A Framework of Deterrence in Space Operations
Abstract
The national security and military operations of the United States and many other countries are highly dependent on information derived from and transmitted through space. Over the past two decades, potential adversaries have developed a wide array of increasingly sophisticated means to disrupt or deny the United States and its allies access to their significant advantages in space capabilities. This situation and deepening great-power tensions have given new urgency to understanding the counterspace strategies of potential adversaries and how they can be deterred from taking actions to disrupt or destroy U.S. and allied space assets or be dissuaded from even developing certain counterspace capabilities. Aspects of this topic have been addressed in many excellent studies and reports. However, there is no broadly agreed-on framework in the U.S. and allied governments or the wider analytic community on the nature and requirements of deterrence in space operations. Concepts of conventional and nuclear deterrence are often applied to assessments of deterrence in space, but these concepts have their limits, given certain unique characteristics of the space domain. This report seeks to fill this analytic gap by presenting such a framework, which is comprised of three archetypes for deterrence in the space domain that can be utilized to identify and assess the deterrence strategies of various countries and illuminate how a nation could deter disruptive or destructive attacks on its space assets.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 05, 2023
- Accession Number
- AD1209648
Entities
People
- Alexis A. Blanc
- Nathan Beauchamp-mustafaga
- Nicholas Martin
- Stephen J. Flanagan
Organizations
- RAND Corporation