for Competition	21
7.1.	Illustrative Analysis: Linking a Sample of Specific Army Capabilities Across Warfighting Functions with Competition Objectives	86
8.1.	Summary of Processes' Fulfillment of Competition Imperatives	100
A.1.	Criteria for Achieving Agility	112
A.2.	Criteria for Achieving Innovation	113
A.3.	Criteria for Achieving Resilience	114
A.4.	Criteria for Achieving Integration	115
A.5.	Criteria for Achieving Efficiency	116
A.6.	Criteria for Achieving Proactivity	117
C.1.	Overview of Army Unit Task List	134
C.2.	Overview of Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units	139
C.3.	Overview of Army-Relevant Competition Missions	142

Introduction

Background

Great power strategic competition, specifically with China and Russia, has become the defining U.S. national security priority in recent years, beginning with the publication of the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and continuing with the publication of the 2022 NDS.¹ Although *competition* means different things to different entities across the U.S. government, the term means the following in its most general sense:

A situation in which states engage in activities designed to advance their interests relative to others believed to pose a challenge or threat, without escalating to armed conflict. More specifically, states might be seeking to advance a variety of objectives, including promoting their own security, shaping the global agenda, advancing their status relative

¹ White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., December 2017; U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge, Washington, D.C., 2018; DoD, *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., 2022. The research presented in this report was conducted prior to the release of the 2022 NDS. As reflected in the 2022 NDS, *campaigning* and *competition* are distinct but related terms. Campaigning occurs across the competition continuum, including during periods of cooperation, competition below the threshold of armed conflict, and armed conflict. Throughout this report, we use the terms *competition* and *competition activities* to refer to campaigning that seeks to disrupt the objectives of near-peer competitors.

to others, and influencing or dictating outcomes relating to a specific matter or region.²

Such competition can and does occur across a continuum of conflict phases, ranging from activities perpetrated in an environment short of war (“below the threshold” of armed conflict) to those perpetrated in active combat situations (“above the threshold” of armed conflict), with the Army engaging in campaigning across this continuum. Competition below the threshold of armed conflict is often conceptualized in terms of the so-called *gray zone*, which has been defined as an

operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for events.³

Figure 1.1 depicts the competition continuum and illustrative activities relevant to the space below the threshold of armed conflict.

As such concepts as competition have emerged, the Army has sought to adapt to emerging requirements by changing strategy and doctrine. Since World War II, the Army has made significant revisions to its strategy, core doctrine, or force structure at least 20 times (as Figure 1.2 summarizes). In addition to these high-level changes, several initiatives are underway to better orient the Army to competition, which we will discuss in the subsequent analyses of security cooperation, Foreign Military Sales (FMS),

² Michael J. Mazarr, Jonathan S. Blake, Abigail Casey, Tim McDonald, Stephanie Pezard, and Michael Spirtas, *Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2726-AF, 2018, p. 5.

³ Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, and Marta Kepe, *Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2942-OSD, 2019, p. 7.

FIGURE 1.2

Army Strategic and Doctrinal Adaptation Over Time



SOURCES: Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2017; Jensen, 2016; Mahnken, 2012; Luke O'Brien, "The Doctrine of Military Change: How the U.S. Army Evolves," War on the Rocks website, July 25, 2016; Jeffrey W. Long, *The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: From Active Defense to Airland Battle and Beyond*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Staff and General Command College, 1978, p. 29; Gordon S. Barrass, *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012, pp. 71–89; James S. Powell, "Book Review: Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army," *Military Review*, June 2, 2017; Jen Judson and Todd South, "The New Way to Fight: US Army Unveils Field Manual 3-0," *Defense News*, October 10, 2017; and doctrinal documents provided by the Army Publishing Directorate.

NOTE: FM = Field Manual.

throughout this report, reinforces the importance of these external and internal drivers of adaptation.

Each of the services has had to rethink its roles and responsibilities amid this shift to competition, particularly in terms of approaching the focus on winning without fighting.⁶ By definition, competition and campaigning during competition require strategies, approaches, and missions that are different from those associated with the past two decades of focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency during the Global War on Terror. While the Army's MDO Concept 2028 characterizes the nature of the preferred U.S. military response to this new strategic imperative, the concept has thus far fallen short in its alignment with joint and whole-of-government approaches, such as Dynamic Force Employment.⁷

Therefore, for the Army to achieve success in the competitive realm against near peers, it must work with DoD and other U.S. government entities in an acutely integrated fashion, and DoD as a whole must be enabled to execute missions at a speed that denies first-mover advantage to, and imposes incremental costs on, adversaries proactively rather than reactively. Yet, DoD as a whole suffers from a dearth of analyses about how Army and DoD processes could and should better account for this new great power competition. Although many recent analyses have addressed the concept of strategic competition more broadly, the number of immediately actionable recommendations for changes that could allow the Army and DoD to transition more quickly from competition to crisis and conflict responses is

⁶ U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, *Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*, December 2020; Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-4, *Competing*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, December 14, 2020; U.S. Air Force, *Sharpening the Air Force's Competitive Edge: A Business Operations Plan, Fiscal Years 2019–2021*, Washington, D.C., January 2019.

⁷ The Dynamic Force Employment concept provides options for the proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force while still maintaining its capacity and capability to engage in major combat operations (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, December 6, 2018; DoD, 2018). The Joint Warfighting Concept, however, has incorporated important aspects of Army MDO Concept 2028, and the Army did not write the concept with the expectation that the Joint Force and broader U.S. government would accept the concept as their operational approach.

limited.⁸ Most DoD processes, force sizing constructs, stationing, and funding decisions are determined by the services' and combatant commands' (CCMD's) ability to prosecute combat operations, so it is necessary to alter planning significantly to account for DoD's competitive efforts below the threshold of armed conflict.

The Futures and Concepts Center of U.S. Army Futures Command asked RAND Arroyo Center to assist in this endeavor by (1) studying areas in which DoD and Army processes and organizations would benefit from evolution or modification in the context of great power strategic competition and (2) helping inform the Futures and Concepts Center's understanding of existing Army capabilities that enable the United States to effectively compete and how the Army can communicate the utility of such capabilities in the competition realm. The results of this project are intended to directly support Army efforts to operate more effectively within and across DoD. The project also aims to communicate to other stakeholders the procedural and organizational changes and authorities necessary to allow the Army to better contribute to DoD's response to competition challenges.

Objectives and Approach

The objectives of this research were to identify how the Army can make or influence procedural and/or organizational changes to help tailor DoD processes for competition and to identify existing Army capabilities that could

⁸ The RAND Corporation has published several research reports on the broader topic of strategic competition in recent years. Among these reports are the following: Mazarr et al., 2018; Michael J. Mazarr, Bryan Frederick, John J. Drennan, Emily Ellinger, Kelly Elizabeth Eusebi, Bryan Rooney, Andrew Stravers, and Emily Yoder, *Understanding Influence in the Strategic Competition with China*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A290-1, 2021; Timothy R. Heath, *U.S. Strategic Competition with China: A RAND Research Primer*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-A290-3, 2021; Morris et al., 2019; Jeffrey W. Hornung, *Allies Growing Closer: Japan–Europe Security Ties in the Age of Strategic Competition*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A186-1, 2020; and Bonny Lin, Michael S. Chase, Jonah Blank, Cortez A. Cooper III, Derek Grossman, Scott W. Harold, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lyle J. Morris, Logan Ma, Paul Orner, Alice Shih, and Soo Kim, *Regional Responses to U.S.–China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Study Overview and Conclusions*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4412-AF, 2020.

be more fully used and understood in competition. To that end, we examined six main research questions:

1. What should various DoD processes be able to achieve, and how do they need to function, in terms of competition?
2. What is the nature of the gap between the current processes and these requirements?
3. To what extent, and how, do processes and organizations need to change to best facilitate competition?
4. What existing Army capabilities can be oriented toward competition?
5. How can the Army ensure that the competition-relevant capabilities are understood across the Army and DoD?
6. What authorities and/or policy changes are needed?

We took a multidisciplinary, multimethod approach to answering these questions. This approach included a multidisciplinary series of literature reviews; a review and analysis of existing authorities, statutes, and policy; process tracing; semistructured subject-matter expert interviews; comparative historical case studies; and systematic analysis of overlaps between the existing supply of Army capabilities and the demands of competition below the threshold of armed conflict.

In the first stage of the research, we conducted a multifaceted review of literature, authorities, statutes, and policy, aiming to glean contextual, background insight into secondary questions, such as the following:

- What are the Army and DoD processes and key organizational structures, and how do they relate to competition?
- What are basic Army responsibilities and authorities?
- What must Army and DoD processes and organizations be able to do to compete successfully?
- In what ways and when has the Army adapted so far?
- What does the organizational literature say about how organizations and processes can achieve U.S. government imperatives?

Our review of the literature occurred in multiple stages throughout the project and focused on a variety of policy and doctrinal documents, such as the NDS, NSS, Joint Doctrine publications, Army Doctrine Publications

(ADPs), Army Field Manuals, and Army MDO Concept 2028; scholarly, consulting, think tank, and policy documents, including key pieces from the organizational behavior literature; news coverage of Army initiatives related to competition; and websites of Army and DoD offices engaged in activities related to the particular processes under consideration.⁹ The basic intent for this stage of the research was to develop an overall awareness of how various bodies of literature *theorized* that DoD, and the Army in particular, might streamline processes and organizations to compete successfully against near peers and how the Army had successfully adapted in the past. From this literature review, we identified the major legal authorities associated with each process, then reviewed and analyzed these primary legal sources to determine whether existing authorities constrain the adaptation of key processes.

As detailed in Chapter Two, key outputs from this stage of the research included development of two related frameworks that allowed baseline assessments of the requirements for competition. The first of these frameworks consists of a typology of **competition objectives** spanning three lines of effort [LOEs]). We assessed existing Army capabilities against these competition objectives to determine the applicable supply of such capabilities to meet overall demands in a competitive strategic environment. We leveraged the Army Universal Task List (AUTL) to identify the capabilities the operational Army supplies, while also considering the capabilities of Army-funded executive agents, such as Army commands (ACOMs), to fully capture the range of existing Army capabilities. We then conducted a mini-Delphi exercise to compare the *supply* of Army capabilities with the *demand* for specific capabilities to succeed across the three LOEs in competition.

The second framework entails a set of **competition imperatives**. We assessed a subset of four current DoD processes utilizing this framework. Our aim was to determine how well such processes were meeting these imperatives and to identify additional process modifications that might be required to better position DoD to compete effectively. We selected pro-

⁹ We also reviewed Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), “The Army in Military Competition,” Washington, D.C., Chief of Staff Paper #2, March 1, 2021a, and HQDA, “Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict,” Washington, D.C., Chief of Staff Paper #1, March 16, 2021b.

cesses for close examination from a larger list of DoD processes in consultation with the Futures and Concepts Center:

- security cooperation planning processes
- FMS processes
- GDP and GFM processes
- Army talent management processes (including PME).

Chapters Three through Six detail our assessment of each process, including analysis from the literature review and interviews.

Building on the lessons gleaned from the historical assessment of Army adaptation, the second stage of the research consisted of analysis of 11 comparative historical and contemporary examples of organizational adaptation, selected for variation across time, type of organization, location, and factors and approaches that led to successful adaptation. The set included nine examples of successful organizational adaptation and two case studies of unsuccessful organizational adaptation. The examples also included instances of organizational change from the Army, the interagency community, and foreign militaries. The intent of this analysis was to explore how organizational adaptations have occurred *in practice* in the past and to identify some emerging insights that DoD and the Army can use as they change and adapt to improve the U.S. capability to compete effectively. These insights are interspersed throughout the remainder of this report.

In the third stage of the research, we interviewed subject-matter experts. We sought to interview individuals who (1) are directly involved in formulating U.S. strategy and policy relating to competition below the threshold of armed conflict, (2) plan and conduct activities in the competition space, (3) are experts in one of the four DoD processes explored here, and/or (4) are familiar with the U.S. Army's structure, processes, and culture. In some cases, interviewees met more than one of these criteria. In all, we conducted interviews with 28 individuals spanning 20 organizations across DoD and various Army offices and a small handful of scholars from academia and RAND. Individual interviewee affiliations are detailed in Table 1.1.

Representing the same interview sample in a different light, Table 1.2 depicts the number of individuals we interviewed for each process.

TABLE 1.1
Interviewees, by Organization

Organization	Number of Interviewees
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Strategy & Force Development	1
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Directorate of Plans & Posture	1
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation	2
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation	1
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs	1
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)	2
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command–U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)	1
U.S. European Command J3	1
U.S. Army Pacific Command G5, Plans & Posture	1
U.S. Army Pacific Command, Security Cooperation Office	2
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)	2
TRADOC, Combined Arms Center	1
Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs	1
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (DASA) Defense Exports and Cooperation (DE&C)	2
U.S. Army Office of Military Personnel Management	1
U.S. Army Talent Management Task Force (ATMTF)	1
U.S. Army Colonels Management Office	1
U.S. Army War College	1
Representatives from academia and think tanks	5

We used both inductive and deductive approaches to summarize and analyze information from our interviews. To do so, we created a coding matrix to identify, analyze, and refine cross-cutting interview themes. We coded all interviews in this matrix both by types of activity (security coop-

TABLE 1.2
Interviewees, by Process

Process	Number of Interviewees
Security cooperation	5
FMS	3
GDP and GFM	6
Talent management	7

eration, FMS acquisition, GDP/GFM, and Army talent management) and by a series of thematic codes driven by the interview protocol design. These thematic codes included assessments of whether the comment in question pertained to the following:

- competition objectives relevant to a particular process
- discussion of the success or failure of a process in meeting specific imperatives for competition
- strengths and weaknesses of current authorities pertaining to particular processes or capabilities
- discussion of existing Army capabilities relevant to competition and perceived reasons for any lack of understanding of such capabilities as competition-relevant
- general comments on the operationalization of the strategic competition concept across DoD or the Army or on the definition of the competition concept itself.

These data subsequently informed the remainder of our project and our overall findings, and this coding exercise was particularly useful in enabling a trend analysis of points of agreement and disagreement among interviewees.¹⁰ In the following chapters, we report particularly illustrative findings

¹⁰ The interview stage of this research took place between November 2020 and January 2021. Because of the global response to coronavirus disease 2019 at the time, we conducted all interviews virtually, via Microsoft Teams or conference call. We were able to capture feedback from a diverse and robust sample of interviewees across organizations of interest utilizing this method, and the need to conduct interviews virtually did not

individually and others based on broad trends across interviews. Because we identified officials from key stakeholder organizations relevant to each of the processes, we are confident that comparative analysis of these interview results, combined with the other methods used in this report, provides some useful insight. A limitation of the interview effort was the relatively small number of interviewees for each process, which may limit generalizability of the findings. Additional research, including additional interviews with key stakeholders, may help refine and extend these initial findings.

The fourth stage of the research consisted of exploring the alignment of existing Army capabilities with the demands of competition. In an attempt to include the full range of potential Army contributions to competition efforts, we considered four layers of Army capabilities in the context of the competition objectives and associated LOEs mentioned earlier and discussed in further detail in Chapter Two. The four layers of potential capabilities included Army units, Army-funded executive agencies, ACOMs (including Army service component commands [ASCCs] and direct reporting units [DRUs]), and Army contributions to other competition-related missions.

To conduct this analysis, we leveraged varied sources, including the AUTL and Army policy and guidance documents outlining Army executive agent responsibilities and ACOM responsibilities. Finally, we cross-referenced a comprehensive list of U.S. government activities pursued in competition that was set forth in prior RAND research. Using these data sources, we conducted an iterative mini-Delphi exercise to compare the supply of existing Army capabilities with the demand for competition-relevant capabilities. Chapter Seven describes this approach in detail.

We faced several challenges in conducting this analysis: The definition and understanding of competition vary across the force;¹¹ competition

appear to hinder responsiveness to interview requests. Further analysis of the interview findings can be found in Chapters Three through Seven.

¹¹ Consistent with prior research on this topic, officials from various entities across the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy (OSD-P) and outside subject-matter experts noted that, at the time of this research in 2020–2021, DoD did not have a universally shared understanding of what it means to be in competition. This was due, in part, to a “lack of coherence and general acceptance around the SECDEF- [Secretary of Defense–] approved definition,” as well as generalized blurriness of the conceptual distinctions among *deterrence*, the *gray zone*, and *competition*. Interview with OSD-P offi-

activities (demand) do not always necessarily translate neatly into capabilities (supply); and, relatedly, the demand signal for competition-relevant activities is at times opaque and, therefore, difficult to robustly discern in practice. Regardless, the analysis yielded a number of interesting findings and recommendations for the Army regarding the relevance and understanding of its current capabilities to U.S. efforts to compete, as detailed in Chapter Eight.

Organization of This Report

The remainder of this report begins in Chapter Two with an elaboration of the development of the competition framework discussed earlier, including the delineation of both competition objectives and competition imperatives. Chapters Three through Six provide an in-depth analysis of each of the four processes we examined—security cooperation, FMS acquisition, global force posture and GFM, and Army talent management—and elucidate both literature and interview findings regarding the current state of such processes in meeting the imperatives for competition and areas for improvement in this regard. Chapter Seven details our analysis of existing Army capabilities relevant in the context of strategic competition and provides an overview of underlying gaps in communication across the force of the relevance of capabilities to competition. The report concludes with an overview of our key findings and recommendations in Chapter Eight. Appendix A details the imperatives framework, including the criteria used to assess success in achieving these imperatives. Appendix B provides an in-depth overview of legal authorities pertaining to the four processes analyzed in this report. Appendix C details the methodological underpinnings of Chapter Seven’s capabilities analysis.

cial, December 15, 2020; interview with OSD-P official, December 18, 2020; interview with OSD official, December 22, 2020; interview with academic subject-matter expert, December 10, 2020.

Frameworks for Assessing Army Contributions to Competition

To inform our analysis of Army processes and capabilities, we developed a framework for understanding and assessing Army contributions, and potential contributions, to competition. This overarching framework, which we call the *framework for competition*, consists of two main components: an objectives framework and an imperatives framework.

The *objectives framework* describes three primary LOEs in competition, encompassing a total of six strategic and operational objectives of competition. In our analysis, this framework serves as a baseline against which to assess demand for Army capabilities in competition.

The *imperatives framework* identifies six key imperatives that align with current DoD and Army guidance for *how* various DoD organizations are directed to operate to best achieve the objectives of competition. Notably, the six imperatives also align with established best practices for organizations in the management theory literature. In our analysis, this framework serves as a baseline against which to assess Army and DoD success in reorienting and adapting existing key processes to enable the United States to compete effectively.

Comparing the two frameworks (see Table 2.1), the objectives framework illustrates the *strategic and operational means* that DoD and the Army must pursue to succeed in competition and to support Army campaigning during competition, while the imperatives framework highlights the recommendations currently outlined in strategic guidance documents for *the ways* in which DoD should optimally operate to achieve the objectives of competition. In this chapter, we introduce these frameworks and explain how these analytic constructs improve our understanding of how Army processes and capa-

TABLE 2.1

Frameworks for Assessing Army Contributions to Competition

Framework	Description	Applicability to Project
Objectives framework	Describes three primary LOEs with six distinct objectives for DoD in competition. These LOEs and objectives represent what DoD—and the Army—need to accomplish in competition.	Analysis of Army capabilities (Chapter Seven)
Imperatives framework	Identifies six key imperatives that align with strategic guidance and established best practices for organizations, providing a baseline against which to assess DoD and Army processes in competition. These imperatives can be tuned to meet the needs of a given process or organization.	Analysis of DoD and Army processes (Chapters Three to Six)

bilities contribute to competition efforts. In doing so, we hope to elucidate the utility of these frameworks as tools that Army leaders and policymakers can use to tailor their own processes and organizations to the demands of campaigning during competition below the threshold of armed conflict.

Developing a Framework for Competition

Objectives Framework


Existing Army and DoD strategy and policy guidance characterizes great power competition as the organizing principle for Army and DoD activities.¹ The guidance does not, however, establish a clear hierarchy of defense objectives in competition. While much emphasis has been placed on the need to prepare for great power conflict, the NDS also highlights the growing threat that competition under the threshold of armed conflict poses, including influence operations, predatory economics, the subversion of democratic processes, the use of proxies, and coercion.²

¹ In particular, see the 2018 NDS (DoD, 2018), the irregular warfare (IW) annex to the NDS (see DoD, *Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy*, Washington, D.C., October 2020b), and Army MDO Concept 2028 (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 2018).

² For discussion of the NDS's treatment of these irregular threats, see Eric Robinson, "The Missing, Irregular Half of the Competition Equation," Modern War Institute website, September 8, 2020.

To understand the role of the Army in ongoing competition efforts, we developed an objectives framework for assessing Army contributions and potential contributions to competition. While the primary purpose of the Army is to provide land forces for combat operations, this framework serves as a tool for assessing Army contributions below the threshold of armed conflict. This framework, which informs our analysis of Army capabilities, clearly delineates three LOEs. Each LOE is associated with two measurable objectives. Figure 2.1 illustrates this framework. The framework draws on a number of authoritative sources, including three LOEs described in the NDS,³ the 2019 IW Annex to the NDS,⁴ Army MDO Concept 2028,⁵ European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPA-

FIGURE 2.1
Objectives Framework



NOTES: FMF = Foreign Military Financing; MISO = military information support operations; PSYOP = psychological operations; OCO/DCO = offensive and defensive cyberoperations; OPE = operational preparation of the environment; RS&OI = reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; IPoE = intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

³ DoD, 2018.

⁴ DoD, 2020b.

⁵ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 2018.

COM) posture statements that describe competition objectives,⁶ and prior RAND research on competition.⁷

LOE 1: Strengthen Allies and Partners

The first LOE draws on the NDS's second strategic objective: to strengthen alliances and attract new partners.⁸ We break this LOE down into two inter-related, but distinct, component parts. First, U.S. military efforts in competition often seek to Secure the United States as a Partner of Choice (LOE 1.1), including efforts to build and maintain alliances, secure local partnerships, and advance U.S. values and prestige. This also includes efforts to secure U.S. influence by supporting the internal defense of an ally or partner and efforts to secure access, basing, and overflight for U.S. forces.

The second objective under this LOE, while related to the first, focuses directly on efforts to Build Partner Capacity (LOE 1.2). Examples include security cooperation programs, security assistance (SA), train-and-equip programs, security force assistance, and FMS and financing. Building partner capacity initiatives often serve to secure the United States as a partner of choice but also serve to increase the capacity of allies or partners to provide for their own security or contribute to multinational military campaigns alongside the U.S. military. Separating these two objectives is important, in that efforts to secure the United States as a partner of choice need not require building the capacity of an ally or partner to succeed.

LOE 2: Win Without Fighting

The second LOE refers to efforts to gain advantage in day-to-day competition outside the context of a potential conflict. The first of the LOE's

⁶ Tod D. Wolters, "Statement of General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command," testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 25, 2020. See also Philip S. Davidson, "Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Posture," February 12, 2019.

⁷ Mazarr et al., 2018; Morris et al., 2019.

⁸ The three strategic objectives laid out in the NDS are rebuilding military readiness, strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, and reforming DoD's business practices for greater performance and affordability.

two objectives is to Gain Asymmetric Advantage short of war (LOE 2.1). This involves primarily offensive applications of U.S. military capabilities, including unconventional warfare (support to a resistance or rebellion movement), sabotage and subversion, psychological operations, cyberspace operations, and efforts to illuminate and disrupt malign actions of competitors. Unlike efforts to prepare for conventional war, this objective focuses on military tools that can impose costs in day-to-day competition short of war.

The second objective under this LOE is to Stabilize Fragile Regions (LOE 2.2). This involves primarily defensive or stability-focused applications of U.S. military capabilities, including efforts to build allied or partner resilience to malign acts, civil-military operations, countering threat networks, countering threat finance, and institutional capacity building. While this objective is closely related to building partner capacity (LOE 1.2), the focus here is on directly supporting U.S. operational objectives in fragile regions rather than on partner force development.

LOE 3: Prepare for War

The third LOE refers to efforts in competition that secure U.S. advantage in the event of conflict. The first objective of this LOE is to Deter Conventional Aggression (LOE 3.1). For the Joint Force, this includes efforts to improve the lethality of its units and weapon systems, efforts to posture forces so as to deter attack, exercises and experiments to validate and develop new war-fighting capabilities, efforts to assure U.S. allies and partners of our resolve to defend their territory, and efforts to build interoperability with partners.

The second objective in this LOE is to Prepare the Battlespace (LOE 3.2), including operational preparation of the environment activities for both maneuver units and cyber forces; space forces and information-focused forces; reception, staging, and onward integration efforts; intelligence preparation of the environment; strategic intelligence collection prior to conflict; logistics supply and sustainment efforts; and efforts to build various human and logistical networks to support forward operations.

This LOE is undeniably an extremely critical contribution for the Army and Joint Force in competition, to the extent that no other entity within the U.S. government plays a role in deterring conventional aggression and preparing for war. Yet, preparing for war is just one of the three overall LOEs for competition in our framework. Therefore, deterring conventional aggression

is just a subset of what is required for success in competition, and military capabilities also play important roles in strengthening allies and partners and in winning without fighting outside the context of preparing for war.

Imperatives Framework

As noted earlier, existing strategic, policy, and doctrinal guidance documents pertaining to competition do not establish a clear hierarchy of defense objectives in competition. However, relevant guidance documents, including the 2018 NDS, the 2017 NSS, Army MDO Concept 2028, and the IW Annex to the 2018 NDS, do mention in passing a panoply of organizational behavioral ideals that should optimally characterize DoD and service operations to ensure success in competition. We conducted a thematic, iterative trend analysis of these documents to capture and organize the discussion of such organizational behavioral characteristics within guidance documents. This analysis, including our definitions of the imperatives, was informed by a review of organizational design and related literatures, including strategic management and organizational innovation literature.⁹ The result of this analysis is an imperatives framework aimed at highlighting the *ways* in which processes and organizations should be oriented to best achieve competition objectives. Our focus differed in that we sought to describe how DoD and Army organizations should operate to achieve noncombat goals.

⁹ Some of the organizational literature we reviewed overlaps with literature on military innovation because organizational theory (e.g., March and Simon's impact on organizational innovation theory and literature linking organizational culture to innovation) has informed the rich body of military innovation research (James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958; Jeffrey A. Isaacson, Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla, *Predicting Military Innovation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, DB-242-A, 1999). Our literature review focused more directly on organizational literature because several of the concepts that emerged from the analysis of the core documents of interest focused less directly on military outcomes, such as the development of new warfighting concepts or new means for integrating technology, and more directly on internal organizational processes (Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 5, October 2006). Additionally, because some terms, such as *agile*, have a strong presence in academic and practitioner bodies of literature outside a military innovation context, we focused on pulling from a wide range of organizational literature to help contextualize the imperatives.

This framework, which informs our analysis of DoD and Army processes in the next four chapters, corresponds with recognized best practices in the organizational theory literature. A given organization or process need not be optimized for *each* imperative; some imperatives are more critical to particular processes than are others, and the extent to which a process or organization meets the imperatives most relevant to its overall aims is what matters. To determine which imperatives were particularly critical to specific processes, we sent interviewees read-ahead materials in advance of each interview that included definitions of each imperative. The read-ahead materials specified that these imperatives had been derived from strategic guidance documents, including the 2018 NDS and Army MDO Concept 2028, in conjunction with principles gleaned from the organizational literature. During interviews, we again presented interviewees with the list of imperatives and the definitions of each imperative. Then, as part of our interview protocol, we asked interviewees to identify the imperatives that they considered most relevant to the processes in their area of expertise. Specifically, we asked interviewees to identify the imperatives that the processes were meeting *best* and those that the processes were *not* meeting or were *not yet* meeting. We reminded interviewees that they did not need to address *each* imperative for a given process but only those at which they believed the processes were either particularly adept or were significantly challenged in meeting. Table 2.2 introduces and defines the six key imperatives for competition.

TABLE 2.2
Imperatives for Competition

Imperative	Definition
Agility	An agile organization is an organization that aims to achieve both stability and dynamism by acting as a “network of teams within a people-centered culture that operates in rapid learning and fast decision cycles which are enabled by technology, and that is guided by a powerful common purpose to co-create value for all stakeholders.” ^a
Innovation	Innovation is “the process of ideation, evaluation, selection, development, and implementation of new or improved products, services, or programs.” ^b

Table 2.2—Continued

Imperative	Definition
Resilience	Resilience can be defined in terms of “organizational and employee strength, perseverance and recovery when encountering adversity.” ^c Alternatively, it can be defined as the “ability to maintain a critical level of operational capability despite disruptive events and regardless of the impact on individual systems and components.” ^d
Integration	Integration within an organization means using “rules and procedures, configurational plans, the authority of the hierarchy and decision-making committees” to “make different departments work in coordination.” ^e
Efficiency (including cost effectiveness)	Efficiency is defined as the “amount of resources used to achieve the organization’s goals.” ^f While efficiency typically refers to “inputs, use of resources, and costs,” ^g “administrative efficiency” focuses on how “work processes contribute to the overall value added in an organization.” ^h
Proactivity	Proactivity consists of certain behaviors, such as “taking charge, voicing issues, and initiating change,” that are considered to bring value to groups and organizations. ⁱ “Proactive” is often used in contrast to “reactive.” ^j

^a Wouter Aghina, Karin Ahlbäck, Aaron De Smet, Clemens Fahrbach, Christopher Handscomb, Gerald Lackey, Michael Lurie, Monica Murarka, Olli Salo, Elizabeth Seem, and Jannik Woxholth, “The Five Trademarks of Agile Organizations,” webpage, McKinsey & Company, 2017.

^b M. Malinoski and G. S. Perry, “How Do I Measure ‘Innovation’?!?” Cary, N.C.: Balanced Scorecard Institute, 2000.

^c Martina K. Linnenluecke, “Resilience in Business and Management Research: A Review of Influential Publications and a Research Agenda,” *International Journal of Management Reviews*, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 2017, p. 4.

^d Alan D. Meyer, “Adapting to Environmental Jolts,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 4, December 1982.

^e Richard M. Burton, Borge Obel, and Geraldine DeSanctis, *Organizational Design: A Step-by-Step Approach*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 39–40.

^f Richard L. Daft, *Organization Theory and Design*, Boston, Mass.: Cengage Learning, 2016, p. 23.

^g Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011, p. 11.

^h Charles Lusthaus, Marie-Helene Adrien, Gary Anderson, Fred Carden, and George Plinio Montalvan, *Organizational Assessment: A Framework for Improving Performance*, Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank/International Development Research Centre, 2002, p. 116.

ⁱ Scott L. Martin, Hui Liao, and Elizabeth M. Campbell, “Directive Versus Empowering Leadership: A Field Experiment Comparing Impacts on Task Proficiency and Proactivity,” *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 5, October 2013, p. 1372.

^j Darrel K. Rigby, Jeff Sutherland, and Andy Noble, “Agile at Scale,” *Harvard Business Review*, May–June 2018.

We will discuss how each of the four processes—security cooperation, FMS, GDP planning and GFM, and Army talent management—align with these imperatives in Chapters Three through Six. Notably, we reviewed only a subset of DoD processes in this project and cannot confirm the representativeness of the findings for all processes across DoD. Failure or success in any of the imperative ratings is not intended to indicate an assessment of holistic failure or success of any of these processes. However, our analysis indicates that, from the perspective of improving its competitive posture below the threshold of armed conflict, DoD may want to look more closely at how to improve agility, integration, and efficiency across a broader span of processes.¹⁰ Conversely, this analysis suggests that DoD is enjoying relative success in terms of innovation, a trend that should be perpetuated. These findings are preliminary and deserve further exploration across a variety of different processes but do indicate the areas for process improvement to best enable the United States to gain an edge over its near-peer competitors.

Each of these two frameworks—the objectives framework and the imperatives framework—provides a conceptual basis for significant portions of the analysis in the remaining chapters. However, even beyond the assessments we conducted for this research effort, these frameworks are tools in their own right. We would encourage policymakers to adapt these tools for their own needs long into the future and to use them to assess progress in strengthening the U.S. ability to engage effectively in strategic competition.

¹⁰ The position of the chief management officer, although intended to improve agility, integration, and efficiency by supporting business transformation efforts within DoD, has not led to substantial improvement in these areas.

Security Cooperation Processes

Overview and Purpose of Process

Security cooperation includes a wide range of activities aimed at advancing U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by building the capacity and capability of partner nations. While there is no governmentwide definition outlining which activities fall under the security cooperation umbrella, DSCA's definition includes

all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.¹

Ultimately, the purpose of security cooperation is to

build relationships that help promote U.S. interests; enable partner nations . . . to provide the [United States with] access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives.²

¹ DSCA 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, undated.

² Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017, p. V.

This report focuses on Title 10 programs for building partner capacity, which include train-and-equip and institutional capacity-building activities, although our analysis of relevant authorities also includes a discussion of non-Title 10 authorities. While how security cooperation activities are resourced and executed and the specific requirements of each authority vary, the security cooperation process is largely driven by first assessing U.S. strategic objectives within a country or region, as well as a partner nation's capability and capacity, then designing and planning activities or programs using the assessment; executing activities and monitoring progress toward the objectives; and, finally, evaluating the outputs and outcomes against the objectives.

Relationship to Competition

Security cooperation activities are particularly central to the first competition objective: strengthening allies and partners. Security cooperation activities are designed to build partner capacity and develop close ties with strategic partners.³ U.S. strategy in this area focuses on providing tangible

³ For past RAND research on security cooperation, see Jefferson P. Marquis, Michael J. McNerney, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Merrie Archer, Jeremy Boback, and David Stebbins, *Developing an Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Framework for U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1611-OSD, 2016; Michael J. McNerney, Jefferson P. Marquis, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, and Ariel Klein, *SMART Security Cooperation Objectives: Improving DoD Planning and Guidance*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1430-OSD, 2016; Angela O'Mahony, Ilana Blum, Gabriela Armenta, Nicholas Burger, Joshua Mendelsohn, Michael J. McNerney, Steven W. Popper, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Thomas S. Szayna, *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2165-A, 2018; Christopher Paul, Michael Nixon, Heather Peterson, Beth Grill, and Jessica Yeats, *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TL-112-OSD, 2013; David E. Thaler, Beth Grill, Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, and Stephanie Pezard, *Factoring Security Cooperation into Core U.S. Air Force Decisionmaking Processes: Incorporating Impact in Planning, Programming, and Capability Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2351-AF, 2018; David E. Thaler, Michael J. McNerney, Beth Grill, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Amanda Kadlec, *From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,

support to partners through training, equipment transfers, and education programs and building military-to-military relationships. Building partner capacity can include military capacity, such as Section 333 programs that provide training and equipment to partner-nation units. It frequently involves institutional capacity-building programs, which are designed to ensure that partner nations are able to “absorb, apply, and sustain” national security capabilities and exercise responsible civilian control.⁴

Security cooperation professionals design programs in part to ensure that the United States is the partner of choice. This supports the sale of U.S. equipment and helps foster interoperability but also builds relationships with partner militaries. Army units work hand in hand with partner-nation units to provide required training and institutional support and to build familiarity and trust between militaries.⁵ Military-to-military engagements and International Military Education and Training programs, which bring partner-nation officers and noncommissioned officers to U.S. education institutions, help ensure that members of partner-nation militaries share close ties with their U.S. counterparts as the members rise through the ranks.⁶ These relationships are an important tool to leverage in long-term competition with U.S. adversaries, contributing to competition objectives to win without fighting and positioning the United States to deter aggression and prepare the battlespace. Ideally, a partner nation that is interoperable with the United States and maintains close ties with the U.S. military will be an ally in deterring aggression and facilitate access to territory, information, and resources.

RR-1438-OSD, 2016; Scott W. Harold, Derek Grossman, Brian Harding, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Gregory Poling, Jeffrey Smith, and Meagan L. Smith, *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3125-MCF, 2019.

⁴ DSCA, “Institutional Capacity Building,” undated b.

⁵ R. Clarke Cooper, “America as the Partner of Choice,” remarks at the Meridien Center, Meridien House, Washington, D.C., October 31, 2019.

⁶ DSCA, “International Military Education and Training,” undated c.

Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships

The following list details the key actors and organizations involved in security cooperation efforts:

- The **Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation (ODASD [SC])** leads security cooperation policy, strategy, prioritization, and evaluation.⁷ This office is responsible for ensuring that security cooperation resourcing is aligned with the national defense strategy.
- **DSCA** is responsible for directing, administering, and providing guidance to the CCMDs and DoD components that execute the security cooperation programs for which DSCA has responsibility. DSCA attempts to integrate security cooperation programs to support a whole-of-government approach in an effort to ensure that security cooperation activities within each partner nation are working concurrently toward a consistent set of objectives.⁸
- The **geographic combatant commands (GCCs)** are responsible for establishing theater objectives through theater campaign plans. This drives prioritization and planning within DoD, DSCA, and the services.
- **HQDA** validates security cooperation activities that will be executed by the Army. HQDA also publishes Army campaign support plans (ACSPs), which detail “how the Army develops and synchronizes those capabilities in support of campaign plan objectives and GEF [Guidance for Employment of the Force] end states.”⁹ HQDA is also responsible for executing a variety of Army staff talks and formal Chief of Staff of the Army counterpart visits with a host of countries.

⁷ For additional insight into the role of ODASD (SC) and its relationship with DSCA, see Robert M. Scher, “Advance Policy Questions for Nominee Mr. Robert M. Scher to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities,” responses for the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, December 2014.

⁸ DSCA, “DSCA—Our Mission,” webpage, undated a.

⁹ Army Regulation (AR) 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Policy*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, March 21, 2013, § 1-5.

- **ASCCs** are responsible for developing theater and functional campaign support plans that address capabilities required to achieve CCMD objectives. ASCCs work with the GCCs, functional CCMDs, and HQDA in an effort to ensure that appropriate security cooperation activities are chosen to achieve desired objectives or provide the desired capabilities. ASCCs also develop force requirement estimates.¹⁰
- **USASAC**, which is part of Army Materiel Command, is responsible for managing and executing Army SA and FMS programs using the total package approach to ensure that FMS cases are accompanied by capacity-building programs.¹¹
- **DRUs** develop funding requirements to support country objectives and directly execute security cooperation activities.¹²

Army's Current Role in Security Cooperation Processes

Using national strategic guidance documents, theater campaign plans, and other relevant guidance, each GCC first creates country plans consisting of objectives related to each partner nation or region within its area of responsibility (AOR). The Army uses GCC country plans to develop its own ACSPs, which outline the Army resources required to support the activities in each GCC.¹³ The GCCs develop assessments of their current relationship with and the capabilities of each partner nation. The Army plays an important role in contributing to the assessments, providing an assessment of the partner nation's capability and capacity to conduct military missions and of the partner-nation military's interoperability with the Army.¹⁴ The Army also shares its expertise on the appropriate programs or activities to

¹⁰ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-5.

¹¹ USASAC, "About," webpage, undated.

¹² AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-18.

¹³ PAM 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 6, 2015, § 3-2.

¹⁴ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 3-5.

be included in the design and planning of security cooperation activities. In addition to ensuring that appropriate activities are funded, participation in this process provides Army leaders with insight into force requirements, informing the GFM process.¹⁵

Adapting Security Cooperation Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition

Although security cooperation plays an important role in competition, a number of barriers in the ways that security cooperation processes work prevent the Army from tailoring its contributions to competitive objectives, particularly LOE 1, Strengthening Allies and Partners. To discern weaknesses and strengths in the operation of security cooperation processes aimed at fulfilling competition objectives, we looked to the imperatives

¹⁵ Within their respective theaters, the ASCCs are well-positioned to have insight into Army capabilities and specific objectives and are thus a particularly important part of the security cooperation life cycle. ASCCs use the campaign support plans to identify the expected demand for forces and the need for accompanying training, equipment, technology, and information. Conventional forces drawn from theater-assigned units, rotational units, units deployed under a request for forces, mobile training teams, and the National Guard or Reserve execute security cooperation activities with augmentation from ASCCs, ACOMs, and DRUs. While executing activities, the ASCCs and DRUs are responsible for collecting data to monitor progress toward program objectives and submitting that data to the Army Global Outlook System and the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System, which will soon be transitioned to Socium. See PAM 11-31, 2015, §§ 2-5, 2-7. Socium is

a DoD enterprise-wide cloud-based activity and workflow management tool that will facilitate and integrate the planning, budgeting, collaboration, program design, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting in support of all U.S. Security Cooperation (SC) activities in one streamlined and intuitive interface”

that replaces the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System. See DSCA “Privacy Impact Assessment” form for Socium, September 24, 2020. We have been unable to find definitive evidence that this has been implemented already, but we found a source indicating that it received HSPC/PII approval in September 2020, so we think it may already be in place. The SCIP portal is separate from Socium (“Security Cooperation Information Portal,” webpage, undated e).

framework elaborated in Chapter Two. Our findings suggest that security cooperation processes are largely resilient; not very well integrated; and partially agile, innovative, efficient, and proactive.¹⁶ Notably, our interviews and analyses indicate that organizational and process *integration* and *agility* are most relevant to the security cooperation enterprise; we will, therefore, discuss the findings with regard to these two imperatives in detail. In doing so, we acknowledge that the other imperatives do inform the success of security cooperation processes but to a more limited degree.¹⁷ In the small sample of interviews we conducted ($n = 5$) with experts at various levels of seniority in the security cooperation enterprise, we largely found agreement on the challenges inherent in DoD and Army security cooperation processes related to these imperatives.

The Security Cooperation Enterprise Is Not Well Integrated

Integration is a particular challenge for the Army's security cooperation efforts and across the enterprise. In an integrated organization, rules, procedures, and a clear hierarchy allow different components to work in coordination effectively.¹⁸ This affects not only the extent of the Army's role in security cooperation efforts but also the effectiveness of security cooperation processes in meeting LOE 1, Strengthen Allies and Partners, as an element of broader competition efforts. We will examine each of these challenges in greater detail in turn.

¹⁶ These coding decisions were based on interviews with relevant stakeholders.

¹⁷ During the interviews for this project, we also asked interviewees which imperatives were most relevant to the processes in their area of expertise. The imperatives identified here as being most relevant to the security cooperation enterprise—and to the other processes examined in this report—are those the interviewees as such. Each of the processes included in our analysis have different strengths and weaknesses; as mentioned in Chapter Two, the imperatives are not equally relevant to each process. Success in meeting the imperatives can be gauged in terms of a process having the appropriate balance of imperatives and strength in the imperatives most relevant to the characteristics of that particular process.

¹⁸ Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011, pp. 39–40.

First, according to our interviews with stakeholders, both the Army's own security cooperation practitioners and those in the broader security cooperation enterprise lack a clear and consistent understanding of the objectives of security cooperation activities or how and when to deliver resources to achieve the highest possible return on investment.¹⁹ No centralized office handles security cooperation across the U.S. government. Therefore, DoD, the Department of State, DSCA, each of the services (including the Army), and other stakeholders have developed their own security cooperation objectives. Although the Army and other components of the security cooperation enterprise use similar strategic documents to craft these objectives, the stovepiped nature of this process translates into a notable lack of consistency across the enterprise. As a result, Army security cooperation practitioners, along with their counterparts in other services, have less visibility into how their work ties to what the Army and DoD are trying to achieve overall. Two interviewees highlighted two aspects of this problem in the context of great power competition: Our interlocutor from DSCA noted that security cooperation authorities developed for the Global War on Terror may not be as relevant for competition, while our interviewee from USINDOPACOM argued that lower-level staff across the security cooperation bureaucracy may not know how their efforts fit into the larger competition effort.²⁰

Second, the lack of a centralized security cooperation leadership structure has led to uncertainty over roles and responsibilities across the enterprise. This uncertainty creates confusion regarding the appropriate lead for different steps of security cooperation processes. As one interviewee noted, USASAC, DASA (DE&C), and DSCA are all involved in resourcing and execution, creating confusion about who leads the process at each step, while the Army's Security Force Assistance Command, which is part of U.S. Army Forces Command, oversees the work of security force assistance bri-

¹⁹ Interview with DSCA official, December 18, 2020; Interview with OASD (SC) official, December 15, 2020.

²⁰ Interview with DSCA official, December 18, 2020; Interview with USINDOPACOM official, December 17, 2020. DSCU and theater campaign plans, however, may serve as references for staff to learn more about how their efforts support broader competition goals.

gades.²¹ This confusion is magnified by the variety of different authorities that govern security cooperation activities, which translates into a variety of budgeting and resource allocation processes. In turn, these factors make it more difficult for the Army to discern how best to contribute to security cooperation efforts, which means that these efforts are less likely to benefit from the Army's perspective. Given the primacy of security cooperation efforts to meet the competition objective of strengthening allies and partners, this is a critical area for Army process improvement.

Third, information-sharing across the security cooperation enterprise is largely driven by ad hoc interactions. This exacerbates the lack of visibility of Army security cooperation practitioners into broader security cooperation efforts. We found agreement among several parts of the security cooperation bureaucracy on this point. For example, interviewees from OASD (SC), DSCA, and USINDOPACOM noted that the distributed management of the security cooperation enterprise does not promote effective information-sharing and leads to stovepiping. As a result, there is a lack of visibility into what others are doing, even within the same AOR.²²

This lack of visibility, in turn, makes it difficult for the Army to identify opportunities to contribute to and align Army security cooperation activities with broader competition efforts. As an interviewee from U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) explained, a reliance on ad hoc interactions means that a working group intended to improve communication, for example, may

²¹ Interview with USINDOPACOM official, December 17, 2020.

²² Interview with OASD (SC) official, December 15, 2020; Interview with DSCA official, December 18, 2020; Interview with USINDOPACOM official, December 17, 2020. The importance of avoiding stovepiping and facilitating visibility into what others are doing is illustrated by the historical example of the Joint Force Development Group. The group consisted of six hand-picked majors and lieutenant colonels from the Army and Air Force. They were purposefully selected to “avoid the so-called ‘Iron Major’ syndrome,” which refers to an officer who becomes “such an ardent advocate of his own service program that he . . . neither compromise[s] on the details of a project nor consider[s] alternatives to it” (Richard G. Davis, *The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force–Army Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1987, p. 41). Group members were selected for their joint backgrounds, which meant they were “familiar with the language and foibles of the other service” and were able to “tak[e] a free and open approach to problems” (Davis, 1987, p. 41).

in fact undercut existing informal communication networks.²³ Improving information-sharing between different parts of the security cooperation enterprise will improve overall coordination of security cooperation efforts, thereby enhancing the contributions of these efforts to competition objectives under LOE 1, Strengthening Allies and Partners.

Security Cooperation Processes Exhibit Some Degree of Agility, But Challenges Remain

Interviewees consistently noted the relevance of *agility* to the security cooperation process. An agile organization is characterized by rapid learning and fast decision cycles that enable stakeholders to create value.²⁴ In the large and diverse security cooperation community, it is challenging to bring holistic, multiyear, multiauthority initiatives from initial design to execution. In addition to the difficulty of working with many parties in a distributed system, interlocutors frequently noted the significant constraints that the fiscal-year budget cycle imposes on multiyear planning.²⁵ To obtain the required approvals and funding, program planning must begin several years ahead of execution. Despite these issues, security cooperation planners have found novel ways to maintain agility, starting planning cycles earlier and speeding up decisionmaking to ensure responsiveness.²⁶ As noted earlier, planners across the enterprise have also created informal groups for collaborating and sharing information.

Current Efforts to Streamline and Improve Security Cooperation Processes

In recognition of these challenges, DoD has responded with several ongoing initiatives. First, the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU), which was created to educate a professional security cooperation workforce,

²³ Interview with USARPAC official, December 8, 2020.

²⁴ Aghina et al., 2017.

²⁵ Interview with USARPAC official, December 8, 2020. Interview with OASD (SC) official, December 15, 2020.

²⁶ Interview with OASD (SC) official, December 15, 2020.

is an avenue for Army security cooperation practitioners can use to improve their understanding of relevant processes, objectives, and the role of security cooperation in competition. DSCU courses provide a basic understanding of security cooperation planning processes and the roles and responsibilities of different entities.

Second, existing challenges related to information sharing may be mitigated by introducing enterprise-wide systems, such as the Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMS), now known as Socium, and periodic conferences that specifically aim to improve communication. The Joint Security Sector Assistance Review, for example, provides a formal avenue for information sharing and deconfliction. These efforts will enable Army security cooperation efforts to be more agile by increasing Army practitioners' awareness of ongoing activities. In addition, the participation of other service representatives and of planners from DSCA and the GCCs in Army security cooperation meetings can improve information-sharing between the Army and other parts of the security cooperation enterprise, thereby improving the ability of security cooperation efforts to meet the demands of competition through LOE 1, Strengthening Allies and Partners.

Third, an effort will improve the visibility of Army security cooperation practitioners into broader security cooperation efforts by developing an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework. This effort, which was mandated in the 2017 NDAA,²⁷ will enable the integration of this framework into planning and execution cycles. Much of this process is led by ODASD (SC), which is responsible for the Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives process and serves as the central evaluation office.²⁸ Evaluations will include targeted recommendations to improve the security cooperation enterprise. This effort should provide practitioners, both within the Army and in other services, with a clear understanding of the objectives of secu-

²⁷ Pub. L. 114-328, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, December 23, 2016.

²⁸ Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 13, 2017.

rity cooperation programs, while also helping policymakers understand the extent to which security cooperation is achieving these objectives.

These efforts to improve the agility of security cooperation processes are promising regarding the potential for both overarching U.S. and Army-specific security cooperation activities to contribute positively to the competition objective of strengthening allies and partners. Shortcomings in the overall integration of security cooperation processes, meanwhile, indicate areas of needed improvement to ensure that the Army, DoD, and the U.S. government as a whole are fulfilling the competition objectives related to strengthening allies and partners.

Foreign Military Sales Processes

Overview and Purpose of Process

FMS, a component of SA, are authorized under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).¹ Section 3 of the AECA permits the United States to “sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President makes a determination that a prospective purchaser is eligible.”² Eligible countries and entities are identified in DSCA’s *Security Assistance Management Manual*.³ The manual contains policy guidance on various aspects of SA and cooperation.

DoD executes FMS on behalf of the Department of State, meaning that FMS qualifies as a form of SA.⁴ The *Green Book* explains this contractual arrangement:

¹ Pub. L. 94-329, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, June 30, 1976.

² Pub. L. 94-329, 1976; DSCU, *Security Cooperation Management*, 40th ed., Arlington, Va., May 2020 (also known as the *Green Book*), p. 5-1.

³ DSCA 5105.38-M, undated, Table C4.T2.

⁴ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-1. While the term *security assistance* is often conflated with security cooperation, DSCA treats it as a subset of the broader security cooperation category. The main distinguishing factors are the authorities and lead actors for SA, which is conducted under Title 22 authority and overseen (and sometimes implemented) by the Department of State. According to DSCA, SA refers to:

A group of programs, authorized under Title 22 authorities, by which the United States provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. All SA programs are subject to the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State to best serve U.S. foreign policy interests; however, programs are variously administered by DoD or Depart-

FMS programs are conducted through binding contractual agreements between the U.S. government (USG) and an authorized foreign purchaser. These government-to-government agreements to transfer defense articles and services are called Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs). A signed LOA, along with its associated revisions, is called an FMS case.⁵

The goal of FMS is to help partner nations “achieve full-spectrum capability, which increases U.S. national security and also partner nation national security.”⁶

The FMS process has three main phases: pre-case development, case development, and case implementation and execution. Figure 4.1 sets out the steps in each phase.

Relationship to Competition


As stated earlier, FMS programs are a key component of SA and security cooperation. Therefore, as with security cooperation processes, these programs contribute to LOE 1, Strengthen Allies and Partners. FMS programs allow the United States to build partner capacity and build and deepen relationships with desired partners. This is particularly true because the sys-

ment of State (DoS). Those SA programs that are administered by DoD are a subset of SC.” (“Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships,” in DSCA 5105.38-M, undated)

⁵ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-1.

⁶ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-2. As noted in this report, there is a great deal of overlap between security cooperation and FMS processes. Past RAND work on FMS has therefore primarily covered security cooperation more broadly. See, for example, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler, *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-413-OSD, 2013; Philip S. Anton, Brynn Tannehill, Jake McKeon, Benjamin Goirigolzarri, Maynard A. Holliday, Mark A. Lorell, and Obaid Younossi, *Strategies for Acquisition Agility: Approaches for Speeding Delivery of Defense Capabilities*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4193-AF, 2020; Scott W. Harold, “Making Sense of U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan,” *The RAND Blog*, August 9, 2019; RAND Corporation, “Russian Arms Sales and Sanctions Monthly Snapshot,” webpage, June 2021.

FIGURE 4.1
Overview of the Foreign Military Sales Process



SOURCE: The text in this figure has been adapted from Table 5-1, “Foreign Military Sales Process,” in DSCU, 2020, pp. 5-2 and 5-3.

NOTES: SCO = Security Cooperation Organization; LOR = letter of request; IA = implementing agency; CWD = Case Writing Division; DOC = Department of Commerce; DSAMS = Defense Security Assistance Management System; HQ = headquarters; DFAS = Defense Finance and Accounting Service; SCA = Security Cooperation Accounting.

tems provided through FMS programs often come with several-year-long agreements for sustainment, training, and other activities. FMS can thus be an important means of increasing U.S. influence in partner nations. FMS also allows the United States to enhance interoperability with partners, which facilitates joint exercises, training, and joint operations in the event

of a conflict. FMS can also bolster deterrence in the potential target countries of shared adversaries by equipping the countries with systems that can dissuade or deny an attack. This, in turn, can help set the conditions for effective competition below the threshold of armed conflict by mitigating adversary threats and frees resources to contribute to other types of competition efforts.

Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships

Numerous implementing agencies oversee various aspects of the FMS process. The following are the main actors involved in the process and their responsibilities:

- **Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force:** The military departments all serve as implementing agencies for FMS, with the Army writing the largest number of FMS cases.⁷
- **National Security Agency:** This is the largest FMS implementing agency outside the military and serves as the FMS authority for all encryption equipment, meaning that the agency must grant approval for the sale of any such items.⁸
- **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency:** This agency has authority over the sale of any equipment involving geospatial intelligence and also writes and manages related cases.⁹
- **Defense Information Systems Agency:** This agency supports the FMS process by “provid[ing] internet connection services, networking systems, command and control systems, software, and information assurance support services through FMS LOAs to coalition partners.”¹⁰
- **Defense Contract Management Agency:** This agency “provides Contract Administration Services . . . to partner nations who elect to pur-

⁷ DSCU, 2020, pp. 5-21 to 5-23.

⁸ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-24.

⁹ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-24.

¹⁰ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-25.

chase their defense articles and/or services through Direct Commercial Sales.”¹¹

- **Missile Defense Agency:** This agency is responsible for providing U.S. ballistic missile defense systems to FMS customers.¹²
- **DSCA:** Although it plays a key role in related security cooperation processes and has the right to write and manage FMS cases, DSCA has not exercised this right since 2002 and thus does not currently play a major role in FMS.¹³
- **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA):** The DLA manages DoD’s inventory of consumable items and spare parts, which are cataloged in the Federal Logistics Information System. The DLA also “provides catalog data and cataloging services to partner nations through the DLA Logistics Information Service . . . [and] manages surplus property disposal of non-lethal equipment, which may be granted to or purchased by partner nations through the DLA Disposition Services.”¹⁴
- **Defense Threat Reduction Agency:** This agency conducts assessments of partner-nation capacity to store weapons of mass destruction. It also assists with and verifies the destruction of weapons by partner nations.¹⁵

Army’s Current Role in FMS Processes

In terms of FMS cases written, the Department of the Army is the largest implementing agency, defined as “a DoD organization authorized to receive and respond to LORs with an LOA,” of FMS programs.¹⁶ Several Army organizations have FMS responsibilities:

¹¹ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-25.

¹² DSCU, 2020, p. 5-25.

¹³ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-25.

¹⁴ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-24.

¹⁵ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-25.

¹⁶ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-21.

- The **Office of the DASA (DE&C)** is one of the Army's two lead organizations for implementing FMS responsibilities. In this capacity, DASA (DE&C) has "management oversight for Army Security Assistance policy as well as for international armaments cooperation, foreign disclosure, technology transfer, and munitions export licensing."¹⁷
- **Headquarters, USASAC** is the other major Army player in FMS because it is responsible for receiving and tasking out (through the Defense Security Assistance Management System) all Army letters of request for materiel and overseas training.¹⁸
- A **branch of USASAC** located in Pennsylvania serves as the Army's international logistics control office for FMS; in this capacity, the branch houses the Army's central case managers who write and manage cases for follow-on support.¹⁹
- The **Security Assistance Training Field Activity** is responsible for writing and managing cases for U.S.-based and institutional training, while the **Security Assistance Training Management Organization** is "responsible for selecting, training, and supporting mobile training teams . . . that deploy overseas to support security cooperation training requirements."²⁰
- The **U.S. Army Corps of Engineers** is responsible for handling FMS cases dealing with Army design and construction services.²¹
- Beyond these formal organizational responsibilities, the Army can play a role in identifying partner requirements. Because the Army typically engages in security cooperation efforts through training and otherwise helping build the capacity of partner nations, it can provide FMS planners with insight into the needs and absorptive capacity of partner nations to help facilitate FMS.

¹⁷ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-22.

¹⁸ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-22.

¹⁹ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-22.

²⁰ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-22.

²¹ DSCU, 2020, pp. 5-22 to 5-23.

Adapting FMS Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition

Through our interviews and additional research, we identified *agility*, *proactivity*, and *efficiency* as being the imperatives most relevant to the successful execution of FMS processes vis-à-vis competition.²² Innovation is crucial to the development of new weapon systems and equipment to meet U.S. needs, as well as those of partner nations. However, because our focus is on processes related to the sale rather than development of these weapons, we did not consider innovation as one of the most relevant imperatives for this analysis. In evaluating the performance of the current process against each of the imperatives, we identified considerable gaps in agility, proactivity, and efficiency. In the rest of this section, we examine the ways in which the current system is not meeting each of the relevant imperatives.

FMS Processes Lack Agility

Critiques of the FMS process typically center on the slow pace of its execution, which breeds a lack of agility. There is considerable debate—both among the five interviews we conducted related to FMS and within policy circles—as to whether the slow nature of the process is deliberate, prudent, and inevitable, or whether it stems from inefficiencies in the process that could and should be improved. One interviewee, for instance, characterized “decisionmaking by FMS planners” as “often slow,” noting that “customers are always complaining about how slow FMS is, especially when talking about great power competition.”²³ Another interviewee argued, however, that the FMS process is slow by design and that this slowness is actually a strength of the process.²⁴ In this view, the FMS process enables deliberate,

²² As noted previously, this assessment is not meant to imply that the other imperatives are not relevant but, rather, that the selected imperatives are most critical to the successful execution of FMS processes.

²³ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

²⁴ Ensuring transparency and accountability are also important attributes of the FMS process, and these attributes may be facilitated by the deliberate nature of this process;

strategic decisionmaking by allowing the U.S. government to ensure that it provides a comprehensive suite of training, services, and other support with each sale through the Total Package Approach.²⁵ The deliberate nature of the FMS process also ensures that the United States sells to responsible and capable partners. Indeed, as the interviewee explained,

[p]eople complain that the process is slow; the process is not slow, the process is deliberate. Unlike other countries, the United States takes a more careful and systematic approach. When the process needs to speed up, it tends to speed up. Most critical systems are able to get out, but not everybody's going to get stuff overnight.²⁶

Another reported success of the FMS process is that it is well documented and can easily be tracked through the Security Cooperation Information Portal, which provides U.S. government and partner-nation personnel the ability to view and follow the status of individual FMS cases. The differences in opinion over the agility of the FMS system could stem from the differing nature of the roles of our interviewees; for instance, those focused on high-level strategy may see the benefits of having a slower, more deliberate process to ensure compliance with the tenets of the Total Package Approach, while officials working at the more tactical, implementation levels may view the slow pace as a damaging constraint because they are unable to provide potential clients or partner nations with the items they need on a satisfactory timeline.

to best enable success in competition, however, the slow pace of the FMS process represents an area for improvement (Interview with DASA (DE&C) official, December 14, 2020.).

²⁵ According to the *Green Book*, the Total Package Approach refers to the following idea:

Effective planning for an FMS weapon system sale involves anticipating not only the requirements for the weapon system itself, but also the associated initial and follow-on support articles and services necessary for introduction and sustainment of the system. (DSCU, 2020, p. 5-5)

²⁶ Interview with DASA (DE&C) official, December 14, 2020.

The FMS Process Is Characterized by a Lack of Proactivity

Putting aside the debate over whether the FMS process moves at an adequate pace, we identified several specific features that are contributing to a lack of proactivity; these, in turn, are hampering the efficiency of the overall process. Interviewees from several organizations specifically identified a lack of *proactivity*—defined as certain behaviors, such as taking charge and initiating change²⁷—among stakeholders as a clear area for improvement. As one interviewee observed, “some country program managers are not as proactive or determined to get things done in timely manner.”²⁸ This individual attributed this lack of proactivity to a “stovepiped mindset about having to do something in a particular order because that’s what policy says, rather than figuring out how to do things concurrently.”²⁹ Meanwhile, an interviewee from DSCA observed that the Army could improve its proactivity in executing FMS programs:

The Army waits until they have the cash on hand from the partner nation to initiate acquisition. The other services don’t do that. [By waiting until the funds come in to start the acquisition process,] the Army loses 30–60 days, so when there is a hot issue, they just can’t come through [with the equipment or capability].³⁰

This interviewee also noted that FMS planners are not always proactive in anticipating the requests and needs of partner nations and suggested that cultivating a better understanding of partner-nation requirements and

²⁷ Martin, Hui Liao, and Campbell, 2013, p. 1372.

²⁸ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020. Here, the example of the British Army during the Falklands War illustrates the importance of cultivating proactivity in organizations. British soldiers were not empowered to proactively make decisions during the conflict, which was subsequently linked to increased casualties. The introduction of the Mission Command system, which gave “people the tools to make rapid decisions in order to disrupt the enemy,” was intended to address this shortcoming (Justin Maciejewski and Rob Theunissen, “How the British Army’s Operations Went Agile,” *McKinsey Quarterly*, October 31, 2019).

²⁹ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

³⁰ Interview with DSCA official, December 7, 2020.

learning to better predict future requests would help speed up the FMS process.

This sentiment was echoed in other interviews as well.³¹ Another interviewee suggested that FMS planners should evaluate host-nation capacity more thoroughly in advance to improve their understanding of what is feasible to provide to the country, although country directors do typically conduct such analyses to at least some extent. Army Futures Command, the interviewee suggested, should be

thinking about exportability to USG [U.S. government] partner nations beyond NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. Especially out at INDOPACOM—a lot of these countries don't have the capability to work on our most advanced systems. A lot of times when they want to get in, we say it's not available to them, or they've been priced out. This is outside of the Army, those agreements have to be done with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, etc.³²

A related issue that affects the Army's ability to be proactive in this space is that the Army does not have policies to cover all FMS requests, particularly when it comes to technology transfers. As one interviewee explained: "Sometimes we run into situations where there's not a precedent for something." Using the example of a recent case, in which India wanted to acquire items quickly for immediate use, they explained that "there was a lot of back-and-forth with OSD-P because we didn't have an Army policy on exporting uniforms" and suggested that it would be useful for the Army to reassess some of its policies and regulations.³³

To get ahead of these issues, the Army could update its export policies to try to anticipate and account for the types of requests that may arise from partner nations. This would help the Army mitigate delays when new requests come through, as some policy would theoretically be in place to deal with the incoming request.

³¹ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

³² Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

³³ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

Multiple Inefficiencies Plague FMS Processes

As mentioned in our discussion of security cooperation processes in Chapter Three, the Army's current organizational structure for planning and executing SA is a source of inefficiency because the key implementing organizations are poorly integrated with each other. Interviewees made clear that this inefficiency affects FMS acquisition processes as well. The Army, one interviewee noted, is disjointed when it comes to SA. The lack of a clear lead for SA efforts—USASAC or DASA (DE&C)—can also have negative effects on FMS planning and execution.³⁴ The interviewee explained:

USASAC does the execution realm and writes the FMS cases, but then DASA (DE&C) is the policy and resource lead for Security Assistance in the Army. DASA (DE&C) works for ASALT [Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology], and AMC [U.S. Army Material Command] is the lead for USASAC. [This system is] very disjointed; the leaders often do not have the same mindset in how to deal with the situations that come up. That disjointedness in the Army creates some lag and challenges in getting processes done. The sister services are not that disjointed—they're all under one lead, so it's much better when dealing with tech transfer, personnel management, etc. When the head of those organizations says something, it's final. For the Army, both organizations have to work out any disagreements first.³⁵

³⁴ The perils of disjointed organizations and lack of a clear lead were pointed out in the inquiry conducted by the Winograd Commission, which was formed after the Second Lebanon War. The commission recommended that Israel create an information and propaganda unit within the Israeli Defense Forces. The new unit, called the National Information Directorate, would lead efforts across a "spectrum of activities, including traditional media, new media, and diplomacy." It was intended to allow the Israeli Defense Forces to "present a unified, clear, and consistent message and maintain a single voice," which it had not done during the conflict in Lebanon (William B. Caldwell IV, Dennis M. Murphy, and Anton Menning, "Learning to Leverage New Media: The Israeli Forces in Recent Conflicts," *Military Review*, May–June 2009). See also Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Michael Schwille, Jakub P. Hlávka, Michael A. Brown, Steven S. Davenport, Isaac R. Porche III, and Joel Harding, *Lessons from Others for Future U.S. Army Operations in and Through the Information Environment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1925/1-A, 2018, pp. 8–9.

³⁵ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

This interviewee noted that other opportunities for improvement include providing more visibility into the system and increasing transparency for host-nation purchasers to assuage concerns over slow deliveries. Partner nations would particularly appreciate “more visibility into . . . our contracting or acquisition process.”³⁶

At the strategic level, moreover, there is not always clear guidance regarding how FMS programs fit into great power competition, an emphasis on leveraging FMS programs in competition, or a clear mechanism for how these programs lead to influence. As a result, implementing or executing agencies often do not think of FMS as a competitive tool, and FMS is not integrated into competition plans or strategy. This mismatch between strategy and available competitive tools has a negative effect on competition efforts:

One of America’s most important foreign policy tools is not fit for purpose. U.S. security sector assistance—the means by which the United States strengthens alliances and partners—is stuck in the past. Crucially, it is out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied [sic] and partners.

Despite widespread agreement on the need to prioritize strategic competition with Russia and China, the United States still directs a disproportionate amount of assistance toward the Middle East. An emphasis on counter-terrorism since 9/11 has also contributed to an emphasis on building the wrong capabilities. The United States is not equipping allies and partners with the capabilities they need to deal with competitors who are adopting increasingly sophisticated strategies in the areas of cyber security, strategic communications, and illicit commercial activity.³⁷

The United States is undoubtedly seeking to address multiple competing national security objectives through such efforts. However, if policymak-

³⁶ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

³⁷ Stephen Tankel and Tommy Ross, “Retooling U.S. Security Sector Assistance,” War on the Rocks website, October 28, 2020. Ross was the first DASD of OSD-P’s security cooperation office.

ers want to prioritize and optimize national security efforts for near-peer competition, a comprehensive, overarching strategy is needed to incorporate competitive aims into varied processes, such as those surrounding FMS acquisition and the other processes explored in this report. For instance, one interviewee from USASAC explained that their work is often not conducted with the broader context of great power competition in mind:

At USASAC, our mission is focused just on our little portion of what we're doing for a country. We're not really seeing what the other components are doing to shape that country for overall US goals. It's often not impressed upon lower-level staff how what we're working on fits into great power competition—how important selling a weapons system is, for example; it's not just us giving them that capability but also allowing USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] to come in and have access. We don't think of it in that manner—we just think we've given them X system. [In reality], it's more about access and helping them develop capabilities.³⁸

Additionally, the allocation of funding in one-year increments under Title 10, Section 333 can be disruptive in terms of long-term planning and makes it difficult for FMS planners to arrange for the timely, efficient delivery of capabilities to host nations. The same official explained:

If DSCA and Congress haven't agreed until June and the funding expires in September, that makes it very challenging for the office managing that program to implement. Some funding is two-year money, which is beneficial. Sometimes mistakes are made in the process because people are just trying to get that money obligated. If that program had a pot of money for two to five or two to three years instead of just that one-year money, it would really help both the service develop and . . . the partner nation get the capability they need. They could also get all of the pieces of a specific program at one time instead of piecemeal over several years.³⁹

³⁸ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

³⁹ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

Another opportunity for improvement relates to the waiver review process for nonrecurring costs. In its current form, the waiver review process contributes to the slow pace of FMS execution and represents a source of high costs and inefficiencies. As explained in a *Defense News* article,

[w]hile the Defense Security Cooperation Agency has final approval authority, the waiver is reviewed by up to 12 different offices in the Defense and State departments.

Not only does this create inefficiencies, like requiring 11 electronic signatures to confirm that a foreign buyer is in fact one of the 34 countries eligible for an equipment standardization waiver, it also makes tracking waiver data a nightmare.⁴⁰

Indeed, a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the current system for tracking FMS costs, including waivers, is not operating efficiently:

Currently, DSCA uses the Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS) to maintain records on FMS case initiation and execution, but an official stated the system was not designed to track non-recurring cost data, such as data on waivers requested or actual costs waived, for each individual FMS case. DSCA uses separate methods for tracking data on approved waivers and the equipment that was purchased as part of an individual FMS case. DSCA officials stated that to calculate the amount of nonrecurring costs actually waived for each approved waiver, they manually review DSAMS records for individual FMS cases to identify the planned quantity of items to be purchased.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Daniel Cebul, “GAO: Foreign Arms Sales Waivers Cost US Billions,” *Defense News*, February 2, 2018.

⁴¹ GAO, *Foreign Military Sales: DOD Should Take Additional Steps to Streamline Process for Assessing Potential Recovery of Certain Acquisition Costs*, Washington, D.C., GAO-18-242, January 2018, p. 14.

Finally, several legal constraints, including Leahy vetting,⁴² Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requirements, can slow down or otherwise pose obstacles for FMS, although these constraints are intended to ensure that the U.S. government sells only to partners that comply with U.S. laws and norms and are capable of receiving and using systems responsibly. There are also inherent constraints on how fast the FMS process can move because of the pace of development of new systems.⁴³ Research, development, and the fielding of new systems can take a long time and translate into long time horizons for the acquisition and sale of these systems. In addition, there are political limits on the types of systems that the United States can provide to other countries. For example, the United States will not provide certain air systems to non-NATO members in Europe because of fears that the systems could be used to instigate an attack on a NATO member. These technological and political limitations may result in delays even when the FMS process itself functions effectively.

Current Efforts to Streamline and Improve FMS Processes

DoD and other agencies are aware of many of these issues and, in recent years, have made efforts to speed up and otherwise improve FMS processes. This reflects a recognition that FMS processes, in their current form, are

⁴² *Leahy vetting* refers to the process for investigating whether individuals or units of a nation's security forces have engaged in human rights violations. This process is a prerequisite to providing U.S. assistance or training to such forces. For additional information on the process, see Michael J. McNerney, Jonah Blank, Becca Wasser, Jeremy Boback, and Alexander Stephenson, *Improving Implementation of the Department of Defense Leahy Law*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1737-OSD, 2017.

⁴³ The history of the Future Combat Systems program illustrates this point. Although the program was "predicated on significant leaps in technology," concept developers "suffered from a lack of fundamental technical knowledge. Technologies assumed to be developing were not," which led to the failure of the program (Christopher G. Pernin, Elliot Axelband, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian B. Dille, John Gordon IV, Bruce J. Held, K. Scott McMahon, Walter L. Perry, Christopher Rizzi, Akhil R. Shah, Peter A. Wilson, and Jerry M. Sollinger, *Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems Program*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1206-A, 2012, p. 250).

indeed too slow or, at least, that there is ample room for improvement. This is particularly relevant when considering the potential for FMS to contribute instrumentally to the U.S. competitive edge by enabling the United States to secure and strengthen partnerships. Shortcomings in FMS processes can have a real and detrimental effect on U.S. competition efforts by increasing the likelihood that potential U.S. partners will, instead, turn to the United States' near peers to acquire military equipment. The Green Book, which serves as a reference for security cooperation practitioners, acknowledges these efforts, stating:

DoD, DoS [the Department of State], and Congress are constantly trying to speed up the FMS process by trying to reduce time in several different lanes to include the following: LOA development, foreign disclosure and technology transfer decisions, acquisition, contracting, and more.⁴⁴

In a 2017 article, moreover, Pentagon officials characterized speeding up the FMS process as a priority:

Shanahan, a former Boeing executive, said he has been meeting with Lt. Gen. Charles Hooper, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency head[,] and Ellen Lord, the Pentagon's top acquisition official, to find ways to speed up the FMS process from the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense—or as [then-Deputy Secretary of Defense] Shanahan put it, “making sure we’re not standing on the air hose waiting for a signature.”⁴⁵

Of the four key processes examined in this report, FMS processes are perhaps the most problematic. With sustained high-level support, attention, and resources, however, DoD and the other U.S. government stakeholders in FMS should be able to make substantial progress on the issues identified because these agencies appear to be aware of several of these issues and have already taken steps to improve these overall FMS processes.

⁴⁴ DSCU, 2020, p. 5-2.

⁴⁵ Aaron Mehta, “2018 Pentagon Priority: Speeding Up Foreign Weapons Sales,” *Defense News*, December 29, 2017.

Global Defense Posture Planning and Global Force Management Processes

Overview and Purpose of Process

GDP planning and GFM are closely linked processes, with GDP being the process through which strategic decisions about force posture are made and with GFM being the process through which the decisions are implemented.¹ We elaborate on these distinctions in the next two subsections.²

¹ Interview with former U.S. government official and subject-matter expert on DoD force posture and force management processes, December 3, 2020.

² For additional background on these processes, see Stacie L. Pettyjohn, *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1244-AF, 2012; Thomas S. Szayna, Paul Dreyer, Derek Eaton, and Lisa Saum-Manning, *Army Global Basing Posture: An Analytic Framework for Maximizing Responsiveness and Effectiveness*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-158-A, 2015; Eric V. Larson, *Force Planning Scenarios, 1945–2016: Their Origins and Use in Defense Strategic Planning*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2173/1-A, 2019; David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, *U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1782-1-RC, 2017; Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Michael E. Linick, John E. Peters, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Keith Walters, Stephanie Young, H. G. Massey, and Michelle Darrah Ziegler, *Defense Planning in a Time of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the 2001–2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Implications for the Army*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1309-A, 2018; and Thomas S. Szayna, Stephen Watts, Angela O'Mahony, Bryan Frederick, and Jennifer Kavanagh, *What Are the Trends in Armed Conflicts, and*

Global Defense Posture

The GDP process “enables DoD Component input and informs senior-leader decisions in a timely manner [and] is structured and synchronized with the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process.”³ The GPEC manages GDP processes, serving as the “senior body overseeing posture processes and managing GDP alignment efforts” for DoD.⁴ GPEC provides a forum for stakeholders to interact and coordinate on a day-to-day basis, discuss priorities, evaluate the feasibility of proposals, and evaluate specific funding requests from the CCMDs and the services.⁵

Global Force Management

The GFM process aligns the “assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces to combatant commands” to support “the national defense strategy and joint force availability requirements.”⁶ The Secretary of Defense

What Do They Mean for U.S. Defense Policy? Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1904-A, 2017.

³ DoDI 3000.12, *Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 6, 2016, pp. 6–9. Strategic documents identify three main elements of force posture: force, footprints, and agreements. The main functions of the Global Posture Executive Council (GPEC) are to “oversee and manage GDP processes and procedures”; “provide recommendations to the SecDef [Secretary of Defense], CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and their staffs on appropriate global posture matters”; and “utilize the organizational expertise of its members to ensure respective equities are addressed during global posture actions and deliberations” (DoDI 3000.12, 2016, pp. 6–9).

⁴ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, pp. 6–9.

⁵ Interview with Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, official, January 6, 2021.

⁶ DoDI 8260.03, *The Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI)*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 19, 2014, p. 24. A more detailed definition of GFM describes it as

a process that aligns force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy and Joint Force availability requirements; presents comprehensive visibility of the global availability and operational readiness (to include language, regional, and cultural proficiency of U.S. conventional military forces); globally sources Joint Force requirements; and provides senior decision makers a vehicle to quickly and accurately assess the impact

directs this process under the authority of Title 10, Section 162.⁷ The three major GFM processes are assignment, allocation, and apportionment. The assignment and allocation processes “provide [the Secretary of Defense] the C2 [command and control] mechanisms to distribute forces to CCDRs [combatant commanders,]” while the apportionment process “provides an estimate of quantities of force types reasonably expected to be available over general timelines for planning purposes.”⁸ Each of these processes is summarized here:

- *Assignment.* Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy assign forces to CCDRs. This process occurs annually and is tracked via the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance in even years and the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum in odd years.⁹
- *Allocation.* Executed under the Secretary of Defense’s Title 10 authority to allocate forces among CCDRs, the allocation process “adjusts the distribution of forces and individual augmentees among the CCDRs to resource ongoing operations, crises, and strategic opportunities while mitigating near-term and strategic risk.”¹⁰ The Secretary of Defense’s decision is published annually in the CJCS Deployment Order, which is called the Global Force Management Allocation Plan.¹¹ The plan “specifies the command relationship the gaining CCDR exercises and the losing CCDR relinquishes and the time the force is to be allocated” with the aim of “postur[ing] forces against the strategic priorities first

and risk of proposed allocation, assignment, and apportionment changes.” (CJCS Guide 3130, *Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework*, Washington, D.C., March 5, 2019, p. GL-6)

⁷ U.S. Code (U.S.C.), Title 10, § 162, Combatant Commands: Assigned Forces; Chain of Command.

⁸ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1, 2020, p. D-1.

⁹ JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-2. See also JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 10, 2018, p. I-4.

¹⁰ JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-3.

¹¹ JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-3.

and adjust[ing] to meet the operational priorities while balancing risk to the force, current operations, and potential future contingencies.”¹²

- *Apportionment*. Informed by the GEF and Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, the apportionment of forces “provides an estimate of the capacity to generate capabilities that can reasonably be expected to be available along general timelines.”¹³ This estimate does not specify the actual units to be employed in executed plans but does inform CCDR planning more broadly. The main factors affecting apportionment decisions include “the number of operational forces, the readiness and availability of the forces, and the number of forces employed globally.”¹⁴

Forces are also aligned to requirements at three levels:

- *Preferred force identification*. The supported CCDR identifies preferred forces, which are those “identified as planning assumptions . . . to continue employment, sustainment, and transportation planning and to assess risk.”¹⁵
- *Contingency sourcing*. The Joint Force Coordinator and joint force providers

identify forces that meet sourcing guidance for plans on a specific date, which provides a snapshot depiction of potential sourcing . . . inform[ing] senior leadership of the sourcing feasibility and enabl[ing] further transportation feasibility.”¹⁶

- *Execution sourcing*. The joint force providers identify and recommend forces to be used in execution, which are then

reviewed through the GFM allocation process, and become sourced when approved by [the Secretary of Defense] for the

¹² JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-3.

¹³ JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-3.

¹⁴ JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-3.

¹⁵ JP 3-35, 2018, p. I-5.

¹⁶ JP 3-35, 2018, p. I-5.

execution of an approved operation or potential/imminent execution of an operation plan or exercise.”¹⁷

CCDRs may then task these forces to execute any missions or activities for which the CCDR has authority.¹⁸ The CCDR may request additional forces through the GFM allocation process.

The GFM process also informs CCDRs of each service’s deployment capacity and informs the assessment of potential shortfalls, the ability to limit them, and the individual services’ overall force development processes.¹⁹ Together, the processes that constitute GFM “allow proactive resource and risk-informed planning assumptions and estimates and execution decision making regarding Armed Forces of the United States.”²⁰

Relationship to Competition

GDP and GFM processes are directly relevant to competition because they enable the use of U.S. forces around the world to fulfill aspects of the Secretary of Defense’s global priorities, which are derived from the President’s priorities. They are thus critical to the execution of all three categories of competition objectives but are particularly important in gaining an asymmetric advantage (LOE 2.1) and preparing for war (LOE 3). For example, the 2018 NDS identified “long-term strategic competition with Russia and China” as DoD’s main priority.²¹ Using the GDP and GFM processes, the Secretary of Defense can assign, allocate, and apportion forces as he or she sees fit to contend with these threats.²² Force posture also serves an important signaling function:

¹⁷ JP 3-35, 2018, p. I-5.

¹⁸ JP 3-35, 2018, p. I-5.

¹⁹ JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-4.

²⁰ JP 5-0, 2020, p. D-7.

²¹ DoD, 2018, p. 4.

²² This may result in the posturing and use of forces for such activities as deterrence missions, repositioning for anticipated wars in relevant theaters, and creating a favor-

Foreign and overseas posture is the fundamental enabler of U.S. defense activities and military operations overseas and is also central to defining and communicating U.S. strategic interests to allies, partners, and adversaries.²³

The NDS also highlights the importance of force posture processes to competition in its description of the Global Operating Model, which “comprises four layers: contact, blunt, surge, and homeland.” These layers are “designed to help us compete more effectively below the level of armed conflict; delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression; surge war-winning forces and manage conflict escalation; and defend the U.S. homeland.”²⁴

Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships

Numerous agencies are involved in the execution of GDP and GFM processes. As previously described, the GPEC is the lead organization in charge of the GDP process, but a variety of other organizations play roles in the broader GDP and GFM processes. The entities listed here, most of which are outside the Army, represent some of the most important players in these processes:

- The **Global Posture Integration Team (GPIT)**, alongside the GPEC, is the other key decisionmaking body within the GDP process. The GPIT is “co-chaired by planner-level representatives from the Office of DASD for Plans and J-5 Deputy [Directorate for Joint Strategic Planning] . . . and consists of members from all GPEC organizations.”²⁵ The main role of the GPIT is to “forward all posture matters to the GPEC

able balance of forces in theaters of competition. The ultimate goal in each of these situations would be to dissuade an attack through deterrence by denial or by securing an advantage should fighting break out.

²³ DoDI 3000.12, 2016.

²⁴ DoD, 2018. The Global Operating Model “describes how the Joint Force will be postured and employed to achieve its competition and wartime missions.” (DoD, 2018, p. 7).

²⁵ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, pp. 6–9.

in decision-ready form, with dissenting opinions from GPIT members articulated, and a recommendation on the appropriate senior decision-making body for further action.”²⁶

- The **Office of the DASD for Plans** and the **J-5 Directorate for Joint Strategic Planning** coordinate both between the GPIT and GPEC (e.g., scheduling meetings) and among the GPIT, GPEC, and other relevant agencies.
- The **Secretary of Defense**, under his or her Title 10, Section 162 authority, oversees the GFM process by “provid[ing] directive authority to the CCDRs for the planning and execution of military operations, to include deployment and redeployment operations, as directed by the President.”²⁷
- The **Global Force Management Board** is “a general officer-/flag officer-level body organized by the JS [Joint Staff] to provide senior DOD leadership the means to assess operational effects of force management decisions and implement strategic planning guidance.”²⁸
- **CCDRs** “build the TPFDD [time-phased force deployment data] and validate TPFDD movement requirements,” “determine predeployment standards,” “balance and regulate force flow,” and execute “JTF [joint task force] responsibilities.”²⁹
- **Functional CCMDs**, including U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), are frequently involved in joint operations. As part of the GFM process, they “provide planning and assessment support to GCCs to ensure the alignment and harmonization of campaign plans across AOR and functional boundaries.”³⁰
- The **military departments** and the **National Guard Bureau** “organize, train, supply, equip, maintain, mobilize, account for, and provide

²⁶ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, pp. 6–9.

²⁷ JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-1; 10 U.S.C. § 162.

²⁸ JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-3.

²⁹ JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-1.

³⁰ JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-1.

administrative and logistics support (including service-organic transportation) for their respective forces.”³¹

- **CJCS** oversees several aspects of deployment operations, including “preparing integrated plans for military mobilization” and establish[ing] procedures (in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense [Transportation Policy], the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and DLA) for the submission of movement requirements by DOD user components to USTRANSCOM and for the submission of evaluated requirements and capabilities by USTRANSCOM and the transportation component commands to the CJCS.³²
- The **Director of the Joint Staff** chairs the Global Force Management Board. Several directorates are involved in various aspects of the GFM and GDP processes.

Army’s Current Role in GDP and GFM Processes

Beyond its GFM responsibilities as a military department,³³ the Army is a stakeholder in the GFM process, primarily as a force provider. JP 3-35 specifies that the Department of the Army is responsible for:

the assignment, preparation, and support of Army forces necessary for employment across the range of military operations. For deployment operations, DA [Department of the Army] mobilizes, organizes,

³¹ JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-1.

³² JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-1.

³³ As described in JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, the military departments’ GFM responsibilities include the following:

- coordinating directly with CCMDs, joint force providers, and the Joint Staff J-35 “to develop recommended global sourcing solutions,” executed concurrently with designated service force provider organizations
- assigning forces under DoD jurisdiction to perform missions assigned to CCMDs (or North American Aerospace Defense Command)
- preparing and deploying trained and equipped forces to the CCDRs to conduct assigned missions.

administers, trains, and demobilizes Army forces. The Army's ability to project the military instrument of national power, specifically land power capabilities from the US or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations or force projection encompasses the processes of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.³⁴

Moreover, although not directly referenced in GFM documentation, the Army could also play a role via joint billets and assignments. The Department of the Army is also responsible for providing land transportation to the other services overseas.³⁵

Adapting GDP and GFM Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition

Of the four processes examined in this report, the GDP and GFM processes received the most positive feedback, with interviewees reporting that these two processes generally work well. One former high-level DoD official with focused experience working on force posture and force management processes, for instance, noted that there is a high and consistent level of coordination among the implementing agencies that enables the smooth functioning of the processes. When asked about obstacles or areas for improvement in the processes, this individual responded that they had not observed any major issues affecting the GDP or GFM processes.³⁶ Most critiques of GDP and GFM have focused on the selected positioning of forces to effectively deter adversaries in competition rather than issues with the functioning of the processes themselves.³⁷ Our analysis suggests that the most applicable

³⁴ JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-12.

³⁵ JP 3-35, 2018, p. II-12.

³⁶ Interview with RAND subject-matter expert and former U.S. government official on DoD force posture and force management processes, December 3, 2020.

³⁷ For instance, there is substantial debate in U.S. policy and academic circles over the ideal force posture, both in terms of types of forces and location of forces, to effectively deter Russia.

imperatives for the GDP and GFM processes are *agility*, *efficiency* (particularly cost efficiency), and *proactivity*.³⁸ Despite our specific focus on these three imperatives, our analysis suggests that the GDP and GFM processes generally perform well across all competition imperatives, with the exception of agility. The following analysis highlights particular areas for improvement, and areas for Joint Staff, OSD, and Army consideration.³⁹

GDP and GFM Processes Lack Agility

Multiple interviewees and sources suggested that the existing GDP and GFM processes do not allow quick responses to rapidly changing threats.⁴⁰ This suggests that the agility—defined in this context as processes that are characterized by their dynamism and that foster quick decisionmaking—of these processes could be improved.⁴¹ A USARPAC official specializing in force posture activities had observed the following in the course of his duties in this area:

Force posture processes are really slow. They are based on POM [program objective memorandum] cycles and are not agile enough for competition, though they are okay for steady-state operations. With regard to Army prepositioned stock, we're just now seeing approval for funding through the POM to expand APS [Army prepositioned stocks] to certain countries, and that's taken three years. It will take another few

³⁸ Again, this assessment is not meant to imply that the other imperatives are not relevant but, rather, that the selected imperatives are most critical to the successful execution of GDP and GFM processes.

³⁹ The GDP and GFM processes are largely dominated by decisionmaking at the OSD and Joint Staff levels; however, Army participation in the GPEC provides a notable route for the Army to influence GDP and GFM decisions.

⁴⁰ This is a perennial issue in military organizations. Many of the case studies we analyzed underscored the importance of introducing mechanisms for bypassing existing procedural hurdles to enable rapid or out-of-the-box decisionmaking. The Joint Force Development Group, for example, was created as an “ad hoc group outside [the] permanent staffs” of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force in recognition of the tendency of the military bureaucracy to “move in its own comfortable, familiar paths and to eschew innovation” (Davis, 1987, p. 44).

⁴¹ Aghina et al., 2017.

years to get the sites set up. Inside the Pentagon, [the process] is like a sequential, linear project management.⁴²

Although campaigning, as described in the 2022 NDS, is a long-term, persistent operation—consisting primarily of activities that require sustained effort indefinitely, such as deterrence missions and efforts to build the capacity of partner nations in theaters of competition—the nature of competition also requires the ability to quickly address new threats and opportunities that may arise, whether in the form of new geographic areas of focus, new capabilities fielded by adversaries, or a sudden attack or movement of forces by an adversary. As a U.S. Army War College expert pointed out, predicting the next fight is difficult, so agility is required to counter new and emerging threats.⁴³ This aligns with literature highlighting the relative ease with which U.S. adversaries and competitors can challenge U.S. priorities and planning by disrupting the threat picture:

Rogue nations like Iran and North Korea and transnational terrorist organizations like ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and al-Qaeda can cause the [United States], its partners, and its allies to reorganize priorities with little notice because the enemy always gets a vote.⁴⁴

⁴² Interview with USARPAC official, December 16, 2020. Some observers have noted, however, that the rapid response to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic suggests that these processes can move more quickly when necessary.

⁴³ Interview with U.S. Army War College official, January 4, 2021. The difficulty of predicting the next fight—and developing systems that will be suited for that fight—is underscored by the development of Future Combat Systems. Future Combat Systems concepts and requirements were unsuccessful in “adjust[ing] to the realities of the operational environment,” although they did “foment new ways of thinking about how the Army might fight” (Pernin et al., 2012, pp. 248–249).

⁴⁴ John W. Miller, “American Force Posture Needs to be Better Aligned to Security Interests in an Affordable Way,” Atlantic Council, August 13, 2020.

More Proactive Planning in GDP and GFM Processes May Sharpen the U.S. Competitive Edge

Finally, indicators and analysis suggest that DoD has been struggling for years with insufficient plans for prioritizing and linking future force posture investments to strategic objectives, potentially indicating a lack of proactivity in planning that, if not fully addressed, could further hamper agility and efficiency in meeting competition objectives.⁴⁵ Back in 2015, GAO noted that DoD “has not yet decided on important force structure issues, such as the optimum mix of active and reserve forces or changes to its overseas posture, nor has it developed plans for how it will prioritize and link future investments to its strategic objectives.”⁴⁶ More-recent analyses indicate that this is still the case.⁴⁷ As one of our interviewees noted in late 2020, the Army has made significant headway in tackling this issue, but aligning resources to strategic objectives with limited resources and while contending with multiple threats remains a challenge.⁴⁸ The interviewee explained:

I think that, as GFM is looking to balance supply and demand, we’ve gotten very creative about being agile to meet demand. The challenge is that we have a really difficult time testing and probing and discerning if that demand is truly the most strategy-aligned application of resources. As services like the Army are making ready forces and generating supply, the GCCs are demanding more than we have available,

⁴⁵ In this context, *proactivity* refers to the opposite of *reactivity* (Lusthaus et al., 2002, p. 116).

⁴⁶ GAO, “Military Readiness,” webpage, undated.

⁴⁷ Travis Wright, “Force Structure for the Future—Key Issues for the Army,” Real Clear Defense website, June 5, 2021.

⁴⁸ Interview with OSD-P, Plans & Posture, official, December 18, 2020. Historically, this has been a challenge for the Army. TRADOC, for example, was created to develop and better align doctrine and training with future operational concepts in a resource-constrained environment. See Suzanne C. Nielsen, *An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army’s Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations*, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, September 2010, p. 45, and Charles T. Lombardo, *Managing Transitions: Examining the Institutional Army’s Transformation Following the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015, pp. 19–20.

and we've gotten really creative about meeting that demand without interrogating the premises that go along with it.⁴⁹

Current Efforts to Streamline and Improve GDP and GFM Processes

In recognition of some of these issues with GFM and GDP, DoD has prioritized making force posture processes more responsive.⁵⁰ This is particularly true given that many existing “force employment models and posture date to the immediate post–Cold War era, when [the U.S.] military advantage was unchallenged and the primary threats were rogue regimes.”⁵¹ In pursuit of this objective, the 2018 NDS advocates adoption of the Dynamic Force Employment concept, which would make the GFM and GDP processes more agile, efficient, and proactive in their ability to anticipate and respond to threats. The services have reportedly begun to implement the Dynamic Force Employment concept.⁵²

⁴⁹ Interview with OSD-P, Plans & Posture, official, December 18, 2020.

⁵⁰ As reflected in the 2018 NDS, a key priority of the U.S. government is to “[d]evelop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment” (DoD, 2018, p. 7). To accomplish this, “[f]orce posture and employment must be adaptable to account for the uncertainty that exists in the changing global strategic environment” (DoD, 2018, p. 7).

⁵¹ DoD, 2018, p. 7.

⁵² The 2018 NDS describes *Dynamic Force Employment* as follows:

Dynamic Force Employment will prioritize maintaining the capacity and capabilities for major combat, while providing options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force. A modernized Global Operating Model of combat-credible, flexible theater postures will enhance our ability to compete and provide freedom of maneuver during conflict, providing national decision-makers with better military options.

The global strategic environment demands increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action. The Dynamic Force Employment concept will change the way the Department uses the Joint Force to provide proactive and scalable options for priority missions. Dynamic Force Employment will more flexibly use ready forces to shape proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness. (DoD, 2018, p. 7)

In its departure from traditional deployment cycles, Dynamic Force Employment also serves to enable unpredictability, thereby making it more difficult for adversaries to predict U.S. movements.⁵³ Interviewees reported that they had already seen some changes in practice in response to Dynamic Force Employment. Some analysts have pointed out, however, that it is too soon in the implementation process to tell how effective the concept will be because there are few analyses of Russian and Chinese reactions to Dynamic Force Employment:

What is not yet known is the effectiveness of these actions vis-à-vis Russia and China, nor is the cost of the altered deployment tempo on the equipment, people, and readiness of the U.S. military.⁵⁴

A more drastic proposal to improve the agility of the GDP and GFM processes centers on shifting focus from the geographic alignment of commands toward the five functional commands. This proposal, which would enhance the ability of these processes to respond to emerging threats with transnational elements, is intended to allow the United States to compete more effectively with adversaries, such as China and Russia,⁵⁵ but DoD has not yet adopted this proposal, and its implementation would likely need to be preceded by rigorous study to determine the pros and cons of such a shift.

⁵³ Tyson Wetzel, "Dynamic Force Employment: A Vital Tool in Winning Strategic Global Competitions," *Defense One*, September 18, 2018.

⁵⁴ Wetzel, 2018. RAND Arroyo Center analysis suggests that Dynamic Force Employment is unlikely to be a cost-effective deterrence tool. See Miranda Priebe, Angela O'Mahony, Bryan Frederick, Alyssa Demus, Bonny Lin, Michelle Grisé, Derek Eaton, and Abby Doll, *Operational Unpredictability and Deterrence: Evaluating Options for Complicating Adversary Decisionmaking*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A448-1, 2021.

⁵⁵ Steve Ferenzi and Keith Weber, "We Need to Reorganize More than the Military," *Defense One*, website, August 16, 2020.

Army Talent Management Processes

Overview and Purpose of Process

Personnel management comprises a series of complex and interrelated processes that govern military personnel assignments and promotions. For purposes of this report, we focus specifically on the aspects of personnel management that pertain to the Army, although we recognize there are numerous other related processes across DoD.¹ We also include PME, specifically Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), in our discussion of personnel management processes, given that JPME directly affects both Army assignments and promotions and can be an assignment itself.² We use the term *talent management* to refer to the broad system of Army personnel processes that include recruitment, training, education, assignments, evalu-

¹ Because there is such a large universe of personnel management processes, the Army Futures and Concepts Center requested that we focus on just the Army aspects of the process to enable us to delve into specifics and derive pertinent lessons for the Army.

² The intersection of these two processes is emphasized in a guidance document that was released in 2020: Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 1, 2020. JPME is a subset of PME that “is a requirement for joint qualification, eligibility for certain positions, and promotions per Goldwater-Nichols . . . and is focused on educating officers in joint matters” (Kimberly Jackson, Katherine L. Kidder, Sean Mann, William H. Waggy II, Natasha Lander, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, *Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4347-OSD, 2020, p. 35).

ation, and promotion.³ We also address PME separately, while acknowledging that it is an integral element of overall talent management efforts.⁴

Talent Management

While military personnel management refers to the totality of U.S. military personnel, we focus in this report on officer personnel management because officers are tasked with leading and shaping the strategic direction of the

³ *Talent management* is not an officially defined term and often means different things to different audiences. See Albert A. Robbert, Katherine L. Kidder, Caitlin Lee, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and William H. Waggy, *Officer Career Management: Steps Toward Modernization in the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2875-OSD, 2019, pp. 47–28.

⁴ Personnel management consists of a wide array of human resources functions, including military personnel assignments, promotions, leader development and education, and various aspects of readiness. Talent management is a subset of personnel management that primarily concerns the development and effective leveraging of skills among personnel. PME is a key component of talent management because it allows the development of critical skills; JPME is a subset of PME that focuses on developing officers and enlisted personnel for operating in a joint environment. For additional background on talent management processes, see Paul W. Mayberry, Charles A. Goldman, Kimberly Jackson, Eric Hastings, Hannah Acheson-Field, and Anthony Lawrence, *Making the Grade: Integration of Joint Professional Military Education and Talent Management in Developing Joint Officers*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A473-1, 2021; Albert A. Robbert, Caitlin Lee, William H. Waggy II, Katherine L. Kidder, Natasha Lander, and Agnes Gereben Schaefer, *Modernizing Officer Career Management: Analyzing Eleven Issues*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RB-A416-1, 2021a; Albert A. Robbert, Caitlin Lee, William H. Waggy II, Katherine L. Kidder, Natasha Lander, and Agnes Gereben Schaefer, “Muddling Through”: *The Revolutionary Potential of Evolutionary Officer Management Reform*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RB-A416-2, 2021b; Albert A. Robbert, Caitlin Lee, William H. Waggy II, Katherine L. Kidder, Natasha Lander, and Agnes Gereben Schaefer, *Officer Career Management: Additional Steps Toward Modernization*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4337-OSD, 2021c; Agnes Gereben Schaefer, John D. Winkler, Kimberly Jackson, Daniel Ibarra, Darrell D. Jones, and Geoffrey McGovern, *Approaches for Strengthening Total Force Culture and Facilitating Cross-Component Integration in the U.S. Military*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2143-OSD, 2020; and Timothy M. Bonds, Michael Johnson, and Paul S. Steinberg, *Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1320-RC, 2015.

Joint Force.⁵ More specifically, we focus on talent management, which is an element of personnel management. In the military context, talent management has a variety of meanings.⁶ For this report, we conceive of *talent management* as “the development of needed KSAOs [knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes] and matching individualized KSAOs to specific requirements.”⁷ Each of the services follows its own talent management processes. According to the Army, *talent management* “is how the Army ACQUIRES, DEVELOPS, EMPLOYS, and RETAINS its greatest asset—our people—to enhance readiness by maximizing human potential.”⁸ The Army further defines talent as “the unique intersection of knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences (KSB-P) inherent in every officer.”⁹

⁵ Civilian personnel are also a substantial component of overall DoD personnel, but we do not include civilian-focused personnel management processes in our analysis.

⁶ A recent RAND report summarizes the range of definitions of talent management:

In some contexts, *talent* is equated with general ability; hence, *talent management* is equated with development and utilization of high-performing or high potential individuals. In other contexts, *talents* are equated with specific combinations of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes (KSAOs). Talent thus becomes highly personal, with combinations of KSAOs unique to an individual. While general ability may translate from one assignment to any other assignment, talent as KSAOs may be more suited for some assignments than others . . . [In this case,] talent management becomes the development of needed KSAOs and matching individualized KSAOs to specific requirements. In still other contexts, *talent management* is used as a synonym for human resource management in general, or perhaps the more strategic aspects of human resource management, with a goal of producing desired long-term personnel outcomes. (Robbert et al., 2019, p. 47)

⁷ Robbert et al., 2019, p. 47.

⁸ ATMTF, “Talent Management Army Staff LPD,” briefing slides, October 2019, p. 6; U.S. Army, Headquarters, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, “U.S. Army Talent Management,” webpage, October 10, 2018.

⁹ ATMTF, 2019, p. 6; U.S. Army, Headquarters, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, 2018. The addition of “preferences” to the Army’s concept of talent management is recent and was spearheaded by ATMTF. The concept of talent management is closely related to Joint Officer Management, which refers to the formal ways in which officers across each of the services are developed to be proficient in joint matters, which is generally a combination of assignments or experiences and JPME. See DoDI 1300.19, *DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 2014.

Professional Military Education

PME serves to develop “leaders who are skilled in the art of war and the practical and ethical application of lethal military power.”¹⁰ While PME is service-focused, JPME, as a subset of PME, “consist[s] of the rigorous and thorough instruction of officers in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical in-depth understanding of joint matters.”¹¹ Within the Army, PME can take a variety of forms, but PME and JPME most often take the form of “DoD-administered courses of programs.”¹² There are three main categories of PME and five levels of JPME.¹³

¹⁰ CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01F, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Washington, D.C., May 15, 2020.

¹¹ CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020, Enclosure A. Between the grades of O-4 and O-6, in particular, PME and JPME overlap substantially but are distinct concepts. The clearest distinction is that JPME focuses more specifically on preparing officers with expertise in *joint* force planning and employment. Both JPME and PME are typically “completed at either service or joint institutions or through distance-learning online programs” (Jackson et al., 2020, p. 35).

¹² Jackson et al., 2020, p. 35. In addition, “certain civilian courses of degrees can also be counted” and “civilian schooling can be pursued on an officer’s own time” (Jackson et al., 2020, p. 35).

¹³ The three main categories of PME are basic-level PME, which “is generally focused on developing core competencies, is the services’ educational priority for O-1s to O-3s[, and] is training specific to one’s career field”; intermediate-level education, which is “typically assigned at [the] O-4 [level] and might or might not be completed in coordination with a master’s degree”; and senior service college or senior service fellowships, which are “assigned at the senior grades of O-5 or O-6. Master’s degrees are conferred by all senior service colleges” (Jackson et al., 2020, p. 35). See also Paul W. Mayberry, William H. Waggy II, and Anthony Lawrence, *Producing Joint Qualified Officers: FY 2008 to FY 2017 Trends*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3105-OSD, 2019. The five levels of JPME are pre-commissioning, which is intended for officer candidates and covers military basics; primary, which is for junior officers and covers tactical issues; JPME Phase 1, which is for intermediate and senior officers and covers tactical and operational issues; JPME Phase 2, which is for senior officers and covers operational and strategic issues; and Capstone, which is for general or flag officers at the rank of O-7 and above and covers operational and strategic issues. See Kristy N. Kamarck, *Goldwater-Nichols and the Evolution of Officer Joint Professional Military Education*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2016. In addition, military officers may pursue education at civilian institutions. In some cases, civilian education does not fulfill military career requirements for officers, but in other cases,

Relationship to Competition

Talent management is recognized in DoD and Army guidance as a crucial component of the broader U.S. competitive strategy. Talent management processes allow the U.S. military to leverage the capabilities and skills of its personnel to maximize its competitive edge over potential adversaries across the entire range of competition objectives (LOEs 1–3). The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 2020 guidance document on reforming JPME and talent management stresses that gaining a competitive edge against U.S. adversaries is reliant on proper preparation and management of military personnel:

There is more to sustaining a competitive advantage than acquiring hardware; we must gain and sustain an intellectual overmatch as well. . . . This cannot be achieved without substantially enhancing the cognitive capacities of joint warfighters to conceive, design, and implement strategies and campaigns to integrate our capabilities globally, defeat competitors in contests we have not yet imagined, and respond to activity short of armed conflict in domains already being contested.¹⁴

One expert on PME has similarly underscored the importance of education in preserving U.S. interests and standing globally:

First and foremost, the job of the war colleges is to educate students to make them better defenders of the United States of America and its interests and its allies around the world. Other missions are ancillary, even potentially distracting.¹⁵

The ATMTF similarly characterizes talent management as an enabler of effective competition, asserting that talent management provides the

the services have formal or habitual arrangements with civilian colleges and universities to send their officers for certain degrees as part of fellowships or career specialty requirements, and some types of officers, such as Army strategists, must obtain a master’s degree as part of their training and often fulfill this requirement through a civilian program. (Jackson et al., 2020, p. 35)

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 2.

¹⁵ Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Reform of Military Education: Twenty-Five Years Later,” *Orbis*, Winter 2012.

United States with “a decisive advantage against near-peer adversaries—our smaller population, smaller industrial base, and an all-volunteer force model requires us to maximize potential of our people.”¹⁶ Effective talent management processes enhance the ability of the Army to succeed across all three LOEs identified in the objectives framework by ensuring that Army personnel have the training and education necessary to strengthen allies and partners, achieve an asymmetric advantage, stabilize fragile regions, and deter conventional aggression.

Key Actors, Organizations, and Relationships

Numerous organizations are involved in various aspects of talent management. Within DoD, the **Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness** oversees a variety of talent management efforts.¹⁷ The **Joint Chiefs of Staff** are also involved in producing PME policy. In addition, Army entities play key roles in talent management processes:

- As the Army’s senior military officer responsible for personnel policy, the **Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 (Personnel)** implements existing policy and oversees a number of organizations relevant to personnel processes.
- The **Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower & Reserve Affairs**, a position within the staff of the Secretary of the Army, is the senior Army civilian overseeing personnel policy.
- The **U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC)**, as one of the G-1’s subordinate organizations, is centrally involved in managing military personnel. HRC “executes distribution, strategic talent management, personnel programs and services Army wide in order to

¹⁶ J. P. McGee, “U.S. Army Talent Management Leader Professional Development Briefing,” October 24, 2019.

¹⁷ These efforts encompass “force readiness; force management; health affairs; National Guard and Reserve component affairs; education and training; and military and civilian personnel requirements and management, including equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation, and quality of life matters” (“Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness,” webpage, undated, material as of February 24, 2021).

optimize Total Force personnel readiness and strengthen an agile and adaptive Army.”¹⁸

- The **Officer Personnel Management Directorate**, another key subordinate organization of the G-1, comprises three divisions: Command Management (command selection), Leader Development (education, retention, transition, and reserve component management), and Officer Development (accessions, joint policies).
- The **Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate** and the **Adjutant General Directorate** are other key directorates under the G-1.
- **ATMTF** is the newest Army organization focused on innovative talent management reform. The task force previously fell under the G-1 but now reports to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. ATMTF manages the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP) and the Colonels Command Assessment Program (CCAP)—both of which are described in the next section—because they are currently pilot initiatives. Eventually, management of these programs will be transferred to **TRADOC**, given their innovative nature.

Current Army Role in Talent Management Processes

Within the Army, several military human resource management functions fall under the broad definition of talent management.¹⁹ Three main processes support the development, assessment, and management of soldiers’ skills and knowledge:

- The **Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP)** is defined as a “decentralized regulated market-style hiring system that aligns officers

¹⁸ U.S. Army, “Understanding the Army’s Structure,” webpage, undated.

¹⁹ The U.S. Army War College defines *military human resource processes* as “life cycle [human resources] management functions [that] are derived from the Army’s life cycle” (Lou Yuengert, ed., *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, 31st ed., Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2017–2018, p. 12-1).

with jobs based on [the] preferences” of each officer.²⁰ ATAP is managed using the Assignment Interactive Module 2 platform. Prior to the implementation of ATAP, officer assignments were exclusively centrally managed by HRC, with individual officers receiving little information regarding their potential future assignments. The introduction of ATAP represented a significant change, both because it is designed to take individual preferences into consideration in making assignments and because it provides a mechanism for more effectively matching talent to the needs of specific units.

- **BCAP** was established in 2019 to improve the selection process for battalion commanders. BCAP consists of “a series of in-person assessments designed to enhance the Army’s selection of battalion commanders” and includes “measurements of physical fitness, written and oral communication ability, and cognitive and non-cognitive skills.”²¹
- **CCAP**, which was launched in March 2020, follows a model similar to BCAP’s but is aimed at improving the placement of colonels. CCAP is designed to provide “new, relevant information [to] allow the Army to make better decisions on these vitally important positions and assesses

²⁰ These preferences are “shaped by the unique Knowledge, Skills, and Behaviors (KSBs) of each officer and the KSBs desired by commanders for their available assignments” (ATMTF, 2019, p. 6; U.S. Army, Headquarters, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, 2018).

²¹ James McConville and J. P. McGee, “Battalion Commanders Are the Seed Corn of the Army,” War on the Rocks website, December 23, 2019. The program is designed to “assess each officer’s fitness for command and strategic leadership potential” through a “four-day event that assesses officers who are selected by the centralized selection board” (McConville and McGee, 2019). During this event, officers “undergo a series of cognitive, non-cognitive, and physical assessments in addition to a panel interview with senior Army officers.” The stated goal of BCAP is to “expand the Army’s understanding of each officer’s talents, assess their strategic potential, and make data-informed decisions” (McConville and McGee, 2019). See also U.S. Army, “Battalion Commander Assessment Program,” webpage, undated a. The decision to reform the selection process for battalion commanders first, before initiating broader reforms, reflects the Army’s recognition that battalion commanders are

arguably the most consequential leaders in the Army. Their experience, placement, and influence give them an out-sized ability to shape the future service of the soldiers they lead. They train and develop our young soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers and have more impact on their decisions to continue serving (or not) than any other leadership position. (McConville and McGee, 2019)

readiness for command while placing additional emphasis on strategic potential.”²²

Adapting Talent Management Processes, Organizations, and Authorities to Tailor Army Contributions to Competition

Our interviews and additional research suggest that *agility* and *innovation* are the critical imperatives to ensure that Army talent management processes are optimized for competition below the threshold of armed conflict.²³ Currently, as reported by interviewees, talent management processes are excelling at innovation—in terms of efforts to reform existing practices—but falling short on agility. The remainder of this section addresses the specific areas for improvement against the relevant competition imperatives.

Army Talent Management Processes Lack Agility in Ways that Hamper Development of the U.S. Competitive Edge

A variety of cultural impediments within the Army, and within the military more broadly, affect the agility of Army talent management processes. In this context, *agility* refers to the dynamism of these processes and their capacity to support rapid adaptation to new demands and challenges.²⁴ A foundational impediment is that Army talent management processes are not aligned with the skills and experiences likely to be needed in future competition.²⁵ As a result, talent management processes do not cultivate personnel with a variety of competition-relevant skills that would enable the Army to quickly pivot to

²² ATMTF, “Preparation Guide for BCAP and CCAP, Version 1.0,” August 2020b.

²³ As noted in the previous chapter, this assessment is not meant to imply that the other imperatives are not relevant but, rather, that the selected imperatives are most critical to the successful execution of talent management processes.

²⁴ Aghina et al., 2017.

²⁵ Interview with HRC official, December 3, 2020; Jackson et al., 2020.

and address the emergent demands of competition. Talent management processes reflect the preeminence of the warfighter and warfighting skills in the culture of the Army. According to one interviewee, for example, professional and educational experiences beyond those necessary to acquire combat skills are not highly valued.²⁶ This mindset is an obstacle to efforts to reform the talent management system because the system currently encourages the cultivation and retention only of soldiers with warfighting skills. For example, Army PME is still primarily oriented toward developing and educating the traditional, kinetic warfighter rather than toward producing strategic, innovative thinkers with competition skills and a deep understanding of national security issues.²⁷ While warfighting skills will remain crucial within the Army, other skills will be needed to effectively support competition efforts. Talent management processes should be sufficiently agile to cultivate soldiers with a variety of competition-relevant skills.

Relatedly, the current talent management system offers insufficient opportunities for officers to gain strategic-level experience early in their careers. As one interviewee noted, a general officer will typically have had only one joint assignment, which does not allow the officer to gain a full understanding of joint capabilities and functions or other skills that broadening assignments—defined in Army doctrine as “consist[ing] of those education and training opportunities, assignments, and experiences that provide exposure outside the leader’s branch or functional area competencies”—generally seek to impart.²⁸ These broadening assignments are criti-

²⁶ Interview with EUCOM J-3 official, December 16, 2020. Some officers, the interviewee noted, are even proud that they never served in the Pentagon.

²⁷ Jackson et al., 2020, p. 35. PME itself is often not highly valued compared to key service assignments, especially within the Army, which has historically not placed significant value on PME performance in promotion considerations (Jackson et al., 2020). One interviewee noted that many within the Army treat education, including PME, as a box to check rather than as an inherently valuable experience (interview with HRC official, December 3, 2020; Jackson, et al., 2020). Moreover, an assessment of the goals and content of Army PME should be undertaken to fully understand the extent to which Army PME encourages strategic thinking and a deep understanding of national security issues.

²⁸ Interview with EUCOM J-3 official, December 16, 2020; ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, July 2019, p. 6-2. In

cal because they allow officers to understand how DoD and the interagency work and disseminate information about Army equities and capabilities that could be leveraged in competition.²⁹ The current system discourages officers from pursuing broadening assignments, however, because straying from the typical promotion path might jeopardize an officer's promotion prospects. As one interviewee explained:

Without a forcing mechanism, nobody's going to want to let their guys come out of that protected path. Prior to the CCAP process, it's so competitive. The Officer Evaluation Reports those guys receive are entirely exclusive. It's so competitive to become a brigade commander. By sending a guy outside the box to some of those broadening assignments, you're really putting their promotion at risk.³⁰

The agility of Army talent management is also impeded by the egalitarian nature of Army culture and a general reluctance to change existing promotion paths because of loyalty to subordinates. Targeted incentives tend to focus on an entire category of officer—whether by year group or career field—rather than differentiating among individuals; this could discourage officers from going above and beyond and taking the initiative to obtain competition-relevant skills.³¹ There is also reluctance among the senior leaders who make up promotion boards to change existing promotion paths out of the fear that these changes will negatively affect junior officers with whom senior leaders have served in combat. The tendency of promotion boards to reinforce a “ducks pick ducks” mentality—meaning that they

addition, certain Army assignments may also function to broaden officers' understanding of competition efforts.

²⁹ Interview with former U.S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) official, December 15, 2021; interview with HRC official, December 3, 2020; interview with EUCOM J-3 official, December 16, 2020. While valuable, broadening assignments also come with trade-offs. As discussed, such assignments can remove officers from a promotable track. More substantively, time spent in broadening assignments comes at the expense of other types of training or PME that officers could pursue.

³⁰ Interview with HRC official, December 3, 2020.

³¹ See Mura Gillen, “Captains Now Eligible for \$25k Retention Bonus,” U.S. Army website, September 13, 2007.

typically select for officers who are similar to them in terms of experience or professional background—limits the extent to which talent management processes can be sufficiently agile in responding to the demands of competition.³²

A lack of awareness of the talent that exists in the National Guard and Reserve forces represents another barrier to greater agility. The current talent management database, as one interviewee who previously served in OEMA explained, provides insufficient insight into what skills and capabilities exist in the National Guard and Reserve. As a result, the skills are often underutilized or not fully leveraged by the Army in support of broader competition efforts. This gap has a particular effect on the ability of the Army to compete effectively because several competition-relevant skills, such as cyber expertise, tend to reside in the National Guard and Reserves.³³

Recent Reforms to Army Talent Management Processes Demonstrate Commitment to Innovation

Despite these impediments to greater agility in Army talent management processes, the Army has made significant strides in addressing existing cultural challenges and instituting reforms in the talent management system. These reforms, which include the implementation of the ATAP process, BCAP, and CCAP, demonstrate a commitment to innovation, which will enable the Army to support competition efforts more effectively going forward.³⁴ High-level strategic documents, including the 2018 NDS, have acknowledged issues with the current PME structure.³⁵ In May 2020, in response to the guidance outlined in the 2018 NDS, the Joint Chiefs of

³² Jackson et al., 2020, pp. xiv, 73, 113.

³³ Interview with former OEMA official, December 15, 2021.

³⁴ In this context, *innovation* refers to the development and implementation of new programs (Malinoski and Perry, 2000).

³⁵ The 2018 NDS, for instance, states,

We will emphasize intellectual leadership and military professionalism in the art and science of warfighting, deepening our knowledge of history while embracing new technology and techniques to counter competitors. PME will emphasize independence of action in warfighting concepts to lessen the impact of degraded/lost communications in combat. PME is to be used as a strategic asset to build trust and

Staff released a document offering a new vision for PME.³⁶ The document emphasizes that existing talent management processes are not sufficient to adequately prepare military personnel to meet the challenges posed by great power competition:

The evolving and dynamic security environment, which includes disruptive changes in the character and conduct of warfare, demands immediate changes to the identification, education, preparation, and development of our joint warfighters.³⁷

It offers the following vision for PME:

Our vision is for a fully aligned PME and talent management system that identifies, develops, and utilizes strategically minded, critically thinking and creative joint warfighters skilled in the art of war and the practical and ethical application of lethal military power.³⁸

Beyond PME, ATAP, BCAP, and CCAP represent innovations that will allow the Army talent management system to prepare soldiers more effectively for competition. ATMTF found, for example, that BCAP produced a

interoperability across the Joint Forces and with allied and partner forces. (DoD, 2018, p. 8)

Following this guidance, significant efforts to improve PME are underway, “including, in some cases, the ways that PME is weighted in promotion decisions, and the timing of specific PME experiences in an officer’s career, which might come later than is ideal for shaping an officer’s thinking” (Jackson et al., 2020, p. 35).

³⁶ Jim Garamone, “Joint Chiefs Vision Changes Military Education Philosophy,” press release, U.S. Department of Defense, June 1, 2020.

³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 2.

³⁸ As quoted in Garamone, 2020. A similar trend can be observed in JPME reforms. CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020, establishes Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), defined as “CJCS-approved knowledge areas required to develop warfighting expertise over a continuum of PME development.” The instruction explains that JLAs are “based on high-level guidance and provide JPME programs with a building block approach for designing, developing, and delivering education necessary to become a JQO [joint-qualified officer].” Importantly, one JLA is “The Continuum of Competition, Conflict, and War,” indicating an increased emphasis on preparing soldiers for both competition and conflict (CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020).

cadre of officers who were “more physically fit, had higher levels of cognitive ability, communicated better and exhibited fewer counterproductive leadership traits” than those selected as part of the former centralized selection list process.³⁹ In addition to the introduction of ATAP, BCAP, and CCAP, other initiatives are underway to improve Army talent management by better identifying and matching talent to Army needs, improving retention, better leveraging National Guard and Reserve talent, and providing officers training in competition-relevant skills. For example, one such initiative is a pilot system, currently in use in Chicago, for matching National Guard and Reserve talent with civilian and private-sector needs. The system allows soldiers with cyber expertise to receive drill credit for helping with a project at a private cyber firm.⁴⁰ Because many of these reform efforts are in their nascent stages, however, their effect on the preparation of Army personnel for competition remains to be seen. As one interviewee noted, these efforts will require sustained—and in some cases, more robust—resourcing and support from senior leaders.⁴¹

³⁹ ATMTF, “Army to Hold Selection Assessment Program for Colonels,” July 15, 2020a. At the same time, this perception is not universal, and at least one interviewee questioned whether these changes would be enough to produce leaders who embody the relevant imperatives and have the skills necessary to succeed in competition (interview with EUCOM J-3 official, December 16, 2020).

⁴⁰ Interview with former OEMA official, December 15, 2021.

⁴¹ Interview with HRC official, December 3, 2020; also, interview with former OEMA official, December 15, 2021.

Army Capabilities in Competition

As noted earlier, this research has two objectives ultimately aimed at ensuring that the Army is best positioned to contribute to broader DoD and inter-agency competition efforts. The four preceding chapters explored key Army processes that relate to campaigning in competition in an effort to address the first objective—to identify how the Army can make or influence procedural and/or organizational changes to help tailor DoD processes that support competition activities.

The second objective of this research is to identify existing Army capabilities that could be utilized more fully and understood in competition. In this chapter, we address this second objective, exploring some of the ways in which Army capabilities contribute to competition efforts. It does so by aligning the *supply* of Army capabilities—measured in terms of the full range of capabilities within the operational Army, Army-funded executive agencies, and ACOMs and of the capabilities related to Army contributions to other competition-related missions—with the *demand* for specific types of capabilities to be used in competition, conceived in terms of the objectives framework described in Chapter Two. Notably, the resulting analysis does *not* claim to be an exhaustive, in-depth exploration of all of the ways in which all Army capabilities contribute to competition campaigns. Nonetheless, this exploration provides a useful initial illustrative examination of an issue that has heretofore been omitted from the scholarly, policy, and service literature on competition below the threshold of armed conflict. Moreover, this analysis provides a fruitful starting point for future detailed analyses of Army roles in competition.

Notably, several team members with scholarly, policy, and military strategic expertise in both the conventional and special operations forces

realms conducted this analysis using a mini-Delphi exercise.¹ In doing so, they relied on the triangulated sources of data on capabilities supply discussed earlier to conduct this analysis in multiple stages, compared results, and then iterated across several rounds to fine-tune their conclusions. We deliberately selected this method to ensure comprehensiveness and accuracy in elucidating the full range of potential Army capabilities relevant to competition and in identifying specifically how each might be relevant to competitive efforts.

Our analysis suggests that the Army has much to offer the Joint Force in competition efforts, including its administrative logistics network; ability to partner with ground forces in partner nations; and ability to provide less-provocative, “low-end” deterrent options, including defensive systems, combat service support capabilities, smaller units, training, and exercises. Interviewees noted that, in spite of these strengths, the role of the Army as a significant enabler of the Joint Force in competition is not always fully understood. This is so partly because the linkages between soldiers’ day-to-day activities and competition outcomes are not well defined. This challenge is magnified by the lack of consensus on the definition of *competition*. Finally, joint and broadening assignments that might enhance key leaders’ innate knowledge of the competition space are disincentivized in current Army promotion processes, hindering organic routes of communicating the relevance of Army capabilities to competition.

¹ The Delphi method is a structured communication technique that RAND originally developed in the 1950s as a systematic, interactive forecasting method relying on a panel of experts. Delphi is based on the principle that forecasts (or decisions) from a structured group of individuals are more accurate than those from unstructured groups. When this technique is adapted for face-to-face meetings, it is called a *mini-Delphi* or *Estimate-Talk-Estimate*. There is no single Delphi methodology; the applications are diverse. In general, there is agreement that the Delphi method, at its most basic, is an expert survey with two or more rounds. In the second and later rounds of the survey, the results of the previous round are given as feedback, and the experts answer under the influence of their colleagues’ opinions. Thus, the Delphi method is a relatively strongly structured group communication process. See Kerstin Cuhls, “Delphi Method,” in Kerstin Cuhls, ed., *Delphi Surveys: Teaching Material for UNIDO Foresight Seminars*, Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2005. For more information on the Delphi method, see RAND Corporation, “Delphi Method,” webpage, undated.

The Supply Side: Understanding the Full Range of Army Capabilities

The Army's potential contributions to competition are often framed in terms of a high-end conflict and viewed through the lens of MDO. This framing focuses squarely on the potential contributions of Army maneuver units, leaving out the Army's unique capabilities and roles elsewhere within its formation and its contributions to broader joint functions. In recognition of this broader context, we next consider four layers of Army capabilities to encompass the full range of potential Army contributions to competition efforts across both the operational Army and the institutional Army: Army units, Army-funded executive agencies, ACOMs (including ASCCs and DRUs), and Army contributions to other competition-related missions.

Operational Army

To understand the capabilities contained in the operational Army, we leveraged the AUTL. The AUTL is described in Army doctrine as a “comprehensive, but not all-inclusive listing of Army tasks, missions, and operations” that is intended to “inform all members of the Profession of Arms of what the Army contributes to the joint force in terms of tasks performed.”² The AUTL also informs Army efforts to train units for specific required tasks. It therefore provides a useful accounting of the various tasks Army units conduct across the spectrum from peacetime to conflict. The tasks within the AUTL are organized into six warfighting functions—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, mission command, and protection warfighting functions—and a seventh category, tactical mission tasks. Each category consists of anywhere from three to 15 tasks, and each task is associated with up to 32 separate subtasks.³

² Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-03, *The Army Universal Task List*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2015.

³ For an in-depth overview of the AUTL, see Appendix C.

Army Executive Agents

Additional Army capabilities stem from the Secretary of the Army's role as the executive agent for 40 separate entities that serve specific operational or administrative roles for the Joint Force.⁴ The Army's executive agent responsibilities encompass primarily administrative roles (e.g., entrance processing for new recruits, homeowners assistance for service members, and after-service employment support), medical and research functions (e.g., traumatic brain injury research, biosurveillance efforts, and biosafety programs), operational support programs (e.g., counter-improvised explosive device [IED] and unexploded ordnance programs), and security cooperation and peacekeeping efforts (e.g., the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, and U.S. peacekeeping contributions to the United Nations [UN] Multinational Force and Observers [MFO] mission in the Sinai).

Army Commands, Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

Beyond the Army's executive agent responsibilities, its various headquarters elements and institutional commands, including the various ACOMs, ASCCs, and Army DRUs, also offer unique capabilities. These entities play important roles in supporting competition activities. ACOMs play a largely institutional role, focusing on the organizing, training, and equipping of Army forces for specific missions. ASCCs operating under the auspices of a GCC commander are often engaged in the command, control, and resupply of forces conducting steady-state missions in competition abroad. In other cases, such as with USASOC and U.S. Army Cyber Command (USAR-

⁴ National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*, January 28, 2016. According to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5101.1, an executive agent is the

head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. (DoDD 5101.1, *DoD Executive Agent*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 3, 2002)

CYBER), ASCCs also play institutional roles to organize, train, and equip specialized units within the Army. DRUs serve a variety of purposes, with some focused on specialized tasks, such as medical operations and criminal investigations, and others focused on PME and human resources.

Other Army Missions

Beyond the broad array of Army capabilities represented in the AUTL, the Army's executive agent responsibilities, and the capabilities within the Army's command structures, the Army has additional capabilities that may support competition efforts. These capabilities stem from Army fusion centers, counterdrug operations, Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJSTOs), creating or reorganizing units, new education and training programs, military parades and shows of force, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), and international education and exchange programs.⁵

Assessing the Army's Contributions to Competition

Next, we consider how the Army capabilities described in the previous section can be leveraged in support of competition efforts. To organize our analysis, we used the objectives framework introduced in Chapter Two to represent the demand signal for competition-relevant capabilities and to conduct a supply and demand analysis to consider Army capabilities that might support each LOE in that framework. Table 7.1 illustrates our method of analysis, representing a sample of the entire analysis—that pertaining to competition (LOE 3). In the remainder of this section, we consider the findings pertaining to each LOE in turn.

LOE 1: Strengthen Allies and Partners

LOE 1 consists of two subgoals: Secure the United States as a Partner of Choice (LOE 1.1) and build partner capacity (LOE 1.2).

⁵ For an explanation of the methodology used in this analysis, see Appendix C.

TABLE 7.1

Illustrative Analysis: Linking a Sample of Specific Army Capabilities Across Warfighting Functions with Competition Objectives

Warfighting Function and Capabilities	Example	Related Competition LOE Subgoals
Movement and maneuver		
ART 1.1: Perform Tactical Actions Associated with Force Projection and Deployment ART 1.5: Occupy an Area ART 1.8: Conduct Reconnaissance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deploy from continental United States to theater, including mobilization both to rehearse and demonstrate reception, staging, and onward integration capability. • Occupy key terrain. • Blend <i>real world</i> and <i>exercise</i> reconnaissance to answer theater information requirements. 	Deter conventional aggression (LOE 3.1)
Intelligence		
ART 2.2: Provide Support to Situational Understanding ART 2.3: Conduct Information Collection ART 2.4: Provide Intelligence Support to Targeting and Information-Related Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Every activity (exercise, key leader engagement, military to military, etc.) can contribute to collection for operational preparation of the environment and feed intelligence preparation of the battlefield. • Blend <i>real world</i> and <i>exercise</i> intelligence activities to answer theater information requirements. • Contribute to <i>real world</i> competition in the information environment. 	Prepare the battlespace (LOE 3.2)
Fires		
All moderately applicable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exercise (long-range precision fires) in theater to <i>demonstrate</i> capabilities, <i>coordinate and integrate</i> (kill chain) with partners, and develop or maintain theater-specific proficiency. 	Deter conventional aggression (LOE 3.1)

Table 7.1—Continued

Warfighting Function and Capabilities	Example	Related Competition LOE Subgoals
Sustainment		
ART 4.1: Provide Logistics Support ART 4.3: Provide Health Service Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build modern “iron anthills”—prestige supply items and combat support capabilities in theater. • Invest in Army prepositioned stocks, and ensure that the equipment is the right type, that it remains functional, and that it can be broken out quickly and effectively. • Prestage supplies and equipment to facilitate forward care. Familiarize medical corps personnel with the region. Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for tapping into local medical capability. 	Prepare the battlespace (LOE 3.2)
Mission command		
ART 5.2: Conduct Command Post Operations ART 5.6: Integrate Space Operations ART 5.7: Conduct Public Affairs Operations ART 5.9: Conduct Cyber Electromagnetic Activities ART 5.10: Install, Operate, and Maintain the Network ART 5.11: Conduct Military Deception ART 5.12: Synchronize Information-Related Capabilities ART 5.13: Conduct Soldier and Leader Engagement ART 5.14: Employ Military Information Support Operations ART 5.15: Conduct Civil Affairs Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exercise contingency command-and-control structures in theater, including coordination with partners and transition from competition to conflict, especially in a contested environment. • Develop and exercise a network capable of satisfying command-and-control requirements, including appropriate partner participation. • Contribute to the pursuit of theater (influence) objectives in the information environment with all available information-related capabilities (public affairs, cyber, senior leader engagement, military information support operations, civil affairs, etc.). • Prepare to win in the information environment in the event of a conflict, with particular focus on cyber and electromagnetic activities, deception, space, etc. 	All

Table 7.1—Continued

Warfighting Function and Capabilities	Example	Related Competition LOE Subgoals
Protection		
ART 6.1: Coordinate Air and Missile Defense ART 6.3: Implement Physical Security Procedures. ART 6.4: Conduct Operational Area Security ART 6.6: Conduct Survivability Operations ART 6.10: Implement Operations Security	Execute protection-oriented tasks to manage signatures, maximize unpredictability, and/or deliberately deceive.	Prepare the battlespace (LOE 3.2)

Operational Army

The operational Army can contribute to LOE 1.1 through relationship development and management—*military engagement* in contemporary Army vernacular.⁶ One of the main ways tactical formations, across warfighting functions, can achieve this is by encouraging others to choose the United States through such actions as demonstrating capabilities to partners. Any part of the Army can demonstrate capabilities, but conventional forces are likely to represent the main effort in this regard. Combat arms formations will certainly play an important role but are by no means the only units that can contribute to such efforts. Army foreign-area officers, for example, have the education and regional expertise necessary to support military engagement.

By contrast, LOE 1.2 focuses on what the Army can do for others to build their capacity. When it comes to tactical formations, this will likely manifest itself through training and/or advising to directly build organic capacity in partners. The key implementers of these activities are likely to be security force assistance brigades and state partnership programs, with additional support from such organizations as USASAC, which can assist with FMS, foreign military financing, and international military education and training. This may also include institutional-level advising and Army special operations forces activities.

Army Executive Agents

We assess that slightly less than half of the Army's various executive agent responsibilities support Joint Force efforts to achieve each objective.

We focus first on the potential contributions of executive agents to securing the United States as a partner of choice (LOE 1.1). Several executive agent responsibilities focus directly on preparing Army and joint forces to advance U.S. influence in the competitive space, including Army support to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), and the Army's proponent responsibilities over the Joint Center for Inter-

⁶ See, for example, John R. Deni, *Military Engagement and Forward Presence: Down but Not Out as Tools to Shape and Win*, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Press, January 2016, and Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 17-03, *Theater Security Cooperation: The Military Engagement Team*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., January 2017.

national Security Force Assistance. In some cases, Army support helps prepare American warfighters to constructively engage with allies and partners through language and culture training and develops specialized expertise in how to advise and assist partner forces.

In other cases, Army executive agent responsibilities directly enable Joint Force efforts to advance U.S. influence and promote friendly causes through engagement with allies, partners, and other nations. This includes Army support to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), management of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (a small counterinsurgency development program that U.S. forces in Afghanistan used), and facilitation of DoD support to UN missions and the UN MFO) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai.

In still other cases, Army executive agent responsibilities can help secure the United States as a partner of choice simply by sharing the collateral benefit of DoD's investment in its own capabilities with allies and partners. For example, DoD's chemical and biological defense program could develop capabilities that could be shared with allies or partners to address similar threats in their own countries. More directly, the Georgia-U.S. Biosurveillance & Research Center supports U.S. biodefense efforts collocated with Georgian researchers in Tbilisi.

As for efforts to build partner capacity (LOE 1.2), a similar logic applies in terms of programs intended primarily to support U.S. organic capabilities. For example, the DoD program on medical research for the prevention, mitigation, and treatment of blast injuries could help enable capacity-building efforts among specific allies to better address these medical issues themselves. Lessons learned for countering IEDs (through the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency) could be shared with allies and partners to build their own counter-IED capabilities.

Other Army executive agent responsibilities also help improve the ability of U.S. forces to engage in train, advise, and assist activities abroad. This includes Army support to the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance and WHINSEC, to the extent that U.S. soldiers learn alongside allies and partners in a shared educational environment.

Army Commands, Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

The vast majority of ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs across the Army play some role in strengthening allies and partnerships abroad, both in terms of efforts to secure the United States as the partner of choice (LOE 1.1) and efforts to build partner capacity (LOE 1.2). The Army's ten ASCCs play an essential role. In particular, the efforts of the subordinate commands associated with each GCC are essential for organizing and executing efforts to build partner capacity. Of the Army's various DRUs, a number of capabilities are uniquely suited to securing the United States as a partner of first choice, especially capabilities that can assist allied or partner nations with acquiring the high-demand but low-density expertise that is unmatched by many competitors of the United States. This includes such organizations as the Army Corps of Engineers and Army Medical Command, which could provide niche support to friendly allies and partners. It also includes the U.S. Military Academy, which, along with those educational institutions within TRADOC, often provides military education to foreign students.

Other Army Competition Missions

Several other Army missions help secure the United States as a partner of choice (LOE 1.1). This includes international PME programs, which facilitate the education of foreign military officers in American PME programs, and efforts to develop new military education programs or training, which could provide for exchange programs with foreign military schools. Perhaps most important, Army contributions to fusion centers, where information is shared with allied or partner forces, could help secure local partnerships and build close alliances for shared benefit.

Similarly, a number of these activities help build partner capacity (LOE 1.2) in ways that benefit U.S. competition objectives. Counterdrug operations that involve partner forces can help professionalize, train, and equip partner-nation forces and address root sources of instability within foreign countries. Efforts to create new units or reorganize existing units could help build partner capacity as well, evidenced most clearly by the creation of the security force assistance brigades. Similarly, JCET, most often conducted by special operations forces, can incidentally help build the capacity of partner forces that participate in U.S. training activities abroad.

LOE 2: Win Without Fighting

LOE 2 consists of two subgoals: gain an asymmetric advantage (LOE 2.1) and stabilize fragile regions (LOE 2.2).

Army Units

LOE 2 is the area in which tactical Army formations, especially conventional units, are likely to have the least ability to contribute to competition efforts. Gaining an asymmetric advantage (LOE 2.1) is soundly in the realm of Army special operations forces. Permissions to execute many of these activities are likely to be held at high levels as they can be highly escalatory. This sub-LOE is closely tied to operational preparation of the environment, which is addressed in greater depth in LOE 3.

The Army contributes to efforts to stabilize fragile regions (LOE 2.2) in various ways. For instance, conventional unit deployments in unstable areas may work directly to stabilize fragile regions by preventing the outbreak of a regional conflict, drawing on such capabilities as civil-military operations, civil affairs, military intelligence, and sustainment. Army contributions to allied peacekeeping missions, such as the NATO Kosovo Force, provide another example of Army capabilities directly related to LOE 2.2.⁷ At the other end of the range of Army capabilities, the Army's deployments of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense systems to defend allies and partners provide another example of critical capabilities used to stabilize fragile regions in certain areas.

Army Executive Agents

Compared with LOE 1, a smaller proportion of Army executive agent responsibilities help support Joint Force efforts under LOE 2.

Focusing first on efforts to gain asymmetric advantage (LOE 2.1), Army proponent support to DoD forensics and biometrics programs could play an integral role in efforts to illuminate and disrupt foreign malign activity. This could include efforts to support partner-nation law enforcement to uncover illicit networks used by foreign actors to gather intelligence or more direct efforts of U.S. forces to disrupt competitors' attempts to target

⁷ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, "NATO Mission in Kosovo (KFOR)," webpage, undated.

U.S. forces through proxies in such places as Afghanistan. Alternatively, foreign language and cultural expertise, gained via DLIFLC, could facilitate the messaging efforts of U.S. forces to influence key populations in regions vulnerable to foreign influence. Overall, however, Army executive agent responsibilities are less suited to gaining asymmetric advantage in competition.

Slightly more executive agent roles support efforts to stabilize fragile regions (LOE 2.2). This naturally includes DoD support to the UN—specifically, the MFO peacekeeping mission in the Sinai—which serves to physically keep the peace in fragile regions and enables long-term, sustainable political solutions. This also includes executive agents responsible for organic U.S. capabilities that could help partner stabilization efforts, including the Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence, the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, and the military ground-based Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare technology program.

Army Commands, Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

Across the institutional Army, fewer headquarters and commands are more relevant to efforts to win without fighting in competition than other aspects of competition. ACOMs, such as Army Futures Command and TRADOC, could help establish doctrine and concepts for efforts to gain asymmetric advantage (LOE 2.1) and efforts to stabilize fragile regions (LOE 2.2), but these areas have historically received less focus. Regionally aligned ASCCs are uniquely postured to conduct institutional capacity-building efforts with allied and partner nations, and such activities could prove useful for efforts to build resilience to malign influence (under LOE 2.2). But similarly, these efforts have a lower priority for these commands than do their roles of strengthening allies and partners and preparing for future conflict.

Certain ASCCs and DRUs play essential roles in Joint Force efforts to gain asymmetric advantage (LOE 2.1). This includes the efforts of USASOC and USARCYBER, which develop forces necessary for unique special operations and cyber operations capable of imposing costs against an adversary through less-visible means. Similarly, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security

Command conducts mission command of operational intelligence forces necessary to illuminate malign acts of competitors.

Other Army Competition Missions

Several residual Army competition tasks also help the Joint Force gain asymmetric advantage (LOE 2.1). Army efforts to enable integrated joint technical operations could help eliminate enemy capabilities short of war, and the creation of fusion centers could play a role in illuminating the malign acts of competitors. Similarly, new Army PME programs or coursework could be developed to help Army personnel experiment with creative ways of proactively challenging our adversaries' interests short of war.

As for efforts to stabilize fragile regions (LOE 2.2), a number of Army capabilities to support these competition missions help counter threat networks and build resilience. This includes counterdrug operations, which could help address instability in vulnerable regions. It also includes efforts to educate foreign military personnel in U.S. PME institutions, which could build the institutional capacity of key allies and partners over the long run. Fusion centers could also be used to support counter-threat finance efforts that maintain the stability of allied or partner financial systems.

LOE 3: Prepare for War

LOE 3 consists of two subgoals: deter conventional aggression (LOE 3.1) and prepare the battlespace (LOE 3.2).

Army Units

Deterring conventional aggression (LOE 3.1) is about the fundamentals of deterrence: capability, credibility, and communication.⁸ Army units can contribute through capabilities that are able to hold adversaries at risk and are positioned where they can be responsive. These capabilities and their positioning must be appropriately messaged, signaled, or communicated. The Army has demonstrated strength in this regard, as seen in such efforts as Operation Atlantic Resolve and the Eighth Army's decades-long pres-

⁸ For more on deterrence, see Mazarr et al., 2018.

ence on the Korean Peninsula.⁹ Moreover, because its presence can tend to be more persistent than that of either the Navy or Air Force, the Army has been shown to be stronger in terms of signaling resolve and demonstrating commitment than the other services.¹⁰

Meanwhile, preparing the battlespace (LOE 3.2) is often underappreciated as an area in which tactical formations can make substantial contributions. Preparing the battlespace involves intelligence- and sustainment-heavy activities, but all parts of the Army can help fill in gaps in higher headquarters' collection matrixes, explore operational limitations during exercises, and build regional and specific area familiarity. Army prepositioned stocks also play a critical role in support of this goal.

Army Executive Agents

The Army's executive agent responsibilities play a similarly small role in the Joint Force's efforts to prepare for war. In terms of deterring conventional aggression (LOE 3.1), certain executive agent responsibilities may invest in new technology capable of neutralizing an adversary's weapon system. This includes the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program and the DoD Biological Select Agent and Toxin Biosafety Program. Such investments could have deterrent value to the extent that an adversary becomes aware that the Joint Force is defended against a specific threat. The deterrent effect of these capabilities is, however, likely small, to the extent that they focus on hyperspecific threat vectors. Alternatively, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance could help deter conventional aggression to the extent that expertise in security force assistance could improve the interoperability of U.S. forces with key allies and partners.

As for efforts to prepare the battlespace (LOE 3.2), a slightly larger number of Army executive agent responsibilities appear relevant. This includes efforts to prepare the Joint Force to operate in denied territory,

⁹ Eighth Army, "Mission," webpage, undated.

¹⁰ Bryan Frederick, Stephen Watts, Matthew Lane, Abby Doll, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Meagan L. Smith, *Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2533-A, 2020; David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1494-A, 2003.

whether through the provision of language training (via DLIFLC), or via efforts to avoid biometric or forensic detection by an adversary (via the DoD Biometrics and Forensics Agency). The Army's role as the coordinator of contracting activities in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR also helps prepare the battlespace, to the extent that it facilitates procurement of base life support and materiel in key regions necessary to deter aggression from state actors.

Army Commands, Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

The institutional Army ultimately plays an essential role in LOE 3, Preparing for War. Specifically, the Army's four ACOMs are critical in efforts to deter conventional aggression (LOE 3.1) by organizing, training, exercising, and deploying Army forces worldwide. The Army's ten ASCCs also play essential roles in preparing the battlespace (LOE 3.2), particularly through their role in managing forward posture and logistics for the overseas Army in each of the GCCs. Many of the various DRUs across the Army play key roles in efforts to prepare the battlespace, particularly through efforts to develop and manage specific expertise across the service (e.g., human resources, engineering, and medical capabilities).

Other Army Competition Missions

Army capabilities to conduct several residual competition missions could help deter conventional aggression (LOE 3.1). This could involve revealing to an enemy the existence of a specific special technical capability to deter aggression, holding a show of force or exercise to demonstrate U.S. resolve to defend its interests, or even developing new units to directly target enemy anti-access and area-denial capabilities. This could also involve educational and training activities that allow Army soldiers to experiment and wargame high-end contingencies in a classroom setting. As far as efforts to prepare the battlespace (LOE 3.2), Army capabilities to conduct these competition missions play a lesser role but can help establish relationships with foreign military personnel through PME programs or even JCETs.

Key Findings and Recommendations

From an analysis of academic, strategic, doctrinal, and policy documents; existing federal law and Army regulations; semistructured interviews with a select set of subject-matter experts; comparative case studies; and an iterative mini-Delphi exercise, we derived key findings about how Army processes and capabilities relate to broader competition activities. From these findings, we developed recommendations to help the Army better support—and better communicate its ability and capacity to support—DoD and U.S. government competition efforts. This chapter details these key findings and our recommendations.

Findings

Process-Related Findings

In deriving key findings for each of the processes we analyzed, we generally found that existing processes—and related authorities—were not designed with competition in mind and, thus, require significant modification in certain areas to better enable the United States to compete globally on solid footing.

Our analysis of **security cooperation** processes suggests that there is a lack of centralized management of security cooperation activities, especially within the Army. This lack of centralized management hinders the integration and agility of security cooperation processes and poses challenges to effective use of the processes to achieve competition objectives aimed at strengthening allies and partners (LOE 1). Our research focused on the acquisition side of the Army security cooperation enterprise, in which there is an absence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities characterized by

the lack of a clear lead agency and confusion over the overlapping roles and responsibilities of USASAC and DASA (DE&C). This makes it difficult to integrate Army security cooperation activities into broader U.S. government competition efforts. While not the focus of our exploration of Army security cooperation efforts, we received some inputs from Army leadership indicating that this absence of clearly defined security cooperation roles and responsibilities may also extend to the Army operations side of the enterprise. In addition, existing security cooperation authorities, many of which have their origins in the Global War on Terror, are not aligned with competition objectives and impede the efficient provision of SA as a mechanism of competing effectively.

Similarly, our analysis of **FMS** processes suggests that existing policies and authorities do not easily accommodate new and novel requests. While often critiqued for being slow, FMS processes enable deliberate, strategic decisionmaking; allow the U.S. government to ensure that it is providing a comprehensive suite of training, services, and other support with each sale through the Total Package Approach; and ensure that sales are made to responsible and capable partners. At the same time, identified inefficiencies contribute to the slowness of FMS processes, such as the absence of a clear lead for Army FMS planning and execution, insufficient proactivity in assessing partner-nation requirements and capacity, a duplicative waiver review process, and the allocation of funding in one-year increments. Certain authorities, moreover, such as congressional notification thresholds, are outdated, and, generally speaking, authorities related to FMS processes do not support efficiency. In addition, FMS is not always leveraged as a competitive tool. In sum, FMS processes currently face challenges in their contributions to competition objectives—specifically, LOE 1, Strengthen Allies and Partners—by a lack of agility, proactivity, integration, and efficiency.

Our analysis of **force posture** processes suggests that, while they work well across the relevant imperatives during steady-state operations and longer-term deterrence missions, these processes lack the agility to respond to rapidly evolving threats and opportunities. That affects the ability of the processes to support competition objectives, such as LOE 2.1, gain an asymmetric advantage, and LOE 3, Prepare for War.

Finally, **talent management** processes remain oriented toward developing the traditional conventional warfighter rather than developing soldiers

who also have optimal skills for competition activities. This aspect of current talent management processes poses challenges to the Army's agility in seeking to achieve the entire range of competition objectives. Promotion and assignment processes, for example, reinforce a "ducks pick ducks" mentality, such that soldiers with conventional warfighting skills and experiences are viewed more favorably. By prioritizing warfighting skills, these processes discourage soldiers from pursuing broadening assignments or seeking out experiences that might develop competition-relevant skills. This contributes to a lack of understanding of the Army's role as a significant enabler of the Joint Force in competition.¹ Similarly, PME efforts to produce strategic, innovative thinkers are not designed to extend to actions in competition. Ongoing efforts to reform talent management processes, however, show promise in more effectively retaining and utilizing top Army talent. Talent management processes are also marked by increasing levels of innovation, indicating that these processes may—if modified to increase agility in selection and development of ideal competitor soldiers—ultimately be able to provide strong support to U.S. efforts to compete.

Our findings on the extent to which existing processes achieve the imperatives that interviewees identified as key to success are summarized in Table 8.1. We have provided ratings for the imperatives identified as particularly important for the success of a given process. We have indicated as less applicable the imperatives that were not identified as the most important for a given process.

Capability-Related Findings

The Army Has Significant Capabilities That Can Contribute to Competition, but Current Incentive Structures Seem to Interfere with the Army's Ability to Fully Leverage These Capabilities

As outlined in Chapter Seven, our detailed supply-and-demand analysis of existing Army capabilities' fit for the needs of an era of competition highlighted an abundance of Army strengths in the competition realm. In particular, the Army provides a critical Joint Force backbone through its adminis-

¹ This lack of understanding is also influenced by the widespread misunderstanding of the meaning of *competition* and a lack of familiarity with Army capabilities.

TABLE 8.1

Summary of Processes' Fulfillment of Competition Imperatives

Process	Agility	Innovation	Resilience	Integration	Efficiency	Proactivity
Security cooperation	●			○		
FMS	○				○	○
GDP and GFM	○				◐	◐
Army talent management	○	●				

○ Largely does not meet imperative

◐ Partially meets imperative

● Mostly meets imperative

trative logistics network and ability to provide additional air defenses, fires, and medical evacuation capabilities.

Our analysis of Army capabilities suggests that existing Army capabilities largely satisfy competition requirements, as discussed earlier. These capabilities, however, are not always tailored to meet CCDR demands in support of competition activities. This stems from several factors, but, in particular, relevant Army organizations are not always incentivized to tailor their contributions to meet the needs of broader DoD competition activities. For example, talent management processes seem to favor officers with demonstrated warfighting skills rather than rewarding officers who have other competition-relevant skills and/or who have pursued joint assignments and opportunities to broaden their perspective through civilian education programs.

Recommendations

Engage with Partners Across the U.S. Government to Agree on a Better-Specified Definition of “Competition”

Lack of agreement across the U.S. government on the meaning of *competition* and its relationship to campaigning hinders Army efforts to specify how its capabilities might contribute to these efforts. We therefore recom-

mend that all U.S. government agencies, including Army stakeholders and DoD, take steps to coordinate on a better-specified definition of competition that clarifies its relationship to campaigning, possibly borrowing from the objectives and imperatives frameworks outlined in Chapter Two of this report. Clarity is needed not only in terms of the relative roles and responsibilities of various government and military entities during competition activities but also in terms of the specification of the strategy itself, such as in a clearer distinction between *deterrence* and *competition*, and in the role of steady-state operations in supporting competition efforts.

Policymakers Should Employ Objectives and Imperatives Frameworks as Tools for Optimizing Organizations for Competition

The objectives and imperatives frameworks used in our analysis have the potential to offer significant value to policymakers as they think through how to tailor their own workforces and workflows to the demands of campaigning during competition below the threshold of armed conflict. In general, we recommend that these frameworks be employed as tools for improving the competitive posture of relevant DoD and Army organizations.

Identify Opportunities to Streamline Key Processes

A theme of the key findings described earlier is that, while existing processes work well in competition below the threshold of armed conflict, they may not be tailored for progression along the competition continuum into active conflict. Our analysis suggests that there are opportunities to streamline and tailor key processes to enable quick responses to the rapidly changing threats that may characterize the competition environment. While there are ongoing efforts to improve and streamline talent management processes, it is important to formalize these improvements and give them institutional support. We recommend that the Army undertake a review of processes that support competition activities to identify opportunities for improving the efficiency and agility of these processes. This review should be informed by historical examples of successful organizational adaptation

within military organizations.² Our specific recommendations pertaining to potential avenues for streamlining each process are detailed in the following subsections.

Security Cooperation Processes

We recommend that the Army identify a lead entity for security cooperation efforts and clearly spell out the responsibilities of all organizations involved in these efforts. At present, the overlapping roles and responsibilities of

² Our review of the historical literature suggests that successful organizational adaptations are correlated with the use of working groups and incubators in which participants are empowered; inclusive and collaborative processes; and a willingness to learn from past failures, including the past failures of foreign military organizations. Working groups and incubators are important for successful adaptation because they allow bypassing of typical bureaucratic processes and institutional equities, which facilitates efficient development of innovative solutions to challenging problems. The Joint Force Development Group, an ad hoc group of six majors and lieutenant colonels from the Army and Air Force that reviewed the roles of the two services in high-intensity conflict between 1983 and 1984, is a historical example of an effective working group. The group had “carte blanche to rewrite air-ground relations,” and its members were “allow[ed] great latitude” to propose innovative solutions (Davis, 1987, pp. 42–43). Inclusive and collaborative processes, especially those in which information is shared effectively, are also correlated with successful organizational adaptations. The historical example of the Active Measures Working Group, which formulated a strategy for countering Soviet disinformation during the Cold War, illustrates this point. The working group “shared information well, including classified information,” and “expertise was openly shared with” any group members who “express[ed] an interest in . . . contributing to group output” (Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, “Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference,” *Strategic Perspectives* 11, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2012, p. 97). Finally, a demonstrated willingness to examine past failures critically is correlated with successful organizational adaptations. The creation of the Winograd Commission following the Second Lebanon War, which was charged with investigating shortcomings in the Israeli Defense Forces’ performance during the conflict, illustrates this point. The commission, which had a broad mandate to investigate and call witnesses, concluded that a disconnect between the Israeli political and military establishments had resulted in a lack of a unified communications strategy, which allowed Hezbollah to “control the information battlefield” (Iver Gabrielsen, “Military Strategy and the Conduct of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War,” *Comparative Strategy*, 2013, p. 439). The commission recommended the creation of a National Information Directorate to coordinate information and propaganda efforts across the political and military establishments and with nongovernmental entities (Paul et al., 2018, pp. 8–9).

USASAC and DASA (DE&C) make it difficult to identify opportunities to streamline existing security cooperation processes. This would improve the integration and agility of security cooperation efforts across the Army and enable the Army to provide support more easily to security cooperation programs aimed at achieving competition objectives.

FMS Processes

Although FMS processes may be slow by design to enable deliberate planning, we recommend that the Army identify opportunities to streamline segments of these processes and reduce delays in the provision of equipment to foreign militaries. This, in turn, will better enable the Army to be agile, proactive, efficient, and integrated in seeking to meet competition objectives, such as strengthening partners and allies. While funding is currently allocated on a year-to-year basis, allocating funding for multiple years would allow the Army to provide more-comprehensive rather than piecemeal packages to partner nations and invest in developing lasting relationships with partners. In addition, contracting processes could be modified to allow expedited review of urgent requests under special circumstances. The Army should also consider making changes to the current waiver review process, which interviewees described as duplicative.

Force Posture Processes

Force posture processes are well suited to competition below the threshold of armed conflict, but they may not be tailored for agile transition along the competition continuum into an active conflict. We recommend that the Joint Staff and OSD-P consider potential process modifications to ensure efficiency in force posture transitions, particularly when the United States needs to transition from competition to active conflict rapidly. We recommend that the Army review these processes and identify chokepoints that prevent the Army from responding quickly to rapidly evolving threats.

Talent Management Processes

We recommend that the Army make a proactive effort to prioritize skills relevant to campaigning in competitive settings alongside warfighting skills in promotion decisions. While ongoing efforts to reform talent management processes are a step in the right direction, these efforts should be formalized

and given additional institutional support. In addition, the Army should ensure that talent management processes incentivize officers to undertake broadening assignments, including assignments in OSD and interagency roles. This will not only enable Army officers to gain competition-relevant skills but also provide the opportunity to communicate competition-relevant Army capabilities to their counterparts in other services and across DoD.

The Army should also ensure that officers with competition-relevant skills are sent to JPME, especially as these schools begin to focus more on strategic-level and competition-relevant curricula, and subsequently serve in positions that make use of their education. Furthermore, while our analysis focused on officer talent management, the Army should also examine enlisted talent management processes and the extent to which they are tailored to competition.

Review and Update Core Authorities and Regulations to Ensure That They Are Tailored for the Demands of Competition

While we have endeavored to provide a detailed overview of the relevant authorities pertaining to each process examined here in Appendix B, it would benefit the Army to undertake a comprehensive review of competition-relevant authorities and Army regulations to determine the extent to which they are consistent with competition objectives. As a DSCA official explained during our research effort, there is a mismatch between existing authorities and the activities involved in competition. Existing authorities were “developed to encourage partners to play operational roles in current operations” rather than to support Army contributions to competition efforts.³ This review should include an examination of the day-to-day implementation of core authorities, with a focus on identifying potential updates to these authorities. For example, our analysis suggested that authorities related to talent management, technology transfer and exports, and security cooperation may need to be updated to facilitate the recruitment and retention of soldiers with competition-relevant skills, allow the

³ Interview with DSCA official, December 18, 2020.

U.S. government to export advanced technologies to allies and partners in support of competition objectives, and enhance relationships with partners in regions where near-peer competitors seek to gain influence.

Security Cooperation Authorities

Existing authorities may need to be updated to enable the Army to undertake security cooperation activities efficiently and match the pace of these activities to the quick pace of competition. We recommend that the Army consider whether existing authorities, particularly those related to congressional notification requirements, are leading to delays. By enabling the Army to respond more rapidly to emerging threats and provide partners with needed assistance and capabilities, the revision of security cooperation authorities might enhance relationships with partners in regions where near-peer competitors seek to gain influence.

FMS Authorities

We recommend that Army-specific regulations and guidance pertaining to technology transfer and export policies be updated. Interviewees reported that existing regulations lack sufficient detail, which means that they often “run into situations where there is not a precedent for something,” such as a novel request from a partner.⁴ To remedy this, the Army should ensure that existing regulations provide more-detailed guidance.

Force Posture Authorities

We recommend that the Army review existing authorities pertaining to the GDP and GFM processes to ensure that these authorities promote agility, efficiency, and innovation. Remedying these issues would allow the Army to leverage force-posture processes in support of competition efforts more effectively.

Talent Management Authorities

Although the Secretary of the Army has flexible statutory authority regarding the promotion and recruitment of officers with competition-relevant skills, this authority may not be currently leveraged to the fullest degree

⁴ Interview with USASAC official, December 17, 2020.

to support competition efforts. We recommend that the Army consider how existing authorities may be leveraged to recruit, promote, and retain officers with competition-relevant skills and, when necessary, update existing authorities to provide additional flexibility. In addition, existing Army policy guidance on talent management and PME should be codified to ensure that these policies are interpreted and implemented consistently across the service; interviewees reported that existing policies are not applied consistently.

Consider Creating a Named Operation for Competition

While the process and authorities improvements recommended earlier will improve the Army's ability to contribute to competition efforts, our analysis suggests that the creation of a named operation for competition may represent an effective way to accelerate the provision of needed resources, streamline processes, and remedy inefficiencies in existing authorities. Numerous interviewees raised this point. As one interviewee explained, "if competition was a named operation," SA could be provided "much more efficiently." Security cooperation practitioners currently "utilize a bunch of different authorities," the interviewee noted, and if they "could somehow consolidate all [these] authorities at the national level, that would be really helpful." A named operation for competition would provide "funding [that] could [be] access[ed] for the sake of competition." The interviewee emphasized that this would have benefits beyond the security cooperation enterprise.⁵ Indeed, another interviewee concurred that, from a force posture perspective, a named operation for competition would "accelerate the resources . . . through a cooperative authorities process."⁶ Further analysis is required to determine whether the creation of a named operation for competition is both permissible and advisable. We recommend that the Army and DoD examine whether the statutory framework for named operations would permit the creation of a named operation for competition and consider the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach.

⁵ Interview with USARPAC official, December 8, 2020.

⁶ Interview with officer at USARPAC G5 Plans & Posture, December 16, 2020.

Currently, there are a variety of Army and DoD-wide efforts intended to achieve competition objectives. For example, the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative is an effort focused on building partner capacity in the South China Sea. It provides funding to the Joint Force to help build the maritime security and maritime domain awareness capacity of select partners in Southeast Asia.⁷ The Pacific Deterrence Initiative authorizes funding to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region, including efforts focused on building U.S. deterrent capabilities in cooperation with partners and allies in the region.⁸ It prioritizes investments in missile defense; long-range strike systems; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as in adaptive basing, advanced critical munitions, prepositioned stocks, distributed logistics, information operations, and bilateral and multilateral exercises, among other investments. The European Deterrence Initiative, meanwhile, authorizes funding to enhance U.S. deterrence posture in the EUCOM AOR, increase the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and bolster the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners.⁹ Building on such existing initiatives through a named operation for competition would allow unity of effort across DoD and allow the Army to identify opportunities to contribute to competition objectives more easily.

Consider Modifying Existing Personnel Incentives to Prioritize Joint Tours or Other Broadening Assignments for Officers Across All Echelons

Related to the talent management process findings, the Army personnel system may not reward key assignments relevant to competition, including

⁷ For background, see DSCA, “Section 1263 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI),” webpage, undated d.

⁸ See Section 1251, “Pacific Deterrence Initiative,” in Pub. L. 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, January 1, 2021.

⁹ U.S. European Command, “FY2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet,” undated.

those in OSD and interagency organizations and those in joint organizations providing regular exposure to interagency actors and processes. Such assignments can help communicate the relevance of Army capabilities to competition objectives. At present, however, participation in such broadening roles can negatively affect officer promotions. Positions outside a typical career path can affect chances for promotion when they do not lead to a series of predictable stepping-stone positions aiming toward an ultimate, high goal—such as a general officer role. As one interviewee noted:

Our GOs [general officers] are supposed to be smart and broad. These are the people we need to be identifying early. We could identify them based on who has done broadening assignments earlier in their career. The only way you could do that [now] while protecting promotion tracks would be to pull some people off the GO track.¹⁰

To sidestep the potentially negative career implications of broadening assignments, the Army should consider designating senior jobs that require competition-related knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Therefore, in an effort to improve communication of competition-relevant capabilities throughout the force, the Army should closely examine potential changes to its promotion system that would incentivize key broadening assignments for the Army's leaders, including ways it might maximize the advantages of such changes while minimizing the opportunity costs. In addition, the Army should devise a clear messaging strategy to convey the significance and utility of Army capabilities in competition. This messaging strategy should highlight the Army capabilities that are most relevant to Joint Force and theater objectives in competition, even if these capabilities are not historical core competencies of the Army.

¹⁰ Interview with official from the U.S. Army Colonels Management Office, December 3, 2020.

Imperatives for Competition

As noted in Chapter Two, our analysis of recommended changes to existing processes was informed by our imperatives framework. In this appendix, we provide additional background on these imperatives.

We developed this framework following an in-depth review of key strategic documents, including the 2018 NDS, the 2017 NSS, Army MDO Concept 2028, and the IW annex to the 2018 NDS. We identified key themes across these documents. Next, several team members conducted separate reviews of these documents and cross-referenced the key themes in the documents against key themes in the organizational theory literature. Then, we compared their separate analyses and identified six key imperatives for competition. In addition, we drew heavily from the organizational theory literature to identify imperatives that characterize best practices for effective organizations.

The selected imperatives, which we describe in more detail in the following section, are as follows:

1. agility
2. innovation
3. resilience
4. integration
5. efficiency (including cost-effectiveness)
6. proactivity.¹

¹ Our analysis suggests that these imperatives are not equally relevant across all DoD processes considered here. Rather, certain imperatives pertain more or less strongly to specific processes. For example, interviewees told us that efforts to cultivate agility and innovation were particularly important for talent management processes. On the other

In addition to being frequently referenced in key strategic documents, these imperatives are characterized in the organizational theory literature as being aligned with best practices for effective organizations and processes. The imperatives can be tuned to achieve the optimal mix for a given organization or process.

Defining Key Imperatives

Because any given process is complex and involves many actors from different organizations, we used an organizational design framework to describe the key imperatives identified earlier.² This framework can be used to examine how each imperative may affect different core aspects of complex processes:

- **Strategy:** This encompasses the strategy and goals that “define the purpose and competitive techniques” of an entity.³
- **Structure:** An organizational structure includes formal reporting relationships, such as the “number of levels in the hierarchy and [the] span of control of [the] manager and supervisors”; the grouping of individuals into departments and how departments “fit into the organization as a whole”; and the design of organizational systems to “ensure effective communication, coordination, and integration of efforts across departments.”⁴
- **People:** This category describes human resources, talent management, and organizational culture.⁵

hand, because FMS acquisition processes are designed to be deliberate, agility may be less of a critical competition imperative for offices and personnel working in this area to strive toward than are other competition imperatives, such as integration.

² Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011.

³ Daft, 2016, p. 21.

⁴ Daft, 2016, p. 88.

⁵ Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011.

- **Processes:** Processes are defined as “organized group[s] of related tasks and activities that work together to transform inputs into outputs that create value for customers.”⁶
- **Coordination and control systems:** This category includes management and oversight systems and technology.⁷

This framework was based on our review of the organizational design literature. We also conducted targeted literature reviews to understand how each imperative term has been used. These literature reviews surveyed previous RAND reports, including reports that provide in-depth studies of organizational agility, resilience, and innovation; practitioner documents; and the academic literature on management science and related fields. Two team members independently reviewed this literature to identify common themes related to how organizations achieve the six imperatives identified earlier. They then compared their separate analyses, while a third team member with expertise in organizational theory helped synthesize their analyses and resulting themes to develop formal criteria for each key imperative.

Agility

An agile organization is one that aims to achieve both stability and dynamism by acting as a “network of teams within a people-centered culture that operates in rapid learning and fast decision cycles which are enabled by technology, and that is guided by a powerful common purpose to co-create value for all stakeholders.”⁸ See Table A.1.

Innovation

Innovation can be defined as “the process of ideation, evaluation, selection, development, and implementation of new or improved products, services, or programs.”⁹ See Table A.2.

⁶ Daft, 2016, p. 116.

⁷ Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011.

⁸ Aghina et al., 2017.

⁹ Malinoski and Perry, 2000.

TABLE A.1
Criteria for Achieving Agility

Organizational Dimension	Criteria for Achieving Agility
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organizational leaders adopt an agile mindset. If they do not, “they unwittingly continue to employ conventional management practices that undermine agile projects.”^a
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited number of management layers Use of broad spans of control
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supervisors empower people and teams Team orientation (teams are empowered and accountable) Modular, cross-functional teams (teams form and disband to support organizational goals)
Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rapid iteration Allow fast fail when and where this makes sense Continuous learning Close connection to the end user, customer, or client Agile work practices can include rapid experimentation and iteration, role mobility, flexible resource allocation, and information transparency^b
Coordination and control systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transparency and open communication Emphasis on decentralized authority in which staff have clear authority, responsibility, and accountability; senior leaders provide actionable guidance about priorities and expected outcomes

^a Rigby, Sutherland, and Noble, “Agile at Scale,” 2018, p. 43.

^b Olli Salo, “How to Create an Agile Organization,” McKinsey & Company website, October 2, 2017.

Resilience

Resilience can be defined in terms of “organizational and employee strength, perseverance and recovery when encountering adversity.”¹⁰ Alternatively, it can be defined as the “ability to maintain a critical level of operational capability despite disruptive events and regardless of the impact on individual systems and components.”¹¹ *Resilience* is a term that can be applied to both individuals (e.g., psychological resilience) and organizations (e.g., organizational adaptation). See Table A.3.

¹⁰ Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 4.

¹¹ Meyer, 1982.

TABLE A.2
Criteria for Achieving Innovation

Organizational Dimension	Criteria for Achieving Innovation
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear descriptions of what innovation should look like across parts of an organization or process • Some areas may allow more or less innovation and/or risk
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of autonomous innovation cells (e.g., a stand-alone unit with different expectations from the parent organization, allowing a greater degree of experimentation and fast-fail, or a system in which points of failure are rapidly identified or indicated) • Networked structures that support bridging relationships within an organization and/or with outside entities to bring together diverse individuals to foster exposure to new information and alternative perspectives^a
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Factors that support an innovative workforce include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – “Autonomy in selecting and managing one’s work; – Collaboration with specialists having complementary knowledge – Substantive work in the discipline rather than management; and – Flexible work arrangements^a
Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processes themselves can be designed to be more innovative via the use of new methods or practices • Processes can also be used to support product innovation (e.g., to facilitate idea- and information-sharing across diverse groups)
Coordination and control systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination and control systems should be consistent with strategic goals for any given unit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – For example, the parent organization must give an innovation-focused unit leeway to experiment and fast-fail; if failure is punished (e.g., if the rules for an innovation unit are the same as the rules for a unit that is not focused on innovation), innovation will be hampered.

^a Shirley Ross, Sandra Kay Evans, Irina A. Chindea, J. J. Roomsburg, Norah Griffin, and Samantha E. DiNicola, unpublished RAND Corporation research, 2018.

Integration

Externally, *integration* can mean vertical or horizontal integration within an industry. It can also mean forming strategic networks or alliances. Integration within an organization means using “rules and procedures, configurational plans, the authority of the hierarchy and decision-making commit-

TABLE A.3
Criteria for Achieving Resilience

Organizational Dimension	Criteria for Achieving Resilience
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity and flexibility to respond and adapt to changing circumstances
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slack (i.e., diverse, redundant) resources to “absorb the impacts of adverse conditions”^a • Clear communication and reporting structures
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees have the capability of improvising • All personnel have a shared mission awareness • Develop psychological strength in employees (e.g., coping skills, based on the idea that resilience is a learnable psychological capacity)
Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processes should support organizational mindfulness (defined as a “preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, an under specification of structures”) and the “capability to discover and manage unexpected events.”^b • Processes should emphasize rapid detection, dynamic planning, and response procedures^c
Coordination and control systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systems should allow flexibility and adaptation to maintain mission and functions • Systems should minimize response time, avoid duplication of efforts, and avoid role confusion if activities need to shift^c

^a Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 19.

^b Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 1999, in Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 17.

^c Krista Langeland, David Manheim, Gary McLeod, and George Nacouzi, *How Civil Institutions Build Resilience: Organizational Practices Derived from Academic Literature and Case Studies*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1246-AF, 2016.

tees” to “make different departments work in coordination.”¹² Integration is often compared with differentiation. A highly differentiated organization (or process) needs a greater degree of integration. See Table A.4.

¹² Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011, pp. 39–40.

TABLE A.4
Criteria for Achieving Integration

Organizational Dimension	Criteria for Achieving Integration
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Balance differentiation and complexity with integration • Determine where alliances, partnerships, or other connections can support goals
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrator or liaison roles for individuals or teams can be used to connect and coordinate parts of an organization or process
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use integrator or liaison roles, committees, or teams for decisionmaking across areas of an organization or process
Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The degree of integration within an organization or process will depend on its relative complexity (the number and type of actors involved, the level of decisionmaking, etc.)
Coordination and control systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use rules and procedures to help integrate across entities

Efficiency

Efficiency is defined as the “amount of resources used to achieve the organization’s goals.”¹³ While efficiency typically refers to “inputs, use of resources, and costs,”¹⁴ “administrative efficiency” focuses on how “work processes contribute to the overall value added in an organization.”¹⁵ See Table A.5.

Note that, in this research, we include cost-effectiveness as an element of efficiency. Cost-effectiveness, which is closely related to efficiency but focuses on costs, can be defined in terms of “achieving the most effectiveness for a given level of cost.”¹⁶

¹³ Daft, 2016, p. 23.

¹⁴ Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011, p. 11.

¹⁵ Lusthaus et al., 2002, p. 116.

¹⁶ Michael Spirtas, Yool Kim, Frank Camm, Shirley M. Ross, Debra Knopman, Forrest E. Morgan, Sebastian Joon Bae, M. Scott Bond, John S. Crown, and Elaine Simmons, *A Separate Space: Creating a Military Service for Space*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4263-AF, 2020, p. 24.

TABLE A.5
Criteria for Achieving Efficiency

Organizational Dimension	Criteria for Achieving Efficiency
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategy informs desired relationship between the unit of output and the cost of producing the outcome^a
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear decisionmaking hierarchy and authorities • Clear reporting and information structures • Administrative systems in place provide good value for costs
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear decisionmaking roles and responsibilities • Human, financial, and physical resources meet goals • Costs of staff members make sense relative to their productivity
Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fast decisionmaking • Financial resources are used optimally (i.e., in line with comparative ratios of costs and results) • Continuous improvement (e.g., Kaizen) • Smooth operations with reduced errors and delays • High quantity of production • Limited ways in production processes • Increased speed of production • Lean and responsive (e.g., minimized slack)^b
Coordination and control systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of precise, standardized benchmarks • Uniform standards or consistency of practices

^a Lusthaus et al., 2002.

^b George Cheney, Lars Thøger Christensen, Theodore E. Zorn Jr., and Shiv Ganesh, *Organizational Communication in an Age of Globalization: Issues, Reflections, Practices*, Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2010.

Proactivity

Proactivity consists of certain behaviors, such as “taking charge, voicing issues, and initiating change,” that are considered to bring value to groups and organizations.¹⁷ *Proactive* is often contrasted with *reactive*.¹⁸ See Table A.6.

¹⁷ Martin, Hui Liao, and Campbell, 2013, p. 1372.

¹⁸ Rigby, Sutherland, and Noble, 2018.

TABLE A.6
Criteria for Achieving Proactivity

Organizational Dimension	Criteria for Achieving Proactivity
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leaders empower and encourage employees to behave proactively • Guidance for what proactivity can look like is clear (e.g., the degree of proactivity that individuals can exercise may vary within parts of an organization or process)
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clearly define roles and responsibilities • Defined dimensions in which proactivity is encouraged within a process
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Autonomy and empowerment to allow desired levels of proactivity in a work unit
Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidance and clarity for parts of processes benefiting from proactivity versus reactivity
Coordination and control systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systems and rules support the desired level of proactive behavior (e.g., individuals should not be asked to be proactive and then face punishment when they are proactive because, for example, they made a decision or did not consult someone in part of the organizational hierarchy)

Analysis of Relevant Authorities

In this appendix, we provide an in-depth overview of authorities for the four processes—security cooperation, FMS, force posture, and talent management—analyzed in this report.

Authorities for Security Cooperation Processes

Federal law authorizes and provides appropriations for major SA programs. The primary federal authorities that pertain to SA are the Foreign Assistance Act and the AECA.¹ The Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the International Military Education and Training program; the Economic Support Fund; peacekeeping operations; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs; the management of overseas SA programs; grant transfer of excess defense articles; and emergency drawdowns, among other foreign assistance programs.² The AECA provides statutory authority for the conduct of the FMS program, which is described in more detail in Chapter Four.³ Beyond the Foreign Assistance Act and AECA, Title 10 provides broad authorities for SA and cooperation. In particular, Section 333 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to conduct programs that “provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the pur-

¹ Pub. L. 87-195, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, September 1, 1961; Pub. L. 94-329, 1976.

² 22 U.S.C. § 2151, Congressional Findings and Development of Policy.

³ 22 U.S.C. § 2751, Need for International Defense Cooperation and Military Export Controls; Presidential Waiver; Report to Congress; Arms Sales Policy.

pose of building the capacity of such forces⁴ to undertake certain specified operations, including counterterrorism operations,⁵ counter-weapons of mass destruction operations,⁶ counter-illicit drug trafficking operations,⁷ counter-transnational organized crime operations,⁸ maritime and border security operations,⁹ military intelligence operations,¹⁰ and operations that support existing international coalition operations.¹¹

The role of the Army in security cooperation is described in more detail elsewhere in Title 10. Section 7062 states that the Army should be “capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces,”¹² of “preserving the peace and security”¹³ of the United States and “overcoming any nation responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.”¹⁴ The Army is “responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war.”¹⁵ It is likewise responsible for the “expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war,” as provided by integrated joint mobilization plans.¹⁶ While these authorities do not make explicit the Army’s responsibility for engaging in security cooperation, they underscore the Army’s general responsibility for supporting peace and security through the preparation and provision of land forces.

Title 22 provides further insight into the provision of military assistance, education, and training to foreign countries. Under Title 22, the President

⁴ 10 U.S.C. § 333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity (a).

⁵ 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).

⁶ 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).

⁷ 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(3).

⁸ 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(4).

⁹ 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(5).

¹⁰ 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(6).

¹¹ 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(7).

¹² 10 U.S.C. § 7062, Policy; Composition; Organized Peace Establishment (a).

¹³ 10 U.S.C. § 7062(a)(1).

¹⁴ 10 U.S.C. § 7062(a)(4).

¹⁵ 10 U.S.C. § 7062(b).

¹⁶ 10 U.S.C. § 7062(b).

is “authorized to furnish military assistance . . . to any friendly country or international organization” to “strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.”¹⁷ This authority enables the President to “[assign] or [detail] members of the Armed Forces of the United States . . . to perform duties of noncombatant nature.”¹⁸ The President is further authorized to provide “military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries.”¹⁹ Finally, the President is

authorized to furnish . . . assistance to foreign countries in order to enhance the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in international terrorist acts such as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking.²⁰

Although these authorities do not explicitly mention the role of the Army in providing SA, it is understood that the Secretary of Defense will delegate some SA activities to the Army, thereby making the Secretary of the Army responsible for their execution under Title 10 authorities.²¹

In addition to the federal authorities described earlier, Army regulations detail the roles and responsibilities of the Army in security cooperation. AR 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Policy*, stipulates that HQDA is responsible for providing resources in support of security cooperation.²² The Army’s role in security cooperation “may involve participation in a variety of overlapping military missions and U.S. Government foreign assistance activities,” including “security force assistance, foreign internal defense, SA, and security sector reform.”²³

As explained earlier, different Army entities are responsible for various aspects of security cooperation. These responsibilities are formalized in

¹⁷ 22 U.S.C. § 2311, General Authority (a).

¹⁸ 22 U.S.C. § 2311(a)(2).

¹⁹ 22 U.S.C. § 2347, General Authority.

²⁰ 22 U.S.C. § 2349, General Authority.

²¹ 10 U.S.C. § 7013, Secretary of the Army (d).

²² AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-6(a).

²³ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-5(f).

AR 11-31. Through the Office of Army International Affairs, HQDA is the “ultimate authority for validating select [security cooperation] requirements for Army execution.”²⁴ The ASCCs are responsible for “develop[ing] theater and functional campaign support plans that identify the [security cooperation] capabilities required to achieve COCOM [combatant commander] objectives.”²⁵ HQDA is responsible for publishing ACSPs, which “detail how the Army develops and synchronizes those capabilities in support of campaign plan objectives and GEF end states.”²⁶ During planning cycles, HQDA, ACOMs, DRUs, and functional ASCCs are responsible for coordinating proposed security cooperation activities with the relevant theater Army.²⁷ HQDA directorates, theater armies, ASCCs, ACOMs, and DRUs are responsible for “submit[ting] [security cooperation] resource requirements for consideration into the DOD PPBE [planning, programming, budgeting, and execution] and [GFM] processes to the appropriate service or command.”²⁸ HQDA is also responsible for maintaining the Army Global Outlook System, which is described as the “Army system of record for justification of [security cooperation] planning and activities.”²⁹ HQDA, ACOMs, and DRUs are responsible for entering their security cooperation activities into this system.³⁰ Moreover, ASCCs must provide an annual status report on their functional or theater campaign support plans, and theater armies must provide country-specific security cooperation plans to HQDA.³¹

AR 11-31 also delineates the Secretary of the Army’s responsibilities in supporting security cooperation activities. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for coordinating security cooperation “policy guidance and campaign plans” and allocating resources to security cooperation

²⁴ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-7(a).

²⁵ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-5(d).

²⁶ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-5(d).

²⁷ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-6(f).

²⁸ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-7(b).

²⁹ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-6(c).

³⁰ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-6(c).

³¹ AR 11-31, 2013, § 1-6(a).

activities;³² developing a campaign support plan for security cooperation programs and activities;³³ completing “campaign support plan assessments” and contributing “to COCOM [combatant commander] campaign plans”;³⁴ advising and providing recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on matters related to security cooperation;³⁵ carrying out international armaments cooperation with “eligible friendly foreign countries and international organizations”;³⁶ providing military education and training and supporting sales of “defense articles and defense services to eligible friendly foreign countries and international organizations”;³⁷ providing technical information and data “on weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, training, capabilities, logistic support, price, source, availability, and lead-time” in connection with security cooperation programs;³⁸ maintaining and furnishing security cooperation records;³⁹ and providing both military and civilian personnel to carry out security cooperation assignments.⁴⁰

Army Pamphlet (PAM) 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*, provides more general guidance regarding how Army activities support security cooperation goals. It specifies that Army activities support ten aspects of security cooperation: operational capacity- and capability-building;⁴¹ human capacity and human capital development;⁴² institutional capacity and security-sector reform;⁴³ support to institutional capacity and civil-

³² AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(a).

³³ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(b).

³⁴ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(c).

³⁵ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(d); AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(e).

³⁶ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(f).

³⁷ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(g).

³⁸ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(h).

³⁹ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(i).

⁴⁰ AR 11-31, 2013, § 2-1(j).

⁴¹ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(a).

⁴² PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(b).

⁴³ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(c).

sector capacity-building;⁴⁴ combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization;⁴⁵ operational access and global freedom of action;⁴⁶ intelligence and information-sharing;⁴⁷ assurance and regional confidence building;⁴⁸ international armaments cooperation;⁴⁹ and international suasion and collaboration.⁵⁰

Authorities for FMS Processes

As noted earlier, FMS programs are authorized under the AECA.⁵¹ Section 3 of the AECA authorizes the United States to sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations.⁵² Additional sections of the AECA detail procurement sales,⁵³ credit sales,⁵⁴ foreign military construction sales,⁵⁵ the sale of defense articles to U.S. companies for incorporation into end items that are then sold commercially to a foreign country or international organization,⁵⁶ and direct commercial sales.⁵⁷ Those partner nations and organizations eligible to purchase defense articles and services through FMS programs are designated in the Security Assistance Manage-

⁴⁴ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(d).

⁴⁵ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(e).

⁴⁶ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(f).

⁴⁷ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(g).

⁴⁸ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(h).

⁴⁹ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(i).

⁵⁰ PAM 11-31, 2015, § 2-4(j).

⁵¹ Pub. L. 94-329, 1976; codified in 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, Arms Export Control.

⁵² Pub. L. 94-329, 1976, § 3.

⁵³ Pub. L. 94-329, 1976, § 22.

⁵⁴ Pub. L. 94-329, 1976, § 23.

⁵⁵ Pub. L. 94-329, 1976, § 29.

⁵⁶ Pub. L. 94-329, 1976, § 38.

⁵⁷ Pub. L. 94-329, 1976, § 38(a)(1).

ment Manual,⁵⁸ which is issued by DSCA and provides guidance for the administration and implementation of SA more broadly.⁵⁹ FMS processes are also subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. In particular, Part 121, the United States Munitions List, delineates those items, called significant military equipment, that require increased export controls due to their special military applications.⁶⁰

In addition to the primary authorities described earlier, federal law provides insight into the roles and responsibilities of the Army in the sale of defense articles and services to foreign countries. Although these authorities are not formally linked to FMS programs, their requirements inform FMS processes. Title 10 authorizes the Secretary of the Army to “use funds appropriated to DoD to transfer a technical data package [for large-caliber cannons], or to provide assistance” if three conditions are met.⁶¹ First, the transfer or provision of assistance must be to a friendly foreign country.⁶² Second, the Secretary of the Army must have determined that there is a “clear benefit to the preservation of the production base for the production of cannon at the arsenal concerned.”⁶³ Third, the Secretary of Defense must have entered into an agreement with the country in question.⁶⁴ The Secretary of the Army must notify Congress of such agreements.⁶⁵

Title 10 also authorizes working capital–funded Army industrial facilities to enter into contracts or other cooperative arrangements with non-Army entities to conduct military or commercial projects.⁶⁶ The Secretary

⁵⁸ DSCA 5105.38-M, undated.

⁵⁹ DSCA 5105.38-M, undated, Table C4.T2.

⁶⁰ U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Part 121; DSCU, 2020, Chs. 5 and 6.

⁶¹ 10 U.S.C. § 4542, Technical Data Packages for Large-Caliber Cannon: Prohibition on Transfers to Foreign Countries; Exception (b).

⁶² 10 U.S.C. § 4542(b)(1).

⁶³ 10 U.S.C. § 4542(b)(2).

⁶⁴ 10 U.S.C. § 4542(b)(3).

⁶⁵ 10 U.S.C. § 4542(g).

⁶⁶ 10 U.S.C. § 4544(a), Army Industrial Facilities: Cooperative Activities with Non-Army Entities (a).

of the Army is authorized to provide for the “sale of fuel, oil, and other supplies for use in aircraft operated by a foreign military or other air attaché accredited to the United States, and for the furnishing of mechanical service and other assistance to such aircraft.”⁶⁷ The Secretary of the Army is also authorized to “sell surplus war material and supplies . . . for which there is no adequate domestic market, to any State or to any foreign government with which the United States was at peace on June 5, 1920.”⁶⁸

Finally, Army regulations provide further guidance regarding the export of defense items. AR 70-1 requires Army project managers to “integrate international acquisition and exportability considerations through the [project management] life cycle.”⁶⁹ It designates the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology as the Secretary of the Army’s “single executive for providing export policy oversight” who has responsibility for “execut[ing] international agreements as [the] delegated signature authority on behalf of the U.S. Government, the [DoD] and/or [the Department of the Army].”⁷⁰

Authorities for Force Posture Processes

Global Defense Posture

As noted earlier, in accordance with DoDI 3000.12, the GPEC has the authority to manage GDP processes.⁷¹ The instruction stipulates that the GPEC should include either a general officer, flag officer, or senior executive service representative from the military services and may include representatives from the military departments “as required.”⁷²

⁶⁷ 10 U.S.C. § 4626, Aircraft Supplies and Services: Foreign Military or Air Attaché.

⁶⁸ 10 U.S.C. § 4681, Surplus War Material: Sale to States and Foreign Governments. This authorization does not extend to food supplies.

⁶⁹ AR 70-1, *Army Acquisition Policy*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 16, 2017, § 3-7(a).

⁷⁰ AR 70-1, 2017, § 3-7(a).

⁷¹ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.2(a).

⁷² DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.2(b)(8); DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.2(b)(9).

The instruction also spells out the role of the Army in GPEC processes. During formal reviews of CCDR posture plans, the GPEC is responsible for initiating a “plan-review directive.”⁷³ Army representatives are then to be given the opportunity to provide comments “in accordance with the plan-review directive.”⁷⁴ In some cases, including for certain administrative matters, such as “instructions, policy questions that do not require programmatic or Military Service deliberation, or recommendations specifically solicited by the Secretary of Defense,” GPEC may forward recommendations to the Secretary of Defense without prior deliberation among Army stakeholders.⁷⁵ In such cases, however, the GPEC must require the military services, including the Army, to “provide concurrence or comments.”⁷⁶ This requirement is intended to promote transparency and ensure that the Secretary of Defense “is provided the benefit of review and comment by senior leaders across all [DoD] stakeholders.”⁷⁷

Global Force Management

In accordance with Title 10, the service secretaries are responsible for “assign[ing] specified forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command to perform missions assigned to those commands.”⁷⁸

JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, formalizes the Army’s role as a stakeholder in GFM processes.⁷⁹ According to the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, component commanders with assigned forces, including Army commanders, are designated force providers and are responsible for

⁷³ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.4(a)(1)(a).

⁷⁴ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.4(a)(1)(b).

⁷⁵ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.4(a)(3)(a).

⁷⁶ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.4(a)(3)(b).

⁷⁷ DoDI 3000.12, 2016, § 3.4(a)(3)(b).

⁷⁸ 10 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1).

⁷⁹ JP 5-0, 2020.

developing and providing force sourcing solutions.⁸⁰ Each military department, including the Department of the Army, is responsible for coordinating directly with the CCMDs, joint force providers, and the Joint Staff J-35 “to develop recommended global sourcing solutions,” to be executed concurrently with designated service force provider organizations; assigning forces to perform missions assigned to the CCMDs; and preparing and deploying trained and equipped forces to the CCDRs to conduct assigned missions.”⁸¹

Although the authorities described earlier do not explicitly reference this, the Army also plays a role in GFM processes through the assignment of Army personnel to joint billets and assignments.

Authorities for Talent Management Processes

Army personnel management processes conform to a variety of legislative requirements and DoD policy regulations. Beyond that, the Army provides guidance regarding the operations and responsibilities of Army processes and organizations in the personnel space. ADP 6-22 provides the Army’s standard definition of a *leader*: an individual who “inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals.”⁸² It further defines *leadership* as the “process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”⁸³ To develop leaders, the Army “leverages a series of processes, such as training, education, assignments, self-development, and certification.”⁸⁴ This section discusses authorities pertaining to talent management and PME.

Army Talent Management

Several key Army documents provide insight into and govern Army talent management processes. AR 600-8 “defines procedures for the management

⁸⁰ CJCS Guide 3130, 2019.

⁸¹ JP 5-0, 2020.

⁸² ADP 6-22, 2019, p. 1.

⁸³ ADP 6-22, 2019, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Jackson et al., 2020, p. 48.

and administration of military human resources officers and supported units.”⁸⁵ AR 600-3 establishes the Army Personnel Development System and assigns responsibility for various aspects of Army personnel management.⁸⁶ It provides that the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has “overall responsibility for civilian personnel management and for civilian personnel policy and programs.”⁸⁷ It further stipulates that the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, is responsible for the Army’s military personnel system and for the “management of personnel within the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities . . . process functions.”⁸⁸ AR 600-3 also provides that this responsibility for personnel management cannot be further delegated.⁸⁹ PAM 600-3 describes how the Army develops officers who are “agile, innovative, and adaptable leaders of unimpeachable integrity, character, and competence who act to achieve decisive results and who understand and are able to exploit the full potential of current and future Army doctrine.”⁹⁰ ADP 6-22 details the desired attributes and core competencies of Army officers.⁹¹

Several primary federal authorities address officer talent management across the military services. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 standardized career paths across the military services. It established the “up-or-out” system, which remains a feature of military policy. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), enacted by Congress on December 12, 1980, sets forth uniform rules for all four military services regarding the appointment of commissioned officers, promotions, and standards for the

⁸⁵ AR 600-8, *Military Human Resources Management Administrative Procedures*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, May 20, 2019.

⁸⁶ AR 600-3, *The Army Personnel Development System*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, September 16, 2019.

⁸⁷ AR 600-3, 2019, § 2-1.

⁸⁸ AR 600-3, 2019, § 2-5.

⁸⁹ AR 600-3, 2019, § 2-5.

⁹⁰ PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, December 3, 2014.

⁹¹ ADP 6-22, 2019.

mandatory separation and retirement of officers.⁹² Further detail regarding personnel management is provided in Chapter 36 of Title 10, which includes guidance on the promotion, separation, and involuntary retirement of active-duty officers.⁹³

In addition to the federal authorities described earlier, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 established joint duty prerequisites for military officers across the services. Service secretaries are able to nominate individuals for joint assignments. It further stipulates that selection boards are required to include at least one officer serving in a joint duty assignment, and officers cannot be promoted to the grade of O-7 if they have not served in a joint duty assignment.⁹⁴

Professional Military Education

Title 10 authorizes the Secretary of the Army to “detail members of the Army as students at such technical, professional, and other civilian educational institutions . . . as are best suited to enable them to acquire knowledge or experience in the specialties in which it is considered necessary that they perfect themselves.”⁹⁵ Enlisted members of the Army are permitted to “study and receive instruction to increase their military efficiency and to enable them to return to civilian life better equipped for industrial, commercial, and business occupations.”⁹⁶ Both Army officers and civilian teachers may

⁹² Pub. L. 96–513, Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, December 12, 1980. For an in-depth examination of the history of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and DOPMA, see Bernard Rostker, Harry Thie, James Lacy, Jennifer Kawata, and Susanna Purnell, *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-4246-FMP, 1993. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 were consolidated into DOPMA.

⁹³ 10 U.S.C. §§ 611–649.

⁹⁴ Pub. L. 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

⁹⁵ 10 U.S.C. § 7401, Members of Army: Detail as Students, Observers, and Investigators at Educational Institutions, Industrial Plants, and Hospitals.

⁹⁶ 10 U.S.C. § 7402, Enlisted Members of Army: Schools (a).

provide this training.⁹⁷ The Army is responsible for maintaining schools for the instruction of enlisted Army members “at all posts at which members of the Army are stationed.”⁹⁸ The Secretary of the Army has the authority to “prescribe the courses to be taught” at PME institutions.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ 10 U.S.C. § 7401(a).

⁹⁸ 10 U.S.C. § 7401(b).

⁹⁹ 10 U.S.C. § 7482, Operation (3).

More on Army Capabilities in Competition

This appendix expands on Chapter Seven’s discussion of Army capabilities and their relevance in competition.

Existing Army Capabilities

In this section, we describe the existing capabilities of Army units, executive agents, headquarters elements and institutional commands, and other competition missions.

Operational Army

To understand the capabilities contained in the operational Army, we leveraged the AUTL. The AUTL is described in Army doctrine as a “comprehensive, but not all-inclusive listing of Army tasks, missions, and operations” that is intended to “inform all members of the Profession of Arms of what the Army contributes to the joint force in terms of tasks performed.”¹ The AUTL also informs Army efforts to train units for specific required tasks. Therefore, it provides a useful accounting of the various tasks conducted by Army units across the spectrum of competition and conflict.

Table C.1 provides an overview of the tasks contained within the AUTL. These tasks are organized into six warfighting functions and a seventh category of tactical mission tasks. Each category consists of anywhere from

¹ ADRP 1-03, 2015.

three to 15 tasks, and each task is associated with up to 32 separate subtasks, which are not shown here.

TABLE C.1
Overview of Army Unit Task List

Warfighting Function	Tasks
ART 1: The Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function	ART 1.1: Perform Tactical Actions Associated with Force Projection and Deployment ART 1.2: Conduct Tactical Maneuver ART 1.3: Conduct Tactical Troop Movements ART 1.4: Conduct Direct Fires ART 1.5: Occupy an Area ART 1.6: Conduct Mobility Operations ART 1.7: Conduct Countermobility Operations ART 1.8: Conduct Reconnaissance ART 1.9: Employ Obscurants ART 1.10: Conduct Maneuver Support Operations
ART 2: The Intelligence Warfighting Function	ART 2.1: Provide Intelligence Support to Force Generation ART 2.2: Provide Support to Situational Understanding ART 2.3: Conduct Information Collection ART 2.4: Provide Intelligence Support to Targeting and Information-Related Capabilities
ART 3: The Fires Warfighting Function	ART 3.1: Integrate Fires ART 3.2: Provide Fire Support ART 3.3: Integrate Air-Ground Operations ART 3.4: Employ Air and Missile Defense
ART 4: The Sustainment Warfighting Function	ART 4.1: Provide Logistics Support ART 4.2: Provide Personnel Support ART 4.3: Provide Health Service Support
ART 5: Conduct Mission Command	ART 5.1: Conduct the Operations Process ART 5.2: Conduct Command Post Operations ART 5.3: Conduct Knowledge Management and Information Management ART 5.4: Control Tactical Airspace ART 5.5: Execute Command Programs ART 5.6: Integrate Space Operations ART 5.7: Conduct Public Affairs Operations ART 5.8: Develop Teams ART 5.9: Conduct Cyber Electromagnetic Activities ART 5.10: Install, Operate, and Maintain the Network ART 5.11: Conduct Military Deception ART 5.12: Synchronize Information-Related Capabilities ART 5.13: Conduct Soldier and Leader Engagement ART 5.14: Employ Military Information Support Operations ART 5.15: Conduct Civil Affairs Operations

Table C.1—Continued

Warfighting Function	Tasks
ART 6: The Protection Warfighting Function	ART 6.1: Coordinate Air and Missile Defense ART 6.2: Conduct Personnel Recovery Operations ART 6.3: Implement Physical Security Procedures ART 6.4: Conduct Operational Area Security ART 6.5: Apply Antiterrorism Measures ART 6.6: Conduct Survivability Operations ART 6.7: Provide Force Health Protection ART 6.8: Conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations ART 6.9: Employ Safety Techniques ART 6.10: Implement Operations Security ART 6.11: Provide Explosive Ordnance Disposal Protection Support ART 6.12: Conduct Detention Operations ART 6.13: Conduct Police Operations ART 6.14: Conduct Resettlement Operations
ART 7: Tactical Mission Tasks and Military Operations	ART 7.1: Conduct Offensive Tasks ART 7.2: Conduct Defensive Tasks ART 7.3: Conduct Stability Tasks ART 7.4: Conduct Defense Support of Civil Authorities ART 7.5: Conduct Tactical Mission Tasks ART 7.6: Conduct Military Operations

SOURCE: ADRP 1-03, 2015.

As illustrated earlier, the AUTL captures the wide variety of tasks that are conducted by Army units in both competition and conflict missions. These tasks encompass movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, mission command, and protection warfighting functions and, in ART 7, a broad array of Army-specific missions, including offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The tasks include both explicit Army roles and functions, such as tactical troop movements and mobility operations, and Army contributions to broader joint missions, such as integrating air-ground operations and defense support to civil authorities. Similarly, the AUTL includes tasks conducted by conventional Army maneuver units and tasks conducted by specialized or high-demand, low-density Army units, such as military information support operations, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.

Although the AUTL provides insight into the variety of tasks for which Army units are responsible, it is not intended to include *all* Army tasks, missions, and operations. To better understand the capabilities of the Army

beyond the unit level, we consider the role of Army-funded executive agents and ACOMs in the next two sections.

Army Executive Agents

According to DoDD 5101.1, an executive agent is the

head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components.²

The Secretary of the Army serves as the DoD Executive Agent for 40 separate entities that serve specific operational or administrative roles for the Joint Force.³

These executive agent responsibilities cover primarily administrative roles (e.g., entrance processing for new recruits, homeowners assistance for service members, and after-service employment support), medical and research functions (e.g., traumatic brain injury research, biosurveillance efforts, and biosafety programs), operational support programs (e.g., counter-IED and unexploded ordnance programs), and security cooperation and peacekeeping efforts (e.g., WHINSEC, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, and U.S. peacekeeping contributions to the UN MFO mission in the Sinai).

As noted earlier, the Army serves as the executive agent for 40 separate entities, while the other services are responsible for only 29 entities combined (see Box 1). As an executive agent for 21 entities, the Air Force focuses primarily on command, control, and communications roles, including the Joint Force's Common Data Link, the Global Positioning System program, and defense space programs. The Navy serves as the executive agent for seven entities, including multiple programs related to the maritime domain and limited technology, administrative, and medical programs. The Marine

² DoDD 5101.1, 2002, p. 2.

³ National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016.

BOX 1

Executive Agent Responsibilities

The executive agent responsibilities of the Army encompass the following:

- administrative and resource support for the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command
- the Armed Services Blood Program Office
- the Chemical and Biological Defense Program
- chemical demilitarization
- additional classified executive agent responsibilities
- the Commander's Emergency Response Program
- contract foreign language support to the DoD components
- coordination of contracting activities in the USCENTCOM AOR
- Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury
- DLIFLC
- the DoD Biological Select Agent and Toxin Biosafety Program
- DoD biometrics
- the DoD Civilian Police Officers & Security Guards Physical Fitness Standards Program
- the DoD Combat Feeding Research and Engineering Program
- DoD detainee Operations Policy
- the DoD Law of War program (investigation and reporting of reportable incidents against U.S. personnel)
- DoD Level III corrections; DoD passport and passport agent services
- DoD support to UN missions; explosives safety management
- the Financial Disclosure Management–Ethics Reporting System
- forensics
- the Georgia-U.S. Biosurveillance & Research Center; the Homeowners Assistance Program
- Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
- the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (now Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization)
- management of land-based water resources in support of contingency operations
- medical research for prevention, mitigation, and treatment of blast injuries
- military assistance to safety and traffic

Box 1—Continued

- military ground-based counter radio-controlled IED electronics warfare technology
- the Military Postal Service
- MFO Sinai
- operation of the After Government Employment Advice Repository
- the Persian Gulf War Exposure Registry
- the Recruiting Facilities Program
- support for nonfederal entities authorized to operate on DoD installations
- the Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence
- the USCENCOM Rest & Recuperation Leave Program
- WHINSEC.

See National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 8.

Corps is responsible solely for the department's nonlethal weapon program. Comparing the Army's executive agent responsibilities to those of the other services indicates that the Army makes significant contributions to the Joint Force beyond the provision of tactical ground formations and units.

Army Commands, Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

Beyond the Army's executive agent responsibilities, its various headquarters elements and institutional commands also offer unique capabilities. In some cases, these commands conduct key institutional tasks that prepare Army forces for competition and conflict missions. In other cases, they perform critical roles as subordinate commands supporting larger GCC efforts to organize and plan for MDO. In addition, tailored units within the Army conduct specialized tasks to achieve specific missions that fall within the seams of other Army units.

Table C.2 provides an overview of the various ACOMs, ASCCs, and Army DRUs. These entities play important roles in supporting competition activities. ACOMs serve a largely institutional role, focusing on the organizing, training, and equipping of Army forces for specific missions. ASCCs operating under the auspices of a GCC commander are often engaged in the

TABLE C.2

Overview of Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

Type of Command	Command or Unit
ACOM	U.S. Army Forces Command TRADOC U.S. Army Materiel Command U.S. Army Futures Command
ASCC	U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) U.S. Army South (USARSOUTH) U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) USASOC U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command USARCYBER
DRU	U.S. Army Medical Command U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command U.S. Army Military District of Washington U.S. Military Academy U.S. Army War College HRC U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Civilian Human Resources Agency U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Arlington National Cemetery

SOURCE: Derived from U.S. Army, undated b.

command, control, and resupply of forces conducting steady-state missions in competition abroad. In other cases, such as with USASOC and USARCYBER, ASCCs also play institutional roles to organize, train, and equip specialized units within the Army. DRUs serve a variety of purposes, with some focused on specialized tasks, such as medical operations and criminal investigations, and others focused on PME and human resources.

Other Army Competition Missions

Beyond the broad array of Army capabilities represented in the AUTL, the Army’s executive agent responsibilities, and the capabilities within the

Army's command structures, the Army has additional capabilities that may support competition efforts. To understand these additional capabilities, we cross-referenced Army tasks with a comprehensive list of U.S. government activities that are pursued in competition. This list identifies 11 broad categories of potential competition activities: diplomatic activities, economic and financial activities, law enforcement and legal activities, operations in the information environment, intelligence operations, unconventional warfare, force structure and development, military exercises, security cooperation and building partner capacity, other deterrence and denial activities, and steady-state and readiness-enhancing military activities.

Given these 11 categories, we identified the missions that the Army is likely to directly support in competition. This eliminated certain activities, such as expelling ambassadors and entering into treaties, while leaving behind both core Army tasks (e.g., conducting shaping operations) and interagency tasks in which the Army might play a supporting role (e.g., fomenting or supporting a revolution, rebellion, or separatist movement). To supplement this list, we added joint tasks, drawing on the JP 3-0 Operations series, that have potential applications in competition not uniquely addressed in this list (e.g., counter-drug operations, IJSTO, and special reconnaissance activities). See Box 2 for more information on authorities.

This analysis allowed us to identify specific activities conducted by Army units that are not neatly captured in our foregoing discussion of Army capabilities. The resulting refined list of Army roles in competition, shown in Table C.3, includes 47 separate missions across nine categories. For the purposes of our analysis in this chapter, we focus solely on the missions that the AUTL does not capture adequately. This leaves eight separate missions, shown in bold in the table: fusion centers, counterdrug operations, IJSTO, creating or reorganizing units, new education and training programs, military parades and shows of force, JCET, and international education and exchange programs.

BOX 2

Authorities Consulted

Specifically, the project team analyzed each JP in the JP 3-0 Operations series, available via the Joint Staff's Joint Doctrine Library, to extract discrete mission sets most relevant to competition:

- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017, change 1, October 22, 2018
- JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 2016
- JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 18, 2011
- JP 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, 2016
- JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 2018
- JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 8, 2018
- JP 3-14, *Space Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 10, 2018, change 1, October 26, 2020
- JP 3-15, *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 6, 2016
- JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1, 2019
- JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017
- JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 2018
- JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018
- JP 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 21, 2016
- JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 10, 2018
- JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 14, 2019
- JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 6, 2016
- JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 10, 2018.

Box 2—Continued

- JP 3-40, *Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 27, 2019
- JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Response*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 2016
- JP 3-42, *Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 2016
- JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 9, 2018
- JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 17, 2015, change 1, August 19, 2016
- JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 18, 2015
- JP 3-85, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 22, 2020.

TABLE C.3
Overview of Army-Relevant Competition Missions

Category	Missions
Law Enforcement/ Legal Activities	<p>Creating fusion centers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Countering threat finance Countering threat networks <p>Counterdrug operations</p>
Operations in the Information Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducting electronic warfare operations Signaling/using strategic communications, including public affairs Conducting civil-military operations and civil affairs operations Conducting cyberspace electromagnetic activities <p>Conducting IJSTO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducting military deception Conducting military information support operations
Intelligence Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducting counterintelligence operations Sharing intelligence among Services and with partners and allies Conducting surveillance and reconnaissance Collecting intelligence Conducting shaping activities (such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield) Conducting offensive or defensive cyber operations

Table C.3—Continued

Category	Missions
Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense and Other IW	Conducting pre- and post-conflict stabilization activities Conducting preparation of the environment activities (operational preparation of the environment, advanced force operations) Conducting sabotage or subversion missions Conducting special reconnaissance Conducting direct action Conducting train-and-advise-assist-accompany missions Fomenting or supporting a revolution, rebellion, or separatist movement Support or withdrawing support for proxy or paramilitary forces
Force Structure and Development	Creating new military units or reorganizing existing units Developing new military education programs or training
Military Exercises	Conducting joint exercises with allies and partners Holding military parades/shows of force Regular exercises Snap exercises
Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity	Providing SA/arms transfers/arms sales Providing equipment or training to partner states (security force assistance) Conducting military-to-military engagements Conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster relief/peace operations Conducting JCET International PME and exchange programs Defense institution building and security sector reform
Other Deterrence and Denial Activities	Establishing or enforce anti-access and area denial or no-go zones Mining of straits or other transit routes Deploying forces on a rotational basis Deploying reinforcements to a theater Enhancing force postures (along competitors’ flanks or arrayed defensively around key countries) Mobilizing troops Prepositioning supplies/logistics Joint engineering operations
Steady-State and Readiness-Enhancing Military Activities	Modernization efforts

SOURCE: RAND analysis of various U.S. government policy and doctrinal documentation, including the JP 3-0 series, various dates.

NOTE: **Missions in bold** are those not directly addressed by specific tasks in the AURL.

Abbreviations

ACOM	Army command
ACSP	Army campaign support plan
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army Regulation
ASCC	Army service component command
ATAP	Army Talent Alignment Process
ATMTF	U.S. Army Talent Management Task Force
AUTL	Army Universal Task List
BCAP	Battalion Commander Assessment Program
CCAP	Colonels Command Assessment Program
CDDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
DASA	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DE&C	Defense Exports and Cooperation
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DLIFLC	Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
DRU	direct reporting unit
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSCU	Defense Security Cooperation University

EUCOM	European Command
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
GCC	geographic combatant command
GDP	Global Defense Posture
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GFM	Global Force Management
GPEC	Global Posture Executive Council
GPIT	Global Posture Integration Team
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRC	U.S. Army Human Resources Command
IED	improvised explosive device
IJSTO	Integrated Joint Special Technical Operation
IW	irregular warfare
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
JP	joint publication
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
LOA	letter of offer and acceptance
LOE	line of effort
LOR	letter of request
MDO	multidomain operations
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODASD (SC)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation
OEMA	U.S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD-P	Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy
PAM	Army pamphlet

PME	professional military education
SA	security assistance
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UN	United Nations
USARCYBER	U.S. Army Cyber Command
USARPAC	U.S. Army Pacific
USASAC	U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
U.S.C.	U.S. Code
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USINDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
WHINSEC	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

Bibliography

10 U.S.C.—See U.S. Code, Title 10.

22 U.S.C.—See U.S. Code, Title 22.

ADP—See Army Doctrine Publication.

Aghina, Wouter, Karin Ahlbäck, Aaron De Smet, Clemens Fahrbach, Christopher Handscomb, Gerald Lackey, Michael Lurie, Monica Murarka, Olli Salo, Elizabeth Seem, and Jannik Woxholth, “The 5 Trademarks of Agile Organizations,” webpage, McKinsey & Company, 2017. As of January 10, 2022: <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/people-and-organizational-performance/our-insights/the-five-trademarks-of-agile-organizations>

Anton, Philip S., Brynn Tannehill, Jake McKeon, Benjamin Goirigolzarri, Maynard A. Holliday, Mark A. Lorell, and Obaid Younossi, *Strategies for Acquisition Agility: Approaches for Speeding Delivery of Defense Capabilities*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4193-AF, 2020. As of November 18, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4193.html

AR—See Army Regulation.

Armbruster, H., A. Bikfalvi, S. Kinkel, and G. Lay, “Organizational Innovation: The Challenge of Measuring Non-Technical Innovation in Large-Scale Surveys,” *Technovation*, Vol. 28, No. 10, 2008.

Army Doctrine Publication 1, *The Army*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, July 2019.

Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, July 2019.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-03, *The Army Universal Task List*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2015.

Army Pamphlet 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 6, 2015.

Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, December 3, 2014.

Army Regulation 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Policy*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, March 21, 2013.

Army Regulation 70-1, *Army Acquisition Policy*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 16, 2017.

Army Regulation 600-3, *The Army Personnel Development System*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, September 16, 2019.

Army Regulation 600-8, *Military Human Resources Management Administrative Procedures*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, May 20, 2019.

ATMTF—See U.S. Army Talent Management Task Force.

Barrass, Gordon S., *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Bonds, Timothy M., Michael Johnson, and Paul S. Steinberg, *Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1320-RC, 2015. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1320.html

Burton, Richard M., Borge Obel, and Geraldine DeSanctis, *Organizational Design: A Step-by-Step Approach*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Caldwell, William B., IV, Dennis M. Murphy, and Anton Menning, “Learning to Leverage New Media: The Israeli Forces in Recent Conflicts,” *Military Review*, May–June 2009.

Cebul, Daniel, “GAO: Foreign Arms Sales Waivers Cost US Billions,” *Defense News*, February 2, 2018.

Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 17-03, *Theater Security Cooperation: The Military Engagement Team*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., January 2017.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: The United States Military’s Contribution to National Security*, Washington, D.C., June 2015.

———, “Universal Joint Task List,” November 20, 2020.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 3130, *Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework*, Washington, D.C., March 5, 2019.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01F, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Washington, D.C., May 15, 2020.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Desired Leader Attributes for JF2020,” slide deck, ca. 2020.

Cheney, George, Lars Thøger Christensen, Theodore E. Zorn Jr., and Shiv Ganesh, *Organizational Communication in an Age of Globalization: Issues, Reflections, Practices*, Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2010.

CJCS—See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CJCSI—See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction.

- Cooper, R. Clarke, “America as the Partner of Choice,” remarks at the Meridien Center, Meridien House, Washington, D.C., October 31, 2019.
- Cuhls, Kerstin, “Delphi Method,” in Kerstin Cuhls, ed., *Delphi Surveys: Teaching Material for UNIDO Foresight Seminars*, Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2005.
- Daft, Richard L., *Organization Theory and Design*, Boston, Mass.: Cengage Learning, 2016.
- Damanpour, Fariborz, “Organizational Innovation: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Determinants and Moderators,” *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 34, No. 3, September 1991, pp. 555–590.
- Davidson, Philip S., “Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Posture,” February 12, 2019.
- Davis, Richard G., *The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force–Army Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1987. As of February 22, 2022:
https://history.army.mil/html/books/106/106-1/CMH_Pub_106-1.pdf
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, undated. As of November 19, 2021:
<https://samm.dsca.mil/listing/esamm>
- , “DSCA—Our Mission,” webpage, undated a. As of January 10, 2022:
<https://www.dsca.mil/mission-vision-and-values#:~:text=DSCA's%20mission%20is%20to%20advance,advise%2C%20and%20equip%20foreign%20partners>
- , “Institutional Capacity Building,” webpage, undated b. As of January 10, 2022:
<https://www.dsca.mil/institutional-capacity-building>
- , “International Military Education and Training,” webpage, undated c. As of January 10, 2022:
<https://www.dsca.mil/international-military-education-training-imet>
- , “Section 1263 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI),” webpage, undated d.
- , “Security Cooperation Information Portal,” webpage, undated e. As of January 10, 2022:
<https://www.scportal.us/home/>
- , “Privacy Impact Assessment” form for Socium, September 24, 2020. As of December 27, 2021:
[https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/Privacy%20Impact%20Assessment%20\(PIA\)-%20SOCIUM%20-%20PUBLIC%20VERSION.pdf](https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/Privacy%20Impact%20Assessment%20(PIA)-%20SOCIUM%20-%20PUBLIC%20VERSION.pdf)

Defense Security Cooperation University, *Security Cooperation Management*, 40th ed., Arlington, Va., May 2020 (also known as the *Green Book*).

Deni, John R., *Military Engagement and Forward Presence: Down but Not Out as Tools to Shape and Win*, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Press, January 2016.

Dention, Christopher J., “Battalion Commander Assessment Program,” webpage, undated a. As of December 27, 2021:
https://www.army.mil/article/243040/bcap_the_battalion_command_assessment_program

Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, December 21, 2010.

Department of Defense Directive 5101.1, *DoD Executive Agent*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 3, 2002.

Department of Defense Instruction 1300.19, *DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 2014.

Department of Defense Instruction 3000.12, *Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 6, 2016.

Department of Defense Instruction 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 13, 2017.

Department of Defense Instruction 8260.03, *The Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI)*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 19, 2014.

DoD—See U.S. Department of Defense.

DoDD—See Department of Defense Directive.

DoDI—See Department of Defense Instruction.

DSCA—See Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

DSCU—See Defense Security Cooperation University.

Eighth Army, “Mission,” webpage, undated.

Elgin, Katherine Kjellstrom, “How the Army Is (Not) Preparing for the Next War,” *War Room*, U.S. Army War College, September 25, 2019.

Esper, Mark T., and Mark A Milley, “The Army Vision,” undated.

Ferenzi, Steve, and Keith Weber, “We Need to Reorganize More than the Military,” *Defense One*, website, August 16, 2020.

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2017.

- Frederick, Bryan, Stephen Watts, Matthew Lane, Abby Doll, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Meagan L. Smith, *Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2533-A, 2020. As of November 28, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html
- Gabrielsen, Iver, "Military Strategy and the Conduct of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War," *Comparative Strategy*, 2013.
- GAO—See U.S. Government Accountability Office.
- Garamone, Jim, "Joint Chiefs Vision Changes Military Education Philosophy," press release, U.S. Department of Defense, June 1, 2020.
- Gillen, Mura, "Captains Now Eligible for \$25k Retention Bonus," U.S. Army website, September 13, 2007.
- Grissom, Adam, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 5, October 2006, pp. 905–934.
- Harold, Scott W., "Making Sense of U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan," *The RAND Blog*, August 9, 2019. As of November 18, 2021:
<https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/08/making-sense-of-us-arms-sales-to-taiwan.html>
- Harold, Scott W., Derek Grossman, Brian Harding, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Gregory Poling, Jeffrey Smith, and Meagan L. Smith, *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3125-MCF, 2019. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3125.html
- Harrison, Todd, and Nicholas Harrington, "Bad Idea: Conflating Great Power Competition with High Intensity Conflict," Defense360 website, December 15, 2020.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, "The Army in Military Competition," Washington, D.C., Chief of Staff Paper #2, March 1, 2021a.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict," Washington, D.C., Chief of Staff Paper #1, March 16, 2021b.
- Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, "Assessing the Department of Defense's Execution of Responsibilities in the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program," May 17, 2016.
- Heath, Timothy R., *U.S. Strategic Competition with China: A RAND Research Primer*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-A290-3, 2021. As of November 18, 2021:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA290-3.html>

Hornung, Jeffrey W., *Allies Growing Closer: Japan–Europe Security Ties in the Age of Strategic Competition*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A186-1, 2020. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR186-1.html

HQDA—See Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Isaacson, Jeffrey A., Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla, *Predicting Military Innovation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, DB-242-A, 1999. As of November 23, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB242.html

Jackson, Kimberly, Katherine L. Kidder, Sean Mann, William H. Waggy II, Natasha Lander, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, *Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4347-OSD, 2020. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4347.html

Jensen, Benjamin M., *Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2016.

Johnson, David E., Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1494-A, 2003. As of April 4, 2023:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1494.html

Johnson-Freese, Joan, “The Reform of Military Education: Twenty-Five Years Later,” *Orbis*, Winter 2012.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 1, 2020.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017, change 1, October 22, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 18, 2011.

Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 8, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-14, *Space Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 10, 2018, change 1, October 26, 2020.

Joint Publication 3-15, *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 6, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1, 2019.

Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017.

Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 21, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 10, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 14, 2019.

Joint Publication 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 6, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 10, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-40, *Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 27, 2019.

Joint Publication 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Response*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-42, *Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 9, 2018.

Joint Publication 3-61, *Public Affairs*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 17, 2015, change 1, August 19, 2016.

Joint Publication 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 18, 2015.

Joint Publication 3-85, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 22, 2020.

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1, 2020.

JP—See Joint Publication.

Judson, Jen, and Todd South, “The New Way to Fight: US Army Unveils Field Manual 3-0,” *Defense News*, October 10, 2017.

Kamarck, Kristy N., *Goldwater-Nichols and the Evolution of Officer Joint Professional Military Education*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R44340, January 13, 2016.

Kidder, Katherine, Kelley Saylor, Nora Bensahel, David W. Barno, *Building Better Generals*, Center for a New American Security, October 28, 2013.

Kimmons, Sean, “New Academic Evaluation Report Aims to Better Identify Top Performers,” *Army News Service*, June 24, 2019.

King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Langeland, Krista, David Manheim, Gary McLeod, and George Nacouzi, *How Civil Institutions Build Resilience: Organizational Practices Derived from Academic Literature and Case Studies*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1246-AF, 2016. As of January 18, 2022:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1246.html

Larson, Eric V., *Force Planning Scenarios, 1945–2016: Their Origins and Use in Defense Strategic Planning*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2173/1-A, 2019. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2173z1.html

Larson, Eric V., Derek Eaton, Michael E. Linick, John E. Peters, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Keith Walters, Stephanie Young, H. G. Massey, and Michelle Darrah Ziegler, *Defense Planning in a Time of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the 2001–2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Implications for the Army*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1309-A, 2018. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1309.html

Lin, Bonny, Michael S. Chase, Jonah Blank, Cortez A. Cooper III, Derek Grossman, Scott W. Harold, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lyle J. Morris, Logan Ma, Paul Orner, Alice Shih, and Soo Kim, *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Study Overview and Conclusions*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4412-AF, 2020. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4412.html

Linnenluecke, Martina K., "Resilience in Business and Management Research: A Review of Influential Publications and a Research Agenda," *International Journal of Management Reviews*, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 2017.

Lombardo, Charles T., *Managing Transitions: Examining the Institutional Army's Transformation Following the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015.

Long, Jeffrey W., *The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: From Active Defense to AirLand Battle and Beyond*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Staff and General Command College, 1978.

Lusthaus, Charles, Marie-Helene Adrien, Gary Anderson, Fred Carden, and George Plinio Montalvan, *Organizational Assessment: A Framework for Improving Performance*, Washington, D.C. and Ottawa, Canada: Inter-American Development Bank/International Development Research Centre, 2002.

Maciejewski, Justin, and Rob Theunissen, "How the British Army's Operations Went Agile," *McKinsey Quarterly*, October 31, 2019.

Mahnken, Thomas, ed., *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Malinoski, M. and Perry, G. S., "How Do I Measure 'Innovation'?!?" Cary, N.C.: Balanced Scorecard Institute, 2000.

March, James G., and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-4, *Competing*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, December 14, 2020.

Marquis, Jefferson P., Michael J. McNerney, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Merrie Archer, Jeremy Boback, and David Stebbins, *Developing an Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Framework for U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1611-OSD, 2016. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1611.html

Martin, Scott L., Hui Liao, and Elizabeth M. Campbell, "Directive Versus Empowering Leadership: A Field Experiment Comparing Impacts on Task Proficiency and Proactivity," *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 5, October 2013.

Mayberry, Paul W., Charles A. Goldman, Kimberly Jackson, Eric Hastings, Hannah Acheson-Field, and Anthony Lawrence, *Making the Grade: Integration of Joint Professional Military Education and Talent Management in Developing Joint Officers*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A473-1, 2021. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA473-1.html

Mayberry, Paul W., William H. Waggy II, and Anthony Lawrence, *Producing Joint Qualified Officers: FY 2008 to FY 2017 Trends*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3105-OSD, 2019. As of November 22, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3105.html

Mazarr, Michael J., Jonathan S. Blake, Abigail Casey, Tim McDonald, Stephanie Pezard, and Michael Spirtas, *Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2726-AF, 2018. As of November 18, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html

Mazarr, Michael J., Bryan Frederick, John J. Drennan, Emily Ellinger, Kelly Elizabeth Eusebi, Bryan Rooney, Andrew Stravers, and Emily Yoder, *Understanding Influence in the Strategic Competition with China*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A290-1, 2021. As of November 18, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA290-1.html

McCauley, Daniel, “Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking: Developing 21st-Century Strategic Leaders,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, March 2016.

McConville, James and J. P. McGee, “Battalion Commanders Are the Seed Corn of the Army,” War on the Rocks website, December 23, 2019.

McGee, J. P., “U.S. Army Talent Management Leader Professional Development Briefing,” October 24, 2019.

McGee, J. P., and Ryan Evans, “The Army’s New Approach to People,” War on the Rocks website, December 16, 2019.

McNerney, Michael J., Jonah Blank, Becca Wasser, Jeremy Boback, and Alexander Stephenson, *Improving Implementation of the Department of Defense Leahy Law*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1737-OSD, 2017. As of November 18, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1737.html

McNerney, Michael J., Jefferson P. Marquis, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, and Ariel Klein, *SMART Security Cooperation Objectives: Improving DoD Planning and Guidance*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1430-OSD, 2016. As of November 18, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1430.html

Mehta, Aaron, “2018 Pentagon Priority: Speeding Up Foreign Weapons Sales,” *Defense News*, December 29, 2017.

Meyer, Alan D., “Adapting to Environmental Jolts,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 4, December 1982.

Miller, John W., “American Force Posture Needs to Be Better Aligned to Security Interests in an Affordable Way,” Atlantic Council, August 13, 2020.

Moroney, Jennifer D. P., David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler, *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-413-OSD, 2013. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR413.html

Morris, Lyle J., Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, and Marta Kepe, *Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2942-OSD, 2019. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2942.html

National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*, January 28, 2016.

Nielsen, Suzanne C., *An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations*, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, September 2010.

O'Brien, Luke, "The Doctrine of Military Change: How the U.S. Army Evolves," War on the Rocks website, July 25, 2016.

Ochmanek, David, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, *U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1782-1-RC, 2017. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1782-1.html

Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, webpage, undated.

O'Mahony, Angela, Ilana Blum, Gabriela Armenta, Nicholas Burger, Joshua Mendelsohn, Michael J. McNerney, Steven W. Popper, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Thomas S. Szayna, *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2165-A, 2018. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2165.html

PAM—See Army Pamphlet.

Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Michael Schuille, Jakub P. Hlávka, Michael A. Brown, Steven S. Davenport, Isaac R. Porche III, and Joel Harding, *Lessons from Others for Future U.S. Army Operations in and Through the Information Environment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1925/1-A, 2018. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1925z1.html

Paul, Christopher, Michael Nixon, Heather Peterson, Beth Grill, and Jessica Yeats, *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TL-112-OSD, 2013. As of November 18, 2021:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL112.html>

Pendleton, John H., *Army Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Rebuilding Personnel, Equipping, and Training*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-19-367T, February 6, 2019.

Pernin, Christopher G., Elliot Axelband, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian B. Dille, John Gordon IV, Bruce J. Held, K. Scott McMahon, Walter L. Perry, Christopher Rizzi, Akhil R. Shah, Peter A. Wilson, and Jerry M. Sollinger, *Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems Program*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1206-A, 2012. November 18, 2021:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1206.html>

Pettyjohn, Stacie L., *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1244-AF, 2012. As of November 18, 2021:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1244.html>

Pianta, M., “Organizational Innovation,” in Fagerberg, J., D. C. Mowery, and R. R. Nelson, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Innovation*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

PME Lethality Working Group, “Final Report: The Art and Science of Warfighting, PME and Strategic Thinkers,” Long Version Draft, November 28, 2017.

Powell, James S., “Book Review: Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army,” *Military Review*, June 2, 2017.

Priebe, Miranda, Angela O’Mahony, Bryan Frederick, Alyssa Demus, Bonny Lin, Michelle Gris , Derek Eaton, and Abby Doll, *Operational Unpredictability and Deterrence: Evaluating Options for Complicating Adversary Decisionmaking*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A448-1, 2021. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA448-1.html

Pub. L.—See Public Law.

Public Law 87-195, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, September 1, 1961.

Public Law 94-329, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, June 30, 1976.

Public Law 96–513, Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, December 12, 1980.

Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Public Law 114-328, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, December 23, 2016.

Public Law 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, January 1, 2021.

RAND Corporation, "Delphi Method," webpage, undated. As of February 25, 2022:

<https://www.rand.org/topics/delphi-method.html>

RAND Corporation, "Russian Arms Sales and Sanctions Monthly Snapshot," webpage, June 2021. As of November 18, 2021:

<https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/russian-arms-sales-and-sanctions-compliance/monthly-snapshot/2021/06.html>

Rigby, Darrel K., Jeff Sutherland, and Andy Noble, "Agile at Scale," *Harvard Business Review*, May–June 2018.

Rigby, Darrell K., Jeff Sutherland, and Hiroataka Takeuchi, "Embracing Agile," *Harvard Business Review*, May 2016.

Robbert, Albert A., Katherine L. Kidder, Caitlin Lee, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and William H. Waggy, *Officer Career Management: Steps Toward Modernization in the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2875-OSD, 2019. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2875.html

Robbert, Albert A., Caitlin Lee, William H. Waggy II, Katherine L. Kidder, Natasha Lander, and Agnes Gereben Schaefer, *Modernizing Officer Career Management: Analyzing Eleven Issues*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RB-A416-1, 2021a. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA416-1.html

———, *"Muddling Through": The Revolutionary Potential of Evolutionary Officer Management Reform*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RB-A416-2, 2021b. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA416-2.html

———, *Officer Career Management: Additional Steps Toward Modernization*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4337-OSD, 2021c. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4337.html

Robinson, Eric, "The Missing, Irregular Half of the Competition Equation," Modern War Institute website, September 8, 2020.

Rostker, Bernard, Harry Thie, James Lacy, Jennifer Kawata, and Susanna Purnell, *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-4246-FMP, 1993. As of November 18, 2021:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4246.html>

Salo, Olli, “How to Create an Agile Organization,” McKinsey & Company website, October 2, 2017.

Schaefer, Agnes Gereben, John D. Winkler, Kimberly Jackson, Daniel Ibarra, Darrell D. Jones, and Geoffrey McGovern, *Approaches for Strengthening Total Force Culture and Facilitating Cross-Component Integration in the U.S. Military*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2143-OSD, 2020. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2143.html

Scher, Robert M., “Advance Policy Questions for Nominee Mr. Robert M. Scher to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities,” responses for the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, December 2014.

Schoen, Fletcher, and Christopher J. Lamb, “Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference,” *Strategic Perspectives* 11, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2012.

Schumpeter, J. A., *The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1934.

Spirtas, Michael, Yool Kim, Frank Camm, Shirley M. Ross, Debra Knopman, Forrest E. Morgan, Sebastian Joon Bae, M. Scott Bond, John S. Crown, and Elaine Simmons, *A Separate Space: Creating a Military Service for Space*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4263-AF, 2020. As of December 2, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4263.html

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “NATO Mission in Kosovo (KFOR),” webpage, undated.

Szayna, Thomas S., Paul Dreyer, Derek Eaton, and Lisa Saum-Manning, *Army Global Basing Posture: An Analytic Framework for Maximizing Responsiveness and Effectiveness*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-158-A, 2015. As of November 18, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR158.html

Szayna, Thomas S., Stephen Watts, Angela O'Mahony, Bryan Frederick, and Jennifer Kavanagh, *What Are the Trends in Armed Conflicts, and What Do They Mean for U.S. Defense Policy?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1904-A, 2017. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1904.html

Tankel, Stephen, and Tommy Ross, "Retooling U.S. Security Sector Assistance," War on the Rocks website, October 28, 2020.

Thaler, David E., Beth Grill, Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, and Stephanie Pezard, *Factoring Security Cooperation into Core U.S. Air Force Decisionmaking Processes: Incorporating Impact in Planning, Programming, and Capability Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2351-AF, 2018. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2351.html

Thaler, David E., Michael J. McNerney, Beth Grill, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Amanda Kadlec, *From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1438-OSD, 2016. As of November 18, 2021:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1438.html

TRADOC—See U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

U.S. Air Force, *Sharpening the Air Force's Competitive Edge: A Business Operations Plan, Fiscal Years 2019–2021*, Washington, D.C., January 2019.

U.S. Army, "Understanding the Army's Structure," webpage, undated.

———, "Army Talent Alignment Process," 2016a.

———, "Talent Management: Battalion Commander Assessment Program," 2016b.

———, "Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-1," webpage, December 17, 2018.

———, "Army Talent Alignment Process," online video, August 19, 2019.

U.S. Army, Headquarters, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, "U.S. Army Talent Management," webpage, October 10, 2018. As of February 24, 2021:

<https://talent.army.mil/TM101/>

U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, "About," webpage, undated.

U.S. Army Talent Management Task Force, "Talent Management Army Staff LPD," briefing slides, October 2019.

———, "Army to Hold Selection Assessment Program for Colonels," July 15, 2020a.

———, "Preparation Guide for BCAP and CCAP, Version 1.0," August 2020b.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, December 6, 2018.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-8, *The U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade 20252045*, December 2018.

USASAC—See U.S. Army Security Assistance Command.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle A, General Military Law, Pt. I, Organization and General Military Powers, Ch. 6, Combatant Commands, § 162, Combatant Commands: Assigned Forces; Chain of Command.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle A, General Military Law, Pt. I, Organization and General Military Powers, Ch. 16, Security Cooperation, Subch. IV, Support for Operations and Capacity Building, § 333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle A, Pt. II, Personnel, Ch. 36, Promotion, Separation, and Involuntary Retirement of Officers on the Active-Duty List (§§ 611–649).

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. IV, Service, Supply, and Procurement, Ch. 433, Procurement, § 4542, Technical Data Packages for Large-Caliber Cannon: Prohibition on Transfers to Foreign Countries; Exception.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. IV, Service, Supply, and Procurement, Ch. 433, Procurement, § 4544, Army Industrial Facilities: Cooperative Activities with Non-Army Entities (a).

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. IV, Service, Supply, and Procurement, Ch. 439, Sale of Serviceable Material, § 4626, Aircraft Supplies and Services: Foreign Military or Air Attaché.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. IV, Service, Supply, and Procurement, Ch. 443, Disposal of Obsolete or Surplus Material, § 4681, Surplus War Material: Sale to States and Foreign Governments.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. I, Organization, Ch. 703, Department of the Army, § 7013, Secretary of the Army.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. I, Organization, Ch. 707, The Army, § 7062, Policy; Composition; Organized Peace Establishment.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. III, Training, Ch. 751, Training Generally, § 7401, Members of Army: Detail as Students, Observers, and Investigators at Educational Institutions, Industrial Plants, and Hospitals.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. III, Training, Ch. 751, Training Generally, § 7402, Enlisted Members of Army: Schools.

U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Pt. III, Training, Ch. 757, Schools and Camps, § 7482, Operation.

U.S. Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Ch. 32, Foreign Assistance, Subch. I, International Development, Pt. I, Declaration of Policy; Development Assistance Authorizations, § 2151, Congressional Findings and Development of Policy.

U.S. Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Ch. 32, Foreign Assistance, Subch. II, Military Assistance and Sales, Pt. II, Military Assistance, § 2311, General Authority.

U.S. Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Ch. 32, Foreign Assistance, Subch. II, Military Assistance and Sales, Pt. V, International Military Education and Training, § 2347, General Authority.

U.S. Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Ch. 32, Foreign Assistance, Subch. II, Military Assistance and Sales, Pt. VII, Air Base Construction in Israel, § 2349, General Authority.

U.S. Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Ch. 39, Arms Export Control (Arms Export Control Act of 1976).

U.S. Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Ch. 39, Arms Export Control, Subch. I, Foreign and National Security Policy Objectives and Restraints, § 2751, Need for International Defense Cooperation and Military Export Controls; Presidential Waiver; Report to Congress; Arms Sales Policy.

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Part 121.

U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*, Washington, D.C., 2018.

———, “Defense Acquisition System Directive Goes Into Effect,” press release, September 9, 2020a.

———, *Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy*, Washington, D.C., October 2020b.

———, *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., 2022.

U.S. European Command, “FY2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet,” undated.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Military Readiness,” webpage, undated. As of December 27, 2021:
<https://www.gao.gov/military-readiness>

———, *Foreign Military Sales: DOD Should Take Additional Steps to Streamline Process for Assessing Potential Recovery of Certain Acquisition Costs*, Washington, D.C., GAO-18-242, January 2018.

———, *Professional Military Education: Programs Are Accredited, but Additional Information Is Needed to Assess Effectiveness*, Washington, D.C., GAO-20-323, February 20, 2020.

U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, *Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*, December 2020.

U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, “Advance Policy Questions for Nominee Mr. Robert M. Scher to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities,” 2014.

Wardynski, Casey, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso, *Towards a U.S. Army Officers Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent*, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, May 2010.

Weick, Karl E., Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, and David Obstfeld, “Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness,” *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 21, 1999, pp. 81–124.

Wetzel, Tyson, “Dynamic Force Employment: A Vital Tool in Winning Strategic Global Competitions,” *Defense One*, September 18, 2018.

White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, December 2017. As of January 4, 2021:

<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

Wolters, Tod D., “Statement of General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 25, 2020.

Wong, Leonard, “Cultural Lines of Defense Against Change,” video, remarks at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) 2019 Contemporary Military Forum on Army Talent Management, December 20, 2019. As of February 23, 2022:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UqjLLISZCw>

Wright, Travis, “Force Structure for the Future—Key Issues for the Army,” Real Clear Defense website, June 5, 2021.

Yuengert, Lou, ed., *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, 31st ed., Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2017–2018.

Zolli, Andrew and Ann Marie Healy, *Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012.



With the emergence of strategic competition with near peers as the defining U.S. national security priority in recent years, the U.S. Army has had to rethink its roles and responsibilities. Competition requires strategies, approaches, and missions different from those developed for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, which have been the focus of the past two decades. Many Army missions and capabilities are relevant here, but for the Army to succeed in competition against near peers, it must work in an integrated fashion with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. government entities. The objective of this research was to identify how the Army can make or influence procedural and/or organizational changes to help tailor DoD processes for competition and to identify existing Army capabilities that could be more fully used and understood in competition.

The authors reviewed the relevant literature, authorities, policy, and historical cases; interviewed subject-matter experts; and conducted a systematic analysis of overlaps between the existing supply of Army capabilities and the demands of competition below the threshold of armed conflict.

Among other things, the authors found that relevant Army organizations are not always incentivized to tailor their contributions to support broader DoD competition activities. The best opportunities for the Army to contribute to competition efforts, moreover, may not be in its areas of historical focus or competency.

\$30.00

ISBN-10 1-9774-0872-9
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-0872-3



www.rand.org

9 781977 408723