

REVOLIUTIONIIE PRAVA:
RIGHTS AS WEAPONS IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1893-1917

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Art of War Scholars

by

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ABSTRACT

REVOLIUTSIONIIE PRAVA: RIGHTS AS WEAPONS IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1893-1917, by Major Joseph A. Bedingfield, 137 pages.

In February of 1917 Tsar Nicholas II abdicated the Russian throne and ended the three-century old Romanov dynasty. In October of the same year, the Bolsheviks violently overthrew the interim Provisional Government. The struggle for power in Russia was the biproduct of decades of conflict between the tsar, the Russian people, and intra-revolutionary rivals. This study explores how and to what effect Nicholas II weaponized rights to maintain power, and conversely how and to what effect revolutionaries weaponized rights to gain power. It also analyzes the impact rights as weapons had on the chain of revolutionary events. Given the autocratic tsarist form of government and within the broader struggle for power, rights as weapons played a key role in helping Nicholas II hold off revolution and retain power. In contrast, those who sought to depose the tsar and gain power found themselves at a growing position of advantage. As revolutionaries and ordinary Russian citizens continued to weaponize rights to achieve their ends they slowly chipped away at Nicholas II's total power until the very foundations of Russian social, economic, and military structures were so weak the tsar had no choice but to concede the throne.

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невинным жертвам насильственных диктатур,

мы помним ваш голос.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
TABLES	x
ACRONYMS.....	xi
PREFACE.....	xii
CHAPTER 1 RIGHTS AS WEAPONS	1
Introduction.....	1
Rights as Weapons Framework	4
The Relevance of Rights as Weapons.....	10
Research Structure	13
The Great Reforms: Tsar Alexander II's Shield against Revolution.....	14
CHAPTER 2 REVOLUTION RISING, 1893-1904.....	21
Introduction.....	21
Lenin Emerges: Camouflaged Spears, Wedges, and Rallying Cries.....	22
Rival Revolutionaries: The 1903 Russian Social Democratic Labour Party Congress	28
Preserving Total Autocracy: Tsar Nicholas II's Early Shields, Parries, and Wedges ..	36
A Summary of Rights Tactics, 1893-1904	44
CHAPTER 3 RIGHTS IN REVOLUTION, 1905.....	49
Introduction.....	49
Bloody Sunday: Pushing Rights as Weapons to the Limit	51
Proletarian Peasants: Untapped Dynamite.....	58
The October Manifesto as Shield, Parry, Blockade, and Camouflage	65
A Summary of Rights Tactics in 1905.....	73
CHAPTER 4 AN OPEN ARENA OF COMBAT, 1906-1917.....	77
Introduction.....	77

The Duma: A Rights Battlefield	79
Stolypin's Reforms: The Throne's Last Best Option	84
The Petrograd Soviet: Rights Seizures that Fueled a Revolution	90
Summary of Rights Tactics, 1906-1917	96
CHAPTER 5 ALL FOR NAUGHT – ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!	99
From Revolution to Coup D'état: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917	99
Key Findings	102
Research Implications	106
Conclusion	109
GLOSSARY	111
APPENDIX A COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY (RSDLP).....	113
APPENDIX B COMPLETE TEXT OF THE PROGRAM OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND ORDER NO. 1	115
BIBLIOGRAPHY	117

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Rights as Weapons Framework	7
Figure 2. Updated Rights as Weapons Framework.....	107
Figure 3. Decision and Effect Tree of Authoritarian Governments' Potential Responses to Threats to Their Power	108

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. The “Program-of-the-Five”.....	56

ACRONYMS

MASWMI	Mutual Aid Society of Workers in Machine Industries
RSDLP	Russian Social Democratic Labor Party
SD	Social Democrats (often interchangeable with the RSDLP)
SDP	Soviet of Workers' Deputies
SR	Socialist Revolutionary Party

PREFACE

This research is the culmination of years of interest in Russian history. What started as a fascination with the spirit of the eastern front of World War II grew into a deep appreciation for the incredible complexities of Russian culture. I learned to speak and read Russian and travelled countries not but thirty years removed from the U.S.S.R. In this journey it became quickly apparent that one cannot fully understand Russia without looking at the turn of the twentieth century. This period of Russian history invites one to focus on the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Widely considered one of the most remarkable events in the history of the world, historians are continually drawn to it due to the scope, romanticism, and tragedy behind the story of the fall of the Romanov dynasty. This scope, scale, and depth are precisely what makes researching this period so difficult. Historians disagree on the boundaries of the Russian revolution, namely when it began (most agree that it ended in 1917). This research bounds the revolutionary period between 1893 and 1917, a period that lines up with the reign of Nicholas II.

Due to the breadth of this research, I assume the reader has a basic understanding of the narrative of Russia's revolution. The Bolsheviks did not spontaneously rise up in 1917 – their ascent to power was decades in the making. My research provides what can only be described as a cursory survey of the full narrative of these events. As such, I want to offer two options for companion readings for this research. Sheila Fitzpatrick's *The Russian Revolution* is the seminal undergraduate textbook on Russia's revolution. Her work is the most concise option available to gain a fundamental understanding of the full story and key details of this pivotal moment in history. If the reader wants to gain a deeper understanding, then I recommend Richard Pipes's *A Concise History of the*

Russian Revolution. This work is the biproduct of distilling key points from Pipe's seminal Russian history trilogy (*Russia Under the Old Regime*, *The Russian Revolution*, and *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*) into a succinct narrative. Either of these works are sufficient for a reader to gain a basic understanding of the period of history covered in this research.

CHAPTER 1

RIGHTS AS WEAPONS

Introduction

In 1917 the Bolsheviks dismantled nearly 400 years of autocracy and seized total control of Russia through the February and October Revolutions.¹ This narrative neatly bookends one of the most significant events in modern history but fails to account for how long the tsars defended their seat of power against shifting revolutionary threats. The revolutions in 1917 were natural sequels to the 1905 revolution. The 1905 revolution was itself the result of increasing escalation of the struggle between Tsar Nicholas II and discontent proletariat and *muzhik* populations. In many ways, the 1917 revolution began long before the turn of the 20th century.²

In revolutions, as in any conflict up to and including total war, parties rely on sources of power to compete against and gain advantage over their opponents. The United States Army classifies these resources as *centers of gravity*, defined as, “...

¹ Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969); Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1995); Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1991); Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995); Richard Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, 4th ed. (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017); Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution A New History*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2017); Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, trans. Max Eastman (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2008); John Reed, *10 Days That Shook the World* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1977); Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1998).

² Pipes offers a summary of conflicting viewpoints on the origins and start of the Russian revolution in *The Russian Revolution*, 3-4.

sources of power that [provide] moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”³ Common centers of gravity in conflict include things such as diplomacy, information, military might, and economies, these four often being referred to as the instruments of national power.⁴ In the Russian Revolution, these sources manifested in tangible forms such as politics, print media, militarization, and diverse ideologies.⁵ Existing literature has paid less attention to alternative sources of power revolutionaries and government agents relied on to achieve their goals.

This research will examine this period of Russian history from 1893 to 1917 from a new perspective, more specifically, a new source of power – rights as weapons. The primary research question aims to answer how and to what effect Tsar Nicholas II and revolutionaries weaponized rights to maintain or seize power. The secondary research questions are how rights tactics shaped the progression of revolutionary events and how these stakeholders varied in their preferred rights tactics. Given the autocratic tsarist form

³ The U.S. military’s definition of center of gravity is an interpretation of Carl von Clausewitz’s take on the sources of power nations use in war (referenced by Clausewitz as “*schwerpunkt*,”) see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2019), 2-6; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 485–86, 595–96.

⁴ For a discussion on the application of DIME to achieve objectives see U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-18, *Strategy* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). More expansive models include MIDFIELD (military, information, diplomacy, finance, intelligence, economy, law, and development) speak toward how myriad variables can support the achievement of a strategic objective, see vii-viii.

⁵ Fitzpatrick offers the most concise narrative of how these manifestations of the instruments of national power contributed to the chain of revolutionary events, see *The Russian Revolution*.

of government and within a broader struggle for power, rights as weapons played a key role in helping Nicholas II hold off revolution and retain power. In contrast, those who sought to depose the tsar and gain power found themselves at a growing position of advantage. As revolutionaries and ordinary Russian citizens continued to weaponize rights to achieve their ends they slowly chipped away at Nicholas II's total power until the very foundations of Russian social, economic, and military structures were so weak the tsar had no choice but to concede the throne.

The research methodology relies heavily on a framework of rights as weapons as described by Clifford Bob in *Rights as Weapons: Instruments of Conflict, Tools of Power*.⁶ The following subsection "Rights as Weapons Framework" will outline Bob's framework in detail. This research will sequentially examine the historiography of the revolutionary struggle for power between 1893 and 1917 and dive into events that demonstrate rights tactics. This approach avoids some of the common biases present in studying history, namely the absence of width, depth, or context.⁷ The events surrounding the Russian Revolution spanned every single facet of life in Russia and a sizable portion of the world. As such, a comprehensive and complete analysis of all relevant variables and perspectives is beyond the scope of this thesis. Surveying the historiography and dissecting specific events in context will yield research with enough width, depth, and

⁶ Clifford Bob, *Rights as Weapons: Instruments of Conflict, Tools of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), Kindle.

⁷ Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Parameters* 11, no. 1 (1961): 9–14, <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1251&context=parameters>.

context to support broad conclusions while leaving room for subsequent research to explore targeted areas in more detail.

Rights as Weapons Framework

Researching historical conflicts from a rights as weapons perspective is a relatively new endeavor. Two assumptions are necessary toward this effort. First, the author assumes that the substantive differences between human, natural, positive, negative, or other categories of rights are irrelevant to this research. Second, the author assumes that the morality and ethics of rights are irrelevant to this research.⁸

Great minds, nations, and international organizations have long debated the distinction between rights categories.⁹ Furthermore, morality and ethics are undeniably intrinsic to the conversation of what makes a right a “good” or “correct” right.¹⁰ Wesley

⁸ This assumption does not imply that stakeholders in the Russian Revolution did not consider the morality or ethics of rights as it pertained to them, their rivals, or their adversaries. Including a discussion on how morality or ethics influenced stakeholder’s rights tactics exceeds the scope of this research and thus I will not address it in this research.

⁹ The bibliography of essential works on rights categories is too exhaustive to list in detail here. To gain a sense of the profound differences between them, see the case of natural rights as presented by John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (London, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1880). Contrast this with the United Nations’ evolving definition of human rights as presented in United Nations General Assembly. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Seventh Session, Resolution 217 A. Paris: United Nations, December 1948. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/human-rights/universal-declaration/translations/english>. United Nations, “What Are Human Rights,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed 15 August 2021, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/what-are-human-rights#:~:text=Human%20rights%20are%20rights%20we,language%2C%20or%20any%20other%20status>.

¹⁰ Case study is an efficient way to conceptualize the complexity of the moral and ethical component of rights. For example, the right to free speech is a widely recognized international standard, however, 21st century social movements are concerned with balancing the right to free speech with the right to be free of harmful language such as

Hohfeld's characterization of rights as claims avoids these nuanced and emotionally charged categories.¹¹ Hohfeld drills through the rhetoric to frame rights from the perspective of how they are legally enforced.¹² Rights as claims represent the power to obligate another to something and enforce that right in an official capacity, such as a court.¹³

Historically, rights have been framed as the honorable ends of noble conflicts, releasing people from the bonds of servitude, oppression, and inequality. However, Bob demonstrates how rights can also be leveraged and manipulated as the means and ways within a greater struggle for power.¹⁴ In certain instances rights have been weaponized as means to their own end, such as when African Americans weaponized the right to equal treatment under the law to compel courts to enforce their right to equal treatment under the law.¹⁵ In other instances rights were weaponized for other ends, such as when

hate speech. See Jeffrey Howard, "Free Speech and Hate Speech," *Annual Review of Political Science* 22 (May 2019): 93-109, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051517-012343>; Frederick Schauer, "The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm," *Ethics* 103, no. 4 (July, 1993): 635-653, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051517-012343>.

¹¹ Wesley Hohfeld, *Fundamental Legal Conceptions* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1919).

¹² *Ibid.*, 36.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Ends, ways, and means are a strategic concept commonly used by military and business leaders. Ends represent desired outcomes, means represent resources and capabilities, and ways represent the methods of employing available means. See CJCS, JDN 1-18, II-1.

¹⁵ The sit-ins that kicked off the American Civil Rights movement obligated American courts to enforce the right of a store manager to discriminate against patrons based on their race from a legal perspective and gave civil rights attorneys an opportunity

American revolutionaries weaponized the right to representation and fair taxation to justify armed rebellion against the British.

The concept of rights as weapons is an inherently controversial union of two contradictory ideas. The author by no means seeks to equate a right or rights tactic to a weapon system akin to a rifle, missile, or cannon. Such weapon systems are designed to physically destroy a physical aspect of an adversary's means to fight. Nor will the author assert that actors only weaponize rights toward nefarious or destructive ends. However, kinetic means of destruction and rights do share a characteristic in that actors can mobilize both to seize or preserve power. Where tanks accomplish this through destroying the enemy, rights as weapons rhetorically shape the environment.

Bob's rights as weapons framework offers three ways and associated tactics for how rights are weaponized within a greater struggle for power. First, rights as weapons prepare for conflict through rallying cries, shields, and parries.¹⁶ Second, rights as weapons contend with foes through camouflage, spears, and dynamite.¹⁷ Third, rights as weapons thwart rival movements through blockades and wedges.¹⁸ Rights as weapons escalate conflict through a combination of dynamite and, building on Bob's model, calls to action. These rights tactics are not sequential, occur intermittently throughout a

to challenge discriminatory Jim Crow laws in an official capacity. See Christopher Schmidt, "Divided by Law: The Sit-ins and the Role of Courts in the Civil Rights Movement," *Law and History Review* 33, no. 1 (February 2015): 93-149, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670752>.

¹⁶ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

struggle, and complement one another when synchronized. Additionally, rights tactics are enhanced when synchronized with other political, military, diplomatic, and economic means and ways. Had Russian social revolutionaries solely relied on rights to overthrow the monarchy they may never have succeeded. Conversely, as this research will explore, had they relied solely on violence and subversion they may have been equally unsuccessful.




Figure 1. Rights as Weapons Framework

Source: Created by author using information presented in Clifford Bob, *Rights as Weapons: Instruments of Conflict, Tools of Power* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Figure 1 depicts the rights as weapons framework and associated tactics in an ends-ways-means model. The model also accounts for the potential target audiences of each way and tactic. Distinguishing potential target audiences is essential as rights are not only weaponized against opponents but also against allies, potential rivals, and third

parties. This distinction illuminates how rights as weapons are a strategy of choice when stakeholders are not interested in escalating a conflict with certain opponents but nonetheless need to disrupt or neutralize their influence within a struggle for power.

The following list of definitions establishes the collective understanding necessary for this research. Most of these definitions are drawn directly from Bob's *Rights as Weapons*:

Rallying Cry: The use of rights within a [conflict] to mobilize support among the movement's members and potential third-party allies.¹⁹

Shield: The use of rights to protect individuals, groups, or whole societies – and the interests, values, and goals they carry with them.²⁰ This tactic is used in response to an attack from an aggressor where the deployment of the right is in and of itself the means of protection.

Parry: The reframing of an aggressor's rights tactic to mobilize support amongst the movement's constituents and potential third-party allies.²¹ This tactic is distinct from a *rallying cry* in that it leverages another group's rights claim for the parrying group's ends.

¹⁹ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 38.

²⁰ Ibid., 68.

²¹ Ibid., 70.

Camouflage: The use of rights to serve a purpose unrelated to the rights being leveraged.²² This tactic uses rights to mask a group's true purpose under cover of a rights movement.

Spear: The narrow use of rights to undermine a single policy or law.²³ This tactic is commonly deployed in support of a much broader rights strategy.²⁴

Dynamite: The use of rights in a direct and immediate attempt to undermine or destroy a targeted culture or community, often by forcing changes in key values, ideas, or institutions.²⁵ This tactic is commonly paired with physical violence.²⁶

Blockade: The use of rights to prevent a subordinate or weaker rights movement from accomplishing their goals.²⁷ Blockades can be performed unilaterally, such as when a rights movement prevents a subordinate group from joining them, or as part of an alliance.²⁸ These alliances can be formed with other rights groups seeking power or with organizations already in power.

Wedge: The use of rights to weaken an opposing group by creating divisions in their rights ideology.²⁹

²² Ibid., 85.

²³ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 119.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 150.

²⁶ Ibid., 151.

²⁷ Ibid., 188.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 231.

Calls to Action: The use of rights to inspire people to real action such as protest, strikes, and violence.³⁰

Rights Tactic(s): A collective term referencing; rallying cries, parries, shields, camouflage, spears, dynamite, blockades, wedges, and/or calls to action. Rights tactics represent the ways rights are weaponized to achieve ends.

The Relevance of Rights as Weapons

The relative infancy of the rights as weapons theory contradicts the impact and influence of the strategy through history and our modern world. Nations are weaponizing rights at a scale unheard of throughout history, weaving rights tactics directly into their national strategies. Russia's modern-day Compatriot Policy provides an excellent example of the relevancy of rights as weapons. Russia's Compatriot Policy, formally known as the Russian Federation's State Policy toward Compatriots Living Abroad, was conceived in the early 1990s and formally signed in 2008.³¹ The Compatriot Policy is an instrument of soft power that obligates and authorizes Russia to protect the rights of all Russian compatriots, loosely defined as "former citizens of the USSR; Russian

³⁰ Distinguishing calls to action from rallying cries and other rights tactics is necessary as the gap between supporting and acting on behalf of a cause is significant. For instance, many people support the right to gun ownership, but far fewer decide to take collective action to protect that right. See Leslie Crutchfield, *How Change Happens: Why Some Social Movements Succeed While Others Don't* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 195. Leslie posits that real action is a key difference between successful and unsuccessful movements.

³¹ Kristina Kallas, "Claiming the Diaspora: Russia's Compatriot Policy and Its Reception by Estonian-Russian Population," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 15, no. 3 (2016): 5-7, <https://www.exmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2016/Kallas.pdf>.

immigrants from the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation; descendants of compatriots; and foreign citizens who admire Russian culture and language.”³² Russia regularly references the Compatriot Policy to justify influencing foreign governments and meddling in their affairs. The policy is an evolution of rights as weapons and represents a national approach to merge rights and legal means to justify military and diplomatic action to protect the rights of Russian’s living outside Russia’s sovereign territory.³³ This rights tactic is outside the bounds of this research, but nonetheless demonstrates how Russia is weaponizing rights in our modern environment.

The Joint Special Operations University published a call for research on the tactical application of rights as weapons in response to authoritarian states’ efforts to reshape global norms through increasingly aggressive tactics.³⁴ Bob closes his book by calling for research on additional rights as weapons tactics and highlights Russia as an actor of interest.³⁵ Developing a deep understanding of Russia’s rights as weapons

³² Heather Conley and Theodore Gerber, *Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An Examination of Russian Compatriot Policy in Estonia* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2011), 12, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110826_Conley_RussianSoftPower_Web.pdf.

³³ Conley and Gerber offer extensive analysis of the relative effectiveness of Russia’s Compatriot Policy and how Moscow uses it to justify Russian involvement in Estonia in *Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century*.

³⁴ Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), *Special Operations Research Topics 2022* (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, August 2021), 25.

³⁵ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 261.

history will enhance understanding of modern day rights as weapons strategies such as the Compatriot Policy.

Additionally, this research fills a gap in the body of work on the topic. Bob limits his research on the rights as weapons theory to case studies dating to the 1970s supported by historical evidence and anecdotes.³⁶ Furthermore, Bob structures his work to evaluate a single rights strategy or tactic against a solitary historical event. This is an efficient approach to analyze each rights tactic but fails to account for what happens when myriad rights tactics are employed in concert within a single struggle for power. As such, the body of literature on the topic lacks historical perspective and critical analysis of a struggle for power through a comprehensive rights as weapons concept. The author found no body of knowledge, theses, essays, papers, or any other medium of work expanding on Bob's work. This research will serve as a proof of concept of Bob's entire rights as weapons theory applied to a contained historical event, a first for the field of study.

The final benefit of this study is increasing our understanding of one nation's historical usage of rights as weapons. The existing research lacks a comprehensive historical perspective and so researchers lack an adequate baseline to compare disparate nations' use of rights as weapons strategies. Building the body of knowledge of Russia's history of weaponizing rights will therefore establish a baseline to compare other nation's rights as weapons strategies. If not direct, follow-on research may use this as a model to evaluate historic struggles for power in China, Iran, or North Korea, among other relevant actors on the world stage today.

³⁶ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*.

Research Structure

This research analyzes the weaponization of rights in Russia from 1893 to 1917 using the rights as weapons framework presented in Figure 1. From an ends, ways, and means perspective, I focus my analysis on how rights served as the means and ways toward achieving an objective. I conclude Chapter 1 with a brief analysis of the Great Reforms of Tsar Alexander II, a watershed rights tactic that preceded Tsar Nicholas II's coronation. This analysis is necessary to contextualize many of the rights tactics Nicholas II used during his reign as tsar and establish how Russians perceived society and the monarchy.

In Chapter 2 "Revolution Rising, 1893-1904" I explore how rights influenced the events leading up to the 1905 revolution. As revolutionaries began to organize and coalesce, Tsar Nicholas II struggled to retain absolute control while containing an increasingly vocal opposition. I focus on Vladimir Lenin's early rights tactics, workers' strikes and union activity, the Bolshevik-Menshevik split at the 1903 second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, how Nicholas II dealt with the student strikes of 1899, and the *zubatovschina*. This analysis reveals how rights tactics contributed to the explosion of revolutionary activity during the 1905 revolution.

In Chapter 3 "Rights in Revolution, 1905" I concentrate on key events of the 1905 revolution, sometimes referred to as the First Russian Revolution. The events of 1905 saw disparate sects of Russian society revolt against their oppressors, albeit in a highly disorganized fashion. I pay specific attention to Father Georgii Gapon and his role in Bloody Sunday, the unintended consequences of the *zubatovschina*, the *muzhik* revolts in southern Ukraine, and Tsar Nicholas II's reluctant October Manifesto. Rights tactics

during this period played a critical role in setting the conditions necessary for Nicholas II's enemies to move freely once again in Russia and begin to organize their final assault on the monarchy.

In Chapter 4 “An Open Arena of Combat, 1906-1917” I examine the period after the 1905 revolution through the February Revolution of 1917. This decade marked a dramatic turn where the revolutionaries finally had enough power and the necessary rights and organs of enforcement to directly challenge the tsar. I center my analysis on the first through fourth Duma and how revolutionaries and the monarchy sought to gain advantage within the Tauride Palace, Stolypin's agrarian reforms and their potential to preserve the monarchy, and the Petrograd Soviet's destruction of the existing balance of power. This period marked Nicholas II's last opportunity to preserve the throne and describes the long-term effects of past rights tactics.

In Chapter 5 “All for Naught – All Power to the Soviets!” I offer a brief narrative explanation of the Bolshevik Revolution. Then, I offer my research findings and answer the primary and secondary research questions. Following this I discuss the implications of this research as they relate to the rights as weapons framework and their application toward modern problems and conflicts. Next, I offer my observations on how this research may assist the Joint Special Operations University in developing a rights as weapons approach to irregular warfare. I conclude by summarizing the essential research observations and outlining options to continue this research.

The Great Reforms: Tsar Alexander II's Shield against Revolution

The period of analysis for this research begins in 1893 but stepping into this year without understanding key rights tactics of the monarchy prior to 1893 would be a

disservice. The Great Reforms of Tsar Alexander II in the 1860s marked a transition in the collective consciousness of the Russian public from the idealist question of, “Who are we?” to the more positivist or realist question of, “What are we to do?”³⁷ The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the introduction of the *zemstvo* in 1864, collectively included in the Great Reforms, were the root issues at play in the early rhetoric and rights tactics of social revolutionaries in the 1890s. These reforms, often romanticized as an example of the Russian monarchy’s improving opinions of the *muzhik* and working classes, were nothing short of rights weaponized as shields and camouflage to preserve the power of the monarchy. Understanding how Tsar Alexander II leveraged these rights tactics is critical to understanding rights weapons tactics through the revolutionary period of 1893 to 1917.

Tsar Alexander II, increasingly threatened by serfs seeking a redistribution of land rights, saw in them an existential threat to his power. In 1861 Alexander II reluctantly freed over twenty-three million peasants from the bondage of serfdom in response to their growing discontent.³⁸ This was not a benevolent act by a compassionate ruler; it was the provisioning of a right to a perceived aggressor intent on influencing them away from a more violent revolution.³⁹ Alexander II directly acknowledged the motivations behind his

³⁷ Richard Pipes credits this question to Nikolai Novikov’s work in 1769, see *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 269.

³⁸ Serge Zenkovsky, “The Emancipation of the Serfs in Retrospect,” *The Russian Review* 20 no. 4 (October 1961): 281, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/126692>.

³⁹ Alfred J. Rieber, ed., argues that the emancipation was singularly driven by Tsar Alexander II’s desire to improve Russia’s capacity to rapidly conscript large field armies to meet a growing European threat in *The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of*

actions in a speech to the Marshalls of the Nobility in 1856 wherein he is claimed to have stated, "... the existing system of serf owning cannot remain unchanged. It is better to begin abolishing serfdom from above than wait for it to begin to abolish itself from below."⁴⁰ Alexander II weaponized the right to freedom to protect himself from a perceived threat, a textbook example of the rights shield tactic.

A brief analysis of the subsequent installation of the *zemstvo* in 1864 adds credence to this conclusion. The serfs' emancipation provided them a wealth of new opportunities, but it did not achieve Alexander II's intent of shielding the monarchy from revolutionary escalation. In many ways, the emancipation catalyzed the very threat that concerned him. A series of high-profile instances of unrest such as student political marches, a rebellion in Poland, and outright terrorism in St. Petersburg illustrated the *muzhik*'s realization that their emancipation was not all they expected it to be.⁴¹ In fact, each of these instances were in some way influenced by peasants and workers seeking

Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinski, 1857-1864 (Paris and The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1966).

⁴⁰ S. S. Tatishchev, *Imperator Aleksandr II*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, Russia: A. S. Suvorin, 1911), 1-278, quoted in George Vernadsky, ed., *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972), 589. See also Vladimir Shlapentokh's notes on Aleksandr Koshelev's warning to Tsar Alexander II promising rebellion if the tsar did not abolish serfdom in. Olga Trubetskaia, *A. Cherkasskii I ego uchastie v razreshenii kret'ianskogo voprosa*, vol. 1, part 2 (Moscow, Russia: 1904), 400, quoted in Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Alexander II and Mikhail Gorbachev—Two Reformers in Historical Perspective," *Russian History* 17, no. 4 (1990): 400, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24656392>.

⁴¹ The original Emancipation Proclamation included measures to keep the *muzhik* partially tied to the land as "[Russian] authorities knew how ready the Russia peasant was to abandon the soil ... [and] feared that an uncontrolled mass movement of the peasantry would provoke social unrest," see Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 164.

more influence over their own destiny, now more than ever considering that they were no longer bound to the land. The *zemstvo* were representative local governments established alongside the emancipation in 1861 but did not carry legal weight until 1864. In effect, they provided the *muzhik* and workers with a representative platform to shape local governance over their way of life.

Again, this was not simply a benevolent gift from Alexander II. Letters between Grand Duchess Elena Pavlona, Tsar Alexander II's widowed aunt-in-law, and Prince Vladimir Cherkassky, a renowned slavophile and advocate for emancipation, regarding the *zemstvo* reveal a deep monarchical apprehension about provisioning political representation to the newly freed *muzhik*. In these letters, when Duchess Pavlona posited to Cherkassky a concern that the *zemstvo* would become more political than administrative, he responded pessimistically that the opportune moment for the *zemstvo* had long passed and that public trust in the *zemstvo* institution would decrease each day they were not implemented.⁴² In other words, to prevent further distrust amongst the *muzhik*, the *zemstvo* must be installed as soon as possible. Alexander II distrusted the *muzhik* to such a degree that he specifically designed the *zemstvo* to prevent the *muzhik* from wresting actual power via the *zemstvo*.⁴³

⁴² James A. Malloy, "The Zemstvo Reform of 1864: Its Historical Background and Significance in Tsarist Russia," (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1965), 78.

⁴³ Alfred J. Reiber offers a comprehensive analysis of the escalatory measures Tsar Alexander II and Alexander III took to preserve monarchical representation in the *zemstvo*, ranging from increasing the voting power of monarchy installed bureaucrats to installing watchdog agencies to police the political ambitions of the nobility, see "Alexander II: A Revisionist View," *The Journal of Modern History* 43, no. 1 (March, 1971): 52, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877924>.

One cannot argue the immense political, social, and economic gains peasants and workers saw under Alexander II's reign. These advances drive the overall historical perspective of Tsar Alexander II as one of Russia's great reformers. In reality, the emancipation of the serfs and the *zemstvo* were calculated concessions designed to appease social tensions while maintaining absolute monarchic control, albeit through increasingly decentralized mechanisms. These two rights tactics illuminate an expansion of Bob's presentation of rights weaponized as shields. As demonstrated by Alexander II, rights shield tactics can also defend against the perceived threat of a rival group. If used preemptively rights shields have the potential to delay escalation or prevent conflict altogether.⁴⁴ Peasants and workers spent forty-four years trying to wrest more power from the monarchy using the rights Tsar Alexander II granted and within the systems he designed to enforce those rights before their efforts elevated to revolution.⁴⁵

The emancipation of the serfs and the *zemstvo* also both demonstrate the effectiveness of camouflaging a rights tactic. Bob's description of camouflage as when an actor uses a right to mask another action's true purpose is restrictive.⁴⁶ In some cases, rights tactics can be executed in such a way to camouflage either their own purpose or the

⁴⁴ As Bob described, "When used as shields, rights protect individuals, groups, or whole societies—and the interests, values, and goals they carry with them," but only applies this from a perspective of rival movements. This contrasts what Tsar Alexander II did in 1863, where his perspective represents a government conceding a right to protect the power of the monarchy. See Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 69.

⁴⁵ Bob does not address the concept of rights shields, or any other rights tactics, including a governing power conceding a right to protect itself from a real or perceived threat. He does however encourage future research on how to weaponize rights to "extract concessions" from a governing power. See Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 261.

⁴⁶ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 84.

actor's true intent. Alexander II did not announce to Russian society that either the emancipation or *zemstvo* were clever calculations designed to quell escalations of revolutionary activity, but this was his intent nonetheless.⁴⁷ The Great Reforms' camouflage as benevolent action delayed mass realization of the measures' inadequacies and true purposes.

In an ironic twist, Alexander II's assassination in 1881 occurred just one day prior to another camouflaged rights shield tactic. Had the Narodnaya Volya failed in their attempt on Alexander II's life, Russia's peasants, workers, and revolutionaries would have witnessed Loris-Melikov's constitutional reforms. Alexander II acknowledged this reform as a necessary step toward a Russian constitution, but nevertheless structured it in a way not to give away any real power to the people. Instead, Alexander II intended to further tie Russian society to the absolute power of the monarchy.⁴⁸

Weaponizing rights as camouflaged shields to protect institutions of power from the perceived threat of a rival group prior to conflict is a common theme present throughout the Russian Revolution. Thus, 1893 dawns on the Russian society in the aftershock of rights weaponized as shields and camouflage, made only worse by Tsar Alexander III's expansion of the police state and political repression.⁴⁹ The radical *intelligentsia* had a tall order ahead of them in finding a way to synchronize otherwise

⁴⁷ Shlapentokh, "Alexander II and Mikhail Gorbachev," 399.

⁴⁸ Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, trans. Francis Haskell (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 1960): 187-189.

⁴⁹ Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 315.

disparate revolutionary groups. Conversely, Tsar Nicholas II would need to find new and inventive ways to snuff out the rising revolutionary tide without violating the sanctity of his autocratic power.

CHAPTER 2

REVOLUTION RISING, 1893-1904

Introduction

Key revolutionary leaders and ever more conscious proletariat and *muzhik* classes began to coalesce right around 1893, the final year of Alexander III's reign and the year prior to Nicholas II assuming the title of Tsar. The industrial revolution was in full swing, the *intelligentsia* was growing more vocal, political papers were springing up across St. Petersburg and Moscow, and the *muzhik*, proletariat, and radical *intelligentsia* were starting to peer through the veil of Tsar Alexander II's reforms. Revolution seemed to many an inevitability, but the monarchy still had options to disrupt, delay, and defeat the threats it faced. The radical *intelligentsia* were not yet a coordinated mass and ideological differences resulted in dozens of competing parties, committees, and organs much more focused on fighting one another than working together against the tsar.

The ideological differences between revolutionary groups were so great that the radical *intelligentsia* were focused on little other than which Marxist theory would prevail or who would seize control of the movement.⁵⁰ Toward this end most rights tactics the radical *intelligentsia* deployed targeted other revolutionary movements, a strategy that gave Nicholas II an immense amount of breathing room. Given this freedom Nicholas II

⁵⁰ Vladimir Lenin wrote that, "It [was] absolutely essential to begin a determined struggle against [other revolutionary or Marxist theories]" to prevent them from having a negative influence on the revolution, see *What Is To Be Done?*, trans. George Hanna and Joe Fineburg (New York, NY: International Publishers, 2014), 5.

was able to instead focus his efforts on the more violent fringes of the revolution, student protests, and the blossoming workers' movement.⁵¹

Lenin Emerges: Camouflaged Spears, Wedges, and Rallying Cries

Lenin enters 1893 as one of many voices in a sea of revolutionary rhetoric. The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) would not be founded until five years later and his newspaper *Iskra* would not distribute its first manuscript until 1900.⁵² Lenin is not yet a recognized leader within the greater revolutionary movement.⁵³ Nonetheless, Lenin's contributions to the rapidly evolving revolutionary rhetoric of the period were unmatched. Between 1893 and 1904 Lenin produced no less than 290 written works, each distributed via one or more mediums to various audiences across Russia and greater Europe.⁵⁴ A comprehensive analysis of all Lenin's rights tactics during this period

⁵¹ The Socialist Revolutionary party relied heavily on political terrorism to achieve their revolutionary designs, see Manfred Hildermeier, "Neopopulism and Modernization: The Debate on Theory and Tactics in the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1905-14," *The Russian Review* 34, no. 4 (October 1975): 453-475, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/127873>.

⁵² Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 146.

⁵³ In contrast, Lenin's brother Aleksandr Ulyanov had already been executed for his role in the attempted assassination of Tsar Alexander III, an event that gave Lenin a certain amount of renown amongst revolutionary circles, see Clara Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1934).

⁵⁴ The collected works of Lenin between 1893 and 1905 are catalogued in Vladimir Lenin, *V. L. Lenin Collected Works*, vols. 1-7, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1977). The exact number of his publications during this time is difficult to ascertain as Lenin is well known to have published individual chapters of his works in his newspaper, *Iskra*, which historians have assembled into completed works constituting single ventures.

exceeds the scale of this research. This research will instead focus on select examples to illuminate trends in Lenin's rights tactics.

It is imperative to describe how Lenin viewed rights within Russian society to fully understand how Lenin weaponized rights through the entire revolutionary period. Lenin provided a clear opinion on rights in one of his very first publications, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats."⁵⁵ Lenin presented a theory that the state's nature is to protect the economically advantaged "feudal landlords and big bourgeoisie" and to "punish with the utmost brutality" every attempt of the economically weak to stand up for their rights.⁵⁶ This was the first time among Lenin's major works wherein he mentioned the rights of the economically underprivileged, and in doing so, alluded to the need to fight for those rights by challenging the system designed to prevent their realization. Lenin blamed the *muzhik's* lack of rights as the cause for their exploitation and expropriation.⁵⁷ He immediately followed this observation by commenting on how the monarchy granted the landed nobility general civil rights only as a special favor. Lenin built on this observation by presenting the Social-Democratic agenda as "unreservedly associate[d] [with] the demand

⁵⁵ Vladimir Lenin, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats," in *V. L. Lenin Collected Works 1893-1894*, vol. 1, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1977), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-01.pdf>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 259.

⁵⁷ Esther Kingston-Mann, "Proletarian Theory and Peasant Practice: Lenin 1901-04," *Soviet Studies* 26, no. 4 (October 1974): 527, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/150676>.

for the complete restoration of the peasants' civil rights, the complete abolition of all the privileges of the nobility, ... and the peasants' right to manage their own affairs.”⁵⁸

Lenin presented here perhaps the first vision of his revolutionary purpose by framing rights as a means that could dismantle the autocratic order. He drew a direct link between the provisioning of rights to the *muzhik* with the dissolution of the nobility's advantages. *Muzhik* with equal civil rights would shake critical pillars of Russian society. For example, the state would no longer legally be able to compel *muzhik* labor in support of the bourgeoisie factory manager. In a way this rights tactic resembles dynamite as provisioning these rights would inherently destabilize essential pillars of tsarist autocracy.⁵⁹ Finally, and certainly not least, Lenin ended his essay by equating the plight of the *muzhik* to that of the proletariat.⁶⁰ This final claim is something Lenin wavered on through the revolution, most notably in his future work *What Is To Be Done?* and during the 1903 second RDSLP congress.⁶¹

Lenin then identified the target audience for his rhetoric and presented his opinions on how the state creates social divisions in the *muzhik* by classifying them by their rights. He explained how the state subdivided *muzhik* communes into classes such as “landless, allotment-holding, ex-manor serfs, paid-up allotment holders, those registered

⁵⁸ Lenin, “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats,” 290.

⁵⁹ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 150.

⁶⁰ Lenin, “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats,” 321.

⁶¹ Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*.

[and those unregistered]” and then provisioned disparate rights to each.⁶² Lenin provided the first example of a rallying cry in this prose. He explained to the *muzhik* how the state separated them, and in doing so provided for them an image of how they are the same, a narrative they shared and could rally toward. One of Lenin’s most prolific rights tactics, he designed this rallying cry to influence the *muzhik* toward coalescing as one.

Lenin offered his first call to action in 1895 as a subtle aside in “Frederick Engels.”⁶³ He theorized that, “... in order to fight for its economic emancipation, the proletariat must win itself certain political rights.”⁶⁴ Lenin camouflaged this rights tactic under cover of economic advancement. However, his vision of economic emancipation and political rights could only be realized through struggle. Less than two months later, Lenin provided the spear that workers used to fight for economic emancipation through rights tactics.

Later in 1895 Lenin deployed a spear aimed straight at Articles 143-152 of the law “Rules for Industry, Part Two, Volume II” of the Russian Code of Laws in “Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers.”⁶⁵ Lenin outlined how

⁶² Vladimir Lenin, “The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve’s Book. (The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature.) P. Struve. Critical Remarks on the Subject of Russia’s Economic Development, St. Petersburg, 1894,” 340-394, quoted in Vladimir Lenin, *V. L. Lenin Collected Works 1893-1894*, vol. 1, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1977), 361, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-01.pdf>.

⁶³ Vladimir Lenin, “Frederick Engels,” in *V. L. Lenin Collected Works 1895-1897*, vol. 2, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1972), 27, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-02.pdf>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Vladimir Lenin, “Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers,” in *V. L. Lenin Collected Works 1895-1897*, vol. 2, trans. George Hanna

the bourgeoisie considered any workers who sought to understand and fight for their rights as nothing more than corrupt.⁶⁶ He emphasized that a proletariat that pays no attention to their rights only benefitted the bourgeoisie.⁶⁷ Lenin informed workers on their lawful right to engage investigators and object to unjust or illegal fines. He informed them of this right because once a fine was adjudicated it was illegal to appeal that decision.⁶⁸ The law “Rules for Industry, Part Two, Volume II” provided this right to workers, and is the same law the spear targeted. Lenin’s tactic is not only a spear, but also an example of a right representing both the means and the end of an action. In other words, workers could only compel the state to enforce their rights if they exercise those same rights. It would be disingenuous to not acknowledge that immediately following this statement Lenin conceded that this strategy was unlikely to resolve illegal or unjust fines and that strikes were the next most obvious evolution of reasonable resistance.⁶⁹

Lenin weaponized rights as wedges on many occasions, most often against other revolutionary parties. A notable example exists in “Why the Social-Democrats Must Declare a Determined and Relentless War on the Socialist-Revolutionaries.” Here, Lenin weaponized the rights Marxist societies offer to expose what he defined as the Socialist

(Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1972), 29-72, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-02.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 51.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 38.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 54.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 62.

Revolutionary Party's (SR) objective of "petty-bourgeois reformism."⁷⁰ Lenin perverted the SR's vision of rights as inferior relative to the RSDLP's superior vision of rights. In effect, Lenin attempted to distance the RSDLP from the SR's terrorist preferences and their move away from Marxism toward what Lenin describes as "liberal Narodism."⁷¹ He seemed to show little reservation in distinguishing the RSDLP, and later the Bolsheviks, from corners of revolutionary thought he deemed poisonous to his ends irrespective of any potential loss of organizations that may have served as potential allies.

Lenin did not see the fruits of his efforts to mobilize the *muzhik* and proletariat into an organized revolutionary mass until years after he launched his spears. Leon Trotsky noted that in 1903 only 87,000 and in 1904 only 25,000 people participated in political strikes, further noting that the vast majority of those strikes were economically driven.⁷² A contrary statistic claims that in 1896 nearly 40,000 workers went on strike for the "betterment of the whole working class."⁷³ This quantitative analysis sheds an unfavorable light on the effectiveness of Lenin's rights tactics. Fortunately for Lenin, his efforts in the years preceding 1905 would continue to fuel the revolution for years to come.

⁷⁰ Vladimir Lenin, "Why the Social-Democrats Must Declare a Determined and Relentless War on the Socialist-Revolutionaries," in *V. L. Lenin Collected Works 1895-1897*, vol. 5, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1972), 174, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-05.pdf>.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁷² Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, 27.

⁷³ Ian D. Thatcher, "The First Histories of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 85, no. 4 (October 2007): 22, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25479136>.

Rival Revolutionaries: The 1903 Russian Social Democratic Labour Party Congress

Lenin was but one voice, albeit one of the loudest, in a broader revolutionary movement made up of myriad groups. Several of these groups spent considerable effort attempting to rise as the leaders of the revolutionary movement. The differences between workers unions' and political parties' platforms were subtle, yet profound. The fact that many RSDLP parties also served as workers' unions further complicated the battle lines at the second RSDLP congress.⁷⁴ Each party and union held unique views on the purpose of revolution, the role of the revolutionary, whether to make economic demands or call for political concessions, and the future of tsardom, among other disagreements. These disagreements were divisive and resulted in intense infighting amongst groups who otherwise may have benefited from working together.

Many of these rival revolutionary movements coalesced at the second RSDLP congress, held in Brussels and London from July to August of 1903.⁷⁵ A total of forty-three delegates representing twenty-six unique organizations and parties attended the congress.⁷⁶ Despite the large number of organizations present these participants generally

⁷⁴ Several of the organizations at the second RSDLP congress conducted union business on a day-to-day basis but nonetheless served in a political capacity at the congress. See Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) for a history of the St. Petersburg Committee.

⁷⁵ The second RSDLP congress held the first thirteen sessions in Brussels and in response to increasingly aggressive police prosecution the subsequent twenty-four in London, see Brian Pearce, trans., *1903 Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party* (New York, NY: Labor Publications Inc., 1978). Referred to henceforth as *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*.

⁷⁶ See Appendix A for a complete breakdown of the delegates, organizations, and consultant voices represented at the congress.

represented four positions within the RSDLP: those who supported Lenin, those who supported Yulii Martov, those who supported the Economist Vladimir Akimov, and the Bundists. Lenin categorized these groups based on his opinion of how much he could rely on their support of the programs he planned to introduce at the congress and set out on a path to seize power from his rivals.⁷⁷

The 1903 RSDLP congress is a significant event in the Russian Revolution for several reasons. The most significant outcome of the congress was the RSDLP split between the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions.⁷⁸ Historians disagree on the exact catalyst for this split. Some argue the split was caused by a dispute over the composition of the editorial board of the party organ *Iskra*,⁷⁹ whereas others highlight Bund's hasty exit.⁸⁰ Other perspectives point toward Lenin's sponsorship for the leadership of a revolutionary vanguard,⁸¹ or even Martov's fear that Lenin's program eschewed democracy in favor of dictatorship.⁸² It is much more likely that each of these events influenced the Economists and Bundists to suddenly depart over a series of sessions,

⁷⁷ Allan Wildman, "Lenin's Battle with Kustarnichestvo: The Iskra Organization in Russia," *Slavic Review* 23, no. 3 (September 1964): 479, 484, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2492685>.

⁷⁸ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, 30-31.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 30.

⁸⁰ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 360.

⁸¹ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 22.

⁸² Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 152.

giving Lenin the majority he so desperately sought. In fact, many of these conditions were parts of a broader plan Lenin set in motion months prior to the congress.⁸³

Lenin was not shy about publicly declaring his distrust and distaste for Marxist or revolutionary platforms that did not align with his designs for the RSDLP.⁸⁴ He was so concerned about competing ideologies' influence that he feared the congress would not naturally vote in favor of his ideas.⁸⁵ The first part of Lenin's plan of attack to set favorable conditions at the second RSDLP congress saw him send his agents across Russia to procure public declarations of support for his *Iskra* program.⁸⁶ Once Lenin had a strong network of supporters established he colluded with his supporters to aggressively hold all members of the congress to party rules while they themselves would skirt those same rules through the weight of their influence and strength in numbers.⁸⁷ Lenin's plan included an exit strategy that, if unsuccessful in gaining leadership over the party, he and his supporters would leave and "insist the [congress declared] an unofficial gathering."⁸⁸ Recall how rights as claims obligate another to something and enforce that right through

⁸³ Wildman, "Lenin's Battle with Kustarnichestvo," 484.

⁸⁴ Lenin devotes two entire chapters of *What Is To Be Done?* to attacking Economism and opportunism, and many more pages dismantling the revolutionary potential of "spontaneity".

⁸⁵ Wildman, "Lenin's Battle with Kustarnichestvo," 484.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid. See also Lenin's overt recognition that he was not bound by the same rules he bound others by in his exchange with V. N. Rozonov at the thirtieth session of the congress in Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*, 416. For a complete list of all the RSDLP party rules Lenin leveraged see Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*, 9-10.

⁸⁸ Wildman, "Lenin's Battle with Kustarnichestvo," 484.

an official capacity. Lenin's plan at the congress was to hold his rivals accountable to the authority of the party, the organ of enforcement. If he found outcomes undesirable, he planned to flip this tactic and declare those same mechanisms did not obligate him and could not be enforced on him by an official party. This strategy replicates the rights spear tactic where specific RSDLP party rules served as both the means of Lenin's strategy and the target depending on the situation.⁸⁹ What is interesting about this rights spear is that Lenin conceptualized a way in which the spear could be used to both gain power (offensively) or preserve power (defensively) depending on the situation.⁹⁰ While Lenin's overall strategy centered on a rights spear, Lenin and his followers deployed several other rights tactics including blockades, wedges, and parries to achieve their objectives.

Prior to the congress Lenin used his influence (and a crafty round of deception directed at the Bund)⁹¹ to install him and other hard *Iskraists* in critical congressional leadership roles. Lenin and his two closest allies, Martov and G.V. Plekhanov, constituted the congress Chairman (Plekhanov) and one of the Vice Chairmen (Lenin). They additionally served as members of the Credentials (Lenin), Programme (Lenin and

⁸⁹ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 119.

⁹⁰ The RSDLP's organizational rules' binding resolution was the right fueling Lenin's offensive spear. Organizational rule #6 would fuel his defensive spear by allowing him and his allies to directly challenge the legitimacy of the congress and force the Central Committee to arbitrate the congress' legitimacy. See Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*, 10-11.

⁹¹ After the dissolution of the aborted Belostok Conference, Lenin deceived the Bund into thinking *Iskra* had coordinated with the Belostok Conference coordinators to take lead in coordinating the second RSDLP congress claiming "legal continuity" of efforts, see Wildman, "Lenin's Battle with Kustarnichestvo," 493-495.

Plekhanov), and Organization Commissions (Lenin and Martov), among other roles.⁹²

These positions allowed the *Iskraists* to wield a disproportionate amount of influence over the congress' proceedings and were essential to achieving Lenin's objectives.

The first item on the agenda at the second RDSLP congress sought to clarify who would be allowed to attend the congress and in what capacity, either as a voting member or a consultative voice.⁹³ The Credentials and Organization Commissions resolved the majority of these inquiries prior to the congress convening; however, three groups remained in question as the congress entered their first session.⁹⁴ The congress spent nearly two entire sessions discussing one of these groups in particular, the *Borba*. In the weeks prior to the congress the *Borba* group sent no less than four letters to the Organization Committee of the congress seeking the right to attend as voting members.⁹⁵ In each letter the *Borba* cited specific party rules that justified their attendance.⁹⁶ The exact position of the *Borba* group has largely been lost to history but what remains is clear that they did not agree with Lenin's vision or his party program.⁹⁷ In their second

⁹² Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*, 16.

⁹³ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 27-55.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 479-485.

⁹⁶ The *Borba* cited the first RDSLP organizational rule which addressed who can be considered a member of the RDSLP, see Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*, 10.

⁹⁷ The *Borba* group wanted to attend the congress to present their essays "The Draft Programme of 'Iskra' and 'Zarya' and the Tasks of Social-Democrats" and "On the Problems of Programme and Organization" as counterpoints to Lenin's party programme, see Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*, 479.

letter to the congress, *Borba* stated, "... it is clear that in some sections [our draft programme] differs markedly from the only draft previously published (that of *Iskra* (author's italics) and *Zarya*)."⁹⁸

Allowing the *Borba* group to present an alternate party program at the congress was not something the *Iskraists* could allow. The Organization Committee, of which Lenin was a member, never replied to the *Borba* group's letters.⁹⁹ At the second session of the congress, B.A. Ginzburg (Kolstov), a member of the Credentials Commission, declared the congress had never received the *Borba*'s letters.¹⁰⁰ As the congress debated whether to invite the *Borba* group clear lines were drawn between the *Iskraists* and their opponents. Leon Trotsky emboldened the *Iskraists* when he argued against their inclusion on the basis of the size of the *Borba* group, something rule #1 of the party program did not mention.¹⁰¹ In contrast, V.P. Makhnovets (Akimov), an Economist, took issue with the idea of silencing opposing voices.¹⁰² The *Iskraists* and their allies won the exchange and the *Borba* group was not invited to the congress. Lenin and his cronies manipulated the first rule of the party program to prevent a weaker movement from gaining influence, a clear example of a rights blockade.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Perace, *Second RDSLP Congress Minutes*, 480.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 484.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 51-52.

¹⁰³ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 188.

The question of the Bund was another issue of critical importance to the RSDLP and Lenin in particular.¹⁰⁴ The Bund had long been recognized as an autonomous organization within the RSDLP, a decision made at the first RSDLP congress in 1898.¹⁰⁵ Since that decision the Bund had operated as the sole voice of the Russian Jews and, in light of a growing Zionist movement amongst southern Russian Jews, began to see themselves as an independent nation.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Vladimir Kossovsky, a prominent Bund leader, spread his opinion that *Iskra* espoused “dictatorial tendencies.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, the only outcome Lenin considered appropriate to the Bund was denying their autonomy and in doing so binding them to the *Iskra* program he intended to see passed at the second congress.¹⁰⁸ To prevent the Bund from gaining autonomy Lenin deployed a rights wedge¹⁰⁹ focused on dividing the Jewish congressional voting members along the issue of whether the Russian Jews had a right to label themselves a nation.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ The Bund issue was the second topic on the agenda of the RSDLP, a decision Lenin made as early as 1902. Debates on the status of the Bund permeated the congress’ sessions well after the Bund exited, see Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*, xi; Henry Tobias, “The Bund and Lenin until 1903,” *The Russian Review* 20, no. 4 (October 1961): 355, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/126696>.

¹⁰⁵ Tobias, “The Bund and Lenin until 1903,” 346.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 347.

¹⁰⁸ Prior to the congress Lenin declared that if the Bund’s “federation” ideal won out then the *Iskraists* would leave the congress to hold separate sessions, see Tobias, “The Bund and Lenin until 1903,” 355.

¹⁰⁹ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 231.

¹¹⁰ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 22. McMeekin’s account of Lenin’s strategy is accurate, but he mistakenly refers to Martov as “a founding member of the Bund” and further that Martov left the congress alongside the Bund.

The wedge was successful in dividing members who otherwise may have voted in favor of the Bund, including Martov and Trotsky, themselves both Jews.¹¹¹ The vote to recognize the Bund as an independent organization within a federalist RSDLP structure failed with a vote of forty-one opposed to five supporting.¹¹² The leader of the Bund, Mikhail Liber, responded to this vote by declaring the Bund's exit from the RSDLP.¹¹³ With the exit of the Bund, the voting balance of the congress swung in favor of Lenin. He immediately set to work installing allies as new board members of *Iskra* and confirming the *Iskra* program as the official RSDLP platform.¹¹⁴

The rights tactics on display at the second RSDLP congress do not account for exactly why the *Iskraists* and other parties split into the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. However, they do illuminate some of the strategies Lenin employed to set conditions favorable to his goals. Had Lenin failed to isolate the Bund they may have locked him out of key leadership roles by swinging the votes in favor of *Iskra's* opponents. The amount of energy and time Lenin and his adversaries devoted to gaining power within the revolution meant they had little time to organize revolutionary activity outside of their immediate circles. As a result, Nicholas II spent the first eleven years of his reign facing down spontaneous and disorganized social unrest rather than a united foe.

Martov stayed with the congress until its conclusion, see Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 128-131.

¹¹² Ibid., 378.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 360.

Preserving Total Autocracy: Tsar Nicholas II's Early Shields, Parries, and Wedges

Tsar Nicholas II inherited the throne from his father, Tsar Alexander III, in 1894. Nicholas II is well documented as assuming the role of absolute ruler with little to no confidence in his abilities.¹¹⁵ By this time, the *intelligentsia* and *zemstvo* had established themselves as relevant actors within Russia's systems of governance. Nicholas II was quick to dissuade their hopes to capitalize on his inexperience. He concluded an address to a *zemstvo* delegation in January 1895 by firmly declaring his absolute support of the total authority of the Russian monarchy.¹¹⁶ However, Nicholas II ruled over a much different Russia than did Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III.¹¹⁷ Nicholas II inherited a disaffected proletariat and increasingly violent and frequent pogroms targeting Russian Jews. The *dvoriansvo* and nobility were beginning to comingle with the *zemstvo* and *intelligentsia*.¹¹⁸ Revolutionary language was seeping into Russian universities. Under

¹¹⁵ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 58.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹¹⁷ The differences between Alexander II's, and Alexander III's, and Nicholas II's Russias exceed the scope of this research. The author emphasizes the changing aspect of of patrimonialism under each of these tsars. See Pipes, "Chapter 4: The Anatomy of the Patrimonial Regime," and "Chapter 5: The Partial Dismantling of the Patrimonial State," in *Russia Under the Old Regime* and contrast with "Part One: The Agony of the Old Regime, Chapter 3: Rural Russia," in *The Russian Revolution*. The changing relationship between the tsars and the *muzhik* is a key aspect of how dramatically and rapidly Russian society changed between these rulers.

¹¹⁸ The *dворянство* constituted a sort of bridge between the *muzhik* and the monarchic nobility, essentially serving as landed agents of the tsar that enforced patrimonial systems but lacked any real power, see Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 171-190.

these threats Nicholas II looked back to the tactics of Alexander II to quell the slow boil of revolution.

The condition that was most different under Nicholas II's rule was that the social divide between the Russian nobility, peasants, workers, and monarchy was rapidly dissipating. Up until the 1890s Russian revolutionaries were far more interested in either intra-revolutionary quarrels or revolts against their immediate oppressors than focusing their efforts on the monarchy.¹¹⁹ This meant that the revolutionary actions that did manifest against the tsar were limited to targeted acts of terrorism easily disrupted through enhanced police practices including direct violent suppression.¹²⁰ In the 1890s the voices of revolution slowly began to direct their rhetoric directly at the monarchy.

A brief analysis of the student riots of 1899 sheds light on how Nicholas II perceived the threat of revolutionary rhetoric influencing the *muzhik* and proletariat, a population the tsar would not be able to put down as easily as the nobility. On February 8, 1899, students from St. Petersburg University prepared to celebrate the founding of the university, as they did every year, with peaceful and non-political celebrations in the center of the city. The relationship between the students and police had deteriorated after a series of clashes in 1895, 1897, and 1898, all stemming from non-political disagreements.¹²¹ Additionally, in 1899 the current law declared any non-sanctioned

¹¹⁹ Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 251.

¹²⁰ In response to an attempt on Alexander II's life in 1880 he established the first organ of what would become the *okhrana*, a special police institution designed to protect the Russian state from threats within her own borders, see Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 300-301.

¹²¹ The 1897 clash resulted after a female student immolated herself after being arrested and reportedly assaulted by a police prosecutor, see Samuel Kassow, *Students*,

public event as insubordinate and thus inherently political.¹²² In response to the planned celebration St. Petersburg University authorities prohibited any public activities. As could be expected, the students spilled onto the streets in protest where they clashed with police once again.¹²³ The students voted to continue the protest until the government guaranteed the police would respect their rights.

The protest spread from St. Petersburg to Moscow and Kyiv promulgating into a nationwide student voice against police brutality. In the early days of these protests the student narrative shifted from a call for the protection of existing rights (or at least the perceived notion that students were immune from police brutality) to calls for political reform.¹²⁴ However, the majority of students did not initially support the inclusion of demands for political reform and thus did not become a core objective of the strike until after it began.¹²⁵ In fact, the calls for political reform were present from the very beginning of the protest, but grew in frequency as the protest continued and served as a

Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 90.

¹²² Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 5.

¹²³ Many sources refer to these protests as “strikes,” see Kassow, *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*. The author has chosen to label them as protests to differentiate them from workers strikes also discussed in this research.

¹²⁴ This sentiment is credited to Vladimir Medem, a prominent Jewish Bund leader, who observed Kyiv University students’ reaction to the Organizational Committee emissary’s tale of police brutality in some way marred their perception that students enjoyed a “deference” or “immunity” against police brutality, unlike the *muzhik* class would. See Kassow, *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

rallying cry that drew more students and citizens to the cause.¹²⁶ On March 4, revolutionaries associated with the protest saw an opportunity and issued a Manifesto calling for the complete abolishment of the monarchy as the solution to the student's core grievances.¹²⁷ The specific demand to abolish autocracy represented a rights spear targeting the heart of Russian power.¹²⁸

The sequence of these events illustrates Nicholas II's concern for politics tainting otherwise non-political institutions and social groups. The 1899 student protest began absent any political aims and through one catalyst or another assumed revolutionary rhetoric calling for the end of the autocracy. It is fair to assume that Nicholas II recognized the promulgation of revolutionary rhetoric and took care to ensure that it did not seep into the mind of the proletariat or *muzhik* classes. In other words, Nicholas II may have seen an opportunity to create a wedge between revolutionaries and their most valuable target audiences, the proletariat and *muzhik*.

¹²⁶ Kassow details the complex struggle for prominence between political, non-political, and apolitical groups within the student protests in *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*, 93-104.

¹²⁷ Pipes credits the revolutionary rhetoric to members of the Organizational Committee affiliated with the Mutual Aid Fund, an illegal socialist group comprised of many future leaders of the revolutionary movement, see *The Russian Revolution*, 7. For an alternate perspective on the impact of March 4th see Kassow's emphasis on the accompanying March 4th demonstrations which, in his opinion, well overshadowed the impact of the March 4th Manifesto in *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*, 135.

¹²⁸ Specifically, this spear was aimed at the Fundamental Laws from which the tsar derived their autocratic power by "formally designat[ing the] Emperor, as 'unlimited' and 'autocratic,'" see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 74.

The most prominent example of Nicholas II weaponizing rights during this period was the *zubatovschina*, which he used as a wedge, parry, and shield. The *zubatovschina* was a police-sponsored trade union network, authored by S.V. Zubatov, the chief of the Moscow political police. The Minister of the Interior Viachaslev Plehve's approval of the program implied Nicholas II's implicit support.¹²⁹ Until 1903, workers' efforts at improving their lot in life remained largely apolitical. Their strikes and protests sought better working conditions, wages, and the right to unionize toward these ends.¹³⁰ Prior to the *zubatovschina* organized union activity remained illegal, resulting in illegal trade unions outside the purview of the government and thus a fertile ground for revolutionary recruitment. The right ring newspaper *Novoye Vremja*, echoing advice given to Alexander II, implored the tsar to "forestall demands from below by reforms from above" to resolve the plight of the worker.¹³¹ The tsar ignored the recommendations of *Novoye Vremja* before shutting down the paper and prosecuting the owners for speaking on labor question in spite of the paper's "conservative tendencies."¹³²

The effort to address the proletarian threat did not gain traction until 1899 when Dmitry Trepov, Head of the Moscow Police, wrote,

so long as the revolutionary preaches pure socialism, he can be dealt with exclusively by repressive measures but when he begins to exploit to his advantage

¹²⁹ In tsarist Russia ministers lacked the authority to do much, if anything, without the explicit approval of the tsar. In many ways Ministers were the tsar's glorified secretaries, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 57-59.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 11.

¹³¹ See Kyril Tidmarsh, "The Zubatov Idea," *American Slavic and East European Review* 19, no. 3 (October 1960): 336, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3001003>.

¹³² Ibid.

the petty shortcomings of the legal order, repressive measures alone are not enough and immediately one has to tear away the ground from beneath his feet... the purpose of the government should be to indicate to the worker a legal solution to the difficulty of his position, having in mind that only the most youthful and energetic part of the crowd will lose that strength upon which the agitator is dependent.¹³³

As a metaphor, the proletariat was the “ground” the socialists needed to stand on.¹³⁴ His call for a legal solution to the threat of proletariat claims turning political set Zubatov’s *zubatovschina* in motion.

In a bid to insulate the workers from the radical *intelligentsia* rhetoric, Zubatov envisioned a trade union directly connected to the police. Provisioning the right to unionize to workers under a state sanctioned program weaponized rights as a shield, wedge, and parry – a triple threat. The shield tactic mirrors the exact motivations and goals of Alexander II’s serf emancipation. Connecting the unions to the police gave the autocracy total visibility and control over the composition and initiatives of the worker, allowing them to shape the conversation and in many cases arrest revolutionary agents before their ideas could taint the proletariat.¹³⁵ In light of this, the *zubatovschina* also served as a rights wedge, albeit between target audiences rather than between competing

¹³³ S. V. Sviatlovskii, *Professionalnoe dvizhenie* (St. Petersburg: 1907), 75, quoted in Kyril Tidmarsh, “The Zubatov Idea,” *The American Slavic and East European Review* 19, no. 3 (October 1960): 335-346.

¹³⁴ Vladimir Lenin addresses the relevance of the worker population to the success of the revolutionary cause in “Demonstrations Have Begun,” in *V. L. Lenin Collected Works 1895-1897*, vol. 5, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1972), 322, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-05.pdf>.

¹³⁵ Tidmarsh details how *Okhrana* secret police agents of the *zubatovschina* would often combat revolutionary rhetoric by contrasting immaterial utopian revolutionary goals with the more tangible gains of economist endeavors in “The Zubatov Idea,” 343.

ideological or rights frameworks. The *zubatovschina* could also be classified as a parry. As the workers called for greater economic rights, Nicholas II and Zubatov responded by provisioning rights in such a way that it alleviated pressure while serving the tsar's own ends of tightening his grip on economic discourse and controlling revolutionary political ambitions.

Once again, the tsar weaponized rights to preserve power through a shield against a perceived threat. Unfortunately for Nicholas II, this rights tactic, despite its threefold technique, was less effective in staving off revolution than the emancipation of the serfs. Short term benefits of the *zubatovschina* unions were tremendous, over 50,000 workers flocked to *zubatovschina*, yielding the exact goal of control over worker efforts the Zubatov envisioned.¹³⁶ The *zubatovschina* shielded the tsar from a politicized working class for several months. However, the *zubatovschina* also resulted in a more organized and educated working class. This greater education unsurprisingly resulted in a few well-organized and legally legitimate strikes. The increased education meant the strikers demands became more nuanced and increasingly more political. Not to mention, the protection of their police affiliation emboldened the protesters who, in many cases, considered their demands against managers to be sanctioned and supported by the tsar.¹³⁷

Nicholas II's reliance on replicating Alexander II's rights tactics was not sufficient to meet the revolutionary threat facing the monarchy from 1894-1904. Between 1894 and 1904 Nicholas II missed several opportunities to mitigate, if not entirely erase,

¹³⁶ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 11.

¹³⁷ Tidmarsh, "The Zubatov Idea," 339-340.

the threat of revolution using rights tactics. Consider, a prominent portion of the *intelligentsia* authored relevant anti-revolutionary literature in response to the increasingly violent revolutionary tactics post 1850.¹³⁸ Nicholas II did nothing to empower this anti-revolutionary movement nor did any of his rights shields provision a measure of power to those supporting his reign. Nicholas II's apprehension toward ceding even an iota of the tsar's total control prevented him from offering what his opponents were calling for, a measure of control over their own destiny.¹³⁹ It is imperative to note that a sizable portion of those striking and protesting in favor of revolution did so while still revering the total control of the tsar.¹⁴⁰ Provisioning a right to representation to the workers, peasants, the *zemstvo*, students, and the *intelligentsia*, among other stakeholders, while maintaining veto power over the representative body would still equal total monarchic power. Nicholas II missed his opportunity to weaponize rights as a shield in the only way that may have effectively preserved his power, by establishing a constitutional monarchy when revolutionaries lacked unity.

Furthermore, Nicholas II failed to respond to socialist revolutionist rights tactics with relevant counter rights tactics – parries. For every radical *intelligentsia* rights spear, rallying cry, and wedge, Nicholas II could have retargeted the tactic against the

¹³⁸ Tidmarsh, "The Zubatov Idea," 335.

¹³⁹ Fitzpatrick notes that "the most vivid images [of prerevolutionary Russia] are those of displacement, alienation, and lack of control over one's destiny," see *The Russian Revolution*, 17.

¹⁴⁰ For example, Father Gapon and his allies marched on the Winter Palace to make their demands while carrying Nicholas II's picture and singing songs in his praise, see Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 236-239.

revolutionists. For example, recall Lenin's rights spear aimed at articles 143-152 of the law "Rules for Industry, Part Two, Volume II" of the Russian Code of Laws.¹⁴¹ Nicholas II failed to seize the initiative and parry this claim by weaponizing the same right (the economic protections provisioned by this law) by merely enforcing the law.¹⁴² Workers would have no reason to revolt against the bourgeoisie, and subsequently the system that enabled the bourgeoisie, if the monarchy were to protect the rights provided to them by those very systems.

Thus, Nicholas II entered 1905 having made no real concessions to the *muzhik*, proletariat, the radical *intelligentsia*, or the bourgeoisie. Unbeknownst to Nicholas II, the opportunity to weaponize rights to preserve monarchical power likely ended on Bloody Sunday where he would lose the initiative and reactively be forced to make concessions. Those concessions will provide additional context to the effectiveness of rights tactics outlined in this chapter.

A Summary of Rights Tactics, 1893-1904

The years leading up to the 1905 Russian Revolution seem disparate and disorganized for many reasons. Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw a direct causal relationship between the rights tactics revolutionaries used to gain power and the revolutionary explosion in 1905. Under different conditions, Lenin's rallying cries and calls to action may have yielded a far greater impact than they did in the early 1890s.

¹⁴¹ Lenin, "Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers."

¹⁴² Bob's case study on Italian atheist's' struggle against school crucifixes in 1985 provides an excellent example of the relative advantages and disadvantages of a state enforcing, ignoring, or not enforcing a law, see *Rights as Weapons*, 125-146.

Indeed, many of the workers committees and soviets that sprung up in 1903 and spread like wildfire after 1905 mirrored in form and function many of Lenin's recommendations.¹⁴³ Conversely, there is a direct causal relationship between the rights tactics Nicholas II used to preserve power and the 1905 revolution. The *zubatovschina* played a particularly decisive role in providing means and resources to Father Gapon and his Assembly to legally mobilize and seek economic reforms.¹⁴⁴ I will pay specific attention to Father Gapon in Chapter 3, suffice to say here that despite his disagreements with the radical *intelligentsia* his efforts between 1903 and 1905 mirrored Lenin's call to "coopt" legalized unions.¹⁴⁵

The primary limitation of the effectiveness of Lenin's rallying cries and calls to action in the years preceding 1905 is likely due to the competition for the attention of Russian society between rival revolutionary factions. Lenin's ideology had to struggle not only against the tsar but also against Economists, Bundists, the SR, and even the *Borba* group. Additionally, oppressive *okhrana* measures prevented Lenin's *Iskra* from being as widely distributed as he intended it to be.¹⁴⁶ This allowed rival publications such as *Rabochee Delo* ("Workers' Affairs") and *Rabochaia Mysl* ("Workers' Mind") to prevent

¹⁴³ Thomas Hammond, "Lenin on Trade Unions Under Capitalism, 1894-1904," *The American Slavic and East European Review* 8, no. 4 (December 1949): 275-288, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2491847>.

¹⁴⁴ V. Nevskii, *Rabochee dvizhenie v ianvarskie dni 1905 goda* (Moscow: 1930), quoted in Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 144.

¹⁴⁵ Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, 112.

¹⁴⁶ Tobias, "The Bund and Lenin until 1903."

Lenin from achieving ideological hegemony.¹⁴⁷ After Lenin and his allies seized power over the RSDLP he wielded a disproportionately large amount of influence over Russian society;¹⁴⁸ despite their name (translated as “majority”), the Bolsheviks were numerically inferior to their rivals.

The rights tactics Lenin used to seize power at the second RSDLP congress also illuminate a gap in Bob’s theory.¹⁴⁹ The tactics used to suppress the *Borba* group match the specified effect of a rights blockade, however the definition provided by Bob is complicated in application. During the second session of second RSDLP congress Aleksandr Martinov, an *Iskraist*, admitted the *Borba* group met all the requirements for membership as prescribed in the party program before declaring the congress simply did not need to honor that rule in relation to the *Borba* group.¹⁵⁰ In other words, the *Borba* group’s rights claim to membership in the second congress, which the congress was responsible for enforcing, was essentially ignored for no other reason than *Iskra*’s convenience. In this regard, a party in power (provisioning and enforcing a right) *confiscated* a right to achieve their own ends. This rights tactic falls outside of Bob’s rights as weapons framework but is a tactic Nicholas II will replicate in the years

¹⁴⁷ See Robert Mayer, “Lenin and the Concept of the Professional Revolutionary,” *History of Political Thought* 14, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 249-263, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26214357>.

¹⁴⁸ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 361.

¹⁴⁹ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*.

¹⁵⁰ Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress*, 50.

following the 1905 Russian Revolution. I offer the following definition for the rights confiscation tactic:

Confiscate: The confiscation of a right formally provisioned to a party to prevent their ability to leverage it to achieve their goals and to open the door to prosecute otherwise accepted and/or legal actions.

Finally, the contrast between Nicholas II and Alexander II's rights tactics deserves attention. It is a fair conclusion that Alexander II's ability to make concessions without violating his monarchical autocracy was due to his superior leadership. However, the conditions facing each of these tsars was vastly different. Alexander II was facing a single relevant threat, the *muzhik*, whereas Nicholas II had to not only deal with the peasants, but also a more vocal radical *intelligentsia*, a restless proletariat, and disaffected student population. In the face of these broad challenges, a single rights tactic such as the serfs' emancipation was not adequate to the task at hand. Nicholas II instead chose to invest heavily in broadening the powers and size of the *okhrana* under a strategy of aggressive repression.¹⁵¹ The police suppression of revolutionary activity was so effective that Lenin and many of his compatriots were forced to live abroad while they struggled to organize the revolution.¹⁵² In light of these successes, Nicholas II lacked the incentive to consider employing more aggressive rights tactics that may have yielded results akin to those achieved by his grandfather.

¹⁵¹ The arrest of nearly every agent provocateur at the aborted Belostok Conference validates the effectiveness of Nicholas II's aggressive *okhrana* repression of the revolution, see Wildman, "Lenin's Battle with Kustarnichestvo," 494.

¹⁵² Helen Rappaport offers a comprehensive analysis of the many times Lenin went into hiding in *Conspirator: Lenin in Exile* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2010).

Unfortunately for the tsar, Lenin was correct in his assessment that the concessions Nicholas II did make (*zubatovschina*) would “*in the long run* (author’s emphasis)... be [in favor of the revolutionaries].”¹⁵³ Even more stunning is how accurate Lenin was when he said, “But whenever [the government] takes a real step forward, though it be the most ‘timid zigzag,’ we will say: Please continue!” as that step would represent “a real, if small, extension of the workers’ field of action.”¹⁵⁴ The *zubatovschina* was indeed a small step forward, but it provided the proletariat just enough freedom of action to unite under common purpose and initiate the next stage of the revolution with a bang.

¹⁵³ Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, 112.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 113.

CHAPTER 3

RIGHTS IN REVOLUTION, 1905

Introduction

The 1905 Russian Revolution is more reminiscent of an unexpected chemical reaction than it is an organized uprising. Several of the most influential revolutionary leaders, particularly those of the RSDLP, were in foreign lands avoiding Russian authorities when Bloody Sunday ignited the revolutionary fire. Vladimir Lenin, Viktor Chernov, Yulii Martov, and Georgy Plekhanov, all widely known socialist leaders prior to 1905, were conspicuously absent for large portions of the revolution, and none of them exerted any substantive impact on events.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, while the start of the 1905 revolution aligns with the start of the year, there is no clean bookend marking the end of the revolutionary activity.¹⁵⁶ Few proletariat, *muzhik*, and revolutionaries considered their actions in 1905 a success, and neither agents of the monarchy nor Nicholas II considered the revolution quelled as 1906 dawned.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Lesser-known leaders such as Leon Trotsky, Alexander Kerensky, Alexander “Parvus,” and a young Joseph Stalin, attempted to exploit the opportunities in 1905 and in doing so gained immense prestige within the socialist movement. See McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 40-41.

¹⁵⁶ The Bolshevik led Moscow Soviet, the most organized and openly revolutionary act of 1905, did not launch their violent bid to establish a republic until December 6. This armed rebellion survived until the Semenovskiy Guard Regiment dispersed the uprising with artillery, with fighting ending on Jan 1 of 1906. In Tiflis, General Griazanov deployed the Cossacks to suppress revolutionary activity on Jan 5 of 1906, marking him for assassination by Stalin less than a month later. See McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 43; Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 374.

¹⁵⁷ After the October Manifesto, a small percentage of the RSDLP split off to form the Octobrist and Kadet parties, both of which considered the concessions sufficient

Thus, the proletariat and *muzhik* coalesced into revolution across Russia despite the absence of revolutionary leadership. The man most responsible for igniting the fire of revolution was not even a socialist, he was instead a rural priest named Father Georgii Gapon.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, radical *intelligentsia* agenda held most no influence over the *muzhik* revolts on the eastern bank of Ukraine. Nonetheless, they too revolted against their landlords in 1905.¹⁵⁹

The diversity and breadth of concerns amongst the cast of 1905 did little to assuage authorities' or the tsar's perception that the radical *intelligentsia* propagated the entire event. From the perspective of the monarchy there was trivial difference between the workers strikes in St. Petersburg, the *muzhik* revolts across the countryside, and the radical *intelligentsia*'s agenda in the years preceding 1905. Nicholas II's diary entry concerning Father Gapon identifies him as nothing more than "some socialist priest."¹⁶⁰ Thus, the tsar's reaction to the perceived socialist revolution in 1905 mirrored his reactions in the years preceding.

to meet their current goals to one degree or another. See Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, 34.

¹⁵⁸ See Father George ("Georgii") Gapon's autobiography, *The Story of My Life*. (New York, NY: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1906) and Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*. These works are widely cited in research concerning Bloody Sunday and Father Gapon's role in 1905. For an alternate perspective assigning Gapon minimal influence during and leading to Bloody Sunday, see U. A. Shuster, *Peterburgskie rabochie v 1905-1907 gg.* (Leningrad: 1976), 59-95.

¹⁵⁹ Robert Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest* (London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 116-117.

¹⁶⁰ Nicholas Romanov II, *Dnevnik Imperatora Nikolaia II* (Berlin: Slovo, 1923), quoted in Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 209.

Bloody Sunday: Pushing Rights as Weapons to the Limit

The events in St. Petersburg on January 9 of 1905 may have catalyzed the start of the 1905 revolution, but they also served as the penultimate moment of Father Georgii Gapon's lifetime of service. Bloody Sunday, the climax of Father Gapon's life, intersects with the rising action of the Russian worker. As industrialization encouraged more *muzhik* away from the land and into the city, their identity began to split from the *muzhik* into a new class, the industrial proletariat.¹⁶¹ In many ways, Father Gapon's actions in St. Petersburg between 1898 and 1905 personified the rising proletarian spirit. Without Gapon, St. Petersburg workers may have never united under a common cause. Prior to analyzing key actions taken during this period it is essential to outline Father Gapon's opinion of the tsar and his distaste for the radical *intelligentsia*.

Gapon's belief in the tsar as a benevolent ruler stems from meetings with the Princess Elizabeth Narishkin, a lady in waiting to the Empress. Gapon met with Elizabeth regularly in 1898 when he first took up the idea of helping the working class as he studied at the Ecclesiastical Academy in St. Petersburg.¹⁶² Elizabeth told Gapon stories of Nicholas II's character, kindness, and honesty, to which Gapon concluded, "I thought that the day would come when the tsar would suddenly rise to the height of the situation with which he was faced, and would listen to the voices of his people and make them

¹⁶¹ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 16.

¹⁶² Gapon, *The History of My Life*, 72-73.

happy.”¹⁶³ Many of Gapon’s decisions in 1904 would be driven by this perception, in truth a mischaracterization, of Nicholas II.¹⁶⁴

Gapon’s distrust of the radical *intelligentsia* showed little in the way of changing until the days immediately preceding Bloody Sunday. Gapon’s distaste for the *intelligentsia* was as much practical as it was ideological; he did not think they could achieve real change while operating in the shadows.¹⁶⁵ In kind, the radical *intelligentsia* held a mutual disdain for Father Gapon and his state-sponsored Mutual Aid Fund, it being a natural evolution of the *zubatovschina*. Revolutionaries considered Gapon’s organization as nothing more than a clever ruse by the monarchy to siphon off the militant capacity of the proletariat.¹⁶⁶ Compounding the issue was Gapon’s total ignorance of revolutionary labor and social ideologies, an opinion shared by both the *intelligentsia* and Zubatov himself.¹⁶⁷ Zubatov’s opinion of Gapon’s revolutionary

¹⁶³ Gapon, *The History of My Life*, 73.

¹⁶⁴ Figes posited that no Russian believed in the tsar’s love for his people more than Gapon, see *A People’s Tragedy*, 174

¹⁶⁵ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 75-76. Gapon once described his “... sympathy with the heroic figures of the Russian Revolutionary Movement...” This quote could mean many things, among them a hidden admiration for the revolutionary platform, or admiration of Russians willing to lay down their lives for a cause they feel is just. In either case, Gapon spent considerable effort describing his concerns about aligning with revolutionary movements. See Gapon, *The Story of My Life*, 85.

¹⁶⁶ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 60-61. See also Solomon Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers Movement and the Birth of Bolshevism and Menshevism*, trans. G. Vakar (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 385-400.

¹⁶⁷ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 65.

ignorance justified his decision to legally sanction the Mutual Aid Society in St. Petersburg.

The details of the historiography between 1898 and 1902 are incredibly important but exceed the scope of this research. In summary, Gapon spent the years between 1898 and 1902 ingratiating himself with the proletariat and elite, making every attempt possible to leverage his connections to better the lives of his patrons and friends.¹⁶⁸ During these meetings Gapon made excellent impressions in imperial and ministerial circles, among them Zubatov. Gapon's unparalleled support of the tsar and innocence of revolutionary ideals led Zubatov to recruit him to establish a *zubatovschina*-esque Mutual Aid Society in St. Petersburg in 1902.¹⁶⁹ At this period, labor organizations remained expressly forbidden, with the exception of Mutual Aid Societies designed only to "assist victims in cases of accident, sickness, unemployment, death, etc."¹⁷⁰ Gapon's Mutual Aid Society met for the first time in November of 1902, and spent the next four months laying out the statutes for the organization.¹⁷¹

Despite their alliance Zubatov and Gapon envisioned dramatically different purposes for the organization. Zubatov wanted to prevent revolutionaries from accessing

¹⁶⁸ Gerald Surh, "Petersburg's First Mass Labor Organization: The Assembly of Russia Workers and Father Gapon Part I," *The Russian Review* 40, no. 3 (July 1981): 241-242, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/129374>.

¹⁶⁹ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 65.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 66.

the proletariat in alignment with the core objective of the *zubatovschina*.¹⁷² On the other hand, Gapon's true purpose was remarkably similar to the radical *intelligentsia*'s, albeit with a few major differences.¹⁷³ The most significant difference was Gapon's insistence that his movement could be successful within the existing structure of the monarchy.¹⁷⁴ However, at the outset of his partnership with Zubatov, Gapon knew that he had to carefully hide any of his personal goals that correlated with revolutionary thought.¹⁷⁵ This detail demands inspection. Gapon considered himself a loyal subject of the tsar even though he recognized some of his goals were revolutionary in nature. He was nonetheless more than willing to lay his life down for the proletariat cause.¹⁷⁶

Gapon's partnership with Zubatov was a calculated move to leverage rights toward his own ends. When Zubatov approved a legalized aid society Gapon saw a way to achieve his primary goal of a workers' organization independent of ministerial control. The statutes Gapon drew up for the initial "Mutual Aid Society of Workers in Machine Industries" (MASWMI) in March of 1903 were the first of many parries meant to open a slow path to the proletariat legally standing up for itself. As the MASWMI grew, Gapon

¹⁷² Tidmarsh, "The Zubatov Idea," 342.

¹⁷³ Gapon's objectives most closely aligned with the revolutionary Economist platform, see Jonathan Frankel, ed. and trans., *Vladimir Akimov on the Dilemmas of Russian Marxism 1895-1903* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

¹⁷⁴ Gapon deeply revered the Tsar and believed that Nicholas II could usher in a better life for the proletariat, see *The Story of My Life*.

¹⁷⁵ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 72, 94-95.

¹⁷⁶ Gapon speaks of the overwhelming guilt that he did not also perish at the Narva Gates in, *The Story of My Life*, 206.

organized a clubhouse for workers to come and organize under the equally legal umbrella. Gapon's subsequent parry was The Assembly of the Russian Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St. Petersburg (The Assembly). Put another way, Gapon designed both organizations with the intent to shield himself and his allies using the rights Zubatov granted in his exception for the groups' existence. Gapon's statutes for The Assembly deliberately played into ministerial concerns that the monarchy needed a means to prevent the radical *intelligentsia* from accessing the proletariat.¹⁷⁷ In summary, Gapon deliberately coopted the *zubatovschina*'s purpose for his own ends and to protect his organizations' activities.

The Assembly's statutes were a spear directed at the heart of monarchic repression of independent action, but also camouflage for the true goals of The Assembly. Zubatov approved The Assembly statutes in February of 1904.¹⁷⁸ The very next month Gapon assembled four of his closest allies and laid out his secret "Program-of-the-Five," depicted in Table 1.¹⁷⁹ Gapon set his lieutenants to task quietly spreading the message of the "Program-of-the-Five" throughout the Assembly. Whether by design or not, Gapon set the proletariat on a collision course with the monarchy when he publicly declared submission to ministerial constraints in the organization's purpose while secretly circulating a considerably more radical program to the proletariat.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ R. Kobiakov, "Gapon i okhrannoe otdelenie do 1905 goda," *Byloe* 29, no. 1 (1925): 28-45, quoted in Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 85-87. The language of The Assembly's statutes is deliberately patriotic and pro-Russian ('*Rus*'), intended to pacify opposition within the ministries. This was paired with a vocal argument that "It would be better to allow workers to satisfy *their natural* desire to organize for self-help and mutual aid ... rather than [allow] them to ... manifest their independence *secretly and guilefully, harming themselves and perhaps the entire nation* (author's emphasis)"

¹⁷⁸ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 102.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 103. Major political demands are conspicuously absent from "The-Program-of-the-Five," which Sablinsky attributes to either an oversight or a fundamental misunderstanding of the minimum restructuring of state power necessary to meet the demands.

¹⁸⁰ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 145.

Table 1. The “Program-of-the-Five”		
Measures to Eliminate Ignorance of, and Arbitrariness Toward, the Russian People	Measures to Eliminate the Poverty of the People	Measures to Eliminate the Oppression of Labor by Capital
1. Freedom and inviolability of person; freedom of speech, press, assembly, and freedom of conscience in matters of worship. 2. Universal and compulsory education, financed by the state. 3. Responsibility of the ministers before the people and guarantees that the government will abide by the law. 4. Equality of all before the law without exceptions. 5. Immediate pardon of those who suffered for their convictions.	1. Abolition of indirect taxation and the introduction of direct, progressive, and income, taxes. 2. Abolition of the land redemption tax, [establishment of] cheap credit, and the gradual transfer of land to the people.	1. Protection of labor by the law. 2. Freedom of cooperative associations and professional labor unions. 3. An eight-hour workday and regulation of overtime work. 4. Freedom of struggle for labor against capital. 5. Participation of representatives of the working class in drafting legislation for the state insurance of workers. 6. Normal wages [minimum wage].

Source: Table created by author using information in Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 132.

In December 1904 workers at the Putilov plant, one of the largest industrial factories in St. Petersburg, went on strike in response to the “illegal” firings of three workers.¹⁸¹ As the Putilov strike grew, Gapon felt the timing was right to bring a petition to Nicholas II laying out the plight of the proletariat. In the days leading up to that fateful day on January 9, Gapon began to encounter roadblocks within his well-established

¹⁸¹ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 164.

ministerial networks. The shield Gapon so delicately constructed began to rapidly deteriorate despite having united a substantial portion of St. Petersburg workers under a common banner. Between January 7 and 8, Gapon either met or attempted to meet with the ministers of finance, justice, and the interior, the Governor General, and his friend Zubatov.¹⁸² The meetings that did occur ranged in tone from indifferent to outright hostile in the case of N. Murav'ev, the minister of justice.¹⁸³ Gapon was torn, in part because he knew there was nothing he could do to prevent a march on the imperial palace without "shattering every hope for the future."¹⁸⁴

This is not to imply that Bloody Sunday was entirely unavoidable. Gapon included specific measures in The-Program-of-the-Five he knew went too far so he could negotiate to preserve the more important claims such as the eight-hour work day or state sponsored education.¹⁸⁵ The authorities could have believed Gapon's repeated cries that the march would be peaceful, un-revolutionary, unarmed, and in no way designed to impugn Nicholas II's role as the patron father of the Russian people. Nicholas II could have returned to the Imperial Palace to take the meeting and negotiated from a paternal position of power rather than remain cloistered in Tsarkoe Selo.¹⁸⁶ Gapon, in a final bid to protect the proletariat as they marched on the palace with their demands for protection

¹⁸² Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 204-206.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 205.

¹⁸⁴ Gapon, *The Story of My Life*, 168.

¹⁸⁵ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 290.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 209.

and fair treatment under the monarchy, disguised themselves under color of religion. Gapon and his lieutenants directed the procession to acquire religious artifacts and carry them at the front of the procession (alongside pictures of Nicholas II) to give their march, centered on gaining greater rights and protections, the image of a religious procession.¹⁸⁷

Gapon and Bloody Sunday stand as a litmus test for how far a movement can weaponize rights to achieve their ends. Rights as weapons, an inherently non-violent strategy, have an inherent disadvantage when opposed by violence. Gapon made every effort possible to generate space and time for the proletariat to grow and coalesce toward the tsar with their claims. Gapon not only worked within the limitations of laws and policies of the monarchy, he also leveraged his relationships to gain exclusive exceptions to repressive policies designed to stifle the voices of the Russian people. Gapon used every available means at his disposal and a diverse set of rights tactics to achieve his objectives. Nevertheless, Gapon watched as all his well laid plans were in an instant cut down by a hail of gunfire at the Narva Gates. As the smoke from the imperial soldiers' guns still wafted in the air, Gapon rose to his feet with an emboldened revolutionary spirit, crying "There is no God any longer! There is no Tsar!"¹⁸⁸

Proletarian Peasants: Untapped Dynamite

The monarchy's violent suppression of the proletariat's march on the Imperial Palace was not successful in quelling revolutionary tides in the cities. Unfortunately for Tsar Nicholas II, the subsequent wave of violence and strikes in the cities coincided with

¹⁸⁷ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 213.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 243.

an increasingly mobilized *muzhik*.¹⁸⁹ Bloody Sunday seems an obvious catalyst for hundreds of simultaneous yet largely autonomous *muzhik* revolts that shocked the Russian countryside.¹⁹⁰ Bloody Sunday did catalyze revolutionary activity in certain instances such as the violent insurrection in Moscow in November 1905.¹⁹¹ However, while Bloody Sunday and the subsequent violent strikes in the cities certainly influenced the *muzhik*,¹⁹² the origins of their discontent rested deep in their historic class identity.

In an epilogue to Tsar Alexander II's final shield, the second and third order effects of the serfs' emancipation weighed heavily on the *muzhik*.¹⁹³ The emancipation freed them from their shackles to the land, but it also freed their landlords from the shackles of a feudal economic system. The *muzhik* watched helplessly as their rights and access to essential resources such as forest and pasture dwindled while the landlords pivoted to predatory capitalism through rent and taxation.¹⁹⁴ In another emancipation

¹⁸⁹ Maureen Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907: Its Social Composition and Revolutionary Significance," *Past & Present*, no. 57 (November 1972): 123, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/650419>.

¹⁹⁰ Maureen Perrie provides a quantitative analysis of *muzhik* uprisings across Russia from 1905-1907, see "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907," 123-155.

¹⁹¹ McMeekin traces the effects Bloody Sunday had on militarizing the proletariat which provided the radical *intelligentsia* a fertile population to revolutionize toward violent insurrection in *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 34-43.

¹⁹² Figs attributes Bloody Sunday's contribution to the peasant revolts as a "mood of rebellion" rather than the spread of revolutionary ideology in *A People's Tragedy*, 182.

¹⁹³ Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907," 124-127.

¹⁹⁴ Perrie notes that practices such as money-rent, labor-rent, and sharecropping were widespread but much more common in the Black Earth and Volga regions in "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907," 124.

aftershock, the *zemstvo* led to a higher literacy rate in rural populations that spawned a small class of rural *intelligentsia*.¹⁹⁵ Thus the *muzhik* looked much different in 1905 than it had in the past. They collectively recognized the emancipation had not brought the freedom it had promised. It had instead kept the land just out of their reach and emboldened their landlords to find evermore creative ways to exploit their labor.¹⁹⁶

The *muzhik*'s evolving perception of the tsar and their perception of life is also essential in understanding why they rose to action in 1905. When the populists (*narodniki*)¹⁹⁷ engaged the *muzhik* in the 1870s and 1880s they encountered a deeply religious people loyal to the tsar.¹⁹⁸ As a result of myriad economic and social factors, the *muzhik* in 1905 were neither deeply religious nor were they comfortable with accepting that their lot in life was relative to their position in society.¹⁹⁹ Rural youth were restless, industrially disenchanted, and generally disaffected with life in general.²⁰⁰ As the realities

¹⁹⁵ Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907," 125. Pipes adds that concerted efforts from "rural schools and private associations," increased literacy rates and cites a 45% literacy rate for males aged 10 to 29 and a 21% rate for women of the same age, see *The Russian Revolution*, 119-120.

¹⁹⁶ Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907," 124-126.

¹⁹⁷ The *narodniki* constituted a small class of educated peasants who eventually became some of the founding members of Russian Marxism. See Daniel Field, "Peasants and Propagandists in the Russian Movement to the People of 1874," *The Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 3 (September 1987): 415-438, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879856>.

¹⁹⁸ Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905 to 1907," 125.

¹⁹⁹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 119. See also Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905 to 1907," 124; Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*, 2-4.

²⁰⁰ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 119.

of industrialization polluted the *muzhik*'s conscience their reverence for mythology, mysticism, and their unquestionable loyalty to the tsar as the divine father of the Russian people gave way to widespread cynicism toward class inequalities.²⁰¹

Additionally, rural revolts in 1905 had little to do in the way of the broader revolutionary movement. The *muzhik* showed little interest in taking their fight all the way to the tsar. Instead, they targeted landlords and local government agencies as they were the more immediate means of their continued oppression.²⁰² In most cases, revolts only directed their unrest at the police or military (both of which more directly correlated with an action "against autocracy") when they brutally defended landowners.²⁰³

Conversely, revolutionaries invested little to no effort to organize or coopt *muzhik* strikes or more violent unrest. RSDLP and SR attitudes toward peasants rarely elevated them past second class revolutionaries whom the proletariat would lead in overthrowing the monarchy.²⁰⁴ Lenin was one of the most vocal leaders espousing the revolutionary

²⁰¹ Joseph Bradley, "Subjects into Citizens: Societies, Civil Society, and Autocracy in Tsarist Russia," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 4 (October 2002): 1098-1103, <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/107.4.1094>. The evolution of the *muzhik*'s world view can just as easily be described as the death of Russian superstition toward the *muzhik*'s purpose in relation to the responsibility of the tsar. For a historical perspective on the *muzhik*'s acceptance of hardship and turmoil and reverence for the tsar, see Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 161-162; *The Russian Revolution*, 119.

²⁰² Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907," 126-127.

²⁰³ Notable exceptions to this generalization include Georgia where the *muzhik* replaced or otherwise disbanded most local mechanisms of governance and opted instead for one form or another of anarchy. Approximately 20% of *muzhik* actions against their landlords in Russia's southwest resulted in conflict with Russian state officials, police, or troops, see Perrie, "The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907," 127-128.

²⁰⁴ Michael Melancon offers a comprehensive analysis of the evolving RSDLP and SR attitudes toward the *muzhik* leading to and during 1905, see "The Radical

potential of the *muzhik*, even going to far as to classify them as the “rural proletariat.”²⁰⁵ His argument failed to sway the broader radical *intelligentsia* attitudes. Nevertheless, local authorities were quick to blame *muzhik* uprisings on radical *intelligentsia* influence.²⁰⁶

Thus, in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, the *muzhik* rebellions and strikes presented neither a social class collectively mobilizing against the monarchy, nor a concerted revolutionary effort to destroy autocracy. Nonetheless, the kaleidoscope of *muzhik* revolutionary activity concealed a rights dynamite claim attacking a fundamental pillar of Russian social structure.²⁰⁷ The preponderance of revolts in Russia’s southwest region (modern day Ukraine) focused on agrarian demands for more land and resources alongside an economic claim of “a ruble a day.”²⁰⁸ A small subset of these revolts added

Intelligentsia from 1902 to 1907: Peasant and Workers Party,” *Russian History* 12, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 6-13, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24655783>.

²⁰⁵ Vladimir Lenin, “The Development of Capital in Russia,” in *V. L. Lenin Collected Works 1896-1900*, vol. 3, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1977): 175, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/dcr8ii/ii8xiii.htm>. The Mensheviks vehemently opposed Lenin’s belief that the *muzhik* had revolutionary potential and the radical *intelligentsia* never invested resources toward revolutionizing them. See also Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*, 8-9; Melancon, “The Radical Intelligentsia from 1902 to 1907,” 10-11. In contrast, attention can be paid to the corollary conditions of the Russian *muzhik* in 1905 and the Chinese peasants in the Chinese Revolution, whom Mao preferred over the Chinese industrial proletariat to lead his revolution, see Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel Griffith II (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000): 14-16.

²⁰⁶ Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*, 116.

²⁰⁷ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 150.

²⁰⁸ The claim for a “ruble a day” was one of the more universal demands among otherwise unconnected *muzhik* rebellions. This claim was not new, originating as far back as Nicholas II’s coronation in 1893. The economic claim may have been linked to

their dynamite to the mix, a claim targeting the monarchic concept of vertical respect.²⁰⁹

In fairness, the *muzhik* never defined exactly what they meant by respect. To understand the impact of the claim, Robin Dillon's treatise on respect as "[involving] regarding [something] as making a rightful claim on our conduct, as deserving moral consideration in its own right, independently of considerations of personal well being," will suffice as proxy.²¹⁰

Near modern day Kyiv and Volynia a quiet minority made a unique claim - a reprieve from "inhuman treatment" and a "lack of respect."²¹¹ The claim itself seems benign but were the tsar or any subservient government agency to pay respect to the *muzhik* it would irreversibly alter the autocracy Nicholas II was so determined to preserve. In 1904 respect in Russia flowed as it always had, from lower social classes up through the hierarchical structures of power. The *muzhik* respected landlords, workers

demands for more land, as the increased wages would have allowed the *muzhik* to purchase the land back from the landlords, see Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*, 124-125.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 129.

²¹⁰ Robin Dillon's treatise breaks down respect into three aspects: *respekt*, *observantia* (definition outlined in the body above), and *reverentia*. *Respekt* is "the uneasy and watchful attitude that has 'the element of fear' in it," and *reverentia* is "the special feeling of profound awe and respect we have in the presence of something extraordinary or sublime, a feeling that both humbles and uplifts us." Both alternative definitions could replace the one offered (*observantia*) to for purposes of this research, see Edward Zalta, ed., "Respect," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/respect>.

²¹¹ Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*, 130-131.

respected employers, and both respected the police, army, governors, and ministers who oversaw every function of daily Russian life.²¹²

The Russian peasant, once considered the “cornerstone of the country’s stability,” had been contaminated.²¹³ The historic lord-peasant relationship had at some point deteriorated from its paternal nature to a mere employer-employee connection.²¹⁴ Increasing literacy rates meant younger peasants no longer needed to rely on the oral history of their elders.²¹⁵ Literacy also brought a growing sense of individualism and allowed the *muzhik* to see through their landlords’ predatory economic practices.²¹⁶ Rising economic and geographic mobility further emboldened rural youth to embrace a new aspect of their identities, “I earn money therefore I am.”²¹⁷ In light of a growing class consciousness a desire for respect seems a natural next step. The claim is only surprising in that it gained no traction across the wider *muzhik* population.²¹⁸

The claim was also incredibly audacious. Gapon’s “Program-of-the-Five” only danced around a claim as bold as respect from the tsar or industrial leaders. Of course,

²¹² Pipes attributed the historic patrimonial flow of respect in Russia to “[the] law]” and “an interest in the preservation of the status quo,” see *The Russian Revolution*, 112.

²¹³ Ibid., 92.

²¹⁴ Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*, 129.

²¹⁵ Figs, *A People’s Tragedy*, 93.

²¹⁶ Ibid. 94.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 93.

²¹⁸ Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*.

had Nicholas II recognized Gapon's program in totality the proletariat would have been inherently afforded a measure of respect, but only within well defined economic parameters. Imagine a landlord in rural Russia unable to settle disputes without considering the social class of claimants or forced to acknowledge the merits of the case rather than rest on the authority of their position when they negotiated with communes. Now imagine the impact of that paradigm shift at the industrial, ministerial, judicial, or monarchic level. Vertical respect flowing up and down would demand autocratic machines to engage the proletariat, *muzhik*, and radical *intelligentsia* directly on the merits of their claims. This would have been a significant cultural and social shift neither Nicholas II nor his ministers could allow.

The *muzhik* dynamite in southwest Russia is unique within this research in that it had no short- or long-term effects on the broader revolutionary movement. The rights tactic yielded the *muzhik* no concessions or new allies, nor did it inspire broader *muzhik* mobilization. In effect, the *muzhik*'s rights dynamite was a rights dud. In contrast, the rights dynamite of respect resurfaced years later in the political strikes in Petersburg prior to World War I and later among the Red Army in 1917 as part of the broader revolutionary agenda rather than a disjointed parallel.²¹⁹

The October Manifesto as Shield, Parry, Blockade, and Camouflage

Bloody Sunday, violent strikes, and peasant revolts were not the only threats Nicholas II had to contend with in 1905. Not only was the tsar faced with the challenging task of quelling a rising revolution from within, he also had to grapple with the increasing

²¹⁹ Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants*, 131.

likelihood of Japanese victory in Manchuria.²²⁰ The combination of internal and external threats should have motivated Nicholas II to react decisively. However, he remained characteristically “oblivious to the extremity of the situation.”²²¹ When A.G. Bulygin, the Minister of the Interior, suggested to Nicholas II that political concessions may be the only way to calm the people, Nicholas II is said to have responded, “One would think you are afraid a revolution will break out.”²²² The myriad internal threats facing the monarchy spanned the country and each threatened the tsar’s total power in unique ways. The strikes in St. Petersburg sought fair and legal labor practices, the peasants sought increased land rights and fair wages, and the radical *intelligentsia* sought representative democracy, the decline of capitalism, and the dissolution of the monarchy. The diversity of these objectives shared a thread in that achieving any of them would mean greater rights for the Russian people, many at the expense of Nicholas II’s autocratic power. Nicholas II faced a seemingly impossible situation where every available option came with consequences that outweighed the relative benefits.

Until 1905, either through luck or deft statecraft, the monarchy somehow managed to quell revolutionary activity without actually ceding any power. The emancipation of the serfs quelled peasant revolutionary spirit, much as Nicholas II’s

²²⁰ See Richard Connaughton, *Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: Russia’s War with Japan* (London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2003) for a full account of the land campaign of the Russo-Japanese War. Vladimir Semenoff covers the naval campaigns in *The Russo-Japanese War at Sea 1904-5*, vol. 1, *Port Arthur, the Battles of the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan* (London: Leonaur, 2014) and vol. 2, *The Battle of Tsushima and the Aftermath* (London: Leonaur, 2014).

²²¹ Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, 186.

²²² Ibid.

zubatovschina delayed the politicization of workers.²²³ In both instances Alexander II and Nicholas II were able to give their opponents exactly what they were asking for without giving them anything of actual value. However, both instances also occurred prior to opponents mobilizing into revolution. Additionally, in both instances the solution only had to address the claims of one social class to delay or quell the greater threat. Nicholas II encountered neither of these situations in the wake of Bloody Sunday. As evidenced in his response to A.G. Bulygin, Nicholas II's natural response to these new conditions was to ignore that the revolution had begun and that it was no longer isolated.

Nicholas II did not jump straight from ignorance to signed declarations and concessions. Before Nicholas II took A.G. Bulygin's advice to offer concessions, he considered suppression and negotiations as alternative solutions.²²⁴ Unfortunately, the vast majority of Russia's army (over one million men) were engaged 5,000 kilometers away and the police were unquestionably incapable of pacifying all social unrest.²²⁵ Negotiation seemed equally insufficient, if not simply beneath Nicholas II's position. Immediately following Bloody Sunday, Nicholas II authorized the proletariat in St. Petersburg to elect a delegation to meet him in Tsarkoe Selo to discuss constitutional

²²³ Gapon's followers aggressively shouted down and kicked out revolutionaries every time they attempted to infiltrate their movement, see Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 124.

²²⁴ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 46.

²²⁵ Nicholas II and his ministers did not abstain entirely from using the forces they did have available, as evidenced by the violent suppression of numerous peasant revolts and strikes. The violent suppression peaked in mid-summer when the strikers in Odessa, joined by mutineers from the battleship *Potemkin*, suffered 5,000 dead and wounded at the hands of the Russian army. See Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 24-26.

reform.²²⁶ When the workers arrived they received no such platform and were instead forgiven their trespasses and thanked for their steadfast devotion.²²⁷ In truth, negotiations with the proletariat or any other class was never really an option as it would have violated Nicholas II's perception of himself as a tsar of the Byzantine tradition.²²⁸ Concessions remained Nicholas II's only remaining option, one he reluctantly acted on under tremendous internal conflict.

Following the proletariat delegation to Tsarkoe Selo and considering A. G. Bulygin's warning of the arrival of the revolution, Nicholas II issued the Imperial Manifesto and Decree on February 18.²²⁹ The Imperial Manifesto was Nicholas II's first of two rights tactics in 1905 that manifested as shield, parry, blockade, and camouflage. As a shield the decree bought time for the monarchy to mobilize. As a parry the decree provided Russians the voice they wanted, albeit absent any weight behind their new platform. As a blockade it isolated the *intelligentsia* by appealing to the "silent majority" liberal base.²³⁰ Finally, as camouflage the Imperial Decree allowed Nicholas II to embolden his image as a reformer to the non-revolutionary citizens while directly targeting the revolution itself.²³¹

²²⁶ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 27.

²²⁷ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 187.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 28.

²³⁰ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 191; Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 28.

²³¹ Figes discusses how those sympathetic to the tsarist regime, particularly those nostalgic to the old Soviet days of glory, eagerly cite the Imperial Decree to support an

The Imperial Decree consisted of three declarations: the current bureaucracy was inadequate, “well meaning citizens” should send ideas on how to improve that system, and the promise of a proposal for a national assembly.²³² The Decree seemed a promise of a brighter future with increased cooperation between the tsar and his people. In truth it was nothing short of a strategic maneuver described by Alexander Kerensky as “[meant to] calm and silence the revolutionary movement ... so that all forces of the government can be consolidated for one purpose ... to prevent any of [the revolution’s] promises from being delivered.”²³³ The Imperial Decree gave the monarchy nine months of breathing room before Nicholas II was forced into further concessions. In the interim, A.G. Bulygin designed the representative body the decree promised, which would come to be known as the Duma.²³⁴

Despite its inadequacies, A.G. Bulygin’s Duma was a tremendous step forward for Russians seeking major political reform. The Duma was purely consultative, held no power to pass or veto laws, and would consist of representatives elected on tremendously limited franchise that favored noble representation.²³⁵ Conversely, it acknowledged the principle of representation within the tsarist autocracy – something Nicholas II had

image of Nicholas II as “[the] enlightened Tsar [that] introduced democracy to Russia,” see Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, 191.

²³² Ibid., 186.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, 187; Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 34.

²³⁵ Ibid., 187.

claimed several times he would never do.²³⁶ From a functional perspective, the consultative nature of the Duma was in itself performative as Nicholas II had no obligation to actually consult the representative body.²³⁷ Newspapers first carried reports of the Duma to the Russian people on June 23.²³⁸ Seeing the promise of the Imperial Decree, the radical *intelligentsia*, proletariat, and peasants now faced the difficult decision of accepting the concession or fighting for more.²³⁹ Unfortunately for Nicholas II, a rights tactic that may have been sufficient in turning the tide just six months earlier was completely unacceptable this late in the game.²⁴⁰

The proletariat, by far the most militant and widely organized class organized against the tsar, was far from quieted by Nicholas II's rights tactics. In late September printer workers in Moscow initiated the largest strike of the year.²⁴¹ Within weeks virtually the entire economy had coalesced into a unified strike against autocracy.²⁴² The radical *intelligentsia* and the Union of Unions coopted the workers strike in Moscow to organize the Soviet of Workers' Deputies (SWD).²⁴³ Where the Duma failed, the SWD

²³⁶ Pipes takes a favorable tone in describing the reformative value of the Duma, claiming it gets too little credit among modern historians, see *The Russian Revolution*, 34.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid., 33.

²³⁹ Ibid., 34.

²⁴⁰ Figs, *A People's Tragedy*, 187.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 189.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Pipes notes that conflicting primary documents confuse the history of who was responsible for coopting the Moscow strike, see *The Russian Revolution*, 40-41.

succeeded in establishing a parallel government where the proletariat could directly challenge the tsar's monarchical power.²⁴⁴ Additionally, the SWD accomplished many of Gapon's objectives, including protection of labor by the law, freedom of cooperative associations and professional labor unions, and freedom of struggle for labor against capital.²⁴⁵ Granted, they were only successful in this regard because they also served as the organ enforcing those rights. In contrast to Gapon, legal boundaries and ministerial contacts did not limit the SWD because the revolutionaries simply took what they wanted. The SWD is a curious rights tactic that falls outside of Bob's rights as weapons framework.²⁴⁶ This event will be explored in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter.

By October 10 over fifty similar Soviets had sprung up across the country.²⁴⁷ The gravity of the revolution did not resonate with Nicholas II until he understood the extent of the threat the soviets posed. Nicholas II once again faced the decision of ignorance, negotiation, suppression, or concession. In this instance there is no record of him attempting to negotiate, and as he toiled Sergei Witte, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, sensed the situation and drew up a manifesto that would soon be known as the October Manifesto.²⁴⁸ The majority of Nicholas II's government and military advisors

²⁴⁴ The SDP organized strike activity, distributed media, raised a militia, and distributed food and goods, among providing other essential governance functions, see Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 190-191.

²⁴⁵ S. A. Smith, "Moscow Workers and the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917," *Soviet Studies* 36, no. 2 (April 1984): 285-286, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/151392>.

²⁴⁶ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*.

²⁴⁷ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 190.

²⁴⁸ Witte drafted the October Manifesto absent direction from Nicholas II. He knew the monarchy lacked the military power to suppress the revolution and in a

joined Witte in encouraging the tsar to immediately sign the manifesto.²⁴⁹ Nicholas II was unconvinced and travelled to his uncle Grand Duke Nikolai to solicit his assumption of the role of dictator.²⁵⁰ Nikolai is said to have pointed a pistol at his own head and demanded Nicholas II sign the manifesto under threat of suicide.²⁵¹ Nicholas II finally accepted that repression was not a feasible solution and after returning home and crossing himself, signed the October Manifesto on October 17.²⁵²

The October Manifesto mirrored the Imperial Decree as a rights tactic in almost every way. Once Nicholas II signed the manifesto, the royal court set to implementing its provisions as slowly as possibly so that the monarchy could return to total autocracy once the revolution had subsided.²⁵³ Nicholas II had no desire to honor the manifesto's provisions as the concession was extracted from him under threat of revolution. Furthermore, the manifesto made no mention of a "constitution" so Nicholas II still considered himself the undisputed ruler of all Russia.²⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the manifesto still managed to shield the monarchy to a much greater degree and for longer duration than

desperate bid to preserve the monarchy appealed to Nicholas II's irrational desire to preserve his position, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 39.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Figes argues that Grand Duke Nikolai is the only person in Russia who would have been capable of playing dictator, see *A People's Tragedy*, 191.

²⁵¹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 43.

²⁵² McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 41. See Annex X for a summary of the October Manifesto as provided by Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 42.

²⁵³ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 192.

²⁵⁴ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 42.

the Imperial Manifesto. The manifesto parried by providing the rights the Russian people so desperately wanted while maintaining autocratic control over how to enforce those new rights. Luckily for Nicholas II, the radical *intelligentsia* would continue their intra-revolutionary bickering for another twelve years instead of exploiting the Duma to unite against a common foe. Finally, the manifesto camouflaged the tsar's true intent of repealing all concessions once the environment calmed down.

A Summary of Rights Tactics in 1905

The results and impacts of the rights tactics employed in 1905 reinforce the concept that the 1905 Russian Revolution had no clear end. The October Manifesto was the final major action of the year, but the residual effects of monarchic concessions and the actions of Gapon and the *muzhik* would echo until the moment Nicholas II abdicated the throne. This was also the first instance in the Russian Revolution where rights tactics were employed amongst more violent tactics and within a dynamic “back and forth” struggle for power. An analysis of the 1905 Russian Revolution reveals a preference for the following rights tactics: shields, camouflage, parries, and blockades. Admittedly, a case could be made to categorize every rights tactic of the proletariat, radical *intelligentsia*, and *muzhik* as dynamite as each would “undermine or destroy a targeted culture or community ... by forcing changes in key values, ideas, or institutions.”²⁵⁵

Gapon's efforts complicate the practical application of several rights tactics, namely parries and shields. His efforts certainly support classification as spears as he carefully escalated his statutes and declarations to overturn specific laws and policies of

²⁵⁵ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 150.

the monarchy. The Assembly's statutes provided camouflage for the secretive "Program-of-the-Five." However, Gapon's partnership with the *okhrana* and Zubatov to legally protect his efforts was both a rights shield and a parry. For Zubatov, the Mutual Aid Society shielded the monarchy from the radical *intelligentsia* mobilizing the proletariat. Gapon took that shield, parried it, and used it to shield his own organization from the monarchy. In doing so he protected an increasingly radical proletariat from suspicion and prosecution.

When applied to this series of events, Bob's definition of the parry and shield rights tactics are insufficient. The intent of Gapon's parry was not to mobilize support but spoil Zubatov's rights tactic for Gapon's own ends. This begs expanding Bob's definition of parry, potentially to read something closer to:

Parry: The reframing of an aggressor's rights tactic [to serve the parrying party's own ends].

This definition includes Bob's more specific purpose of "mobilizing support amongst the movement's constituents and potential third-party allies" and provides room to address several other potential uses of the rights tactic.²⁵⁶ From the shield perspective, Bob's definition is also insufficient and counterintuitive to the inherently defensive posture the concept of a shield intones.²⁵⁷ A shield may be defensive in nature but can be

²⁵⁶ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 70.

²⁵⁷ To Bob's credit, he does acknowledge that "[in broader political conflicts] defensive and offensive tactics are difficult to distinguish [because] all sides simultaneously advance and guard particular visions of society." Conversely, in the preceding sentence he also states that shields are "[ineffective] in analyzing broader political conflicts," a statement the analysis in this research reveals to be problematic, see *Rights as Weapons*, 69.

quite deadly in the offense when in the right hands. The efforts Gapon took to legally shield MASWMI and The Assembly's members and activities were not meant to retain power (the purpose from Zubatov's perspective), but rather to enable Gapon to gather power under protection of the law until the proletariat was "a force to be reckoned with."²⁵⁸

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is another rights tactic that falls outside of Bob's research framework.²⁵⁹ The SWD *seized* and acted under the protection of rights the monarchy denied them. In this case, the SWD seized the right to represent and govern themselves, performing many critical functions often left to a state government. This tactic mirrors a rights spear in that it is in relation to a specific right, or in this case a set of rights.²⁶⁰ The absence of a clear target of this rights tactic further distinguishes itself from the other rights tactics offered by Bob. The author offers the following definition for this tactic:

Seize: The seizure of rights denied by a governing body to strengthen a movement.

Numerous stakeholders will replicate this tactic, much in the exact same form. Chapter 4 includes discussion of seizures that proved to have decisive effects on the sequence of revolutionary events. The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'

²⁵⁸ Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, 104. This answers one of Bob's observations that rights shields may be used offensively, although his research does not specifically address this phenomenon, see *Rights as Weapons*, 260.

²⁵⁹ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 119.

Deputies replicated in form and function, albeit on a much grander scale, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' deputies. Additionally, the issuance of Order No. 1 alongside the Program of the Constituent Assembly both seized rights to such an extent that the central pillar of Russian stability, the army, deteriorated within a matter of days.

CHAPTER 4

AN OPEN ARENA OF COMBAT, 1906-1917

Introduction

While numerous revolutionaries considered 1905 to be a failure, many saw the October Manifesto as a great victory.²⁶¹ The Mensheviks, who despite their name still represented the majority of the RSDLP's split population, considered the forthcoming Duma as their best opportunity to gain popular support for their movement and distribute the revolutionary message to the masses.²⁶² Unfortunately, as evidenced in the Menshevik's perspective, the general sentiment was that the Duma was not to be a grand vehicle to democratic conciliation, but rather an arena of open combat.²⁶³

Nicholas II and his revolutionary enemies engaged one another within this arena for the next twelve years, the latter of which would require Nicholas II to also contend with German and Austrian opponents in World War I.²⁶⁴ Luckily for Nicholas II, the

²⁶¹ The most notable revolutionary group that considered the October Manifesto a sufficient victory was the Octobrists. Even though they considered themselves conservative and in support of the tsar, they nonetheless sought for the Duma to have constitutional power, an objective that ran contrary to Nicholas II's goals, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 252.

²⁶² J.L.H. Keep, "Social-Democracy and the First State Duma," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 34, no. 82 (December 1955): 183, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4204717>.

²⁶³ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 51.

²⁶⁴ It is without question that World War I had tremendous impact on Russia's revolutionary period. However, this grand event falls outside of the scope of this research and thus I will discuss the Great War in detail. For a history of Russia's experience in World War I, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*; Roger Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution: 1856-1917* (Lawrence, KS: Kansas University

manifesto had succeeded in disrupting revolutionary cohesion. The Social Democrats had further fractured with many joining the new Kadet and the Octobrist parties.²⁶⁵ Once again, Nicholas II's shield yielded invaluable breathing room for the monarchy. However, the Duma also forced him to do something no tsar had done before – directly engage revolutionaries who sought his demise.

The historical period covered in this chapter is immense in depth and character and contains myriad opportunities to analyze rights as weapons. As a total survey exceeds the scope of this research, I will narratively navigate the period between 1906 and September 1917 along select periods of the Duma.²⁶⁶ I begin my analysis with the first Duma to illustrate the new rights battlefield prior to shifting to Pyotr Stolypin's agrarian reforms in relation to the third Duma. Finally, I analyze the interval between the February and October revolutions of 1917, a period which included the final months of the fourth Duma, the rise and fall of the Provisional Government, and the rise of the Soviets.

Press, 2019); Laura Engelstein, *Russia in Flames, War, Revolution, Civil War: 1914-1921* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).

²⁶⁵ Warren Walsh, "The Political Parties in the Russian Dumas," *The Journal of Modern History* 22, no. 2 (June 1950): 145, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1870883>. The Kadets and Octobrists disagreed on many things, but agreed that to one degree or another the Duma was a sufficient political concession to achieve their distinct objectives, see Sean Kalic and Gates Brown, eds. *Russian Revolution of 1917 The Essential Reference Guide* (Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO: 2017), 67-68, 112-113.

²⁶⁶ For an analysis of the context, proceedings, and composition of the Dumas, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 179-187; Walsh, "Political Parties in the Russian Dumas;" Warren Walsh, "The Composition of the Dumas," *The Russian Review* 8, no. 2 (April 1949): 111-116, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/125180>; Bernard Pares, "The Second Duma," *The Slavonic Review* 2, no. 4 (June 1923): 36-55, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4201686>; C. Jay Smith, "The Russian Third State Duma: An Analytical Profile," *The Russian Review* 17, no. 3 (July 1958): 201-210, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/126141>.

The Duma: A Rights Battlefield

The breadth and scope of every rights tactic employed within the 1906-1917 Dumas' institutional boundaries exceeds the scale of this research. During any given session, as evidenced by the relatively less adversarial second RSDLP congress, parties had many opportunities and reason to weaponize rights in any number of ways. This section will instead focus on the rights tactics Nicholas II, allies of the monarchy, and revolutionaries used to strengthen or weaken the Duma itself.²⁶⁷ I will demonstrate how rival parties in an open and direct contest used rights to gain power via the influence of a single institution. This will avoid highlighting events others may define as political rhetoric or lawfare.²⁶⁸ The first Duma only lasted for a little over two months. In this brief period agents of the monarchy used camouflage, shield, blockade, and confiscation tactics to disrupt revolutionaries' ability to gain power via the Duma. Conversely, revolutionaries launched parries, rallying cries, calls to action, and seizure tactics to coopt the Duma for their own ends.

²⁶⁷ The Duma represented many rights, most importantly the right to representative government and, to a degree, the right to contribute to decisions concerning the governance of Russia and her citizens. Representatives of the Duma also enjoyed nearly unlimited freedom of speech and legal immunity for actions taken while on official government business.

²⁶⁸ Given that the Duma was an officially recognized political and bureaucratic institution in Russia the rights tactics employed within its walls could also be classified as mere political rhetoric or, considering the ideological polarity and violent undercurrent of the situation, potentially lawfare. For an analysis on these frameworks see Eric Posner, "Dockets of War," *The National Interest*, no. 112 (March/April 2011): 25-32, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897716>; David Bolgiano, "A Nationalist's View of Lawfare," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), 263-274, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12024.21>.

The Duma went through four iterations under Nicholas II's rule and existed as an institution from April 26, 1905 to February 25, 1917.²⁶⁹ The Duma was born of the October Manifesto wherein Nicholas II declared, "... no law can come into force without its approval by the State Duma and representatives of the people will be given the opportunity to take real part in the supervision of the legality of government bodies."²⁷⁰ The word "constitution" was noticeable absent in the manifesto, though Nicholas II admitted to his mother that granting the Duma legislative authority was tantamount to constitutionalism.²⁷¹ Thus, when the tsar finally explained the Duma's functions just four days prior to its initial session, Russia received a revision of the Fundamental Laws rather than a constitution.²⁷² One of the more significant of these revisions concerned how the Duma would be split into two parts with the representative State Duma (*gosudarstvennaia дума*) subordinate to the State Council (*gosudarstvennyi soviet*).²⁷³ This specific revision of the revised Fundamental Laws served to strengthen the Duma as a shield against the tsar's foes. Rather than the representative arm of the Duma enabling the people to check the power of the tsar, Nicholas II reshaped his promise to shield the monarchy from the very power he yielded to the people. This is the very essence of

²⁶⁹ Walsh, "The Political Parties in the Russian Dumas," 144; Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 271.

²⁷⁰ Kalic and Brown, *Russian Revolution of 1917*, 203.

²⁷¹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 44.

²⁷² Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 215. The Fundamental Laws (*osnovniie zakonii*) were the first volume of the Russian code of laws which dealt with the powers and authority of the tsar, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 153.

²⁷³ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 158.

Nicholas II's rights strategy. He made concessions when necessary and then cleverly canceled or weakened them once the threat receded.

While the tsar schemed on how to best protect his throne from the very institution designed to shield him from his foes, revolutionaries continued to disagree on what the next step in their struggle was. The prevailing Bolshevik opinion accurately concluded that the Duma was nothing short of camouflage designed to confuse the people and thus decided they would boycott the first Duma in its entirety.²⁷⁴ Pavel Akselrod agreed that the Duma was not the answer and sought to parry Nicholas II's concession for their own ends.²⁷⁵ SDs and SRs planned to boycott the official Duma elections and instead hold parallel elections for their own Duma-esque representative body. Their goal was for their illegal Duma to directly compete with the official Duma until their "more democratic" Duma emerged as the official representative body within Russia.²⁷⁶ This false Duma would have been built on rights otherwise not provided in the revised Fundamental Laws. SDs and SRs failed in their plan to seize Nicholas II's Duma.²⁷⁷ Further, their boycott only benefitted the monarchy by diminishing revolutionary representation in the legal Duma.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁴ Keep, "Russian Social-Democracy and the First State Duma," 184-185.

²⁷⁵ These parallel elections did not achieve any of their objectives and served only to strengthen other groups influence in the official Duma, see Keep, "Russian Social-Democracy and the First State Duma," 181.

²⁷⁶ Keep, "Russian Social-Democracy and the First State Duma," 181.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 185.

²⁷⁸ Walsh, "Political Parties in the Russian Dumas," 145.

The first Duma only lasted seventy-two days. The narrative of the first Duma essentially boiled down to an aggressive struggle between the representative Duma and monarchic State Council.²⁷⁹ The Duma assumed the form of a revolutionary pulpit, one Orlando Figes likened to a “battering ram against the fortress of autocracy.”²⁸⁰ In the summer of 1906 the Duma bent to the will of the revolutionaries and submitted revolutionary reforms to the tsar for consideration. The tsar responded two weeks later by requesting the Duma approve the opening of new laundromats and greenhouses.²⁸¹ When the Duma failed to take the hint and continued their calls for land reform, redistribution of power to the Duma, and universal male suffrage, Nicholas II dissolved the first Duma on July 8, 1906.²⁸²

Nicholas II was well within his legal right to dissolve the Duma, and absent this act he would have continued to face aggressive calls for reform within the halls of his shield against the revolution and otherwise been unable to take more direct action against his adversaries. The dissolution was itself a rights spear, shield, confiscation, and blockade, a dynamic action that generated multiple effects in favor of the tsar. Nicholas II weaponized his rights offered under the Fundamental Laws as a spear against the promises he made in the October Manifesto. In effect, this action confiscated the rights provided in the October Manifesto. In doing so, he also succeeded in blockading his

²⁷⁹ Keep, “Russian Social-Democracy and the First State Duma.”

²⁸⁰ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 218.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 219.

²⁸² Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 179.

adversaries from achieving their objectives and shielded the throne from their legally protected calls for massive political reforms.

The second Duma did not convene until over seven months later on February 20, 1907.²⁸³ In the interim period Nicholas II took steps to further protect himself from revolutionary rhetoric permeating the assembly.²⁸⁴ Unfortunately, the dissolution had the unintended side effect of motivating the SD and SR elements to abandon their boycott and seek any and every opportunity to sabotage the Duma while exploiting parliamentary immunity as a parry to spread revolutionary rhetoric as wide as possible.²⁸⁵ The periods between each of the Dumas hold an extremely important detail to understand Nicholas II's comprehensive rights strategy during this period. The revised Fundamental Laws included Article 87 which stipulated that when the Duma was not in session the tsar could again rule by decree, and further that those decrees would be valid unless the Duma failed to confirm them within sixty days of its reconvening.²⁸⁶ The legal and legislative nature of this provision complicates its categorization as a rights tactic. However, it nonetheless demonstrates Nicholas II's institutionalization of his overall rights strategy.

²⁸³ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 179.

²⁸⁴ The ousted Kadets gave Nicholas II the ammunition he needed when they issued a manifesto (the "Vyborg Manifesto") calling for all Russians to revolt against the tsar via quitting paying their taxes and refusing to send recruits to the Army. Nicholas II responded by imprisoning all but three of the authors and barring any Kadets who had served in the first Duma from holding office in the second. See Figs, *A People's Tragedy*, 280-282.

²⁸⁵ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 179.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 167.

In combination, his right to dissolve the Duma and revert to governance by decree is what allowed Nicholas II to strip his adversaries of their means to engage him directly.

Despite Nicholas II's efforts to create a more favorable second Duma, it suffered a similar fate to the first. With the SD and SR boycott lifted the second Duma was dysfunctional from the moment it first convened.²⁸⁷ The tsar dissolved the second Duma only 102 days after its first session. In the interim period between the second and third Duma, Pyotr Stolypin, the dual-hatted Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, began what many consider to be the final genuine set of reforms capable of uniting Russia and preserving tsardom.

Stolypin's Reforms: The Throne's Last Best Option

Amidst the turmoil in the Duma the monarchy never lost sight of the peasants, the silent threat in the shadows.²⁸⁸ Luckily for Nicholas II, Pyotr Stolypin envisioned one final option to pacify the *muzhik*. Stolypin had a deep appreciation and respect for Russia's institutions and is widely recognized as one of tsarist Russia's last great statesmen.²⁸⁹ To Stolypin, the Duma was a necessary obstacle, one that had to be navigated carefully to achieve something he truly believed in – a united Russia under the tsar.²⁹⁰ In Stolypin's mind, the peasant village was the key to this pacification, and he had

²⁸⁷ The government hoped the second Duma would find a majority in their Octobrist allies, but the lifting of the SD and SR boycott resulted in over 220 socialist candidates to only 54 Octobrists, see Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 225.

²⁸⁸ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 164.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 191.

²⁹⁰ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 224.

learned through experience that a prosperous village was a peaceful village.²⁹¹ However, he did not think that peace could be won without a firm hand and proved to be just as ruthless in his repression of violent *muzhik* uprisings as he was forward thinking in paving the road for their social and economic advancement.²⁹² In Stolypin's mind reform was only possible in the presence of law and order, which meant state-sanctioned peasant courts and public hangings that numbered in the thousands.²⁹³

In contrast, Stolypin was a voice for the people long before the major agrarian reforms Stolypin is most widely known for. Stolypin considered his fight to be on two fronts, against revolution and for reform.²⁹⁴ Stolypin wrestled new laws that protected Russians from senseless arrests, granted progressive tax reform, and enhanced insurance for state workers through the second Duma's revolutionary gridlock.²⁹⁵ However, Stolypin's agrarian reforms offered a master class in the potential effectiveness of state sponsored rights shields, blockades, and wedges. In summary, Stolypin set out to fundamentally restructure the village commune (*obshchina* or *mir*), one of the core pillars of the peasant's world.²⁹⁶ To achieve this he systematically gave the *muzhik* exactly what

²⁹¹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 192.

²⁹² Peasant hangings were coined as "Stolypin's Neckties" by the *muzhik*. Granted, an attempt on his life at his own home that claimed dozens of lives and severely wounded his daughter heavily influenced Stolypin's ire towards terrorists see McMeekin, *A New History of Russia*, 46.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 224.

²⁹⁵ McMeekin, *A New History of Russia*, 47.

²⁹⁶ Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 305.

they had been asking for since their emancipation over forty years earlier, the land. However, in tried-and-true fashion, the monarchy's ulterior motive to distract the peasants and pacify them through a "peaceful revolution" before they rose up against their masters tainted the benevolent nature of Stolypin's reforms.²⁹⁷

Despite Stolypin's prior successes with the second Duma he met staunch resistance to his agrarian reforms. A majority coalition that included the Trudoviks, a party primarily composed of peasant farmers, blocked his efforts at every turn.²⁹⁸ Stolypin spent significant political capital to convince Nicholas II to dissolve the second Duma for the express purpose of leveraging Article 87 to pass Stolypin's agrarian reform policies.²⁹⁹ In a stroke of luck, authorities discovered several members of the Duma were plotting terrorist actions against state officials which gave Nicholas II pretext to dissolve the second Duma on June 2, 1907.³⁰⁰

Seeing an opportunity, Stolypin seized the initiative to exploit Nicholas II's rights strategy for his own ends. In the interim period between the second and third Duma Stolypin convinced Nicholas II to pass his agrarian reforms under Article 87 and dramatically alter voting laws to ensure a more conservative representative body in the third Duma via Imperial Decree.³⁰¹ This was a blatant and uncamouflaged rights

²⁹⁷ W. E. Mosse, "Stolypin's Villages," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 43, no. 101 (June 1965): 257, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4205652>.

²⁹⁸ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 225.

²⁹⁹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 180-182.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 181.

³⁰¹ Pipes argues against a common narrative that the revision to voting laws is equitable to a coup d'état but acknowledges how it significantly reduced the voting

blockade designed to strengthen the conservative (pro-monarchy) voice in the Duma and weaken liberals' abilities to disrupt Stolypin's agenda. Toward this objective the rights tactic was incredibly successful, and when the third Duma convened in November of 1907 the conservatives commanded a two-thirds majority.³⁰²

Stolypin's strategy yielded him a conservative Duma of landed statesmen who stood behind the throne and against revolution.³⁰³ Thus Stolypin was able to enact his great agrarian reforms, albeit on the back of disenfranchising the very people he meant to help. Stolypin claimed his reforms required twenty-five years to achieve success, and unfortunately the outbreak of World War I saw their dissolution after only seven (1907-1914).³⁰⁴ Nonetheless, the redistribution of land to the peasants heralded the most prosperous economy under Nicholas II's reign.³⁰⁵ The concept of Stolypin's agrarian

power of the *muzhik* and proletariat. The reason Nicholas II changed the voting laws via imperial decree is because Russian law specifically prohibited the use of Article 87 to change "the provisions for elections to the [State] Council or Duma," see *The Russian Revolution*, 181.

³⁰² Between the pro-government Octobrists, Rightists, and Nationalist parties held 287 of the 443 available seats in the third Duma, see Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 225.

³⁰³ William Gleason, "Alexander Guchkov and the End of the Russian Empire," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 73, no. 3 (1983): 31, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1006343>.

³⁰⁴ George Tokmakoff, "Stolypin's Agrarian Reform: An Appraisal," *The Russian Review* 30, no. 2 (April 1971): 124, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/127892>. Mosse argues Stolypin's reforms lasted for nine years but accounts for the entirety of 1907 and the lasting effects of the reform after the state pulled funding in 1905, see "Stolypin's Villages," 263.

³⁰⁵ By 1910 the Russian economy was growing at an annual rate of 10%, see McMeekin, *A New History of Russia*, 48. For a comprehensive analysis of agricultural contributions to this growth rate, see Mosse, "Stolypin's Villages."

reforms were simple, dissolve the village commune and support peasants who wanted to take ownership over their own land. For peasants without access to land, Stolypin arranged to emigrate them to Siberia to own and work plots sold at well under market value.³⁰⁶ Stolypin's reforms assisted over 2.8 million peasants to gain their own land while providing them with tools, grain, and agricultural education.³⁰⁷

The unfortunate early dissolution of Stolypin's reforms begs the question of what could have been had they been allowed to continue. Their effects were so great in the first years of execution it stands to reason that, had they continued, Stolypin may very well have achieved victory on both of his fronts, against revolution and for reform.³⁰⁸ Despite the ulterior motives of the state, Stolypin's reforms actually were in the best interest of the *muzhik* and the greater Russian state. They were also successful in disrupting revolutionaries' access to the *muzhik*. As the reforms took hold of the *muzhik*, Lenin envisioned a race between the next revolution and the completion of Stolypin's reforms.³⁰⁹ So great was Lenin's concern that he considered a revolution impossible once

³⁰⁶ Tokmakoff accounts for how the average cost of land sold to peasants via the reforms were generally more affordable than those sold on the market, which is a testament to Stolypin's ability to manage inflation, see "Stolypin's Agrarian Reform," 129.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 133.

³⁰⁸ Tokmakoff concluded that had Stolypin's reforms continued they would have carried the *muzhik* into a new age of capitalism, see "Stolypin's Agrarian Reforms," 138. In contrast, Mosse posits the agrarian reforms were an irrelevant factor in dissuading (or encouraging) revolution amongst the *muzhik*, see "Stolypin's Villages," 274.

³⁰⁹ B. D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (London, UK: Dial Press, 1948), 360.

capitalism took complete hold of the rural countryside.³¹⁰ In this light, Stolypin's reforms could have also created an effective long-term wedge between the revolutionaries and the *muzhik*.

The most interesting aspect of analyzing Stolypin's reforms as blockades, shields, and wedges is the effect their success had on the relationship between Stolypin and Nicholas II. As the peasants gained control of the land their political power increased. To Nicholas II, this seemed a direct assault on his total autocratic power. He considered the concessions contained in the agrarian reforms to only be necessary when the throne was threatened, a perception in line with his overall strategy. As such, the more Stolypin's reforms improved the lives of the peasants, the less Nicholas II and his court had use for any of Stolypin's ideas.³¹¹

The very rights tactics Stolypin designed to preserve and protect Nicholas II were the very actions the tsar perceived as a threat to his power. Stolypin found himself increasingly ostracized from both the imperial court and the Duma and he was considered "politically dead" long before he was assassinated by D.G Bogrov, a student-activist and police informant, in August of 1911.³¹² Stolypin's reforms carried on for several years after his passing, albeit absent the backing of Stolypin's herculean force of character.

³¹⁰ Mosse, "Stolypin's Villages," 258.

³¹¹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 183.

³¹² Stolypin is quoted as saying, "I am happy to die for the Tsar," before he died in full view of Nicholas II, see Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 230.

The Petrograd Soviet: Rights Seizures that Fueled a Revolution

Had the first world war not engulfed Russia in the flames, Stolypin's reforms may well have continued to carry Russia into an enlightened new age of rural and industrial capitalism. Moreover, Russia would not have had cause to mobilize and arm millions of *muzhik* to fight on the western front (from Russia's perspective). The first years of the war contain several independent and corollary events and decisions that directly contributed to the fall of the Romanov dynasty, all of which fall outside the boundaries of this research.³¹³ Suffice to say, these factors coalesced and bred the perfect environment for revolution in the early months of 1917. The events in February of 1917 came as a surprise to nearly everyone, not just because they played out as they did, but that they played out at all.³¹⁴ Part of the surprising turn of events may be that the keys to the revolution were not just the *muzhik*, nor just the proletariat, but rather peasant soldiers of the Petrograd barracks waiting to be shipped out to the front.

On February 23, 1917, women entered a crowded rights arena. In a march organized by socialists, thousands of women took to the streets of Petrograd under a

³¹³ Major factors include Grigori Rasputin's controversial relationship with Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, Nicholas II's decision to assume direct leadership of the Army, Russia's economic inability to support the sustained war effort, or the utter incompetence of the ministers charged with governing in the tsar's absence.

³¹⁴ Neil Faulkner offers a detailed breakdown of a number of prominent revolutionary leaders who either predicted inaction prior to or surprise in the aftermath of the February Revolution, see Neil Faulkner, *A People's History of the Russian Revolution* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2017), 112.

rallying cry demanding equal rights.³¹⁵ By the following day, approximately 200,000 workers and their *intelligentsia* provocateurs had joined the women and the demonstration took an irreversible political tone.³¹⁶ Upon hearing the news on February 25, Nicholas II drove the final nail into the throne's coffin when he ordered General Khabalov, Chief of the Petrograd Military District, to use force to put down the riots.³¹⁷ Up until this point in Russia, the army was the single most important institution protecting the tsar from any enemy who sought to otherwise harm total autocratic power. The army played a leading role in putting down the most violent peasant uprisings and colored the streets of St. Petersburg red on Bloody Sunday.

The same failsafe that had repeatedly protected the throne became an agent of its demise. The following day many soldiers and police followed the order, leaving dozens of Russians wounded and dead throughout the city.³¹⁸ Nicholas II paired his order of violent suppression with another rights shield as he dissolved the fourth Duma indefinitely.³¹⁹ The surprise came that evening when soldiers of the Petrograd Military District rose up against their officers to instead stand alongside their fellow Russian citizens.

³¹⁵ It is important to specifically note that these marches initially consisted almost entirely of women of several social classes and were nearly void of workers, see Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 308.

³¹⁶ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 275.

³¹⁷ Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 312.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 278.

In 1917 the Russian army was many things; however, it was not on the brink of revolt.³²⁰ Peasant soldiers were certainly more than capable of violence against their superiors but were generally held in check by the guarantee of immediate remand for lapses in discipline.³²¹ In other words, the peasant soldiers held a deep regard for the power their officers held over them. Upon being ordered to fire on their fellow citizens, this discipline was challenged and defeated by the respect the soldiers had for their fellow Russians. This serves as an echo of the rights dynamite of the *muzhik* in eastern Ukraine – different only in that in this instance it was not their own esteem that was being violated. By the evening of February 27 nearly 16,000 armed soldiers had joined the protestors in a pitched battle against the police and Cossacks.³²²

The last remnants of the tsar's ability to suppress the uprising in Petrograd vanished that same evening. On February 28, the struggle for control of Russia shifted from one between the tsar and his opponents to one between two new bodies of power, the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet – both rights seizures in their own

³²⁰ As evidence, even after the abdication of the tsar and the establishment of the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet most units chose to remain at their posts and maintain discipline, see Allan Wildman, "The February Revolution in the Russian Army," *Soviet Studies* 22, no. 1 (July 1970): 5, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/149649>.

³²¹ Pipes observes that due to the depths of Russian mobilization by 1917, the majority of soldiers were peasants born in the 1880s and carried with them "three hundred years of serfdom" and "obeyed only as long as disobedience carried mandatory punishment..." see *The Russian Revolution*, 281; Wildman, "The February Revolution in the Russian Army," 6.

³²² Figes provides a particularly colorful quote attributed to Sergeant Fedor Linde who, after hearing the screams of a tender age girl run down by a Cossack horse, yelled, "Friends! Friends! Long live the revolution! To arms! To arms! They are killing innocent people, our brothers and sisters!" before he led an attack against the Cossacks and police, see *A People's Tragedy*, 315.

regard. Upon receiving news of their dissolution Duma convened to assemble a plea for the tsar to recognize a new cabinet of ministers titled the “Provisional Committee of Duma Members for the Restoration of Order in the Capital and the Establishment of Relations with Individuals and Institutions.”³²³ The cumbersome name reflected the apprehensive attitude of the Duma toward usurping power from the tsar. As an official government body, they did not acknowledge their own authority to take power and felt it necessary to be given the right to govern from above.³²⁴

In contrast, the workers’, mutinous soldiers’, and radical *intelligentsia*’s Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies held no such preconceptions when they seized their right to govern and took up residence alongside the Provisional Government in the Tauride palace.³²⁵ A brief struggle for power of the Petrograd Soviet played out that resulted in the radical *intelligentsia* gaining control of the soviet’s executive committee (*ispolkom*) thus allowing predetermined socialist programs to drive the soviet in a radical revolutionary direction.³²⁶

The Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet’s seizures succeed in wresting control of the Russian empire out of a power vacuum. For the next eight months these competing institutions reluctantly shared power. What is most significant about these two

³²³ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 287.

³²⁴ Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, 327.

³²⁵ Within a 48-hour period of time the Petrograd Soviet issued rules for elections, held elections, and received approximately 3,000 delegates for its first plenary session on February 28, 1917. The Soviet’s rapid establishment is a stark contrast to the tepid nature of the Provisional Government, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 403.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 295.

new government bodies is how they capitalized on the rights they appropriated. By securing the right to govern Russia from the tsar, they became de-facto organs capable of enforcing any further rights they seized. Still in the days preceding Nicholas II's abdication, two orders were published that stoked the revolution Nicholas II instigated with his order to violently suppress the mob just days earlier.

On March 1, the Provisional Government published the "Program of the Constituent Assembly" and the Petrograd Soviet published "Order No. 1."³²⁷ Both of these documents were rights seizures that escalated to dynamite because of their impact on Russian society and the revolution. As the dual wings of Russian government sought to stabilize the growing unrest from reaching total anarchy they both recognized an immediate need to bring the mutinous army under control of one or the other's spheres of influence. As such, both documents provided clear guidance concerning the legal immunity and future direction of the armed forces.³²⁸

If there remained any semblance of hope for the revolution to be averted and Nicholas II to return to Petrograd with his power intact, these two rights seizures destroyed it. In combination they not only validated and legally protected the actions of the mutinous Petrograd Military District, they also effectively dissolved the police, including the anti-revolutionary *okhrana*, across the entire Russian empire. Furthermore,

³²⁷ Pipes credits partial authorship of the Program of the Constituent Assembly to the Provincial Government, while Figes gives full credit to the Petrograd Soviet. It is likely that Pipes is correct that revolutionary *intelligentsia* from the soviet had a hand in the program given the rhetoric and themes it shares with Order No. 1, see Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 297-298; Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 334-335.

³²⁸ See Appendix B for the complete text of both cited documents.

they placed the army, the very tool the monarchy had for hundreds of years relied upon to preserve power, under the strict control of the Petrograd Soviet. Sensing opportunity, peasant soldiers along the front immediately began electing their own representatives and snatching power from their officers.³²⁹

Shortly after these actions cut the last legs out from underneath Nicholas II's throne³³⁰ and amidst increasingly direct calls from his ministers and generals to abdicate, Nicholas II realized the only way to preserve the safety of his family was to give up the throne.³³¹ Nicholas II abdicated on March 2, 1917 in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael Aleksandrovich, who promptly stepped down from the throne himself on March 3, 1917.³³²

As anticlimactic and spontaneous as it seemed, the February Revolution did indeed begin and functionally end in a matter of a few weeks. Even more surprising is that once again the grand schemes of the professional radicals failed to accurately predict the instrument of revolutionary change. However, to their credit they were more prepared to coopt the unprompted uprising than they were twelve years prior. The revolution was

³²⁹ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856-1917*, 377.

³³⁰ Leon Trotsky is quoted as categorizing Order No. 1 as "... the single worthy document of the February Revolution, a charter of the freedom of the revolutionary army ...", see *History of the Russian Revolution*, 199.

³³¹ Fitzpatrick provides a concise retelling of a particularly tumultuous hours long episode within Nicholas II's train on the outskirts of Petrograd where he gradually realized it was in the best interest of his son Aleksie, who suffered from hemophilia, if he was also removed from the line of succession, see *The Russian Revolution*, 45-46.

³³² Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 316. The Bolsheviks would execute Michael in June of 1918, see *The Russian Revolution*, 1046.

instead roused by a largely unscripted women's march's subtle rallying cry that mobilized the proletariat to drive the final stake into the heart of tsarist Russian autocracy.

Summary of Rights Tactics, 1906-1917

The narrative surrounding the period of this chapter is both grueling and dramatic. The events following the 1905 revolution demonstrate a clear continuation of the same rights tactics Nicholas II used in the past to thwart his enemies. They equally demonstrate the radical *intelligentsia*'s continued hope of engineering a rights tactic that could ignite the Russian people to glorious revolution. Nonetheless, both the tsar and the radical *intelligentsia* contributed contributed to the events in February 1917 without actually catalyzing the uprising of the Petrograd Military District.

The Duma shield protected the tsar from those seeking to reshape Russia for twelve years. Stolypin's agrarian reforms made headway in reforming the *muzhik*, improving the economy, and distancing the *intelligentsia* from one of their potential allies. The *intelligentsia* made solid and effective efforts toward parrying the Duma for their own ends and to their credit saw straight through the visage of Stolypin's reforms as monarchic benevolence. None of these tactics unilaterally provoked Russians to rise up against the tsar. Rather, it was all of them in concert that served as kindling for the February Revolution. In many ways the February Revolution carried echoes of every rights tactic discussed in this research.

From the emancipation of the serfs nearly sixty years prior, to the Bolsheviks' aggressive strategy at the second RSDLP congress, to Father Gapon and the proletariat's march on the Imperial Palace – each of these events remained alive and well in the

collective consciousness of the Russian people. Decades of revolutionary rhetoric, intra-revolutionary conflict, and monarchic concessions and backstepping profoundly changed Russian society. Considering this, it seems far less surprising that neither the *muzhik*, the proletariat, nor the *intelligentsia* lit the match of revolution – but women, equally as tired of the government infringing their rights as they were desperate for food for their families.

From a research framework perspective, this period of analysis yields two significant findings. First, it challenges the perspective of rights tactics as actions that achieve a specified effect. For example, a rights shield “weaponizes [a right] to protect individuals, groups, or whole societies.”³³³ Conversely, a rights blockade “weaponizes [a right] to prevent a subordinate or weaker rights movement from accomplishing their goals.”³³⁴ The Duma violates this tenet of a single action yielding a single and specific effect. According to the definitions provided, the Duma was certainly a rights shield, but it could similarly be categorized a blockade, or camouflage. A single rights action, weaponizing a single right (the right to political representation), achieved the effects of multiple unique rights tactics.

The Dumas’ compound effects as a rights tactic reveal it may be more appropriate to theoretically define rights tactics from the perspective of the effect they achieve rather than the tactics’ form. Conversely, another option would be to clarify multi-effect rights tactics based on the prioritization of their primary intended effect, for example the Duma

³³³ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 68.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 188.

as a rights shield (as its primary purpose was to protect the throne from the 1905 revolution). The answer to this question exceeds the scope of this research, but nonetheless reveals a compelling factor of the rights as weapons paradigm.

The second significant finding concerns which aspect of rights serving as the source of power. Provided Hohfelds concept of rights as actions that obligate others and are enforced by an organ of authority,³³⁵ the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet's seizures complicate whether the action or the enforcing organ was the source of power. In truth, it may be that both facets can serve as sources of power.³³⁶ The Provisional Government, Petrograd Soviet, and even the Moscow Soviet in the 1905 revolution, all rights seizures, generated substantial short-term effects not replicated by other tactics. Namely, they all forced the tsar to account for his forces to determine if it was feasible to suppress their illegitimate claims to power. The Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet not only seized new rights but also enforced and enabled the expression of those rights. Within these organizations' spheres of influence, Nicholas II had neither law nor the threat of law to hold back the citizens from rising up alongside their revolutionary neighbors. In this light, it seems to suggest that in a struggle for power, assuming control over the institution(s) that enforce rights is an equally valid and effective strategy.

³³⁵ Hohfeld, *Fundamental Legal Conceptions*.

³³⁶ Recall the definition for sources of power, otherwise referred to as "centers of gravity," outlining how means "[provide] moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." In this historical example, both the right and the organs of enforcement could be defined as the center of gravity for these rights seizures, see HQDA, ADP 3-0, 2-6.

CHAPTER 5

ALL FOR NAUGHT – ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!

From Revolution to Coup D'état: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917

The February Revolution separates two distinctly different periods of revolutionary struggle. Prior to the revolution the radical *intelligentsia* had to rely on generally non-violent tactics that would not escalate the situation to such a degree as to invite the police, Cossacks, or the army to suppress their activities. All three of these organizations went through fundamental and existential changes once the throne was dissolved. They changed to such a degree that key institutions that would have normally dissuaded parties from planning a violent coup d'état were no longer able to hold back the more violent fringes of Bolshevism.

With the throne gone, it should not come as a surprise that the Petrograd Soviet considered the Provisional Government a necessary burden, one that existed only at the Soviet's "sufferance."³³⁷ In an effort to curb the remnants of conservative ideology, on March 5th, 1917 the Soviet declared conservative newspapers closed pending decision of the Soviet.³³⁸ Trotsky justifies this confiscation by arguing that the right to free speech is subordinate to the requirements of revolution.³³⁹ This action was entirely unsuccessful and the Provisional Government overturned the Soviet's censorship within a week.³⁴⁰

³³⁷ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 323.

³³⁸ Ibid., 324.

³³⁹ Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, 171.

³⁴⁰ Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, 172. Alexander Kerensky, the leader of the Provisional Government, played a key role in overturning this decision.

This benign action is significant for two reasons. First, it represents one of the last rights tactics of this research period of 1893 to 1917. Second, the confiscation provides a chilling preview of the state the Bolsheviks created once they assumed total power over Russia.

When Lenin finally returned to Russia on April 3, 1917, he went about setting the groundwork for the Bolsheviks to assume control over Russia. He published his April Theses the following day, in which he presented his frustration that the transfer of power in February had gone to the bourgeoisie rather than the proletariat.³⁴¹ In the aftermath of the April Theses many Bolsheviks switched camps to the Mensheviks and left Lenin and his diehard supporters extremely isolated.³⁴² In this isolation Lenin reshaped the Bolshevik party to be more in line with his perspective that politics and combat were one and the same.³⁴³ Under Lenin's leadership the Bolsheviks set out to arm themselves with

Kerensky is notably absent from this research as he was not a key player in any of the rights tactics analyzed. Nonetheless, he played a decisive role in 1917. For a treatise on Kerensky's life, see Richard Abraham, *Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1941). For Kerensky's firsthand account of the Bolshevik Revolution, see Alexander Kerensky, *The Catastrophe: Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution* (United Kingdom: Borodino Books, 2017).

³⁴¹ Vladimir Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution (The April Theses)," in *V. L. Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 24, trans. George Hanna (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1977), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm>.

³⁴² Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, 225-226. Lenin's April Theses created a significant crisis in the Bolshevik party, one that Trotsky discusses in great length along ideological and revolutionary lines of thought, see *History of the Russian Revolution*, 227-239.

³⁴³ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 396.

the great stores of weapons seized during the February Revolution. After an impassioned speech by Trotsky on July 2nd, and amidst rumors that the pro-Bolshevik 1st Machine Gun Regiment was about to be sent from Petrograd to the front,³⁴⁴ machine gunners and armed workers marched on the Tauride palace amidst their cries of “All Power to the Soviets!”³⁴⁵ The coup was unsuccessful, likely due to its lack of organizational leadership.³⁴⁶

The most significant aspect of the July insurrection is the difference in the events preceding the uprising. No Bolshevik leaders authored papers or gave grand speeches on how the Provisional Government was impeding their right to democratic representation or stepping on their rights as workers. No one tried to camouflage the act as anything other than what it was. No one made calls to the Provincial Government for political concessions. It was exactly what it presented itself as, a violent bid for total control of

³⁴⁴ This consideration is relevant because the new front Kerensky was opening violated the political assumption that he was working to extricate Russia from the war. Additionally, it was a well known secret that Kerensky knew the 1st Machine Gun Regiment was mutinous and intentionally assigned them to the front to “rid Petrograd of troublesome agitators,” see McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 183.

³⁴⁵ Pro-Soviet sources make little to no mention of any Bolshevik centralized control or influence over the July attempted coup. McMeekin claims that during Trotsky’s speech he shouted, “Kill Kerensky!”, see *The Russian Revolution: A New History*, 169. In contrast, Trotsky treats the political attitudes in the days following the July insurrection as “slandorous,” see *History of the Russian Revolution*, 418-438. Regardless of the truth of the matter, Pipes’ assessment that the July insurrection was a disaster that almost saw the Bolshevik party wiped out rings true, as dozens of Bolshevik leaders were either arrested or forced to flee the country following the march on the Tauride palace, see *The Russian Revolution*, 419-421.

³⁴⁶ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 423.

Russia. In many ways, July served as an example supporting Trotsky's observation that "... the struggle of historic forces, [once] underground, [is now] in the open ..."³⁴⁷

The Bolshevik party barely survived the abortive July insurrection. In the months that followed, the Bolsheviks rinsed their hands and organized for their next attempt. In October, owing to several external and internal factors, the Bolsheviks launched their second coup, this one successful.³⁴⁸ Once again, no rights tactics played a prominent role in their violent bid for power.

Key Findings

In my primary research question, I asked how and to what effect Tsar Nicholas II and revolutionaries weaponized rights to maintain or seize power. In my secondary questions I asked how rights tactics shaped the progression of revolutionary events and how stakeholders varied in their preferred rights tactics.

A comprehensive analysis of the entire body of research is necessary to answer each of these questions. In many cases a single rights tactic's influence persisted for decades. For example, Alexander II's emancipation of the serfs, a rights shield, produced a short- and long-term benefit to the monarchy of curbing revolutionary attitudes. It also generated a long-term benefit for revolutionaries as the *muzhik* realized their 'freedom' was not what was promised to them. The latent expectation of a massive land redistribution played a key role in the 1905-06 peasant rebellions and remained engrained in the *muzhik*'s class identity through Stolypin's reforms.

³⁴⁷ Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, 72.

³⁴⁸ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 439-505.

However, amongst each rights tactic's nuances there are trends that allow us to answer the research questions. I will describe how this research answers each research question in three parts. First, I will answer each question from the perspective of Nicholas II and other agents of the monarchy. Second, I will answer each question from the perspective of the disparate revolutionary groups and other agents seeking power. Finally, I will offer some unrelated findings that do not directly address the stated research questions.

First, the sum of Nicholas II and monarchic agents' rights tactics between 1893 and 1917 illuminate a pattern in their overall strategy. In many ways, Nicholas II's rights tactics mirrored those of his grandfather, Alexander II. Shields and blockades were the monarchy's tactics of choice, demonstrated through the *zubatovschina*, the October Manifesto and subsequent Duma, and Stolypin's reforms. Each of these actions conceded rights to protect the state and prevent adversaries from gaining power. Unfortunately for Nicholas II his tactics were far less successful than his grandfather's were. The *zubatovshchina* curbed the proletariat's revolutionary actions for two years, the Duma reduced revolutionaries' political power for twelve, and Stolypin's reforms held the peasants in check for seven years.³⁴⁹ Timing was the critical difference between Alexander II's relatively more successful shields and Nicholas II's relatively less successful ones. Alexander II acted before the serfs became a threat, whereas Nicholas II preferred to wait to act until after a verifiable threat to his power emerged. Nicholas II

³⁴⁹ In contrast, the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the *zemstvo*, introduced in 1863, each to one degree or another curbed *muzhik* revolutionary attitudes for four decades.

authorized the *zubatovschina* only after the proletariat and students politicized their strikes and protests. The Duma was a direct response to the 1905 revolution. Stolypin's reforms, the most successful of Nicholas II's shields, was the only one he deployed prior to the emergence of a threat.³⁵⁰ This reinforces my conclusion that a shield's effectiveness is related to whether it is proactive or reactive.

The second trend present in Nicholas II and agents of the monarchy's rights tactics requires a cross analysis of the counteractions of opponents of the throne. Nicholas II yielded power to the throne's adversaries without actually giving them enough power to become a true threat to autocracy. The unfortunate side effect of this strategy is that even though the *zubatovschina*, Duma, and Stolypin's reforms were designed in such a way for the throne to retain total power, they nonetheless increased the means available to his adversaries. As the tsar yielded this power to his adversaries, his enemies parried Nicholas II's tactics into weapons of their own. Despite Father Gapon's anti-revolutionary and pro-tsarist position, he nonetheless leveraged the *zubatovschina* for his own ends within two years of its inception. The first and second Duma were so infested with revolutionary and anti-tsarist sentiment that Nicholas II abolished them and rewrote the rules to ensure a more conservative representative body. The only rights tactic that revolutionaries were unable to parry for their own ends was Stolypin's reforms, possibly because they were ingeniously designed to benefit the target audience and improved the *muzhik*'s lives within the existing tsarist autocracy.

³⁵⁰ One could argue that the revolutionary threat emerged in 1905 and remained in play through 1917, albeit in a recessive state.

In the absence of the *zubatovschina* Father Gapon did not have the means necessary to organize workers to march on the Imperial Palace. In the absence of the Duma revolutionaries would have continued to meet secretly in foreign lands struggling against the *okhrana* to deliver their underground newspapers and foment revolution in piecemeal format. In many ways, Nicholas II's shields served as the very means of his own destruction and were thus decisive to the sequence of events as they played out.

In contrast, revolutionaries, the proletariat, and the *muzhik* preferred different rights tactics. These parties preferred rallying cries, calls to action, and parry tactics when their target audience was the tsar. Over time, this strategy shifted to include increasingly aggressive rights seizures. As the series of revolutionary events progressed, rallying cries and calls to action became increasingly effective in catalyzing strikes and protests against the tsar. However, these strikes and protests only generated observable short term effects when they escalated to violence. From a macro perspective, the short-term failures of these tactics improved to long term success. Anti-tsar and Bolshevik rhetoric introduced as early as 1893 remained prevalent and influential in 1917. The revolutionaries' parries were their most effective rights tactics. In Lenin's own words, every monarchical concession inadvertently increased the revolutionaries' field of action, expanding the means available for them to achieve their objectives.³⁵¹

Revolutionaries preferred wedge and blockade tactics when their target audience was rival parties. The struggle for dominance between rival revolutionary groups was highly ideological and quite ruthless. The intra-revolutionary conflicts present in the 1903

³⁵¹ Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, 112.

second RSDLP congress and Dumas reveal a consistent strategy to leverage rights to distinguish party identities and eliminate barriers to future political dominance. These actions played a critical role in shaping the Russian revolution's ideological landscape. In the absence of these blockades and wedges, the February and October Revolutions may have played out against a much different slate of actors.

Research Implications

The Russian revolutionary period of 1893 to 1917 provided a fertile ground for research on the concept of rights as weapons. My research reveals that rights tactics were not only present during this struggle but essential to the sequence of events as they occurred. Furthermore, I identified three new tactics (confiscations, seizures, and calls to action) and improved Bob's definitions of parries and shields.³⁵² Where rights seizures take and exercise rights not yet afforded, confiscations refuse to honor or enforce rights already afforded. The call to action tactic seeks an escalation of action, in contrast to how rallying cries provide motivation to act.³⁵³

My findings also suggest that a rights tactic could yield effects akin to multiple other tactics. For example, the Duma's primary purpose was to shield the monarchy from greater revolution. However, it also achieved effects associated with blockades and camouflage. Further, the Duma served as Nicholas II's means when he subsequently confiscated the rights the October Manifesto provided, and further his ways when he

³⁵² Bob, *Rights as Weapons*.

³⁵³ The author hypothesizes there are instances where a rights tactic would serve as both a rallying cry and a call to action. I did not observe this phenomenon in this research.

altered voting laws to strengthen the Duma. Thus, this single action correlates with no less than four unique tactics. This finding aligns with Bob’s conclusion that rights tactics have “conjoined aspects.”³⁵⁴ Any future research on rights as weapons should specifically account for the possibility that one rights tactic may produce myriad secondary and tertiary effects associated with different tactics.

I created Figure 2 to synthesize my conclusions with the model I presented to summarize Bob’s framework.³⁵⁵ I included findings from the chapter summaries, namely how spears can be used against rivals (rather than just foes) and how rights enforcement organs may serve as the means to conduct a rights tactic (rather than rights themselves).




Figure 2. Updated Rights as Weapons Framework

Source: Created by author using information presented in Clifford Bob, *Rights as Weapons: Instruments of Conflict, Tools of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).

³⁵⁴ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 261.

³⁵⁵ See Figure 1.




Figure 3. Decision and Effect Tree of Authoritarian Governments' Potential Responses to Threats to Their Power

Source: Created by author.

My research has implications for both historical and modern-day perspectives. The conclusions enhance Bob's findings that rights as weapons are not only a real and effective aspect within political struggles, but that they can also have substantial impacts within broader struggles that include direct violence. From a modern perspective, it is necessary to recall the Joint Special Operations University's call for research on options to tactically apply rights as weapons against authoritarian regimes.³⁵⁶ The framework in Figure 2 may serve as a baseline for further study supporting the development of a rights as weapons approach to irregular warfare.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁶ JSOU, "Special Operations Research Topics 2022," 25.

³⁵⁷ The U.S. Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as, "a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy." It considers this activity to be a vital asset in gaining a competitive advantage over state and

I offer the following observations in support of future efforts to develop a practical irregular warfare rights as weapons concept. During Tsar Alexander II, Alexander III, and Nicholas II's reigns and within the construct of their autocratic form of government they only performed three actions in response to rights tactics. Regardless of the aggressors or their purpose the tsars either made concessions, ignored the threat, or suppressed the threat. In Figure 3, I provides a graphic representation of each of these responses and their corollary short and long-term effects. By understanding how autocratic regimes may respond to rights tactics targeting their power, actors can proactively shape a rights strategy to instigate desirable or avoid undesirable outcomes. Future research is necessary to confirm if this hypothetical decision and effect structure accurately frames how autocratic regimes respond to threats to their authority.³⁵⁸

Conclusion

Rights as weapons were a crucial factor throughout the Russian revolutionary period of 1893-1917. Rights tactics helped Nicholas II retain power for as long as he did while concurrently contributing to his adversaries' success in stripping the throne from him. Furthermore, rights tactics played a key role in the Bolshevik's rise to power. My

non-state actors seeking to reshape global norms in favor of more repressive forms of government, see *Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF>.

³⁵⁸ The author hypothesizes that if Figure 3 accurately depicts how autocratic regimes respond to threats to their power then autocratic regimes are particularly susceptible to rights tactics as a strategy to delegitimize their authority and transfer power to an opposition party. Additional research is necessary to confirm or deny this assumption.

analysis supports Bob's observation that "losers" in rights conflicts fight on unless their defeat is absolute as they retain the means to reorganize within changing systems.³⁵⁹

The subsequent Bolshevik Red Terror and Russian Civil War is a ripe historical period to continue this line of research. The Bolsheviks dramatically changed their social democratic goals as they built a regime far more oppressive than Nicholas II's ever was.³⁶⁰ Additionally, Stalin's Red Famine and purges, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's communist expansion through the Cold War, and Russia's conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria (among others) are equally viable events to explore through a rights as weapons lens. From a modern-day perspective, Russia's compatriot policy and their ongoing war in Ukraine are equally viable actions worthy of further rights as weapons research.

³⁵⁹ Bob, *Rights as Weapons*, 76.

³⁶⁰ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*.

GLOSSARY

Authors Note: Items in this section and throughout the thesis written in *italics* represent a transliterated Russian word. In some instances, such as “bolshevik,” I have chosen to use the anglicized version of the word. The translations and meanings for the transliterated words presented here are reflective of my understanding of the Russian language.

Bund. Represented Russian Jews within the RSDLP; advocated for political reforms that would acknowledge the Russian Jewish population as a nation.³⁶¹

Bolshevik. (literal translation: majority) The more radical wing of the RSDLP; advocated for a more selective revolutionary organization that would see a small band of professional revolutionaries lead an armed insurrection over the tsar.³⁶²

Constitutional Democrat (Kadet). Political party; advocated for democratic and economic reforms under a more reasonable approach than that of the Social Democrats.³⁶³

Dvoriensvo. Russian rural intellectuals, many of whom formed the Marxist-populist *Narodniki* terrorist group.³⁶⁴

Intelligentsia. Russian intellectual class.

Iskra. A political newspaper and official organ on the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party.³⁶⁵

Iskraists. Members and allies of the political newspaper *Iskra* closely aligned with Vladimir Lenin.³⁶⁶

³⁶¹ Tobias, “The Bund and Lenin until 1903,” 344-346.

³⁶² Kalic and Brown, *Russian Revolution of 1917: The Essential Reference Guide*, xxxv-xxvi, 123-124.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, xvii, xxvii, 67-68.

³⁶⁴ Richard Pipes, “Dvorianstvo,” in *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1995), 172-190.

³⁶⁵ The literal translation of *iskra* is “spark.”

³⁶⁶ The literal translation of *iskraist* is “sparkler,” and is seen represented throughout literature as both a transliterated and an anglicized word, both meaning a follower of Lenin’s teachings.

Menshevik. (literal translation: minority) The moderate wing of the RSDLP; advocated for a more inclusive revolutionary organization that would see the masses topple the tsar through legal means.³⁶⁷

Muzhik. Russian peasant class.

³⁶⁷ Kalic and Brown, *Russian Revolution of 1917: The Essential Reference Guide*, xvii, xxv, xxviii, 99-100.

APPENDIX A

COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY (RSDLP)

Members of the Congress³⁶⁸

Organizations

1. 'Emancipation of Labour' Group
2. *Iskra* group
3. Foreign Committee of the Bund
4. Central Committee of the Bund
5. League of Russian Social Democrats
6. Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad
7. *Yuzny Rabochy* group
8. Petersburg Committee
9. Petersburg Worker' Organisation
10. Moscow Committee
11. Kharkov Committee
12. Kiev Committee
13. Odessa Committee
14. Nikolayev Committee
15. Crimean Association
16. Don Committee
17. Association of Mining and Metallurgical Workers
18. Yekaterinoslav Committee
19. Saratov Committee

Delegates

1. Plehhanov
2. Deutsch
3. Martov (2 votes)
4. Hofman
5. Goldblatt
6. Leiber
7. Yudin
8. Abramson
9. Lenin (2 votes)
10. Martynov
11. Akimov
12. Popov
13. Yegorov
14. Gorsky
15. Brouckere
16. Byelov
17. Sorokin
18. Ivanov
19. Medvedev
20. Pavlovich
21. Stepanov
22. Osipov
23. Kostich
24. Makhov (2 votes)
25. Panin (2 votes)
26. Gusev
27. Tsaryov
28. Lvov
29. Lensky
30. Orlov
31. Lyadov
32. Gorin

³⁶⁸ Pearce, *Second RSDLP Congress Minutes*.

- 20. Tiflis Committee
- 21. Baku Committee
- 22. Batum Committee
- 23. Ufa Committee

- 24. Northern Association

- 25. Siberian Association

- 26. Tula Committee

- 33. Karsky (2 votes)
- 34. Rusov (2 votes)
- 35. Bekov (2 votes)
- 36. Fomin
- 37. Muravyov
- 38. Lange
- 39. Dyedov
- 40. Psadovsky
- 41. Trotsky
- 42. Hertz
- 43. Braun

Persons with a Consultative Voice

Persons

- 1. Akselrod
- 2. Zasulich
- 3. Starover
- 4. Koltsov
- 5. Wolf
- 6. Stein
- 7. Fischer
- 8. Warszawski
- 9. Hanecki
- 10. Glebov
- 11. Strakhov
- 12. Yuzhin
- 13. Sablina
- 14. Kostrov

Representing

- 1. Editorial Board of *Iskra*

- 2. Bund

- 3. Organising Committee

- 4. Polish Social-Democrats

APPENDIX B

COMPLETE TEXT OF THE PROGRAM OF THE CONSTITUENT

ASSEMBLY AND ORDER NO. 1

Program of the Constituent Assembly³⁶⁹

1. Immediate amnesty for all political prisoners, including terrorists;
2. Immediate granting of the freedom of speech, association, and assembly, and the right to strike, as promised by the tsarist government in 1906 but never fully implemented;
3. Immediate abolition of disabilities and privileges due to nationality, religion, or social origin;
4. Immediate preparation for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, to be elected on a universal, secret, direct, and equal ballot;
5. All police organs to be dissolved and replaced by a militia with elected officers, to be supervised by local government;
6. New elections to organs of local self-government on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret vote;
7. Military units that had participated in the Revolution to keep their weapons and to receive assurances they would not be sent to the front;
8. Military discipline in the armed forces to be maintained, but when off duty soldiers were to enjoy the same rights as civilians.

Order No. 1³⁷⁰

1 March 1917

To the garrison of the Petrograd Military District, to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and fleet for immediate and exact execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for their information.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has decreed: ---

- (1) Committees are to be elected immediately in all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons, and in individual units of the different forms of military directorates, and in all naval vessels, from elected representatives of the rank and file of the above-mentioned units.
- (2) All troop units which have not yet elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies are to elect one representative per company. Such

³⁶⁹ Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 298.

³⁷⁰ John Boyd, "The Origins of Order No. 1," *Soviet Studies* 19, no. 3 (1968): 359-360, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/149949>.

representatives are to appear, with written certification, at the State Duma building at 10 a.m. on 2 March.

- (3) In all political actions, troop units are subordinate to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and to the committees thereof.
- (4) The orders of the Military Commission of the State Duma are to be obeyed, with the exception of those instances in which they are in contradiction to the orders and decrees of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
- (5) All types of arms, such as rifles, machine guns, armoured cars, and others, must be put at the disposal of company and battalion committees, and under their control, and are not, in any case, to be issued to officers, even upon demand.
- (6) On duty and in the performance of service responsibilities, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but when off duty, in their political, civil and private lives, soldiers shall enjoy fully and completely the same rights as all citizens. In particular, standing at attention and compulsory saluting when off duty are abolished.
- (7) In the same way, addressing officers by honorary titles ('Your Excellency', 'Your Honour', etc.) is abolished and is replaced by the following form of address, 'Mr. General', 'Mr. Colonel', etc.

Course address to soldiers by anyone of higher rank, and in particular, addressing soldiers by *ty*³⁷¹ is prohibited, and any breach of this provision, as well as any misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, are to be reported by the latter to the company committees.

This order is to be read at all companies, battalions, regiments, ships' crews, batteries and other combatant and non-combatant units.

Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

³⁷¹ Translated as the Russian language informal version of "you," typically reserved for those of a lower social class or those undeserving of one's respect.

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