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THESIS

**AVERTING THE NEXT ATTACK: LAW ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGIES TO DISRUPT FOREIGN-INFLUENCED
TERRORISM IN THE HOMELAND**

by

Larry McCurtain

September 2022

Co-Advisors:

Cristiana Matei
David W. Brannan (contractor)

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DISRUPT FOREIGN-INFLUENCED TERRORISM IN THE HOMELAND**

Larry McCurtain
Chief Deputy Sheriff, Kern County Sheriff's Office
BA, Fresno Pacific University, 2016

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September 2022**

Approved by: Cristiana Matei
Co-Advisor

David W. Brannan
Co-Advisor

Erik J. Dahl
Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Local law enforcement agencies have an important role in protecting the homeland from a variety of threats, including the threat from foreign-influenced terrorism. The role in which local law enforcement has in the fight against this threat is often confusing and challenging, as roles vary from one agency to another. This thesis explores how local law enforcement can strengthen its role in disrupting foreign-influenced terror in the homeland. A comparative analysis and case study methodology was used to explore the extent of the threats faced from terrorist organizations' exerting foreign influence to further attacks inside the United States. This thesis finds that the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism remains high and that local law enforcement agencies must be prepared to prevent and disrupt terror activities. Social identity theory is critical in understanding why individuals gravitate toward groups and ideologies that inspire violence toward innocent people. This thesis recommends that local law enforcement standardize nationwide terrorism training, build on relationships throughout the homeland security enterprise, embrace the philosophy of community-oriented policing and apply it toward prevention and the disruption of foreign-influenced terrorism, and enhance information-sharing capabilities.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CVE	countering violent extremism
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DVE	domestic violent extremism
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HIDTA	high-intensity drug-trafficking area
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JIS	Jam'iyyat UI-Islam Is-Saheeh
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
NYPD	New York City Police Department
SIAM	social identity analytical method
SIT	social identity theory
SWAT	special weapons and tactics
TEW	terrorism early warning
TLO	terrorism liaison officer

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Local law enforcement agencies in the United States are an integral component of the homeland security apparatus. When terror plots are carried out in the homeland, local law enforcement agencies are often, if not always, the first to respond. With over 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies spread throughout the United States, they provide a necessary and substantial resource for combatting terrorism.¹ Foreign-influenced terrorism in the United States remains a constant threat to the homeland as demonstrated in the attacks on the El Al ticket counter at the Los Angeles International Airport; the Army recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas; Fort Hood, Texas; the Boston Marathon; the San Bernardino Department of Public Health, and many more.² This thesis addresses the causes of foreign-influenced terrorism in the United States by analyzing recruitment methods, radicalization processes, local law enforcement strategies, and local law enforcement training and provides recommendations for local law enforcement to strengthen its role in disrupting foreign-influenced terror in the homeland.

This thesis draws on academic works that analyze what foreign-influenced terrorism is and why it occurs. This research does not focus on a singular group or foreign terrorist organization; rather, it examines different terrorist groups, their ideologies, and the influence they impart on individuals and groups of individuals to do harm inside the

¹ Duren Banks et al., *National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data*, NCJ 249681 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 2016), <https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf>.

² Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Lone Wolf Islamic Terrorism: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe) Case Study,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (January 2014): 110–28, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849921>; Jeremiah J. Hart, “Strategic Mutual Aid Response to Terrorism: A New Approach” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64938>; Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem, *9/11 Commission: Legislative Action Concerning U.S. Immigration Law and Policy in the 108th Congress*, CRS Report No. RL32616 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), ProQuest; Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw, and Leena Malkki, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.854032>; Zoe Marchment, Noémie Bouhana, and Paul Gill, “Lone Actor Terrorists: A Residence-to-Crime Approach,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 7 (2020): 1413–38, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481050>; Gillian Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’: Issues and Challenges,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2, no. 1 (2009): 95–102, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539150902752846>; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual from Radical Opinion to Radical Action,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 69–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849916>.

United States. Understanding why an individual, or group of individuals, is attracted to an ideology of terror is important for local law enforcement to combat the threats it faces. Social identity theory and the social identity analytical method can be useful in evaluating group behavior to understand actions and ideologies, as well as why individuals may radicalize and join terrorist groups.³

Understanding the dynamics of group terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and inmate radicalization is key to identifying strategies for local law enforcement agencies to disrupt and prevent attacks in their communities. Local law enforcement agencies are in a unique position to identify individuals who may be radicalizing in their communities due to the daily interactions they have with their citizens. The concept of community-oriented policing is crucial to solving problems in a community; however, this concept can also be applied to preventing and disrupting foreign-influenced terrorism through the early identification of at-risk individuals. Community-oriented policing is based on Sir Robert Peel's policing principles, which state that police are at the service of the public.⁴ The concepts behind community-oriented policing emphasize bringing the community and the police together to work in partnership to solve common problems. These partnerships can be expanded upon within communities to combat the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism, just as they are used to combat narcotics trafficking, criminal street gang activity, and other crimes and quality-of-life issues.

Training for local law enforcement officers is the foundation for their success in protecting the communities they serve, but different jurisdictions around the United States have different training needs, specialties, and requirements. The types and levels of training also vary depending on the size of agencies and the populations they serve, as well as the threat streams each agency faces. Regarding terrorism training, there is no national standard for local law enforcement. Regular, routine policing activities and training are

³ David Brannan, Anders Strindberg, and Kristin Darken, *A Practitioner's Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis* (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 49. See also Anders Strindberg, *Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism and Violent Extremism* (Stockholm: FOI, 2020), 17–25.

⁴ Nadav Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 2nd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 190.

often relied on to identify terrorist activity and disrupt attacks.⁵ States continue to evolve as the threat landscape changes and updates are continuously implemented for entry-level and advanced peace officer training. California, for example, has expanded its basic academy curriculum to include terrorist threats and ideologies, prevention/deterrence concepts, critical infrastructure protection, and intelligence cycle and intelligence resources.⁶

In addition to reviewing existing literature from subject-matter experts on radicalization, terrorist recruitment, and law enforcement training and strategies, this thesis examines several case studies of foreign-influenced attacks and a foiled plot in the United States. In some of the case studies, it was later learned that the individuals who carried out the attacks had been brought to the attention of federal authorities before the attacks occurred.⁷ The case studies are instrumental in examining the processes of radicalization and terrorist recruitment, as well as identifying the reasons these individuals supported the ideologies of foreign terrorist organizations. Additionally, the case studies provide insight into what strategies local law enforcement used to combat these threats and what worked and did not work at different government levels.

This thesis concludes with recommendations for local law enforcement to disrupt the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism. The findings of this research reveal that the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism in the United States remains serious, and there are many methods for terrorist organizations to recruit and radicalize, mainly through the internet and social media platforms. Through analyzing the literature, as well as case studies, this thesis identifies numerous strategies for local law enforcement to implement to disrupt the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism. The identified strategies and recommendations include standardized nationwide terrorism awareness training,

⁵ Christopher Hewitt, "Law Enforcement Tactics and Their Effectiveness in Dealing with American Terrorism: Organizations, Autonomous Cells, and Lone Wolves," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 61, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849913>.

⁶ "Legislative Mandated Training," California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, June 27, 2022, <https://post.ca.gov/legislative-mandated-training>.

⁷ Caroline Joan "Kay" S. Picart, *American Self-Radicalizing Terrorists and the Allure of "Jihadi Cool/Chic"* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 146, ProQuest.

indoctrination of community-oriented policing in at-risk communities, enhanced sharing of information with fusion centers and task forces, increased relationships with federal agencies, participation in terrorism liaison officer-type programs, increased training and information sharing with non-law enforcement public safety agencies, collaboration with behavioral health and other local public safety agencies, and continuous professional training throughout law enforcement officers' careers. However, this thesis finds that some areas need additional research to further identify the efficacy of existing strategies and enhance the effectiveness of local law enforcement in the homeland security enterprise.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The threat of foreign-influenced terrorism in the United States has remained a concern for law enforcement since the terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Indeed, since 9/11, numerous attacks carried out by citizens on U.S. soil are suspected to have been foreign influenced. The El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport in 2002; the Army recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 2009; Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009; the Boston Marathon in 2013; and the San Bernardino Department of Public Health in 2015 are just a few examples in this context.¹

Instability in the Middle East and elsewhere, border security, terrorist propaganda, social media, and religious extremism can all lead to an increase in foreign-influenced terrorism in the homeland. For example, foreign fighters from Tunisia and Algeria have conducted terror activities in other countries, only to return to their home countries to perpetrate terrorism there. Many of these activities have taken place in unstable regions, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.² Furthermore, foreign fighters use social media platforms to communicate about religious topics, post updates on conflicts and threats from the West, and hold regular conversations.³ Border security has also become a concern with respect

¹ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Lone Wolf Islamic Terrorism: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe) Case Study,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 110–28, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849921>; Jeremiah J. Hart, “Strategic Mutual Aid Response to Terrorism: A New Approach” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64938>; Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem, *9/11 Commission: Legislative Action Concerning U.S. Immigration Law and Policy in the 108th Congress*, CRS Report No. RL32616 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), ProQuest; Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw, and Leena Malkki, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.854032>; Zoe Marchment, Noémie Bouhana, and Paul Gill, “Lone Actor Terrorists: A Residence-to-Crime Approach,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 7 (2020): 1413–38, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481050>; Gillian Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’: Issues and Challenges,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2, no. 1 (2009): 95–102, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539150902752846>; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual from Radical Opinion to Radical Action,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 69–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849916>.

² R. Kim Cragin, “Preventing the Next Wave of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Lessons Learned from the Experiences of Algeria and Tunisia,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 44, no. 7 (2021): 543–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1568005>.

³ Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 1 (2015): 10–11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.974948>.

to the infiltration of foreign-influenced terrorism in recent decades. On numerous occasions over the last 30 years, members of terrorist organizations have traversed borders to enter the United States. The northern border with Canada, for example, has been the site of numerous such crossings. Three members of a group associated with Al-Qaeda attempted to penetrate the border, carrying explosive materials; the 1993 World Trade Center bombing suspects passed over from Canada; and the 1999 Los Angeles International Airport millennium bomb plot suspect likewise came across the Canadian border.⁴ Furthermore, at the southern border, Mexican government officials have speculated that Islamic terrorist organizations, specifically Al-Qaeda, might attempt to enter the United States from Mexico.⁵ According to Tussing, “During 2005, Border Patrol apprehended approximately 1.2 million illegal aliens [along the Southwest border between the United States and Mexico]; of those, 165,000 were from countries other than Mexico. Of the non-Mexican aliens, approximately 650 were from special interest countries.”⁶

Conflict in the Middle East can lead to foreign fighters’ attempting to infiltrate the West by traveling across our borders. If this scenario occurs, it increases the likelihood of recruitment for foreign-based and foreign-influenced terrorist groups and individuals inside the United States. Historically, in other conflicts, adversaries of the United States have used Mexico as a launching pad for operations within U.S. borders. For example, in World War II, Japanese agents conducted intelligence operations inside the United States from Tijuana, Mexico. Japan realized that the southern border was easily exploited to traverse multiple times.⁷ Potentially, adversaries of the United States could use neighboring countries to coordinate activities inside the homeland.

⁴ Bert Tussing, “New Requirements for a New Challenge: The Military’s Role in Border Security,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 4, no. 3 (October 2008): 2.

⁵ Ramón J. Miró, *Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999–2002* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2003), 44, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf.

⁶ Tussing, “New Requirements for a New Challenge,” 2.

⁷ Nathan S. Whitfield, “Traveling the Terror Highway: Infiltration of Terror Operatives across the U.S.–Mexico Border” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 18, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10708>.

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Local law enforcement agencies have a role in fighting these nefarious threats, but balancing intelligence sharing and law enforcement operations has been challenging and confusing for local law enforcement agencies as roles vary from one agency to another. For example, some agencies have intelligence collection units, as well as personnel assigned to federal terrorism task forces, but others have neither. Most agencies collect and share data with fusion centers and federal agencies, but some larger agencies investigate terrorism-related cases on their own. The lack of consistency among local law enforcement agencies across the United States, with respect to handling terrorist threats, creates confusion about which roles their respective departments will or should play because of statutory limitations on cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.⁸ This situation can lead to “linkage blindness,” in which information is available to a certain jurisdiction but not others.⁹

Consequently, law enforcement and intelligence organizations are responsible for protecting the state, property, and citizens, but sometimes they fail to do so.¹⁰ An example of information and intelligence not being shared was the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013.¹¹ Two brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, were responsible for the attacks, which killed three people and injured over 200.¹² Tamerlan and his mother had gained the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after Russian authorities provided

⁸ Richard A. Best Jr., *Securing America's Borders: The Role of the Intelligence Community*, CRS Report No. R41520 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 8, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R41520.pdf>.

⁹ The 9/11 Commission identified the issue of linkage blindness, which typified numerous intelligence agencies that failed to make connects with information possessed by each other. Rick Brown, “Understanding Law Enforcement Information Sharing for Criminal Intelligence Purposes,” *Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, no. 566 (December 2018): 2.

¹⁰ Diego Esparza and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Closing the Gap between Law Enforcement and National Security Intelligence: Comparative Approaches,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 32, no. 2 (2019): 323, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1522219>.

¹¹ Michael E. Horowitz et al., *Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings* (Washington, DC: Intelligence Community Inspector General Forum, 2014), 1, <https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2014/s1404.pdf>.

¹² Horowitz et al., 1.

information about them in March 2011.¹³ The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) determined that Tamerlan had a link to terrorism. In September 2011, Russian authorities provided almost identical information to the Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁴ Subsequently, Tamerlan was placed on the terrorist watchlist, and this information was provided to the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State. Three months later, he traveled to Russia and returned to the United States after six months.¹⁵ Upon reentry to the United States, his travel resulted in no additional investigation or vetting process, and information about him was not relayed to local law enforcement.¹⁶ This example emphasizes the importance of intelligence and information sharing among the different levels of government that are responsible for homeland security efforts. Local law enforcement remains on the front lines of combatting 21st century terrorism. If given specific information or intelligence, local law enforcement might have had methods at its disposal to interdict the attack. Thus, intelligence sharing and collaboration are essential to preventing and disrupting terror activity in the homeland.

Another challenge arises from local law enforcement agencies' limited resources for, and expertise in, combatting foreign-influenced terrorism.¹⁷ Indeed, as domestic violent extremism (DVE) has become a priority for homeland security agencies, resources have moved from training and education in fighting foreign-influenced terrorism to preparing to combat DVE. With reduced resources, many local law enforcement agencies remain limited in their ability to disrupt foreign-influenced terrorism.

¹³ Horowitz et al., 1.

¹⁴ Horowitz et al., 1.

¹⁵ Horowitz et al., 1–2.

¹⁶ Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, "Statement of the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security on the Completion of the IC IG Forum Review of the Boston Marathon Bombings," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 10, 2014, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organizations/icig/icig-related-menus/icig-related-content/unclassified-summary-of-information-handling-and-sharing-prior-to-the-boston-marathon-bombings>.

¹⁷ Fred D. Collie, "21st Century Policing: The Institutionalization of Homeland Security in Local Law Enforcement Organizations" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 47, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2845>.

Additional challenges to local law enforcement agencies' roles in combatting this phenomenon stem from underutilized assets—most notably, local communities. Local law enforcement agencies have a unique connection to the communities they police and, therefore, have access to local sources of intelligence. Routine patrol work by local law enforcement officers is an important resource in preventing, identifying, responding to, and gathering intelligence, as well as identifying potential threats, as terrorists and terrorist sympathizers live and hide in these neighborhoods.¹⁸ Yet not all local law enforcement agencies use these assets routinely because of a lack of training, knowledge, and resources.

Identifying how to mitigate these challenges is key to disrupting foreign-influenced terrorism. To this end, this thesis seeks to identify how local law enforcement agencies can strengthen their current role in combatting foreign-influenced terrorism.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

How can local law enforcement strengthen its role in disrupting foreign-influenced terror in the homeland?

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis aims to identify the degree of the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism to the homeland and provide local law enforcement agencies with recommendations on how to disrupt and combat current and future threats originating from foreign-influenced terrorism groups. This thesis uses a comparative analysis to accomplish this goal and formulate recommendations for local law enforcement agencies.

First, it identifies and defines the concept of foreign-influenced terrorism and determines the threats posed to the homeland by it, using scholarly outlooks and analyses of several components driving foreign-influenced terrorism: recruitment methods, radicalization, local law enforcement strategies, and local law enforcement training. Furthermore, the literature analyzed provides confirmation from scholarly sources and

¹⁸ Frank Straub, Jennifer Zeunik, and Ben Gorban, "Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks," *CTC Sentinel* 10, no. 5 (May 2017): 1–7.

addresses any contradictions about the significance of the threat posed to the homeland by foreign-influenced terrorism.

Next, this research examines case studies of terrorist events that have either occurred or been disrupted in the United States. The case studies compare several types of foreign-influenced terrorism plots and attacks, including individual terrorism (lone-wolf), group terrorism, and inmate radicalization. These case studies outline the process from recruitment to radicalization to the execution of attacks. These case studies examine the actual terrorist events, what led up to the events, and the radicalization process for the perpetrators of the events. Furthermore, the information sharing between governmental agencies, or lack thereof, is examined. The cases are as follows:

1. Curtis Culwell Center, Garland, Texas (2015),
2. Pulse nightclub, Orlando, Florida (2016), and
3. California prison radicalization plot (2004–2005).

These case studies were selected for their differing circumstances from radicalization to execution. These circumstances involve how different countries and varying levels of government combatted the threats of foreign-influenced terrorism. Additionally, these case studies provide different perspectives on and discussions of a variety of levels of government. These case studies examine the differences, as well as similarities, in how the events were handled by law enforcement and governmental agencies and address intelligence sharing and cooperation, thus identifying whether these events could have been successfully disrupted.

Finally, with respect to the Garland, Texas, and California prison radicalization plots, the roles local law enforcement played in disruption and interdiction are examined. These case studies helped to generate recommendations for local law enforcement in the prevention and disruption of future terrorist events and plots. Furthermore, based on the findings of the research, this thesis determines the significance of the threat foreign-influenced terrorism poses to the homeland and provides recommendations for local law enforcement agencies to disrupt these threats.

This research employed primary sources, such as government documents, including various federal government commission reports, state government reports, official law enforcement publications, and after-action reports. This research also consulted such secondary sources as theses, scholarly journal articles, books, media coverage, and news articles. These primary and secondary sources provided a wide array of analyses and research to examine the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism and assisted with providing recommendations for local law enforcement agencies to interrupt future terrorist events.

D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter II reviews existing literature for the causes of foreign-influenced terrorism, methods for combatting the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism and driving factors in the radicalization process. This chapter focuses on four types of terrorism, including group terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and inmate radicalization. This chapter concludes by summarizing the role that local law enforcement agencies play in the protection of the homeland from internal and external threat streams.

Chapter III examines the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism to the United States by reviewing recruitment methods and influences used by terrorist organizations. The recruitment methods include the use of social media, media coverage of destabilized regions in the Middle East, and sociopolitical issues. This chapter concludes by summarizing how the various recruitment methods used by foreign terrorist organizations influence individuals and groups of individuals in the United States to plan and carry out terrorist attacks in the homeland.

Chapter IV examines local law enforcement strategies in the United States as they relate to combatting the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism. These strategies focus on intelligence and information collection and law enforcement training. The intelligence- and information-collection strategies reviewed are community-oriented policing, fusion centers, and task forces. The law enforcement training strategies are terrorism awareness, the terrorism liaison officer program, and prevention and disruption. This chapter concludes by summarizing the combination of local law enforcement intelligence and information collection and training to prevent and disrupt terror activities in the homeland.

Chapter V provides an in-depth examination of several U.S. case studies. The case studies examine different types of terror plots and attacks, including group terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, and inmate radicalization. This chapter concludes by summarizing similarities among the actors in the different case studies and a review of actions and inactions that may have prevented the events and saved lives.

Chapter VI provides a conclusion of all information reviewed in this thesis and an overview of the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism in the United States. Furthermore, this chapter provides a summary of findings, provides recommendations for local law enforcement, and identifies opportunities for further research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Understanding foreign-influenced terrorism and why it occurs is essential for local law enforcement to identify and strengthen disruption methods. This chapter reviews the literature on various aspects of foreign-influenced terrorism. It first discusses drivers of foreign-influenced terrorism, followed by the means of combatting the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism, and the radicalization process for group terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and inmate radicalization. Local law enforcement agencies must understand the complexity of the terrorism threat when evaluating their commitment to resources and engagement in the counterterrorism realm.¹⁹

A. DRIVERS OF FOREIGN-INFLUENCED TERRORISM

This research draws on academic works that analyze what foreign-influenced terrorism is, why it occurs, and which methods disrupt it. Since terrorism is a global issue, this review considers sources from the United States and other regions of the globe. Although it does not focus on a specific terrorist group's influence in the homeland, it highlights different groups, ideologies, and issues related to the evolving foreign-influenced threat faced by the West.

The drivers of foreign-influenced terrorism can be applied to two types of terrorists: those belonging to a group and the lone-wolf variety. Using data provided by governmental organizations can facilitate such an analysis; however, it would more than likely offer a biased one, leading to a conclusion based on others' beliefs and preconceived notions.²⁰ Government reports do, however, provide a perspective that can be useful in analyzing drivers of radicalization and additional context for why individuals may become lone-wolf terrorists or join a group of like-minded individuals.

¹⁹ John A. O'Kleasky Jr., "The Integration of Counterterrorism into the DNA of American Policing" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 21, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44635>.

²⁰ David Brannan, Anders Strindberg, and Kristin Darken, *A Practitioner's Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis* (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 4.

The triggers that lead to lone-wolf radicalization are different from those in group radicalization. Belonging to a group creates a sense of identity and shared perception, as a sense of belonging, social identity, and rivalry fuel a shared reality.²¹ Identifying with a group of individuals with shared feelings, values, and grievances may lead to membership in a larger cause. As for lone-wolf terrorists, identifying a single reason for radicalizing is similarly elusive.²² Walter Lee identifies multiple reasons for individual radicalization, including “personal aversion or depression, negatively perceived developments in personal life or career, interaction with extremist movements, socio-political polarization and radicalization, militant literature and internet publications, and admired terrorism occurring elsewhere.”²³ Beth Windisch, who examined the radicalization model for lone-wolf terrorists, notes there is a lack of understanding about why one radicalizes in the absence of a group dynamic, which is common in the radicalization process.²⁴ Windisch identifies that “lone actors faced with identity threats derived from their self-categorization as men may progress toward radicalization in a society that values hegemonic masculinity.”²⁵

Another study, conducted by researchers Bob McDonald and Yaser Mir, aimed to examine what causes Al-Qaeda-influenced violent extremism, while also reviewing perspectives from the Muslim community on how the government responds to the issue.²⁶

²¹ Stephen M. Felty, “Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Israel/Palestine” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), 16, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62248>.

²² Walter A. Lee, “Finding the Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: Ways to Distinguish and Deter Lone-Wolf Terrorists” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 8, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45218>.

²³ Lee, 8.

²⁴ Beth Windisch, “Lone Actor Terrorists: The Performance of Hegemonic Masculinity through Acts of Violence” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 12, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66050>.

²⁵ Windisch, 56.

²⁶ In 2007–2008, the Metropolitan Police Service in London authorized a study called the Pathfinder program. This program involved community engagement focused on community-oriented policing and outreach efforts “to improve mutual understanding on issues of policing, crime and community safety between the police/stakeholders and a select group of black and minority ethnic communities resident in London.” This study set out to increase knowledge in several areas: violent extremism prevention, organized crime, and community engagement and unity. Data were gathered from a variety of sources, including in-depth one-to-one interviews, community group input, and discussions. Muslim community members interjected their perspectives as well as they related to Al-Qaida-influenced extremism. Bob McDonald and Yaser Mir, “Al-Qaida-Influenced Violent Extremism, UK Government Prevention Policy and Community Engagement,” *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research* 3, no. 1 (2011): 33, <https://doi.org/10.5042/jacpr.2011.0020>.

The viewpoint from some within the Muslim community concerns the risk from Al-Qaeda-influenced violent extremism; however, others feel that this study unfairly targets the Muslim communities and discriminates against Muslims.²⁷ Ultimately, no single trait could be linked to Al-Qaeda-influenced violent extremism.²⁸ Although the researchers had difficulty pinpointing any exact causes for Al-Qaeda-influenced violent extremism and general traits of at-risk persons, they singled out generic psychological, sociological, and at-risk behavior traits, such as being deprived of a future and experiencing discrimination.²⁹

Scholars have long contended that the media also plays an important, if not essential, role in driving foreign-influenced terrorism by inadvertently facilitating the communication of the terrorists' grievances.³⁰ Margaret Thatcher famously said of the terror-media relationship that the media provides "the oxygen of publicity on which they [terrorists] depend."³¹ In recent years, the media has widely covered jihadists flocking to areas such as Syria to participate in terror activities. Why fighters would travel to another country to fight is often elusive, as authorities may not have contact with these individuals—which has generated research on perception. Britain, for example, has experienced this issue, and Raquel da Silva and Rhys Crilley's work on citizens' online comments seeks to identify the perceptions of the citizenry about why British fighters would travel to Syria to fight.³² These scholars argue that the public perceives British foreign fighters as threats to the homeland who are inspired by religion and extreme ideologies. These authors conclude that media coverage of British foreign fighters creates a public perception that young Muslim men pose a threat to the homeland because of

²⁷ McDonald and Mir, 37.

²⁸ McDonald and Mir, 42.

²⁹ McDonald and Mir, 37.

³⁰ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 3rd. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 187–88.

³¹ R. W. Apple Jr., "Meese Asserts U.S. Favors Press Code," *New York Times*, July 18, 1985, <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/18/world/meese-asserts-us-favors-press-code.html>.

³² Raquel da Silva and Rhys Crilley, "'Talk about Terror in Our Back Gardens': An Analysis of Online Comments about British Foreign Fighters in Syria," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (2017): 180, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1237011>.

religious radicalization and violent tendencies.³³ In sum, these scholars agree that media coverage and reporting shape public perceptions of foreign-influenced terrorism and the population it impacts.

Other studies examine the role of narrative in news reporting to shape perceptions of terrorist threats. Jamie Matthews, for example, notes that community perceptions are a concern, and narratives about the Muslim population could be influenced by such perceptions and reporting methods.³⁴ Additional research has been conducted on perceptions and the reporting of terrorist events. More specifically, studies conducted in Britain between 1974 and 2007 focused on Muslim and Irish communities.³⁵ These studies concluded that reporting had, in fact, constructed narratives about and generated suspicion of Muslim communities.³⁶ Thus, pinpointing a single reason for radicalization is difficult because many reasons may be found, but media reporting plays a role in shaping community perceptions and attitudes about the threats posed from within.

These media-influenced public opinions are important because a different group of scholars identifies prejudices as drivers of foreign-influenced terrorism. Da Silva and Crilley find that negative feelings among the general public toward members of the Islamic community drive perceptions of how and why someone becomes a foreign fighter.³⁷ The public's perception, mostly from media and social media reporting, attributes the driving factor to the Islamic religion.³⁸ Marcelle Burroni identifies these prejudices as playing a role in the radicalization of individuals, which can be authentic or originate from

³³ da Silva and Crilley, 180.

³⁴ Jamie Matthews, "Framing Alleged Islamist Plots: A Case Study of British Press Coverage since 9/11," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (2015): 277, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2015.1042305>.

³⁵ Henri C. Nickels et al., "Constructing 'Suspect' Communities and Britishness: Mapping British Press Coverage of Irish and Muslim Communities, 1974–2007," *European Journal of Communication* 27, no. 2 (2012): 135, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323112445604>.

³⁶ Nickels et al., 147.

³⁷ da Silva and Crilley, "'Talk about Terror in Our Back Gardens,'" 180.

³⁸ da Silva and Crilley, 180.

perceptions.³⁹ Craig Considine, who also examines the correlation between the radicalization of Muslims in the United States and the perceived discrimination of American Muslims, agrees with da Silva and Crilley, noting that American Muslims and those who appear to be Muslim experience discrimination and abuse due to the public's false association with the war on terror that results in prejudices against them.⁴⁰ Considine invokes the term Islamophobia in suggesting that most Muslims are profiled or perceived to be a threat and radicalized.⁴¹ The research also takes into account hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims and the ethnicities American Muslims identify with, in turn resulting in the perception that their safety and liberties are infringed upon in the United States.⁴² If this logic is applied to the research conducted by Burroni and da Silva and Crilley, more radicalization could be a byproduct. Anti-Muslim sentiment could very well be a reason for someone to radicalize inside the United States.

By the same token, media platforms also play a role in influencing terrorist-related activity. For example, Gillian Youngs examined how media reporting influences perceptions of the war on terror. She found that the internet and constant connectivity provided terrorists and their supporters with platforms to recruit, communicate, and plan.⁴³ Such electronic communication further complicates the perceptions that populations and governments have because both use the very same platforms to form opinions. Likewise, Burroni confirms that media platforms around the globe have fueled radicalization and acts of terror by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁴⁴ But Al-Qaeda and ISIS use different media platforms to recruit, gain support, and plan operations globally. Burroni agrees with researchers in Britain because ISIS fighters from the United States who have

³⁹ Marcelle R. Burroni, "The Homegrown Jihadi Terrorist: The Threat of ISIS-Inspired Radicalization in the United States" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 15, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/60369>.

⁴⁰ Craig Considine, "The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and 'Flying While Brown,'" *Religions* 8, no. 9 (2017): 165, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel8090165>.

⁴¹ Considine, 165.

⁴² Considine, 165.

⁴³ Youngs, "Media and Mediation in the 'War on Terror,'" 101.

⁴⁴ Burroni, "The Homegrown Jihadi Terrorist," 18.

traveled overseas to fight have come from communities of similar ethnic backgrounds, akin to events that have occurred more frequently in Europe.⁴⁵ In analyzing a case of foreign-influenced radicalization in the United States known as the Minnesota cluster, Burroni notes the group's ability to organize and communicate through existing friendships, as well as multiple communications platforms.⁴⁶ In sum, researchers concur that terrorist organizations use media platforms, communications platforms, and propaganda to further their cause and gain support.

Finally, the perception of foreign-influenced terrorism and how to deal with it differs from country to country. British scholar Christopher Baker-Beall argues that after the 9/11 attacks, the United States viewed foreign-influenced terrorism primarily as an external threat whereas European countries considered it both internal and external.⁴⁷ Government agencies within the European Union, for instance, perceived that Al-Qaeda had support in Britain, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Italy, according to the European security strategy.⁴⁸ Bradley Greaver argues that Al-Qaeda sought to brand itself the "leader of all jihadist movements."⁴⁹ He also contends that Al-Qaeda focused on Europe and the United States, using every form of communication possible to gain support and establish a brand of fundamentalist ideologies.⁵⁰ Researchers agree that Al-Qaeda seeks to establish its brand as a global Islamic militant organization.

⁴⁵ Burroni, 43.

⁴⁶ Burroni, 50.

⁴⁷ Christopher Baker-Beall, "The Evolution of the European Union's 'Fight against Terrorism' Discourse: Constructing the Terrorist 'Other,'" *Cooperation and Conflict* 49, no. 2 (2014): 213, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713483411>.

⁴⁸ Baker-Beall, 223. This perception helped shape the European Union's counter-terror policy whose approach was based on that of criminal justice agencies.

⁴⁹ Bradley S. Greaver, "Terrorist Group Brands: Understanding Terrorist Group Strategies through Brand Exposure" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 18, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49471>.

⁵⁰ Greaver, 19.

B. COMBATTING THE THREAT OF FOREIGN-INFLUENCED TERRORISM

A corpus of literature discusses how to prevent foreign-influenced terror attacks in the homeland. Cathy Lanier, who explores the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the United States, advises of the need for nationwide prevention programs to detect potential terrorist activity at early stages.⁵¹ These programs have always aimed to bring numerous sectors together for such prevention. Lanier's focus on state and local law enforcement roles and strategies gained popularity in the mid-late 2000s because of the events of 9/11, and information sharing and intelligence sharing have improved at the local level.⁵² Collaboration between government agencies and private-sector stakeholders has been addressed since 2005, when Lanier's research was conducted; however, there is a continuous need to build on and enhance public-private collaboration.⁵³ For example, Burrioni uses game theory to analyze the threat of those radicalized inside the United States to inform counterterrorism. Part of Burrioni's analysis details how federal and local authorities could prioritize counter-radicalization tactics in communities that are designated as high risk.⁵⁴ Multiple researchers, therefore, agree that collaborative, inclusive programs can be developed and implemented to combat the foreign-influenced radicalization process and identify and disrupt terrorist activity.

Burrioni's research also addresses funding issues related to countering violent extremism (CVE) and whether this goal is a worthwhile mission for the United States.⁵⁵ This analysis involves exploring programs that focus on deradicalization. Burrioni's research relates the perspective and experiences of the military in dealing with foreign-

⁵¹ Although the names of Islamic fundamentalist groups and ideologies have shifted since 2005, this threat can be applied directly to the threat of foreign-influenced terror. Cathy L. Lanier, "Preventing Terror Attacks in the Homeland: A New Mission for State and Local Police" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1957>.

⁵² Renee Graphia Joyal, "How Far Have We Come? Information Sharing, Interagency Collaboration, and Trust within the Law Enforcement Community," *Criminal Justice Studies* 25, no. 4 (December 2012): 358, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601X.2012.728789>.

⁵³ Nathan E. Busch and Austin D. Givens, "Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: Opportunities and Challenges," *Homeland Security Affairs* 8 (October 2012): 1-24.

⁵⁴ Burrioni, "The Homegrown Jihadi Terrorist," 59.

⁵⁵ Burrioni.

influenced terrorism to radicalized citizens within the United States. In 2011, the White House released its first CVE strategy for the homegrown threat: *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism*.⁵⁶ This strategy removed responsibilities from the federal government and recruited local agencies and organizations to enter the CVE realm. The proposed strategy involves three components: “1) enhancing federal engagement with and support to targeted local communities, 2) building expertise within government and law enforcement in preventing violent extremism, and 3) countering violent extremist propaganda.”⁵⁷ The ultimate focus of this program is to deradicalize individuals through community participation while reducing concerns over violations of liberties.⁵⁸ Lanier similarly argues that local involvement in the form of community-oriented policing could be a strategy in the detection and prevention of terrorism.⁵⁹ Lanier likewise holds that using the same principles taught to law enforcement officers for community-oriented policing could be included to prevent and detect terrorism, in the same way police officers detect and prevent crime.⁶⁰ These sources suggest that the creation and establishment of community-based programs focused on deterring and identifying radicalization at a local level can be an effective tool in fighting foreign-influenced radicalization and terrorist activity.

Likewise, scholars contest the role that counternarratives play in deradicalization. Kurt Braddock and John Horgan argue that pushing counternarratives to combat violent extremism can reduce support for radicalization and terrorism.⁶¹ Terrorist ideologies present recruitment and radicalization material (narratives) for would-be terrorists. These scholars present parameters for constructing counternarratives and explore methods for

⁵⁶ Executive Office of the President, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf.

⁵⁷ Executive Office of the President, 5–6.

⁵⁸ Executive Office of the President, 7.

⁵⁹ Lanier, “Preventing Terror Attacks in the Homeland,” 39.

⁶⁰ Lanier, 40.

⁶¹ Kurt Braddock and John Horgan, “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39, no. 5 (2016): 381, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116277>.

dissemination. The methods Braddock and Horgan identify include “cultivating trust among anonymous communicators, leveraging trusted others, and promoting counternarrative virality.”⁶² These scholars urge that the use of words as weapons can impact the effectiveness of terrorist narratives aimed to gain support for their cause.⁶³

In a report titled *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, which identifies the stages of radicalization, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) observes the lack of a “profile” to guide law enforcement officials toward individuals who may radicalize because they come from different backgrounds. However, the authors identify consistent behaviors in individuals as they progress through the radicalization process, which in turn provides a level of potential predictability for disruption and intervention.⁶⁴ As with other issues surrounding foreign-influenced terrorism, the internet and other communications platforms catalyze terrorism support, and identifying characteristics and indicators of radicalization are important aspects of prevention and detection of nefarious activity.⁶⁵ Lee hypothesizes that certain would-be terrorists, more specifically lone-wolf terrorists, may engage in violence because of being rejected from extremist groups.⁶⁶ This hypothesis can make it difficult to identify specific characteristics of those undergoing radicalization, as noted in the NYPD report, thus emphasizing the need to prevent radicalization before it starts.

C. RADICALIZATION

Radicalization in the context of foreign-influenced terrorism includes different phases. Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt present four phases: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization.⁶⁷ Fathali Moghaddam further describes the

⁶² Braddock and Horgan, 392–94.

⁶³ Braddock and Horgan, 400.

⁶⁴ Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007), 84, <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/radicalization-west-homegrown-threat>.

⁶⁵ Silber and Bhatt, 87.

⁶⁶ Lee, “Finding the Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing,” 10.

⁶⁷ Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, 6.

radicalization process with his foundational work titled “The Staircase to Terrorism.”⁶⁸ Moghaddam likens the individual’s progress through the stages of radicalization to ascending a flight of stairs. His research notes that the radicalization process includes “psychological interpretation of material conditions, perceived options to fight unfair treatment, displacement of aggression, moral engagement, solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organization, and the terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms.”⁶⁹ Researchers Hasan Arslan and Alec Petrone opine that stopping the radicalization process before it occurs is a primary strategy.⁷⁰ They have identified numerous foundations that contribute to the radicalization process, including “radical madrassas, jihadist audio/video tapes and rhetoric circulating at study centers, schools and universities.”⁷¹

Erin MacDonald reviewed cases of radicalized individuals in Canada and identified reasons for the radicalization. Focusing on Islamophobia, she found that the treatment and perceptions of Muslims around the globe contributed to the radicalization process for certain individuals.⁷² The results of her research indicated that Canadian Muslims were more likely to join together because of their overall group identity as Muslims and global conflicts rather than issues in Canada.⁷³ The majority participated in activities that were not illegal and did not involve violence; however, the potential was still there for radicalization into extremist beliefs.⁷⁴ Based on her research, it can be concluded that similar sentiment may be shared in other countries as well. Likewise, other arguments blame Islamophobia and stereotypes of Muslims for radicalization. Considine explored

⁶⁸ Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (February 2005): 161–69, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161>.

⁶⁹ Moghaddam, 162–66.

⁷⁰ Hasan T. Arslan and Alec Petrone, “A Proposed Strategy to Fight Religious Fundamentalism,” *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 9, no. 2 (April 2017): 108.

⁷¹ Arslan and Petrone, 108.

⁷² Erin Geneva MacDonald, “Muslims in Canada: Collective Identities, Attitudes of Otherment and Canadian Muslim Perspectives on Radicalism,” *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 3, no. 1 (2015): 56, <https://doi.org/10.13169/islastudj.3.1.0044>.

⁷³ MacDonald, 56.

⁷⁴ MacDonald, 56.

stereotypes that portrayed Middle Eastern countries as sanctuaries for terrorists and all people of Muslim decent as purveyors of terrorism.⁷⁵

In addition to traditional radicalization methods, research has examined a different type of radicalization directed at terrorists who exploit family bonds. Mohammed Hafez, for one, notes that “kinship” radicalization involves extremists’ passing ideologies to close contacts and family through “social and psychological mechanisms that are devoid of grievances, ideology, or politics, but instead associated with love, trust, and life-long bonding.”⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the radicalization process can vary from individual to individual and generally takes time.

The literature finds that different ideologies have been presented, and those who radicalize often have several reasons for such radicalization.⁷⁷ The radicalization process can thus lead to becoming involved with terrorism in various ways. The following subsections examine group terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and inmate radicalization in relation to their causal factors.

1. Group Terrorism

Group terrorism is a generic term that identifies individuals who join a group with similar causes and ideologies. First, what constitutes a group must be understood. Put simply, “a group can be defined as any given body of people who think of themselves as a distinct group.”⁷⁸ A more elaborate definition of a group is “some number of people (from very few to very many) who are united around a common interest, purpose, or practice, and who think of themselves as connected in some way.”⁷⁹ Al-Qaeda and ISIS are examples of group terrorism. Similarly, insurgent groups align with the definition of group

⁷⁵ Considine, “The Racialization of Islam in the United States,” 165.

⁷⁶ Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Ties That Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds,” *CTC Sentinel* (February 2016): 17, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55212>.

⁷⁷ Burroni, “The Homegrown Jihadi Terrorist,” 15.

⁷⁸ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 51.

⁷⁹ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, 51.

terrorism, as they exert influence, often through violent means, to gain territory or force populations into conforming to their ideologies.⁸⁰

Social identity theory (SIT) and the social identity analytical method (SIAM) can be useful in evaluating group behavior to understand actions and ideologies.⁸¹ In theory, SIT can also be applied to understand why individuals radicalize and join terror groups. Understanding ingroup/outgroup dynamics that influence whether an individual joins a group is important in the application of SIT and SIAM. An ingroup is a group that the individual identifies with and joins, and an outgroup is a group the individual neither identifies with nor joins.⁸² Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken identify four “markers” for group behavior that can be applied to terrorist groups: the patron–client relationship, the honor–shame paradigm, limited goods, and the challenge–response cycle.⁸³ These markers, as well as ingroup/outgroup dynamics and dominant ingroup narratives, can be useful in understanding not only group terrorism but the radicalization process as well. In the same vein, Stephen Felty states, “SIT is valuable as an analytical framework because it is flexible enough to account for different cultural contexts while analyzing group identity.”⁸⁴ Henri Tajfel, who conceived of SIT, researched intergroup relations extensively.⁸⁵ Tajfel’s research has been examined by Kitty Dumont and Johann Louw, who reviewed 10,038 articles from various journals and found that Tajfel’s publications were referenced in 774 articles.⁸⁶ According to Tajfel’s research, SIT is “a heuristic model

⁸⁰ Ami-Jacques Rapin, “What Is Terrorism?,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 3, no. 3 (2011): 166, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2010.512155>.

⁸¹ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 49. See also Anders Strindberg, *Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism and Violent Extremism* (Stockholm: FOI, 2020), 17–25.

⁸² Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 55.

⁸³ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, 70.

⁸⁴ Felty, “Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Israel/Palestine,” 15.

⁸⁵ Felty, 15.

⁸⁶ Kitty Dumont and Johann Louw, “A Citation Analysis of Henri Tajfel’s Work on Intergroup Relations,” *International Journal of Psychology* 44, no. 1 (February 2009): 49, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207590701390933>.

that describes how an individual's identity grows within and among groups through communication and interactions.”⁸⁷

Understanding why someone would join a terrorist organization is difficult, as no single factor can account for an individual's radicalization to an extreme ideology. Researchers have recognized several common factors that result in radicalizing and eventually joining terrorist organizations. These factors include a combination of perceived social injustices, rationalization of extreme actions based on those perceived social injustices, and ingroup ideologies.⁸⁸ Further research by scholars Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins found four common drivers of radicalization that are applicable to terrorist organizations: grievances, networks, ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures.⁸⁹ Although different researchers and scholars have identified other factors for radicalization and integration into terrorist organizations, the reasons are similar.

2. Lone-Wolf Terrorism

Lone-wolf terrorism, a term heard frequently across the United States, describes acts of violence carried out by a single person. As with the definition of terrorism, researchers and government agencies struggle to agree on a definition for lone-wolf terrorism.⁹⁰ Having evaluated numerous definitions of lone-wolf terrorism, Lee summarizes the concept as follows:

an individual or several individuals whose act of terror is conducted without orders from a higher chain of command. The individual or individuals are not part of an organized terrorist group but may have had contact or been trained in the past from a terrorist group. Lone wolf terrorists may take ideological and motivational factors from known group terrorists. Lone

⁸⁷ Felty, “Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Israel/Palestine,” 15.

⁸⁸ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 308.

⁸⁹ Mohammed M. Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 11 (2015): 961, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375>.

⁹⁰ Lee, “Finding the Wolves in Sheep's Clothing,” 3–5.

wolf terrorists use violence against governments, society, military and civilian targets in order to further their ideological motives.⁹¹

According to the FBI's *Strategic Plan 2004–2009*, lone-wolf terrorism was projected to be the predominant terrorism threat facing the homeland.⁹² Understanding why persons radicalize to carry out lone-wolf terror can assist authorities in noticing indicators of pending activity. As lone-wolf terrorists often radicalize by themselves—drawing their conclusions from a variety of sources—and they do not have expectations and a hierarchy that groups often possess, they prove difficult to identify during the radicalization process, according to Phillips.⁹³ Much research points to the adoption of ideologies from established groups as the cause of radicalization.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, these ideologies often are based on grievances and perceived social injustices. Lone wolves simply choose not to join a larger group or movement to accomplish their goals. The FBI has surmised that lone-wolf terrorists obtain their beliefs and intentions from established terrorist organizations and act of their own accord.⁹⁵ José Zúquete notes that lone-wolf terrorists typically have a “broader ideological cause” for the acts they carry out.⁹⁶ Thus, there are recurring reasons that lone-wolf terrorists radicalize even though they are different from terrorist organizations. Windisch has found that the dynamic behavior of a group is a missing component among lone-wolf terrorists.⁹⁷ Identifying with a group and thus connecting with the ingroup narrative often fuel the behavior of those belonging to the group. In contrast, lone-wolf terrorists do not have this sense of belonging to a physical group and can radicalize without pressure from others to carry out acts of terrorism.

⁹¹ Lee, 5.

⁹² Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Strategic Plan 2004–2009* (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004), 15, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=466149>.

⁹³ Brian J. Phillips, “Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves, Terrorist Groups, and Attack Lethality,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 3 (2017): 533, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1054927>.

⁹⁴ José Pedro Zúquete, “Men in Black: Dynamics, Violence, and Lone Wolf Potential,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 104, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849920>.

⁹⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Strategic Plan*, 27.

⁹⁶ Zúquete, “Men in Black,” 105.

⁹⁷ Windisch, “Lone Actor Terrorists,” 12.

Lone-wolf terrorists must obtain their material and ideologies from sources to influence their radicalization process.⁹⁸ This radicalization process is fueled by propaganda and other means of influence found on social media, internet sites, and other media platforms. From this viewpoint, researchers Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw, and Leena Malkki have noted that lone-wolf terrorists are not necessarily alone but are associated in some manner with others who have similar ideologies.⁹⁹ This association is possible because the internet can connect like-minded individuals from around the world on multiple electronic communications platforms, as these scholars posit.¹⁰⁰

For the foreign-influenced lone-wolf terrorist, researchers are divided on the influence of radical Islam on radicalization. Hoffman reinforces the FBI's concern about lone-wolf terrorism as it relates to aligning with Islamic extremist ideologies.¹⁰¹ Another researcher, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, argues that radical Islamic ideologies and religious beliefs contribute to the radicalization of lone-wolf terrorists in the homeland.¹⁰² Ramón Spaaij notes in his research that “political, social, and individual influences” are often connected to lone-wolf radicalization.¹⁰³

In sum, researchers have investigated the causes of radicalization into lone-wolf terrorism, and many of the reasons are like those leading to group terrorism. However, individual differences may have an impact on the ideologies lone wolves adopt.

3. State-Sponsored Terrorism

State-sponsored terrorism often involves nations sponsoring organized terrorist organizations. The support provided by nations to these organizations often includes

⁹⁸ Christopher T. Yankow and Riley McEvoy, “Predicting the Random: Understanding Islamist Lone Wolf Terrorism” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 13, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/66748>.

⁹⁹ Kaplan, Lööw, and Malkki, “Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism,” 4.

¹⁰⁰ Kaplan, Lööw, and Malkki, 4.

¹⁰¹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 125.

¹⁰² Gartenstein-Ross, “Lone Wolf Islamic Terrorism,” 111.

¹⁰³ Ramón Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 9 (September 2010): 862, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501426>.

financial support and supplies such as weapons and logistical support. Hoffman states that certain countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, have proactively supported terrorist organizations.¹⁰⁴ The U.S. State Department continues to label certain countries state sponsors of terrorism if they provide material support to terrorist organizations to further their foreign policy beliefs.¹⁰⁵ Support provided by countries to terrorist organizations influences the organizations' ability to radicalize others and obtain members and supporters.

Although some countries consider certain terrorist organizations enemies, they sometimes support them to further a common goal against a third party considered an enemy of both. Barak Mendelsohn argues that such was the case with the relationship between Syria and Al-Qaeda after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Mendelsohn argues, "After the U.S. invaded Iraq, the Assad regime viewed the threat from the U.S. as severe enough to justify collaborating with al-Qaeda to [bog] down the U.S. forces in Iraq and dissuade Washington from pushing for regime change in Syria."¹⁰⁶ Syria provided substantially lower levels of support than Iran has provided Hezbollah; however, a Syrian-sponsored Al-Qaeda radicalized volunteers to join the fight against the United States in Iraq, as Mendelsohn notes.¹⁰⁷ He further explains that the support provided by Syria, however unofficial it was, resulted in a partnership that fueled radicalization due to ideologies and perceived social injustices.¹⁰⁸ Another example is the sponsorship and cooperation between Iran and Al-Qaeda. The two had a relatively stable relationship before 9/11, but afterward, their relationship atrophied due to differing religious, ideological, and political stances.¹⁰⁹ Bryce Loidolt notes that "recipient groups face tradeoffs in quelling

¹⁰⁴ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 18.

¹⁰⁵ Hoffman, 269.

¹⁰⁶ Barak Mendelsohn, "The Limits of Ideologically-Unlikely Partnerships: Syria's Support for Jihadi Terrorist Groups," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2021): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1868094>.

¹⁰⁷ Mendelsohn, 4.

¹⁰⁸ Mendelsohn, 6.

¹⁰⁹ Bryce Loidolt, "Al-Qaeda's Iran Dilemma: Evidence from the Abbottabad Records," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2020): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780011>.

external audiences and meeting operational objectives, which could push other strange bedfellow relationships toward neither fully cooperative nor fully hostile equilibria.”¹¹⁰ Thus, certain countries have historically sponsored terrorist organizations though they may not fully pledge support to a common enemy, as was the case with the Iran and Al-Qaeda.

In the past, countries have also influenced radicalization by providing a haven for terrorist organizations to operate, as Afghanistan did for Al-Qaeda. Many factors contribute to a country’s harboring of terrorist organizations; however, it is often due to the host country’s not having an effective government and not possessing police or military services capable of fighting the terrorist organizations.¹¹¹ The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has conducted research into the effectiveness of governments and insurgencies. Seth Jones, writing for CSIS, has found that terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS primarily had an impact on countries with low government effectiveness.¹¹² Jones specifically notes Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia.¹¹³ By not taking actions against terrorist organizations within their borders, these countries foster an environment where training sites can proliferate.¹¹⁴ These environments are attractive to those who are radicalizing or who have already radicalized if they wish to join established terrorist organizations abroad.

4. Inmate Radicalization

Inmate radicalization as it relates to terrorism has been researched from various viewpoints. For this research, inmate radicalization applies to individuals incarcerated in prisons, jails, or other forms of detention facilities. The correctional institution in the United States is a large system that spans all 50 states and includes federal, state, local, and

¹¹⁰ Loidolt, 16.

¹¹¹ Daniel Byman, “Understanding, and Misunderstanding, State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2020): 10, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1738682>.

¹¹² Seth G. Jones, “Beyond Baghdadi: The Next Wave of Jihadist Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 4, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-baghdadi-next-wave-jihadist-violence>.

¹¹³ Jones.

¹¹⁴ Jeremy R. Reeves, “A New Typology for State-Sponsored International Terrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 17–18, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10680>.

contracted private institutions. The radicalization of inmates has been a concern in the United States and abroad for some time, yet it has not been studied as extensively as other areas of terrorism.¹¹⁵

The United States maintains the highest incarceration rate globally, providing a large population susceptible to radicalization.¹¹⁶ Detention facilities in the United States have been a breeding ground for gangs and other organized criminal organizations for quite some time. Historically, inmates display traits that are ripe for radicalization. Frank Cilluffo, Sharon Cardash, and Andrew Whitehead have identified common traits that are susceptible to radicalization: “alienation, anti-social attitudes, cultural disillusionment, social isolation, and violent tendencies.”¹¹⁷ The group dynamic, according to Tony Parker, who agrees with Cilluffo, Cardash, and Whitehead, among inmates in a correctional setting, coupled with an ingroup narrative, make it possible for incarcerated individuals to seek a different identity.¹¹⁸ There are “social pressures” within the correctional setting that impact individuals in many ways, thus leading to involvement and association within a group setting.¹¹⁹ Researchers and correctional professionals agree that the group dynamic in prisons and jails leads individuals to associate with like-minded groups or find belonging with a new group.

Researchers have, therefore, held that detention facilities such as jails and prisons are prime locations for radicalization and recruitment into terrorist organizations.¹²⁰ Researchers from RAND believe that terror suspects incarcerated in Britain use the prison

¹¹⁵ Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” *Criminology & Public Policy* 8, no. 3 (August 2009): 562, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x>.

¹¹⁶ Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, and Andrew J. Whitehead, “Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond Borders,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 114, ProQuest.

¹¹⁷ Cilluffo, Cardash, and Whitehead, 114.

¹¹⁸ Tony C. Parker, “Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America’s Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 59, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32881>.

¹¹⁹ Clarke R. Jones, “Are Prisons Really Schools for Terrorism? Challenging the Rhetoric on Prison Radicalization,” *Punishment & Society* 16, no. 1 (2014): 96–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474513506482>.

¹²⁰ Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” 562.

or jail environment to recruit and radicalize new members.¹²¹ Believing this phenomenon might occur in the United States, George Klein conducted research between 2003 and 2005 to evaluate whether Islamic extremists had been successful in contacting and recruiting white supremacists in prisons. Klein concluded there was no nexus to terrorism although there were extensive connections to non-terrorism-related criminal activity.¹²² It should be noted, however, that Klein investigated only the connection between Islamic fundamentalists and white supremacists, which does not capture an overall picture of the prison population in the United States.

While incarcerated, inmates have access to many services, including religious services. In this environment, inmates can explore religious beliefs and associate with like-minded individuals. There are many opportunities in a prison or jail environment to exploit at-risk inmates to follow others with extremist ideologies, thus leading to radicalization.¹²³ As Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington, and Peter Bell argue, before individuals are incarcerated, they may not be affiliated with religion, but while in prison or jail, they often find a purpose and become involved with some type of religious service.¹²⁴ Mark Hamm has explored the concept of radicalization through the social context of prisoner radicalization and terrorist recruitment.¹²⁵ Hamm identifies several factors within the correctional setting in the United States that fuel radicalization. Hamm notes that Islam is “the fastest growing religion among prisoners in America,” with an estimated 80 percent of inmates embracing Islam.¹²⁶ While in prison, inmates tend to convert to Islam through

¹²¹ Useem and Clayton, 562.

¹²² George C. Klein, “An Investigation: Have Islamic Fundamentalists Made Contact with White Supremacists in the United States?,” *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations* 7, no. 1 (January 2007): 98, https://doi.org/10.1300/J173v07n01_05.

¹²³ Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington, and Peter James Bell, “The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: A Review of the Literature on Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability,” *Journal of Human Security* 9, no. 1 (2013): 4, <https://doi.org/10.12924/johs2013.09010004>.

¹²⁴ Mulcahy, Merrington, and Bell, 4.

¹²⁵ Mark S. Hamm, *Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2007), 112.

¹²⁶ Hamm, 112.

established social networks with other inmates they trust.¹²⁷ Hamm also recognizes that the incarcerated often embrace gang values, which emphasize loyalty to the ingroup narrative when they associate with others.¹²⁸ As it relates to Islam, however, Mulcahy, Merrington, and Bell estimate that very few adopt extremist ideologies and even fewer become involved with terrorist activity.¹²⁹

However, tracking information on those who convert to Islam in prison or jail can prove challenging, as staff working inside detention facilities often do not know who has converted or the reasons for their conversion. Maintaining a seamless standard and intelligence capability among all correctional institutions is nearly impossible. The National Institute of Justice commissioned a report to explore terrorist recruitment in correctional institutions in the United States. This report explores a wide array of issues related to prison radicalization. A major finding in the report maintains that “the danger to U.S. security is not the number of adherents to Islam, or to white supremacy religions, but in the potential for small groups of true believers to instigate terrorist acts upon their release from prison.”¹³⁰ Radicalization in correctional settings does occur, but compared to the number of inmates incarcerated in the United States, the rate of radicalization is low.¹³¹

Overall, there are radicalized individuals incarcerated at all levels of government detention facilities in the United States, providing a continuous stream of potential recruits for extremist ideologies.¹³² Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, however, have found there are low levels of radicalization among U.S. inmates for several reasons, including structured prison life, anti-radicalization efforts, and little accessibility between inmates and radicalized individuals.¹³³ Although researchers disagree about the extent of radicalization

¹²⁷ Hamm, 112.

¹²⁸ Hamm, 112–13.

¹²⁹ Mulcahy, Merrington, and Bell, “The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates,” 5.

¹³⁰ Hamm, *Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions*, 113.

¹³¹ Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” 568.

¹³² Hamm, *Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions*, 113.

¹³³ Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” 568.

within incarcerated populations, they do agree that radicalization is possible and does occur.

D. CONCLUSION

Foreign-influenced terrorism in the homeland continues to be a concern for the United States. This threat is especially concerning for local law enforcement agencies, as they are the first to respond to incidents in their communities. Local law enforcement plays an integral role in the protection of the homeland from internally and externally motivated threat streams. The drivers of foreign-influenced terrorism and radicalization methods must be examined to assist local law enforcement agencies in the protection of their communities. Radicalization can occur in any community, so understanding group terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and inmate radicalization is essential for local law enforcement to be effective in its endeavors to protect communities from this threat. Chapter III addresses the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism to the United States and recruitment methods employed by terrorist organizations.

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III. THE THREAT OF FOREIGN-INFLUENCED TERRORISM TO THE UNITED STATES

The threat of foreign-influenced terrorism occurring in the United States does not appear to have subsided.¹³⁴ A recent example in this context was the 10-hour-long hostage taking on January 15, 2022, by Malik Faisal Akram—a British national—inside the Congregation Beth Israel synagogue in Colleyville, Texas.¹³⁵ President Joe Biden, as well as British and Israeli officials, identified the attack as an “act of terror.”¹³⁶ This incident reaffirmed there are still threats looming from foreign influences that require heightened awareness, especially at synagogues around the world.¹³⁷ The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s *Annual Threat Assessment* by the U.S. Intelligence Community also identifies groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah continuing to threaten U.S. interests and posing a threat abroad and at home, even though some of these groups have suffered leadership losses in recent years.¹³⁸ According to a 2020 report by CSIS, foreign-influenced terrorist groups targeting the United States include “white supremacists, anarchists, and religious extremists inspired by the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.”¹³⁹ CSIS found that Islamic State and Al-Qaeda leadership continue to spread propaganda to

¹³⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, “Assessing the Threat,” in *Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies, Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States since 9/11* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 26, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op343rc.10>.

¹³⁵ According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Akram demanded the release of Aafia Siddiqui, a federal prisoner being held on conviction of attempting to kill American forces in Afghanistan. Yuliya Talmazan, “Texas Synagogue Hostage-Taker Was Once Probed by U.K. Intelligence,” NBC News, January 18, 2022, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/texas-synagogue-hostage-taker-investigated-uk-intelligence-terror-rcna12544>.

¹³⁶ Talmazan.

¹³⁷ The Texas synagogue attack ended as hostages ran from the building and an FBI tactical team entered, fatally shooting Akram. As the investigation continued, British authorities detained two teenagers in connection with the attack but later released them. Talmazan, “Texas Synagogue Hostage-Taker.”

¹³⁸ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021), <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.

¹³⁹ Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, “The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 2020, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-terrorism-problem-united-states>.

influence Western individuals to carry out attacks.¹⁴⁰ The United States, therefore, continues to be a target of terrorism from foreign terrorist organizations and those who support them.

Identifying the root causes of why a person, or group, chooses to carry out attacks on the United States under foreign influence is difficult, and the reasons vary from person to person and group to group. To this end, additional research must be conducted to understand recruitment and radicalization methods, which pose a risk to the security of the homeland. This chapter addresses recruitment methods and opportunities for jihadi terrorist organizations that pose a threat to the United States. It begins with the use of social media, followed by media coverage of destabilized regions in the Middle East, and concludes with a discussion concerning sociopolitical issues, all of which pose threats by recruiting individuals and influencing them to do harm to the United States.

A. RECRUITMENT METHODS

There have been numerous attacks in the United States by those who have been recruited or influenced by the views of terrorist recruiters. For example, the Fort Hood, Texas, active shooter, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, killed and wounded numerous people at the base. Hassan admitted that his actions were fueled by information broadcast by Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical imam for Al-Qaeda.¹⁴¹ Al-Awlaki, on the other hand, was American born and an imam at two mosques in the United States in the early 2000s, prior to relocating to England and, finally, Yemen.¹⁴² Al-Awlaki became Al-Qaeda's main recruiter by spreading propaganda and ideology over the internet.¹⁴³ Al-Awlaki was a successful recruiter in the eyes of Al-Qaeda, with influence over Western individuals due to his native ability to speak American English and employ modern methods of communication.¹⁴⁴ Hoffman states, "Al-Awlaki's messages of radicalization and violence

¹⁴⁰ Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington, 7.

¹⁴¹ Burroni, "The Homegrown Jihadi Terrorist," 32.

¹⁴² Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 237.

¹⁴³ Hoffman, 237.

¹⁴⁴ Hoffman, 237.

have reportedly been linked to more than fifty persons who since 2009 have either carried out terrorist attacks or been indicted on terrorism-related charges both in the United States and elsewhere.”¹⁴⁵ Al-Awlaki and others like him have successfully combined technology with effective messaging skills to inspire would-be terrorists.¹⁴⁶ Even postmortem, Al-Awlaki’s messaging has influenced attacks in the United States, including the Boston Marathon bombers, the San Bernardino attackers, and the Pulse nightclub shooter.¹⁴⁷

Recruitment is essential for terrorist groups to survive and carry out activities that align with their ideologies. To this end, terrorist organizations use an array of techniques and tactics to lure potential recruits and supporters.¹⁴⁸ The wide assortment of recruitment strategies include violence, humanitarian efforts, political activities, the use of social media, and branding.¹⁴⁹ Research has revealed that terrorist organizations do not necessarily focus their efforts on violence for recruitment but rather employ a wide array of nonviolent recruitment tactics, such as propaganda, appealing to ideology and political views and even employing varied social service networks. Media coverage of terrorist events also supports terrorist groups’ recruitment efforts. These multi-dimensional strategies eventually enhance their abilities to carry out acts of violence to achieve organizational goals and objectives.¹⁵⁰

Terrorist organizations that have a broader perspective to sell to potential recruits and supporters pose multi-faceted threats to the United States because of their “multi-dimensional” approaches.¹⁵¹ Their use of a wide variety of recruitment strategies is more efficient in gaining supporters because these organizations can show what they are capable of, not only through violence but also through humanitarian efforts, political activities, and

¹⁴⁵ Hoffman, 238.

¹⁴⁶ Hoffman, 240.

¹⁴⁷ Hoffman, 240. Al-Awlaki was killed in a U.S. drone strike in September 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Burcu Pinar Alakoc, Stephanie Werner, and Michael Widmeier, “Violent and Nonviolent Strategies of Terrorist Organizations: How Do Mixed Strategies Influence Terrorist Recruitment and Lethality?,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2021): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1935706>.

¹⁴⁹ Alakoc, Werner, and Widmeier, 2.

¹⁵⁰ Alakoc, Werner, and Widmeier, 2.

¹⁵¹ Alakoc, Werner, and Widmeier, 2.

media participation.¹⁵² These multi-dimensional strategies eventually enhance their abilities to carry out acts of violence to achieve organizational goals and objectives.¹⁵³ The following sections discuss the primary recruitment methods that terrorist organizations use to gain membership and supporters in the United States.

One important factor in terrorist recruitment is branding. Many companies utilize branding to create appeal, recruit customer bases, and sell their products.¹⁵⁴ Terrorist organizations, too, have used this tactic successfully. Terrorism scholar Gordon McCormick defines terrorism as the “deliberate use of symbolic violence or threat of violence against non-combatants for political purposes.”¹⁵⁵ Research has concluded that terrorist groups maximize their communications capabilities to reach a global audience to influence others using their ideologies, goals, ambitions, and visions.¹⁵⁶ These efforts can be construed as terrorist organizations’ method of establishing a brand for the purpose of influencing others to carry out attacks on their behalf.

These organizations maximize sociological tactics to attract recruits and supporters by appealing to ingroup and outgroup dynamics. Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken define ingroup/outgroup dynamics: “A person’s ingroup is the group to which he/she belongs, and an outgroup is any and all other groups.”¹⁵⁷ Terrorist organizations, often through propaganda, seek to reach large numbers of individuals by appealing to a cause. They utilize a sense of social identity to create positive feelings and a sense of acceptance to attract members and supporters.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Alakoc, Werner, and Widmeier, 2.

¹⁵³ Alakoc, Werner, and Widmeier, 2.

¹⁵⁴ Greaver, “Terrorist Group Brands,” 5–6.

¹⁵⁵ Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 6, no. 1 (June 2003): 474, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085601>.

¹⁵⁶ Greaver, “Terrorist Group Brands,” 13.

¹⁵⁷ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 55. See also Strindberg, *Social Identity Theory*, 42–51, for a foundation of these dynamics.

¹⁵⁸ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 56–57.

1. Social Media

Terrorist networks use social media platforms to capture the attention of those seeking a cause and to recruit individuals and groups with similar thinking.¹⁵⁹ Social media platforms have been effective tools for terrorist organizations' operational readiness and capabilities because they are capable of being operated on a cellular device and, therefore, can connect fighters in the field to larger populations.¹⁶⁰ This constant connectivity allows terrorist organizations to broadcast propaganda and information instantaneously, as well as communicate with others, including in the United States, to appeal to the ingroup narrative.

The effective communication of appealing messages about a certain group brings about an emotional connection to and affinity for that group, thus facilitating a sense of belonging and connection.¹⁶¹ To that end, terrorist organizations use social media for propaganda and outreach—to attract potential followers and supporters in the same way that social media platforms reach the public worldwide. In studying the radicalization and recruitment process, the NYPD has identified what Silber and Bhatt have coined radicalization incubators.¹⁶² Silber and Bhatt state, “The internet, with its thousands of extremist websites and chat-rooms, is a virtual incubator of its own.”¹⁶³ Ines Von Behr et al. also researched the impact that the internet has on radicalization and found there was a vast amount of terrorist material available online.¹⁶⁴ This study found that the search term “how to make a bomb” had 1,830,000 results, “Salafi publications” had 46,200 results, and “beheading video” had 257,000 results.¹⁶⁵ The internet has provided a platform for

¹⁵⁹ Terrorist groups use such popular social media platforms as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Ask.fm, PalTalk, kik, viper, WhatsApp, Tumblr, and JustPaste.it. As international authorities have the capabilities to track and identify locations, terrorist groups often use encryption methods for communications in attempts to hide or delay location data that can be attached to digital communications. Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad,” 1.

¹⁶⁰ Klausen, 1.

¹⁶¹ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 53.

¹⁶² Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, 22.

¹⁶³ Silber and Bhatt, 22.

¹⁶⁴ Ines Von Behr et al., *Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism* (Brussels: RAND Europe, 2013), 3, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ Von Behr et al., 3.

terrorist organizations to communicate with others and place images and other types of propaganda online, which are easily accessible by the masses.¹⁶⁶ Combining the capability of social media platforms with ingroup narrative messaging enhances the reach that terrorist organizations have to influence individuals around the world and, even more concerning, within the United States.

The accessibility of the internet, on a global scale, provides individuals with real-time information and different perspectives of the individuals and groups whom they may be following online. Not only does the internet provide a wide array of views and perspectives, but it also has the ability to create new discussions based on what is being reported.¹⁶⁷ For example, as late as 2015, the Brookings Institution estimated that ISIS had created “an estimated 90,000 Tweets per day and amassed roughly 46,000 Twitter followers.”¹⁶⁸ This effort by ISIS reached individuals around the world, including Americans, as the FBI had over 1,000 terror-related investigations, including ISIS and Al-Qaeda cases, within the United States as of 2017.¹⁶⁹ In sum, the power of the internet and its associated social media platforms has continued to radicalize individuals and provided a medium to influence attacks in the United States.¹⁷⁰

Terrorist organizations rely on the effective use of social media not only to recruit but also to finance activities. Alexander Tsesis states, “Each incremental aid for terrorists to strengthen their standing and influence increases the ability of leadership to

¹⁶⁶ Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai, *Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review, 2006–2016* (London: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), 20, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICSR-Paper_Research-Perspectives-on-Online-Radicalisation-A-Literature-Review-2006-2016.pdf.

¹⁶⁷ Greaver, “Terrorist Group Brands,” 12.

¹⁶⁸ Greaver, 22.

¹⁶⁹ Seamus Hughes, *Combating Homegrown Terrorism* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2017), 2, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/HughesCombatingHomegrownTerrorism727.pdf>.

¹⁷⁰ Matthew C. Benigni, Kenneth Joseph, and Kathleen M. Carley, “Online Extremism and the Communities That Sustain It: Detecting the ISIS Supporting Community on Twitter,” *PLoS One* 12, no. 12 (December 2017): 2, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181405>.

simultaneously carry out destructive missions.”¹⁷¹ Terrorist organizations cannot sustain activities against their adversaries without first prioritizing certain aspects such as recruitment and funding.¹⁷²

As a terrorist organization grows and changes, its recruitment efforts on the targeted population change, because the organization may need different expertise based on its evolving goals.¹⁷³ For example, Al-Qaeda has focused recruitment in the past on those with engineering experience, but as of July 2014, ISIS targeted its recruitment efforts at “doctors, nurses, engineers, and computer scientists” to harm the United States.¹⁷⁴ Messaging designed to target specific skill sets, such as engineers and medical professionals, will ultimately shift focus, as different skills, such as those possessed by cyber and communications experts, are required within terrorist organizations.¹⁷⁵

If a terrorist organization is in need of specific skill sets or any other specialties, social media platforms allow the group to find new talent by casting a targeted recruitment effort on a global scale if needed.¹⁷⁶ In this context, terrorist organizations use social media “influencers” to communicate strategically to potential recruits.¹⁷⁷ Osama bin Laden—who believed that a large portion of the struggle for recruitment was through communication—is just one example of an Al-Qaeda social media influencer.¹⁷⁸ Al-

¹⁷¹ Alexander Tsesis, “Terrorist Speech on Social Media,” *Vanderbilt Law Review* 70, no. 2 (March 2017): 675.

¹⁷² Mia Bloom, “Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and ‘Talent Spotting’ in the PIRA, Al Qaeda, and ISIS,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 7 (2017): 605, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237219>.

¹⁷³ Bloom, 606.

¹⁷⁴ Bloom, 606.

¹⁷⁵ Bloom, 606.

¹⁷⁶ Bloom, 605.

¹⁷⁷ Social media influencers, according to Freberg, “represent a new type of independent third-party endorser who shape audience attitudes through blogs, tweets, and the use of other social media.” Nadja Enke and Nils S. Borchers, “Social Media Influencers in Strategic Communication: A Conceptual Framework for Strategic Social Media Influencer Communication,” *International Journal of Strategic Communication* 13, no. 4 (2019): 261–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2019.1620234>.

¹⁷⁸ Jenkins, “Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism,” 15, 17. Al Qaeda, for instance, realized after 9/11 that an online campaign to incite violence and recruit followers and sympathizers was almost equally important as conducting acts of violence themselves, thus furthering the ambitions of the terrorist organization.

Awlaki, too, was an effective influencer for Al-Qaeda on social media .¹⁷⁹ Al-Awlaki motivated others through lectures and sermons broadcast on social media platforms, utilizing technology to radicalize and recruit others.¹⁸⁰ Some individuals who were radicalized have credited those such as al-Awlaki with having a great influence on them by utilizing online and social media broadcasting methodologies.¹⁸¹

One of the most successful groups to utilize social media as a recruitment tool was ISIS. Although Al-Qaeda utilized al-Awlaki to a great extent, ISIS maximized content by including “memes, videos, songs, [and] video games . . . through social media platforms.”¹⁸² ISIS employed propaganda beyond Al-Qaeda’s and other groups’ abilities, by not only stating its goals but also identifying the end state—establishing a caliphate.¹⁸³ For a limited period, ISIS established control in certain areas, governed portions of Iraq and Syria at one point, and “ruled over 10 million people under its self-proclaimed Caliphate.”¹⁸⁴ These milestones showed that it could achieve its goals, thus influencing individuals and further supporting its social media propaganda.¹⁸⁵ In the United States, as of 2015, there were 71 ISIS-related criminal cases, and the defendants had various backgrounds in terms of economic status, ethnicity, and academic achievement levels.¹⁸⁶ Experts suspect that most ISIS supporters in the United States were radicalized through

¹⁷⁹ Yankow and McEvoy, “Predicting the Random,” 8.

¹⁸⁰ Alphonso Harris, “Why Do Americans Go Abroad to Fight in Foreign Conflicts?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 2, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/59679>.

¹⁸¹ Harris, 37.

¹⁸² Anna Kruglova, “‘I Will Tell You a Story about Jihad’: ISIS’s Propaganda and Narrative Advertising,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 44, no. 2 (2021): 117, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1799519>.

¹⁸³ Kruglova, 116.

¹⁸⁴ Suleyman Ozeren, Suat Cubukcu, and Gabriel Cash, “Exposure to Extremist Content and Public Sympathy for ISIS,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2021): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1965728>.

¹⁸⁵ Kruglova, “‘I Will Tell You a Story about Jihad,’” 116.

¹⁸⁶ Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, *ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2015), 5, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/isis-america>.

various social media platforms as a “way to find belonging and a sense of personal identity.”¹⁸⁷

Another group that embraces social media campaigns is Hezbollah. Recently, Hezbollah has established an advanced information campaign in Syria to further its political and military purposes, using radio, print, social media, and television outlets to advertise itself as the protector of Shia communities.¹⁸⁸ Another engaging and effective recruitment tool for younger populations is manifest in video games produced by Hezbollah, such as *The Holy Defense*, wherein players defend holy sites from Islamic State militants.¹⁸⁹ Social media platforms provide Hezbollah with even more capabilities to advertise and broadcast messages to a wide range of audiences in different world regions. This capability instills the belief in supporters and potential recruits that the group is elite compared to others and willing to use modern methods to achieve its goals, thus creating a desired ingroup/outgroup distinction, which the group can use to its advantage. A social media presence further strengthens the group’s influence, as it can broadcast a message of strength in a technologically savvy fashion. Such capabilities further indoctrinate members with a sense of purpose and identity with the group. Thus, regarding extremist views on Islam, the internet provides a worldwide connection to others who can influence and bring those with similar ideologies together to further terrorist beliefs.¹⁹⁰

In sum, the power of the internet and its associated social media platforms has continued to radicalize individuals and provided a medium to influence attacks in the United States.¹⁹¹ The threat to the United States continues from individuals influenced by terrorist organizations.¹⁹² For example, Seamus Hughes notes that since 2018, a minimum

¹⁸⁷ Alexia Fernández Campbell and National Journal, “What You Need to Know about ISIS in America,” *Atlantic*, December 6, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/why-isis-recruiting-in-america-reached-historic-levels/433560/>.

¹⁸⁸ Seth G. Jones and Maxwell B. Markusen, “The Escalating Conflict with Hezbollah in Syria,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 20, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-conflict-hezbollah-syria>.

¹⁸⁹ Jones and Markusen.

¹⁹⁰ Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, 39.

¹⁹¹ Benigni, Joseph, and Carley, “Online Extremism and the Communities That Sustain It,” 2.

¹⁹² Hughes, *Combating Homegrown Terrorism*, 2.

of 250 individuals from the United States have either tried to go or succeeded in going to the Middle East to join terrorist organizations.¹⁹³ Additionally, from March 2014 to July 2017, terrorism-related criminal charges were levied against 128 individuals from the United States, of whom “nearly 30% were accused of being involved in plots to carry out attacks on U.S. soil.”¹⁹⁴

2. Media Coverage of Destabilized Regions in the Middle East

Traditional media coverage of destabilized regions in the Middle East also contributes to the recruitment methods utilized by terrorist organizations. Media coverage of conflicts in the Middle East, as well as terrorist attacks on the West and Western interests, has increased as technology continues to evolve. This coverage occurs on social media platforms, mobile devices, radio, or television and offers the public a multitude of perspectives. Members of terrorist organizations have posted magazines, videos, recordings, and other articles of media for the world to see.¹⁹⁵ A focus of terrorist organizations’ use of media coverage to enhance recruitment methods has been to paint a picture that Western countries, including the United States, should be blamed for the struggles and suffering that Muslim populations face.¹⁹⁶

Traditional media, along with internet platforms, have impacted the support for conflicts as well as terrorism.¹⁹⁷ For example, terrorist organizations can recruit individuals who specialize in strategic recruitment through writing about their conflicts, struggles, and ideologies to employ the media and associated platforms to get that message

¹⁹³ Hughes, 2.

¹⁹⁴ Hughes, 2.

¹⁹⁵ Mohammed M. Hafez, “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 1 (2007): 96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550601054873>.

¹⁹⁶ Justin D. Dragon, “Western Foreign Fighters in Syria: An Empirical Analysis of Recruitment and Mobilization Mechanisms” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 10, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45842>.

¹⁹⁷ Dorothy E. Denning, “The Internet and the Iraq Conflict” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 1, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/59871>.

to a wide audience.¹⁹⁸ Often, the information broadcast through media platforms can lead to what Hegghammer refers to as “grassroot radicals”—anonymous supporters on internet chat forums.¹⁹⁹ A large amount of media coverage is made possible by the internet. Terrorist organizations can widely broadcast their messages due to the sheer number of people who have internet access. For example, according to Dorothy Denning, approximately 1.3 billion people had internet access in 2007.²⁰⁰ This number has continued to increase, as there are an estimated 4.66 billion users as of 2021.²⁰¹ Regarding internet coverage of the Iraq war, Denning stated that “at the very least, it . . . affected support for the war and for Al-Qaeda’s insurgency, both within Iraq and globally.”²⁰² The widely varying modes for media coverage of destabilization and conflict areas around the globe provide terrorist organizations with avenues to focus messages for recruitment purposes.

Hezbollah is an example of how media coverage and media platforms can be used by terrorist organizations to increase recruitment and gain support. When one thinks of a “traditional” terrorist organization, “covert” and “clandestine” are two terms that immediately come to mind. Operational security, or secrecy, is essential for legitimate, criminal, and terrorist organizations to succeed. Why, then, would Hezbollah maintain multiple media platforms? Multiple media platforms allow the group to send a message to a broad range of audiences, communicate on a global scale, and spread propaganda. Hezbollah was one of the first groups to implement and maintain media platforms in the form of al-Manar television stations and related internet news websites.²⁰³ Hezbollah produced different types of television shows ranging from talk shows to propaganda shows and even deployed combat camera crews to accompany Hezbollah fighters during combat

¹⁹⁸ Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,” *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 16, <https://doi.org/10.3751/60.1.11>.

¹⁹⁹ Hegghammer, 17.

²⁰⁰ Denning, “The Internet and the Iraq Conflict,” 1.

²⁰¹ “Internet Users in the World 2021,” Statista, accessed February 27, 2022, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/>.

²⁰² Denning, “The Internet and the Iraq Conflict.”

²⁰³ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 234.

situations.²⁰⁴ Hezbollah's philosophy has been "if you haven't captured it on film you haven't fought."²⁰⁵ Certain media platforms, such as social media and television, can be highly censored, and acts of violence or disturbing material is often deleted after it is posted.

ISIS has also been recognized as extremely successful in recent times through the use of media marketing strategies.²⁰⁶ ISIS produced two successful magazines, *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*, to appeal to individuals by telling stories of the great opportunities awaiting them in the caliphate as compared to oppression in lands of the West.²⁰⁷ These magazines told a story of traveling from the West to participate in jihad as part of the Middle Eastern caliphate and becoming a martyr fighting the enemies of Islam.²⁰⁸ The stories told in these magazines, loosely based on destabilized regions in the Middle East, appealed to those living in Western countries such as the United States because they painted a picture of hatred toward Muslims in the West and encouraged individuals to travel to the caliphate to live a prosperous life and fight against Islam's enemies.²⁰⁹ These magazines and their stories played largely on SIT principles, as they told stories of oppression, bravery, and unity against the West and influenced social identity with the group (ISIS).²¹⁰

Hezbollah, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda successfully demonstrated the effective use of media platforms for recruitment; likewise, the Iraq conflict produced similar results. Just as coalition forces used media for support, so did insurgent groups that wished to expel

²⁰⁴ Hoffman, 235.

²⁰⁵ Colin P. Clarke, "How Hezbollah Came to Dominate Information Warfare," *RAND Blog*, September 19, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/09/how-hezbollah-came-to-dominate-information-warfare.html>.

²⁰⁶ Clarke.

²⁰⁷ Kruglova, "'I Will Tell You a Story about Jihad,'" 121–24.

²⁰⁸ Kruglova, 124.

²⁰⁹ Kruglova, 124.

²¹⁰ Kruglova, 124.

them from the territory.²¹¹ Furthermore, insurgent groups utilized media platforms to incite further hate among other ethnic groups.²¹²

In sum, the proliferation of conflict in areas such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Afghanistan has resulted in an increase of recruits as foreign fighters, traveling to these areas to fight alongside groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.²¹³ As Suleyman Ozeren, Suat Cubukcu, and Gabriel Cash state, “ISIS uses indoctrinated Westerners in its propaganda to create a familiar and welcoming sentiment for other Westerners.”²¹⁴ Coverage of events in these areas has instigated conflict, thus bringing additional attention and uprisings.²¹⁵

3. Sociopolitical Issues

Factors that can influence recruitment of an individual to join a terrorist group or radicalize to support terrorism activities include such sociopolitical issues as “economic deprivation and economic development.”²¹⁶ As a result, terrorism activities more often than not originate in densely populated regions that are devoid of democratic practices and volatile, because of the instability of government functions.²¹⁷ For example, terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda continue to develop in areas of the world that have “failed and failing states.”²¹⁸ Examples of such states include Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. In addition, as Korotayev reveals, “social injustice, ethnic conflicts, wars, massacres, and state terror” also motivate individuals or groups to join terrorist organizations.²¹⁹ These factors are not exclusive to Muslim nations as “religious, ethnic,

²¹¹ Denning, “The Internet and the Iraq Conflict,” 3.

²¹² Denning, 3.

²¹³ Dragon, “Western Foreign Fighters in Syria,” 17.

²¹⁴ Ozeren, Cubukcu, and Cash, “Exposure to Extremist Content and Public Sympathy for ISIS,” 7.

²¹⁵ Dragon, “Western Foreign Fighters in Syria,” 17–18.

²¹⁶ Andrey Korotayev, Ilya Vaskin, and Sergey Tsirel, “Economic Growth, Education, and Terrorism: A Re-Analysis,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 33, no. 3 (2021): 573, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1559835>.

²¹⁷ Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks, “What Causes Terrorism?,” *Public Choice* 147, no. 1–2 (2011): 19, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9601-1>.

²¹⁸ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 298.

²¹⁹ Korotayev, Vaskin, and Tsirel, “Economic Growth, Education, and Terrorism,” 573.

clan, ideological, and other types of conflicts” can be causes for terrorist activities around the world.²²⁰

Al-Qaeda was once able to thrive in recruitment and training efforts in pre-9/11 Afghanistan, which had a wide array of social groups and economic instability. This scenario presented the terrorist organization with a refuge to train, recruit, plan, and carry out attacks.²²¹ Since 9/11, however, the United States and its allies have pressured Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations around the globe, thus impacting their ability to wage war against the West.²²² The question remains, however, whether Afghanistan will turn into a terrorist haven following the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. Without a thriving economy and structured education, and given the country’s divisive ethnic populations, terrorist organizations in Afghanistan may soon pose a threat. Such destabilized regions often provide motivation for radicalization due to the West’s being blamed for less-than-favorable conditions.²²³

Another example of the impact of these variables on recruitment of Americans by terrorist organizations was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Analysts believe that during the invasion by Western countries, as well as the years after, anger intensified across the Islamic world over foreign policy implemented by the United States.²²⁴ Researchers and analysts alike have commented that these policies and their negative impact on Iraq increased recruitment for terrorist organizations, thus making Iraq a new safe haven as Afghanistan had been.²²⁵ Due to the circumstances in Iraq and other conflict areas, jihadists and would-be jihadists around the globe had a centralized cause to wage terrorism against the United States and other Western allies.²²⁶ At the same time, researchers

²²⁰ Korotayev, Vaskin, and Tsirel, 586.

²²¹ Daniel Byman, “Does Al Qaeda Have a Future?,” *Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (2019): 67, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663117>.

²²² Byman, 68.

²²³ Byman, 70.

²²⁴ Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,” 11.

²²⁵ Hegghammer, 11.

²²⁶ Hegghammer, 12.

realized that rather than fighting for a specific piece of territory, the Al-Qaeda movement redirected terrorism activities on a global scale.²²⁷ Terrorist organizations, due to the conditions in the areas in which they operate, consisted of individuals and groups with differing political beliefs, yet they attracted attention based on their hatred of the West.²²⁸ This negative perception of the West, in destabilizing and creating deplorable conditions in the Middle East, also affected the United Kingdom. McDonald and Mir note that terrorist organizations capitalized on these perceptions of social injustices by the West, which led to discrimination and social inequality for Muslims around the world.²²⁹ Thus, these perceptions directly affected recruitment capabilities as organizations capitalized on them. Al-Qaeda's founders presented a message to potential, mostly Muslim recruits that it was the duty of Muslims to fight against the West because the sovereignty of their lands was in jeopardy.²³⁰ Such messaging clearly appealed to some terrorists and would-be terrorists in the United States, as Al-Qaeda terrorists were "responsible for 30 homicides, 12 attempted homicides, and 63 violent plots since 1990 in the United States."²³¹

Research has also been conducted to establish commonalities among those involved in terrorism relating to "social origin, political philosophy, education, age, and family background."²³² For instance, Charles Russell and Bowman Miller concluded that many individuals who participated in and conducted terrorist activities targeting U.S. citizens, as well as those in leadership positions in terrorist organizations, were well educated.²³³ ISIS supporters in the United States have come from a variety of backgrounds and showed support for the group in many different fashions.²³⁴ Al-Awlaki, for example, had obtained

²²⁷ Hegghammer, 13.

²²⁸ Hegghammer, 14.

²²⁹ McDonald and Mir, "Al-Qaida-Influenced Violent Extremism," 37.

²³⁰ Kevin M. Fitzpatrick et al., "A Community-Level Comparison of Terrorism Movements in the United States," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 5 (2017): 403, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212548>.

²³¹ Fitzpatrick et al., 404. Note that these statistics do not reflect the casualties incurred on 9/11.

²³² Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist," *Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (1977): 18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576107708435394>.

²³³ Russell and Miller, 27.

²³⁴ Vidino and Hughes, *ISIS in America*, 33.

a bachelor's degree in civil engineering from Colorado State University and was extremely influential to Western individuals.²³⁵ Other research, specific to the Palestine region, has examined textbooks and social data related to juvenile involvement with terrorist organizations.²³⁶ The results indicate that the educational material provided to children influences their participation in terrorism.²³⁷

Further research has been conducted to determine the correlation between terrorism and educational levels. Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger, and Daniel Meierrieks examined education in domestic terrorism cases in over 100 countries spanning two decades.²³⁸ Their findings indicate that seemingly low levels of education influence terrorism activities in countries with poor socioeconomic and political conditions.²³⁹ However, their research indicates the opposite for countries with improved environments. Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks claim that terrorism opportunities and involvement decline in countries that are economically developed and have established educational environments.²⁴⁰ These researchers surmise that “promoting education in less developed countries may actually foster terrorism when poor structural socioeconomic and politicoinstitutional conditions are not addressed at the same time.”²⁴¹

In summary, sociopolitical issues around the globe, such as perceived and actual injustices, a lack of economic opportunities, unstable governments, and ethnic conflicts, have attracted individuals to terrorist organizations.²⁴² Christopher Yankow and Riley McEvoy studied five individuals who carried out terror attacks in the United States and

²³⁵ Jarret Brachman, “Anwar al-Awlaki,” *Britannica*, accessed March 17, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anwar-al-Awlaki>.

²³⁶ Korotayev, Vaskin, and Tsirel, “Economic Growth, Education, and Terrorism,” 574.

²³⁷ Korotayev, Vaskin, and Tsirel, 574.

²³⁸ Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger, and Daniel Meierrieks, “Great Expectations and Hard Times: The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1186, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713520589>.

²³⁹ Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks, 1186.

²⁴⁰ Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks, 1187.

²⁴¹ Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks, 1188.

²⁴² Korotayev, Vaskin, and Tsirel, “Economic Growth, Education, and Terrorism,” 573.

identified five commonalities that could be attributed to social and political issues.²⁴³ These commonalities consisted of “engrossment in radical messaging/propaganda on the internet, first or second-generation immigrant, reduction of personal effects/finances, affinity with extremist groups, [and] rapid shift in beliefs/mosque attendance.”²⁴⁴ Sociopolitical issues that affect terrorist organizations have resulted in the recruitment of individuals to carry out attacks in the name of these terrorist organizations, even though they may have no direct affiliation.²⁴⁵

B. CONCLUSION

The threat of foreign-influenced terrorism—more specifically, Islamic extremism—is still serious in the United States. The influence of groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS is amplified through their effective recruiting, which consist of various methods, such as social media, magazines, and other online activity. The continuous evolution and popularity of social media platforms among the global population provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to spread propaganda and recruit individuals to support terrorism and cause harm to the United States. The many social media platforms available for terrorist organizations to utilize enhance their ability to broadcast messages to audiences in the West, including the United States. Social media platforms, combined with more traditional methods of media such as magazines and other publications, can carry propagandist messages related to destabilized regions in the Middle East and the fight against the West and the United States. Terrorist organizations emphasize sociopolitical issues through these various methods of recruitment and appeal to individuals in the United States to join the fight against oppression of those in the Middle East by facilitating an ingroup narrative. Appealing to the ingroup narrative and creating a sense of belonging to the ideologies and goals of terrorist organizations continue to be an effective recruitment method to influence Americans to provide support for and participate in attacks in the United States and interests abroad.

²⁴³ Yankow and McEvoy, “Predicting the Random,” 37.

²⁴⁴ Yankow and McEvoy, 37.

²⁴⁵ Byman, “Does Al Qaeda Have a Future?,” 70.

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IV. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

The U.S. government has countered terrorist groups' radicalization and recruitment methods by implementing prevention, preparedness, and disruption strategies in the homeland. One obvious driver for establishing national-level strategies was the 9/11 attacks' impact on the United States. Prior to 9/11, the United States possessed a wide range of investigative and intelligence agencies that reported to different leaders and departments. Immediately following 9/11, on October 8, 2001, President George Bush signed an executive order establishing the Office of Homeland Security.²⁴⁶ This executive order outlined exactly what this office would accomplish: "The functions of the office shall be to coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States."²⁴⁷ President Bush's executive order also mandated coordination and cooperation between federal, state, local, and private entities to accomplish these objectives.²⁴⁸

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), intended as a single department responsible for homeland security, would coordinate the efforts and resources of all the agencies involved. Overall, 22 federal agencies were reorganized under this single department to streamline information sharing and create a more efficient and productive homeland security enterprise to protect the United States and its interests.²⁴⁹ DHS became operational as a cabinet-level department in March 2003 and was responsible for the implementation of strategies to ensure that the United States could effectively combat and respond to future terrorism threats.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ "Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security," White House of George W. Bush, October 20021, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html>.

²⁴⁷ White House of George W. Bush.

²⁴⁸ White House of George W. Bush.

²⁴⁹ "Creation of the Department of Homeland Security," Department of Homeland Security, accessed February 23, 2022, <https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security>.

²⁵⁰ Department of Homeland Security.

Although the United States had maintained intelligence and investigative agencies well before 9/11, the creation of DHS led to formal national counterterrorism strategies, which have assisted local governments in their endeavor to prevent and prepare for acts of terror in the homeland. These national strategies were designed to provide a framework for the federal government to coordinate with state and local governments, as well as private entities, to ensure the safety of the country.²⁵¹ Since then, various levels of government have adopted strategies to combat and prevent terrorism. This chapter discusses local law enforcement strategies from the intelligence and information collection and training perspectives.

A. INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION COLLECTION

State and local law enforcement has historically focused on preventing and investigating traditional criminal activity. With the evolving threat of terror-related activities, especially since 9/11, law enforcement agencies have constantly developed and adapted strategies to enhance homeland security.²⁵² The U.S. government maintains a robust intelligence community, composed of 18 different organizations throughout a variety of disciplines, including the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and others.²⁵³ Local law enforcement, on the other hand, has approximately 18,000 different agencies throughout the United States. Sharing intelligence and information among many state and local agencies is an astronomical challenge, due to the sizes of these organizations; geographical locations; populations served; differing priorities, training, and operational capabilities; and several other factors. A major question often posed in this context is whether law enforcement officers should be in the intelligence- and information-collection business. The following subsections address several methods utilized by state and local law

²⁵¹ White House of George W. Bush.

²⁵² Jose M. Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 1, no. 1 (2005): 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=461880>.

²⁵³ “Members of the IC,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed March 2, 2022, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic>.

enforcement for intelligence and information collection: community-oriented policing, fusion centers, and task force models.

1. Community-Oriented Policing

Many of the policing models in the United States are based on principles originating from the United Kingdom, chiefly Sir Robert Peel's policing philosophies. Peel believed in "policing by consent," which means that police serve at the public's behest.²⁵⁴ Peel's nine principles include the prevention of crime and disorder, the public's approval, public cooperation, the connection between public respect and diminished use of force, impartial service, use of force only as a last resort, the police as members of the public, law enforcement's adherence to its prescribed authority, and the absence of crime as a measure of police efficacy.²⁵⁵ Principles such as these led to the formation of what is known as community-oriented policing.

The concepts of community-oriented policing emphasize bringing the community and the police together to work in partnership to solve common problems. All law enforcement agencies in the United States, at state and local levels, exist to protect the communities they serve, and extensive training is provided to emphasize the importance of community policing and the relationship between the police and the community. The Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services under the Department of Justice defines community policing as "a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime."²⁵⁶ Local law enforcement agencies in the United States have always strived to work in partnership with the community to provide a safe environment for residents and visitors in the communities they serve. The community-oriented policing

²⁵⁴ Nadav Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 2nd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 190.

²⁵⁵ Carole Moore, "Peel's 9 Principles . . . Are They Still Relevant?," *Law Enforcement Technology* 42, no. 7 (July 2015): 54.

²⁵⁶ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Community Policing Defined* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014), 16, <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p157-pub.pdf>.

strategies adopted by law enforcement agencies are also used to solve community problems that affect citizens' quality of life. Although law enforcement strategies have continued to evolve, community-oriented policing strategies have remained constant but have been enhanced by technology, information-sharing platforms, and communication methods.

Although community-oriented policing is effective and part of standard operating procedures for state and local law enforcement, the federal government is also teaching community-oriented policing concepts to special agent recruits. As the federal government has the greatest responsibility in investigating terrorism-related activities in the United States, the FBI's training material for its staff includes community-oriented policing.²⁵⁷ Such community-oriented policing training was adopted at the federal level, as its principles have proven valuable and effective for law enforcement agencies.²⁵⁸

Community-oriented policing strategies create community outreach programs, which assist with preventing and investigating not only traditional criminal acts but acts of terrorism as well.²⁵⁹ One of the FBI's successful community outreach programs, which includes state and local law enforcement personnel, too, is Infragard.²⁶⁰ This program links law enforcement with the civilian sectors of critical infrastructure and facilitates the sharing of unclassified information to assist with prevention efforts within the critical infrastructure community.²⁶¹ Addressing the role of community-oriented policing in terrorism prevention and awareness, Lanier recognizes that "utilizing the same problem-solving philosophy and community partnerships, terrorism prevention through detection and deterrence can be integrated into police organizations without reducing the emphasis on crime control, order maintenance or service to the community."²⁶²

²⁵⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Strategic Plan*, 119.

²⁵⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, 119.

²⁵⁹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, 127.

²⁶⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, 127.

²⁶¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, 127.

²⁶² Lanier, "Preventing Terror Attacks in the Homeland," 40.

Some local law enforcement agencies rely on specialized units to prevent terrorism and investigate terrorism-related activities; however, agencies do not realize the full impact of community-oriented policing activities if this expertise is confined to specialized units.²⁶³ When these initiatives are implemented effectively, local law enforcement knows who is in the community, what the issues are, and which avenues of communication have been established with members of the community. Ideally, members in the community will share information regarding suspicious activity with law enforcement so that criminal activity and, in certain instances, terrorist activity can be detected and prevented. As with narcotics and gang activity in the United States, law enforcement agencies attempt to build relationships and establish programs in at-risk communities to deter crime and violence, all the while providing transparency.

Even though community-oriented policing may not have a direct focus on counterterrorism, its concepts and practices can identify pre-radicalization behaviors as well as pre-operational activities of those who may have already radicalized.²⁶⁴ The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has taken community-oriented policing philosophies a step further and instituted outreach programs in the Muslim community. This approach includes attending community events and educating immigrants at local mosques about law enforcement in the United States.²⁶⁵ Overall, this type of policing model has increased transparency about the duties of law enforcement and has resulted in less suspicion of police officers.²⁶⁶ In Las Vegas, the police department has embraced

²⁶³ Lanier, 40.

²⁶⁴ Adrian Cherney, "Police Community Engagement and Outreach in a Counterterrorism Context," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 13, no. 1 (2018): 75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1432880>.

²⁶⁵ John M. Glionna, "Police in Las Vegas Forge Close Ties to the City's Muslim Community," *Washington Post*, May 22, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/police-in-las-vegas-forge-close-ties-to-the-citys-muslim-community/2016/05/22/4f2a6e3c-1647-11e6-924d-838753295f9a_story.html.

²⁶⁶ Glionna.

building “communities of trust through community engagement using community policing teams for outreach, awareness, and education.”²⁶⁷

When information is obtained through various law enforcement processes, such as community-oriented policing, the ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate the information has proven difficult. The next subsection details the U.S. strategy for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information through the fusion center model.

2. Fusion Centers

Law enforcement, as part of the overall homeland security enterprise, collects a vast amount of information and intelligence through various sources. Local law enforcement can apply tools and methods that federal authorities cannot. For example, routine calls for service, routine policing activities, and traffic enforcement are methods for collecting information and intelligence. A noteworthy example of routine state and local policing activities is the arrest of Oklahoma City bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh. After the bombing, an Oklahoma state trooper conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle for a minor violation. The driver, identified as McVeigh, was arrested after it was found that he was carrying a loaded and concealed firearm.²⁶⁸ Other evidence was in the vehicle, and the FBI was able to link McVeigh to the bombing. Were it not for routine traffic enforcement, McVeigh might not have been located so quickly, and valuable evidence could have been lost.

After 9/11, many questions were raised about what can be done to disrupt terror plots and share information, including that gathered by local law enforcement, to ensure open lines of communication between appropriate authorities. Mike Sena, president of the National Fusion Center Association, testified before the U.S. Senate that “fusion centers were created by state and local governments across the nation in the aftermath of September

²⁶⁷ “Watch: How Social Isolation Is Leading to Radicalization,” *Homeland Security Today*, April 6, 2022, <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/watch-how-social-isolation-is-leading-to-radicalization/>.

²⁶⁸ Dan Marcou, “Police History: How Trooper Charlie Hanger Caught the Oklahoma City Bomber,” *Police 1*, April 16, 2019, <https://www.police1.com/terrorism/articles/police-history-how-trooper-charlie-hanger-caught-the-oklahoma-city-bomber-TOWns4jqYYH4Acet/>.

11, 2001, to assist in the identification, prevention, mitigation, response and recovery of terrorist acts and other major threats to public safety and the lives of every citizen in our country.”²⁶⁹ The fusion center model centrally locates a number of vital resources that include representatives from federal, state, and local agencies. As of 2022, there are 80 fusion centers in various states and locations throughout the United States.²⁷⁰ Fusion centers provide state and local agencies with a variety of critical resources, including training, analysis, data access, technological resources, cyber security, and overall collaboration to combat current and future threat streams.²⁷¹

Fusion centers are normally located in urban areas and managed by individual states around the country.²⁷² The purpose of locating fusion centers in major urban areas is to facilitate the “receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT), federal and private sector partners.”²⁷³ According to Patrick Miller, the duties of fusion centers are not meant to take the place of established intelligence- and information-collection processes but rather to analyze information to identify similarities across threat streams.²⁷⁴ Fusion centers provide not only resources for the information and intelligence fusion process regarding terrorism-related activity but also the same functions of traditional criminal activity and information dissemination processes throughout government channels.²⁷⁵

The fusion center concept was a change in philosophy for law enforcement intelligence- and information-collection activities after 9/11. Many law enforcement

²⁶⁹ Mike Sena, “Examining the Role of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis” (Washington, DC: National Fusion Center Association, 2021), 2, <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Sena-2021-05-18.pdf>.

²⁷⁰ “The National Network of Fusion Centers,” National Fusion Center Association, accessed March 26, 2022, <https://nfcausa.org/fusion-centers/>.

²⁷¹ Sena, “Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis,” 5–6.

²⁷² “Fusion Centers,” Department of Homeland Security,” accessed March 21, 2022, <https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers>.

²⁷³ Department of Homeland Security.

²⁷⁴ Patrick E. Miller, “How Can We Improve Information Sharing among Local Law Enforcement Agencies?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 51, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1961>.

²⁷⁵ National Fusion Center Association, “The National Network of Fusion Centers.”

agencies maintained an intelligence capability within their organizations related to narcotics, organized crime, and criminal street gang activity. Large metropolitan law enforcement agencies with more resources had the capability to collect intelligence related to traditional terrorism activities—one example is the NYPD’s intelligence program.²⁷⁶ The fusion center model provided an opportunity to connect all law enforcement and other public safety organizations with information analysis and dissemination capabilities. Developing relationships between fusion centers and law enforcement, other public safety organizations, and private-sector organizations continues to be a focus in protecting U.S. communities.²⁷⁷

While fusion centers have provided a centralized location for information sharing for government agencies, there are still challenges. Intelligence centers were originally developed in the 1980s to assist with combatting the importation and distribution of illegal narcotics.²⁷⁸ These centers were designed to support regional high-intensity drug-trafficking area (HIDTA) task forces to collect and disseminate intelligence and information related strictly to narcotics enforcement.²⁷⁹ In the 1990s, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives focused on violent crime involving firearms, which led to crime gun centers, which were often located within HIDTA intelligence centers.²⁸⁰ This combined-center model enabled much cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies and pooled information to analyze and identify issues that impacted multiple jurisdictions.²⁸¹ The successes, as well as shortcomings, of these intelligence

²⁷⁶ Erik J. Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: The New York Police Department Model,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 9, no. 2 (2014): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2014.940815>.

²⁷⁷ Jeremy G. Carter et al., “Law Enforcement Fusion Centers: Cultivating an Information Sharing Environment While Safeguarding Privacy,” *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology* 32, no. 1 (2017): 23, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-016-9199-4>.

²⁷⁸ David L. Carter and Jeremy G. Carter, “The Intelligence Fusion Process for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement,” *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 36, no. 12 (December 2009): 1324, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854809345674>.

²⁷⁹ Carter and Carter, 1324.

²⁸⁰ Carter and Carter, 1324.

²⁸¹ Carter and Carter, 1324.

centers provided a foundation for the expansion into the all-hazards fusion center model.²⁸²

3. Task Forces

Task forces have been established for many years and used to strengthen capabilities for combatting various threats faced by the United States. The basic definition of a task force is “a temporary grouping under one leader for the purpose of accomplishing a definite objective.”²⁸³ Law enforcement has historically relied on a task force model to bring resources together to investigate and solve crimes. These task forces have been more common around the United States to combat narcotics, organized crime, and criminal street gangs. HIDTA task forces and intelligence centers, established in the 1980s, have provided a valuable resource to law enforcement and set an example for other types of task forces.

The success of HIDTA task forces is continually evaluated through four annual requirements: threat assessments of narcotics activity in respective jurisdictions, strategies for combatting identified threats, budget proposals, and reports on objectives that have been met.²⁸⁴ Funding is allocated based on the success of each HIDTA initiative.²⁸⁵ The FBI leads the JTTF in the United States, and the first such task force was created in 1980 in New York City.²⁸⁶ According to Lanier, after 9/11, President Bush’s vision was to implement an apparatus to combine the efforts of federal, state, local, and private entities to combat terrorism in the United States.²⁸⁷ This vision embodied what a task force model was meant to be: combined expertise and resources to enhance capabilities and improve efficiency.

²⁸² Carter and Carter, 1324–25.

²⁸³ *Merriam-Webster*, s.v. “task force,” accessed March 26, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/task+force>.

²⁸⁴ Kristin Finklea, *High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program*, IF11917 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), 2, ProQuest.

²⁸⁵ Finklea, 2.

²⁸⁶ “Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 26, 2022, <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces>.

²⁸⁷ Lanier, “Preventing Terror Attacks in the Homeland,” 5.

With the establishment and expansion of FBI-led JTTFs, this definition has been expanded upon, as JTTFs are well established throughout the United States and coordinate operations and intelligence through the National Joint Terrorism Task Force in Washington, DC.²⁸⁸ As of 2022, the FBI leads approximately 200 JTTFs out of 56 field offices around the United States.²⁸⁹ The FBI-led JTTFs comprise federal, state, and local agencies from various law enforcement organizations. According to the FBI, JTTFs “serve as a national resource and create familiarity among investigators and managers before a crisis by conducting frequent training to maintain the specialized skills of investigators, analysts, and crisis response teams.”²⁹⁰

The expansion of FBI JTTFs and the inclusion of more state and local law enforcement agencies into the JTTFs was apparent after the 9/11 attacks. In the years after 9/11, the FBI experienced a significant increase in JTTF participation from state and local law enforcement agencies.²⁹¹ This expansion of participation conferred the benefits of community-oriented policing philosophies, as local law enforcement officers are intimately familiar with the communities in which they serve. Anthony D’Angelo found that implementing standard protocols, training, and clear roles of responsibility for JTTF participants was necessary for a successful task force.²⁹²

In addition to the FBI-led JTTFs, local jurisdictions have created similar task forces, or groups, that work in conjunction with the FBI but provide a more area-specific focus. These groups are known as terrorism early warning (TEW) groups, with Los Angeles County being the largest of this kind.²⁹³ The Los Angeles TEW was created in 1996 and designed to create an information-sharing environment for all entities with

²⁸⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joint Terrorism Task Forces.”

²⁸⁹ Federal Bureau of Investigation.

²⁹⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation.

²⁹¹ Anthony P. D’Angelo, “Strategic Change and the Joint Terrorism Task Force: Ideas and Recommendations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 1, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3012>.

²⁹² D’Angelo, 108.

²⁹³ Miller, “How Can We Improve Information Sharing,” 39.

homeland security responsibilities.²⁹⁴ Although task forces have historically comprised almost exclusively law enforcement agencies, the Los Angeles TEW includes membership from not only law enforcement but also fire departments and public health agencies in the Los Angeles County area.²⁹⁵ The TEW model leverages resources not normally found within established task forces and provides additional capabilities through its organization. The Los Angeles County TEW, structured under a unified command, has branches of investigative, analysis, and consequence management capabilities, which include epidemiological intelligence and forensic intelligence components.²⁹⁶ Having studied the TEW concept, Lanier describes it as “a multi-discipline, multi-agency approach that provides a local network of public and private agencies that serve multiple fusion functions and provide information on . . . indications and warning, operational assessments, and special events with threat potential.”²⁹⁷

With terrorism activities on the radar of law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, the various task force models provide wide-ranging opportunities for the investigation of illegal activities and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence. Terrorism activities often cross jurisdictional boundaries and disciplines, which provide a unique requirement for task forces of different disciplines to gather pieces of a larger picture to identify trends and initiate disruption techniques.

B. LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING

Terrorism awareness and specialized terrorism response training for local law enforcement agencies varies across the United States. With approximately 18,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States, there are different needs, specialties, and requirements for training.²⁹⁸ Likewise, with every U.S. state maintaining

²⁹⁴ Miller, 39.

²⁹⁵ Miller, 40.

²⁹⁶ Miller, 41.

²⁹⁷ Lanier, “Preventing Terror Attacks in the Homeland,” 50.

²⁹⁸ Duren Banks et al., *National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data*, NCJ 249681 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 2016), <https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf>.

its own training standards, the level of training varies significantly. The type and levels of training also vary depending on the size of agencies and the populations they serve. Agencies in large metropolitan areas, such as New York and Los Angeles, have different needs and threat streams from smaller agencies located in rural areas of the United States. For example, New York City has a population of over 8 million people and will have different needs from a city such as Butte, Montana, whose population is just over 34,000. Not only does the population size factor into the needs of different cities, but the demographic composition is an important variable. It is for these reasons that most law enforcement agencies rely on the federal government for specialized terrorism training. The State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training program, administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, provides “no-cost training and resources to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement officers, analysts, and support staff, who serve as the front line of defense against acts of terror.”²⁹⁹ This program provides opportunities for non-federal law enforcement personnel to receive a variety of introductory and advanced terrorism training for such aspects as collection, analysis, and information sharing.

Individual states that set minimum requirements for law enforcement officer training also require and provide terrorism training. California, for instance, requires that all local law enforcement officer trainees attend a terrorism awareness component in the basic academy.³⁰⁰ The basic academy is approximately six months long, but the terrorism awareness portion requires only eight hours of training.³⁰¹ This minimal requirement provides merely a glimpse into the threat that terrorism poses to the United States. For more advanced terrorism-related training, California offers additional courses such as international terrorism, domestic terrorism, advanced counterterrorism strategies, and

²⁹⁹ “Home Page,” State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program, accessed March 27, 2022, <https://www.slatt.org>.

³⁰⁰ “Legislative Mandated Training,” California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, June 27, 2022, <https://post.ca.gov/legislative-mandated-training>.

³⁰¹ California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training.

intelligence analysis through the California Specialized Training Institute, sponsored by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services.³⁰²

Although there are varied requirements and opportunities for local law enforcement officers in the United States, the following subsections focus on three areas: terrorism awareness, the terrorism liaison officer program, and prevention and disruption training.

1. Terrorism Awareness

The primary mission of local law enforcement agencies is to protect the citizens in the communities they serve by providing professional public safety services. Historically, these services have focused on traditional criminal activity; however, with ever-evolving homeland security threat streams, local law enforcement has recognized that it has a role in protecting the United States from terrorist activity as well. Regular, routine policing activities and training are often relied on to identify terrorist activity and disrupt attacks.³⁰³ The U.S. government routinely publishes national strategies and frameworks for countering terrorism and provides opportunities for terrorism training.³⁰⁴ Research conducted by LD Maples on the 50 states asked whether each state mandated terrorism training for certification to be a peace officer.³⁰⁵ Because there is no national standard for required terrorism training, the results varied between states. Maples identified that not every state requires terrorism training for entry-level peace officers in the basic academy curriculum, yet some states may offer it as advanced continuing education.³⁰⁶ More

³⁰² "California Specialized Training Institute," California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, accessed July 27, 2022, <https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/operations/planning-preparedness-prevention/california-specialized-training-institute/>.

³⁰³ Christopher Hewitt, "Law Enforcement Tactics and Their Effectiveness in Dealing with American Terrorism: Organizations, Autonomous Cells, and Lone Wolves," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 61, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849913>.

³⁰⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf.

³⁰⁵ LD M. Maples, "Terrorism 101—Knowledge about the 'What and Why' of Terrorism as a State and Local Law Enforcement Competency" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 30, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3954>.

³⁰⁶ Maples, 31–40.

specifically, Maples found that 29 states mandated terrorism training, and 21 did not.³⁰⁷ This disparity in training requirements brings into fine focus the inconsistency among local law enforcement in the United States regarding terrorism training.³⁰⁸ Additionally, among the states that did mandate terrorism awareness training, the topics related to religion and terrorism, political motivations, psychological factors, and radicalization varied widely.³⁰⁹ Maples's analysis of courses from different states showed there was not necessarily a consistent theme, as courses ranged from radical Islamic beliefs to right-wing Christian identity movements.³¹⁰

States continue to evolve as the threat landscape changes and updates are continuously implemented for entry-level and advanced peace officer training. California, for example, has expanded its basic academy curriculum to include terrorist threats and ideologies, prevention/deterrence concepts, critical infrastructure protection, and intelligence cycle and intelligence resources.³¹¹

From the local law enforcement perspective, however, homeland security may not be a concern for the citizens of the community, which means it does not become a training priority. As Lanier states, "The average American citizen is more afraid of becoming the victim of a robbery than they are of being the victim of a terrorist attack."³¹² With rising violent crime rates throughout the United States, states may emphasize training focused on current challenges for local communities rather than terrorism awareness.

2. Terrorism Liaison Officer Training

Although terrorism awareness training and consistency may be lacking across the United States for local law enforcement, some programs and training are available for

³⁰⁷ Maples, 40.

³⁰⁸ Maples, 40.

³⁰⁹ Maples, 49.

³¹⁰ Maples, 40.

³¹¹ California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, "Legislative Mandated Training."

³¹² Lanier, "Preventing Terror Attacks in the Homeland," 36.

agencies to be proactive in protecting their communities from the terror threat. One such training opportunity is the terrorism liaison officer (TLO) program, which provides an avenue for agencies to collect information and submit suspicious activity reports for analysis, without having to require training for every officer.

Local law enforcement agencies have a long-standing history of receiving specialized training and developing expertise in dealing with quality-of-life issues in their communities. Often, these specialties are in the areas of criminal street gangs and narcotics traffickers, as their actions often result in violence and garner significant publicity. Therefore, specialized task forces have been developed over time to combat specific problem sets. After 9/11, however, local law enforcement was also tasked with protecting communities from the threat of terrorist acts and recognizing suspicious behavior that could lead to identifying and disrupting terrorist activity. In response, many states, through their fusion centers, developed the TLO program, which trained officers for awareness of terrorism activities. The Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center in California has described a TLO as an “individual who has completed a fusion center recognized TLO Basic course in the state of California and can serve as a point of contact for a public safety agency in matters related to terrorism information and intelligence.”³¹³

TLO programs combine different disciplines that all have roles and responsibilities in the homeland security environment. The goal is not to create large numbers of experts in homeland security-related issues but rather to identify professionals from different disciplines, such as fire, military, and public health, who can receive training, develop additional resources, and increase operational capabilities.³¹⁴ Therefore, TLOs do not need to be law enforcement officers, as the goal of TLO programs is to bring multiple public safety disciplines together for better situational awareness. Often, TLOs comprise law

³¹³ “About Our Terrorism Liaison Officer Program,” Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, accessed April 4, 2022, <https://ociac.ca.gov/default.aspx?menuitemid=24>.

³¹⁴ Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center.

enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical services, and public health personnel.³¹⁵

Providing the same training to multiple disciplines in the public safety realm results in consist information collection and sharing, which enhance awareness related to actual and potential terrorist activity. TLOs for different agencies are trained to provide a conduit between state and local agencies so that homeland security information can flow seamlessly between state and local officials.³¹⁶ In California, for example, prospective TLOs attend an eight-hour basic course that covers duties, terrorist tactics, and trends, among other topics.³¹⁷ Most law enforcement officers do not receive additional training on terrorism-related topics beyond that of initial academy training, even if it is offered in their state. Law enforcement must possess the ability to recognize and understand terrorism, which requires training and continuous education on the topic.³¹⁸ The TLO program facilitates information flow, not only between the state and local levels but within the community as well. Developing a comprehensive TLO program in the public safety realm can enhance the relationships with community members and other public safety partners to ensure that indicators are recognized and information is shared. Fred Collie maintains, “Collaboration with community groups, business groups and civic organizations can greatly enhance a law enforcement organization’s community education efforts.”³¹⁹

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 included law enforcement in counterterrorism-related duties and specifically suggested that local law enforcement be a force multiplier for the collection and dissemination of intelligence and

³¹⁵ William F. Wickers, “A Comprehensive Fusion Liaison Officer Program: The Arizona Model” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 27, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45272>.

³¹⁶ Michael D. Andreas, “How Should Municipal Police Agencies Participate in America’s Homeland Security Strategy?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 17, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/3807>.

³¹⁷ “NCRIC Terrorism & Infrastructure Liaison Officer Programs,” Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, accessed March 27, 2022, <https://ncric.org/default.aspx?menuitemid=362&menugroup=NCRIC+Public+Home&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1>.

³¹⁸ Collie, “21st Century Policing,” 44.

³¹⁹ Collie, 45.

information.³²⁰ The TLO program has provided a framework for achieving this goal, as well as enhancing prevention and disruption tactics used by local law enforcement.

3. Prevention and Disruption

Local law enforcement uses many different methods for preventing and disrupting terrorism activities. Often, those involved with terrorism or those traversing the radicalization process do so covertly. Therefore, terrorism activities present a difficult problem set for law enforcement, especially local law enforcement, as they are not as common as narcotics trafficking, criminal gang activity, and daily quality-of-life issues. Many of the same methods used for confronting terror-related issues are employed for more traditional criminal issues such as organized crime, criminal street gangs, and narcotics trafficking. As discussed earlier in this chapter, community-oriented policing, task forces, and the TLO program are just a few of the components law enforcement uses to prevent and disrupt terrorism. With respect to individual tactics, law enforcement implements different methods depending on the situation.

Regarding law enforcement tactics and their effectiveness in fighting terrorism, Christopher Hewitt has studied the wide-ranging approaches implemented both before and after terrorist events, including crime scene examinations, witness interviews, routine policing duties, surveillance operations, the use of informants, information provided by members of the public, and rewards.³²¹ These traditional law enforcement tactics are used daily for a variety of investigations and information-collection activities. Crime scene examinations have helped to determine the identity of and capture terrorists, as was the case for the first World Trade Center bombing. Authorities identified the vehicle identification number from a rental truck, which was later reported stolen, and the person who rented it.³²² In another case, the questioning of witnesses led to the identification of Eric Rudolph, the Olympic Park bomber, who was followed and identified by witnesses

³²⁰ Esparza and Bruneau, “Closing the Gap,” 329.

³²¹ Hewitt, “Law Enforcement Tactics and Their Effectiveness,” 60–62.

³²² Hewitt, 60.

who saw him leave the scene of the bombing incident.³²³ Routine policing strategies and officer intuition have also thwarted terrorist attacks, as was the case in Garland, Texas, where a “Draw the Prophet Contest” at the Curtis Culwell Center was anticipated to be controversial. A local law enforcement officer working exterior security near the event noticed that a vehicle without state license plates had stopped quickly, thus heightening his awareness.³²⁴ When the passenger exited the vehicle armed with an AK-47-style rifle, a gunfight ensued, ending with two suspects deceased but no one inside the venue injured.³²⁵

Surveillance operations have long had success in disrupting criminal activity, and their disruption of terrorism has been no different. For example, in 2011, the NYPD conducted surveillance operations for extended periods on Jose Pimentel, who was ultimately taken into custody for planning to conduct attacks on military, post office, and police personnel in New York City.³²⁶ The use of informants has also long been a tactic used by law enforcement at all levels of government. Informants can provide information to law enforcement while infiltrating criminal and terrorist organizations. The NYPD once again used informant methods to prevent and disrupt a planned attack in 2004, at the Herald Square subway station before the Republican National Convention, by Shahawar Siraj and James Elshafay, who were taken into custody before any overt actions could be initiated.³²⁷

Information provided by the public also assists in preventing and disrupting terrorism, as well as apprehending wanted persons. The Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 was no exception. The event was a large venue attended by thousands of people, which made identifying the suspects difficult. Immediately following the bombing, websites were established so that members of the public could submit photos and videos of persons they thought were suspicious (i.e., crowdsourcing), which ultimately provided false information

³²³ Hewitt, 60.

³²⁴ Mike Wood, “Cop Shares Gunfight Lessons from ISIS-Inspired ‘Draw the Prophet’ Terrorist Attack,” *Police 1*, September 15, 2017, <https://www.police1.com/active-shooter/articles/cop-shares-gunfight-lessons-from-isis-inspired-draw-the-prophet-terrorist-attack-iV5H704a3jD3VAnz/>.

³²⁵ Wood.

³²⁶ Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism,” 89.

³²⁷ Dahl, 89.

about the identity of the suspects.³²⁸ One of the victims, however, assisted law enforcement by examining surveillance video and identifying one of the suspects.³²⁹ Monetary rewards programs have had mixed results; however, when applied to terrorist organizations' most wanted, large multi-million-dollar rewards were not successful in locating Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.³³⁰

C. CONCLUSION

Local law enforcement strategies for combatting terrorism range widely, but many traditional tactics used for fighting organized crime, criminal street gangs, and narcotics traffickers are employed for this purpose. Many of the tactics implemented by local law enforcement depend on the collection of intelligence and information, thus providing a decision tree for which strategies to deploy. Community-oriented policing is the historical backbone of policing strategies and has the potential to provide a wealth of intelligence and information. Using this model, relevant information collected at the local level, as well as suspicious activity reporting, can be effectively relayed to a fusion center for analysis and dissemination. Task force components of local law enforcement agencies vary in their specialties, yet information related to terrorism often crosses disciplines, and information and intelligence can be collected and acted on by task forces.

For local law enforcement strategies to be effective, training is an essential component. Although terrorism has not historically been a responsibility of local law enforcement, 9/11 impacted the duties of law enforcement agencies and augmented the regular responsibilities of police. Terrorism awareness has become a focus of standardized and advanced training for local law enforcement officers. The introduction of the TLO program has provided local law enforcement with additional resources and expertise to

³²⁸ Leti Volpp, "Symposium: Citizenship, Immigration, and National Security after 9/11: The Boston Bombers," *Fordham Law Review* 82 (April 2014): 2209, Lexis.

³²⁹ "Boston's Legacy: Can Crowdsourcing Really Fight Crime?," NBC News, April 12, 2014, <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/bostons-legacy-can-crowdsourcing-really-fight-crime-n74831>.

³³⁰ Christopher M. Ford, "Money, Motivation, and Terrorism: Rewards-for-Information Programs," *Naval War College Review* 70, no. 4 (Autumn 2017): 103.

combat terrorism by spreading awareness and increasing networking with allied agencies and fusion centers.

The continued expansion of local law enforcement intelligence- and information-collection capabilities, coupled with training, increases the effectiveness of and enhances the U.S. apparatus to prevent and disrupt terrorism. Training and equipping local law enforcement officers, and ensuring they are competent and effective in their daily duties, stands to further enhance the resilience of the United States against threats of terrorism.

V. CASE STUDIES OF TERRORISM PLOTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This chapter examines case studies of terrorist attacks and plots that occurred or were disrupted in the United States. The radicalization process, strategies, and tactics used by the terrorists are examined, as are the involvement of local law enforcement and intelligence authorities with the terrorists before and during the incidents. The events include the Curtis Culwell Center attack in Garland, Texas (better known as the Draw the Prophet Contest); the Pulse nightclub attack in Orlando, Florida; and the California prison radicalization plot. These case studies have been selected to match each of the frameworks discussed in Chapter II: group terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, and inmate radicalization.

A. GARLAND, TEXAS

On May 3, 2015, Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi, both residents of Arizona, planned to carry out an attack at the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas, where an event called the Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest was being held.³³¹ Simpson and Soofi arrived in Texas equipped with body armor and assault rifles to carry out their planned attack.³³² As the pair—who had been inspired by ISIS—arrived near the Culwell Center, a police officer who was working external security noticed that a vehicle with Arizona license plates had stopped abruptly, and the passenger exited with an AK-47-style assault rifle.³³³ Simpson and Soofi engaged law enforcement officers in a gunfight that resulted in the wounding of a security officer and the death of both suspects.³³⁴ It was believed that Simpson and Soofi wished to enter the building where the art contest was taking place, so

³³¹ Texas Department of Public Safety, *Assessing the Mass Attacks Threat to Texas* (Austin: Texas Department of Public Safety, 2020), 23, https://www.dps.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/director_staff/media_and_communications/2020/tmassattackassessment.pdf.

³³² Texas Department of Public Safety, 23.

³³³ Wood, “Cop Shares Gunfight Lessons.”

³³⁴ John Tully Gordon, “Redirected Radicals: Understanding the Risk of Altered Targeting Trajectories among ISIL’s Aspiring Foreign Fighters” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 61, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50554>.

they could engage a large crowd and cause mass casualties.³³⁵ Local law enforcement officials in Garland, Texas, had believed this event would be controversial and planned multiple layers of security outside in preparation for an act of violence.³³⁶ As an officer engaged and wounded both suspects, members of a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team arrived and also engaged the suspects, who were purportedly trying to detonate an improvised explosive device contained in a backpack.³³⁷ This final engagement effectively ended the immediate threat of gunfire from the suspects.

Unknown at the time of the attack was the suspects' affiliation with and inspiration to carry out the attack in the name of ISIS, which ultimately "praised" the attack.³³⁸ Law enforcement agencies later learned that social media platforms had helped Simpson radicalize and boosted his support for ISIS and that he had been in online communications with two identified ISIS foreign fighters.³³⁹ The FBI also disclosed that "one of the attackers exchanged 109 encrypted messages with a known, but unnamed, overseas terrorist during the morning prior to the operation in Garland."³⁴⁰ These revelations brought into question what the federal government might have known about Simpson and Soofi before the attack.

CBS's *60 Minutes* conducted an independent investigation into the events leading up to the attack. Its researchers discovered that Simpson had been previously investigated by the FBI, had converted to Islam, was talking to an undercover FBI agent, and was in contact with a paid FBI informant.³⁴¹ Furthermore, CBS claimed that an FBI agent was conducting surveillance of the suspects and taking photos of them as they arrived at the

³³⁵ Gordon, 61.

³³⁶ Wood, "Cop Shares Gunfight Lessons."

³³⁷ Wood.

³³⁸ Gordon, "Redirected Radicals," 61.

³³⁹ Gordon, 61.

³⁴⁰ Gordon, 61.

³⁴¹ Anderson Cooper, "60 Minutes Investigates First ISIS-Claimed Attack in U.S. and What the FBI Knew," CBS News, March 26, 2017, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/terrorism-in-garland-texas-what-the-fbi-knew-before-the-2015-attack/>.

event to conduct the attack.³⁴² The CBS investigation revealed that the FBI had investigated Simpson in 2014, as well as immediately before the attack, due to online statements made by Simpson.³⁴³

The CBS investigation was conducted through interviews, a review of affidavits, and an examination of documents released by government officials. The FBI would not agree to an interview and released a statement that read, “There was no advance knowledge of a plot to attack the cartoon drawing contest in Garland, Texas.”³⁴⁴ CBS also learned after the trial of a man associated with Simpson that the undercover FBI agent who was in contact with Simpson sent a text message several weeks before the event that read, “Tear up Texas.”³⁴⁵ It was also alleged that this was the same FBI agent who was in Garland when the event took place, did not take action when the attack occurred, and was stopped and detained at a police checkpoint.³⁴⁶ This allegation identifies the continuing problem with a lack of information sharing with local law enforcement authorities, as the FBI might have known about an imminent attack but said nothing. This attack appears to be the first ISIS-inspired attack in the United States involving converted Islamic radicals, empowered by the reach of ISIS on social media.³⁴⁷ This attack also demonstrates the impact that ingroup narratives have on people who wish to be a part of something and carry out acts on behalf of a group.

If not for the actions of local law enforcement, this attack had the potential to be a disastrous mass casualty incident. Additionally, this attack underscores the importance of information and intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local law enforcement as it relates to threats and preparedness for terrorist attacks.

³⁴² Cooper.

³⁴³ Cooper.

³⁴⁴ Cooper.

³⁴⁵ Cooper.

³⁴⁶ Cooper.

³⁴⁷ Gordon, “Redirected Radicals,” 61.

B. ORLANDO, FLORIDA

On Sunday, June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen, a U.S. citizen and son of Afghan immigrants, carried out an attack at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, which resulted in the death of 49 people and 58 additional injuries.³⁴⁸ The Pulse nightclub is popular among the LGBTQ community, and there were approximately 300 patrons inside the 4,500-square-foot building in the early morning hours of June 12.³⁴⁹ Just after 2:00 a.m., Mateen entered the nightclub armed with an assault rifle and a handgun and began firing at the crowd, firing an estimated 200 rounds in less than five minutes.³⁵⁰ The attack resulted in a massive response of law enforcement and emergency personnel to the scene. While the shooting was occurring and the response was underway, patrons fled the building or hid inside.³⁵¹ The initial active shooter incident transitioned to a barricaded gunman–hostage situation and ended at approximately 5:15 a.m., when SWAT officers engaged the suspect.³⁵² Although the suspect had been neutralized, law enforcement still had the responsibility of clearing Pulse and declaring the scene and the suspect’s vehicle safe. The scene was not completely secured until approximately 11:15 a.m.³⁵³

Mateen’s case is unique, as he bypassed steps of the radicalization process—transitioning rapidly from pre-radicalization to jihad but skipping self-identification and indoctrination.³⁵⁴ At the time of the attack, local authorities did not know who Omar Mateen was or why he committed such a violent act. Also, it was unclear whether he had any ties to terrorist organizations or whether he had been radicalized. In the aftermath of the mass shooting, authorities learned that Mateen had called 9-1-1 during the incident,

³⁴⁸ Frank Straub et al., *Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2017), 198, <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0857-pub.pdf>.

³⁴⁹ Straub et al., 13.

³⁵⁰ Straub et al., 15–18.

³⁵¹ Straub et al., 7–12.

³⁵² Straub et al., 12.

³⁵³ Straub et al., 12.

³⁵⁴ Caroline Joan “Kay” S. Picart, *American Self-Radicalizing Terrorists and the Allure of “Jihadi Cool/Chic”* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 151, ProQuest.

identifying his “allegiance” to ISIS and mentioning the Boston bombers.³⁵⁵ Further investigation revealed that Mateen was a U.S. citizen and his parents immigrants from Afghanistan.³⁵⁶

In 2013, three years before the Pulse nightclub incident, the FBI had been notified by coworkers that Mateen might have had terrorist inspirations, as he had claimed to be connected to Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah.³⁵⁷ The FBI questioned Mateen on more than one occasion, put him under surveillance, and interviewed his acquaintances, who had witnessed his comments about terrorist organizations.³⁵⁸ No identifiable connections to terrorism were determined at that time because Mateen told the FBI he had been untruthful when he made the comments to others. As Caroline Picart notes, the investigation was closed “in a pattern eerily resembling the FBI’s closing its files on the older Tsarnaev brother,” one of the Boston Marathon bombers.³⁵⁹ The case with Mateen, and the way it was investigated, had similarities to that of the Boston bombers’ case, which resulted in a terrorist attack.

Again, in 2014, the FBI investigated Mateen for possible ties to an American foreign fighter who fought in Syria, which resulted in “inconclusive” findings because the FBI “determined that contact was minimal and did not constitute a substantive relationship or threat at that time.”³⁶⁰ The American foreign fighter, Moner Mohammad Abusalha, who had grown up in Florida, attended the same mosque as Mateen and became the first known American suicide bomber for an Al-Qaeda-associated organization.³⁶¹ Even though Mateen had pledged allegiance to ISIS, he displayed no clear lines of connection to terrorists or the more traditional process of radicalization. He displayed signs of being

³⁵⁵ Picart, 142–43.

³⁵⁶ Picart, 143.

³⁵⁷ Picart, 146. Picart notes that Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah are near diametric opposites and that Mateen’s statements were contradictory.

³⁵⁸ Picart, 146.

³⁵⁹ Picart, 146.

³⁶⁰ Picart, 146.

³⁶¹ Picart, 146.

inspired by terrorist acts, as he referred to Al-Qaeda, imitated a “burning plane after 9/11,” and displayed signs of admiration for terrorist groups.³⁶² As is common with others who have carried out attacks, Mateen followed and listened to propaganda by Anwar al-Awlaki, and one of his previous spouses claimed he frequented online extremist websites.³⁶³

There were, however, signs of violence in his history. Mateen, considered a lone-wolf terrorist, acted alone in the planning and execution of his attack. In this connection, Windisch, who has studied lone actors of violent attacks, notes, “Often, the backgrounds of these attackers are riddled with accounts of domestic violence, as in the case of Omar Mateen, the Pulse nightclub shooter.”³⁶⁴ Mateen, during the span of two marriages, was alleged to have been abusive to his spouse and had numerous problems at his various places of employment.³⁶⁵ During a CBS investigation, Imam Syed Shafeeq Rahman revealed that Mateen had attended a mosque in Fort Pierce to pray for some time, and those who knew him said he was quiet and reserved but did not display signs of violence—which notably contradicted his behavior with others outside the mosque.³⁶⁶ The fact that he was anti-social and quiet and kept to himself, coupled with his interactions with coworkers, might have been reason for concern; however, it is unknown whether the FBI had any contact with members of the mosque before the attack.

Mateen was known to the FBI for some time and had been investigated on more than one occasion. He had made comments that showed support and affection for terrorist organizations, was investigated by the FBI, and legally purchased two firearms before the attack.³⁶⁷ To further complicate the case of Mateen, additional news media investigations revealed that Mateen’s father, Seddique Mateen, had been an FBI informant between 2005

³⁶² Yankow and McEvoy, “Predicting the Random,” 22.

³⁶³ Yankow and McEvoy, 23.

³⁶⁴ Beth Windisch, “A Downward Spiral: The Role of Hegemonic Masculinity in Lone Actor Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2021): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1928894>.

³⁶⁵ Yankow and McEvoy, “Predicting the Random,” 22.

³⁶⁶ “Who Is Orlando Gunman Omar Mateen?,” CBS News, June 12, 2016, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/orlando-nightclub-shooting-suspected-gunman-omar-mateen/>.

³⁶⁷ CBS News.

and 2016 and even speculated that he had played a role in the FBI's not prosecuting Mateen in 2013 for providing false statements.³⁶⁸

Unfortunately, law enforcement was unable to thwart this attack and prevent the many deaths and injuries to innocent civilians. As with the Garland case, this case underscores the importance of information and intelligence sharing among various law enforcement agencies when investigations occur based on potential threats and warning signs of violent activity. It is unknown whether sharing information among federal and local agencies could have prevented this attack or further prepared law enforcement for a response to an incident of this magnitude, but there might have been opportunities to disrupt or interdict the attack.

C. CALIFORNIA PRISON RADICALIZATION PLOT

In July 2005, police officers in Southern California arrested two individuals, Levar Washington and Gregory Patterson, members of a radicalized Islamic prison group, for multiple robberies of gas stations.³⁶⁹ Unknown at the time of their arrest was that this routine robbery investigation would evolve into an in-depth terrorism investigation. An investigation into the robberies led to a search of Washington's residence, which revealed terrorist-related material and what was believed to be a target list of sites in Southern California.³⁷⁰ The investigation led to the discovery that Washington and Patterson were part of a larger plot, involving other members seeking to conduct attacks, and belonged to a radical prison group called Jam'iyyat UI-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), which, according to Dennis Ballas, "supports the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, or government, in the United States and advocates the targeting of the American and Israeli governments, as well as Jews, in retaliation for their policies regarding Muslims."³⁷¹ It was routine police work

³⁶⁸ "Father of Pulse Gunman Was FBI Informant, Widow's Attorneys Say," CBS News, March 26, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pulse-nightclub-shooting-gunman-father-fbi-informant-seddique-mateen/>.

³⁶⁹ Dennis A. Ballas, "Prisoner Radicalization," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 79, no. 10 (October 2010): 1.

³⁷⁰ Ballas, 1.

³⁷¹ Ballas, 1.

that uncovered the larger plot and expanded the investigation beyond Washington and Patterson. This investigation was initiated not on a tip or an in-depth intelligence gathering operation but rather by local law enforcement officers conducting thorough investigations and having a sense of awareness about homeland security issues and terrorism threats.

This case represents the threat that can emerge from criminal street gang members, as well as other criminal minds, and those who are incarcerated for long periods, as they have the time to radicalize. Prior to the discovery of the plot, a subject named Kevin James was sentenced to 10 years in Folsom State Prison in California for robbery, where he founded JIS.³⁷² James was a member of an infamous criminal street gang and used that influence and his likeability to “radicalize and recruit fellow gang members as well as encourage other members to recruit once released on parole.”³⁷³ While in prison, James and Washington converted to Islam and planned to conduct attacks on “U.S. military bases, synagogues, and Israeli government facilities.”³⁷⁴

James and Washington created a strategy document titled “Blue Print 2005” to provide JIS members with the rules of their group, including learning to speak Arabic, maintaining employment, acquiring firearms, learning to handle and create explosive devices, and leading a normal life and not attracting attention.³⁷⁵ Ballas states that JIS “not only has its own hierarchy, code of conduct, and secret communication system but the members also have their own group identity.”³⁷⁶ The identity of the group relates to the SIT concept, as the individuals’ “society” provides members with a sense of belonging.³⁷⁷ The group identity gives them a “shared purpose and has led to a form of collective resistance against the United States government.”³⁷⁸ Two additional members of JIS,

³⁷² Parker, “Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model,” 1.

³⁷³ Parker, 1.

³⁷⁴ James Austin, “Prisons and Fear of Terrorism,” *Criminology & Public Policy* 8, no. 3 (August 2009): 643, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00580.x>.

³⁷⁵ Austin, 643.

³⁷⁶ Ballas, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 2.

³⁷⁷ Felty, “Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Israel/Palestine,” 15.

³⁷⁸ Ballas, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 2.

Gregory Patterson and Hamad Samana, were recruited by Washington at a mosque in Inglewood, California, where they began to plan their attacks.³⁷⁹ One of the planned targets was Los Angeles International Airport, where Patterson was employed.³⁸⁰

The extent of the plot involving these four individuals might not have been uncovered if it was not for one of the suspects, who dropped a cellphone at the scene of a robbery, which led to their identification.³⁸¹ The cellphone was a break for law enforcement, which followed up with routine investigative methods to determine the owner of the cellphone. The initial investigative activities conducted by local law enforcement authorities revealed the extent of the plot, which led to the involvement of federal, state, and local agencies combining resources, sharing information, and conducting an in-depth terror investigation. Upon their arrests, the suspects admitted to law enforcement authorities that they were attempting to fund their terrorist activities with money stolen during the robberies.³⁸²

Local law enforcement identified and disrupted this plot through routine investigation on a robbery case, but no intelligence or warning signs made their way to law enforcement during James's and Washington's time in prison together about their path toward radicalization. The investigative ability, as well as the training local law enforcement had related to terrorism awareness, was beneficial, as officers noticed items that were out of the ordinary and notified local and federal partners. This level of awareness resulted in a large-scale investigation involving over 200 personnel that revealed the four suspects had participated in "target acquisition, preattack surveillance, and supply procurement."³⁸³ Ultimately, all four suspects were sentenced to prison for their involvement in the plot. Washington received 22 years, Patterson 12 years (plus an additional 22 years for other crimes), James 16 years, and Samana 70 months,

³⁷⁹ Ballas, 1.

³⁸⁰ Ballas, 1.

³⁸¹ Ballas, 1–2.

³⁸² Ballas, 2.

³⁸³ Ballas, 1.

respectively.³⁸⁴ The cooperation between local and federal law enforcement authorities identified and disrupted a plot against multiple high-profile targets, to which some of the suspects had access.

D. CONCLUSION

The three case studies described in this chapter illustrate an act of group terror in the Garland, Texas, attack; a lone-wolf attack in Orlando, Florida; and a disrupted plot involving JIS prison radicalization. Although all the cases demonstrated different circumstances in how the terrorist acts were planned and carried out, a commonality between them was that all the individuals described in these case studies wished to harm innocent people in the United States. The inspiration projected on these actors to commit acts of terrorism by a foreign influence was undeniable and must continue to be a focus for law enforcement and the public. Unfortunately, in the case of the attacks that were carried out, warning signs and indicators could have been acted on before the attacks occurred yet were missed by law enforcement agencies because of a lack of information sharing and awareness, and resource restrictions.

Although there might not have been enough information to prosecute these individuals before the attacks occurred, information could have been passed along, and additional resources could have been dedicated to more in-depth investigation or prevention efforts to disrupt the radicalization process. The radicalization and recruitment process in prison was also largely unnoticed until law enforcement conducted an unrelated investigation and uncovered the plot. Training, investigative capabilities, and, most importantly, information sharing were found lacking in the cases studied—which otherwise might have prevented or disrupted the terrorist plots at early stages, thus saving lives and reducing other casualties. Ingroup narratives and the sense of belonging to a violent group or cause must be noticed and acted on swiftly, before individuals have progressed into an operational stage for their planned terrorist activities.

³⁸⁴ Ballas, 2.

VI. CONCLUSION

The threat of foreign-influenced terrorism in the United States remains. As law enforcement agencies struggle to maintain staffing levels to address increasing violent crime and quality-of-life issues in their communities, terrorism must not be forgotten. Using a systematic methodology in reviewing previous research, this thesis examined how individuals are recruited, radicalized, and operationalized by foreign terrorist groups and ideologies. Furthermore, this thesis examined strategies implemented by local law enforcement to combat this threat through intelligence and information collection and training. Several case studies were reviewed to identify possible differences in the reasons that individuals and groups radicalize and carry out attacks in the homeland, as well as the strategies local law enforcement has implemented during investigations. All this research reveals that the strategies law enforcement agencies rely on are not consistent throughout the United States, and there is room for improvement to deter, prevent, and interdict future attacks.

This chapter summarizes findings from the research, identifies areas for future research, and provides recommendations for local law enforcement to disrupt foreign-influenced terrorism in the homeland. Although the protection of the homeland has historically been considered a federal responsibility, local law enforcement must realize that it is on the frontline of ensuring that American citizens live in a secure environment, free from foreign-influenced terror attacks. Providing homeland security services at the local level is a daunting task, but local law enforcement leaders must recognize that the threat still exists and is continually evolving and devise methods and cooperation with the public and other government organizations at all levels to secure the American way of life. As the threat streams evolve, so must law enforcement. Law enforcement can progress to meet continued and new threats but not without cooperation of the community and state and federal agencies.

Therefore, a systematic and consistent methodology to prepare local law enforcement to confront the threat of foreign-influenced terror in communities across the United States should be a priority moving forward. The methodology should involve law

enforcement leadership's building on established relationships, as well as creating new ones, with the public and other government organizations at all levels. Recognizing that foreign-influenced terrorism remains a threat is the first step, and standardized, adequate terrorism awareness training for local law enforcement must increase. To accomplish this task, many entities must work together, including citizens, all government organizations, and lawmakers.

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Based on the findings of this thesis, foreign-influenced terrorism continues to be a threat to the homeland. In examining the recruitment and radicalization process in the case studies, a common theme emerged. Many of the individuals were attracted to terrorism due to feeling a sense of belonging and identifying with ideologies and actions of others.³⁸⁵ Using SIT was critical for understanding why individuals gravitate toward groups and ideologies that inspire violence toward innocent people. Although many individuals who radicalize and are ready to carry out terrorist attacks may not actually have physical contact with others who inspire them, technology has bridged that gap.³⁸⁶ Therefore, local law enforcement must recognize the many opportunities for individuals to radicalize and eventually operationalize and carry out attacks. Local law enforcement, as well as other government organizations, must realize that radicalization originating from a foreign source is a reality.

This thesis identified many methods for recruitment and radicalization. Often, especially in recent history, the internet and social media platforms have provided the vehicle for recruitment, radicalization, and operationalization.³⁸⁷ Through the internet and social media, many individuals can subscribe to individuals and groups that interest them or have shared beliefs. Additionally, propaganda can permeate different online platforms with little to no content moderation. Terrorist recruiters and influencers can post content in a variety of formats and communicate directly without physical contact. Communication

³⁸⁵ Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 53.

³⁸⁶ Burroni, "The Homegrown Jihadi Terrorist," 32–33.

³⁸⁷ Harris, "Why Do Americans Go Abroad to Fight in Foreign Conflicts?," 2.

is made possible with a variety of electronic devices, thus exploiting the opportunities provided by global connectivity.³⁸⁸ With continuous advancement of technology, connecting to terrorists and instigators of terror will become even more accessible.

This thesis also examined different law enforcement strategies, including intelligence and information sharing and training. Based on findings in this thesis, the use of fusion centers and task forces has proven effective in combatting a wide array of threats, including foreign-influenced terrorism. One area that may be overlooked in the arena of terrorism prevention is community-oriented policing. Community-oriented policing by local law enforcement has proven effective in knowing the community, reducing crime, and building relationships with citizens to provide information and assist with the security of the community. Local law enforcement agencies have a unique advantage over state and federal agencies in obtaining information about possible terrorist plots because they live and work in the communities they serve. This intimate knowledge and relationship-building skillset, combined with the right training, allows local law enforcement to have a better chance at recognizing and learning of individuals or groups gravitating toward the foreign-influenced terrorism indoctrination and radicalization process. Successful community-oriented policing programs provide opportunities not only to deter and prevent traditional criminal activities but to enhance the intelligence apparatus by combining resources to strengthen the entire homeland security enterprise.

In analyzing the case studies, this thesis found challenges in information sharing related to potential foreign-influenced terror attacks. Although law enforcement agencies in the United States have access to fusion centers and task forces, information sometimes does not make it from one agency to the next. This lack of information sharing was evident in the case studies of Garland, Texas, and Orlando, Florida. In these case studies, all individuals involved with the attacks were at some point surveilled, questioned, and otherwise investigated by the FBI. What remains unclear upon the conclusion of the investigations is how much information, if any, was relayed to local law enforcement authorities. The federal government has access to enormous amounts of data; however,

³⁸⁸ Greaver, "Terrorist Group Brands," 13.

local law enforcement has access to different databases and connections throughout communities via community-oriented policing strategies. Numerous cases of future foreign-influenced terrorists were closed due to no known connections to terrorism or active threats. Therefore, information should be passed along to local authorities for awareness and possible consultation in the event there is an information gap between agencies. Operational security is essential to investigations, yet too much secrecy may result in information not flowing to the right places for awareness and further vetting processes.

This thesis also found that local law enforcement training can be improved upon. Quality training is a foundation for law enforcement officers to be successful in protecting the communities they serve. Without proper training, law enforcement officers cannot carry out their duties in a productive, effective manner. Terrorism training is no exception. This research found very few consistencies between different states relating to terrorism training. Some local law enforcement officers may not receive terrorism training in a basic academy and would have to rely on supplemental training later. With approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide, there is no guarantee that all law enforcement officers will receive terrorism training, let alone advanced training on the subject. Federal agencies provide no-cost training to local law enforcement, but not every jurisdiction takes advantage of these opportunities. Mandated training that is consistent in content should be a requirement in all basic academies throughout the United States, regardless of individual state requirements. Standardized terrorism training would ensure that all local law enforcement officers nationwide receive the exact same training to strengthen awareness and reporting capabilities.

B. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Local law enforcement faces continuous and evolving threats of many varieties, including foreign-influenced terrorism, and it must be prepared to confront the threat. With the responsibilities already entrusted to them, local law enforcement agencies cannot accomplish this mission alone. Local law enforcement must partner and collaborate not only with the community but also with behavioral health and other local public safety

agencies. Based on research conducted during this thesis, the following is a list of recommendations for local law enforcement to strengthen its role in disrupting foreign-influenced terror in the homeland:

1. Standardized nationwide terrorism awareness training.
2. Indoctrination of community-oriented policing in at-risk communities.
3. Enhanced sharing of information with fusion centers and task forces.
4. Increased relationships with federal agencies (build trust and share information).
5. Participation in TLO-type programs.
6. Increased training and information sharing with non-law enforcement public safety agencies.
7. Collaboration with behavioral health and other local public safety agencies.
8. Continuous professional training throughout a law enforcement career.

Local law enforcement officers have a duty to protect and serve their communities. Often, those in leadership positions of these organizations plan to police traditional criminal activity and solve quality-of-life issues for their residents. Although these issues are of paramount concern to their communities, no community is immune from the threat of foreign-influenced terrorism, as global connectivity is possible almost anywhere. Local law enforcement, as well as its leadership, must recognize that it is on the front lines of the threat from foreign-influenced terrorism and prepare accordingly.

C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

During this research, several questions and areas of concern were identified that could benefit from further research. The first and maybe most important issue is to research how many terror suspects who carried out acts of terrorism in the United States were previously investigated by federal authorities without the knowledge of local law enforcement. A common theme in this research was that suspects were investigated,

sometimes on more than one occasion; cases were closed; and an attack was carried out later. What remains unclear is whether information was shared and, if so, to what extent and via which method. Related to this issue is identifying how many cases were not shared with local law enforcement after they were closed. If the information is available, it would be beneficial to identify whether sharing information regarding any previous investigations might have led to the disruption of a terror attack later.

Also, in some instances, local police officers have prevented, disrupted, or identified indicators of possible terror activity. Few if any studies have explored the level and type of training these police officers had. Additional research into whether officers who have identified and disrupted terror attacks received terrorism training would be an indicator of the possible success in implementing standardized terrorism training nationwide. It remains unclear whether these officers relied solely on traditional law enforcement training or had received specific terrorism-related training and used those skills as well. The level of training can be co-examined with community-oriented policing philosophies. It would be beneficial to know whether the agencies these officers were employed by strongly emphasized community-oriented policing in their communities. Combining community-oriented policing philosophies with terrorism awareness training has the potential to further enhance local law enforcement capabilities as they relate to preventing and disrupting terror-related activities.

Finally, the TLO program has been effective at introducing terrorism training to disciplines outside of law enforcement. Although this program is used heavily for identifying suspicious activity, networking, training, and other duties, it remains unclear how successful this program is in identifying and disrupting terror plots. Additional research into how many TLOs there are from different agencies across the United States and whether information they have supplied has disrupted terror plots would assist with assessing and improving the program. This information might lead to a requirement for every public safety agency nationwide to participate in the program. If the information does not support the effectiveness of the program, funding could be reallocated by government officials to better serve prevention and disruption efforts.

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