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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



**Instruments of Power:
Revitalizing the Interagency Process at the Combatant Command Level**

By:

Thomas F. Cook, Jr.

Lt Col, USAF

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**Instruments of Power:
Revitalizing the Interagency Process at the Combatant Command Level**

by Thomas F. Cook, Jr.

Lt Col, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.


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Abstract

Lack of interagency coordination below the National Security Council level challenges the United States government's ability to accomplish strategic objectives. While all instruments of Power are focused on achieving these objectives, barriers to success exist. These barriers come from undefined processes and procedures within the Joint Planning process and ill-defined interagency structures and processes within the interagency construct. Joint Publication, 5-0, provides guidance and instruction for overall operational planning and the campaign planning process. Operational planning teams lead this process, and while the Joint Publication includes direction on when and how to coordinate plans with interagency partners, it does not provide for collaboration within the interagency process; instead, it provides for coordination only. To break down these barriers, integrated planning teams must replace operational planning teams at the Combatant Command Level.

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Dedication

This paper is dedicated to my amazing wife, Jamie, and our incredible sons, Cason, and Travis. Thank you for all your love and support and for all the times you have sacrificed for this paper and my career. The three of you inspire me every day. I love you all so very much.

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Introduction

The Interagency process below the National Security Council level is broken. To bring about positive change, Combatant Commands can be better utilized in the achievement of national objectives if the following actions are outlined in Joint Doctrine at the Combatant Command Level: (1) Interagency structures and processes are outlined, (2) The development and use of interagency planning teams are described and implemented, to include associated personnel requirements and (3) Joint Doctrine is updated to require Combatant Commanders to coordinate efforts at the appropriate levels when preparing campaign plans. The Department of Defense significantly improved due to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, becoming arguably the most successful and most used instrument of national power available to the United States. However, the changing character of war drives the United States to evaluate the need for a second Goldwater-Nichols Act, which would require integrating the departments responsible for the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic instruments of power.

While the Services initially fought hard against the original Goldwater-Nichols Act, the results are undeniable, Goldwater-Nichols made the United States military a more effective instrument of national power. From this point forward, a second Goldwater-Nichols Act, referred to as GWNA 2.0, will need to go beyond the integration of the Joint Force within the Department of Defense to provide a roadmap and specific guidance for integrating all instruments of national power. The need for a GWNA 2.0 exists, but the political will to establish the act does not appear to be available now nor in the foreseeable future.

The need for integrating all instruments of power has been proven time and time again by the Department of Defense. However, lacking direct guidance, structure, or processes for integration with the other instruments of national power are not codified by the Defense Department. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directs combatant commanders to integrate their campaigning efforts by, with, and through the other instruments of power within the United States government and with our friends and allies. The problem the combatant command commanders face is a need for more guidance on how and when to integrate their efforts at the operational planning level. While commanders at all levels would prefer less guidance and more freedom of maneuver when deciding how to integrate the other instruments of power into their campaign plans, the changing character of war and the complexity of today's fight necessitates deeper integration of all the elements of national power. Integration should start at the operational planning level.

Standard, repeatable processes and guidelines are needed to integrate the instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. Without guidance, any military commander will do what is expected and figure out what works for them. This approach makes the processes personality-dependent and is subject to change each time a new combatant commander takes command. While this paper fully acknowledges that combatant commanders have been successful in their efforts, a defined, structured, process-driven approach outlining how to better integrate the instruments of power into the campaign planning process will increase overall effectiveness. This process will also improve the combatant command's ability to achieve strategic objectives within their area of responsibility. Additionally, having a clear policy and regulatory guidance on

integrating the instrument of power into campaign planning will make combatant command planning staff more effective at planning while streamlining the coordination process, thereby producing better outcomes.

Recognizing the need for integration now more than ever and the fact that history provides examples of this integration of the whole-of-government approach, this paper will review the Office of Military Government United States (OMGUS) as a case study. The US government used the OMGUS to govern and start rebuilding post-surrender Germany after the Second World War. OMGUS used a year-long planning cycle led by military and civilian teams broken down by specific areas such as commerce, rail, finance, security, and agriculture. These planning teams are staffed by personnel from the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury. This case study will yield best practices to form the basis for integrated planning teams into doctrine, specifically Joint Publication 5-0. Doing so will improve operational campaign planning and the overall advancement of strategic objectives by, with, and through a renewed whole-of-government approach. This review will identify best practices needing strengthening, sustainment, and or brought back into existence for use by the commands. This paper will provide a recommendation on codifying these practices into doctrine for use by the combatant commands will be provided.

This paper will not seek to render an opinion on the validity or appropriateness of the strategic objective examples used in this paper. This paper will instead focus on how the strategic objective was achieved using integrated planning teams and the interagency process.

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Definitions

Character of War

As Carl von Clausewitz stated, “the changing aspects of warfare are determined by the time and age...the technology, geography, specific belligerent personalities, and capabilities.”¹ Clausewitz also writes that war is policy, and policy decides the character of war. An interpretation of these two statements is that policy decides the character of war informed by available technology, geography, and capabilities belligerents use to conduct war. Elected officials determine policy and thus have the responsibility to develop and implement policy. Today’s technology drives the need for a GWNA 2.0 or, at the very least, drives the Department of Defense to acknowledge and implement interagency processes at the combatant command level. All combatant commands require a certain level of interagency coordination, especially if China is in its AOR.

China is consistently in the news regarding the changing character of war. China’s predatory lending tactics are well documented and have profound and lasting impacts on those countries that fall prey to their financial agreements with China. China is also deeply involved in information and economic warfare, looking for advantages in telecommunications or simply buying farmland in the United States. China also continues to militarize the Spratly Islands despite a ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. All of the above leads back to the teaching of Sun Tzu, where he states, “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” China’s approach to war necessitates the need for better integration throughout the instruments of power. The best

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

place to start within the DoD is at the combatant commands in the operational planning process.

Goldwater-Nichols Act

The Rand Corporation best describes the Goldwater-Nichols Act below. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act passed in 1986 was one of the most sweeping pieces of legislation to affect the Department of Defense and the military services in decades. Its passage resulted from dissatisfaction by Congress and other influential policymakers with what they perceived as the US military's stubborn refusal to deal with long-festering problems. These problems included an inability on the part of the military services to mount effective joint operations and an inefficient, unwieldy, and at times corrupt system for acquiring weapon systems.² Additionally, as outlined in Joint Forces Quarterly, Congress established eight purposes for this act.³

1. To reorganize the DoD and strengthen civilian authority.
2. Improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and the SECDEF.
3. To place clear responsibility on commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.

² Charles Nemfakos, Irv Blickstein, Aine Seitz McCarthy, Jerry M. Sollinger, "The Perfect Storm," Rand Corporation, 2010,

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP308.sum.pdf.

³James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Forces Quarterly, 1996, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-13.pdf>.

4. To ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
5. To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
6. To provide for the more efficient use of defense resources
7. To improve joint officer management policies
8. Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DoD management and administration.

For the purposes of this paper, items 3 and 5 above are of particular importance. Item 3 identifies the combatant command commander as the person responsible for accomplishing the mission assigned to those commands. Item 5 focuses on the need for strategy formulation and contingency planning. It is precisely the strategy formulation and contingency planning that needs additional detail and requires updating by, though, and with the interagency process.

The Current Interagency Process

In 2021, the White House updated the National Security Council (NSC), announcing a “renewal of the National Security Council System.”⁴ The update provides details on who attends NSC meetings and the structure of the council’s principles committee, deputy committee, and interagency policy committee.⁵ While the memo describes the role and responsibility of each of the three committees mentioned above, there is no written guidance on any coordination below the interagency policy committee.

⁴ Jane Edwards, “White House Memo Outlines Structure of National Security Council”, 5 February 2021

<https://executive.gov.com/2021/02/white-house-memo-outlines-structure-of-national-security-council/>

⁵ Edwards, “White House Memo Outlines Structure of National Security Council”

Instead, only a line that says, “the interagency policy committees will oversee the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple government agencies.”⁶ While Joint Publication 5-0 does provide the next level of detail within the DoD, it does not provide any additional guidance at the operational planning level. The Joint Publication 5-0 makes statements like “commanders should consider” and “when possible” when discussing the interagency process at the operational level of planning.

Methodology

1. Initial lead and organizing functions
2. How was it integrated?
3. Who led the integration?
4. Who enabled it (what agencies/supporting vs. supported)
5. How was it coordinated?
6. Was the operation successful or not?

Context

The SECDEF gives guidance to the Combatant Commands (CCMDs) on integrating the whole-of-government approach but does not articulate how to do it at the operational planning level. Joint Force Commanders must include, at a minimum, State, Treasury, USAID, and likely Coast Guard and possibly FBI in their operational campaigning (operations, activities in their AOR, investments, and action taken to achieve strategic goals) function. The bureaucratic process severely limits integration below the National Security Council (NSC) level and is non-existent at the operational planning level. Repeatedly, speakers at Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) have

⁶ Edwards, “White House Memo Outlines Structure of National Security Council”

discussed how participants within the National Security Council (NSC) apparatus at the Cabinet level are willing to come to the table and bring their stove pipes of excellence to bear on any given problem. The main issue is the lack of coordinated effort from all agencies involved in a particular effort “post-NSC decision.” Again, as stated by these same JAWS guest speakers, specifically, once a decision is made at the NSC level, the various agencies involved in that area of responsibility go back to their bureaucratic processes without regard to integration or coordination moving forward. This sequence results in disjointed effects in any given area of responsibility and hinders the achievement of strategic objectives. This paper seeks to remedy the above situation by recommending that integrated planning starts at the lowest level of campaigning at the CCMDs.

Chapter 1: The Office of Military Government United States

Before Germany's surrender during the Second World War, Lieutenant General Lucius Clay was appointed Deputy to General Eisenhower for Military Government. This action took place almost a month before Germany surrendered. The United States realized, before the war ended, that there would be a "German problem." How to handle the rebuilding of Germany as a nation with a self-sufficient and integrated economy linked with the rest of the world and with the ability to pay war reparations to the Allied Powers quickly became a focus in the waning days of World War II. This responsibility was no small feat. Years of war and destruction took a significant toll on everyday life in every way possible in Germany. Essential services such as power, law and order, available water, and supplies were non-existent, banking and financial institutions were destroyed, inflation was rampant, and black-market trade and bartering were facts of life. To rebuild Germany, the Allies developed Military Governments to oversee this regeneration. The focus of this chapter will be to illustrate how the US Military can quickly and efficiently organize for this type of effort. The Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) framework will be used to examine the three years of US Military Government Operations leading up to the implementation of the Marshall Plan.

While this paper uses the Military Government and its transition to the follow-on Marshall Plan as a case study, it acknowledges that the Military Government and the Marshall Plan were used to rebuild a nation by an occupying force. This case study's focus will not be the use of an occupying power. This paper will instead focus on the teaming concepts between the Departments of War, State, Treasury, Commerce, and

Agriculture, and the processes and procedures these entities used in concert to rebuild West Germany. Fully acknowledging during this period, the US Army was an occupying force. However, their campaign planning for this effort is a tremendous case study of how modern-day Combatant Commands can utilize these efforts. Their organization of departments, divisions, and committees to address immediate and or longer-term problems provide excellent examples of completing their mission while also planning, coordinating, and integrating efforts for the whole-of-government approach. The following questions will further illustrate the need for integrated planning, 1) Who initially led and organized functions? 2) How was it integrated (or not)? 3) Who led the integration? 4) Who enabled it (what agencies/supporting vs. supported)? 5) How was it coordinated? 6) Was the operation successful or not?

Seven days after Germany surrendered, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued JCS Memorandum 1067 (JCS-1067), a top-secret document instructing General Eisenhower on his roles and responsibilities as Commanding General of the United States Forces of occupation in Germany. Additionally, this document gave direction for his responsibility for the administration of military government in the zone or zones of assignment to the US for occupation and administration.⁷ JCS -1067 consisted of three parts; Part I – described and outlined “General and Political responsibilities such as the basis for of Military Government and basic objectives, The Control Council and Zones of Occupation, Economic Controls, Denazification, Demilitarization, Political Activities, Public Relations, Control of Public Information, German Courts, Police, Political

⁷ “JCS 1067,” Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany. Last modified 3 December 2016, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/JCS_1067.

Prisoners, Education, and Arts and Archives.⁸ Part II describes Economic Objectives and Controls, the German Standard of Living, Labor, Health and Social Insurance, Power, Transportation, Communications, Foreign Trade, and Reparations.⁹ Part III covered Financial.¹⁰ While some of these roles are military actions, occupation, and demilitarization, for example, the remaining requirements are more aligned with the Diplomatic, Information, and Economic Instruments of Power, yet the Commanding General of the US Forces in Germany was empowered to discharge these duties.

Before addressing the DIME model and the roles played by the US Army in Germany post-surrender, it is essential to understand the chain of command. General Eisenhower was the Theater Commander and the Commanding General of the US Occupation Forces in Germany. He was responsible for all US troops in Theater and the execution of the Military Government in Germany. To execute the Military Government in Germany, he stood up the Office of the Military Government United States in Germany. General Eisenhower selected Lt. Gen. Lucius Clay for this mission.

At the time, Lt. Gen. Clay was Justice James F. Byrnes's deputy, Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion in Washington, DC.¹¹ By Clay's admission, he "had been a soldier in two wars and had never seen combat."¹² He was known as a skilled administrator, and this skill set would play an essential role in his next job as Deputy to General Eisenhower for Military Government. Robert D. Murphy, a career Foreign Service Officer in the State Department, would later become Lt. Gen. Clay's Political

⁸ "JCS 1067," accessed November 20, 2022, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/JCS_1067

⁹ "JCS 1067," accessed November 20, 2022, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/JCS_1067


¹⁰ "JCS 1067," accessed November 20, 2022, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/JCS_1067

¹¹ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1950), 2

¹² Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 3

Advisor. As Clay would later describe Mr. Murphy, "for four years we worked together daily, attended international conferences together and traveled Germany together; his knowledge of Europe, his understanding of European and German political conditions, and his basic faith in American concepts made him a counselor of rare worth."¹³ With the leadership of the OMGUS set, the organizational structure and execution of duties were next.

Figure 1. Organizational Chart - 1945¹⁴




¹³ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 242

¹⁴ "OMGUS Organizational Chart," accessed November 20, 2022, <https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/occy/ch24.htm>

When the original Deputy position within OMGUS was stood up, General Walter Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, exercised control of the G-5, which provided oversight for OMGUS. This action relegated Lt Gen Clay to more liaison-type duties through his position on the Coordinating Committee as part of the larger group known as the Control Council. This changed in 1946 when the OMGUS moved under the direct control of the Deputy Military Governor. This placed Lt. Gen Clay. and OMGUS in the direct role of addressing the German problem as outlined in JCS-1067.

Figure 2. Organizational Chart – 1 April 1946¹⁵



Lt. Gen. Clay's book, *Decision Germany*, outlines several examples of standing committees led by General Officers and Colonels. For example, a One Star General led the US Control Group and had several hundred officers and a few civilians that were

¹⁵ "JCS 1067," accessed November 20, 2022, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/JCS_1067

experts in their specific field of government.¹⁶ Clay describes the organization of the US Control Group as "paralleling the German ministries which were to be seized on surrender and continued in operation under Allied control."¹⁷ Months of planning and preparation had gone into these efforts, as the expectation was the complete collapse of the German Government was inevitable. Lt. Gen. Clay goes on to write, "the group had studied the German Government carefully, and its accumulated knowledge and considered planning were to prove of great and lasting value to our work."¹⁸ Even before Germany surrendered, the work of the Military Government was paying off. Clay writes, "the heavy burden performed so well under the circumstances by the Military Government Teams which accompanied the combat troops and were engaged before the surrender in re-creating some form of local administrative machinery at the city and county level."¹⁹ In the preceding few paragraphs, we see the planning and integration of civilian and military teams, the Departments of War and State working together, and committees that mirror the tasks they know they will face. We see all this led by a military officer with a State Department official as his deputy. Organizing and planning are critical components of success. However, execution is where it all pays off.

Clay and Murphy appear to be masters at executing the DIME framework. They took significant steps to coordinate with each other by visiting twice a day to ensure the other was well informed of cables from the State and War Departments.²⁰ Throughout their four years together, they took great pride in working problems through the various

¹⁶ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 8

¹⁷ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 8

¹⁸ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 9

¹⁹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 16

²⁰ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 58

committees and groups they developed to address the German problem through Diplomatic, Information, on occasion, Military, and Economic actions.

In his book *Decision Germany*, Clay constantly discusses, supports, and encourages the push for democracy. He lays out concrete plans for enabling democracy and the inclusivity of all, except Nazi, political parties. While Clay was able to force specific reforms and provide a strict roadmap for democracy in Germany, he refrained. He did not demand any quotas on representation, did not demand specific language in state constitutions, nor did he favor any one party or constitutional language over another. He let the democratic process within Germany take its course; this is an example of fostering democracy by guiding a nation rather than forcing a government to look and function exactly like the US system. Clay allowed the Germans, post-de-Nazification, to determine their form of democracy and way of life in Germany. Clay and Murphy were skilled at working on diplomatic issues inside of Germany. Based on their knowledge of the issues and proximity to the problems, they were the best people to advise on the solutions.

By October 1947, Britain was having trouble meeting its financial obligations and wished to be relieved of all dollar liability were possible.²¹ A meeting was held in Washington, DC, to discuss the matter. The American delegation included Assistant Secretary's from Treasury, Commerce, and War and equal representation from the British Government.²² Clay and Murphy were also brought from the OMGUS and their counterparts from the British sector. Clay states, "the US delegation held out for continuation of equal financial liability; however, considering the British dollar position,

²¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 177

²² Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 177

they knew this to be unrealistic."²³ Understanding the position the British were in, Clay writes, "the United States delegation believed that they were entitled to a larger voice in financial and economic matters if they agreed to accept a heavier share of the financial responsibility."²⁴ Clay also describes the American view of wanting a "predominant voice in political matters."²⁵ Lt. Gen. Clay knew the American delegation had a point and could force the issue. Still, he made the case that relegating Britain to a "junior partner" status was not in the best interest of the United States by making the British appear weak in Europe.²⁶ The argument here is Clay was on the ground in Germany and understood the politics, the economics, and impacts relegating Britain down level would have on the overall effort. He based his advice on the US' ability to help the situation while keeping a strategic partner fully engaged in the recovery effort. While OMGUS continued to navigate diplomatic issues, information was critical to the success of OMGUS.

Information, while considered a soft power, can dramatically affect the mission. As Nye writes in his book *Soft Power*, "soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others."²⁷ He says this is accomplished through the "powers of attraction" and "leading by example" while "attracting others to do what you want."²⁸ Nye describes soft power as primarily resting on three things, culture, political values, and foreign policy.²⁹ In the previous paragraphs, Clay has executed soft power in his approach to

²³ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 177

²⁴ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 178

²⁵ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 178

²⁶ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 178

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York, New York: PublicAffairs) 2004, 5

²⁸ Nye, *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, 5

²⁹ Nye, *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, 11

implementing democracy in Germany. He did not force it, nor did he mandate its implementation; he let it run its course, thus illustrating an attractiveness to US soft power through political views and foreign policy. Clay takes this a step further with two information campaigns, one for economic reforms and the second to combat communism.

As described in JCS-1067, Clay had initially been directed to let Germany's economic and financial systems take their course. In an updated policy memo, based on the situation in Germany, he was tasked with "making currency reforms and other measures necessary to develop a balanced economy based on sound currency and credit."³⁰ To accomplish these reforms, he was directed to maximize "cultural exchange and the use of our information media to present factual information to the German people."³¹ These actions fit nicely into Nye's definition and use of soft power. The second instance where Clay uses soft power is in his efforts to combat communism.

By early 1947 Communist news outlets were continuously running media campaigns deriding American and British efforts in Germany. Lt. Gen. Clay writes, "day in and day out...we heard the continuing chant: Imperialist-Monopolist-Exploiters."³² Early on, he had instructed his information division to keep the OMGUS messaging constructive by illustrating the advantages of western democracy.³³ With the constant barrage and increasingly targeted media attacks by the Soviets, Clay decides to change tactics. In late October, he directed his information control division to "attack communism in every form wherever it existed and to cite each exposed example of its

³⁰ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 238

³¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 238

³² Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 158

³³ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 158

day-to-day work."³⁴ In doing so, Clay again uses soft power to influence the German population using a targeted media campaign. Information and media are essential steps in the process; however, the population must deliver and acknowledge results. In this case, economic results were a must.

Throughout Lt. Gen. Clay's time in Germany, several economic issues were addressed. Two specific instances stand out as examples of working across several Departments of the US Government, the first was combining economic zones, and the second was problems with currency. By 1946 problems as a result of independent economic zones were becoming apparent.³⁵ To address this issue, Lt. Gen. Clay and Mr. Murphy prepared and submitted a report to the War Department recommending an "amalgamation of as large an area as possible into an economic unit by mutual agreement by two or more of the occupying powers."³⁶ Clay and Murphy's team presented their plan to Secretary of State Byrnes, making it clear that the invitation should be extended to all occupying powers and limited to economic matters only, not governmental control.³⁷ Again, we see Clay and Murphy working together with the War and State Department to improve the situation in Germany. The suggested plan was approved; however, only the British were interested in joining economic zones. This action greatly enhanced cooperation among the allies and improved the economic situation in both zones. With economic collaboration in progress, currency reform was next on the agenda.

In 1947, life in Germany, specifically the American and British zone, also known as Bizonal, was improving. However, there was still much work to be done. Clay writes,

³⁴ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 158

³⁵ Richard Mayne, *The Recovery of Europe*, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973), 193

³⁶ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 165

³⁷ Mayne, *The Recovery of Europe*, 195

"currency reform affects the everyday life of the individual as no other measure."³⁸ He is alluding to problems that arise from an unstable currency that leads to a lack of public trust in the currency that enables black market forces to appear, causing further problems for the population and the economy. To combat this issue, Lt. Gen. Clay recommends a new currency with proper controls be put into circulation as soon as possible.³⁹ The need for new currency is furthered by Clay and Murphy's belief in the rumors the Soviets are preparing to establish their own currency for their zone. Lt. Gen. Clay and Mr. Murphy's teams worked with the Treasury Department to quickly approve the printing of new currency, which could be placed into circulation quickly.⁴⁰ Clay describes the full cooperation of the Treasury Department as "making it possible for us to have this currency printed and dispatched before the end of the year" they referred to this action as Operation BIRD DOG.⁴¹ In both instances of combining economic zones and new currency and currency reforms, the War, State, and Treasury Departments, along with Clay, Murphy, and their teams in Germany, worked together within the interagency process to improve conditions in Germany.

Lt. Gen. Clay, Mr. Murphy, and the OMGUS laid the foundation for continued success in Germany by addressing economic issues. "General Clay and subsequently the three German commissioners and the new democratic government of Germany oversaw a revival that was soon called...the economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder)."⁴² Despite losing East Germany as an asset for production and agriculture, the German economy

³⁸ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 210

³⁹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 210

⁴⁰ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 211

⁴¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 211

⁴² Charles L. Mee, Jr., *The Marshall Plan*, (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 256

greatly improved. Between 1949 and 1950, foreign trade doubled; the following year, it grew by 75 percent, and in the ten years between 1954-1964, it tripled.⁴³ Clay and Murphy and their teams are not due all the credit, but their planning and execution in the early years of the occupation set Germany on the right path for recovery.

When General Clay was appointed, he was appointed directly as General Eisenhower's Deputy; he did not work for nor go through the General Staff. This action allowed much-needed autonomy and direct access to the Theater Commander when needed. Throughout his time as the head of the OMGUS, the technical experts across multiple fields such as engineering, financial, economics, rail, agriculture, public safety, judicial, and foreign policy from departments across the government and private industry were critical to their success. Mr. Murphy, Clay's deputy was a career foreign service officer and political adviser. Murphy had previous North Africa experience and was an adviser to General Eisenhower. Clay and Murphy took over an operation where the planning staff had been working for months preparing for the eventual surrender of Germany. This planning period with interagency experts put the OMGUS in a position to step in and govern Germany until sufficient reforms could be made. The Germans could take over the responsibilities of managing their own country. Existing divisions or teams within OMGUS, which included US Army, War, Treasury, and State Department personnel, were critical to the successful execution of OMGUS as they addressed the German problem. In late 1946, Clay raised the question of turning over the leadership of OMGUS to competent civilian authority.⁴⁴ Clay reports Secretary of State Byrnes was unalterably opposed to the transfer, being "convinced the State Department should keep

⁴³ Mee, *The Marshall Plan*, 257

⁴⁴ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 82

aloof from the operating responsibilities which might interfere with its policy-making functions.⁴⁵

Furthering this point is Clay's commentary on the differences between the War and State Departments. He describes the differences between the two based on their "respective responsibilities towards Congress."⁴⁶ Lt. Gen. Clay recalls State working with the Foreign Relations committee in Congress based on the need to address occupation policies. In contrast, the War Department and the US Army worked with the various Congressional Appropriations committees on funding the occupation and German recovery efforts.⁴⁷ This ties back to an earlier assertion of the current strategic environment, the DoD has the bulk of the funding and workforce, coupled with the COCOMs being in direct contact with the nations within their area of responsibility. These lessons and precedents set in the early days of OMGUS in Germany can be applied to today's interagency problem by embedding interagency planning teams within the COCOMs and formalizing doctrine to include these functions at all COCOMs. Or as Clay states, "we had a compact organization responsible to a single head which worked with the German officials at the state level through our state directors and with the German Government on matters pertaining to the zone as a whole...."⁴⁸ Finally, Clay is given clear guidance in the form of JCS-1067. JCS-1067 provided initial guidance to Clay, and the document would see revisions as policy needs or conditions on the ground dictated.

Best practices previously identified are as follows: Integrated Planning Teams that included members of the War, State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture Department

⁴⁵ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 83

⁴⁶ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 59

⁴⁷ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 59

⁴⁸ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 61

to synchronize efforts and availability and by leveraging subject matter experts. Additionally, divisions within OMGUS were based on the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic framework with clear guidance in the form of JCS-1067 and eventually JCS-1779 for all members of OMGUS regardless of Department or function. A clear chain of command, early on Clay was Eisenhower's Deputy before Clay took over as the Theater Commander and retained oversight of the Military Government. Unity of effort and policy directives were essential. As Clay writes, "while much of the new policy was in effect when received, as a result of amendments from time to time, it was helpful to have our instructions in a single document."⁴⁹ History contains wars and operations that lack clear intent; while policy changes can be overcome and adapted, clarity of purpose is paramount. All things flow from the purpose of what we are trying to accomplish; Clay had that clarity through JCS-1067, JCS-1779, and a clear chain of command.

In conclusion, in George C. Marshall's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, he advised, "the need to understand and draw on our history as we shape the present...we must seek to understand the conditions which have led to past tragedies and should strive to determine the great fundamentals which must govern a peaceful progression toward a constant higher level of civilization."⁵⁰ These fundamentals are found in establishing and operating an integrated Office of Military Government United States in Germany we must continue in today's COCOMs. Planning for the campaign to come immediately following the surrender of Germany began months before the surrender. Integrating

⁴⁹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 238

⁵⁰ Bruce Jones, *The Marshall Plan and the Shaping of American Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute Press, 2017), 77

officials from multiple US government departments under a single chain of command provided unity of effort critical to the success of OMGUS. The development and use of departments, divisions, and committees to address issues in the DIME framework enable OMGUS to anticipate and react to problems of the day. The initial leader and organizing functions were led by the G-5 Division of General Eisenhower's staff, then eventually transferred to the OMGUS. The OMGUS was wholly integrated across all the major Departments of the US Government and was explicitly enabled by the State Department for policy and the War Department for execution. Coordination was conducted in various forums, through committee and division level meetings up through Lt Gen Clay and Mr. Murphy. Because of all the items above, OMGUS was able to get the US sectors, the Bizonal with the British, and Trizonal with the French, in a combined effort to address the German problem.

The success of these efforts laid the foundational mechanism to implement the Marshall Plan by rebuilding Europe. The Brookings Institute book *The Marshall Plan* states, "US strategy is wisely tied to institutions of architecture, of burden sharing and cooperation with the West and beyond."⁵¹ The need for protective structures has only increased in the last few years with a continuously rising China and a more aggressive Russia. COCOMs need to be armed with doctrinally driven planning teams, divisions, and departments as was used by the OMGUS. The Brookings Institute book addresses the latest trend in ad hoc or temporary coalitions. This arrangement lacks trust among the parties involved and fails to signal lasting American commitment to a region or

⁵¹ Jones, *The Marshall Plan and the Shaping of American Strategy*, 115

problem.⁵² COCOMs are in the best position to realize lasting partnerships, demonstrate American commitment, and link physical security to economic security and prosperity.

⁵² Jones, *The Marshall Plan and the Shaping of American Strategy*, 125

Chapter 2: Joint Publication 5-0

Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0) provides instructions and intent from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Combatant Commands and Joint Force Commanders on how to accomplish the Joint Planning process. It describes planning as "Commander's Business," specifically, that commanders should own the planning process; JP 5-0 also gives the commander latitude on how to accomplish Joint Planning.⁵³ When addressing the Commander's Role, JP 5-0 states, "Commanders distinguish the unique features of their current situations to enable the development of innovative or adaptive solutions."⁵⁴ And that "they understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of the problem."⁵⁵ JP 5-0 states commanders will accomplish this "through the use of operational design and the application of operational art, where commanders develop innovative, adaptive alternatives to solve complex challenges."⁵⁶

JP 5-0 established the need for joint planning by describing strategy as "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives."⁵⁷ To be effective, the synchronization and integration of instruments of national power must be woven within all levels of planning and execution, not simply at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSDP) level. While individual instruments of power need experts to effectively use these powers, stove-piping remains a problem. There are several reasons the Goldwater-Nichols Act forced the services into

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 Dec 2020), XIX.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," XXVI.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," XXVI

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," XXVI

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," XII

Joint operations; among them is the need to effectively use all of the services in a concerted effort to achieve national objectives. JP 5-0 addresses the planning process to accomplish a concerted effort.

The planning process continues to evolve based on the strategic and political situation. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, *Competition Continuum*, states, "the experience of past wars demonstrates that initial policy objectives shift as the conflict rearranges the political and strategic context."⁵⁸ We have seen these types of changing strategic and political goals most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The initial policy goals for these operations changed as the conflicts continued. As Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 points out, "to accommodate the inevitable shifts in policy over any extended period, Joint Force Commanders (JFC) and planners adopt a mindset of campaigning rather than of campaigns."⁵⁹ JD 1-19 states, "this is a flexible approach that recognizes joint force activities of all kinds—not just armed conflict—should be continually adapted in response to evolving strategic conditions and policy objectives."⁶⁰ To effectively meet policy objectives in a changing strategic and political environment, integrated planning is needed at the operational level and above, not just at the OSDP and JCS levels. Limiting integration at the OSDP and JCS levels does not provide the "flexible approach" prescribed in JD 1-19.

JP 5-0 does provide a level of granularity for the types of plans, i.e., campaign, contingency, or crisis, and describes campaign or contingency planning as the type of planning that "encompasses the preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum*. (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 03 June 2019)

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum*, 1-19

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum*, 1-19

with a timeline generally, not driven by external events.⁶¹ This type of planning, non-crisis planning or planning not driven by a timeline or external event, is perfect for integration at the operational level, primarily because "combatant command campaign plans provide the means to translate strategic guidance into activities executable by combatant commands."⁶²

According to JP 5-0, principles of planning focus on the end state. "Joint planning is end state oriented: plans and actions positively contribute to achieving national objectives" and "planning begins by identifying the desired national and military end states."⁶³ If the purpose of planning is the end state based on national and military end states, planning can no longer focus on the military application of power alone; integration must be at the forefront of the planning process. The JP 5-0 acknowledges the need for integration by stating "military forces alone cannot achieve national objectives" and that "joint forces must effectively coordinate with United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, allied and partner nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, commercial entities (contractors), and local and regional stakeholders."⁶⁴ Yet in the same paragraph, JP 5-0 states; JFCs and staffs should consider how to involve interagency and multinational partners, relevant international organizations and NGOs, and the private sector in the planning process, how to coordinate and synchronize joint force actions with the operations of these organizations; and the military actions and resources required to address international organization and

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," XIII

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," XIII

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," 1-2

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," 1-2

NGO functions when those resources are not available, consistent with existing legal authorities."⁶⁵

JP 5-0 encourages commanders and planning staff to "consider how to involve" other instruments of national power into the planning process but does not provide specific direction for accomplishing the suggested integration. JP 5-0 states, "regardless of the level of involvement during the planning process, commanders and staffs must consider the impact of these various entities on joint operations."⁶⁶ In today's fight, resources and workforce are limited. However, integrating national instruments of power into combatant command campaign plans is not an area the US should take risk; integration is a must.

JP 5-0 defines interagency coordination as "the interaction that occurs among USG departments and agencies, including DOD, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective." Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the US military and the other instruments of national power."⁶⁷ The JP 5-0 goes on to address the need for achieving national strategic objectives through unity of effort that is accomplished "by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power."⁶⁸ The National Security Council (NSC) is identified as the organization with the "key role in the integration of all instruments of national power by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation and is responsible for overseeing the interagency planning efforts."⁶⁹ The Joint publication

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-2

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-2

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-15

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-15

¹⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-15

discusses the need for military and civilian information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration to accomplish a common goal.⁷⁰ Finally, within that same paragraph, JP 5-0 places the responsibility on the commander to seek cooperation and build consensus. JP 5-0 states, "in operations involving interagency partners and other stakeholders, where the commander does not control all elements, the commander seeks cooperation and builds consensus to achieve unity of effort."⁷¹

The JP 5-0 places this responsibility on the commander but does not outline a process or procedure for accomplishing this "unity of effort." In the absence of a process or procedure, commanders will make the best of the situation, driven by what works for them. This action causes the process to be personality-driven and not driven by a standard, repeatable process. The lack of a standardized process leads to inefficiency. Worse, what works for one commander is likely to change when commanders move on, causing the staff to change previously established processes to meet their expectations while forcing the interagency partners to adjust.

At the senior level of Government, the joint planning process is clearly outlined in JP 5-0 by addressing Civilian-Military Dialogue. JP 5-0 defines "shared understanding" by introducing the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) process. This process includes "the department-level enterprise of policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and information technology used by the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) to plan and execute joint operations."⁷² The JP 5-0 takes this a step further by explaining that "the APEX enterprise facilitates the

¹⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-15

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-16

²⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," XIII

interagency review of plans and appropriate annexes approved by the OSDP following guidance provided in IPRs."⁷³ At the most senior levels, careful considerations, policies, procedures, and even information technology is used to ensure decisions makers are given the best information and courses of action when considering the use of instruments of power; however, at the lower levels of campaigning, guidance and procedures are lacking.

JP 5-0 describes the need for interagency planning at the operational level by stating, "effective collaboration and coordination with interagency partners can be a critical component to successful operation and campaign activities, as well as during transitions when Joint Force Commanders may operate in support of other USG departments and agencies."⁷⁴ JP 5-0 encourages commanders and staff to consider integrating DoD and non-DoD capabilities to accomplish national objectives.⁷⁵ How to accomplish this step at the operational level is vague at best. OSD and the Joint Staff are responsible for "facilitating interagency support and coordination to support DOD plans as required."⁷⁶ Again, this addresses interagency support "to" DoD plans, not the integration of interagency capabilities into the operational planning or the campaigning process. Instead, the JP 5-0 encourages "at the operational level; subordinate commanders should consider and integrate interagency capabilities into their estimates, plans, and operations."⁷⁷ There is no standardized process for how commanders "should"

²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-17

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-16

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-16

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-16

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning," 1-17

accomplish the suggested integration. In fairness to the JP 5-0, Annex V is cited as the avenue for interagency coordination.

Annex V is a tool available to the Joint Force Commander to collaborate with interagency partners.⁷⁸ As stated in JP 5-0, "Annex V should specify the objectives, tasks, and desired level of shared situational awareness required to resolve the situation and identify the anticipated capabilities required to accomplish tasks."⁷⁹ What Annex V does explicitly allow "interagency planners to more rigorously plan their efforts in concert with the military, to suggest other activities or partners that could contribute to the operation, and to determine support requirements better."⁸⁰ The actions above are accomplished after the Combatant Command gains release authority to the appropriate agencies and is designed to identify support requirements the DoD needs from these agencies rather than a collaborative approach in achieving policy objectives. Essentially, the DoD is giving part of the plan to the interagency process and asking how they can help, including the interagency at the beginning and throughout the planning process.

Guest Speakers from the President's Lecture Series at the National Defense University have repeatedly spoken about the interagency process. A common theme that emerges from the speakers is that the process at the National Security Council level works well. Leaders from various agencies come to the table with options in a very collaborative approach and present the best advice from their department's instrument of power to the President on how to address policy goals of the United States. These guest lectures also state that when the NSC meeting is over and a decision is made, those same

²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," 1-17

²⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," 1-17

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "*Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning*," 1-17

leaders go back to their stove pipes and that this is where the interagency process breaks down. Not for lack of desire to see policy goals through but due to the lack of methods below their level. Although there are processes in place, such as those described in JP 5-0, they are more after-the-fact in their coordination vice collaboration from the start. This lack of collaboration at the beginning, where all instruments of national power are potentially brought to bear in campaign planning or campaigning, is where the renewed focus is needed.

JP 5-0 adroitly addresses the need for interagency coordination. It demonstrates why it is needed and how doing so contributes to policy goals and ultimately gives decision-makers options. APEX is used at the senior DoD and across the other Departments of the US government level. The Joint Planning and Execution Community is used to plan and execute joint operations; information technology is also used during these processes. Commanders are given a great deal of latitude when planning and are given direction and encouraged to utilize interagency partners in the process. Operational Planning is clearly outlined, including how and when to do it; whether it is contingency, crisis, or a campaign plan, there is a well-thought-out process and methodology to follow. However, the JP 5-0 falls short in the policy, process, and procedures for interagency planning at the operational level. In today's fight, integration of all instruments of power must start at the operational level. As previously addressed, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 outlines the need for campaigning or continuous adjustment amid changes in the environment and changing policy goals. Campaigning is accomplished at the Combatant Command level. The level where operational planning is critically important to achieving national political objectives. The so-called gray zone or below-threshold engagements

require an integrated use of national power. Therefore, planning to include complete integration of the whole-of-government approach must start at the Combatant Commands and begin with integrated planning.

In conclusion, the Joint Staff and the DoD do an excellent job of planning and integrating at senior levels. The systems and processes in place foster solid courses of action at those levels; however, we can achieve better outcomes if we start the integration with other US government agencies earlier in the process. The JP 5-0 establishes planning as commander's business. It provides a framework for coordination but not for collaboration. Sharing part of the plan or a portion considered "releasable" is not enough in today's environment. Collaboration at the beginning of the process is required to meet today's challenges. As JP 5-0 points out, planning is end-state oriented, used to achieve national policy goals, not a military end-state, but a national objective. Based on this, planning should begin with collaboration and inclusion at the beginning of the process, not a cursory check at points throughout the process, releasing limited information to the other US government departments that help provide instruments of national power. The interagency process below the National Security Council must be readdressed and reconfigured; this starts with operational planning that includes all instruments of power at the combatant command level.

Chapter 3: Conclusion

As the OMGUS case study demonstrated, integrated planning teams led to success in post-surrender Germany. The group includes military and civilian personnel from the War department and the Department of Treasury, State, Commerce, and Agriculture. Joint Publication 5-0 needs to be updated to require the following: interagency planning teams or IPTs at the operational planning level, funded personnel positions will need to be added to each Combatant Command, operational control and administrative control of personnel will need to be established, coordination authority for campaign plans will need to be reviewed and adjusted, and legal authorities will need to be reviewed and updated.

JP 5-0 already stipulates that operational planning teams or cross-functional teams will conduct operational planning. Additionally, it describes the interagency review process via Annex V and how it has input authority but not veto authority for COCOM campaign plans. The input but not veto authority will need to remain. However, starting with interagency personnel in the initial planning process should produce a more complete campaign plan that makes the most use of all instruments of national power and makes the coordination process that much more effective and efficient. Adding non-DoD personnel to a COCOM staff will require agreements between the COCOM and the department these experts work with.

Operational control and administrative control of personnel must be established for non-DoD personnel included in the IPTs. Operational Control will need to be transferred to the COCOM. This action will maintain continuity and clarity of purpose and chain of command. Administrative control can remain with the departments to which

they belong. The individual departments will need to manage their personnel's training, development, promotion, and rotation.

To establish these IPTs, additional funded personnel positions must be authorized at each COCOM. These positions will vary and should be tailored to the mission of the COCOM. For example, Southern Command will need different subject matter experts than Central Command. Where Southern Command is more drug interdiction focused, they will need positions focused more on law enforcement and Treasury versus what Central Command may need. Once these IPT positions are funded and filled, they can review current campaign plans and create new plans based on the Combatant Commander's direction.

Coordination authority for campaign plans will need to be reviewed and adjusted. JP 5-0 outlines the Coordination Authority for planning by establishing IPTs that include interagency players at the operational planning level; this authority will need to be reviewed and updated. This paper recommends coordination be pushed down to the Combatant Commander level. As such, legal authorities will need to be reviewed and updated. Each department in the government has different legal authorities and statuses. These authorities and statuses will need to be updated based on having other department personnel working on and operating within the COCOM.

In conclusion, a historical look at past efforts can benefit today's fight. Campaign planning is critical to countering these efforts in an era where our adversaries blur the lines between combat and below-threshold conflict. The OMGUS is an excellent example of how this can be accomplished. Planning teams, with members from across the departmental spectrum of the US government, demonstrated the ability to plan, execute,

and achieve the nation's strategic goals in a highly volatile and complex environment. Clear lines were established between policy and execution. At the time, the Secretary of State agreed the policy-making arm responsible for guiding US actions in post-surrender Germany should remain a function of the state department. The planning, execution, adjustments, and processes required for accomplishing these policy goals should stay with the war department.

JP 5-0 provides well-thought-out processes and procedures and guidance for conducting planning. However, the JP 5-0 needs to be updated based on changes in the character of war. Our adversaries no longer define war as violence; below threshold, conflict is commonplace. The US must remain loyal to our values, which means staying true to values-based strategic goals. To accomplish our strategic goals in today's environment, a new way of planning and execution is required at the operational level. Operational planning can no longer afford to be stove-piped within the COCOM, with interagency planning being conducted in the later stages of the process. To remedy this planning issue, integrated planning teams need to be established and implemented at the COCOM level. Personnel, legal, operational, administrative control, and funding for these positions are all areas that need to be addressed. While this is a departure from how these departments are used to operating, these changes are required to meet current threats. All the above are items that can be implemented short of Congress passing a Goldwater-Nichols Act 2.0. The COCOMs are very good at campaign planning; these suggested changes will make them better and can accomplish this without significant changes in legislation.

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Vita

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