The Failures of the Russian Aerospace Force in Ukraine
Abstract
Since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, one of the enduring questions of the conflict concerns Russia's misuse of air power. Choosing to forego offensive air operations to establish air superiority - or even air supremacy - over Ukraine, the Russian leadership has limited its Russian Aerospace Force (VKS) to conducting long-range cruise missile and drone strikes from within the bastion of its national borders or worse, dangerous low-altitude strikes in the heart of Man Portable Air Defense (MANPAD) and Air Defense Artillery (ADA) engagement zones. Why has Russia not taken advantage of its numerical and technological air advantage over Ukraine to seize the skies? While analysis of Russia's failure to achieve air superiority has tended to focus on the technical-tactical features of the conflict, few have offered a Russian perspective on the VKS' challenges. Piecing together pre-war Russian thought on VKS operations reveals a set of interwoven challenges that Russia had not yet solved by the outbreak of the war. This includes a strategic priority on defensive over offensive operations, failure to develop sufficient capacity and capability for operations at this scale, and comparatively immature operational concepts. These lessons have critical implications as NATO undergoes major force modernization over the next several years.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 09, 2023
- Accession Number
- AD1206107
Entities
People
- Matthew Galamison
Organizations
- Naval War College