INTEGRATING INSTRUMENTS:
DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE MILITARY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

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Art of War Scholars

by

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This work evaluates the areas of alignment and misalignment between three instruments of national power within the Indo-Pacific region. Integrating the diplomatic, development, and military instruments are stressed throughout numerous national strategic policies, but at the regional level there are limited mechanisms to ensure unified action and policies become diffused. This paper includes contemporary literature and policy reviews to examine what misalignments exist and what are their potential sources. Policy misalignments, resourcing shortfalls, and a lack of formalized structure to integrate these instruments of power at the regional level are determined to be sources for misalignment. Misalignment, under-resourcing, and structural inadequacy put U.S. national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific at risk, especially within the context of great power competition with the People's Republic of China. The conclusions and recommendations in this paper are intended to inform members of the national security enterprise where existing gaps in policy are and an approach to address them.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

INTEGRATING INSTRUMENTS: DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE MILITARY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC, by Andrew R. Horgan, 133 pages.

This work evaluates the areas of alignment and misalignment between three instruments of national power within the Indo-Pacific region. Integrating the diplomatic, development, and military instruments are stressed throughout numerous national strategic policies, but at the regional level there are limited mechanisms to ensure unified action and policies become diffused. This paper includes contemporary literature and policy reviews to examine what misalignments exist and what are their potential sources. Policy misalignments, resourcing shortfalls, and a lack of formalized structure to integrate these instruments of power at the regional level are determined to be sources for misalignment. Misalignment, under-resourcing, and structural inadequacy put U.S. national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific at risk, especially within the context of great power competition with the People's Republic of China. The conclusions and recommendations in this paper are intended to inform members of the national security enterprise where existing gaps in policy are and an approach to address them.

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ACRONYMS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DIMEFILD	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Development (instruments of national power)
DoS	United States Department of State
DoD	United States Department of Defense
EAP	East Asian and Pacific Affairs (United States Department of State Bureau)
FOIP	Free and Open Indo-Pacific
INSSG	Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
GFA-19	Global Fragility Act of 2019
INDOPACOM	Indo-Pacific Command (United States military Combatant Command)
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
JRS	Joint Regional Strategy (Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development)
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
PLA	People's Liberation Army (Chinese military, including the Navy and Air Force)
SCA	South and Central Asian Affairs (United States Department of State Bureau)
US PC&PS	United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
>
> —George Washington, "Washington's Farewell Address, 1796"

Background

President Washington's commentary during his farewell address rings today as true as it did then. Dr. Charles Hill, a deceased career diplomat and professor at Yale University, weaves these words into the tapestry of literature and statecraft, exploring fear of popular democracies' shortcomings and tendency of popular rule towards war without good cause.[1] Hill identifies a strain of thought that has endured throughout the history of American statecraft, the tendency to distrust diplomatic relations with foreign states.

The tendency for the United States to minimize diplomatic efforts and structures has ebbed and flowed throughout our history. Diplomatic and military instruments and their influence have grown or reduced based on domestic developments. Generally, growth of the military is linked to external threats, perceived or real. The diplomatic

[1] Charles Hill, *Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 148-149.

instrument has had a different path than the military one, but recently it has been argued that the diplomatic instrument has experienced significant decline in influence.[2]

Today, public awareness of great power competition has increased. After what has arguably been decades of decline for the American diplomatic instrument, President Joe Biden's *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (*INSSG*) prioritized diplomacy as the leading instrument in a whole of government approach aimed at, "renew[ing]. . . enduring advantages so that we can meet today's challenges from a position of strength."[3] This not only is a shift from U.S. hesitancy for engagement and potential entanglement, given voice even in the country's earliest days, but it also could signal a reverse of course following twenty years of U.S. military engagements throughout the world. A shift to diplomatic leadership carries with it structural, cultural, and resource implications which will be felt at least into the near future. With the diplomatic instrument assigned as lead agency in developing American advantages globally, the military must re-assess its role in enabling the country's success.[4] Alignment across the U.S. government can be assessed in a number of ways, to include policy, integration mechanism structures, and resourcing. These key indicators must be examined in totality and in relation to each other down to the operational level to ensure alignment. This is particularly true in the Indo-Pacific region where China presents a growing, revisionist threat to global order. In

[2] Ronan Farrow, *War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 2018), ix-xxxiii.

[3] Joseph Biden, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (*INSSG*) (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021), 3.

[4] Ibid., 13.

comparison to China's centrally planned challenges, the American Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development have greater potential for developing and executing stovepiped strategies. The policies of geographically aligned organizations addressing the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific region are overtly misaligned, when viewed comprehensively. These include Indo-Pacific (INDOPACOM) and European (EUCOM) Combatant Commands for the Department of Defense and the East Asian and Pacific and South and Central Asia Bureaus for Department of State. All four sub-departmental organizations have key responsibilities for addressing the nation's security in each region. These organizations have their own strategies, areas of focus, and priorities for addressing this common challenge. Ensuring the Departments of Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development are aligned, cohesively organized, and have mechanisms in place to facilitate synchronization at the operational level will influence the outcomes of our national security for years to come and throughout competition.

Problem Statement

The Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development are compelled by the *INSSG* to, "[advance] American interests and [uphold] our universal values…."[5] Current policy has reemphasized the importance of developing "common cause with our closest allies and partners" to achieve these ends.[6] A strategic challenge exists; revitalizing U.S. leadership in international institutions and

[5] Biden, *INSSG*, 3.

[6] Biden, *INSSG*, 3.

defending national interests abroad while simultaneously modernizing the military. U.S. Government efforts are expected to be synchronized across all elements of national power.[7] Aligning the diplomatic, development, and military instruments at the operational level is a requirement for unified action.[8] Achieving unified action is complicated by the number of key actors in great power competition, their differing structures, independent policies, and resourcing. With the diplomatic instrument in the lead, the Department of Defense must ensure its efforts are aligned with the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development strategies at the operational level of war.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the alignment of the Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development in the Indo-Pacific region. Focusing on policy, organization, resourcing, and mechanisms for integration, this analysis intends to identify if there are any gaps in alignment. The study will recommend preliminary solutions for identified misalignments or shortfalls. While detailed solutions to any identified issues are best addressed by the parties involved through interagency working groups.

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[7] The elements of national power include: Diplomacy, Information, Military Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Development. See pages 7 and 8 for a complete definition of the terms diplomacy, military, and development (instruments of national power). Further information concerning the elements of power is available in The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2021).

[8] See page 7 for a complete definition of the term unified action.

Research Questions

Primary Question: Are there gaps in alignment between the Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development that could affect addressing the challenge of great power competition with China at the operational level through unified action for the next five years in the Indo-Pacific region?

Secondary Question 1: What is the intended relationship between the diplomatic, military, and development instruments in the Indo-Pacific region?

Secondary Question 2: What are the likely effects on unified action due to differing organizational structures in the Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development within the Indo-Pacific region?

Secondary Question 3: What are the likely sources of misalignment between the actors, if misalignment is identified?

Secondary Question 4: What literature exists concerning gaps in Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development policy objectives and processes? In other words, what other literature addresses the researcher's primary research question?

Assumptions

1. The principal of unified action, as defined by Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* is a shared concept and goal by the departments and agency covered in this study.
2. Organizations in the U.S. Government are not inherently aligned, but they are willing to cooperate to achieve national security goals.

3. Members of the three primary governmental organizations of this study view national security as core component of their mission.

Definition of Terms

Competition Continuum – "Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. As states of non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests, they continually compete for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage."[9] "[Competition Continuum] Describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. These descriptors refer to the relationship between the U.S. and another strategic actor (state or non-state) in relation to a set of specific policy objectives. This description allows for simultaneous interaction with the same strategic actor at different points along the competition continuum."[10]

Development (instrument) – "can be used to encourage or discourage behavior by offering or withholding development assistance, or by building a partner nation's capacity, such as economic, infrastructure, education, or medical, to encourage behavior that aligns with U.S. national interests."[11]

Diplomacy (instrument)– "How a state formally interacts with other state actors and sometimes non-state actors. It can consist of bilateral or multilateral engagement and

[9] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19, *Competition Continuum* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2019), 1.

[10] Ibid., 2.

[11] The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer*, 52.

span nearly the full spectrum of strategic approaches, from forging alliances, to communicating coercive threats, to notifying of sanctions or declaring war. Diplomacy is not conducted in a static environment and the other party's or parties' reactions, ranging from cooperation to active resistance, also have bearing on diplomatic engagement.[12]

End – "A specific desired outcome; also termed objectives."[13]

Indo-Pacific Region – The region of interest in this study. It includes The Pacific Ocean from Hawaii west and the Indian Ocean including Diego Garcia. All states bordering these bodies of water except for Antarctica are included. This region is specially named to remove bias from other standing delineations associated with standing organizations such as INDOPACOM, EAP, and SCA.

Levels of War – "Strategic, operation, and tactical – link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives."[14]

Military (instrument) – "Entails the use of force, threat of the use of force, or enabling partners to use or threaten force to shape another actor's behavior to align with one's own national interests. The application of the military instrument could span virtually the entire spectrum... with possible approaches ranging from security cooperation to nuclear war."[15]

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[12] The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer*, 49.

[13] Ibid., 171.

[14] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication)JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2017), I-7.

[15] The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer*, 50.

Means – "The resources and capabilities available or required to achieve the ends."[16]

National Interests – "Conditions we seek to achieve or protect as a nation and that we believe are in our state's fundamental best interest; categories of such interests are *survival*, *vital*, *important* or *major*, and *peripheral*."[17]

Operational Level of War – "The operational level links strategy and tactics by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and strategic objectives."[18]

Public Diplomacy – "The entire array of diplomatic instruments – cultural, educational, political, ideological, information, and intelligence- designed to have relations with, and influence over, foreign societies, foreign publics, and foreign opinion leaders, with the ultimate effect of influencing foreign opinion.:[19]

Risks – "Things that could go wrong with a strategy."[20]

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[16] The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer*, 171.

[17] Ibid., 169.

[18] CJCS, JP 1, I-8.

[19] John Lenczowski, *Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 19.

[20] The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer*, 170.

Strategy – "A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater and multinational objectives.[21]

Unified Action – "The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort."[22]

Unity of Effort – "Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization which is the product of successful unified action."[23]

Ways – "Proposals for how to achieve the ends; also termed courses of action."[24] Whole-of-government – Including and effectively integrating all relevant instruments for the issue in question."[25]

Scope

This study explores the existing policy documents that relate to national and Indo-Pacific regional strategy produced by the President of the United States, Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development. It will attempt to analyze these documents for alignment in purpose and strategy. It will also examine the

[21] CJCS, JP 1, I-7.

[22] Ibid., GL-12.

[23] Ibid, GL-13.

[24] The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer*, 167.

[25] Ibid., 171.

Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development for organizations that synchronize strategy with operations. The gaps and misaligned priorities will be those identified within bureau and combatant command theater strategies developed by each organization at the national and regional level.

This study assesses the body of strategic policy between the years 2010 to 2020 to identify alignment or misalignment between the Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development. The study does not include documents developed after the March 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. This sampling is chosen due to time constraints and to isolate the study from evolving policy updates. The entirety of Asia will not be studied, only states in the Indo-Pacific region, as defined on page eight.

Limitations and Delimitations

Limitations:

1. Any primary source material that requires travel outside the Leavenworth, Kansas area will not be available for this study.
2. No classified materials will be included in this research, to include policy, integration mechanisms, or structures.

Delimitations:

1. This study is limited in scope to the diplomatic and military instruments of national power.
2. Economic and information instruments are addressed in passing as they are often congruent with military, development, and diplomatic factors.
3. The period studied is from 2010 to March 21, 2020.

Research Methodology

To answer the primary research question, this study will focus on official policy documents providing guidance to the bureaus and combatant commands executing national security strategy within the Indo-Pacific region. The official documents are critical to analysis of potential gaps or misalignment in policy between the departments, regional bureaus, and combatant commands. The documents developed by the bureaus and combatant commands in the region of study will be of particular interest to identify how they assess their requirements and organize to achieve national strategic ends. Independent analysis of the instruments of power, their structure, and levels of integration will be critical to this study. These research products will provide the researcher additional perspectives to compare against the source documents to validate the arguments of the independent studies.

This study will follow a qualitative methodology. The social-cultural phenomenon associated to integration of instruments of national power at the operational level is the primary focus. Understanding the nature of the intended relationship between the diplomatic, development, and military instruments of national power is fundamental to the conduct of this research. This research seeks to identify the relationship between these instruments, assess their alignment, and identify gaps in alignment as they apply to synchronizing efforts and effects in the pursuit of national strategic objectives. The culture of each organization and their resulting regional policies are of interest comparatively against their directive and common national policies.

The research techniques utilized are informed historical and security studies methodology. Investigation of the approaches taken by various organizations who are

responsible for addressing the complex problem of national security within the context of great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region contributes to the professional dialogue of these organizations. While the stakeholders will not be directly interviewed for this study, their publicly available works will provide their position on key matters that fall within the scope of this study.

To understand the primary research question, the relationship between these organizations, this study will analyze strategic policy documents. The documents examined will include published, unclassified policies codifying the roles, organizations, and strategies of the Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development as they apply to great power competition in the Indo-Pacific region. The resources analyzed will include the documents released by these organizations from the strategic to operational levels. Individual documents from regional bureaus and geographic combatant commands provide context for how each organization sees the common problem and how they aim to address it. The close reading of these documents is intended to show the priorities each organization explicitly states in relative to the other organizations' developed strategy.

This document analysis will demonstrate overlapping areas of interest and gaps between the efforts of each organization. The lexicon used by each agency, based on their responsibilities, perspectives, and legal foundation, will provide contextual understanding for the intent behind the language they use. Additionally, understanding each organization's audience will provide critical context to interpreting their publicly available strategies. The cumulative cultural understanding developed for these

independent agencies will provide insight into how their thinking, an as a result, their approach to a common challenge is interpreted and then codified in policy.

Secondary research questions will be addressed using all sources, both primary (e.g. the *INSSG* is a primary source document) and secondary, and analysis. These resources will include analysis of professionals concerned with the region and those within the national security structure who are not active members of either department. Comparing their analysis of each department's released strategy and organizations will provide insight as to the effectiveness of their approach, potential shortfalls, and mechanisms for integration. Assessing each author's background, potential biases, and argument will contextualize their position and contribute to assessing their validity.

During analysis, this study will solicit the lessons learned from case studies conducted by professional national security organizations commissioned to review integration of the Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development. Published scholarly articles and thesis will also be solicited for perspectives on the secondary research questions, informing resourcing and challenges to integrating these instruments of national power at the operational level.

Ethical Considerations

The most significant ethical consideration during this study will be addressing and mitigating bias. The author's interest in this topic and service in the U.S. military opens opportunities to include subconscious biases in the development of this research product. This bias will be reduced through a methodological application of supporting documentation from various sources and oversight by the researcher's committee. The researcher has a natural bias toward internationalism and a recognition for the efficacy of

international realism. The researcher intends to alleviate bias based on their personal perspectives by surveying several sources that provide varying perspectives on international theory and employment of the national instruments of power. Primary and secondary sources will be assessed by the researcher for their bias and read with this framework in mind. The resources selected for this study will not be selected by the researcher alone, with the intent of alleviating any tendency for the researcher to select sources that reinforce their worldview. Research librarians provided several of the resources to the researcher for inclusion in the study. Bias is inherent and shapes the frame of the researcher, but it is acknowledged to the best of their ability, reported to the reader, and systematically mitigated wherever possible.

Significance of the Study

The contemporary security environment presents a significantly different set of challenges than the U.S. has experienced recently. This environment is characterized by great power competition with a disruptive ascendant power—the People's Republic of China—in one of the globe's most important regions. As a global power and a member of the Indo-Pacific region, U.S. security and prosperity is inherently linked to this vital area. In this critical region, the U.S. competes with an ascendant China. Many sovereign states throughout this region are increasingly aware of their potentially complicated position, being pressured to choose between association with the U.S. or the People's Republic of China. The nature of this competition means it remains below the threshold of direct conflict between the great powers but includes military actions which include shaping and deterrence.

The geographic position, economic potential, territorial disputes, and presence of two competing powers make the Indo-Pacific region a location for potential conflict. Conventional military actions, to include security force assistance, cultural exchange, and freedom of navigation operations, are on-going and potentially escalatory within the competition space. Since this competition is below the level of war and influencing neutral parties in the region is a critical portion of the *INSSG*, military action cannot be the primary instrument of national power in the region. This is reinforced by the *INSSG* which directs the diplomatic instrument to be in the lead.[26]

The alignment of the diplomatic, military, and development instruments is critical to the security of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region. Alignment supports unified action, decentralized execution, conserves resources, and increases effectiveness. An analysis of key policies, organization, and structures contributes to the professional discourse on the topic of strategy and interdepartmental synchronization. Identification of areas where one department cannot support policy effectively due to resource constraints or capabilities gaps are identified with the intent that professionals within these organizations can assess the validity of the gap and develop methods for addressing them.

Military, diplomatic, and development professionals, as well as members of the national security structure and academia, will be interested in the effective synchronization of the three instruments investigated in this study. The policies, organizations, and structures that are intended to integrate these key elements of national power are of vital interest at this time. Ensuring there is alignment at the operational level

[26] Biden, *INSSG*, 13.

across the government to support the U.S.'s shift in focus provides a cohesive message to allies and partners while creating compounding effects in pursuit of national objectives. At the national level of government, structures are in place to coordinate across departments, such as reporting, planning, and integration counsels. At the theater-operational level, the potential for misalignment of policy, resources, and effort increases and mechanisms for integration are limited.

Structure and Content

The following chapters will be structured to progress the reader from base knowledge through the author's analysis and conclusions. Chapter Two reviews the existing literature concerning national security structure, policy hierarchy, and interagency cooperation, as it applies to the Indo-Pacific since 2010. Chapter Three reviews the existing national and theater strategic unclassified policies which are intended to direct and align the national instruments of power as they attempt to support national security in the Indo-Pacific. Chapter Four will build from the knowledge of structures, intended alignment, and policy decisions annotated in Chapters Two and Three. The author's assessment of U.S. strategy as it progressed between 2010 to March 2021 and the implications of this evolution on the alignment or misalignment of the instruments of national power in the region. The second part of Chapter Four will assess the impacts of policy evolution on the current structure, staffing, and resourcing for the diplomatic, military, and development instruments of power. Chapter Five summarizes and provides tentative recommendations for how the U.S. government, departments, and agencies should address any gaps or misalignments that would create risk in achieving

U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. Further research suggested by the tentative recommendations will also be provided in the final chapter of this study.

Summary

This study addresses the alignment or misalignment of the diplomatic, development, and military instruments of national power. The resources considered will be those published open-source strategic policy papers and officially released unclassified summaries of classified policy documents. These documents are assessed for the likely impacts alignment or misalignment can have at the operational level of war during the shaping and deterrence phases of competition with China in the Indo-Pacific Region. The conduct of this study is multi-disciplinary in nature - supported by historical methods and international relations theory.

The significance of this study is that it provides a critical analysis of the key documents and organizations involved in conducting U.S. foreign policy in a critically important portion of the world. The research questions align with the intent of this study and attempt to develop analysis in support of policy makers and staff members conducting operations in the Indo-Pacific area. The analysis will identify areas of cooperation and improvement concerning unified action between the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The intent of this analysis is to contribute to the professional dialogue of national security policy and organization.

Unified action between the Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development is critical to the U.S.'s national security. No instrument is currently authorized, resourced, or designed to achieve the goals identified in the 2021

Interim National Security Guidance unilaterally. Developing policies and organizational structures which contribute to shared perspectives of the common challenge, how to address them comprehensively, and methods for integrating their individual organization resources is critical to the success of the U.S. throughout competition with China in the 21st century.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

> All planning, particularly strategic planning, must pay attention to the character of contemporary warfare.
>
> —Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Introduction

This chapter surveys major writings on the national security structure, policy hierarchy, and interagency cooperation. It is organized with a historical methodology, presenting works by topic in a chronological manner. Resources for this literature review were identified by various methods. Literature reviewed include references recommended by subject matter experts from organizations researched in the thesis, commissioned reports provided by research librarians, and official documents developed by the respective departments and agencies concerning their interagency cooperation.

Initial research was conducted to identify documents specifically written with analysis on the integration of diplomatic, development, and military instruments in the Indo-Pacific region. The resources available on this specific topic are limited at the unclassified level. To compensate, the researcher pursued documents outlining agency and department culture, cooperation, and methods of integration more broadly. Additional research was conducted into the structure for the Departments of Defense and State, and U. S. Agency for International Development, with particular emphasis on their structures for liaison and policy development. Further research was conducted into the alignment of national instruments of power during periods of peace, war, and the increasingly acknowledged “character of contemporary warfare” which is often referred

to as competition.[27] In this effort, the researcher recruited resources written about the national security infrastructure.

The researcher shifted his emphasis to resources analyzing the diplomatic, development, and military instruments of national power and their integration more broadly. Many of the documents available on this topic were oriented on counterinsurgency operations during the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. Given the recency of these evaluations and their focus on the immediate scenario they reviewed, the researcher deliberately avoided centering the majority of their research on analysis derived from these conflicts. A major reason to avoid Afghan and Iraq conflict analysis is because these campaigns were conducted within the context of counterinsurgency conflict and state-building as compared to the focus of this research, taking place during shaping and competition phases. Another reason these studies did not form the majority of research is because the analysis conducted would have been done within the context of these politically contentious operations and carried with them a higher likelihood of biases and political interests that the researcher could not account for.

[27] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 220.



Figure 1. Chapter 2 Structure

Source: Created by author.

Indo-Pacific Integration

Military leaders within the U.S. government have signaled the importance the U.S. places on the Indo-Pacific theater and its vital interests in the region. One of these leaders is Admiral Phil Davidson, then Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific, who testified in 2019 to the House Armed Services Committee on the topic.[28] He spoke to the key challenges faced within the region and the role of the U.S. military in coordination with the U.S. national security enterprise, allies, and partners to advance the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. In February 2020, Admiral Davidson, spoke to these historic and

[28] Phil Davidson, "House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Opening Remarks," (Washington, DC, 27 March, 2019), https://www.pacom.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=55&ModuleId=13576&Article=1797909.

contemporary interests, and the U.S. government's efforts in the region beyond just the Department of Defense.[29] He spoke to an audience at Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia about the depth of military involvement with Australia, but he also covered diplomatic and economic development interests shared between the two countries.

Ryan M. Finn and David B. Moore co-authored "A New U.S. Indo-Asia-Pacific Security Strategy" which was published in *Avoiding the Trap: U.S. Strategy and Policy for Competing in the Asia-Pacific Beyond the Rebalance*. This work was featured in the "Military Instrument" section of the edited document. The authors argue for several actions to address Chinese competence in the Indo-Pacific below the threshold of conflict.[30] The authors offer seven recommendations to achieve U.S. policy goals, two of the solutions they offer are described in ways which require detailed interagency coordination. Specifically, they recommend developing a "collective security architecture," an effort to "compet[e] in the gray zone" more effectively, and to "determine 'redlines' and clearly demonstrate the will to enforce them."[31] These items require diplomatic and information instrument coordination or leadership for the U.S. to achieve their full potential.

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[29] Phil Davidson, "The United States' Interests in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. INDOPACOM," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, February 14, 2020, https://www.pacom.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId.

[30] Ryan M. Finn and David B. Moore, "A New U.S. Indo-Asia-Pacific Security Strategy," in *Avoiding the Trap: U.S. Strategy and Policy for Competing in the Asia-Pacific Beyond the Rebalance*, ed. David Lai, John F. Troxell, and Frederick J. Gellert (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2018), 287-288.

[31] Ibid., 311.

Sandra K. Minkel's "Diplomacy under the Strategic Rebalance and a Look Forward" was produced in 2018 when she was the U.S. Agency for International Development senior advisor to U.S. INDOPACOM. Her work addresses how instruments of national power were prioritized following the President Barrack Obama rebalance to Asia.[32] She develops recommendations to meet the dynamic environment in the Indo-Pacific and based on her assessment on the efficacy of instrument alignment at the time. These recommendations include use of all instruments of national power, including physical participation in multilateral events, economic engagement, consistent messaging, abstaining from decreasing financial resourcing for diplomatic and development efforts within the region, and employment of experts to develop regional policy.

U.S. Army Captain Johannes Geist's January 2020 essay "The Strategy of a Great Power Competitor" describes his recommendation for U.S. grand strategy in relation to the People's Republic of China.[33] He discusses U.S. interests, drawing lessons from the Cold War as they relate to competition with China. He employs the framework of hard and soft power approaches, assesses China's use of power to achieve strategic ends, and identifies discord between the two countries' global goals. He acknowledged the various

[32] Sandra Minkel, "Diplomacy Under the Strategic Rebalance and a Look Forward," in *Avoiding the Trap: U.S. Strategy and Policy for Competing in the Asia-Pacific Beyond the Rebalance*, ed. David Lai, John F. Troxell, and Frederick J. Gellert (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2018), 411-443.

[33] Johannes Geist, "The Strategy of Great Power Competitor," (The Landpower Essay Series LPE 20-1, The Association of the United States Army, Arlington, VA, 2020), 4, https://www.ausa.org/publications/strategy-great-power-competitor.

instruments of national power and their role in the region but posits the U.S. should maintain its historical grand strategy while being prepared to oppose the Chinese military.[34]

Interagency Cooperation

Mark A. Stoler's historic study on military and diplomatic policy leading up to and throughout World War Two, *Allies and Adversaries*, provides a historic look at the founding of modern U.S. interagency integration. The book documents increasing military influence on U.S. foreign policy as the war progressed, including the shifting balance of power between the Departments of State, War, and Navy from traditional peacetime roles to a wartime footing. He notes early requests for, ". . . guidance and coordination submitted by DoD. . .," were declined because, ". . . they challenged civilian prerogatives in the policy making process and thus civilian supremacy over the armed forces."[35] The book describes instances of bifurcated policy development which negatively affected unified action when the Department of State failed to notify the military of policy changes relevant to the conduct of operations. Stoler documents the changes President Franklin D. Roosevelt made to the foreign policy structure, including realigning the Joint Board to advise the Commander-in-Chief and not Service Chiefs. [36] Ultimately, he shows the shifting balance of power between the diplomatic and military

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[34] Geist, "The Strategy of Great Power Competitor," 3-4.

[35] Mark A. Stoler, *Alliances and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 1-4.

[36] Ibid., 16.

instruments, resulting in a post-war peace, relative to power sharing with the Soviet Union, which was directly opposed by the State Department and Britain.[37] This book provides historical context for how primacy of national instruments of power and policy development can shift during a time of war.

Another author exploring connections between the civilian diplomatic and military instruments is J. Noel Williams. In his paper "U.S. State Department and U.S. Marine Corps: Partners for the 21st Century," the author identifies existing linkages between the Department of State and the U.S. Marine Corps which they argue strengthening would contribute to national security. Fundamentally, the proposal advocates for an, "expansion of the State Department role in national defense," specifically as it relates to the realm of information.[38] They recommend a deliberate effort to modernize information collection capabilities and cultural diplomacy efforts by the U.S. military based from embassies. To achieve this end, the author recommends a program to develop Marine Officers' foundation for an assigned region, language proficiency, and recruitment of Marine Officers with education which would facilitate their transition to become a Foreign Affairs Officer after leaving military service.[39] The author also records the fiscal and resulting organizational shortcomings, cited as 50% decrease in international affairs budget at publication in 1996, within the Department of

[37] Stoler, *Alliances and Adversaries*, 266.

[38] Noel J. Williams, "U.S. State Department and U.S. Marine Corps: Partners for the 21st Century: Using Embassies as Advanced Bases for Information," (Paper, Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Quantico, VA, 1996), 7.

[39] Ibid., 8.

State due to since the end of the Cold War.[40] The author's argument for Marine Corps and Department of State information and organizational modernization is intended to provide an edge in a multipolar world which requires rapid responses to ambiguous threats abroad based in robust cultural understanding.[41]

The realm of interagency operations is also an inherently complex multipolar world, described expertly in Robert S. Pope's *U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and Analysis of Options for Improvement*. Throughout the first portion of this book, the author explores the current methods and organizations to create unity of effort within the national security environment. The most unique portion of this study is the emphasis placed on foreign policy organization from the regional level, as compare to the majority which are oriented on the national level. Specifically, he delves into the existing standing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), contingency Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF), and Political Advisors (POLAD).[42] He also explores its inherent shortcomings as part of existing Combatant Command structures, including non-compulsory participation by non-military national security organizations and the military-centric orientation it builds into U.S. foreign policy.[43] Pope proposes evolutionary reformation options and a recommendation for how

[40] Williams, "U.S. State Department and U.S. Marine Corps," 10.

[41] Ibid., 18.

[42] Robert S. Pope, *U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options of Improvement* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2014), 10-15.

[43] Ibid., 17-37.

to improve regional interagency structures in the closing chapters of the book. The options available for improving regional interagency cooperation are exhaustively reviewed within this work, informed by Congressionally mandated studies and academic papers.[44] The author's recommended solution is a regional interagency organization led by a presidentially nominated and Senate appointed Department of State Foreign Service Officer, empowered to direct the formulation and execution of regional foreign policy.[45]

Another analysis concerning interagency cooperation, organizational bias, and misalignment is Rosa Brooks' *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*.[46] The author's views are based upon their experience as a lawyer, State Department civil-servant, non-governmental organization member, and service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mrs. Brooks acknowledges the evolution of power, international order, and national security must all be dynamic. As a result of this dynamism, she argues organizations, law, and national security theory must reflect the changing environment to maintain relevance. She addresses the difficulties of wars without discernable end states, shortfalls in legal structure, military preeminence in foreign policy, and shrinking diplomatic and development influence domestically. These gaps are attributed throughout the writing to the nature of how the U.S. frames the security environment as a polarity between war and peace. She describes resourcing

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[44] Pope, *U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation*, 95-117.

[45] Ibid., 132-133.

[46] Rosa Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2016), 26-29.

shortfalls leading to cyclic failures: where the non-military instruments of national power are underfunded, the military must assume their responsibilities, and the non-military instruments receive even less funding because of their perceived inability to perform their traditional role.[47] She recommends the national security enterprise be reviewed for modernization to account for the blurring lines between war and peace, endlessly expanding means with which to conduct national security, and an increasingly complex international system.[48] While the book also contains recommendations to change the international security cooperation, the majority of the author's work focuses revieing the U.S. national security structure.

Editors Robert Z. George and Harvey Rishikof analyze what they as the refer to as the "national security enterprise," defined as a diverse official and unofficial network of interested parties involved in national security policy and operations.[49] The editors describe this amalgamation as three concentric circles: 1) executive departments and agencies, 2) Congress and the Supreme Court, and 3) media, think tank members, experts, former government members, and interest groups.[50] The collection of essays are organized to demonstrate the national security enterprise's development through modern American history, the structure and character of the three groups within the enterprise,

[47] Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, 20-21.

[48] Ibid., 345-351.

[49] Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds, *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 3.

[50] Ibid.

and the impact these actors have on the formulation of national security policy and its achievement. The editors selected works which provide context for each organization and actor's cultural predilections. It is the editors' position that actors within the national security enterprise are influenced by the organizational culture of their bureaucratic institution and that this colors both the cohesiveness and performance of the national security enterprise.[51] The essays include analysis of each department and agency's cultural underpinnings and perspective on the world. Through this methodology, they shape a narrative that provides numerous lenses for how interested parties approach national security and interagency cooperation more broadly.

Ronan Farrow provides an exhaustive investigation into the evolving national security environment and interagency imbalance from within the Department of State. As a former State Department official and investigative journalist, he argues traditional diplomatic and development institutions are not being replaced or reimagined to meet the modern national security environment.[52] To inform this book, the author interviewed every living active and former U.S. Secretary of State. Like the foundations of Rosa Brooks' argument, he observes the military filling the vacancies left by other instruments of national power during a period of war and decreased funding. He documents diplomatic and developmental decline starting with the President George W. Bush administration and continuing through the early days of President Donald J. Trump. To do so, he develops narratives involving significant contemporary diplomatic figures,

[51] George and Rishikof, *The National Security Enterprise*, 8.

[52] Farrow, *War on Peace*, xxxi.

including Richard Holbrooke. He ties historic American trends marginalizing diplomacy as the primary element in foreign policy with contemporary effects. He argues this with supporting statistics including his experience with, ". . . 28 percent of overseas Foreign Service officer slots. . . either vacant or filled by low-level employees working above their level of experience."[53] The author identifies that the balance between diplomatic, development, and military instruments had not been reestablished at the point the book was published in 2018.

William J. Davis, Jr. and contributing authors Janet K. Benini and Michael S. Choe developed *A Practitioners Handbook for Interagency Leadership*. In this work, they describe the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment in its complexity and why it is so difficult to lead. In their Chapter 2, "Why We Keep Getting It Wrong: What Makes the JIIM So Different" they offer, "seven key aspects of the JIIM that a leader must appreciate in order to lead and successfully operate."[54] These aspects include potentially significant sources of misalignment such as differences in organizational culture and the lack of binding doctrine to drive interagency cooperation. Even with recommended leader actions within the book, these sources of misalignment are systemic and create discord during conduct of interagency planning and operations.

[53] Farrow, *War on Peace*, 4, xxx.

[54] William J. Davis Jr., Janet K. Benini, and Michael S. Choe, *A Practitioner's Handbook for Interagency Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Foundation Press, 2018), 9.

Lieutenant Colonel John Kendall authored a piece exploring methods to adapt the U.S. instruments of power for contemporary competition. He leverages his experience as a U.S. Army Special Forces Officer and foreign affairs officer to argue for a more integrated U.S. national security response to counter the PRC which he calls "enduring competition."[55] The author uses cases including Ecuador and Djibouti to describe China's attempts to coerce peripheral states using the "three warfares."[56] He attributes PRC influence failures to strong democratic governments armed with accurate information. To perpetuate these failures, the author argues the U.S. must incorporate enduring competition theory by adjusting institutions and cultures within the national security enterprise, providing a method to achieve this at the country-level through U.S. country engagement centers (CEC). While he mentions interagency coordination in the National Security Council is important, the CECs provide a similar function under the purview of the State Department's local Chief of Mission. Fundamentally, Lieutenant Colonel Kendall argues for greater integration of all instruments of power by forming CECs to support democracy internationally, provide accurate information to populations within peripheral countries, and ultimately undermine the effectiveness of the PRC's coercive behavior.

[55] John Kendall, "Enduring Competition in a New Age of Power," *Military Review* (September-October 2021): 16.

[56] Ibid., 16-17.

Summary

The content of this literature review focused on two main categories of authorship. The primary focus was on documents analyzing the integration of the diplomatic, development, and military instruments within the contemporary Indo-Pacific competition space. The works available on this topic provided various perspectives on the current organizational structures and gaps existing between the instruments of national power prevalent in the Indo-Pacific. This base information will be combined with contemporary national and regional strategies, reviewed in Chapter 3, to inform the researcher's analysis and conclusions, Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

The second portion of this literature review focused on works produced evaluating interagency cooperation broadly. The information collected from these documents provides a base for understanding the organizational cultures of agencies in the national security enterprise. They also demonstrate recent trends and analysis reviewing prioritization and resourcing for the agencies required to conduct great power competition with China. These documents provide a base from which to evaluate the alignment and gaps between these organizations. They also detail recommendations for how to improve the national security structure, maximizing U.S. competitive advantage through unified action.

CHAPTER 3

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

> Soldier and civilian policymakers must communicate all but continuously, and each will need to insist that the other pays due attention to that which is mandatory in the world of the other. However, policy must be the dominant participant in the dialogue. If it is not, the proper relationship between war and policy would be reversed.
>
> —Colin S. Gray, *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on WAR, PEACE, and STRATEGY*

Introduction

This chapter examines the current body of national and departmental policy established by key stakeholders that guide operations by the diplomatic and military instruments present within the Indo-Pacific region. The assessment will include legally required national guidance, bilateral regional strategies developed by the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, geographic combatant command strategic reviews, and documents dictating organizational integration and responsibilities. This portion includes recent historic guidance directing alignment of these instruments during periods below the threshold of war. The following figure graphically depicts the policy documents to be reviewed throughout this chapter chronologically. The policies reviewed are categorized by the researcher as either national strategic or theater strategic based upon the focus of their content and publishing agency. The documents reviewed are presented in order of national policy first, next Department of State regional policy, and finally Department of Defense regional policy.



Figure 2. Chapter 3 Reviewed Policy Chronological Timeline

Source: Created by author.

2010 National Security Strategy

President Barack Obama was elected in 2008 with a promise to bring change, and the 2010 *National Security Strategy* was his administration's first formal national security document to start that change. Rhetorically, the 2010 *NSS* provided a sense of hope and change. The President's introduction called attention to the greatness and potential of the international moment while it tied itself to the history of the American citizens continually improving the country.[57] These statements were delivered within the context of the on-going War on Terror and following "the most devastating recession. . . since the Great Depression."[58] The approach advocated for in this strategy are both important as a driving policy within President Obama's first term and for its implications on national security.

The 2010 *NSS* is portioned into four distinct sections. The strategy opens with an overview of the strategy and closes with a conclusion summarizing the entirety of the document. The second section provides the President Obama Administration's strategic approach, addressing the current state of the world and how the administration envisions it should be.[59] The section on "Advancing Our Interests" covers diverse topics including security, prosperity, values, and international order.[60] The logical development of this

[57] U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (*NSS*) (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 1-2.

[58] Ibid., 2.

[59] Ibid., 7-14.

[60] Ibid., 17-50.

policy is built upon a liberal internationalist framework and strongly focuses on broad domestic development, human rights initiatives, and engagement with foreign partners.

President Obama's election was greatly influenced by his plans for domestic policy. This emphasis is reflected throughout the 2010 *NSS* but is balanced to offset against disillusionment with international systems and engagement.[61] As a result, the strategic approach is based in domestic improvement—to engage with the international community from an advantageous footing.[62] The premise for this *NSS* is that domestic strength provides the means by which the U.S. perpetuates its values globally and underpins the financial support required to achieve foreign policy objectives. The domestic first theme resonates throughout the document despite President Obama's foreign policy requirements and intentions.

With a basis in domestic strength, the President Obama administration's foreign policy agenda starts with "pursuing comprehensive engagement."[63] While this engagement was focused on our, "closest partners and allies," it also extended to, "other 21st century centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia. . ."[64] The cooperation with major powers is limited for countries pursing conflicting goals on the international order by labeling them adversarial governments and providing them clear direction to operate within established norms. President Obama's tendency toward

[61] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2010, 1.

[62] Ibid., 9-12.

[63] Ibid., 11-2.

[64] Ibid., 11.

maintaining the international order and rule of law align with international liberalist tendencies. Additionally, diplomatic and development instruments are identified as major contributors to the initiative to improve security in Southeast Asia by building new and stronger partnerships.

The Indo-Pacific was not the point of emphasis for foreign affairs, despite all the major countries of influence listed in the document being located within the region. The President Obama administration's approach to developing partners is key to the substance relating to the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S.'s traditional partners, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, are all listed as the basis for the U.S. strategy regionally.[65] The strategy directs partnership development, but there is a clear tendency toward international security by maintaining and building military presence within the region. To that end, China's military modernization and reorganization is explicitly identified as an item for continued assessment by the U.S.[66] When coupled with the strategy's earlier comments concerning governments attempting to revise the international order, China can be identified as a potentially adversarial country.

In contrast to the suspicion towards China, India is identified as a potential ally of the highest importance in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. and India's similarities as the world's largest democratic states, both possessing significant economic power, makes their partnership of high value to the U.S.[67] The relationship identified within the 2010

[65] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2010, 42.

[66] Ibid., 43.

[67] Ibid.

NSS is comprehensive in nature, including, "global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation . . . poverty reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture."[68] To achieve such a broad and strategic partnership, a comprehensive interagency approach was required. Emphasis on this partnership, the eventual pivot to Asia, and continued emphasis on the rules based order provide continuity between the 2010 *NSS* and the 2015 *NSS*.

2015 National Security Strategy

President Barack Obama's 2012 re-election provided him an opportunity for continuity in pursuit of the national strategic objectives outlined in his 2010 *NSS*. The priorities his administration established in 2010 were brought into the 2015 *NSS* with little change.[69] The principles of international liberalism which underpinned the 2010 *NSS* continued to provide the foundation to the President Obama administration's approach to national security. President Obama's efforts to descope U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan poised his administration to break from the previous 15 years' emphasis on the Middle East.[70] The President Obama administration's desire to use this freedom to shift away from the wars of the President George W. Bush administration is present throughout the document. As a result, there is an increased emphasis placed on

[68] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2010, 43.

[69] U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (*NSS*) (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 2.

[70] Ibid., 3.

maintaining international order and the "Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific" throughout the 2015 *NSS*.[71]

The 2015 *NSS* argues that U.S. engagement with, and leadership of, the international community is fundamental to national security.[72] The leadership envisioned by the President Obama administration was intended to maintain, and refine where necessary, an international order based upon the rule of law.[73] Efforts to maintain this order are intended to be supported by like-minded countries and allies who also have a vested interest in the form of order established following the Second World War.

U.S. international leadership is explicitly intended to be conducted with an integrated approach utilizing all instruments of national power. Building from the 2010 *NSS*' decreasing emphasis on the military instrument as the primary element to achieve national objectives, the 2015 *NSS* takes a step further. Explicitly, the 2015 *NSS* explains "our first line of action is principled and clear-eyed diplomacy, combined with the central role of development in the forward defense and promotion of America's interests."[74] The primacy of diplomatic and development instruments is identified as are the inherent limitations of the military instrument to solve complex challenges short of conflict. This shift away from military primacy and toward a comprehensive diplomacy and development first approach is the outcome of continuity between the 2010 and 2015 *NSS*.

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[71] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2015, 24-5.

[72] Ibid., 3.

[73] Ibid., 1.

[74] Ibid., 4.

Use of these instruments also aligns with the policy's stated desire to, "lead with a long-term perspective."[75] Implicit in the shift in emphasis is an interest in comprehensive strategic solutions to address changing balance within the international order, instead of crisis response.

Integrating the diplomatic, development, and military instruments to achieve national security are described in the section titled "Building Capacity to Prevent Conflict."[76] The section describes challenges to international norms including Russia's invasion of the Ukraine, Chinese expansion in the South and East China Seas, and North Korean saber-rattling. The effort to prevent conflict is cast within the realm of international cooperation to address these issues and not as an U.S. unilateral effort.[77] U.S. capabilities are described as contributory to supporting international efforts on this front. The diplomatic instrument, backed by a powerful U.S. military, are capabilities intended to provide legitimacy to these international efforts. Implicit in this strategy an argument that conflict prevention and strengthening fair governance practices abroad undermine sources of stability which undermine national security.

Maintenance of international norms is a theme throughout the 2015 *NSS*, but territorial disputes and conflict over global commons are addressed specifically. Specifically, overlapping claims in Asia are identified as a point of concern with a recommendation for countries to use regional organizations as a forum to resolve these

[75] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2015, 5.

[76] Ibid., 10.

[77] Ibid., 10-1.

conflicts diplomatically.[78] In an effort to support the existing international rule of law, the strategy calls for the U.S. Congress to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This request is an example of continuity from the 2010 *NSS* and is more strongly worded with the inclusion of the term "failure" use to describe the lack of progress on this policy objective.[79] It also reflects a more assertive administration embarking on their second term in the White House with a perceived mandate from the U.S. people. Supporting international norms aligns with the Obama administration's foreign policy emphasis on the rules-based order, integration of national instruments of power, and the "Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific."[80]

A significant change to U.S. policy from the 2010 *NSS* is the inclusion of the "Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific." The emphasis on the region acknowledges U.S. national interests as a power with Pacific coastline and territories, economic growth, and the presence of strategic competitors within the region. The 2015 *NSS* prescribes a multifaceted approach requiring unified action to pursue U.S. interests in conjunction with partners and cooperating with competitors, where able. The basis for a comprehensive approach includes the military instrument's ability to contribute to

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[78] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2015, 13.

[79] The 2010 *NSS* lists ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a "key effort in the sea domain" to support commerce on page 50. The U.S. Congress still had not ratified UNCLOS by the release of the 2015 *NSS*. The rhetoric used on page 13 of the 2015 *NSS* for this topic changed to: "America's ability to press for the observance of established customary international law reflected in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea will be enhanced if the Senate provides its advice and consent—the ongoing failure to ratify this Treaty undermines our national interest in a rules-based international order." As of 2022, the U.S. is still not a signatory of UNCLOS.

[80] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2015, 24.

regional security and diplomatic and development instrument efforts to diversify relationships, strengthen democratic governance, and improve trade. Another area of continuity from the 2010 *NSS* is the acknowledgment of India's role in the area and U.S. interest to deepen their relationship with the rising democratic country. Comparatively, China's rise is treated as both an opportunity for cooperation and a challenge requiring modification to be realized within the structure of existing international norms. Even with these challenges, the strategy is quick to posit China's rise does not necessitate conflict.

2017 National Security Strategy

President Donald J. Trump was elected in 2016 with a promise to "Make American Great Again."[81] This promise was tied to several initiatives which emphasized economic and military strength. The 2017 *NSS* was released nearly a year after the President Trump administration entered office, December 2017, and provided strategic direction at the national level. This change included a significant shift in approach to foreign policy, described within the strategy as "America First."[82] The "America First" policy is combined with a shift in emphasis on instruments of national power throughout the document, leaning more heavily on military and economic strength. Broadly, the strategic approach is more closely aligned with realist international relations theory while maintaining many of the same strategic objectives of previous national security policy.

[81] U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (*NSS*) (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 1.

[82] Ibid.

The prioritization placed on each instrument of nation power can be inferred from the arrangement of the document, in addition to the verbiage of the policy itself. The document is organized into four pillars and a section on "The Strategy in a Regional Context."[83] The pillars include: 1) "Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life," 2) "Promote American Prosperity," 3) "Preserve Peace Through Strength," and 4) "Advance American Influence." To emphasize the shifting prioritization between instruments of power, there is a three page sub-chapter focused upon "Diplomacy and Statecraft," throughout the entirety of the 55-page document.[84]

The 2017 *NSS*'s pillar structure organizes the policy and provides the framework for the President Trump administration's national security strategy. The first pillar addresses a number of threats which cover a wide array of possibilities and concerns. These include items as diverse as weapons of mass destruction proliferation, border security, jihadist terrorism, transnational crime, and cyber security.[85] The second pillar focuses on economic, technological, and energy dominance in order to maintain and build U.S. advantages competitive advantages.[86] The third pillar, "Preserve Peace Through Strength" includes a number of areas in which the President Trump administration wishes to "renew capabilities" and "competitive advantages."[87] The vast majority of these

[83] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, V-VI.

[84] Ibid., VI.

[85] Ibid., 7-13.

[86] Ibid., 17-22.

[87] Ibid., 25-32.

capabilities which receive attention for renewal are related to the defense and intelligence instruments of power. Most importantly, the advantages sought are captured within the context of competition and increasing influence. These contexts are more enduring and inherently recognize global and regional persistent struggle with great powers including China and Russia.[88]

When compared to the number of renewal initiatives oriented on the military and economy, the diplomatic and development instruments are comparatively under-represented. The two-page section on "Diplomacy and Statecraft" provide some guidance for the employment of these two elements of national power.[89] When linked to earlier goals of partnership development and meeting other nation's where they are philosophically, the diplomatic instrument clearly has a role to play. Identified diplomatic efforts and areas for renewal are listed as "competitive diplomacy," "tools of economic diplomacy" and "information statecraft."[90] The President Trump administration's prioritization of this instrument of power is not only reflected in the brevity with which it is treated, but signaled as well with the comment that, [e]ffective diplomacy requires the efficient use of limited resources . . ."[91] This comment is instructive since it hints that the diplomatic instrument was unlikely to receive significantly increased funding during the administration.

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[88] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 26-7.

[89] Ibid., 33-5.

[90] Ibid., 33-5.

[91] Ibid., 33.

Within the strategy, an integrated approach combining the capabilities of all elements of national power to achieve a common goal is not a point of emphasis. An unified action approach is mentioned once in the introductory section of Pillar III.[92] With the exception of this one place, the relationship between the diplomatic and military instruments is identified when discussing renewing military capabilities. The strategy emphasizes a real politik theory that, "[o]vermatch strengthens our diplomacy and permits us to shape the international environment to protect our interests."[93] Further, the development instrument of national power is even more severely neglected throughout the document, reinforcing the lack of deliberate coordination intended between these instruments in pursuit of national security objectives.

National security priorities are addressed within a regional framework near the end of the policy. Of particular note, the Indo-Pacific is the first region listed, potentially signaling the importance the President Trump administration intended to place on the area.[94] The Indo-Pacific section identifies the regimes in China and North Korea as a challenge to stability within the region. The strategy calls for partnership with regional allies, seeking a coordinated effort to defend areas of mutual interest against these malign actors while leaving a door open to influence their behavior.[95] Expanding partnerships is briefly mentioned, specifically an initiative to, "increase quadrilateral cooperation with

[92] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 26.

[93] Ibid., 28.

[94] Ibid., 45-7.

[95] Ibid., 46.

Japan, Australia, and India."[96] The regional contest provided within this section is not a significant departure from previous national objectives within the region, but the explicit quadrilateral cooperation is important as a diplomatic and military effort.

Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy

The *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy* (NDS) is the unclassified summary developed for public review since the actual NDS is a classified document.[97] This product is developed to align the Department of Defense's efforts with the President Trump administration's 2017 *NSS*. Taking its lead from the parent 2017 *NSS*, the Summary of the 2018 NDS shares verbiage and conceptual strategic underpinnings. It confirms the Department's unclassified defense objectives, "strategic approach," and provides an overarching conclusion.[98] This iteration of the NDS was created under the leadership of then Secretary of Defense, James Mattis.

The Summary of the 2018 NDS demonstrates an understanding of the Department of Defenses' contribution to unified action. The document explicitly states their role in supporting other instruments of power, including the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, to increase U.S. competitiveness and address revisionist powers' coercive and subversive practices.[99] Another method for supporting

[96] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 46.

[97] Secretary of Defense (SecDef), *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (NDS) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), 1.

[98] Ibid., Table of Contents.

[99] SecDef, NDS, 5.

interagency cooperation is achieved through the NDS' talent management priorities which include, "fellowships, civilian education, and assignments that increase understanding of interagency decision-making processes. . ."[100] These policy choices expand upon an item only briefly addressed in the 2017 *NSS*, but aligns with the document's requirements to influence the international order and provide for enduring national security.

Another area of interagency cooperation listed in the Summary of the 2018 NDS is critical to achieving the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. The document acknowledges the role the Department of Defense plays in providing security and its contribution to strengthening alliances and partnerships within the region.[101] This military cooperation is intended to bolster the independence of countries throughout the area and deter the previously mentioned coercive and subversive actions of revisionist powers. This role is not independent of diplomatic and development initiatives as it contributes to a comprehensive security architecture to support U.S. interests.

Description of the National Military Strategy, 2018

The *Description of the National Military Strategy* is an unclassified overview of the classified *National Military Strategy*, 2018. This document was released to the public on July 12, 2019 by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford.[102] The document is meant to reflect the unclassified advice of the Chairman to

[100] Ibid., 8.

[101] Ibid., 9.

[102] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs (CJCS), "Description of the 2018 National Military Strategy Released," (Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the Joint Force. It was developed to support the President's 2017 *NSS* and the Secretary of Defense's 2018 NDS. The eight-page long document reiterates key elements from the Summary of the 2018 NDS's strategic environment, specifically identifying relevant security trends including the reemergence of great power competition.[103] Significantly, it also lists the importance of the military training to build capacity and interoperability with international and interagency partners, key components in senior strategies for success within the Indo-Pacific.

2020 United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability

The *United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability* (U.S. PC&PS) was developed to meet the requirements of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (GFA-19). This strategy is a statutory document compelled by the Global Fragility Act's requirement for a ten-year strategy.[104] The intent behind the strategy's ten-year scope is to prevent the diffusion of effort and decrease entanglement in open-ended commitments.[105] The strategy was developed under the President Donald J. Trump administration. The major executive agencies included in the document are the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International

July 12, 2019), https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/1903669/description-of-the-2018-national-military-strategy-released/.

[103] CJCS, "Description of the National Military Strategy," 2.

[104] U.S. Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and U.S. Department of the Treasury (DoT), *United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability* (Washington, DC: DoS, USAID, DoD, and DoT, 2020), 1.

[105] Ibid., 3.

Development. The document is structured by describing the strategic challenge, the approach and goals for the U.S. Government, how the strategy will be advanced, by outlining the integration of national tools and policy initiatives, and how performance will be measured.

The U.S. PC&PS's primary goal is to, "break the costly cycle of fragility and promote peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners."[106] The strategy describes the four major goals to be pursued in order to achieve this end state. These goals include prevention of violent conflict, stabilization of conflict, partnerships to create stability, and management practices to prioritize efforts.[107] The strategy acknowledges other countries may take predatory actions against fragile states to exploit them and advance their own interests.[108]

A significant component of this strategy is the inclusion of language that stresses accountability, prioritizing assistance to countries which directly affect America's interests, and the responsibility of countries to share the costs with the U.S. in their development. The strategy sets forth a requirement to identify and address key factors which contribute to a country's fragility.[109] Countries identified to receive support are to be prioritized based on their potential to threaten or positively contribute to U.S. interests. Additionally, the strategy describes the need for application of best practices to ensure

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[106] DoS et al., *United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability*, 1.

[107] Ibid., 7-10.

[108] Ibid., 4.

[109] Ibid., 6.

accountability within the supported country.[110] This approach is intended to be measured and contribute to those countries that are of most value to achieving the goals of the 2018 U.S. *National Security Strategy* (*NSS*-18).

Fundamental to the U.S. PC&PS is the identification of internally versus externally driven nation building. The strategy posits externally driven nation building as ineffective, negatively impacting the aided country's economy, facilitating corruption, and possibly undermining the intention to stem conflict.[111] There is a clear message that countries that are interested in receiving assistance must help themselves in this effort, creating their own solutions and investing in their own development. This aligns with the Trump administration's more transactional approach to international policy.

To address the complex problems presented by fragile states, the *Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability* calls for a whole-of-government approach. The intent is to leverage the expertise and capacities of the multiple departments and agencies to develop the assisted country. To support this strategy, the roles and responsibilities for the Department of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development are outlined within the document. The Department of State is listed as the lead agency for this effort, and it is responsible for executing this strategy as foreign policy.[112] The U.S. Agency for International Development is assigned the responsibility of "lead implementing agency for international development, disaster, and non-security

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[110] DoS et al., *United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability*, 14.

[111] Ibid., 5.

[112] Ibid., 11.

prevention and stabilization assistance."[113] The Department of Defense is to provide support in these efforts by preventing conflict and assist the other executive organizations. The capabilities identified which the Department of Defense are expected to provide include "civil affairs, psychological operations, Information operations engagements, institutional capacity-building, and security cooperation."[114]

The strategy, informed by the Global Fragility Act of 2019, outlines specific actions that must be taken to integrate the interagency effort. The first requirement is the establishment of a Global Fragility Act steering committee that will review actions supporting this strategy quarterly. The committee will operate under the National Security Council (NSC) and includes members of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of Management and Budget.[115] The steering committee will be informed by the "working-level secretariat" organized by the Department of State, providing updates "as needed."[116] Practical execution and coordination fall under the Chief of Mission's purview for the supported country, working laterally with representatives from the other agencies and combatant commands. This tiered approach aligns with Department of State's responsibility to lead the effort described in the strategy while providing budgetary oversight centralized at the National Security Council level.

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[113] DoS et al., *United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability*, 11.

[114] Ibid., 11-12.

[115] Ibid., 12.

[116] Ibid.

2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

The 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (*INSSG*) was released in March 2021.[117] This policy was one of the first significant international guidance documents released by the recently inaugurated President Joseph Biden administration. The title which includes the term "interim" leads the audience to believe that the policy was drafted prior to the administration taking office and intended for replacement by a follow-on National Security Strategy.

The 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* argues there is an immediacy for a changing international and domestic policy. The impetus for change is the acknowledgement of new challenges at a time described as an "inflection point."[118] The context driving the change is described as a philosophical struggle between democracy and authoritarian rule. Within the policy, President Biden's administration identifies three security priorities: 1) "to protect the security of the American people," 2) "an enduring interest in expanding economic prosperity and opportunity," and 3) "realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart o the American way of life."[119] To address this struggle, the strategy outlines a broad domestic and international approach requiring a whole-of-government effort to shift the perceived trend globally.

The 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* outlines the actions the President Biden administration views as requirements to achieve national security. These

[117] Biden, *INSSG*, 1.

[118] Ibid., 3.

[119] Ibid., 9.

fundamentals involve both domestic and foreign policy efforts. Domestically, the policy describes the requirement to build and defend at home.[120] Internationally, security efforts include "promoting a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries . . . ," and, "lead[ing] and sustain[ing] a stable and open international system . . ."[121] The three requirements listed are reflected throughout the document, demonstrating a strategic balance to strike between domestic and foreign priorities as with developing partnerships and deterring competitors.

To achieve these security priorities within a dynamic world, the 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* calls for greater engagement by the U.S. abroad.[122] The international emphasis is carried forward on the premise that democratic countries can work in coordination as allies and partners to combat rising authoritarian powers. Doubling down on this emphasis, the *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* states, ". . . one thing is certain: we will only succeed in advancing American interests and upholding our universal values by working in common cause with our closest allies and partners. . ."[123]

The 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* emphasis on international engagement is multi-faceted. Explicitly identified within the document is the primacy of the diplomatic instrument to achieving the U.S.' national interests. With, "[d]iplomacy as

[120] Biden, *INSSG*, 9.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Ibid., 6.

[123] Ibid., 3.

our first tool to contribute to our national interests," the Biden administration's approach to foreign policy is depicted as a fundamental shift when it states, "American cannot afford to be absent any longer on the world stage."[124] This engagement is presented for domestic audiences as how to provide security for the American people within an increasingly connected world.

The second major component of the strategy's diplomatic effort lies in international development. Developing strong, resilient democracies is in line with the Biden administration's stated interest in building partnerships between "like-minded allies and partners."[125] More resilient countries are expected to be less susceptible to the influences of "anti-democratic forces."[126] Two significant lines of effort supporting international development include investing in the economic development and strengthening the health systems of countries around the world.[127] Developmental efforts generally fall under the shared interest of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development.

The military instrument is also discussed throughout President Biden's 2021 *INSSG*. Beside the previously mentioned supporting role to diplomatic leadership, the military instrument is identified to require modernization to compete and deter today's

[124] Biden, *INSSG*, 13.

[125] Ibid., 19.

[126] Ibid., 7.

[127] Ibid., 4-6.

threats.[128] In congruence with the modernization effort, the strategic guidance explains the military's withdrawal from Middle Eastern conflicts.[129] The Strategic Guidance also sets conditions for the use of military force to defend vital national interests when aligned with a coherent strategy and appropriate resourcing.[130] This policy makes a deliberate and clear philosophical shift to disengage the military while preparing it for future conflict and competition globally.

In conjunction with the diplomatic instrument's leadership, as envisioned in this policy, the national security effort is described as an interagency effort. To achieve this vision, the administration prioritizes the balanced application of instruments that can be brought to bear: ". . . modernize[ing] our military capabilities, while leading first with diplomacy; and revitalize[ing] America's unmatched network of alliances and partnerships."[131] In order to realize interagency coordination, the national security budget is identified as requiring re-prioritization that emphasizes diplomacy and development "to avoid overreliance on the U.S. military to carry out tasks and missions better suited to others . . ."[132] Shifting budgetary priorities with the intent to fully empower all instruments of national power is intended to increase national security in the changing competition environment.

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[128] Biden, *INSSG*, 14.

[129] Ibid., 11.

[130] Ibid., 14.

[131] Ibid., 3.

[132] Ibid., 22.

The 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* does identify specific countries that pose a threat to the U.S. Three of these countries are operate from the Indo-Pacific area: China, Russia, and North Korea.[133] These countries clearly serve as competitors to gauge U.S. national security readiness against. The primary competitor is China, and they are singled out as "the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system."[134] The policy urges that despite strategically competing with China, the U.S. will still cooperate on areas of mutual interest while advancing the American international agenda alongside its partners.[135] Naming key competitors, both regional and global, serves to identify geographic areas of emphasis, even if the Indo-Pacific is not named as the priority theater within this policy.

U.S Agency for International Development Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense

The U.S. Agency for International Development is the U.S. Government's lead agency for the conduct of international development programs and humanitarian assistance.[136] Generally, U.S. Agency for International Development is the primary implement for the development instrument of national power. The Agency is present

[133] Biden, *INSSG*, 8.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid., 20.

[136] U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "Mission, Vision and Values," last updated February 16, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values.

throughout the world in developing countries and contributing to U.S. foreign policy objectives by promoting stability abroad and democratic governance.[137] U.S. Agency for International Development is noted for their focus on missions conducted by country. Despite the conduct of their mission by country, they do contribute some national strategic-level policies and Joint Regional Strategies with the Department of State.

The 2015 *USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense* (PC/DoD), "updates the Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy issued in July 2008."[138] The policy was developed with input from the Departments of Defense and State, making the document more well rounded and inclusive in its message. Explicitly, the then Acting Administrator for U.S. Agency for International Development, Alfonso E. Lenhardt, identified this policy as providing, "a new way of doing business."[139] He also recognized the relationship that had been built with the Department of Defense to support the development efforts which contribute to national security. The policy is structured in four chapters, outlining the purpose of the policy, the policy statement itself, and providing guiding and operating principles for cooperation with the Department of Defense.[140] The policy's scope begins quite broadly, explaining what the prior policy was, what has changed in the level of operations conducted jointly with the Department of Defense, and how the two can more effectively support foreign policy goals. It should also be noted,

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[137] USAID, "Mission, Vision and Values."

[138] U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: USAID, June 2015), 1.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid., 1-9.

this policy is a departure from a more aloof stance toward cooperation with the military instrument and potentially a recognition of the funding and increasing role the military plays in the conduct of foreign policy since September 11, 2001.

The USAID PC/DoD is intended to be directive to members of U.S. Agency for International Development and codify guidance for cooperation with the Department of Defense based on recent lessons learned.[141] The recent learning throughout cooperation with the Department of Defense and the role of U.S. Agency for International Development to coordinate with non-governmental organizations places it between parties that do not always choose to work well together. In that way, U.S. Agency for International Development has an interest as an integrator to support foreign policy, which is reflected in the guiding principles of this policy. The guiding principles provided are: 1) "Mutual understanding of each other's roles and responsibilities is the basis for USAID DoD cooperation," 2) "USAID will apply selectivity and focus to its engagement with DoD," 3) "Cooperation with DoD occurs in different degrees depending on context," and 4) :USAID may serve as a liaison between DoD and USAID's implementing partners.[142] There is a clear tension in these guiding principles between the U.S. Agency for International Development's role as development instrument lead, lack of detailed coordination on projects involving the Department of Defense previously, and the involvement of organizations that may not wish to coordinate directly with the military.

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[141] USAID, *USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense*, 1-2.

[142] Ibid., 3-4.

The next chapter of the USAID PC/DoD describes where and how the Agency will improve their cooperation efforts. The policy provides a multi-tiered approach to integration with the Department of Defense, placing liaisons in the Pentagon, Combatant Commands, and with individual Services.[143] Specifically, U.S. INDOPACOM, then known as U.S PACOM, was identified to receive four members to coordinate efforts in Hawaii: Senior Development Advisor, Deputy Development Advisor, two Humanitarian Assistance Advisors, and a Liaison Officer to the Combatant Command serving in Washington, D.C. These liaisons are intended to improve communication, conduct strategy development, conduct combined planning, contribute to crisis planning, and provide methods to measure effectiveness in their bilateral efforts.[144]

Overall, this policy provides members of the U.S. Agency for International Development with guidance and structure with which to support foreign policy efforts in partnership with the Department of Defense. The liaisons and guiding principles provide methods to improve coordination between these two different cultures. Additionally, this policy acknowledges the breadth of environments in which the Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development must synchronize their efforts, in fragile, crisis, and conflict states.[145] The USAID PC/DoD recognizes the unique advantages both organizations bring to support national security and it attempts to leverage both to contribute more to the U.S.'s foreign policy efforts.

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[143] USAID, *USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense*, 6.

[144] Ibid., 7-8.

[145] Ibid., 9.

Department of State Policy

"The U.S. Department of State is the leading U.S. foreign affairs agency. . .," and represents American interests abroad.[146] The Department is responsible for the foreign relations and policies as a department in the U.S. government's executive branch. The Department of State develops policies to achieve national objectives in alignment with executive policies, such as the *National Security Strategy* or 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. They create both national policy and regional policy to support assigned national security objectives. The policies they develop can be created independently or with the assistance of another agency. An example of bilateral regional policy development include the following Joint Regional Strategies developed with the U.S. Agency for International Development. While the two organizations do not share common organizational structure for regional bureaus, their overlapping interests are codified in these Joint Regional Strategies.

The State Department is organized into geographic and functional bureaus to achieve national objectives.[147] The geographic bureaus focused on throughout this study are the East Asia and Pacific Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs. The Department of State coordinates and directs the efforts of these bureaus by developing national strategies which guide the development of subordinate bureau strategy. These

[146] U.S. Department of State (DoS), *U.S. Department of State Student Internship Program* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Human Resources, September 2014), 2.

[147] U.S. Department of State (DoS), "Countries and Areas List," April 2021, https://www.state.gov/countries-and-areas-list/.

strategies are developed to create cohesion within the region and guide strategy development by subordinate country teams.

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision

During President Donald J. Trump's administration, Secretary Michael Pompeo led the Department of State. His tenure covered a period where national emphasis shifted to the Indo-Pacific. The State Department developed policy to inform this shift, including "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision." This policy is unclassified, released on 4 November 2019, and was signed by then Secretary of State, Michael R. Pompeo.[148] The 2019 strategy built upon the 2017 Indo-Pacific strategy, updating programs implemented since the previous strategy's release. A *Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision* (FOIP) asserted the U.S. as a traditional Indo-Pacific state that is engaged throughout the region and interested in addressing challenges to regional order.[149] The 2019 version's structure demonstrated an appreciation for the whole-of-government approach, as demonstrated in the strategy's three pillars. [150]

This strategy expressed a vision for the Indo-Pacific and to emphasize America's engagement throughout the region. It focused on three pillars to achieving the concept: economics, governance, and security. These three pillars are expressed through a whole-of-government approach that describes efforts underway by the Departments of

[148] U.S. Department of State (DoS), *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision* (Washington, DC: DoS, November 2019), 1-4.

[149] Ibid., 5.

[150] Ibid., 30.

Commerce, Treasury, and Defense. The organizational structure is worth noting due to its similarity to the 2017 *NSS* and is likely deliberate to emphasize the Department's intent to nest with the senior policy document. The free and open concept was underpinned by economic growth throughout the Indo-Pacific region. A foundational factor to this growth, as agued in the strategy, is the rules-based order facilitating fair competition practices, access to resources, and trade.[151] Economic integration and fair competition are stressed throughout the strategy and supported by data on the volume of trade, aid, and foreign investment the U.S. conducts in the Indo-Pacific.

This strategy provides the Department of State's bureaus the framework of "competition" to inform their efforts within their respective region.[152] The term "competition" is distinct from "conflict" and identifies a balance to strike when addressing Chinese influence in the region. The competition framework allows flexibility for regional partners since competition is beneficial to multiple parties and does not require countries in the region to choose between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China. This concept also defines the interest of the U.S., enables dialogue with likeminded nations, and allows for cooperation with countries unwilling to align with either the U.S. or the People's Republic of China.

The strategy emphasizes the importance of alliances and partnerships to competition and providing security.[153] Security arrangements with Japan, Australia,

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[151] DoS, *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, 7.

[152] Ibid., 5.

[153] Ibid., 6-12.

Philippines, and Thailand are included as existing structures that provide a framework for the free and open Indo-Pacific.[154] The security pillar includes information sharing and partner military interoperability development as key items for deterring coercive action. These efforts align with the U.S.'s efforts to maintain or increase engagement to build partnerships and deter adversaries from undermining the global rules-based order. Attainment of these objectives inherently requires cooperation with the Department of Defense, especially in the conduct of Theater Security Cooperation and intelligence sharing with partner militaries.

Partnership and cooperation on maritime security is outlined throughout the strategy and is linked to the three pillars. Naval exercises with India, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states are highlighted.[155] While bilateral and multilateral naval exercises are not as overt as traditional land-based partnership exercises, these events increase partner capacity and common understanding which support potential coalition operations within the region. For naval exercises to support public diplomacy efforts, they must be synchronized with the information instrument to maximize their visibility, when desired. Additionally, maritime law enforcement and counter-piracy operations with Southeast Asian partners are demonstrated as areas of cooperation that contribute to the sovereignty, economic development, and security of countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

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[154] DoS, *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, 8.

[155] Ibid., 22-4.

Increased diplomatic outreach to India is identified as contributing to all three of the strategy's pillars and increased partnership.[156] Bilateral training and on-going peace keeping operations in Africa provide examples for this partnership. Areas of security growth within India include maritime security, cybersecurity, and additional multinational training opportunities. India's status as an emerging, democratic state possessing vast economic, military, and human capital potential make it a major power of interest in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.

Joint Regional Strategy: East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau

The Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs is a subordinate organization within the Department of State. The Bureau is headed by an Assistant Secretary, currently Daniel Kritenbrink. The bureau is responsible for the relations between the United States and the countries listed in Appendix C. The Bureau conducts actions both internal to the Department of State and externally with the states within its region. Internally, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs advises the Secretary of State and Under Secretary for Political Affairs about the East Asia and Pacific region.[157] Externally, the bureaus coordinate and integrate regional policy while ambassadors and chiefs of mission conduct foreign policy and U.S. relations with their host country.

The Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, in partnership with the United States Agency for International Development, produce a Joint Regional Strategy. This

[156] DoS, *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, 8-9.

[157] DoS, *U.S. Department of State Student Internship Program*, 25.

document is an unclassified product for public release. The most recently released Joint Regional Strategy was approved on 20 November 2018. The document provides an executive summary, bureau strategic framework, goals and objectives within the region, and management objectives and goals. Of note, this document was developed and released during the President Trump administration and was designed to achieve the foreign policy objectives of his administration. An updated Joint Regional Strategy for public release has not been produced since the President Biden administration took office.

The Joint Regional Strategy's fundamentals are based on the long-standing policy of the free and open Indo-Pacific.[158] The strategy was developed to contribute to the Department of State's national security efforts, aligned with the National Security Strategy. Additionally, it is to be "consistent" with the Indo-Pacific strategy and the departmental joint strategies for the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. The deliberate alignment with enduring strategy and demonstrated interagency cooperation between the two national security organizations demonstrate the foundations for unified action, albeit without the military instrument's explicit input.

The *Joint Regional Strategy for East Asia and Pacific* includes three priorities that the State Department and United States Agency for International Development share. The priorities listed are "[1] addressing with regional partners the Democratic People's

[158] U.S. Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Joint Regional Strategy: East Asia and the Pacific* (JRS EAP) (Washington, DC: DoS and USAID, November 2018), 3.

Republic of Korea's unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile program; [2] addressing China's direct challenge to an international order by reinforcing rules-based norms, emphasizing sovereignty, human rights, and non-threatening interaction; and [3] assisting partner countries on their journey to self-reliance."[159] This assistance also contributes to partnership development, stressed as a national security strategic way throughout U.S. policy. The strategy describes a whole-of-government approach to achieve these goals through diplomatic efforts, economic cooperation, and military security assistance.

Within this strategy, there are specific requirements for Department of State and Department of Defense cooperation. The strategy discusses preventing coercion within the region to promote the free and open Indo-Pacific. Areas of common interest include theater security cooperation, freedom of navigation and flight, and deterrence to enable diplomatic and development efforts. To this end, the strategy is explicitly developed to nest within other policies of the United States to pursue the free and open Indo-Pacific initiative. The concept of competition with China is addressed within the strategy's second goal. The strategy identifies strengthened alliances and partnerships with an emphasis on security within the region to address Chinese influence. Specific countries listed for improved alliances with established partners, but also includes India as a security partner which is located within the Bureau of South and Central Asia's boundaries.

There is also an objective to deter China and shape their future actions which could include integration with the Department of Defense. In this case, deterrence is

[159] DoS and USAID, JRS EAP, 3.

intended to address ambiguously identified "problematic behavior."[160] The third goal of the strategy, security, also identifies an objective to increase the capability and interoperability of regional partners. While the objective does not require interoperability with the United States, the previously mentioned integration of this strategy with other United States Government policies leaves the opportunity for Department of Defense integration.

Joint Regional Strategy: South and Central Asian Affairs

The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs is a subordinate organization within the Department of State. The Bureau is headed by an Assistant Secretary, currently Donald Lu. The bureau is responsible for the relations between the U.S. and the countries listed in Appendix C. The Bureau conducts actions both internal to the Department of State and externally with the states within its region. The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs performs similar functions and responsibilities as the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau. In that capacity, The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, in partnership with the United States Agency for International Development, produce a Joint Regional Strategy. The most recently released Joint Regional Strategy was approved on 27 February 2019. The document provides an executive summary, bureau strategic framework, goals and objectives within the region, and management objectives and goals. Of note, this document was also developed and released during the President Trump administration and was designed to achieve the foreign policy

[160] DoS and USAID, JRS EAP, 5.

objectives of his administration. An updated Joint Regional Strategy for public release has not been produced since the President Biden administration took office.

The Joint Regional Strategy reflects the on-going involvement of the U.S. within Afghanistan and the global war on terror, at the time of publishing.[161] The strategy was developed to contribute to the Department of State's efforts to enhance security in Afghanistan and throughout South Asia The prioritization of efforts to align with Operation Enduring Freedom are an example of both the requirements that delayed President Barrack Obama's shift to the Indo-Pacific, but also demonstrates how outdated policies do not represent the changing strategic environment.. Specifically, this strategy was developed to nest with U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs and Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The *Joint Regional Strategy for South and Central Asia* includes five goals that the State Department and United States Agency for International Development share. The priorities include stability, security, and freedom of navigation for countries of the region, economic growth, transparent democratic governance, political settlement of conflicts to include denying safehaven for terrorists, and India's growth as a global power.[162] The strategy describes a role for the United State military to contribute to security cooperation and counter terrorist activities through cooperation with countries in the region.

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[161] U.S. Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Joint Regional Strategy: South and Central Asia* (JRS SCA) (Washington, DC: DoS and USAID, February 2019), 3.

[162] Ibid.

India is the main area of overlap with the rest of this study. Building security cooperation with India is listed in both the East Asia and Pacific Bureau's Joint Regional Strategy as well as in the South and Central Asia Bureau's product. Additionally, the South and Central Asia Bureau's strategy references the Indo-Pacific Strategy as a policy considered to inform integration with India to further trade, freedom of navigation, and international norms.[163] The priority placed on developing partnership with India is reflected by policies developed under the diplomatic, military, and development instruments of national power. The overlap demonstrated in policies from across the national security enterprise are a sign of strategic alignment.

India's emergence as an American partner is the fifth goal listed in the Joint Regional Strategy. Included within this goal is an objective to increase integration of the United States in the areas of security cooperation and defense within the Indo-Pacific region. While the Department of Defense is not explicitly stated as conducting security cooperation with India in this strategy, increased defense efforts with India provide an opportunity for Department of Defense further integration. Military exercises between the Department of Defense and India as a major defense partner are highlighted as past efforts to support this objective.

Department of Defense: Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

The Department of Defense's *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region* is an unclassified reported. The document was signed on 1 June 2019 by then-Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M.

[163] DoS and USAID, JRS SCA, 5.

Shanahan. The report was informed by strategies like the 2017 *National Security Strategy* and 2018 *National Military Strategy*, developed during the President Trump administration.

The report consists of an introduction that outlines America's standing as a natural member of the Indo-Pacific and how the fundamentals of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. It describes trends identified within senior strategic documents including the four major challenges: a revisionist People's Republic of China, a malign Russia, a rogue Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, and transnational challenges.[164] United States national interests in the region and defense strategy are reviewed. A trio of lines of effort are listed that are intended to contribute to the United States' influence in the region.[165] Finally, a conclusion is provided that ties together the Indo-Pacific Strategy with its alignment to guiding documents, national interests, and the interests of our international partners.

The basis for the Indo-Pacific strategy is supporting United States' interests in the region as an inherent member of the Indo-Pacific community. The strategy identifies American history in the region and the requirement for continued American engagement to support our security and prosperity.[166] Our prosperity in the region is identified to be based on international norms for the conduct of trade, open commerce, and freedom of

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[164] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region* (ISPR) (Washington, DC: DoD, 2019), 7-14.

[165] Ibid., 17-52.

[166] Ibid., 1-3.

navigation throughout the global commons of air, land, sea, cyberspace, and space. Prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific is argued to be based upon American influence that pursued partnerships instead of domination in the region and stability to facilitate economic development.[167]

The vision behind the strategy is the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)," expressed in the Department of State's policy by the same name.[168] The components of free and open are both defined in this document and are tied to the ability of countries to "exercise their sovereignty free from coercion by other countries" and having access to the global commons described above, respectively.[169] This concept is described as a whole-of-government security endeavor, linking domestic economic, leadership, and security standards comprehensively with the international norms that have underpinned global order in the past century.

The report attempts to describe the nature of actions taken by the People's Republic of China and why they do not align with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. The argument that the People's Republic of China does not follow these international standards is intended to delineate between their actions and those of the United States and that these actions are not in the interests of other countries in the region. Violations described include suppression of Muslims in Xinjiang, cyber theft, coercion, militarization of disputed territories, and military demonstrations against

[167] DoD, ISPR, 3.

[168] DoS, *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific*.

[169] DoD, ISPR, 4-6.

Taiwan. The report identifies coercive actions by China in the region across all instruments of national power to include emphasis on economic actions which disadvantage other countries for Chinese gain.[170]

The Strategy Report attempts to demonstrate the Indo-Pacific strategy's alignment with both the 2017 *National Security Strategy* and the 2018 *National Defense Strategy.* Building on the identified importance placed on the Indo-Pacific, the review of the 2017 National Security Strategy is summarized with listing the four enduring national interests: protecting the American people, promoting American prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence.[171] The strategy report provides the guidance the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* directs: defending the homeland, remaining the preeminent military power in the world, ensuring the balances of power in key regions remain in our favor, and advancing an international order that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.[172] The Strategy Report argues that the Department of Defense is supporting these aims in the Indio-Pacific region by adapting the force and increasing partnership cooperation.

Summary

This chapter reviewed and examined the breadth of national and theater strategic policy documents. National strategic documents were reviewed first to identify the strategic ends and ways which were intended to support national security. The regional

[170] DoD, ISPR, 7-10.

[171] Ibid., 15.

[172] Ibid., 16.

strategies followed to provide a logical progression and facilitate the reader's understanding of the context in which they were developed and facilitate analysis for misalignment or gaps, where they occur. Country strategies developed by individual embassies and U.S. Agency for International Development were not reviewed due to the volume of policies and a desire to maintain the researcher's focus on the Indo-Pacific region wholistically.

The policies reviewed above, when combined with the literature review in chapter two, provide the basis for analysis of expressed national security intent, how it has evolved, and where it is now. These reviews provide context for what gaps or misalignments exist within the U.S. national security strategy and how they developed. Major trends that emerge include an emphasis on the People's Republic of China evolving into an identified security threat, a desire to maintain the existing international order, cooperation with partners to maintain the rules-based order, and the inherent interests the U.S. has within the Indo-Pacific. These policies express priorities which can be compared to resourcing and the execution of national security policy, facilitating further analysis into misalignment of resources compared to the espoused strategy.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

> If you seek ends beyond your means, then sooner or later you'll have to scale back your ends to fit your means. Expanding means may attain more ends, but not all because ends can be infinite and means never can be. Whatever balance you strike, there'll be a link between what's real and what's imagined: between your current location and your intended destination. You won't have a strategy until you've connected these dots—dissimilar though they are—within the situation in which you're operating.
>
> —John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy*

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the instruments of national power for alignment in the Indo-Pacific. The intent is to identify what gaps or shortfalls exist, what their possible origins are, and provide preliminary solutions. The analysis will emphasize policy, organization, resourcing, and integration mechanisms intended to synchronize national and interagency cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This analysis is structured in two parts. The first part addresses the strategies identified in the security policy documents reviewed in the previous chapter. This portion is intended to be the principal section concerned with the researcher's Secondary Research Question 1. The second part will analyze departmental and agency organization, staffing, and resourcing. This portion will explore the remaining secondary research questions. Both parts explore the current balance between the stated U.S. ends, the means currently available, and the strategies, reviewed in Chapter 3, developed to connect them.

The first part focuses on the overall strategy employed by the U.S. between 2010 and 2021. Under the direction of each presidential administration's *NSS* (or *INSSG*), the previously reviewed subordinate policies will be assessed for gaps or misalignment.

Analysis on the national security policies over time will be shown to directly inform the structure and content of subordinate security documents from the Departments of Defense, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The analysis will be directly informed by the limited literature available on integration in the Indo-Pacific specifically and more broadly on national security works. The first portion will assess the effects evolving policy has on the alignment of the instruments of national power. It will use the ends, ways, and means and Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Development frameworks. Utilizing these structures and comparing their implementation throughout recent administrations' security strategies will provide insight into where gaps of alignment were created. The premise being adjusting the primacy provided to a particular instrument creates a requirement to shift subordinate policies and focal points.

The first part of this chapter will also include the historical context in which each national security document was developed. National security policy is developed within the world as it is perceived at the time, not independent of it. With this in mind, it is critical to briefly summarize significant political and environmental factors which were likely to inform the development of each administration's respective national security policy. It must be noted, this analysis is conducted at a time very closely following the development of these policies. This is important since many primary documents and sources are unavailable to definitively state the exact logic leading to a policy decision and those that may exist are likely to be sensitive or still classified. While this approach will not rigorously examine each significant factor, the attempt to contextualize these

documents is intended to facilitate the reader's understanding on why particular policy items were emphasized when they were produced.

The second part will analyze the effects of departmental and agency organization, staffing, and resourcing on their ability to achieve unity of effort. The organization of each department or agency establishes a perspective from which they approach the conduct of national security. By identifying areas where there are overlaps, gaps, and misalignment due to organizational perspective contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the difficulties faced institutionally in accomplishing the U.S. National Security Strategy. Another key factor allowing an organization to accomplish its national security responsibility is its staffing. Prioritization within the national security structure should lead to prioritization for staffing and resources. This chapter will analyze the staffing and resourcing within the agencies relative to their prioritization according to national policy

The literature review sampled strategic thought on the Indo-Pacific and interagency cooperation. Since the topic of this research thesis is contemporary, a wealth of published works directly treating the integration of instruments of power in this region is not immediately available. Other literature sources reviewed included books and papers concerning integration of the national instruments of power more generally. These publications were developed with a focus on the contemporary period. Works on this topic are either so current that they are likely in development or are missing key information due to the sensitive or classified nature of the topic. The primary influences for this portion of the literature review informed contextualization of integration and structural organization designed to achieve unified action.

Research Questions

Primary Question: Are there gaps in alignment between the Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development that could affect addressing the challenge of great power competition with China at the operational level through unified action for the next five years in the Indo-Pacific region?

Secondary Question 1: What is the intended relationship between the diplomatic, military, and development instruments in the Indo-Pacific region?

Secondary Question 2: What are the likely effects on unified action due to differing organizational structures in the Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development within the Indo-Pacific region?

Secondary Question 3: What are the likely sources of misalignment between the actors, if misalignment is identified?

Secondary Question 4: What literature exists concerning gaps in Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development policy objectives and processes? In other words, what other literature addresses the researcher's primary research question?



Figure 3. Chapter 4 Structure

Source: Created by author.

Part I: Strategy

Balancing potentially infinite ends against necessarily finite means is fundamental to strategy development.[173] A method used to assess strategy is the ends, ways, and means framework. This conceptual framework is formed to demonstrate the intended outcomes through a particular process using the available instruments or available resources. The current alignment of ends, ways, and means contributes to identifying a source to gaps in alignment between the instruments of national power. Simply, the intended goal is to identify what serves the national interest, how to pursue that reality, and utilizing the correct assets to achieve it. This is easily said, but the complexity of

[173] John L. Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2018), 21.

issues and finite resources combine with evolving desired ends to create an ever-changing strategic environment. Within this environment, actions and decisions are constantly made in response to conceptions of decision-makers within the environment.[174] The complexity of this reality reflects John Boyd's theory of "Destruction and Creation" for "improve[ing] their capacity for independent action."[175]

Figure 4. Policy Hierarchy: National and Theater Strategic

Source: Created by author.

[174] John R. Boyd, "Destruction and Creation," In *A Discourse on Winning and Losing*, ed. Dr. Grant T. Hammond (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2018), 2.

[175] Ibid., 8.

When we discuss means at the national strategic level, we are referring to the instruments of national power. The means available to the U.S. are described in several constructs. The most common is the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) structure.[176] A more comprehensive model includes financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (FIL) instruments to the original DIME to make DIMEFIL. Finally, an exhaustive list may include the Development instrument to create DIMEFILD. The instruments in DIMEFILD are not necessarily cleanly aligned to a specific department or agency due to overlapping capabilities, but within the diplomatic, military, and development instruments the State, Defense, and Agency for International Development are primary in each instrument, respectively. The instruments this paper is most concerned with have been primarily the diplomatic, military, and developmental instruments.

President Obama introduced several initiatives which underpin current policies and actions throughout the U.S. government. These include adding increased emphasis to the diplomatic and development instruments. Between his 2010 *NSS* and 2015, focus began to shift from the military being the primary instrument of national power to a more diplomatic and development led effort. Following increased China's increased coercion during territorial disputes with neighbors, including a U.S. ally in the Philippines, the Obama administration

Regardless of his desired goals for foreign policy, President Obama's first term was never to be focused on a foreign policy initiative of his choosing. He inherited the

[176] The Marine Corps War College, *Strategy Primer*, 48-49.

conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and with violent extremist organizations. Despite the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq in 2011, new developments continued to drive national security toward these conflict regions, as it had for the previous decade.[177] Ending the surge and draw-down in Afghanistan, Arab Spring, Egyptian civil war, Syrian civil war, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and the Libyan civil war continued to draw U.S. military, diplomatic, and development interest. All of these foreign policy issues were in addition to the domestic economic recovery following the 2008 financial crisis which diverted interest and resources from foreign policy efforts.

The conflicts in the Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa, and against transnational violent extremism diffused Obama's attempted "Pivot to Asia." The pivot was announced in 2011, not long after the 2010 *NSS* expressed a desire to "deepen cooperation with our 21st century centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia – on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect."[178] Each of these countries reside in the Indo-Pacific region and are considered significant regional, if not global actors, today. The myriad conflicts and uncertainty which occurred during President Obama's administrations caused concern for the "Pivot to Asia" policy, even at the

[177] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2010, excerpt: "Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented." U.S. President, *NSS*, 2015, 4, excerpt: ". . . our first line of action is principled and clear-eyed diplomacy, combined with the central role of development in the forward defense and promotion of America's interests."

[178] Kenneth G. Liberthal, "The American Pivot to Asia," Brookings, December 21, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/; U.S. President, *NSS*, 2010, 10.

time.[179] Despite these concerns, the basis for the policy, a U.S. emphasis toward the Indo-Pacific and away from the Middle East, North Africa, and Afghanistan, was established and carried forward in varying capacity during the following two presidential administrations.

Despite the renewed interest on the Indo-Pacific and competition, several policies and much of the rhetoric associated to partnership and multilateral defense during the President Trump administration brought into question U.S. interest to lead globally.[180] One of the most immediate and significant breaks from international leadership in the Indo-Pacific occurred with the U.S. withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).[181] While Japan emerged to salvage the TPP in the form of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), this early signal during the President Trump administration sent clear signals that U.S. policy and involvement in the Indo-Pacific was going to deviate from the previous administration. While the nationalistic rhetoric within the 2017 *NSS* can be dismissed, it is argued that the

[179] Richard C. Bush, "The Response of China's Neighbors to the U.S. 'Pivot' to Asia," Brookings, January 31, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-response-of-chinas-neighbors-to-the-u-s-pivot-to-asia/

[180] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 1, 11. This rhetoric included, "America First" and "Unfair burden-sharing with our allies. . ." which can be perceived differently between domestic and international audiences.

[181] Mireya Solis and Jennifer Mason, "As the TPP Lives on, the U.S. Abdicates Trade Leadership," Brookings, March 9, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/09/as-the-tpp-lives-on-the-u-s-abdicates-trade-leadership/.

messaging and binary choice between Beijing and the U.S. is, "likely to be self-defeating for U.S. interests [in Southeast Asia]."[182]

Another significant policy shift was signaled in the "Preserve Peace Through Strength" pillar of the 2017 *NSS*. In this chapter of the *NSS*, prior engagement theory with regard to China was upended, and a more direct and aggressive tone was taken. Despite the pointed rhetoric, there was diplomatic balance by preserving an open door, "to cooperate across areas of mutual interest with both countries [China and Russia]."[183] This pillar in the strategy also emphasized integrating the instruments of national power, but with an emphasis on strengthening the military through budgeting, procurement, and force size.[184] Elements of previous strategy, including cooperation with China when interest align and a whole-of-government approach, existed within the 2017 *NSS*.

Despite the rhetoric, there were a number of policies released during the President Trump administration that did not deviate from previous administration's stance toward engagement in the Indo-Pacific substantively. The foremost example of continuity is *Free and Open Indo-Pacific* policy, which maintained remarkable similarities with the President Obama administration's "Asia Pivot" and 2015 *NSS* for building partnerships to address disruption to the international order.[185] Other areas that remained consistent to

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[182] Jonathan Stromseth, *Don't Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of U.S.-China Rivalry* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 2019), 17.

[183] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 25.

[184] Ibid., 27.

[185] Lindsey W. Ford, "The Trump adminstration and the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific'," Brookings, May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-trump-administration-and-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.

U.S. Indo-Pacific policy norms included a desire to strengthen partnership with India and adherence to the "One China" policy.[186] The continuities in multinational cooperation and international liberalism may not have been driven from the top down, as can be inferred from then Secretary of Defense James Mattis' letter of resignation.[187] Regardless of the cause, organizational momentum appears to have prevented wholistic change to strategy during the course of a single Presidential term.

A particular misalignment in policy in comparison to the 2017 *NSS* was present in the 2018 East Asia and Pacific Bureau's Joint Regional Strategy. This policy identifies the top strategic goal in the region to be placing, "Increased political and economic pressure on North Korea to persuade it to abandon its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs."[188] While the North Korean nuclear program did become a significant foreign policy item for the President Trump administration, the political "priority actions" listed in the 2017 *NSS* were to, "redouble our commitment to established alliances and partnerships," and, "reinforce[ing] our commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with maritime law."[189] The difference between policies may be linked to the timing when policies were released or related to shifting emphasis within the President Trump administration aligning to negotiations with North Korea after the 2017 *NSS* was released.

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[186] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 47.

[187] Jim Mattis and Bing West, *Call Sign CHAOS: Learning to Lead* (New York, NY: Random House, 2019), 246-7.

[188] DoS and USAID, JRS EAP, 5.

[189] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 46.

While rhetorical emphasis shift also occurred with the President Biden administration's 2021 *INSSG*, key policy points dealing with the Indo-Pacific did not. The document returns to many international liberalist tendencies reflected in the 2010 and 2015 President Obama administration *NSS* documents.

President Biden's 2021 *INSSG* did break from the Obama administration's positions in a number of key areas. First and foremost, as it applies to interagency alignment, President Biden announced the diplomatic instrument as the primary instrument for national security.[190] Within the context of great power competition, this signaled the administration's desire to compete peacefully and with open dialogue. It also aligned with the goal of reinforcing international norms against coercion and the importance of partnership building. While President Obama's call for, "Senate. . . advice and consent,"[191] to the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea treaty is no longer included in the Biden administration's policies, the principles of support for international law and partnership networks for like-minded states align with international liberalism.

Assessing the Department of Defense's actions to realign and reorient to competition is very difficult. The Department is not monolithic, the pace of change is not regular or uniform. The smallest military service by size, the United States Marine Corps, started early on this realignment. In December 2020, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

[190] Biden, *INSSG*, 3.

[191] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2015, 13.

General David H. Berger signed Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-4, *Competing*.[192] The document outlines how the Marine Corps sees itself in competition and how its efforts must align with national strategy to enhance national security. This includes an emphasis on the Marine Corps' role in deterrence, compellence, and partner-building. While Marine Corps doctrine is written based on principles which are not intended to shift with policies and administrations, the timing of this publication's release likely demonstrates an understanding within the Service that a shift in national instrument primacy is occurring.

Using the ends, ways, and means frame, the national strategic ends for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific can be assessed as consistent and conceptual. General principles including maintaining international norms and a rules-based order are regularly espoused in policy documents, regardless of administration. Other identifiable trends include increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific region and the desire to modify the behaviors of a rising China. The gradual shift toward framing relations with the PRC as competition is a strategic way, but mostly provides a new name to a method of engagement with China that has been consistent since the opening in 1972.

Continuing with the ends, ways, and means framework, we can identify the ways the U.S. has approached national security within the context of the Indo-Pacific. Every administration identified the need for an integrated or whole-of-government approach to achieve strategic ends within the Indo-Pacific. Another commonality was a desire to

[192] Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-4, *Competing* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, December 14, 2020), 3-4.

develop and maintain partnerships with like-minded countries to curb malign or coercive actions by China within the region. While all policies offered options for a peacefully rising China, there were differences in the approach meant to foster this development. Early President Obama administration policy more closely aligned with the concept of engagement with China in an attempt to normalize their behavior with international standards. During the President Trump administration, overtures for cooperation with China in areas of mutual interest were still present, but an emphasis on military strength and, at least a perceived, requirement for partners to choose between the two powers demonstrated a change in approach.

Part II: Department and Agency Organization, Staffing, and Resourcing

A key component which contributes to capability and unified action is organization. National level foreign policy is primarily directed by Executive Branch, and the President directs national security unified action through policy. Centrally developed policies are interpreted by various organizations in various ways. Each organization interprets these documents using their particular lens, with their own biases, and their own conception of what is possible. Organizational culture permeates interagency operations, creating opportunities and friction. The organizational model employed by the departments and agency of the diplomatic, military, and development instruments of power compounds gaps created by policy change. In a resource constrained environment natural tendencies and distrust can become exacerbated. Simply, there are a number of ways interagency cooperation can fail so gaps and misalignment must be identified and addressed wherever possible.

If the Indo-Pacific region is viewed from the perspective of USINDOPACOM, there is a single geographic and bureaucratic frame. Generally, all units operating within USINDOPACOM area of responsibility subordinate themselves to USINDOPACOM. This singular structure facilitates command and control, as well as shared understanding, mutual interest, and unity of effort. Steady state interagency operations during competition do not have a singular structure or model. The Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development conceive of the same area from greatly differing geographic and bureaucratic models. The geographic bureau and country team structure utilized by the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development do not align with the Department of Defense's combatant command model.[193] Comprehensive coordination for competition in the Indo-Pacific also includes the Russian Federation, adding an additional regional bureau and another combatant command to the mix. Further, since the Department of State only conducts foreign policy with other countries, the USINDOPACOM model again maintains a differing concept of the region since their area of responsibility includes Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific. A final complexity to this organization is related to the mission of the U.S. Agency for International Development, meaning the Agency does not

[193] Figure 5, below, provides a graphic depiction of the various conceptions of the region maintained by each organization (Department of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development. The resources used to inform the researcher's assertion that these organizations do not align is based on the differing geographic boundaries for each regional organization. There are methods of more closely integrating these organizations which are employed already, to include liaisons overseen by the Office of State-Defense Integration. The location of these liaisons can be researched in the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual and associated Foreign Affairs Handbooks. https://fam.state.gov/.

maintain presence in every country within a region so their interests are more country-aligned than regionally focused like their interagency partners. The complexity of the geographic misalignments are represented in Figure 5, below.



Figure 5. Organizational Areas of Responsibility and Presence

Source: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), "USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility," U.S. Department of Defense, last updated March 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/. NOTE: The USINDOPACOM map displaying U.S. Combatant Commands (cited above) was adapted by the author to display U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of State Bureau organizations. Adjustments made are listed in the legend. Countries within regional bureaus for U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of State are located at U.S. Agency for International Development, "Where We Work: Asia," last updated March 17, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/asia; and U.S. Department of State, "Countries and Areas List," April 2021, https://www.state.gov/countries-and-areas-list/.

Another source for misalignment is derived from the ways which the departments and agencies are organized. Distinct organizations tend to develop unique cultures which perceive problems differently. These varying perspectives are both a blessing and a curse. The diversity allows for the interagency team to pool differing frames to better understand a challenge and address it. Simultaneously, convergence is still required to develop and execute a strategy. The U.S. Army's *Red Team Handbook* grapples with the concept of "Fostering Cultural Empathy" as a means to understanding cultures that may otherwise be at odds with each other.[194] Cultural empathy is developed through deliberate efforts to understand the members of the other organization, their values, and experiences.

A common issue found in interagency cooperation is associated to legitimate authority among organizations who do not share a common superior. A recent historic example to drive integration was demonstrated by the National Security Presidential Directive-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*.[195] This directive provided clarification for the roles and responsibilities of all agencies and departments involved in the Iraq reconstruction efforts. It codified the President's decision to appoint the Department of State as lead agency for the

[194] University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity, *The Red Team Handbook: The Army's Guide to Making Better Decisions*, version 9.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center), 4, 19-21.

[195] U.S. President, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 7, 2005).

reconstruction efforts.[196] A similar directive concerning competition in the Indo-Pacific would provide the lead agency positional authority and a method by which to compel members across the interagency to coordinate and synchronize their efforts below the National Security Council level.

Leadership methodologies across the interagency differ as well. These cultural differences create friction during interagency coordination which inhibit unified action in the way challenges and opportunities are addressed. Cultural differences in leadership throughout the interagency enterprise are often stark.[197] The extensive liaison system established within the Office of State-Defense Integration and permeated throughout the Department of State plays a critical role in decreasing friction and increasing understanding between Departments. These leadership styles are learned within each communities' culture.

The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is a recognition of the importance military basing plays in partnership and a way the military instrument can support unified action in the Indo-Pacific. The DPRI is intended "reduce the U.S. footprint on Okinawa and better position U.S. forces."[198] U.S. military posture throughout the Indo-Pacific

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[196] U.S. Marine Corps, "Small Wars: 8905," (Command and Staff College Distance Education Program, Quantico, VA, 2020), 211-212.

[197] Davis, Benini, and Choe, *A Practitioner's Handbook for Interagency Leadership*, 7. "As it was so aptly noted by the former brigade commander quoted above, in an organization that values mission and hierarchy above all else perhaps it is a little harder to lead in an environment where there is no hierarchy, no standard operating procedures, misaligned interests, and where even the concept of a lawful order is laughable."

[198] Nick Oltman, "DPRI: Strengthening U.S.-Japanese Posture in INDOPACOM," *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 2021): WE7.

region is inherently linked to diplomatic and information instrument actions. Forward basing options for the U.S. military were established following World War Two. The positioning of military personnel in foreign countries is often contentious for the host nationals and places stress on their government.[199] Establishing and maintaining military basing in these countries has been viewed within the U.S. as a method of deterrence in the theater. Relocating forces to Guam and decreasing presence in Okinawa will simultaneously assist diplomatic efforts with Japan while maintaining a forward U.S. military presence to deter adversaries and conduct theater security cooperation with partners.

Reciprocally, a significant component for U.S. influence is linked to military presence. The military contributes to national security in a number of overt ways: defense, deterrence, and during interactions with local national while deployed. Even though military combat operations tend to be well funded and documented, the military also contributes significantly to security cooperation, government-to-government cooperation, and cultural diplomatic activities as well. The military instrument offers an informal and forward deployed presence which presents the face of the U.S. government and, often, a tangible representation of U.S. foreign policy. Similar to the concept that every Service Member is a sensor, every Service Member is also a potential diplomat conducting public diplomacy. Studies on the military's contributions to public diplomacy

[199] Oltman, "DPRI," WE7-8.

were conducted throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and these are lessons which will contribute equally well in the Indo-Pacific.[200]

Entry into a foreign country, for the military or any other member of the U.S. government, is based on access rights. Coordinating access is an inherently diplomatic instrument responsibility, outside the context of forcible entry during war. Long-term and contingency access agreements are concluded through state-to-state coordination which often takes place over an extended period of time. Understaffing and resourcing bureaus and country teams can create gaps where the foundations for future access or support do not exist. These gaps limit the U.S.'s ability to deter, compel, or respond to conflict. Additionally, they hamper preparation for large scale conflict to include logistics staging locations and contracting support coordination. During competition, lack of access limits opportunities for cultural diplomatic work, undermining soft power projection and relationship building with like-minded populations abroad.

Diplomatic efforts with like-minded countries throughout the world legitimize and build consensus for maintenance of the international order. These types of activities include Freedom of Navigation Operations, but these operations are not a policy in and of themselves. They are actions conducted to support international trade, standards, and law. These operations must be conducted utilizing multiple elements of national power. Military support is generally the primary instrument conducting the freedom of navigation act, maintaining overflight and accepted international water boundaries while

[200] Matthew Wallin, "Military Public Diplomacy: How the Military Influences Foreign Audiences," (White Paper, American Security Project, Washington, DC, February 2015), 27-34.

deterring escalation. While the military instrument may conduct the actual freedom of navigation action, the operation must be coordinated with the diplomatic and information instruments to ensure the effect is achieved and partners countries in the region do not misinterpret the action as escalatory. The information instrument provides both immediate and long-term impacts supporting these operations. It can be used to assure partners and allies in the short-term and develop consensus for international norms over a longer duration. Synchronizing these efforts provides transparency and accuracy which will create lasting cumulative effects.

A foremost indicator of prioritization is resourcing. Where the U.S. chooses to invest its limited (albeit significant) financial resources provides insight into what it views as most important. Figure 6, below, captures the total budgetary resources reported by the Department of State since the President Obama administration. The years selected for the figure precede and follow significant national policies which were reviewed in Chapter 3. Of note, the years 2009 and 2015 were outliers in what appears to be a normally steady growth in Department budgetary resourcing. The difficulties associated to increasing foreign affairs funding are described generally in Nicholas Kralev's *America's Other Army: The U.S. Foreign Service and 21st Century Diplomacy*. These challenges are presented as both internal, failures of the Department of State to advocate for itself, and external, stemming from U.S. cultural disinterest in foreign affairs more broadly.[201]

[201] Nicholas Kravlev. *America's Other Army: The U.S. Foreign Service and 21st Century Diplomacy* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 12-5.

	Department of State	
	Total Budgetary Resources (in millions)	Percent Change
2008	38.8	-
2009	50.1	23%
2010	52.6	5%
2011	53.3	1%
2015	65.9	19%
2016	69.3	5%
2017	71	3%
2018	72.3	2%
2019	74.9	4%
2020	77.1	3%
2021	80.1	4%

Figure 6. Department of State Budget and Growth by Year

Source: U.S. Department of State (Dos), *Fiscal Year 2010 Agency Financial Report* (Washington, DC: DoS, November 15, 2010), 2; U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Fiscal Year 2016 Agency Financial Report* (Washington, DC: DoS, November 15, 2016), 36; U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Fiscal Year 2018 Agency Financial Report* (Washington, DC: DoS, November 15, 2018), 23; U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Fiscal Year 2019 Agency Financial Report* (Washington, DC: DoS, January 17, 2020), 2; U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Fiscal Year 2020 Agency Financial Report* (Washington, DC: DoS, November 16, 2020), 2; U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Fiscal Year 2021 Agency Financial Report* (Washington, DC: DoS, November 15, 2021), 2.

The effects of deprioritizing the diplomatic and development instruments is a less capable national security enterprise. This is particularly true during competition and peace, when a military force's employment options are limited due to access and capability. Shortages in Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development staffing were determined by those studying the effects as "crisis."[202] This categorization reflects the reported, "15 percent vacancy in existing positions, total lack

[202] Russell Rumbaugh, *Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity* (Washington, DC: American Academy of Diplomacy and The Stimson Center, October 2012), 3.

of training positions . . .” in 2008 and, “28 percent of overseas Foreign Service officer slots . . . either vacant or filled by low-level employees working above their level of experience,” in 2012.[203] The stagnated budgeting reported in Figure 6, above, does not reflect a shift in prioritization to address these shortfalls. The key capabilities brought to bear by the development and diplomatic instruments provide policy makers flexibility, contribute to stability, and further U.S. interests during competition and peace. If these instruments are underfunded and understaffed, the U.S. is at a disadvantage, especially during competition with the PRC below the threshold of armed conflict.

Ensuring the appointment of key diplomatic officials in the Indo-Pacific region will also be of utmost importance. Specifically, ambassadorial positions in key countries throughout the region cannot remain unfilled. The U.S. executive and legislative branches must be cognizant of the cultural perceptions held by many Asian cultures. It is the author’s experience that providing representatives that are not equal in standing to those receiving them sends a message to the host that they are not valued or respected. In this vein, ambassadorial appointments may carry more weight than would otherwise be expected with potentially unintended consequences on relationships and competition in general. Appendices A and B provide two data points, one in 2021 and one in 2022, showing the shifting ambassadorial vacancies in the Indo-Pacific. It is the researcher’s assessment that progress was made between the two surveys in ensuring key countries received their senior U.S. foreign relations representative. The nomination and

[203] Rumbaugh, *Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity*, 3; Farrow, *War on Peace*, xxx.

appointment process must be closely monitored to ensure U.S. interests are well represented in this critical region.

In a resource constrained environment, decisions on resource allocation must be synchronized across the budget. Shifting emphasis between the basis for projecting national power, from military to diplomatic and development led, should be reflected within the way organizations are designed. The U.S. employs what fits *The Cambridge History of Warfare*'s, "capital-intensive military system" model.[204] The 2017 *NSS* recognized this model as insufficient and called for additional investment in the military, adjusting the balance slightly more in the direction of a "labor-intensive system" while simultaneously pursuing greater technological advantage[205] The President Biden administration's shift toward diplomatic and development led national security strategy may result in an increase in resourcing to support this effort.

Summary

This chapter analyzed the alignment of the diplomatic, development, and military instruments of U.S. national power within the Indo-Pacific region. It conducted this assessment in two parts. The first part looked at alignment between the strategies developed at the national and regional levels since the President Obama 2010 *NSS*. The second part of this chapter analyzed the organizations, staffing, and resourcing intended to achieve the national strategic ends within the Indo-Pacific. Both parts were informed

[204] Geoffrey Parker, "The Western Way of War," in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed Geoffrey Parker (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 7.

[205] U.S. President, *NSS*, 2017, 27 Parker, "The Western Way of War," 7.

by literature and policy reviews conducted in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Leveraging the works in the previous chapters, the analysis employed trends and key observations to assess regional policy alignment and structures to achieve U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific.

This chapter included analysis derived from the strategies developed at the national strategic and regional levels. These policies were assessed for misalignment through the ends, ways, and means strategic framework. Strategic ends were determined to be relatively consistent, albeit broad in many cases. The ends could be described and furthering enduring values U.S. national interests. Evaluating these policies throughout time provided insight into the shifting ways identified by national strategic policies between the Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. The ways espoused by different administrations create discord when they vacillate from election-to-election or are overridden by war and crisis. The conclusions of this analysis are captured in the following chapter.

Regardless of the administration in power, generally, the diplomatic and development instruments of power have not received increased funding. With the exception of two years between 2008 and 2021, the Department of State's resourcing has remained stagnant. This trend does not reflect the prioritization for the diplomatic instrument as identified in the 2021 *INSSG*.[206] At the national level, aligning resourcing with policy objectives will enable national security efforts at the regional level, with staff and structures required to conduct integrated and sustained competition with the PRC.

[206] Biden, *INSSG*, 6.

Without the resourcing to match prioritization, the likelihood Rosa Brooks' experience, that underfunded instruments fall victim to a vicious cycle of failing to achieve their mission, losing credibility, and being even further underfunded as a result, is likely to be repeated.[207] Negative impacts due to organizational misalignment and under-resourcing both negatively impact the U.S.'s ability to achieve strategic objectives with a competitive PRC.

[207] Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, 20-21.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

> If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately . . . I think it's a cost-benefit ratio. The more that we put into the State Department's diplomacy, hopefully, the less we have to put into a military budget.
>
> —James Mattis, quoted in Farrow, *War on Peace*

Introduction

As a historic Indo-Pacific power, U.S. national security is inherently tied to the region as both a Pacific state and major trading partner. A rising PRC, combined with the economic and population growth by states throughout the region, is driving the U.S. policy shift toward the area. The policies leading to this shift and their subordinate documents, directing engagement of the instruments, are critical to U.S. national security efforts. These efforts will take place within an environment filled with great opportunities and contention. The policies and organizations the U.S. develops must account for competition and do so with an integrated whole-of-government approach. Great power competition with the PRC requires unified action across all the instruments of national power to defend U.S. interests and support the rules-based international order.

The U.S. strategy to the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific outlines simultaneous cooperation and competition below the level of armed conflict. The U.S. requires a flexible and coordinated set of capabilities for pursuing the country's national security interests. These interests are progressed most proficiently through the adaptable and concerted application all elements of national power. The instruments of power must be

resourced and staffed to achieve the desired outcome. These instruments must also be organized to undertake such a comprehensive challenge.

This chapter will briefly summarize the previous research's outcomes and a way forward in a clear, concise manner. The first section to follow will briefly describe the conclusions the author reached because of the research conducted. The conclusions provided follow the structure of the study's primary and secondary research questions. Next, tentative recommendations addressing the identified misalignments and gaps in national security policy and structure are provided. Finally, the chapter includes areas for continued research to further the discussion on this important topic. The logical progression this chapter follows is organized to progress from the previous research and transition the reader to utilize the research and recommendations for future research and policy development in the Indo-Pacific.



Figure 7. Chapter 5 Structure

Source: Created by author.

Conclusions

The researcher concludes there are existing gaps in alignment between the Department of State's regional bureaus (East Asia and Pacific Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs), Defense's INDOPACOM, and the U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Asia which could negatively impact great power competition with China. The identified misalignments in policy are mostly located at the regional level and linked to prioritization. The number of organizations concerned with planning and executing U.S. regional strategy are quite large and diverse. Those involved include country teams, regional bureaus, and combatant commands, and elements of the National Security Council. Each of these actors have their own mission, perspectives, and organizational culture, all of which inform their policy development and prioritization. At the national level the National Security Council facilitates policy development and coordination. In this way, national and departmental policies are more thoroughly integrated. The resulting national policies include documents directing interagency coordination at the regional level and references to how adjacent organization policies informed the development of their own. Existing structures for integration, including the National Security Council, appear sufficient for the development of national strategic policy. Regional policies do not include the same level of explicit coordination across all instruments of national power.

The same regional policies are developed to nest within the national policies, which are also dynamic in nature. The policies surveyed within this study demonstrate typically static and broad strategic ends, but the ways and prioritization of means for accomplishing them have shifted throughout the same period. Policies can shift relatively

quickly, as long as the organizational climate supports or adapts quickly to changes in emphasis. Organizational cultures, organization, and resourcing are less rapidly changing. The tendency for these factors to respond less quickly to policy change means the organizations and their structure are likely to require additional time and resourcing to align. Significantly, if the ways and prioritization of means described within national policy change frequently, the dissonance can cause instability or result in no sound, substantive adaptation to meet the policy requirements.

President Biden's 2021 *INSSG* directs the primacy of the diplomatic instrument of power. The leading agencies to pursue U.S. foreign policy objectives in this most recent policy are the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development.[208] Despite this, there is nothing in law or policy compelling regional interagency synchronization, coordination, and integration. The Departments of State, Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development use liaisons to represent their interests laterally, but these liaisons are not empowered to make decisions or compel cooperation. Additionally, these positions are not statutory or always prioritized based on organizational culture. As a result, the liaison system is invaluable, but it does not create unified action at a level which develops integrated policy at the regional or theater strategic level.

[208] Biden, *INSSG*, 6.

U.S. culture tends to be distrustful of long-term engagement or agreements with other countries, going back as far as the first president[209]. This cultural proclivity tends toward deemphasizing the diplomatic and development instruments and the enduring arrangements their efforts often create. The inclination to disengagement and distrust of international agreements expressed in President Washington's address makes developing support and funding for the instruments of power dealing in diplomacy and development less palatable to the domestic audience. Particularly, the national security efforts conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development can be misconstrued as committing U.S. taxes to improve other countries without any security or domestic benefit. This vein of thought makes dialogue to support additional funding for these instruments of power more difficult than the nationally supported and more easily observable military instrument or profitable economic instrument.

Justifying funding for the diplomatic and military instruments, in comparison to domestic or military initiatives, is more difficult during periods of domestic economic strife or war. During periods of war, to include the informal Global War on Terror, the military instrument of national power tends to receive greater emphasis in national policy and resourcing. During such times, this shift toward the military instrument of power is regular for both practical and expedient reasons. The Global War on Terror, albeit a different conflict in duration and objectives from other historic U.S. conflicts, precipitated a similar shift toward the primacy of the military instrument of power.

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[209] George Washington, "Washington's Farewell Address 1796," Yale Law School: Lilian Goldman Law Library, accessed May 8, 2022, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.

Combining the historic vein of U.S. disengagement from international affairs with a pragmatic emphasis on the military instrument during times of war, negatively impacts the influence, if not resourcing, of the diplomatic and development instruments of national power.

For all three of these instruments of national power, diplomatic, development, and military, to maximize unified action they must have a primary focus and shared hierarchy. The varied perspectives and prioritization outlined in regional policies reflect poor unity of action at the regional level. Compared to the more integrated national strategic policy, regional policy development may benefit from a structure similar to the hierarchical and tiered National Security Council. The more defined structure provides clarity of vision and a forum to coordinate interagency efforts. At the regional level, the institutions responsible for national security do not have a defined or consistent hierarchy. During periods of crisis, interagency task forces are established to provide this direction and focus. In less defined periods of time, such as great power competition below the threshold of armed conflict, regional bureaus, combatant commands, and country teams are expected to cooperate towards relatively ambiguous strategic ends.

The varied approaches and priorities described by regional policies are not the result of organizations eschewing national security directives. Instead, the different approaches are the result of each organizations' cultures, capabilities, and responsibilities. The culture of each agency informs how they view a challenge, how they approach addressing it, and the timeline on which they expect to see results. These public servants approach national security problems with an expert understanding of their organization. They do not possess the same expertise or cultural understanding for their

adjacent agencies or how those capabilities can be synchronized to provide compounding effects. Culturally, each agency also contains their own biases as it relates to conducting strategic policy development and how they integrate with other members of the national security enterprise. Organizational culture also contributes to the members' echelon of focus, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development's emphasis on country level over regional strategy. The responsibilities of each agency are also diverse, leading to their focus on the mission they are assigned. All three factors contribute to regional organizations developing different interpretations, priorities, and approaches which are codified into policies which maintain distinctly different conceptualizations. The policies drive the organization's actions and can lead to inefficient efforts and even counter productive actions when viewed comprehensively against their adjected agency's policies.

Methods for coordinating interagency activities do exist, but they are not compulsory or institutionalized at the regional level. At the national level, the National Security Council does coordinate policy between the White House and executive agencies. The NSC also can have regional groups, but the organization of the NSC changes from administration to administration and does not necessarily include the members who operate at the regional level. Current interagency policy committees are responsible for day-to-day national security matters. Given their focus, but dislocated relationship with those conducting operations or campaigns, their efforts are not organic to those providing forces or operating foreign missions. Additionally, there are redundant, but non-compulsory organizations at the regional (JIACG) and country team levels. At the country team level, the scope, authority, and staffing are too limited to develop a

comprehensive regional policy with the capability and capacity to conduct great power competition in the Indo-Pacific with a country like China. Linking policy with the means to effect it under the purview of the leaders charged with conducting it increases unity of effort.

There is a dearth of evaluations addressing contemporary Indo-Pacific regional interagency gaps and misalignments. Contemporary policies covered throughout this document are reviewed elsewhere, but, predominantly, these studies are oriented on national strategic documents or covering a single policy rather than policies in their totality. Tangentially, there is literature addressing root causes contributing to gaps and misalignment. There are also some documents that discuss organizational and cultural gaps or provide best practices for conducting integration. Military publications on this topic provide recommendations for ways to foster unified action, but they are not directive or binding for interagency partners. This topic is contemporary and existing literature may be sensitive or classified due to its relevance to national security.

Recommendations

The standard for regional policy development must be interagency in nature. Within the context of great power competition, it is recommended a Congressionally reportable interagency regional strategy be developed for the Indo-Pacific. The lead agency for this strategy must be the Department of State with inputs from a team of representatives from Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development. Without a fundamental national security enterprise realignment, this interagency working group would include members of the Department of State's Bureaus for South and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and European and Eurasian

Affairs; the Department of Defense's Indo-Pacific, European, Strategic, Transportation, Cyber, Space, and Special Operations Combatant Commands; and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Asia Bureau. With all stakeholders represented, a sound interagency strategy is possible, alleviating many of the identified sources for gaps and misalignment. The representatives provide the expertise and various perspectives upon which a sound strategy can be developed, synchronizing the capabilities each instrument of power provides to the national security structure.

A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), like the NSPD-44, is a method by which the executive formally identifies a lead agency for interagency coordination, but it is not a solution recommended by this researcher.[210] A presidential directive carries the weight of the national executive, but it is not sufficient to restructure the national security enterprise in the same way Congressional direction can. A NSPD is effective throughout the duration of the standing administration or if the following administrations concurs with this directive. As a result, a NSPD is relatively temporary and does not drive systemic change or provide the resourcing to realign the instruments of national power. In many ways, a NSPD would be reiterating the direction provided by the 2021 *INSSG* but provide nothing additional in the form of structure to integrate the instruments of power. The goal to develop unified action while synchronizing the instruments of national to address enduring great power competition in the Indo-Pacific cannot be achieved by a temporary and understaffed or ad hoc structure.

[210] U.S. President, NSPD-44.

A more permanent means for integrating the instruments of national power is recommended by the researcher. The method recommended is derived from the conclusions provided by Colonel Robert Pope, entitled "U.S. Regional Mission."[211] Pope's model, as described below, is a standing organization led by a Regional Chief of Mission and Deputy Chief of Mission, both of which are Department of State Foreign Service Officers. They would lead an organization consisting of members from across the national security enterprise permanently assigned to an interagency functional staff or temporarily aligned to support an Interagency Task Force during contingency operations. The model requires Presidential nomination with Congressional approval for the Regional Chief of Mission. In Pope's recommendation, the Regional Chief of Mission would report to the Secretary of State, National Security Council, or an undefined new interagency organization. The Geographic Combatant Commander would maintain their alignment with the Secretary of Defense but provide members of their staff structure to support the U.S. Regional Mission and all coordinating elements overseeing Theater Security Cooperation.

The researcher's recommendation differs from Pope's model in the following ways. The U.S. Regional Mission would replace regional structures within the National Security council and align to the same organization. The Department of State's regional bureaus Assistant Secretary of State would take up their posting as the Regional Chief of Mission, empowering the Assistant Secretary of State with additional power as an ambassador-at-large and Congressional appointment. Similarly, the U.S. Agency for

[211] Pope, *U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation*, 132-6.

International Development would organize their regional bureau within this structure. The new organization would maintain a relationship with the Department of State in a manner similar a Geographic Combatant Command's relationship with military services. The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development would be a force providers to the U.S. Regional Mission while maintaining oversight at the Principal and Deputy levels in the National Security Council. Remaining regional structure within the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development would provide administrative support to country level missions while operational control would be managed by the U.S. Regional Mission. Liaisons from functional Combatant Commands would also be aligned to the Regional Mission structure to provide a method for synchronization and coordination with all capabilities the Department of Defense provides.

To empower the U.S. Regional Mission and clarify their area of responsibility, it is highly recommended regional areas of responsibility be uniform across the interagency. This recommendation aligns with those proposed by the Project for National Security Reform and Center for Strategic and International Studies Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, among others, as described by Pope.[212] Given the prevalence of transregional challenges, liaisons from adjacent regions would be incorporated into the lead U.S. Regional Mission to coordinate and synchronize efforts between regions. Another method to conduct similar coordination without increasing staffing requirements would

[212] Pope, *U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation*, 140-1.

be to utilize existing structure within the National Security Council's Interagency Policy Committees to achieve the same result.

Funding for the U.S. Regional Missions would be provided through a reorganized National Security budget. This budget would replace the Foreign Affairs budget, allowing Congress to prioritize specific regions for fiscal allocation. In this manner, the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development's budget would be described within the context of national security, making the purpose clearer and more palatable to constituents providing taxes. Additionally, funding provided to the Department of Defense to support Theater Security Cooperation missions would be directed by the U.S. Regional Mission. The funding would be allocated by Congress to the Department of Defense but reallocated to the Regional Mission to fund operations securing the region and developing partnerships. In this manner, the direct and indirect funding for the conduct of great power competition would increase while simultaneously increasing efficiency in these efforts across the interagency.

A fundamental requirement to achieve the desired level of interagency cooperation is a thorough understanding of the national security enterprise and organizational cultures. To this end, increased emphasis must be placed on interagency education and prioritizing positions within the newly created U.S. Regional Missions. It is recommended each agency prioritize assignment of highly capable personnel to fill roles within the U.S. Regional Missions. Professional development to serve in these positions will be supported by additional emphasis on interagency education conducted in existing progressive education institutions, like Joint Professional Military Education. Congressional direction requiring a percentage of seat spaces be allocated to interagency

members to professional education programs beginning at the Joint Professional Military Education 1 level, or departmental equivalent. These schools should include positions for members of the adjacent interagency organizations as students and instructors, fostering cultural understanding and networking between the organizations throughout the national security enterprise.

Further Research

There are a number of recommended areas for further research derived from this study. Further study needs to occur that addresses the budgetary and staffing requirements to support the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development's roles in great power competition within the Indo-Pacific region. Another area of study would be to determine the organizational and resourcing requirements to support the recommended structural changes described by the researcher's modified U.S. Regional Mission recommendations. Detailed research into the effectiveness of political appointees serving as U.S. ambassadors within the Indo-Pacific could provide insights into the professional qualifications for those serving as Regional Chief of Mission and conducting great power competition at the country mission level.

Summary

The 2021 *INSSG* informs how the U.S. must balance the diplomatic, development, and military instruments of national power. Already discourse is being conducted to establish fiscal strategies for smarter defense spending in pursuit of national

strategic ends.[213] With a sustained resourcing plan, the diplomatic and development instruments will fulfill their roles in the national security enterprise more capably. This balanced approach to national security, leveraging integrated instruments of national power, provides the U.S. with a flexible array of options to compete in the Indo-Pacific. As the Indo-Pacific gains increasing importance and becomes even more contested, the U.S. must bring to bear all capabilities below the threshold of armed conflict to ensure its vital interests.

These strategies must be driven by the national security policies and implemented down to the regional level. Achieving U.S. national and regional security policy depends on unified action. This can only be achieved if all instruments are thoroughly synchronized and capable of contributing to the common goal. The reorganization of the national security structure recommended in this paper is intended to contribute to the professional discourse addressing great power competition with the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. With the proper structures in place, and informed by effective policy, the U.S. can maximize its competition power and sustain the international rules-based order. In order to achieve this, regional policies must be completely integrated with a common perspective on the challenges the country faces and the tools available to address them effectively.

[213] Kathleen H. Hicks and Joseph Federichi, "Getting to Less? Exploring the Press for Less in America's Defense Commitments," (CSIS Brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 16, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/getting-less-exploring-press-less-americas-defense-commitments.

APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE VACANCIES BY COUNTRY (OCTOBER 2021)

Vacancies by Country		
Country/Organization	Status	Date Nominated
ASEAN		
Australia		
Thailand		
South Korea		
Philippines		
Singapore	Nominated	08-Feb-21
Vietnam	Nominated	19-Apr-21
Brunei	Nominated	20-Jul-21
China	Nominated	12-Sep-21
Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, & Tuvalu		
Japan	Nominated	12-Sep-21
New Zealand & Samoa	Nominated	22-Jul-21
India	Nominated	12-Jul-19
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs	Nominated	UNKNOWN

Source: American Foreign Service Association, "Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors," last updated October 17, 2022, https://afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments.

APPENDIX B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE VACANCIES BY COUNTRY (APRIL 2021)

Country	Status	Nominated
ASEAN	Vacant	None
Australia	Vacant	January 7, 2022
Fiji	Vacant	None
India	Vacant	July 13, 2021
Kiribati	Vacant	None
Nauru	Vacant	None
Papua New Guinea	Vacant	None
Philippines	Vacant	February 10, 2022
Solomon Islands	Vacant	None
South Korea	Vacant	February 14, 2022
Thailand	Vacant	April 5, 2022
Timor-Leste	Vacant	None
Tonga	Vacant	None
Tuvalu	Vacant	None
Vanuatu	Vacant	None

Source: American Foreign Service Association, "Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors," last updated April 19, 2022, https://afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments.

APPENDIX C

DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE AREAS OF

RESPONSIBILITY BY ORGANIZATION

	State Department	INDOPACOM	EUCOM
U.S. Territory		Hawaii American Samoa Guam Northern Mariana Islands	
South and Central Asia Bureau	Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan	 Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Sri Lanka	
European and Eurasisan Affairs	Russia		Russia

Countries in East Asian and the Pacific Bureau	Australia Brunei Burma Cambodia China Fiji Indonesia Japan Kiribati Laos Malaysia Marshall Islands Micronesia Mongolia Nauru New Zealand North Korea Palau Papua New Guinea Philippines Samoa Singapore Solomon Islands South Korea Taiwan Thailand Timor-Leste Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Vietnam	Australia Brunei Burma Cambodia China Fiji Indonesia Japan Kiribati Laos Malaysia Marshall Islands Micronesia Mongolia Nauru New Zealand North Korea Palau Papua New Guinea Philippines Samoa Singapore Solomon Islands South Korea Taiwan Thailand Timor-Leste Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Vietnam	
N/A		Antarctica	

Source: This table was consolidated using the following references: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), "USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility," U.S. Department of Defense, last updated March 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/; U.S. Agency for International Development, "Where We Work: Asia," last updated March 17, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/asia; U.S. Department of State, "Countries and Areas List," April 2021, https://www.state.gov/countries-and-areas-list/.

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