

Software Rejuvenation for Safe Operation of Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of Run-time Cyber Attacks

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Raffaele Romagnoli, Bruce Krogh, **Dionisio de Niz**, Anton Hristozov, Bruno Sinopoli



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

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Outline


1. Introduction to Software Rejuvenation
 - a. Flight Control Software Architecture
 - b. Cyber Attack Exposure
 - c. Software Refresh\Rollback
 - d. Periodic vs Aperiodic SR
2. Proposed Software Rejuvenation Solution
 - a. Ensuring Safety and Safe Tracking
 - b. Software Rejuvenation Scheme
3. Safety and Quadratic Boundedness
 - a. Empirical method for SR design
 - b. Results
4. Conclusions



crazyflie



1 - Introduction to Software Rejuvenation




Mission

- Hovering

Communication

- Connected to the network

1.c - Software Refresh/Rollback



Mission

- Hovering

Communication

- Connected to the network
 - PX4 : Mavlink


Cyber attacks

- On the run-time code

Idea

- **Software Reset/Rollback**

1.d - Periodic vs Aperiodic Rollback



Mission

- Hovering

Communication

- Connected to the network
 - PX4 : Mavlink

Cyber attacks


- On the run-time code

Idea

- **Software Reset/Rollback**

- ★ Periodic Reboot - (Focus on the Security) [Arroyo et al 2017]
- ★ On-line Reach set analysis - (Focus on the Performance) [Abdi et al 2019]

1.d - Periodic vs Aperiodic Rollback



Mission

- Hovering

Communication


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- On the run-time code

Idea


- **Software Reset/Rollback**



- ★ Periodic Reboot - (Focus on the Security) [Arroyo et al 2017]
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


2 - Proposed Software Rejuvenation Solution



- SC - Secure Control
- CP - Checkpoint
- MC - Mission Control
- RB - Rollback

2.a - Ensuring Safety and Safe Tracking




$$\|x - x_{sp}\|_P^2 = (x - x_{sp})^T P (x - x_{sp})$$

$$\mathcal{E}_c = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : \|x - x_{sp}\|_P^2 \leq c\}$$

$$s < m < 1 \Rightarrow \mathcal{E}_s \subset \mathcal{E}_m \subset \mathcal{E}_1$$

2.a - Ensuring Safety and Safe Tracking




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$$s < m < 1 \Rightarrow \mathcal{E}_s \subset \mathcal{E}_m \subset \mathcal{E}_1$$

Lyapunov Theory

$$\dot{x} = f(x) = Ax$$




Lyapunov Function

$$V(x) = \|x - x_{sp}\|_P^2 \quad \dot{V}(x) < 0$$


- \mathcal{E}_c is **positively invariant**

2.a - Ensuring Safety and Safe Tracking




- w_i and w_{i+1} are two waypoints

2.b - Software Rejuvenation Scheme



$$x(t) \longrightarrow \hat{x}(t)$$

3 - Safety and Quadratic Boundedness




Quadratic Boundedness


$$\dot{x} = Ax + Dd, \quad \|d\| \leq \delta$$

$$V(x) = \|x - x_{sp}\|_P^2$$

$$V(x) > \eta \rightarrow \dot{V}(x) < 0$$



3 - Safety and Quadratic Boundedness




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


- Estimation error due to SR.
- Model approximations



0



3.a - Empirical Method for SR Design

$$\|x - x_{sp}\|_P^2 = (x - x_{sp})^T P (x - x_{sp})$$





R. Romagnoli, B.H. Krogh, D. de Niz, A. Hristozov, B. Sinopoli. "Software Rejuvenation for Safe Operation of Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of Run-time Cyber Attacks". IEEE Transactions on Control System Technology. 2023.

3.b - Results




R. Romagnoli, B.H. Krogh, D. de Niz, A. Hristozov, B. Sinopoli. "Software Rejuvenation for Safe Operation of Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of Run-time Cyber Attacks". IEEE Transactions on Control System Technology. 2023.

4 - Conclusions




Romagnoli R, Krogh B.H, DeNiz D, Hristozov A.D, Sinopoli B. (2023). Runtime System Support for CPS Software Rejuvenation. IEE E TRANSACTIONS ON EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTING, ISSN: 2168-6750, doi: 10.1109/TETC.2023.3267899

4 - Implementation



▶ Application vs Kernel level



▶ rollback_handler()

Safety Analysis

- State of the system

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$


- Vector field

$$f(x) = \begin{bmatrix} f_1(x) \\ f_2(x) \end{bmatrix}$$

- Dynamical system

$$\dot{x} = f(x)$$

Positively Invariant



Safety Analysis

6 DOF drone, the state has 12 components



- State of the system

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$


- Vector field

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
- Dynamical system

$$\dot{x} = f(x)$$

Positively Invariant



Software Rejuvenation Safety



Lyapunov level set

$$\Omega_c = \{x \in D \mid V(x) \leq c\}$$

Positively Invariant




Linear Systems

$$\dot{x} = f(x) = Ax$$

$$V(x) = x^T P x$$

$$\mathcal{E}_c = \{x \in D \mid x^T P x \leq c\} \quad \text{Ellipsoid}$$

Example: Drone Hovering



Software Rejuvenation

Mission

- Hovering

Communication

- Connected to the network
 - PX4 : Mavlink


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Idea

- **Software Reset/ Rollback**
- ★ Periodic Reboot
- ★ On-line Reach set analysis
- Trajectory Tracking
- Full information (state) is not available

Example: Drone Hovering




Software Rejuvenation

- Hovering
- Connected to the network
 - PX4 : Mavlink
- Cyber attacks on the run-time code
- Software Refresh

- ★ Periodic Reboot
- ★ On-line Reach set analysis

- Trajectory Tracking
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Proposed Software Rejuvenation Scheme



Software Rejuvenation

- Hovering
- Connected to the network
 - PX4 : Mavlink
- Cyber attacks on the run-time code
- Software Refresh

- ★ Periodic Reboot
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