Software Bugs Go Nuclear
Abstract
In nuclear weapons, software testing cannot meet the high standards for weapon security, safety, and reliability - specifically, the Walske criteria that require the weapons have no more than a one-in-a-billion chance of producing an accidental yield under routine conditions, and no more than a one-in-a-million chance in abnormal environments (for example, in a fire). The new risks that result from digital design will thus require changes in the basic approach to both weapon design and testing. This requires two fundamental changes to the current approach. First, test weapons and real weapons should be nearly identical - this means designing weapons systems to include test equipment like embedded sensors. Second, weapons should be designed with mathematically analyzable software that makes it possible to perform more rigorous and exhaustive digital testing than is currently possible. These two recommendations add up to a single, fundamental change in approach to nuclear weapon design: programs need to "design for test." Weapons with embedded software and firmware cannot meet the Walske criteria without a design-for-test approach.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1204602
Entities
People
- Laura W. Epifanovskaya
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses