EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS IN THE AGE OF SAIL

LESSONS FROM THE BRITISH BASE AT MINORCA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MARINE CORPS

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by

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The British occupation of Minorca in the Western Mediterranean throughout the 18th century over three separate periods was marred by stunning successes and devastating defeats. The British experience at Minorca is filled with over-investment, undermanned occupation forces, and reliance on a British Navy that at times could be unreliable, and political direction thousands of miles away in London. The British lessons offer the modern Marine Corps insight into the challenges associated with Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) in the INDO-PACIFIC and serves as a cautionary tale to operating far from support, reinforcements, and with an untested aging fleet.

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The Glorious Revolution of 1688 inaugurated a long-term competition between Britain and France that lasted until France's final defeat in 1815. At the beginning of the competition, Britain (England until the union with Scotland in 1707) recognized that it faced key geopolitical challenges when fighting France. While the region lacked suitable French naval bases on the English Channel coast, and the significant bases of Brest and Rochefort on the Bay of Biscay were within easy range of Britain's bases at Plymouth and Portsmouth, France had direct access to the Mediterranean. That mattered for two reasons. First, the Mediterranean contained the most valuable trade routes in Europe. Second, at the beginning of every war, France could send an expedition from its base at Toulon unwatched and unhindered by British forces. Britain's geostrategic imperative, therefore, was to establish a durable advanced base in the Mediterranean.

At Tangier, the first British attempt to do this failed; the second attempt, at Gibraltar, was more successful, but Gibraltar was not entirely satisfactory as an advanced base. This essay will demonstrate how the resultant seizure of Minorca in 1708 by General James Earl Stanhope solved several strategic problems while also creating new and unexpected operational challenges.

Examining the costs and benefits of Minorca to Britain in the eighteenth century can suggest lessons for today's Marine Corps as it wrestles with the strategic implications of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) in the INDO-PACIFIC. This essay uses British operations in the Mediterranean as a rough proxy for U.S. operations in and around the First Island Chain.[1] In both cases, the remote theater contains vital national interests, but the major rival (France in the eighteenth century, China today) has direct access to the region. Like

[1] First Island Chain: The series of islands which include Taiwan, northern Philippine islands, and the Southwestern islands of Japan (Okinawa, Miyakojima, Tarama, Ishigaki, and Taketomi, and Yonaguni).

the U.S. today, Britain needed to rely on a combination of allies and advanced bases to project power. Based on its careful reconstruction of British strategy and operations three centuries ago, this essay provides some questions that U.S. policymakers must ask about advanced bases today.

England in the Mediterranean

A century before the Glorious Revolution, English merchants sought access to the highly lucrative Mediterranean trade. The first official support for these activities came from Elizabeth I. In the 1580s, the establishment of the Turkey Company granted exclusive rights to Mediterranean trade to 53 merchants.[2] Over the next century, the Mediterranean became the most profitable trading area for merchants trading overseas. England's most significant export commodity was refined textiles, specifically woolen cloth.[3] But English merchant ships quickly became targets of Barbary Corsairs and other powers within the Mediterranean, highlighting the need for a consistent naval presence by the Royal Navy.[4]

As casualties mounted, the merchants demanded action. Historical records show that the losses were tremendous, considering the small size of the fleets. From 1609 to 1616, Corsairs seized 466 ships, and in 1619 alone, they captured 150 vessels and nearly 1,000 sailors. The

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[2] D.W. Donaldson, "Port Mahon: The Preferred Naval Base for the English Fleet in the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century," *The Mariner's Mirror* 88, no. 4 (2002): 423. The Levant Company was created in response to the success of the Venetian Company. Charters supporting both Companies were issued by writ by Queen Elizabeth I. Near the end of the seventeenth century, the Venetian Company's charter was not renewed, while expanded powers and authorities were issued to the Turkey Company. Attribution to the rise of the Turkey Company and the fall of the Venetian Company during the era is commonly assessed by the growing power of the Turkey Company. During the era, trading companies were given exclusive rights to trade in commodities authorized by Royal Decree. The exclusive rights also included requirements to maintain trading relationships and establish embassies.

[3] Ralph Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700," *The Economic History Review* 7, no. 2 (1954): 163–166.

[4] Efforts to safeguard the trade undertook several mechanisms, including early and accurate planning of which routes to employ (Appendix 2). The Portolan maps of the era were famously separate from the more stylized decorative maps frequently seen today. Portolan maps were customarily used for nautical navigation and included vital features to the mariners while underway. The Portolan maps, named after their function of a compass rose with emanating navigational lines, provided Mariners with reasonably accurate directions between points (Appendix 3). Most Portolan maps skipped hazards at sea, such as islands and underwater features, and instead focused on the coastlines. Notably, a few Portolan maps were used for crossing large oceanic bodies, which were more useful for navigation in areas such as the Mediterranean Sea.

outcry for help eventually reached King James I, and in 1620 he dispatched six ships to the Mediterranean under the command of Sir Robert Mansell, but it had little effect. The failed Mansell expedition highlighted the need for a persistent naval presence in the region. The journey from Britain to the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century took months. On arrival, many expeditions suffered from illness and damage from the weather before they could engage the Corsairs.[5]

In 1649, Cromwell's government began providing convoy escorts for Mediterranean fleets. In 1652, the State's Navy concluded that stationing at least a dozen ships in the region was necessary for trade protection.[6] Concurrently, the merchant fleets devised new tactics to counter the threats, including an early version of a Q-ship. HMS *Kingfisher*, deployed to the region in 1671, masqueraded as a merchant ship and unveiled herself as a frigate when engaged.[7] Specifically designed for the Mediterranean Corsairs, HMS *Kingfisher* saw notable action in May 1681 when she engaged Algerian Corsairs as she departed Naples. However, these efforts could be only sporadically effective and reinforced the need for a persistent Royal Navy presence in the Mediterranean.

Beginning in the middle of the seventeenth century, the British tried to establish an advanced base at one Mediterranean port after another. Many had some merchant and port services that could support a fleet at anchor, while others offered only operational advantages. The need for dedicated military ports increased as the Royal Navy's fleets expanded in displacement and numbers.

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[5] Donaldson, "Port Mahon," 425–26; G.N. Clark, "The Barbary Corsairs in the Seventeenth Century," *Cambridge Historical Journal* 8, no. 1 (1944): 28.
[6] Donaldson, "Port Mahon," 426.
[7] J.R. Hill and Bryan Ranft, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 60.

The earliest attempt came at Tangier, just opposite Gibraltar on the North African Atlantic coast.[8] Obtained in 1661, the English poured significant resources into improving the secluded position. England constructed a sizable harbor breakwater and invested heavily in developing a merchant community, hoping the site would develop into a regional trading hub. Unfortunately, the site was frequently under siege from the Moors, who occupied key terrain around the fortress. Even a significant buildup of defenses could not overcome its lack of local supplies. In 1684, disaster befell the Royal Navy at Tangier when under pressure from the Moors and the Turkish Sultan, King Charles II could no longer reinforce a location he had inherited. As pressure from the Moroccan Sultan Moulay Ismail and the Chief of Fez increased around the isolated city, reinforcements from Britain did little to relieve the pressure from this isolated outpost.[9] Despite the expenditure of more than £400,000, the fortress was inadequate, and the anchorage was too shallow to admit ships of the line as they increased in tonnage. The remote facility required frequent resupply from England to support any naval ships for anything beyond minimal periods.[10]

The next attempt came at Gibraltar, dominated by a large rock formation occupying a substantial portion of the peninsular site. Insufficient mooring for a large fleet, the proximity of Spain, and the lack of dependable local resources for food, and repairs, made supporting a fleet from Gibraltar complex at best and impossible at worst. That is not to say it was useless, of course. In 1680 Admiral Arthur Herbert bribed the Spanish Governor for access to Gibraltar, which he found "conveniently seated" for his squadron's operations against the Corsairs for the

[8] Tangier was obtained as part of a dowry between the Portuguese princess Catherine of Braganza and Charles II. The fortress at Tangier was known as the "mole" due to its isolated position and dugout-like isolation in the desert.
[9] Hill and Ranft, *Oxford Illustrated History*, 76.
[10] Donaldson, "Port Mahon," 427.

next two years.[11] The Royal Navy returned from 1686 to 1689 but again departed without establishing a permanent base.

Gibraltar's difficult environmental and navigational conditions were notorious. In 1694 Admiral Francis Wheeler went down with his flagship in difficult weather conditions in the Strait, and the rest of Wheeler's fleet was either damaged or scattered.[12] Nevertheless, there was some value in holding the Rock as it also divided the French Navy in two. In 1704 a council of war decided against attacking Cadiz, citing the lack of sufficient ground forces to support a naval attack, and instead determined an operation against Gibraltar would be optimal given the location's weakened defenses.[13] The operation was successful, and the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht ceded Spanish ownership of Gibraltar to England in perpetuity.[14] Yet Gibraltar remained unsuitable as an advanced fleet base due to its small size and lack of hinterland; even with significant investment in Gibraltar, nothing could change its geographic limitations.

As a result, other possibilities farther in the Mediterranean were considered. Admiral Russell considered Leghorn and Messina in the 1690s but rejected them both because Leghorn was too difficult to defend and Messina was too small to handle his fleet.[15] England relinquished control of Malta to the Spanish just after 1675 and 1676 after a brief period of occupation. Not until 1800 did the British return, and in the Treaty of Paris in 1814, it became a fledgling British

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[11] Donaldson, "Port Mahon," 426.
[12] R. Baldwin, *The Importance of the Island of Minorca and Harbour of Port-Mahon, Fully and Impartially Considered with a History and Description of Both, in a Letter from a Merchant to a Noble Lord* (London: 1756), 47. The death of Admiral Francis Wheeler occurred in difficult weather when his ship, HMS *Sussex*, ran aground, his body and others would wash ashore. Wheeler's naval career was highly active and represented England's global ambitions.
[13] John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702–1712* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 45.
[14] Foreign Affairs, Commons Select Committee Reports, 1998/99, (HC 4 1998/99), accessed February 10, 2023, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/366/36604.htm
[15] Sir Julian Stanford Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713* (London, 1904), 1:166.

colony.[16] Malta's position in the Eastern Mediterranean eventually attracted the Royal Navy's Mediterranean fleet. Its Grand Harbor possessed deep waters, and its narrow mouth supported more robust defenses than other locations. Malta's location on the maritime trading routes offset shortfalls in locally procured resources. Passing merchant ships carried the many critical materials and goods a fleet required. But for the purposes of this essay, what matters is that the British did not see Malta as a viable base in the Mediterranean until after they had exhausted all the possibilities of Port Mahon on the island of Minorca.

Why Minorca

In the Western Mediterranean, just 130 miles from the Iberian mainland, sits Minorca (Figure 1), one of the Balearic Islands. A long-time transportation hub first occupied by the Moors and later by Christian rulers became, in the fourteenth Century, a vassal state absorbed by



Figure 1: *A new chart of the Mediterranean Sea from the best Authorities*, 1780, Accessed March 10, 2023, https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1871-1209-92

[16] Hill and Ranft, *Oxford Illustrated History*, 130.

the authority of the Spanish Crown. Minorca's terrain is rocky and sparse, with only minor agricultural activity throughout the island. The island also possesses a remarkable natural harbor, Port Mahon. At its narrow mouth sits the large stone Fort of St. Philip. Dotted throughout the harbor are a series of islands, including the Illa del Rei, which would soon become a prominent feature of the Royal Navy's infrastructure development plans.

English merchant ships often visited Minorca, and by the middle of the seventeenth century, Royal Navy ships finally began visiting regularly. Admirals Sir John Lawson (1664), Sir Thomas Allin (1664–65, 1668–70), and Sir Edward Spragge (1670–72) all used Mahon at varying times. In 1669 the Navy Board declared that Mahon was "the most convenient port in case of a Warre with Argier."[17] In 1677 another Royal Navy deployment into the Mediterranean by Admiral Narborough for a campaign against Algiers found the English outpost of Tangier inadequate due to the shallow harbor and shortage of supplies. Due to its sizable harbor and supplies, Narborough sailed to Mahon to refit and repair his ships.

In 1693 the Navy Board urged Admiral Wheeler to use Mahon for the express purpose of resupplying ships. The Admiralty sent two storeships, *Golden Hand* and *Edward*, carrying critical supplies necessary to support the arriving fleet at Mahon. To further reinforce their presence, the Admiralty also sent Richard Gibson to serve as the Agent Victualler to the fleet to establish the necessary logistical enterprise to support a fleet so far from England. In late 1694, Spain offered Mahon to England as a base and additionally offered to send a dockyard labor force to develop the logistics on the island. Yet the admiral on the spot remained unconvinced that the Spanish offer was suitable to his fleet's goals and refused to commit to Mahon. William III finally ordered Russell to winter his fleet at Cadiz, which the fleet did from 1694 to 1696.[18]

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[17] Donaldson, "Port Mahon," 428.
[18] Donaldson, "Port Mahon," 428–32.

However useful Cadiz may have been, the Spanish port fell to the French in 1698, ending English possession of a crucial naval base near the Mediterranean.[19]

The death of Spanish King Charles II in 1700 brought forth a long-simmering concern regarding Spanish dynastic succession. Who would assume the throne, and how would they align? England, the Dutch Republic, and Austria assured France that if a relative of French King Louis XIV assumed the throne, the war would commence between France and England. Averting war would require assurances for England that its maritime trade routes through the Mediterranean would be secure. The threats had no effect, as Louis proclaimed his grandson King of Spain and sent French troops into Spain.[20]

English strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession had two main components: first, a combined army comprised of soldiers from across the Grand Alliance, and second, a combined naval force able to isolate France economically. The latter would operate in the Mediterranean, and operations to attack the French fleet while at anchor or underway began in earnest in late 1701. The loss of Cadiz in 1702 meant that the Royal Navy needed an adequate naval port from which to support operations in the Western Mediterranean. Adding Portugal to the Grand Alliance helped by providing access to the port of Lisbon, though it was still 350 miles away from the Strait of Gibraltar.[21]

France knew the damage the Grand Alliance could inflict in the Mediterranean. As early as 1700, Louis XIV requested the Junta of Regency in Spain to take steps to secure and strengthen their ports, especially Cadiz, Port Mahon, and Gibraltar. Spain hoped to deny the Royal Navy access to key positions within the Mediterranean.[22] France ultimately aimed to split

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[19] Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, 1:188.
[20] Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession*, 11–13, 58–59.
[21] Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession*, 71–71, 80–81.
[22] Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, 1:194.

the Grand Alliance by leveraging dynastic relationships and creating battlefield setbacks that would exploit long-simmering fissures.

The campaigns of 1702, 1703, and 1704 were met with varying degrees of success and failure for the Grand Alliance. The Duke of Marlborough won victories in Cologne on land in 1702 but was defeated at sea in Italy. The strengthened French Army in Italy proved much too difficult to dislodge, but prospects improved when Savoy joined the Grand Alliance in 1703. However, by late 1703 the situation in Germany had turned against the Grand Alliance with a series of defeats and no further gains. The tide turned again in 1704 as the Grand Alliance strengthened.[23]

Eager to expand the war in the Mediterranean, the Duke of Marlborough had long set his sight on Toulon, the home port of the influential French fleet. Toulon's position in the Mediterranean gave Louis XIV easy access to the Mediterranean from which France's offensive operations could be supported. In 1704, as previously discussed, a combined Anglo-Dutch force under Admiral John Byng seized Gibraltar, demonstrating the effectiveness of combined and joint operations in the Mediterranean. By 1707 Marlborough assembled another Anglo-Dutch force to try to attack and seize Toulon.

First, Marlborough understood a base was required to support the attack on Toulon. Gibraltar was not enough, and Minorca was the obvious choice. Fresh from victories in Spain and the siege of Barcelona, General Stanhope was well-positioned to continue the offensive into the Mediterranean. Stanhope, as the commander of all forces in Spain, had a unified military force able to execute this operation. Lastly, such an operation would deny France a key location in the Western Mediterranean. With the full support of the Duke of Marlborough, who had long

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[23] Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession*, 107–112.

sought a winter port for the English fleet, Stanhope assembled his force for the assault on Minorca and its significant port at Mahon.

The Capture of Minorca

Stanhope's early assessments were that without Admiral Leake's naval force, his ability to reduce Fort St. Philip at Mahon was in serious doubt. The fort possessed thick walls, elevated positioning, and excellent artillery lines that could range many avenues of approach. The fortress's relative proximity to the town of St. Philip was a key point of weakness which provided an advancing force cover from small arms fire and, to a greater extent, concealment against the defenders. Families and businesses supporting the encamped Spanish garrison occupied the towns, and many houses and buildings were not easily removed (Figure 2).

Fortunately, Stanhope found in Admiral Leake a naval compatriot who assiduously prepared for the naval role in the operation to seize Minorca. In a stroke of early command and control mastery, Admiral Leake dispatched a squadron under the command of Sir Edward Whitaker that would later prove pivotal in bombarding the key towns at Port Fornell and



Figure 2: *A draught of the town and harbour of Mahon*, 1756, accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_Y-4-89.

Ciutadella. Whitaker commanded a squadron during the critical bombardment phase of the assault on Gibraltar. With Whitaker now in direct support of Stanhope, the operation commenced.

On September 14, 1708, Stanhope and his force landed in a narrow cove, one of many that dot the island's rugged terrain features.[24] In command of about 2,000 soldiers and Marines, Stanhope outnumbered the island's garrison force, estimated to be between 1,000 and 1,500 defenders.[25]

Once ashore, Stanhope made his way to his first objective on the outskirts of Minorca's central town of Ciutadella. The rugged terrain and the lack of developed roads hampered the movement of his forces, but once he arrived, the city surrendered without a fight. Concurrently, Port Fornell became the amphibious force's primary target and was captured after a minor

[24] R.G. Thurburn, "The Capture of Minorca, 1708." Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 55, no. 222 (1977): 68.
[25] Baldwin, *The Importance of the Island of Minorca*, 9.

engagement. With the northwestern portion of the island firmly in control, Stanhope marched his force across the island to the outskirts of Fort St. Philip. Stanhope surrounded the garrison and began to batter the fortress, its thick walls and stone embarkments initially withstanding the barrage, but eventually, it gave way.[26] Realizing they were doomed, the French and Spanish defenders quickly surrendered the garrison. Stanhope, the Duke of Marlborough, and Britain had their naval base in the Mediterranean.

Seizing Minorca turned out to be a significantly easier task than maintaining it. The newly arrived garrison found the conditions on the island to be remarkably bleak, with defensive positions in need of significant improvements and the support infrastructure lacking enough depth to support the newly arrived force. Far from Britain, Stanhope faced a precarious situation with Minorca in which managing the challenges associated with occupation turned out to be far more challenging than London had realized.

In a January 1709 letter to Stanhope, Marlborough recognized that the seizure of Minorca had created a significant advantage in trade for Britain. Yet, Marlborough also recognized that Stanhope was "despondent" as he was short of troops, funds, and support from London.[27] Just a few months later, in July 1709, Marlborough recognized that the situation in Minorca was worsening due to the lack of support from London. Marlborough went so far as to encode his correspondence to Stanhope and reiterate that he understood the "many difficulties" Stanhope was under with Minorca but cautioned him to remain patient and "sufficiently sensible of the great obligation they were under" to the Queen and the King who had done much for them all.[28]

The First Occupation

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[26] Thurburn, "The Capture of Minorca, 1708." 70.
[27] John Churchill to James Stanhope, letter, January 26, 1709, box U1590, folder 0139, Stanhope of Chevening Manuscripts, Correspondence and Military Papers, Kent Archives, Registration, & Libraries.
[28] John Churchill to James Stanhope, letter, July 31, 1709, Stanhope of Chevening Manuscripts.

Britain's formal occupation of Minorca had three principal periods. The first occupation lasted from 1708 to 1756, the second from 1763 to 1782, and the third from 1798 to 1802. Each period of the occupation of Minorca occurred during varying political, military, and economic circumstances that shaped Britain's occupation of the island. During the first period of occupation, Britain encountered its greatest challenges but also made its most significant investment. The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht ended Britain's participation in the War of Spanish Succession and secured Minorca, its inhabitants, and Gibraltar.[29] The Royal Navy could now focus on constructing the naval base at Mahon.

The Royal Navy quickly came upon early problems that it had encountered during momentary periods of use in the late seventeenth century: the lack of sufficient local resources to sustain the fleet. England's early arrival into Minorca provided unique insight into the limited resources within the island. Environmentally, the island received infrequent rain, and agriculture was limited to a few clear areas that the rocky terrain allowed. Livestock on the island mostly provided sustenance to the island's rural inhabitants, and any excess was insufficient to support a moored fleet. The lack of local resources was enough to initially deter stationing a fleet at Port Mahon soon after Minorca's capture. Admiral Whitaker refused to winter his fleet at Port Mahon in the days after its capture, citing its lack of resources and supplies.[30] Admiral Byng arrived a few months later with supplies and adequate personnel to support the internal logistics of Port Mahon.

The island's greatest resource, its large harbor, required significant improvements to support the fleet. The remarkable size of the harbor did not necessarily compensate for the lack of infrastructure. The lack of sufficient forests on the island meant that all wood needed to be

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[29] Baldwin, *The Importance of the Island of Minorca*, 12–13.
[30] Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, 1:308-309.

imported to the barren island. Drying sheds, piers, dry-docks, and offload sites were deficient and needed to be quickly assembled. Adding to the harbor's lack of infrastructure was the vertical terrain and poor roads from the harbor, which meant that what could be offloaded by hand from ships would face the nearly impossible task of transporting the critical goods to the garrisoned forces at Fort St. Philip.

One of the more remarkable aspects of Britain's early possession of Minorca was the Hospital that was constructed soon after the seizure of the island. Convinced that the island required a naval hospital, the Admiralty Sick and Hurt Board Commissioners sent Pierce Griffyth to report and offer a recommendation in early 1709. Soon after that, Griffyth submitted a design that would cost nearly £9,000.[31] The exceedingly expensive and ambitious design received only silence from the Admiralty. Consequently, in 1711, Admiral Jennings personally authorized the construction of a slightly modified design. Admiral Jennings was later suspended from his post for this unauthorized commitment of funds, and it took years to obtain reimbursement for his expenditure.[32]

Construction soon began in 1711 of a Naval Hospital that would become the largest of its kind outside of Britain until the nineteenth century.[33] Occupying a small island within the Port of Mahon named Bloody Island, it cared for the growing army garrison, naval personnel, and passing merchant ships. Equipped with relatively modern facilities, the Naval Hospital also contained a quarantine ward with the ability to quarantine visiting ships.[34] Yet this remarkable medical care far from Britain's shores became a financial burden. Still, its sheer size,

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[31] Fundación Hospital de la Isla del Rey, "El Hospital De La Isla Del Rey Del Puerto De Mahón," (Menorca: Fundación Hospital de la Isla del Rey, 2016). 61

[32] David Whamond Donaldson, "Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century" (PhD thesis, The Open University, 1994), 3:60.

[33] Hospital de la Isla del Rey, "El Hospital De La Isla Del Rey Del Puerto De Mahón," 51.

[34] Hospital de la Isla del Rey, "El Hospital De La Isla Del Rey Del Puerto De Mahón," 216.

architectural style, and capabilities would, in the words of one architectural historian, "evoke patriotism, commemorate the British monarchy, and advertise a sophisticated level of logistical and scientific competence that entitled colonizers to rule hundreds of miles from home."[35]

So devoid of laborers was the island that in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, Spain promised to detach laborers and other merchants to Minorca to support British occupation. The skilled labor shortfall was not the only challenge. The island's native occupants were devout Catholics who shared many of Spain's religious and cultural attributes. Many were farmers, and a small but growing trading economy flourished on the island, taking advantage of the island's strategic position in the Western Mediterranean. Early and frequent confrontations between the island inhabitants and the garrisoned force were commonplace. The garrison also served as the local constables, managing day-to-day policing and disputes between the local inhabitants and serving to tamp down rising opposition to British rule. Minorca's influential governing council, the Jurats, was the most significant source of the island's opposition. These appointed Jurats were the island's political, economic, and social elite. Their heavy influence on the island's population could rapidly solve governance issues and turn simple administrative actions into turmoil-filled affairs. Frequent issues often arose between the Jurats and the Governors, leading to the Jurats establishing an Ambassador to London to air their grievances to the Crown directly.[36]

Religious differences between the British Protestants and the island's sizeable Catholic population were often-underlying points of conflict. As per the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain was responsible for the island's population's religious care. However, successive governors believed that the local Catholic Priests were primarily responsible for the growing distrust and hatred

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[35] Ann-Marie Akehurst, "The Hospital de La Isla Del Rey, Minorca: Britain's Island Hospital," *Architectural History* 53 (2010): 26.
[36] Donaldson, "Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century," 3:408.

between the Minorcans and the garrison. A source of frequent religious concern was approval for a Spanish Catholic Bishop to visit Minorca to provide religious care. It was not until the second period of British occupation that a Bishop finally arrived, in 1782.[37] The British Governor's treatment of the island's religious concerns would become a compounding factor during the successful French attack in 1756, where many of the island's local male population did not participate in the island's defense. Many local Minorcan people believed the French would return Catholic support to the island's starved religious population. Compounding the strained relationship was how Britain deployed forces abroad.

Britain frequently deployed army battalions for significant multi-year periods. Most of the battalions sent to Minorca were commanded by English officers from relatively elite backgrounds who often delegated the highly demanding constabulary duties to Irish and Scottish soldiers. Posting to Minorca was not a sought-after assignment; although officers could generally bring families, the average soldier could not afford or attain permission for such a luxury.[38] At Minorca, heavy drinking, suicide, and self-mutilation were common attempts to escape the island's difficulties. When not on guard duty, the average soldier was assigned hard labor to improve the island's defenses or the daily and grinding tasks associated with life in a regiment far from England. Morale was often low, and generally, harsh punishment deterred the worst behaviors.

A 1720 letter from a Member of Parliament to the King described how growing accusations of misconduct by British soldiers against the local Minorcan population were so egregious that they demanded a response from Parliament in a "concern for the justice and

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[37] Donaldson, "Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century," 3:474.
[38] McGuffie, T. H. "The Strength of the Garrison of Minorca, 1756." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 28, no. 115 (1950): 134.

honour of Great Britain."[39] The deteriorating discipline amongst the soldiers that comprised the garrison at Mahon resulted in crimes against women and children. The threat to the population was sufficient that the unnamed MP described the panic amongst the population from the continuous number of rapes and murders committed by Britain's soldiers. The situation in Minorca was often dire, and a garrison commander at the time believed "his Majesty's faithful subjects of Minorca have no prospect but of utter ruin."[40] Such were the conditions between British soldiers and the island's local inhabitants.

As was customary at the time, most British Governors of overseas territories lived in Britain. The distance between the Governor and the governed often presented various management problems that quickly became critical issues throughout the Empire. During Britain's first occupation, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Kane was directed by Queen Anne to assume the role of Civil Governor for the newly acquired territory in 1712. Unlike other Governors, Kane physically moved to Minorca and was personally involved in the island development efforts during the early challenging occupation periods from 1712 to 1715. Kane was later appointed Lieutenant Governor of Minorca while the title of Governor passed to the Duke of Argyll (who remained in the British Isles), and he thrived in this role. During this period, Kane brought standards to weight and measures, introduced the latest farming methods, and constructed new roads and improvements to Port Mahon. These efforts have largely been lauded through the years and are widely recognized by Spain as important British contributions.[41]

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[39] Anonymous, *The Distress'd Condition of Minorca, Set Forth in Answer to the Vindication of Colonel Kane* (London, 1720), 7.
[40] *The Distress'd Condition of Minorca*, 19.
[41] Hospital de la Isla del Rey, "El Hospital De La Isla Del Rey Del Puerto De Mahón," 103.

Kane's best efforts still cultivated significant animosity amongst the local population, and in 1720 he was charged with religious negligence of the local Minorcan population. His vindication against these accusations came through an appeal to Parliament and a detailed defense against the charges brought forth by the Spanish Ambassador in London.[42] The growing divide between the governed and the Governor increased animosity against British military rule and exacerbated the challenges associated with the occupation of Minorca.

Additionally, the tumultuous occupation of the island was further complicated by incidents of prostitution, illicit affairs, and illegal liaisons, which gave birth to children and relationships. The relatively isolated population quickly became exposed to the pressures of occupation, suffering from diseases, epidemics, and the occasional famine.[43] Records indicate that the impacts of the English occupation introduced a general strain on the population, leading to an increasing birth rate near Mahon that soared well above that of the other main towns. At the same time, life expectancy hovered around 28 years, well below that of England, 43 years.[44] Minorca's population pressures and their effects were compounded by the significant population increase at Mahon, which from 1713 went from 6,341 to just over 14,000 inhabitants by 1781.[45] Although infrastructure improvements on the island occurred under the English occupation, the lack of arable land and isolation from the mainland prevented a corresponding increase in local food production. [46]

Lastly, Minorca tested Britain's overseas basing strategy that had long relied on co-opted facilities in far-flung locales. Additionally, Minorca offered little indigenous supply for a

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[42] Anonymous, *A Vindication of Colonel Kane, Lt-Governor of Minorca against the late complaints made against him by the Inhabitants of the Island* (London, 1720), 2-5.
[43] *A Vindication of Colonel Kane*, 450, 466, 469–70.
[44] Donaldson, "Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century," 3:469
[45] Donaldson, "Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century," 3:467
[46] Donaldson, "Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century," 3:426, 448-449.

garrisoned force. Far from Britain, the military Governors faced the problematic realities of possessing this strategic location. The difficulties aside, Minorca's occupation solved significant strategic issues for Britain. Ultimately, Britain owned a critical naval base to provide strategic deterrence to continental powers and the protection of the merchant fleets.

Admiral Byng and the failure to reinforce Minorca:

Admiral Byng set sail to Minorca on April 6, 1756, at the outbreak of the Seven Years War, to reinforce the garrison at Port Mahon.[47] Byng led an insufficient numbers of ships, many of which were short of crew and in desperate need of repair.[48] Minorca's British garrison of three thousand troops was split across several sites, including the port complex, security within the population centers, and the bulk of the force garrisoned at the crumbling fortress of St. Philip.

The French force led by Admiral La Galissoneiere beat Byng to the island, arriving in mid-April with a strong force.[49] The French landed troops at one of Minorca's many inlets and coves when Admiral Byng neared Minorca. The following naval engagement was indecisive, and Admiral Byng decided to conduct a war council aboard his flagship.[50] His officers then recommended a withdrawal in hopes of obtaining reinforcements from nearby Gibraltar, thereby abandoning the surrounded British garrison to its fate.

The British defenders gave a spirited defense, though they were outnumbered and surrounded with no hope of escape. The garrison surrendered to the French on May 27, 1756, and the garrison commander was recognized for his spirited defense; Admiral Byng was court-

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[47] Herbert W. Richmond, *Papers relating to the loss of Minorca in 1756*, (London: Navy Records Society, 1913), 6.
[48] Richmond, *Papers relating to the loss of Minorca in 1756*, xxi.
[49] Richmond, *Papers relating to the loss of Minorca in 1756*, x.
[50] Richmond, *Papers relating to the loss of Minorca in 1756*, 6.

martialed and shot on the quarterdeck of his flagship for failing to do his utmost.[51] The outcry from London was significantly heightened after a series of overseas losses.[52]

Despite Byng's failure, in 1763, the Treaty of Paris returned Minorca to Britain after the Allied victory over France. Given all the logistical obstacles they encountered during the first occupation, it is fair to ask why Britain wanted Minorca back. Ministers in London seemed more enthusiastic about Minorca than the armed services did. From a strategic deterrence perspective, possessing Minorca offered the Royal Navy a critical position for when and if Britain was to return to military operations against France. Britain's ability to react to a French fleet underway or operate against Toulon was essential. Britain could also support other friendly or allied powers throughout the region from the Mediterranean. Possession of Minorca also allowed Britain to deny the port to any other regional power. Prominent British merchants argued this position, believing that if Minorca were relinquished, all the benefits would be turned against Britain's concerns. Pamphlets and speeches often circulated throughout Parliament that advocated for the possession of Minorca to shape the geopolitical outcome in the Mediterranean. Minorca's most significant value lay in the protection of the critical Mediterranean trade, specifically its proximity to crucial ports in Italy. Reaching the Italian ports was frequently hazardous as merchant ships crossed across the face of both French naval bases and Corsair bases.[53] The sheer number of hazards, either by enemies or the challenging conditions in the Mediterranean, required protection that only the Royal Navy's possession of Minorca could

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[51] Richmond, *Papers relating to the loss of Minorca in 1756*, xi-xii.
[52] Daniel A Baugh, "Byng, John (bap. 1704, d. 1757), naval officer." *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.* 23 Sep 23, 2004.
[53] Baldwin, *The Importance of the Island of Minorca*, 16.

support. Trade from the Mediterranean outperformed all other foreign trade routes throughout seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[54]

The Second Occupation:

Britain's return to Port Mahon only minimally altered the logistical situation on Minorca. The French had made no significant improvements to the port, the facilities, or the island's defenses. From 1763 onwards, Britain substantially improved Fort St. Philip and built warehouses throughout the harbor. Additionally, London financed structural improvements to the island's sizable Hospital that served the flourishing merchant trade in the Mediterranean.

In 1781 a combined French and Spanish naval force returned to test these new defenses. Unlike the previous siege by French forces, the combined force was substantially more significant but encountered a better-prepared defense. The British could effectively defend for months until help arrived. Initial French and Spanish assumptions were that the garrison would surrender upon seeing the overwhelming combined fleet, but no such surrender was forthcoming. French and Spanish forces prepared to bombard Fort St. Philip but found British cannons and artillery well-positioned to respond. The garrison's nearly 3,000 defenders faced a formidable force of nearly 14,000. However, the British troops stored sufficient food and water for the defenders to hold out. With the first attack beginning in August 1781, it was not until late January 1782 that food began to run out. With scurvy rampant amongst the defenders, General Murray faced little choice but to surrender his force.

News of the surrender reached London, and General Murray faced Parliament's inquiry regarding his forces' surrender. Like Admiral Byng, Murray stood trial and was found guilty of

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[54] Baldwin, *The Importance of the Island of Minorca*, 16, 49; Donaldson, "Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century," 3:37.

two offenses related to the surrender, but unlike Byng, Murray was allowed to stay in the Army. Again, the Royal Navy failed to provide timely aid to the isolated force at Minorca, and again, London faced the prospect of recovering a critical base in the Mediterranean. This time, however, the British chose not to demand Minorca back during negotiations at the end of the war, for two reasons. First, London was aware by 1782 of the rising costs necessary to fortify and garrison a force effectively so far from Britain that had been repeatedly beaten, unlike Gibraltar. After all, the siege of 1781 had largely destroyed the island's defensive fortifications, storehouses, and the key Fort St. Philip.[55] Secondly, Britain was negotiating from a weaker position in 1782–83 than it had been twenty years earlier, and conceding Spanish ownership of Minorca helped bring the war to an end.[56]

The Third Occupation

In 1798, the British found themselves on the defensive in the Mediterranean. Sir Horatio Nelson was in charge of a detached squadron aimed at preventing a French amphibious expedition from wreaking havoc on Britain's Mediterranean allies. Napoleon Bonaparte, commanding the expedition, evaded Nelson and even managed in June 1798 to capture Malta. Additionally, Bonaparte was able to conduct landings in Egypt a few weeks later. But Nelson's victory at the Battle of the Nile left the British in a strong naval position in the Mediterranean. That provided a window for the British to recapture Minorca from Spain.[57]

When British forces arrived off Minorca, they found approximately 4,000 Spanish soldiers defending the island.[58] General Charles Stuart, the British army commander, along with

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[55] C. T. Atkinson, "Minorca and the Navy in 1799: The Fleet and the Security of its Bases," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 31, no. 125 (1953): 26

[56] Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1660-1783*, (New York, NY: Sagamore Press, 1957), 474, 481-482

[57] Lord, *England and France in the Mediterranean*, 49–51.

[58] J. W. Fortescue, *A History of The British Army*, (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1915), 4: 616.

Commodore John Duckworth, had no immediate orders to seize Minorca but general orders to "cruise off the harbor for intelligence."[59] When nothing of value was detected, Stuart led a force into the Bay of Addaya on the island's northeastern coast, while a Duckworth feinted to the west and into the inlet at the Fornelles.[60] Once near the shore, the Spanish destroyed their battery fortifications and spiked the cannons. At nearly that exact moment, Stuart witnessed a sizable explosion to the west and realized the small fortress at Fornelles had also been blown by its defenders. Soon the British expedition had 800 men ashore when nearly 2,000 Spanish soldiers appeared nearing his position.[61] HMS *Argo* bombarded the Spanish forces, which soon scattered. The accurate shore bombardment allowed Stuart to disembark his force and rapidly take the surrounding high ground, where his force began moving towards Mercadal, a small town in the center of the island and at the junction of the island's key roads.[62]

Along the way to Mercadal, Stuart determined that approximately 4,000 Spanish defenders were scattered throughout the island. Seizing Mercadal allowed Stuart to split the island's main communications route and road network, thereby cutting off what remained of the Spanish forces on the island's western portion and isolating what was to the east.[63] Meanwhile, Duckworth could offload critical supplies rapidly and additional troops that soon arrived in Mercadal. When the offload was complete, Duckworth instinctively moved to the Port of Mahon, believing this was Stuart's final destination. This movement by Duckworth had two critical effects on the Spanish. First, the ships were now available for shore bombardment; second, they had a tremendous impact on the fighting spirit of the Spanish. Soon, Stuart was seizing small

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[59] "Principal Occurrences," *The New Annual Register, Or General Repository of History, Politics, Arts, Sciences, and Literature, for the Year 1798* (London, 1799), 156.
[60] Fortescue, *A History of The British Army,* 616.
[61] Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, 616.
[62] "Principal Occurrences," 156.
[63] Fortescue, *A History of The British Army*, 617.

groups of fleeing Spanish soldiers who had been left behind or slowed by the weight of supplies and equipment.[64]

Stuart then dispatched 300 soldiers to reconnoiter the town of Mahon at the port's sizable terminus.[65] British troops found the port largely abandoned. With Duckworth now at the mouth of Port Mahon, Stuart could now concentrate on attacking Fort St. Philip. Meanwhile, on the opposite end of Minorca at the fortress of Ciudadella, Stuart had dispatched 600 troops to ascertain the enemy's strength. When British troops were sighted approaching the town of Ciudadella, the fort's namesake, the Spanish Governor sought surrender terms. Stuart readily admitted that his force had created a frontage nearly four miles wide to convince the defenders at Ciudadella that the British force was much larger than it was.[66]

Now that Minorca's Spanish defenders had surrendered mainly in all the outlying positions, Stuart could concentrate his naval and ground forces on the remaining Spanish position at Fort St. Philip. With Duckworth's ships now inside Port Mahon, a shore bombardment began that scattered troops into the fortress's walls. Using this cover, Stuart pressed his forces ever closer to the fort, using the town of St. Philip as cover. Stuart soon brought the Spanish Governor to address the garrison's defenders to convince them to surrender, which they did on November 15, 1798.[67]

Once again in possession of Minorca, the British could have tried to invest in its defenses and infrastructure, but in the decades since they were last there, they had built sufficient logistical support improvements at Gibraltar and Malta. The heavy financial investment required to return Minorca to its previous standing as a formidable naval port was far too burdensome.

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[64] "Principal Occurrences," 156.
[65] Fortescue, *A History of The British Army*, 617.
[66] Fortescue, *A History of The British Army,* 618.
[67] Fortescue, *A History of The British Army*, 619.

Just a few years later, in 1802, the Treaty of Amiens returned Minorca to Spain; although this decision was opposed by the Admiralty, the prospect of peace with Spain proved far too great an opportunity. Britain returned its tumultuous Western Mediterranean base to Spain with little fanfare.

Conclusion

In all three occupations, key issues remained unresolved for Britain. Possession of Minorca, especially Port Mahon, resolved some of the strategic issues but also created new strategic issues. When Stanhope first seized the island, he and Marlborough failed to understand the immense logistical difficulties of supporting a fleet far from Britain, as well as the difficulties that an army garrison would encounter. Efforts to circumvent the logistics by sourcing through local resources failed to meet all of Britain's needs. The logistical issues became most apparent during Admiral Byng's failed attempt at reinforcing the island against the French attack. The outcry from London from the government and public opinion appeared to exceed the Royal Navy's willingness to maintain an island it could hardly support.

During the second occupation period, many of the same logistical issues remained unresolved. Roads remained poor, relations with the local population continued to decline, and the overall population rapidly increased yearly. The isolated garrison of 3,000 defenders far from home and with little hope of reinforcement by sea faced the daunting task of holding against an attacking force of 14,000 Spanish and French troops. Again, lengthy lines of communication and logistics doomed the spirited force, and Britain's repossession of Minorca by treaty could not overcome the complex logistical undertaking required to maintain Minorca.

During England's third occupation, the most short-lived of them all, the same logistical problems that had plagued previous occupation periods remained unresolved. By now, the

Admiralty was ambivalent towards Minorca. The significant harbor at Mahon created far greater challenges than solved. The British garrison at Mahon was required to manage a fleet and a miserable garrison, negotiate with the island's population, support their economic livelihood, and defend against an attack, all while knowing that reinforcements were likely to arrive too late.

Logistics prevented Britain from realizing the benefits of an advanced naval base far from home in highly contested waters. Britain's outposts on Malta (in the seventeenth century), Tangier, and Minorca suffered from similar logistical challenges that made resupply and defense equally difficult. Tangier was difficult to defend and not economically viable; Malta was very far away; and Minorca was expensive to maintain and vulnerable to a quick French strike. Proximity to capable military forces meant a garrisoned force without an attached naval fleet ready to defend it would not survive the opening of a war.

In some ways, Gibraltar was the exception in the eighteenth century. It offered London two distinct advantages. First, the isolated position on the Iberian Peninsula meant that a small garrisoned force could more easily defend Gibraltar against attack. Spain's repeated sieges of Gibraltar could be broken by resupplying the garrison by sea. Second, the location at the entrance of the Mediterranean Sea meant that detecting enemy fleets from the narrow mouth was always worth some military and financial cost. However, Gibraltar could never be made big enough to support a large fleet simply because of the geography of the Rock. Malta eventually solved these problems, but not until after the end of the long-term competition with France.

Unlike Gibraltar, Minorca's size, with its numerous coves and bays, provided an invading force with plenty of opportunity to land forces uncontested and generally with sufficient concealment to protect the naval ships and the embarked landing force. Most acutely, the frequently undermanned British forces on Minorca were much too isolated and without nearby

assistance that could provide reinforcements or rescue. Crucially, Minorca's size was far too great to defend effectively and, combined with the undulating terrain, demanded defensible positions at every ridge, hilltop, and crossroads. These requirements exceeded the available forces on the island and, more importantly, the constabulary construct of the British regiments. In effect, Britain deployed a force sufficient to police and garrison the principal fortress at Mahon rather than defend against an invading ground and naval force.

Lessons for Force Design 2030

Force Design (F.D.) 2030 has provided direction and speed to better compete with the People's Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific for the Marine Corps. Specifically, the August 2021 update to F.D. 2030 stated that the "Stand-in force must remain resilient, under demanding conditions. When other joint force elements are outside the Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ), preparing for deliberate surge layer missions, our forward elements will maneuver in the littorals to disrupt adversary operations."[68] The Marine Corps should look to British naval operations in the Mediterranean during the age of sail. Britain experienced many of the same strategic and operational challenges that the Marine Corps is now coming to terms with.

The seizure of Minorca solved several strategic problems for Britain: It Provided a warm water port with sufficient draft to moor its top-tier ships-of-the-line to winter the fleet far from home and conduct critical logistics and repairs. It provided a staging base to project power in the Mediterranean, initially to deter piracy, then to intercept the French fleet. It meant Britain could defend its most critical aspect of national power, its maritime economy. These familiar strategic problems are relatable and relevant for today's Marine Corps as it sets its sights on how it employs its newly created littoral forces. However, with strategic success came new challenges

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[68] David H. Berger, *Force Design 2030: Annual Update April 2021* (Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, 2021). 6-7.

that tormented the political and military leadership and led to its demise as an advanced naval base that the Marine Corps must be wary of.

First, the lack of indigenous resources at Minorca constrained British operations throughout the region. The British were able to support their forces through a layered and highly intensive process of forward provisioning (foraging) throughout the Mediterranean. Frequently, the British ordered passing merchant ships to sell a portion of their cargo to the garrison at Port Mahon. Often, the British were forced to sail to local markets throughout the Mediterranean for local goods or endure the months-long wait for resupply from Britain. With lines of communication reaching back to Britain, the Royal Navy used what local resources were available. Only under the greatest priority were resources shipped in from Britain, and as this essay has demonstrated, those long supply lines could not respond quickly enough to French and Spanish attacks.

The Marine Corps must augment its current burdensome logistical system with the ability to Forward Provision (forage). Clearly this is not a new problem for the Marine Corps in the Indo-Pacific, as the lack of resupply doomed U.S. forces during the siege of Corregidor from 1941 to 1942. How will the Marine Corps equip its advanced bases to survive the opening rounds of a war without resupply?

Port Mahon remains, to this day, the largest naturally protected port in the world. Yet, Port Mahon's size could not overcome many of its flaws. British naval officers appreciated the safe, sheltered anchorage, but the narrow harbor mouth and the prevailing northerly winds made entry and exit challenging. Port Mahon's narrow entry also made the risk of blockade a pervasive concern.

The U.S. Marine Corps must carefully select sites based on various operational and logistical challenges. Choosing advanced naval base locations incorrectly in the Indo-Pacific may create more problems than the service tries to solve. What are the geographic requirements for an advanced base?

Britain was keenly aware of its strategic priorities in the Mediterranean: deter France from inflicting harm to Britain's critical and lucrative trade routes, and, if necessary, wage war in the Mediterranean to protect its trade. Britain's investment in Minorca was in keeping with this singular focus of its strategic priorities. Today, a combatant commander will inherit the basing solution of his predecessors, the sometimes-onerous priorities of his subordinate services, political influence from Washington, and the limited realities of defense spending. Here too, Minorca offers a critical lesson in strategic priorities. Minorca protected Britain's source of strength: its economy. The Marine Corps should focus squarely on strategic national priorities when selecting where to position its next Expeditionary Advance Base. What are U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, and which possible bases provide the best location from which to safeguard those interests?

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Appendix:

1. Ralph Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700," *The Economic History Review* 7, no. 2 (1954): 163–166.

Analysis of foreign trade, 1663/69 and 1699–1701 (£000)

(i) London, average of 1663 and 1669; (ii) London, average of 1699, 1700 and 1701; (iii) England, average of 1699, 1700 and 1701

	Total			Area I			Area II			Area III			Area IV			Area V			Area VI		
Imports	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)
Linens	582	755	903	570	678	798	6	45	48	—	—	—	6	32	57	—	—	—	—	—	—
Calicoes	182	367	367	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	182	367	367
Silks etc.	215	208	208	81	18	18	—	—	—	105	83	83	—	—	—	—	—	—	29	107	107
Thread	141	74	79	141	74	79	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Metal manufactures	73	55	72	70	47	63	3	8	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Misc. manufactures	99	158	215	74	47	57	4	2	2	17	26	28	—	5	50	—	—	—	4	78	78
Total manufactures	1,292	1,617	1,844	936	864	1,015	13	55	59	122	109	111	6	37	107	—	—	—	215	552	552
Wine and brandy	144	467	546	64	47	48	—	—	—	80	426	496	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sugar and molasses	292	526	630	—	—	—	—	—	—	36	—	—	—	—	—	256	526	630	—	—	—
Tobacco	70	161	249	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	69	161	249	—	—	—
Fruit	196	135	174	3	6	9	—	—	—	193	129	165	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pepper	80	103	103	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	80	103	103
Misc. foodstuffs	169	191	267	74	40	51	4	8	9	31	76	86	6	—	44	22	36	46	26	31	31
Total foods	943	1,583	1,969	141	87	108	4	8	9	341	631	747	6	—	46	347	723	925	106	134	134
Silk, raw and thrown	263	344	346	—	1	1	—	—	—	262	301	302	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	42	42
Flax and hemp	86	116	194	26	3	8	56	112	185	4	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Wool	29	67	200	2	—	—	1	2	2	26	62	73	—	—	122	—	—	—	—	3	3
Textile yarns	83	169	232	17	124	141	—	3	3	55	37	37	3	1	47	—	—	—	8	4	4
Dyes	146	203	226	36	34	41	—	—	—	91	90	92	—	—	—	3	71	85	16	8	8
Iron and steel	67	118	182	19	3	8	42	103	149	6	12	24	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Timber	106	96	138	6	19	26	97	64	96	—	1	1	3	—	1	—	12	14	—	—	—
Oil	151	105	141	20	1	1	—	4	4	131	94	117	—	—	—	—	6	19	—	—	—
Tallow	1	10	85	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	9	84	—	—	—	—	—	—
Misc. materials	326	239	292	78	59	69	59	62	75	47	46	50	8	8	22	71	51	63	63	13	13
Total raw materials	1,258	1,467	2,096	204	244	295	255	351	515	622	644	697	15	18	277	74	140	182	88	70	70
Total imports	3,495	4,667	5,849	1,281	1,195	1,418	272	414	583	1,085	1,384	1,535	27	55	430	421	863	1,107	409	736	756

2. Portolan Map, Mediterranean.



3. Portolan Chart with local allegiance and port significance in red.