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Impact of Individual Augmentation Policy on Navy Reserve Force Readiness



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Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN: 978-1-9774-1202-7

Cover: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Craig Z. Rodarte.

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About This Report

This report addresses the potential negative readiness impact that might have occurred in the Navy Reserve force because of the provision of individual augmentee billets outside the normally established means for filling personnel requirements. Although there were periods during which joint operations provided the majority of demand, throughout the 2012–2021 period, the Navy itself was activating and deploying reserves in billets that reflected near-term demand rather than mobilization billets. In some cases, these billets were filled repeatedly over several years, suggesting that they ought to be considered permanent force structure rather than as temporary augmentation.

The research reported here was completed in April 2023 and underwent security review with the sponsor and the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review before public release.

RAND National Security Research Division

This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Navy and Marine Forces Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense intelligence enterprise.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank our sponsor, the Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve, and particularly the project monitor, LCDR Terence Gilbert. We also appreciate the data and perspectives from the staff of Fleet Forces Command, as well as the many interview participants. We thank the leadership of the Navy Marine Forces Center, Paul DeLuca and Brendan Toland. Finally, we appreciate the thoughtful reviews conducted by RAND Corporation colleagues David Zielinski and Michael Junge.

Summary

This report presents less a history of individual augmentation and more of a look at mobilization of the Navy Reserve for duty in operations associated with the Global War on Terror and in response to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Reservists were mobilized both as individuals and within units that were activated and sent on deployments outside the normal Global Force Management cycle. Beginning in 2001, the Navy Reserve was heavily employed in this kind of activation and deployment. We are relying heavily on data analysis and have used interviews only as context.

Approach and Methodology

For individual augmentation to affect Navy Reserve readiness, there should be an identifiable and measurable outcome on the units providing the augmentations. Our method was to look for evidence in an available database that showed the originating units, the people assigned, the number assigned, the duration of assignment, and various other factors that might affect the Navy Reserve, in terms of both individual units and the broader organization. For this analysis, we used a dataset drawn from the U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database that detailed the individual and unit activations for reserve and active components from 2012 to 2021.¹ The dataset included information on the enlisted ratings or officer designators assigned, the providing command, the receiving command, the dates assigned, whether the billets were filled voluntarily or involuntarily, and whether the receiving activities were Navy or joint.

This approach is highly objective and readily reproducible. It does not imply any value judgment about what the assigned units or individuals did or what they might have done had they not been assigned.

Key Findings

Although there were periods when joint operations provided the majority of demand from 2012 to 2021, the Navy itself was activating and deploying reserves in billets for near-term demand rather than mobilization billets. In some cases, these billets were filled repeatedly over several years, suggesting that these billets ought to be considered as permanent force structure rather than as temporary augmentation.

¹ We were provided with comprehensive Navy Reserve deployment data from January 2012 to the time of writing.

In the case of unit deployments, there were two types: (1) portions of a unit, such as aviation squadron detachments, generally deployed as an intact unit and with assistance from other units at times and (2) units that are formed at the deployed locations from collections of individual augmentees (IAs), which appears to have been the case with many deployments of medical personnel. Although coded as “unit” deployments in the dataset, this latter group appeared to be more similar in character to IA deployments.²

Reserve IAs came from across the reserve force, including from more than 2,000 separate parent unit identification codes. We specifically looked for cases in which key personnel—such as the commanding officer or executive officer—might have been deployed simultaneously, but we did not find any evidence of these cases. We did find that some ratings and designators, particularly those associated with intelligence, were in high demand.

Most IA billets (approximately 78 percent) were filled by volunteers, but with some variation depending on an individual’s designator, deployment location, and other factors. End strength numbers for the reserve force overall did not significantly vary across the period for this report. If there were impacts on retention or recruitment resulting from IAs, these impacts were not apparent in the Navy Reserve’s ability to maintain end strength.

² We did not attempt to recode the second group as IAs and instead counted them as unit deployers within the statistical analysis.

Contents

About This Report	iii
Summary	v
Figures and Tables	ix
CHAPTER 1	
Post-2001 Individual Augmentee Policy—The Background	1
The Readiness Impact of Augmentation Policy on the Navy Reserve: Objectives and Method	2
Definitions Used in This Report	3
Organization of This Report	4
CHAPTER 2	
The Navy Reserve Force Burden After 2011	5
Comparing the ACs and RCs	5
RC IAs	8
CHAPTER 3	
Unit Activations	13
Use of Units in This Report	13
RC Unit Deployers	13
CHAPTER 4	
Individual Augmentation: Unit and Personnel Impact	19
IAs: Impact on the Parent Unit	19
Senior Leaders and IA Assignments	22
Possible Broader Impact—Morale, Recruitment, and Retention	23
IA Impact on Navy Reserve Readiness Is Not Reflected in Obvious Direct Impact on Units or on Overall Force Retention	33
CHAPTER 5	
Force Structure Shortfalls: Have Use of IAs Hidden a Problem?	35
Where Were Reservists Deployed?	35
Cobbling Together Units	36
Recurring Billet Requests	37
Force Structure Demands—the Impact of Dwell	42
What Were the Real Force Structure Needs?	44

CHAPTER 6

Conclusions and Recommendations 47

 Short-Term Impacts Were Generally Mitigated..... 47

 Longer-Term, Indirect Impacts 48

 Recommendations and a Way Forward..... 48

APPENDIXES

A. Complete List of Units Studied 51

B. Proposed Exit Survey 55

Abbreviations..... 57

References 59

Figures and Tables

Figures

2.1.	Comparing the AC and RC Deployment Numbers from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021.....	6
2.2.	Comparing the AC and RC IA and Unit Deployment Numbers from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021	7
2.3.	Comparing the AC and RC Joint and Maritime Deployment Numbers from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021	7
2.4.	Joint And Maritime IA Deployment Numbers for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021.....	9
2.5.	Maritime IA Deployment Numbers by Subcategory for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021	10
2.6.	IA Deployment Numbers for the RC by Operation from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021.....	10
2.7.	Reserve IA Deployment Numbers for Enlisted and Officer by Rank from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021	12
3.1.	Joint and Maritime Unit Deployment Numbers for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021	14
3.2.	Unit Deployment Numbers for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021.....	15
3.3.	VP-62 and VP-69 Deployment Numbers March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021... ..	16
3.4.	Reserve Unit Deployments to MSRON-11 from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021.....	16
4.1.	Distribution of Reserve IAs across Parent UICs	20
4.2.	Intelligence Specialist and Intelligence Officer (183X) Reserve IAs.....	22
4.3.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of ISs	25
4.4.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of HMs	26
4.5.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of ITs.....	27
4.6.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of MAs.....	27
4.7.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of YNs	28
4.8.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of General Unrestricted Line Officers (10XX)	29
4.9.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Warfare Specialist Line Officers (11XX)	29
4.10.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Aviation Officers (13XX)	30
4.11.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Information Warfare Officers.....	31
4.12.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of General Medical Corps Officers.....	31
4.13.	Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Supply Corps Officers (310X)	32

5.1.	IA Deployment Numbers by Location for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021.....	36
5.2.	Maritime IA Demand Plus Five-Year Dwell to Bahrain and Djibouti	42
5.3.	Total Demand on Naval Reserve, Including Five-Year Dwell	43
5.4.	IA Deployment Numbers for Ratings/Designators Intelligence Specialist and 183X, Including Five-Year Dwell from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021.....	44

Tables

2.1.	Total Numbers and Percentages for Combinations of Unit and IA and Joint and Maritime Deployments for Both AC and RC.....	8
3.1.	Maximum Unit Demand Signals for Select Ratings and Designators for Deployments Alone and the Addition of Five-Year Postdeployment Dwells.....	18
4.1.	Multiple O-6s Departing in the Same Calendar Year	23
4.2.	Senior Leader IA Deployments by Calendar Year.....	24
4.3.	Enlisted and Officer Voluntary Percentages for IAs	25
4.4.	End Strength, Recruitment, and Retention of Navy Reserve Force.....	32
5.1.	IA Assignments to Navy Support Activity in Bahrain	38
5.2.	Recurring IA Assignments to NSA Camp Lemonnier.....	39
5.3.	Recurring O-6 Billets	41
5.4.	Maximum IA Demand Signals for Select Ratings and Designators for Deployments Alone and the Addition of Five-Year Postdeployment Dwells.....	43
A.1.	Full List of All Units with Multiple O-6 Deployments: 388 Total O-6s Deployed.....	51

Post-2001 Individual Augmentee Policy—The Background

Since the United States began its campaigns in the Middle East in 2001, the joint force has required the assignment of individual augmentees (IAs). These individuals were “members of the U.S. military (such as a military reservist or a member of the Navy or Air Force) who were assigned to special duty in a military unit (such as an Army battalion) to fill a shortage or to provide particular skills.”¹ These individual augmentations were financed through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.

This practice was controversial from the outset. It took members out of their services, commands, and communities for long periods, sometimes longer than a year.² Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa were predominantly land-centric, and there is a strong perception that most IAs were directed at filling some gap in land-component force structure.

The Navy has relied heavily on its reserve component (RC) to provide IAs, supplying more than 31,000 reservists since 2012. This action amounted to nearly two-thirds of the 43,000 total IAs provided. In one respect, using reservists as IAs for gaps that the active component (AC) has difficulty filling is defensible.³ The available data do not extend back beyond January 2012 and, therefore, exclude the surge in forces to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and the early deployments to Afghanistan before 2012.⁴

However, use of reservists as IAs is not cost-free. Personnel assigned for an IA mission are not available for any other mission. Other risks and opportunity costs might be present,

¹ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Augmentee,” webpage, undated.

² Peggy A. Golfín and Steven W. Belcher, “Active Duty Individual Manpower Augmentation: Selection and Career Impact,” Center for Naval Analyses, briefing, December 19, 2007.

³ Presidential authority to activate reserves for OCO after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was granted to the Secretary of Defense and Military Department Secretaries via an order from President George W. Bush (Presidential Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, White House, September 14, 2001). The authority has been renewed annually by the president ever since.

⁴ The findings and recommendations presented in this report may not be applicable to the period prior to 2012, during which the consequences of using reservists as IAs may have been more pronounced.

ranging from possible impacts on recruiting and retention to misalignment between force structure and assigned missions.

The Readiness Impact of Augmentation Policy on the Navy Reserve: Objectives and Method

In response to these concerns and others, the Secretary of the Navy signed a policy memorandum in January 2021 discontinuing involuntary activation of Navy and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) RC forces in support of OCO IA requirements, effective October 2022.⁵ Involuntary activation of reserves for OCO requirements are limited to activation to the service members' programmed billets at their assigned commands. Individual augmentation requirements might continue to be sourced by Navy Reserve service personnel on a voluntary basis.

This policy is in effect, but the demand for IAs continues. There is a strong likelihood that other contingencies will arise, putting a demand on force structure. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) continue to send the Joint Staff requests for forces to support ad hoc and emergent requirements via manpower allocations beyond what is available via assigned forces or unit force allocations. The IA assignments over the past generation were not made with any specific appreciation of the overall impact on readiness of the reserve force altogether, or the individual units from which the IAs were drawn. It is important to understand how and where these policies had an impact on readiness to mitigate these impacts in future contingencies.

Accordingly, this report was commissioned by the Chief of Navy Reserve to examine the impact of Navy individual augmentation to the Navy Reserve as it relates to recruiting, retention, individual and unit readiness, and ability to maintain a ratio of time deployed to time at home (*dwell*).⁶ This examination included an in-depth analysis from legal and policy perspectives of IA requirement generation and sourcing practices by the Joint Staff and the services.

For there to be readiness impact on the Navy Reserve from individual augmentations, there should be an identifiable and measurable outcome on the units providing the augmentations. Our method was to look for evidence in an available database that showed the originating units, the people assigned, the numbers assigned, the duration of assignment, and various other factors that might have an impact on the Navy Reserve, at both the unit and broader organizational levels.

To conduct this analysis, we used a dataset provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command detailing the individual and unit activations for the RC and AC from 2012 to 2021. The dataset included information on the enlisted ratings or officer designators assigned, the providing command, the receiving command, the dates assigned, whether the billets were filled

⁵ U.S. Fleet Forces Command, *IA Joint Report*, 16th ed., May 2022.

⁶ *Dwell* is a policy decision, and it could be waived or a member could choose to volunteer within a dwell period.

voluntarily or involuntarily, and whether the receiving activities were Navy or joint. We will describe this database in more detail in Chapter 2.

This approach is highly objective and readily reproducible. It does not imply any value judgment about what the assigned units or individuals did or what they might have done had they not been assigned. The results from using this approach show only which components were activated and the consequent reserve force impacts, and derives conclusions from that.

Definitions Used in This Report

The terminology used to discuss mobilization status can be confusing, with such terms as *unit activation* or *individual augmentation* sometimes having multiple, occasionally contrary, meanings. The database we used includes data for different classes of activation and mobilization, and we want to be clear about our interpretation. Accordingly, we provide the following definitions, which are not doctrinal but reflect the apparent use in the database and by the individuals we interviewed:

- **Activation.** This occurs when a reserve force member is ordered from civilian to military status. Individual augmentation requires an activation, but activation does not imply individual augmentation.
- **Mobilization.** This is the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) process for activating reservists.
- **Mobilization billet.** Reservists serve in operational support centers pending activation into a billet that they expect to occupy during a mobilization period.
- **Global Force Management (GFM).** This is the DoD process for allocating and scheduling resources for use by combatant commands (CCMDs), normally through scheduled movements and deployments, but also through surge requirements.
- **Deployment.** This occurs when a unit or individual leaves a home station under orders for a specified period. Ad hoc deployment occurs when the deployment falls outside the deployment cycle that has been established in the GFM process.
- **Request for forces (RFF).** This is the process by which the Joint Staff receives and adjudicates requests for individual or unit resources and assigns these requests to a service to fill them.
- **Request for service (RFS).** This is the process by which the Navy receives and adjudicates requests for unit or personnel resources from within the Navy.
- **Unit activation.** The database we employed distinguishes between “IA” and “unit” activation. Unit activation occurs when an organized command is ordered to active duty and sent under orders for deployment. Therefore, *unit* is shorthand for “unit activation for ad hoc deployment.”
- **Individual augmentation.** Individual service members leave a command and go to another for duty. This is temporary duty, but it might be extended temporary duty.

We do emphasize that the terminology used here is for clarity in the process of doing the research and reflects usage we found in the provided database. The terminology is not intended as doctrinal definitions.

Organization of This Report

In Chapter 2, we discuss the observed pattern of reserve force individual augmentation and unit deployment. In Chapter 3, we look at patterns of activation of reserve units that have the character of commissioned operational units (e.g., aviation squadrons). In Chapter 4, we examine the potential impact of individual augmentations on both the originating units and the individuals. In Chapter 5, we discuss possible force structure implications of repeated IAs and ad hoc unit deployments. In, Chapter 6, we present conclusions and recommendations from our study.

The Navy Reserve Force Burden After 2011

To understand the burden on the Navy Reserve, we used a large database provided by U.S. Fleet Force Command that documents all individual RC deployments since January 1, 2012. It also contains AC deployments that occurred outside an individual's normal deployment cycle. There are 43,303 individual data entries within the database. Each data entry represents a request by a unit (active or reserve) for one individual deployment to augment that unit for a specified period. Each request contains the following information:


- designator or rating and grade
- individual's originating unit or parent unit identification code (UIC)
- the requesting unit or ultimate UIC (UltUIC)
- billet description
- location
- deployment start and end dates
- AC or RC
- mission type, which is either *maritime* or *joint*; maritime implies a Navy UltUIC whereas joint implies non-Navy UltUIC
- individual deployment is characterized as either an IA or as a unit deployment
- operation (e.g., Global War on Terrorism [GWOT], coronavirus disease 2019 [COVID-19]).

Comparing the ACs and RCs

The RC accounted for 74 percent of the data entries, with 31,938 individual deployments, while the AC contributed the remaining 11,375. The average deployment lengths were slightly longer for the RC: 295 days versus 257 days. Most deployments (99 percent) were less than two years in duration. Figure 2.1 contains line graphs (nonstacked) comparing the number of RC and AC personnel deployed at a time from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021. It also shows the percentage of deployed personnel that came from the RC. For example, on March 1, 2016, there were 659 AC and 2,249 RC personnel deployed. The percentage of RC personnel deployed that day was 77 percent (right axis in Figure 2.1).

FIGURE 2.1

Comparing the AC and RC Deployment Numbers from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

There are two notable increases in the RC deployment numbers. The first begins in 2012 and goes through 2014. This increase was at the end of a forcewide surge in deployments to Afghanistan, and overall joint force numbers were coming down during this 2012–2014 period.¹ However, IAs during this period were at a high level, with the RC taking on an increasingly large percentage of the commitment to provide IAs. In February 2013, there were more than 2,000 Navy IAs in Afghanistan with both the AC and RC contributing more than 1,000 each. By 2014, the Navy RC was sending nearly twice as many people as the AC.


The COVID-19 pandemic led to the second noticeable surge beginning in April 2020. This was primarily an RC operation. From August 2020 to March 2021, the RC maintained more than 1,000 deployments in support of the COVID-19 response. Between the two surges, RC demand increased for the most part, while AC demand generally decreased. During that time, the RC's percentage of support rose from 74 percent to 85 percent relative to the AC.

Both components provided IA and unit deployers and joint and maritime deployers. Figure 2.2 compares the IA and unit deployment breakdowns for both AC and RC over time. Figure 2.3 does the same for joint and maritime deployers. Both figures contain stacked or additive graphs.

More than 93 percent of the AC deployments were designated as IA deployments. Most of the 769 AC unit deployments were medical personnel supporting the USMC. RC deployments were more evenly distributed between IA deployments (58 percent) and unit deployments (42 percent). Reserve flying units, Navy construction battalions or Seabees, Maritime Expe-


¹ "A Timeline of U.S. Troops Levels in Afghanistan," *Military Times*, July 6, 2016.

FIGURE 2.2
Comparing the AC and RC IA and Unit Deployment Numbers from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 2.3
Comparing the AC and RC Joint and Maritime Deployment Numbers from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

ditionary Security Squadrons (MSRONs), and Navy Special Warfare (NSW) units provided a large portion of the RC unit deployments in the database. A portion of the unit deployers closely resembled the IA deployers in that they often consisted of combinations of single or small groups of individuals from the same parent UICs to form a deployed unit.

Overall, joint deployments made up almost half (49 percent) of AC deployments, although more than one-half of those occurred during the Afghanistan surge (Table 2.1). After the surge, joint deployments averaged 40 percent of AC deployments until 2020, when they tailed off. Joint deployments made up less than one-third of all RC deployments. Between surges,

TABLE 2.1

Total Numbers and Percentages for Combinations of Unit and IA and Joint and Maritime Deployments for Both AC and RC

	AC		RC	
	Unit	IA	Unit	IA
Joint	0 (0%)	5,522 (49%)	393 (1%)	9,683 (30%)
Maritime	769 (6%)	5,084 (45%)	12,916 (41%)	8,936 (28%)

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

RC joint numbers remained relatively steady (between 600 and 800 deployed personnel), whereas maritime deployments rose steadily from 1,100 personnel in November 2014 to more than 2,000 personnel in May 2018, then declined slightly prior to the initial COVID-19 surge. After the initial COVID-19 wave in early 2020, Navy units requested the bulk of RC personnel during the crisis. Finally, Table 2.1 breaks down the numbers across the four subgroups for both the AC and RC, including their percentages within each. Note that 393 RC joint unit deployments were almost entirely medical personnel in support of the COVID-19 response.

RC IAs

Deployments coded as IAs accounted for 58 percent of all RC deployments within the database. In this section, we further investigated IA deployment trends by considering mission type (joint and maritime), deployment location, rank and designator or rating, and parent UICs and/or UltUICs.


Joint and Maritime Mission Types

Figure 2.4 contains line graphs of the reserve joint and maritime deployments from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021. There were slightly more joint IAs than maritime ones: 9,683 versus 8,936. Reserve IA deployment numbers were relatively stable with a slight increase during the Afghanistan surge, a larger increase during the COVID-19 pandemic, and a slight but steady increase in between the two surges. Joint IAs played a much bigger role during the Afghanistan surge, while both joint and maritime IA numbers surged during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is interesting to note that joint IA numbers remained fairly constant from 2015 through 2019, at around 750 deployed personnel on average; conversely, maritime IA deployments steadily increased from approximately 600 in 2015 to nearly 1,000 just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020).

The maritime mission type is composed of five subcategories: Navy base operation support–infrastructure (BOS-I), NSW support, maritime, NSW unit deployment, and USMC

FIGURE 2.4

Joint And Maritime IA Deployment Numbers for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.


deployment. The last two subcategories had no deployments coded as IA. “Maritime” is likely a catch-all for those deployments that do not fall within the other categories. A deployment of 143 master at arms (MA) to Bahrain in January 2016 caused the large jump in Navy BOS-I numbers. The three spikes afterward were from three additional large deployments of MAs also to Bahrain. Overall, both maritime and Navy BOS-I accounted for 44 percent and NSW support for 12 percent of the reserve maritime IA deployments (Figure 2.5).

IAs by Operation

All individual deployments were in support of a specific operation. More than 94 percent of reserve IAs supported the GWOT; 5 percent supported the COVID-19 response; and less than 1 percent supported other operations.² Of all RC IA deployments in support of GWOT, approximately 53 percent supported joint commands. This value peaked at nearly 85 percent during the Afghanistan surge. However, after the surge, it declined steadily from about 55 percent to below 30 percent by December 2021 (Figure 2.6).


² The remaining operations include Ebola, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, non-GWOT CCMD support, and United Nations military observers.

FIGURE 2.5
Maritime IA Deployment Numbers by Subcategory for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 2.6
IA Deployment Numbers for the RC by Operation from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.


IAs by Enlisted and Officer Rank

Figure 2.7 contains the IA deployment breakdown by enlisted versus officer and then by rank within each. Enlisted personnel accounted for 63 percent of the reserve IA deployments. E-5 was by far the highest-demand enlisted rank, with more than 4,000 database entries, and 85 percent of enlisted personnel were ranked E-6 or lower. Conversely, O-4 was the highest-demand officer rank (2,755) and 95 percent of the officers were of rank O-5 and lower.

Majority of IAs Were to Africa or the Middle East

There were 294 receiving units in the database; of these, 150 requested at least one Navy Reserve IA from 2012 to 2021. Navy and joint commands in Djibouti requested the most Navy Reserve IAs, with 3,500 requests within the database. Afghanistan was second, with 3,236 requests. The top ten UltUIC requesters totaled approximately 75 percent of all Navy Reserve IA requests.

FIGURE 2.7
Reserve IA Deployment Numbers for Enlisted and Officer by Rank from March 1, 2012,
to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Unit Activations

The Navy Reserve has within it units that function as commands. Each of these commands has a mission and a command structure; trains together for operational employment; and, in some cases, normally deploys as part of the GFM process.

Within the U.S. Fleet Forces Command database that we used as the basis for our analysis, there is a class of activation called *unit* in which individuals are deployed together to meet a request for forces. This is a somewhat different process than would be employed for deployment of a unit such as a commissioned ship, in that this would be handled completely within the GFM process. If a destroyer or amphibious ship deploys out of cycle, every crewmember is not considered to be an individually requested movement. The unit activations found in the database appear to be reserve units where reservists serving in a commissioned unit are activated together.


Use of Units in This Report

The Navy Reserve has administrative units whose functions are to provide reservists a venue for training and individual readiness. They do not deploy and do not have a mission beyond training and readiness of reservists who are in a geographical area. Although this is an important mission set, these units are not conceived as groups intended to deploy but as providers of reservists for mobilization billets. We will consider these individuals in a subsequent chapter; our focus in this chapter is on units that were organized to deploy together and were deployed in advance of what might have been expected in normal GFM scheduling.

RC Unit Deployers

Unit deployments accounted for 42 percent of all RC deployments within the database. More than 97 percent were maritime (e.g., requested by Navy commands and units). All 393 joint deployments supported the initial COVID-19 pandemic response (see Figure 3.1).

FIGURE 3.1
Joint and Maritime Unit Deployment Numbers for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Most (87 percent) of the maritime deployments were coded as “maritime” and 9 percent coded as “NSW unit support.”¹

Unit Deployments by Operation

Nearly 81 percent of unit deployments were in support of GWOT, whereas 15 percent supported the COVID-19 response (see Figure 3.2).² During the COVID-19 pandemic, the 393 joint deployments were almost entirely medical personnel. On the other hand, 1,589 COVID-19 deployments were requested by the Navy and a large majority of these were any person of a particular paygrade that backfilled to Navy bases to support base operations during the pandemic.

Unit Deployers: Parent UICs and Designators and Ratings


There were 4,219 parent UICs in the database, of which 1,414 provide at least one RC personnel for unit deployment. The distribution of reserve unit deployers across parent UICs is similar to the IA deployers with 76 percent of the parent UICs contributing fewer than 10 per-

¹ In this case, 3 percent were USMC deployments and 1 percent were NAVY BOS-I.

² These figures compared with 94 percent of IA deployment supporting GWOT and 5 percent supporting the COVID-19 response.

FIGURE 3.2

Unit Deployment Numbers for the RC from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

sonnel. However, there were considerably more parent UICs with at least 50 unit deployments (53 x parent UICs). By inspection, of these 53 parent UICs, there were


- four reserve flying squadrons (HSC-85, VAQ-209, VP-62, VP-69)
- eight NSW units
- 20 MSRON-related units
- 18 Seabee-related units³
- two medical units
- one supply/logistics unit.

Reserve Maritime Patrol Squadron Deployments

There were two reserve maritime patrol squadrons, VP-62 and VP-69. Figure 3.3 plots personnel deployments (unit and IA) from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021. Between both squadrons, there were 263 unit deployments and only five IA deployments. Figure 3.4 shows four distinct unit deployments; for each, both squadrons sent unit detachments to the same UltUIC (either VP-62 or VP-69) at roughly the same time to form a deployed VP unit. All four deployments were to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) theater. The first three deployments were in support of GWOT, while the last one in March 2020 provided non-GWOT CCMD support. All four deployments included some number of deployers from outside the VP squadrons. The number of outside deployers ranged from eight to 15 individuals account-


³ Parent UIC 83748 (Seabee-related) had the most unit deployments, with 175.

FIGURE 3.3
VP-62 and VP-69 Deployment Numbers March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 3.4
Reserve Unit Deployments to MSRON-11 from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

ing for about 14 percent of all deployments to VP-62 and VP-69. Although coded as “unit” deployments, these were either single individuals or small groups (fewer than four individuals) from different parent UICs.

Maximum demand for reserve VP personnel reached 65 in September 2013 during the first deployment. If we include the five-year dwell restriction, then, at one point, 190 VP per-

sonnel were unavailable to deploy for other operations or exercises. This value averaged 143 during and after the third deployment in September 2017.

Reserve MSRON Deployments

We identified 28 parent UICs that appeared to have large cadres of reserve MSRON personnel. Like the maritime patrol squadrons, these often deployed as unit detachments. But, unlike the VP squadrons, multiple parent UICs (more than ten at times) cobbled together unit deployments to form an overseas MSRON. Figure 3.4 shows the reserve unit deployments to UltUIC 55823 (MSRON-11). Each band represents personnel from one of the 28 MSRON parent UICs. Some bands contain at least 20 people from the same parent UIC, while others contain only a few people. Reserve Seabee unit deployments look similar.

Unit Deployments by Designator

Nine enlisted ratings had more than 500 unit deployments. Four of them—builder (BU), construction electrician (CE), construction mechanic (CM), and equipment operator (EO)—were the primary ratings in the Seabee unit deployments. Boatswain mate (BM) and MA were in high demand during the MSRON unit deployments. However, the enlisted ratings with the highest demand were unspecific requests for any rating within a paygrade for airman (AN) with 1,307 unit deployments. More than 99 percent of them were in response to the COVID-19 crisis with many AN personnel backfilling at Navy bases. More than 1,200 AN were deployed from November 2020 to February 2021. There were far fewer unit deployments for officers, which comprised only 17 percent of deployments. Highest-demand officer designators include 13XX, 310X, 510X, and medical personnel. Table 3.1 contains the maximum unit deployment demands alone and with two- and five-year postdeployment dwells.

Three enlisted ratings—hospital corpsman (HM), logistics specialist (LS), and MA—were in high demand for both IA and unit deployments. Combining IA and unit deployments, their maximum demand signals were

- HM: 572 personnel; 1,116 (plus a two-year dwell) and 1,629 (plus a five-year dwell)
- LS: 236 personnel; 669 (plus a two-year dwell) and 1,285 (plus a five-year dwell)
- MA: 448 personnel; 1,050 (plus a two-year dwell) and 1,785 (plus a five-year dwell).

TABLE 3.1
Maximum Unit Demand Signals for Select Ratings and Designators for Deployments Alone and the Addition of Five-Year Postdeployment Dwells

Designator	Unit	Plus 5-Year Dwell
AN	1,252	1,313
MA	129	480
BM	172	578
BU	249	801
CE	111	421
CM	199	541
EO	215	537
HM	420	661
LS	114	515
13XX	52	187
2XXX	303	327
310X	25	139
510X	53	161

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Individual Augmentation: Unit and Personnel Impact

IAs are in a different category in the database and cover cases in which individuals were ordered from one command into a different command, with no indication that these were ordered from units as part of a deployment. These individuals were requested under the RFF process, but the request was for an individual or skill, not for a unit or capability.

Use of these could have a readiness impact in two different ways. One is in impact on the originating unit. Once a person goes to individual augmentation status, that individual is gone from the command without a presumption of replacement for the period of absence. Whether this absence might have an impact depends on the command and the individual. If an individual is one of several in a command, or if the command is primarily administrative, the impact might not be significant. An individual key to an operational command's functioning might, however, have an impact, particularly if the individual is the unit's commanding or executive officer.


A second possibility is that use of IAs could affect the force at a general level. A major example of such impact would be difficulty maintaining end strength because individuals either left or declined to join the Navy Reserve as the result of a possible IA deployment. Evidence of impact could include difficulty filling the billets—with involuntary activations being the norm—and another would be evidence that reservists leave the service or individuals decline to join because of the possibility of being put on as an IA.

IAs: Impact on the Parent Unit

If any particular unit contributed a significant number of IAs either in a given year or across the whole time frame, that could have affected that unit's readiness. The deployed individuals would have been gone for the period deployed and then for a mandated dwell thereafter. Although a small number deployed might have an impact, a large number is very likely to do so.

To determine whether any one set of units might have been affected by large numbers, we examined the data to assess whether any unit or set of units seemed to be unduly tasked as IAs. Per Figure 4.1, 70 percent of the 4,219 units tasked with providing IAs provided fewer than ten IAs, one-half provided fewer than five, and 418—around 10 percent—deployed only

FIGURE 4.1
Distribution of Reserve IAs across Parent UICs



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

NOTE: The break in the first two columns indicates that the scale is compressed above 160.

one IA in the ten-year period of the, 2,311 provided at least one RC member for deployment.¹ Twenty-eight parent UICs deployed 50 or more.

The numbers in and of themselves do not completely represent potential impact. There was limited information on the size of the originating units, so it would be difficult to tell the percentage impact on each unit. What we can determine is that there was an effort to spread the use of IAs among many different units, not repeatedly return to a few. For any given billet, there were anywhere between 50 and 150 parent units providing personnel for these billets across the whole period. In the case of the most commonly requested billet (Patrol/Observation Post/Entry Control Point) that was typically assigned in either Djibouti or Bahrain, there were 191 unique parent units with an average contribution from each of three people.

Of the 28 parent UICs that contributed 50 or more reserve IAs, most appear to be either reserve medical units or reserve units with a preponderance of intelligence personnel. We will examine the distribution of officer designators and enlisted ratings across the population of Navy IAs in the next chapter. However, we do not have a strong sense of whether these units that offered a large number of medical or intelligence personnel suffered an operational impact. It appears that these units were primarily constituted for the purpose of providing an administrative home for these individuals, and thus it would be natural for them to provide these personnel to units with an operational need.

¹ In this distribution, 134 parent UICs contributed both AC and RC personnel; 2,177 parent UICs contributed only RC personnel.

IAs by Office Designator and/or Enlisted Rating

The Navy maintains a force structure with an authorized number of personnel in different officer designators and enlisted ratings assigned to different commands. In most cases, these individuals are assigned to perform missions within the command; there are also cases in which the command exists to provide administrative support pending the individual's activation. We have a more complete examination of force structure in Chapter 5, but here we look at the potential impact on the parent units.

We first examined the demand for ratings and designators. Of the 164 ratings and designators, 55 had no IA deployments and 129 had fewer than 100. Among enlisted ratings, MA was the highest-demand rating of reserve IA deployments with 1,975 data entries, out of an available pool of 10,500 MAs.² The majority of these were assigned to commands in Djibouti or Bahrain as part of the security guard force. Other high-demand enlisted ratings included HM, IS, LS, information technician (IT), and administration yeoman (YN). The presence of the IS rating as high demand might be particularly noteworthy in that there were about 3,000 IS personnel in the Navy throughout the 2012–2021 period,³ while there were about 8,500 LSs and 30,000 HMs.⁴

Among officers, intelligence officer (183X) was the highest-demand officer designator with 945 data entries. General line officers (105X), warfare specialist line officers (11XX), and aviation officers (13XX) each had nearly 500 entries apiece. Similar numbers apply for medical corps/medical service corps officers (29XX) and supply corps officers (310X). Intelligence officers are one of the smallest of the Navy officer community, indicating that relative to the size, this particular community has provided an outsize number of IAs (see Figure 4.2).


For this particular enlisted rating and particular officer designator, assigning personnel as an IA could have had a significant impact on the Navy's overall readiness for reacting to an operation other than the one for which the IA was assigned. With a total force structure of 3,000 IS, for example, in any given year, more than a quarter of these would not be available for assignment if the Navy were to follow its rules on dwell. We will examine force structure implications in more detail in Chapter 5, but the conclusion that IAs would have affected the Navy's ability to respond in at least this critical area seems clear.

² USS Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., "Master-at-Arms (MAA): A Vital Role In The Navy," webpage, September 23, 2023.

³ USS Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., "Navy Intelligence Specialists: Collecting, Analyzing, and Disseminating Information," webpage, September 26, 2022.

⁴ Navy CyberSpace, "Navy Logistics Specialist Rating," webpage, undated; Navy Medicine, "Hospital Corps," webpage, undated.

FIGURE 4.2

Intelligence Specialist and Intelligence Officer (183X) Reserve IAs

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Senior Leaders and IA Assignments

During an interview, we received an anecdotal observation that there were cases in which both the commanding officer and executive officer of a unit were sent on individual augmentation at the same time, with a resulting impact on the originating unit.⁵ If this were more than an isolated occurrence, this could involve significant impact. The database does not describe the billet that the augmentee occupied at the providing command. It does provide paygrade, however, and this could be an indication that the individual occupied a command or senior leadership billet. We thus looked for cases in which a command provided a senior member to fill a billet.

Looking first at the O-6 paygrade. There were 57 units that provided more than one O-6 from their unit as an IA from 2012 to 2021. Table 4.1 shows the parent units, the total number of IAs, and the years in which the individuals were deployed. For example, the first entry in the table shows that parent unit 41394 provided three O-6 IAs, one each in 2016, 2018, and 2021. The majority of these cases are multiple deployments of one individual. There are only eight units that deployed multiple O-6s at the same time. These are highlighted. In every case except one, these involve two O-6s deployed at the same time, and it is possible that these were senior leaders in the originating units. However, in the one case in which more than two were deployed, the officers involved were surgeons, who are generally part of a very senior force structure. It would not be remarkable for a hospital or other medical unit to have several O-6s, with most not serving in leadership positions.

⁵ Senior Navy Reserve officer, interview with authors, July 2022.

TABLE 4.1
Multiple O-6s Departing in the Same Calendar Year

Parent UIC	Quantity	Year and Billet Notes
85336	2	Both in 2018, different billets
85726	2	Both in 2021, different billets
86216	2	Both in 2015, both chaplains (different locations)
86649	2	Both in 2019, different billets
86925	2	Both in 2012, different billets
88145	2	Both in 2021, different billets
88500	5	Two in 2014, three in 2015, 2016 (all chief surgeons)

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Our conclusions are provisional because we could not identify the actual names and compositions of the units, only their identification codes. The units might have been subunits of larger units; they might have been wholly administrative constructs and not functioning commands. We did not find a record of UICs previously used and discarded, so we cannot say for certain what the exact nature of the commands are. Some might be commands that had many O-6s, such as hospitals with senior medical officers, where the loss of a single senior leader might not have serious impacts. However, with all that stipulated, there are only a small number of cases in which a command gave up more than one O-6, and even fewer cases where a command supplied more than one at a time.

We also looked at the distribution of E-9s, O-5s, and O-4s serving as IAs, under the assumption that some of these might be serving in command billets. We do not have complete information as to which billets the individuals were occupying in the originating command—therefore, as with the O-6 distribution, the results are provisional. However, the general pattern is that the numbers of senior personnel requested for IA deployment were relatively stable, with a single large jump in 2020 associated with COVID-19 response (see the shaded row in Table 4.2). This pattern does not suggest that the senior personnel were not filling important billets in the originating commands, but it does suggest that senior personnel were not being picked off in large numbers to fill IA billets.

In 2020, 38 percent of O-5s and 57 percent of O-4s participated in the initial COVID-19 response, but only 7 percent of the O-6s and none of the E-9s were involved in those operations.

Possible Broader Impact—Morale, Recruitment, and Retention

If it is not apparent that IAs had a major impact on any particular unit across most ratings, it does not necessarily follow that there were no impacts on the reserve overall. In particular, if being an IA was a major dissatisfier for individuals, such an assignment might cause them to not reenlist, or it might deter candidates from joining in the first place, either by direct acces-

TABLE 4.2
Senior Leader IA Deployments by Calendar Year

Calendar Year	O-6	E-9	O-5	O-4
2012	31	9	156	264
2013	24	8	136	262
2014	30	7	137	252
2015	21	6	113	251
2016	24	3	103	252
2017	33	8	147	287
2018	33	7	152	257
2019	27	7	157	258
2020	61	6	234	476
2021	39	11	75	196
Total	323	72	1,410	2,755

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

NOTE: Shaded row indicates single large jump in 2020 associated with COVID-19 response.

sion from civilian life or from service on active duty. Unfortunately, there are no data kept on the reasons why individuals leave the service, so we are required to infer possible impacts. We start by looking at whether there was difficulty getting members to fill IA assignments, which can be voluntary or involuntary. We then look at the overall retention and recruitment of the Navy Reserve to see whether there is any association with the prevalence of IA assignments. The readiness impacts in these cases would be generalized rather than specific to commands.

Voluntary or Involuntary Activation: Enlisted

Across the whole period, the majority of IA deployments were voluntary. Table 4.3 breaks down enlisted and officer IAs by rating and/or designator. For IA deployments requiring enlisted reservists of various ratings, 80 percent were voluntarily filled. ITs were an exception, with a 60 percent rate of voluntary activation and an even lower percentage volunteering for deployments to Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Djibouti. Officers, particularly surface, submarine, and aviation line officers, were slightly more reluctant to volunteer (73 percent overall), but even here, the volunteer rate is above 50 percent.

Figures 4.3 to 4.13 break down voluntary and/or involuntary percentages across time by rating or designator. The bars are stacked, with black bars representing voluntary activations, the lighter bars the involuntary, and the light blue line the percentage of involuntary.

Intelligence specialists (ISs) experienced a jump in involuntary activations in the middle of the period; for the most part, these individuals volunteered by large majorities (see Figure 4.3).


TABLE 4.3
Enlisted and Officer Voluntary Percentages for IAs

Designator	IA Mobilizations	Voluntary (%)	AFG, Voluntary (%)	Central Command, Voluntary (%)	Bahrain, Voluntary (%)	Djibouti, Voluntary (%)	CONUS, Voluntary (%)
Enlisted							
HM	1,597	82	82	N/A	N/A	86	86
IS	1,227	84	81	90	N/A	79	82
IT	836	60	44	62	59	47	73
LS	1,310	87	90	98	87	76	96
MA	1,981	90	N/A	91	77	86	96
YN	817	84	N/A	N/A	N/A	86	97
Officer							
10XX	566	62	N/A	56	62	38	90
11XX	907	57	52	N/A	52	38	79
13XX	831	55	46	53	N/A	44	73
18XX	1,258	75	68	74	86	64	85
29XX	698	84	66	N/A	N/A	N/A	99
310X	614	86	92	92	N/A	75	N/A

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

NOTE: AFG = Afghanistan; CONUS = continental United States; N/A = none were assigned.

FIGURE 4.3
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of ISSs




SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

HMs across the period predominantly volunteered, but there are two periods in which there were spikes in involuntary activations: The first appeared to be immediately following the period that reservists began taking on the majority of IA assignments, and the second was late in the period, around the time of the COVID-19 epidemic (Figure 4.4). There are no obvious contextual reasons for the first spike in involuntary activations, but the second might be explained by the widespread demand for medical professionals during the COVID-19 crisis. Reservists have civilian professions, and medical personnel who might activate as reservists would likely have already been fully employed dealing with the pandemic. The only means to draw them away from their civilian jobs might be involuntary activation. With all that noted, across the period, the large majority of IA assignments for HMs were voluntarily filled.

ITs are the one enlisted rating in which the involuntary rate goes above 50 percent during any time from 2012 to 2021 (Figure 4.5). This occurs twice, once in 2016 and again in 2021. Demand for this rating increased overall across the entire time frame and the contextual reasons for the drop in volunteers in these two periods are not completely clear. This is a profession with a strong external job market, so there might have been market factors driving reluctance to volunteer for IA assignments.


MAs overwhelmingly volunteer (Figure 4.6). There are changes across the period, but the percentage remains flat. The same pattern applies for the YN rating and overall across the enlisted reserve force.

FIGURE 4.4
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of HMs




SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 4.5
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of ITs



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 4.6
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of MAs



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Voluntary and Involuntary Officers


The pattern of primarily voluntary activation is not as pronounced with officers, who, although still predominantly volunteering, do have some designators with a rate of volunteering for IA activation near 50 percent (Figure 4.7). The number requiring involuntary activation was highest among general unrestricted line officers (10XX), surface and submarine line officers, and aviators. The overall numbers of officer IAs were relatively small compared with enlisted IAs—unsurprising given Navy force structure—but the numbers suggest that although activation as an IA might have been a dissatisfier of reserve officers, for the majority of IA billets, there were volunteers.

General unrestricted line officers (10XX) were not in great demand, but when they were, they volunteered at a rate of 25 percent to 40 percent (Figure 4.8). The periods where the rate goes above 50 percent generally corresponds to a period in which relatively few volunteers were required.

Surface, submarine, special warfare, and explosive ordnance disposal officers never go above a 50 percent involuntary rate and experience a fairly steady demand across the period. A majority volunteer, but it is not a strong majority (Figure 4.9).


Aviators generally volunteer for IA activation at a lower rate than other officers. We noted in our discussion of unit activations that the Navy did attempt to exempt members of reserve squadrons from deploying as IAs as part of a unit. This would have at least ensured that reservist pilots and flight officers were performing duties that would promote aviation currency. It would not be surprising that reserve aviators would be dubious of IA billets in which the relationship with currency might be less clear (Figure 4.10).

FIGURE 4.7
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of YNs




SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 4.8
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of General Unrestricted Line Officers (10XX)




SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 4.9
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Warfare Specialist Line Officers (11XX)



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 4.10
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Aviation Officers (13XX)



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Information warfare officers by and large volunteer. We will examine this particular designator in more detail as we consider force structure, but the essential pattern with this designator is that members from a limited number of units oriented toward support of these specialized personnel volunteer for billets that, while not necessarily their mobilization billets, are billets that are effectively aligned with an intelligence mission. This demand increased across the period (Figure 4.11).

The data with respect to medical corps officers show steady demand and a general willingness to volunteer. Both the spike in demand in 2020 and the spike in involuntary activations track with a similar pattern for enlisted HMs (Figure 4.12).


Supply corps officers also volunteered for IA activation to a substantial degree, at times requiring no involuntary activations (Figure 4.13).

Maintaining End Strength

An often-repeated narrative was that IA activation was a sufficient dissatisfier to either keep eligible civilians or departing active-duty members from joining the reserve or to cause members to leave rather than deal with repeated IA assignments. As noted earlier, we did not have direct statement or survey information from people who left, let alone from people who never decided to join.


We do have information on the annual end strength of the reserve force, along with the annual numbers of people who joined or left. *End strength* is the legislatively authorized level and it is affected and controlled by gains and losses (see Table 4.4). Evaluating the annual

FIGURE 4.11
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Information Warfare Officers



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.


FIGURE 4.12
Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of General Medical Corps Officers



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 4.13

Voluntary and Involuntary Activations of Supply Corps Officers (310X)



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

TABLE 4.4

End Strength, Recruitment, and Retention of Navy Reserve Force

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
End strength	62,444	59,254	57,359	57,980	57,824	58,196	59,658	59,152	57,632
Gains	7,626	6,105	7,093	8,965	8,752	8,752	9,426	7,416	7,205
Losses	9,870	9,300	8,988	8,344	8,909	8,709	7,970	7,914	8,696

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

budgets from 2013 to 2022, the drop in end strength of the Navy Reserve from 2013 to 2015 was in line with the requested end strengths for those years.⁶ Subsequent years were also all in line with the projected end strength. In several years the Navy Reserve exceeded projected budgetary end strength, 2019 in particular with a very strong recruitment year. The 2019 budget request was for only 59,100 reserves.⁷ The only shortfall came in 2021,⁸ during which an end strength of 58,800 was requested. This shortfall can most likely be attributed to the COVID-19 response. According to the end strength and accession numbers, there is no evi-

⁶ DoD, *Overview: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request*, February 2012; DoD, *Overview: Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request*, April 2013.

⁷ DoD, *Defense Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request*, February 13, 2018.

⁸ DoD, *Defense Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request*, May 13, 2020.

dence to indicate that IAs had a strong influence in the Navy Reserve's ability to recruit or maintain end strength. Although there was a gradual increase of IAs into 2020 before the spike of IAs in support of the COVID-19 response, gains in the Navy Reserve met or actually exceeded budgetary projections. Losses and/or retention within the Navy Reserve, after an initial drawdown, remained relatively steady from 2015 to 2019.

Without an exit survey or specific documentation, we have no evidence to be able to draw a correlation between IAs and sailors exiting the reserves. A drop in retention or recruitment might be related to policy decisions rather than indications of members being dissatisfied or candidates being reluctant to join. However, the fundamental characteristic of end strength is that it stays relatively stable. There is a 5 percent drop from 2013 to 2014, and this appears to have been a legislatively mandated decrease in end strength.⁹ Thereafter, the end strength numbers vary by no more than 2 percent. Gains do vary, dropping in 2013, increasing strongly in 2015, with what would appear to be a gain and then an adjustment from 2018 to 2020. Losses are generally within a 2 percent band.

IA Impact on Navy Reserve Readiness Is Not Reflected in Obvious Direct Impact on Units or on Overall Force Retention

We have examined several potential impacts on the Navy Reserve's readiness resulting from individual augmentations. Most obviously, when members are on IA assignment, they are not available for other tasking and, if dwell were observed, would not be available for a significant period even after the tasking ends.

However, the impact was spread across more than 2,000 reserve units. Moreover, the Navy generally did not assign senior leaders from a single unit simultaneously as an IA.

With respect to willingness to fill the billets, IA assignments were predominately filled by volunteers, although there were variations by rating and designator. Among officers, the results are mixed for unrestricted line officers; for information warfare officers, there appeared to be near total willingness to volunteer for IA assignment.

Finally, whatever dissatisfaction there might have been with IA assignment or unit deployment, it is not apparent in the end strength, recruiting, and retention data in Table 4.4. That is not to say that recruiting and retention were not adversely affected within various subsets of the total force, such as specific ratings, designators, rank, experience, and other areas.

⁹ DoD, 2013.

Force Structure Shortfalls: Have Use of IAs Hidden a Problem?

The Navy used its reserve force to fill billets held to be important for both the joint force and for the Navy itself. For unit deployments, the Navy tried to keep units together, although, in many cases, it was required to put units together to make a complete deployed unit.

What does seem apparent is that some units, ratings, and designators are very much in demand, both from joint commands and from specifically Navy commands. The demand for these specialties was persistent across the period and, in some cases, appear to be more core Navy mission than a means of filling a temporary gap. The Navy Reserve provided personnel for critical missions, and the Navy overall made an assessment that some missions took priority over the missions being used as a basis for the Navy's force structure.

These assignments were being made via a process that was intended as a means of filling short-term requirements, and the ability to use this process might have concealed some very real and persistent capability and manpower needs. As the Navy shifts away from using this process, it might be important to consider what long-term needs might still be in play.

Where Were Reservists Deployed?


Despite “pivot to the Pacific” rhetoric and even formal National Defense Strategy guidance to focus on China as a “pacing” threat,¹ the Navy Reserve's unit and IA deployments were still predominantly to the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Figure 5.1 applies specifically to IA assignments, but the unit deployments were similarly sent to GWOT-oriented locations.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) is the destination for a small minority of Navy Reserve IAs. Even after the 2013 decline in required billets in Afghanistan, the demand for reservists in Bahrain, Djibouti, and the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) remained steady, all the way through the 2012–2021 period.² The billets inside CONUS are, by billet description, closely related to GWOT support, except in 2020, when a spike appears for COVID-19 response.

¹ DoD, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy,” March 28, 2022.

² In this context, CENTCOM AOR excludes billets assigned to Afghanistan and Bahrain.

FIGURE 5.1
IA Deployment Numbers by Location for the RC from March 1, 2012, to
December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.
 NOTE: AFRICOM = U.S. Africa Command; EUCOM = U.S. European Command.

The fact that much of this demand appears to be steady suggests that the billets were not one-time requirements but persistent requirements. Individuals and units of a particular type were needed in specific locations, and individuals were sent repeatedly to fill those billets throughout this period. We found no cases in which a need was identified and filled for a while, then apparently dropped as an IA requirement because a permanent billet was established.

Cobbling Together Units

In Chapter 3, we discussed that Navy Expeditionary Combat Command units—such as MSRONS—were sometimes deployed as units but when in theater were actually combined to make a complete unit. To allow multiple deployments of MSRONS, 28 different parent units across that period had to deploy units to complete the missions. Seabees and cargo handling battalions showed a similar pattern. Aviation units, on the other hand, generally deployed as a complete detachment. At the other extreme, deployed medical units were entirely composed of individuals, even though the deployments were characterized as “unit.”

As a means of force generation, having multiple units form in theater as opposed to having them form in the United States and move through a complete training cycle might have advantages. However, the practice might also hide that the requirement for force structure is not one MSRONS, but four, to make one force structure. Consequently, although it might look as if a deployed MSRONS is meeting a reasonable operational tempo goal, the reality is that the units within it might have deployed multiple times.

Recurring Billet Requests

We have looked at the ratings and designators most in demand and identified that the demand for some would be in excess of overall force structure for that rating. If the billets to which they were assigned were not expected to recur, this shortfall would also be temporary. For example, even though hundreds of Navy reservists were assigned to Afghanistan, with some billets filled repeatedly and continuously, this commitment has ended and, along with it, the force structure demand.

However, when a billet is affirmed as a requirement multiple times over several cycles (and was still being requested at the end of the data period) and requires a turnover, this should be considered as permanent force structure and resourced accordingly rather than filled repeatedly by RFFs and/or IAs. Even if the impact on the commands providing the IA is relatively small, the impact on the command receiving the IA might be considerable and deserves assessment and validation.

Recurring Assignments to Bahrain and Djibouti

There were two locations where the Navy repeatedly assigned reservists as IAs over a period of several years: Bahrain (to UICs 3953A and 50190) and Djibouti (to UIC 3955A). Both of those locations were hosts to large headquarters staffs and various support agencies. Both were operated by the Navy as support facilities, which entailed a requirement for a variety of security and support personnel. In Bahrain, there were two primary commands receiving recurring IAs:

- 3953A: 89 RC-rotational billets (51 officer, 38 enlisted)
- 50190: 96 RC-rotational billets (12 officer, 84 enlisted).

The UICs appear in the IA database. They do not appear on the Navy's list of operational commands. The billets are predominantly for support or security.

About 23 percent of the Bahrain deployments were to the UIC 50190, which hosted a variety of billets and included those with the most deployments. Table 5.1 shows the distribution. The numbers listed combine the different grades (and sometimes designator codes) that were a part of each billet. The highlighted row shows the most in-demand billet, which is for personnel to man guard posts and entry control points.

The Navy also worked to ensure that there were overlaps between the relieved and relieving billet occupants. For example, in the case of the Patrol/Observation Post/Entry Control Point billets, across the period, overlaps of up to 90 days were normal, with an average of 58 personnel overlapping. Although the overlap was most pronounced for these billets, other billets—such as aircraft handler, contractor support, and support equipment maintenance—also have overlaps.

The Navy Support Activity (NSA) at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, had a similar pattern to NSA Bahrain as far as recurring billets with required overlaps, as shown in Table 5.2.

TABLE 5.1
IA Assignments to Navy Support Activity in Bahrain

Billet	Designator/OffEnI/Grade	Number of Deployments (All Years)	Percentage of Deployments That Had an Overlap of More Than 90 Days with Someone Else	Average Number of People Brought on (at a Time) for Billet with Overlap of More Than 90 Days	Years Active
Access and badging support	AN/E/5	9	100	3	2019–2021
Aircraft handler	ABH/E/4	85	100	9	2013–2021
Aviation fuel handler	ABF/E/4	16	88	6	2014–2015
Aviation supply tech	LS/E/5 and LS/E/4	23	100	2	2013–2019
Contractor support	LS/E/4	101	100	11	2013–2021
Flight plans	AC/E/5 and AC/E/4	15	100	2	2014–2020
Food inspector	CS/E/5, CS/E/6, and HM/E/6	39	100	2	2012–2021
HM	HM/E/4, HM/E/5, and HM/E/5	14	86	1	2013–2019
Information systems maintenance tech	IT/E/4 and IT/E/5	28	100	3	2016–2021
Patrol/Observation post/ Entry control point	AN/E/3, AN/E/4, MA/E/4, MA/E/5, and MAS/E/3	470	92	58	2016–2020
Post supervisor	AN/E/5 and MA/E/5	85	99	13	2016–2020
Support equipment maintenance	AS/E/4, AS/E/6, AD/E/4, and AD/E/6	81	100	3	2013–2021
Watch commander	MA/E/6 and MA/E/7	22	82	4	2016–2020
Watch supervisor	MA/E/6	76	99	19	2016–2020

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

NOTES: The highlighted row shows the most in-demand billet, which is for personnel to man guard posts and entry control points. "OffEnI" = officer enlisted.

TABLE 5.2

Recurring IA Assignments to NSA Camp Lemonnier

Billet	Designator/ OffEnl/Grade	Number of Deployments (All Years)	Percentage of Deployments That Had an Overlap of More Than 90 Days with Someone Else	Average Number of People Brought on (at a Time) for Billet with Overlap of More Than 90 Days	Years Active
Air traffic control operator	AC/E/4, AC/E/5, and AC/E/6	32	91	3	2014–2021
Armorer	AO/E/4, GM/E/4, and GM/E/5	37	92	2	2013–2021
Base access control	MA/E/5	30	93	2	2016–2021
Budget analyst	LS/E/5	29	100	2	2013–2020
EKMS clerk	IT/E/5	10	60	2	2015–2018
Flight line patrol/response	IT/E/3	26	92	2	2016–2020
General duty corpsman	H/E/3, HM/E/3, HM/E/4, HM/E/5, and HM/E/6	81	99	3	2013–2019
Key management infrastructure operating account CL	IT/E/5	7	100	1	2018–2020
Law enforcement personnel	MA/E/5 and MA/E/6	233	95	28	2013–2021
Law enforcement supervisor	MA/E/6	16	100	2	2017–2021
Logistics support center (LSC) logistics support	LS/E/5	11	100	2	2018–2020
Postal clerk	LS/E/5 and LS/E/6	38	79	2	2012–2021
Receipts/transfer clerk	PS/E/5	7	100	2	2018–2021
Security force team member (male only)	GM/E/5	35	100	14	2014–2015

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database. NOTE: "OffEnl" = officer enlisted.

The top two billets for Djibouti were law enforcement personnel, representing a total of 233 deployments, and general duty corpsman, representing 81. The rest of the billet deployments were generally in the single digits but did not exceed 40. Law enforcement personnel were sent to fill open billets on an average of 28 per deployment. More than 90 percent of the deployments involved overlaps, sometimes up to 90 days.

The results in both Djibouti and Bahrain suggest that there are billets that amounted to a permanent need in these two areas that were being serviced via the IA process. These were important enough to require turnover. This suggests that these billets—of which law enforcement and control point personnel were predominant—were not being treated as temporary fills but continuing requirements. Although it might be possible that these billets were never essential, the Navy did view them as essential enough to keep them continuously manned, with contact turnover.

Senior Officer Enduring Billets

Although we did not find many instances of senior leaders being taken from the same unit, we did see evidence of billets requiring senior leaders being filled repeatedly over time. Table 5.3 shows the most-requested O-6 billets.³

Although there are cases in which there might be gaps in coverage, by and large these billets have been persistently requested and filled. We did not examine all senior officer and enlisted billets, but these O-6 billets indicate that the Navy required senior leaders in these billets for several years, and, as with enlisted MAs, required contact turnover. Whatever opportunity cost might have been present was readily accepted, with no apparent effort to change the sourcing. Again, we do not know whether these requirements were kept because there was a ready source, but we do know that they existed for commands that largely still exist.

Current Navy IA Demand to Bahrain and Djibouti

Figure 5.2 depicts the historical demand via the Navy for IA billets in Bahrain and Djibouti. For the last six months of 2021, the Navy Reserve averaged around 440 personnel deployed to Bahrain and Djibouti (combined) serving in maritime IA billets with an almost equal split between the two locations. However, when accounting for dwell, the Navy Reserve must allocate more than 3,340 personnel to maintain the current level of commitment.


³ We excluded the 52 Navy emergency preparedness liaison officers for cases in which repeated billets have the same title but are known to be activated for emergencies, such as the federal response to COVID-19.

TABLE 5.3
Recurring O-6 Billets

Quantity	Billet	Location	Notes
18	Chief of Staff	Djibouti	Multiple overlaps and multiple occurrences in the same year, including deployments of less than 1 year
12	NALE Director	Qatar	2013–2021 (current to end of data)
9	Commanding Officer	Djibouti	2012–2021 (current to end of data)
8	Command Surgeon	Tampa, Florida	Annually since 2014
8	JTF Chaplain	Djibouti	2012–2018
8	OCS Director	Afghanistan	2016–2021
8	OIC ECRC Det Fort Jackson (Officer In Charge)	Fort Jackson, South Carolina	Annually since 2013
7	4th Mardiv. Chaplain	New Orleans, Louisiana	2017–2021 (current to end of data)
7	Director J2	Cuba/JTF-GTMO	Annually since 2017
7	Director of Logistics	Djibouti	2013–2020
7	SJA	Djibouti	2012–2020
7	Task Group 152.1 Chief of Staff/Chief of Staff	Manama, Bahrain	2014–2021 (current) gapped briefly in 2020
6	Director of Personnel	Djibouti	2012–2018
6	Division Chief	Kuwait	2017–2021 (current)
6	JTF Engineer	Cuba/JTF-GTMO	Annually since 2016
5	AOIC (Executive Officer)	Afghanistan	2017–2020
5	Chief Contingency Contracting Officer	Djibouti	2014 (2 cases), 2018, 2019 (2 cases)
5	CLO Director/CLO Liaison Officer	Cuba/JTF-GTMO	Annually since 2016
5	NAVCENT Safety Officer	Bahrain	2017–2021 (current to end of data)
4	Director CJ1	Kuwait	Annually since 2017

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

FIGURE 5.2

Maritime IA Demand Plus Five-Year Dwell to Bahrain and Djibouti

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.


Force Structure Demands—the Impact of Dwell

By policy, when individuals are ordered into an IA billet, they are afforded a dwell period for a specified period in which they will not be available for tasking. However, assuming dwell is observed, a member being absent for a year makes that member unavailable for several years thereafter. That drives force structure more than simple immediate demand. Figure 5.3 shows the overall demand placed on the Naval Reserve force, including the impact of the five-year dwell policy after deployment.

At the end of 2021, 1,836 Navy reservists were deployed in either an IA or unit billet. This was approximately 3 percent of total force structure at the time. However, if we include the impact of dwell restrictions, then 19,048 reserve personnel (33 percent of the total force structure) were unavailable for other deployments or duties. IA deployments accounted for the majority (19 percent). For those reservists with mobilization billets, it is unclear which of these billets were most affected. Assuming that the unavailability was evenly spread across the reserves, then about 3 percent could not have been immediately mobilized for other combat operations, and another 30 percent would have had to break dwell to do so.

This demand varied across enlisted ratings and officer designators. Table 5.4 shows the difference across the most heavily tasked enlisted ratings and all officer designators. The column numbers are the number of individuals required to fill annual force structure, given demand and a particular dwell policy. If required to fill IA demand without dwell each year, there would need to be at least 213 HM personnel to avoid a shortfall. However, if the 213 members are held to be unavailable for the next several years, the numbers grow.

FIGURE 5.3
Total Demand on Naval Reserve, Including Five-Year Dwell



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

TABLE 5.4
Maximum IA Demand Signals for Select Ratings and Designators for Deployments Alone and the Addition of Five-Year Postdeployment Dwells

Designator	IA Only	Plus 5-Year Dwell
LS	135	800
MA	350	1,369
HM	213	983
IS	132	755
IT	101	533
YN	103	531
105X	107	415
111X	101	563
131X	68	317
183X	119	651
290X	203	388
310X	69	391

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.


Figure 5.4 presents this information across time for the enlisted intelligence specialists and information warfare officers from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021. The shaded portions reflect the actual demand each year, which is seen to be steady across the whole period. The chart also depicts the numbers that would be required if the Navy were to enforce the dwell policy to limit the amount of time that individuals are actually deployed in a given period. This includes a notional two-year dwell and the actual five-year policy dwell. These graphs represent the number of people that would be unavailable for an alternative deployment at a given time assuming the dwell periods are enforced for all personnel. Of note, there were 3,000 intelligence specialists through this period, assigned to a variety of different units. IA and dwell demands would have made a quarter of these unavailable.

What Were the Real Force Structure Needs?

The Navy Reserve has commissioned units with operational missions, support offices that deal administratively with reservists who are assigned to mobilization billets in active component commands, and an authorized number of officers and enlisted to fill the validated billets. IAs are taken from that force structure—and in some cases repeatedly and persistently—but are not reflected in the overall authorized number of personnel.

If this undefined requirement had been isolated to a few billets, that would be consistent with a view that IAs were a short-term response to a short-term problem and that there would be no justification for adding or changing force structure. But, as we have seen, some billets were long-standing and important enough to warrant a continuous presence. These

FIGURE 5.4
IA Deployment Numbers for Ratings/Designators Intelligence Specialist and 183X, Including Five-Year Dwell from March 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021



SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

seem to have every characteristic of a billet that ought to be considered a part of permanent force structure. If other missions have a higher priority, that might be considered, but it seems important that such decisions be considered using evidence and mission analysis. The National Defense Strategy did not direct services to cease attention to everything except missions directly dealing with China in the Pacific or Russia in Europe. The areas where reserve IAs have been deployed are of direct interest in global power competition.

Repeated assignment of personnel for a task might have been a matter of ease and habit, but it might also have been a matter of real need. The most significant readiness risk might be in diminishment of force structure. If some structure is actually necessary but not resourced—or if needs are never identified even when resourced—the readiness impact might not be felt until the billet ceases being resourced.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The process for assigning reserve units and IAs relied on Joint Staff RFFs and Navy-specific processes. These assignments were intended to be a means of dealing with a short-term demand and relied on OCO funding that was not intended to be a basis for standard budgeting and programming.¹

However, as we have seen, the use of reserve units and IAs has become persistent and such deployments are used more for force shaping and force generation than as a response to an immediate requirement. The Navy itself made liberal use of the process, which is a more direct and convenient approach than the more-complicated method of establishing long-term billets in an authorized force structure. Repeated use of this process has had a readiness impact on the Navy Reserve, although the impact has often been indirect.

Short-Term Impacts Were Generally Mitigated

Short-term impacts include the following:

- There were two essential types of unit deployments: (1) portions of a unit, such as aviation squadron detachments, deployed as an intact unit with assistance from other units at times and (2) units that are formed at the deployed locations from collections of IAs. The need to cobble together units for deployments might indicate inadequate force structure to meet a persistent demand. Medical units were largely ad hoc.
- IAs came from across the reserve force, including more than 2,000 reserve units. We specifically looked for cases in which key personnel—such as the commanding officer or executive officer—might have been deployed simultaneously and did not find any evidence of this. We did find that some ratings and designators, particularly those associated with intelligence, were in high demand.
- Most IA billets were filled by volunteers, with only isolated cases in which involuntary activations were necessary. End strength numbers for the reserve force overall did not significantly vary across the 2012–2021 period. There were cases in which accessions

¹ Elizabeth Field, *Overseas Contingency Operations: Alternatives Identified to the Approach to Fund War-Related Activities*, U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-19-211, January 2019.

fell, and this was coincident with periods of high IA demand. However, this seems to have been done in response to a legislated reduction in force structure, not as the result of difficulty recruiting because of IAs.

Longer-Term, Indirect Impacts

Longer-term impacts exist but are indirect. They include the following:

- For Navy Expeditionary Combat Command units, the practice of taking elements of several units to make a single deployable one might have resulted in a misleading presentation of force structure requirements. The deployed MSRONS, for example, were not actually single units but elements of several. If there were a steady demand for Navy Expeditionary Combat Command unit presence, there would likely not be adequate force structure.
- The most in-demand individual billets do not have adequate force structure for the demand generated. Perhaps because these individuals were often volunteers and also possibly drawn from various units, the impact of insufficient numbers was not apparent in the short term. However, if the level were to continue, the force structure for reservists in multiple ratings and designators would be insufficient.
- The Navy Reserve repeatedly filled billets for several years in Bahrain and Djibouti that the billet requirements held to be important enough to require continual presence and significant turnover. As with particular ratings and designators, the impact on the rest of the force might have been diffused, but the clear suggestion is that these were persistent requirements. Dispensing of these requirements without a mission risk assessment seems ill advised.
- The persistent use of IAs and units causes force structure requirements to be understated and/or risk to be assumed without a clear understanding of the risk level associated with a diminished force structure.

Recommendations and a Way Forward

There is no doubt that U.S. Navy reservists filled unit and individual augmentation billets of importance to the service, the joint force, and the nation. However, these assignments were made as part of a process that was never intended to create permanent requirements but was nevertheless used to fill billets repeatedly.

The following recommendations might assist with Navy Reserve force structure management and force generation. We begin with an assumption that the system for requesting, validating, resourcing, and tracking assignments used through our period of study, while work-

able for contingency operations, is not an effective system for long-term force management. It works in the sense that presumptively important billets were filled, but it did not enforce a requirement to either terminate the billet or force it to be resourced through normal planning and budgeting processes.

Although stopping the process certainly allows termination of things that really should be considered temporary, it might also result in termination of things that were repeatedly resourced because they were important billets.

We recommend several actions to ensure that the Navy both continues current readiness of the Navy Reserve for important missions and is ready to provide flexible support if and when situations arise in which the force structure is insufficient. These actions directly affect the Navy Reserve, and the Navy Reserve should be represented in any plan development. However, these are, for the most part, actions that the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander of the U.S. Fleet Forces Command must undertake.

1. **Formulate data collection plans to measure the impact of significant personnel initiatives.** Formulating such plans seems uncontroversial. However, data collection was not done with reference to IA impact on the Navy Reserve. The IA process has been controversial from its inception, and anecdotes abound of cases in which units or individuals were affected, yet remarkably little recorded information exists to prove any part of this. In particular, the presumption that IAs affected retention and recruiting simply is not borne out by the data. The lack of data does not mean that such effects existed; it simply means that data that would support such a view were never collected. Appendix B contains an example of an exit survey for those individuals who have decided to separate from the Navy Reserve. Surveys, such as our example exit survey, would help quantify the impacts of additional deployments on retention.
2. **Build into any temporary resourcing process a provision that automatically terminates the billet after three years.** If the billet is to be sourced into the future, either it must be treated as a core billet or specific justification has to be provided for keeping it on an ad hoc basis.
3. **Do not allow Navy commands to request Navy-specific temporary billets.** Navy commands have made liberal use of the IA process to request billets from the Navy. The Navy has resource allocation processes, and the practice of using the RFF processes appears mostly to be used as an end run to get a persistent want rather than used as an actual mechanism for filling a short-term need.
4. **Do a strategic assessment of enduring Navy missions.** Navy reservists are performing important missions in Bahrain and Djibouti, and these should not necessarily be curtailed because the process of getting them to these missions was flawed or because of a generic effort to pivot to the Pacific. Few places are more important to global power competition than the Indian Ocean littoral and the Middle East. It is difficult to argue that it is more important to have additional MA support for Pacific bases

than it is to protect the bases in Djibouti and Bahrain. Although it is clear that the whole Navy wants intelligence specialists and information warfare officers, it is not clear that it is prudent to take them out of commands supporting AFRICOM and CENTCOM. The best places for these individuals to serve were beyond this report's scope, but the fact that Navy (and joint) commands repeatedly asked for a certain kind of unit or individual might say something significant about the overall importance of the billet.

5. **Specifically include dwell in end strength calculation.** Dwell is a policy intended to realistically account for the demands of a yearlong absence for a reservist who is not just deployed but also giving up time and income associated with a civilian occupation. Those same factors do not apply with AC members, but they are the price of tapping the unique capabilities of the Navy Reserve. We have shown that accounting for dwell drives required force structure near the point of unsustainability for some in-demand ratings. Not including the longer-term cost of making a deployment distorts the actual force structure need.

As a matter of history, it is not completely clear when and where the process for requesting support from Navy Reserve units and IAs made a transition from an understandably abbreviated process for dealing with a crisis to a means for working around force structure management and force generation processes. But, in general, the billet requirements seem valid, and the important task is to ensure that valid requirements do not go undocumented. The process should be adjusted. However, in making any changes, the Navy should not lose track of some real strategic needs.

Complete List of Units Studied

This appendix provides the complete list of units that were required to provide two or more officers at the O-6 paygrade during any period from 2012 to 2012. The table lists the UICs, the quantity required, and the periods in which this number was required. We did not have a list that provided the names of all the UICs, so it is not possible to tell from the list what percentage of a command's O-6s were deployed, just the quantity deployed. In addition, when a command was required to fill the same deployed billet, we note that.

TABLE A.1

Full List of All Units with Multiple O-6 Deployments: 388 Total O-6s Deployed

Parent UIC	Quantity	Year Deployed and Billet Notes
0614G	2	2014, 2017
0809G	2	2014, 2015 (same billet)
1904G	2	2014, 2016
41394	3	2016, 2018, 2021
42716	2	2013, 2016
82629	3	2016, 2017, 2018 (with small gaps in between, 2018 was a chaplain)
82633	2	2017, 2018
82931	2	2012, 2013
83126	2	2012, 2013
83293	2	2016, 2019
83353	2	2014, 2015
83383	2	2013, 2014
83885	2	2017, 2020
83924	2	2017, 2018
83930	2	2012, 2014
83963	2	2014, 2016 (same billet)

Table A.1—Continued

Parent UIC	Quantity	Year Deployed and Billet Notes
83965	2	2013, 2017
83994	3	2012, 2014, 2020 (same billet)
84019	2	2017, 2019 (slight gap; same billet)
84040	2	2017–2019 (possible same billet, with overlap)
84309	2	2015, 2017
84326	2	2019, 2021
85006	4	2016, 2017, 2018, 2020 (all to Djibouti)
85068	2	2018, 2021 (same billet)
89357	5	2012, 2014, 2018, 2019, 2021
85111	2	2015, 2016 (both Djibouti)
85336	2	Both in 2018 (different billets)
85726	2	Both in 2021 (different billets)
85764	4	2013, 2017, 2018, 2021 (all same billet)
85943	3	2013, 2014, 2020
86216	2	Both in 2015, (both chaplains, different locations)
86518	2	2012, 2019 (both J2 billets)
86649	2	Both in 2019 (different billets)
86760	2	2012, 2014
86907	2	2016, 2020 (both Djibouti)
86908	4	2012, 2021 (engineers); 2020, 2021 (command surgeons)
86913	2	2013, 2019
86925	2	Both in 2012 (different billets)
86925	2	2018, 2020
87821	4	2014, 2017, 2020, 2021 (2017 and 2021 are same billets)
87875	3	2015, 2016
87987	2	2015, 2021
88145	2	Both in 2021 (different billets)
88450	2	2012, 2017 both force surgeons (USMC)
88500	5	2014, three in 2015, 2016 (all chief surgeons)

Table A.1—Continued

Parent UIC	Quantity	Year Deployed and Billet Notes
88671	2	2018, 2019 (same billet)
88769	2	2012, 2014
89076	3	2012, 2013, 2017 (Navy emergency preparedness liaison officer)
89083	2	2018, 2021
89300	2	2012, 2016
89367	2	2016, 2019
89537	2	2015, 2017 (same billet)
89626	2	Both in 2016 (different billet)
89641	2	2012, 2014
89793	3	2019, 2020, 2021 (2019 and 2021 same billet)
89848	2	2018, 2021
9494G	2	2013, 2014

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of 2012–2021 data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command Deployment Database.

Proposed Exit Survey

The following contains a proposed exit survey for those individuals who are separating from the Navy Reserves. It is intended to glean information from individuals who deployed as IAs and whether these deployments affected their decision to leave the force.

Proposed Exit Survey

1. During your time within the reserves, have you mobilized to deploy as an individual augmentee (IA)? Yes / no
 - a. If yes, how many times have you deployed as an IA?
 - b. Were your deployments part of a larger reserve unit, or did you augment some unit/force as an individual? Unit / individual
 - c. If multiple deployments, please indicate how many were as an individual and how many part of a unit.
 - d. If you did not deploy as an IA, skip to Question 6, if you did deploy as an IA, please answer questions 2–5.
2. If deployed as an IA, was your assigned billet related to your rating/designator? Yes / no
 - a. If you deployed multiple times, indicate how many IA assignments were not related to your rating/designator.
3. Upon arriving at your deployed location as an IA, did you perform a billet that matched the description you thought you would do predeployment? Yes / no
 - a. If no, was your billet still related to your rating/designator? Yes / no
 - b. If you deployed multiple times, indicate how many IA assignments were not related to your rating/designator.
4. Did deploying as an IA increase or decrease your ability to perform your rating/designation? Increase / decrease?
5. Did deploying as an IA have an impact on leaving the Reserves? Yes / no
 - a. If yes, was the impact positive or negative? Positive / negative
 - b. Please describe the impact that deploying as an IA had on your decision to leave the Reserves.

6. Did you want to deploy as an IA and not have the opportunity? Yes / no
 - a. If yes, did not deploying as an IA affect your decision to leave the reserves?
Yes / no
 - b. Do you know fellow reservists who also wanted to deploy as IAs, but were not given the opportunity? Yes / no
7. Are you leaving the reserves because you do not want to be sent as an IA? Yes / no
8. Do you know of sailors leaving the reserves because they did not want to be deployed as an IA?
 - a. Can you elaborate on any specific reason they did not want to deploy?
9. Do you know other sailors who left the reserves because of their deployment as an IA? Yes / no
 - a. If yes, can you characterize what about the IA assignment made them leave?
10. Do you feel reservists deploy too frequently as IAs, not enough as IAs, or the correct amount?
11. Do you feel sailors' experiences as IAs enhance unit readiness upon return?
Yes / no
 - a. If yes, how does it positively affect readiness?
 - b. If no, how does it negatively affect readiness?

Abbreviations

AC	active component
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
AN	airman
AOR	area of responsibility
BM	boatswain mate
BOS-I	base operations support–infrastructure
BU	builder
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CE	construction electrician
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CM	construction mechanic
CONUS	continental United States
COVID-19	coronavirus disease 2019
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
EO	equipment operator
GFM	Global Force Management
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HM	hospital corpsman
IA	individual augmentee
INDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
IS	intelligence specialist
IT	information technician
LS	logistics specialist
MA	master at arms
MSRON	Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron
NSA	Navy support activity
NSW	Navy Special Warfare
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
RC	reserve component
RFF	request for forces

RFS	request for service
UIC	unit identification code
UltUIC	ultimate destination UIC
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
YN	administration yeoman

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Since the United States began its Middle East campaigns in 2001, the joint force has required the assignment of individual augmentees (IAs) who are U.S. military members (such as those assigned to special duty in a military unit) to fill a shortage or provide particular skills.

However, personnel assigned for an IA mission become unavailable for any other mission; also, other risks and opportunity costs might emerge, ranging from possible impacts on recruiting and retention to misalignment between force structure and assigned missions. There is a strong likelihood that other contingencies will arise, putting further demand on force structure. The process for assigning reserve units and IAs relies on Joint Staff requests for forces and Navy-specific processes. These assignments were intended to be a means of dealing with a short-term demand and relied on specific funding that was not intended to be a basis for standard budgeting and programming. It is not completely clear when and where the process for requesting support from IAs made a transition from an understandably abbreviated process for dealing with a crisis to a way of working around force structure management and force generation processes. The authors examine the impact of individual augmentation on the Navy Reserve as it relates to recruiting, retention, individual and unit readiness, and ability to maintain a ratio of time deployed to time at home, specifically in mobilization of forces for duty in operations associated with the Global War on Terror and in response to the 2019 coronavirus disease pandemic.

\$23.50

ISBN-10 1-9774-1202-5
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-1202-7



www.rand.org

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