

ROHINGYA CRISIS: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS ON
BANGLADESH AND WAYS AHEAD

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NAHID-UZ-ZAMAN KHAN, PSC, MAJOR, BANGLADESH ARMY
MSS in Security Studies, Bangladesh University of Professionals, Mirpur, Dhaka, 2021

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Name of Candidate: Nahid-Uz-Zaman Khan

Thesis Title: Rohingya Crisis: Security Implication on Bangladesh and Ways Ahead

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Kevin E. Gentzler, DMgt

_____, Member
Trent J. Lythgoe, Ph.D.

_____, Member
LTC Joshua N. Stephenson, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2022 by:

_____, Assistant Dean of Academics for
Dale F. Spurlin, Ph.D. Degree Programs and Research

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ROHINGYA CRISIS: SECURITY IMPLICATION ON BANGLADESH AND WAYS AHEAD, by Major Nahid-Uz-Zaman Khan, PSC, 155 pages.

The Muslim ethnic group residing in the north-western part of the Rakhine State of Myanmar (MN) is known as Rohingya. Despite the historical proof, MN does not accept the Rohingya as its integral population as it considers them illegal ‘Bengali’ immigrants. The MN military has conducted periodic ethnic cleansing with “a genocidal intent” to uproot the Rohingya from the Rakhine state, which led to the forcible displacement of the Rohingya in Bangladesh (BD). The Rohingya influx in BD has caused security concerns, including increased violence, drug trafficking, and a general decrease in law and order. Moreover, the Rohingya refugee crisis has exacerbated Bangladesh’s current economic, social, and environmental challenges. Unsolved, these problems may lead to national security crises, and BD may continually face grave economic, social, and ecological challenges. The study aims to find options for the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) to reduce or eliminate the national security challenges associated with the Rohingya refugee crisis without removing the Rohingya population by force. The author reviewed the existing literature to propose a theory of change following the qualitative comparative case study approach. The author’s thesis was to explore ways and means to increase international pressure on MN to accept repatriation through the use of diplomatic actions at the UN and other IOs and actors. Alternatively, he explored the revised theory of change if MN refuses to repatriate the Rohingya. Against this backdrop, this paper intended to identify the challenges for BD in finding a sustainable means of Rohingya return to MN; ways and means to maintain the congenial security situation in BD overcoming the obstacles; and develop suitable alternative options if return of the Rohingya to MN is stalled or unsuccessful.

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ACRONYMS

ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BD	Bangladesh
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
DIME	Diplomacy, Informational, Military and Economy
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDMN	Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals
FRiT	Facility for Refugees in Turkey
GOB	Government of Bangladesh
GOM	Government of Myanmar
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDP	Internally Displaced Personnel
IO	Intergovernmental Organizations
ISDEP	Employment Support Project for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Turkish Citizens
MN	Myanmar
MSIP	Municipal Services Improvement Project
NGO	Non-Government Organizations

OE	Operational Environment
OIC	Organization for Islamic Countries
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SRQ	Secondary Research Questions
SuTP	Syrian children under the Temporary Protection
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Bangladesh (BD) and Myanmar (MN) are two neighboring countries that share a 271-kilometer land boundary. However, the relationship between the two neighbors has not flourished due to the exodus of Rohingya refugees from MN, land and maritime bordering crimes, lack of connectivity, bilateral trade, and other trans-border security issues. Among all those issues, the Rohingya crisis is the most significant problem for the Government of Bangladesh (GOB). The Muslim ethnic group residing in the north-western part of the Arakan State (presently named as Rakhine) of MN is known as Rohingya.¹ Rohingya people have lived in the Arakan state for ages and practice the Sufi-inflected Sunni Muslim religion and differ from MN's dominant Buddhist groups ethnically, linguistically, and religiously.²

Rohingya have resided in the Arakan state with ups and downs since the 8th century under the ruling of different rulers of MN. Immediately after the independence of Burma (presently renamed as Myanmar) in 1948, the Burmese government refused to recognize Rohingya as one of their 135 ethnic groups labeling them as illegal

¹ Adrian Askiali, "Rohingya Crisis: The Security Implications in ASEAN Region," (Thesis, Eskisehir Osmangazi University, 2018), 2, https://www.academia.edu/32396464/Rohingya_Crisis_The_Security_Implications_in_ASEAN_Region.

² Eleanor Albert and Lindsay Maizland, "The Rohingya Crisis," Council on Foreign Relations, last updated January 23, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis>.

Bangladeshi migrants.³ Since 1970s, Rohingya people have faced institutionalized discrimination, including exclusionary citizenship laws and state-sponsored persecution by the military and nationalist Buddhists, which compelled hundreds of thousands of Muslim Rohingya to flee their homes to BD.⁴ MN enacted the “Citizenship Law 1982” that banned the Rohingya from being the legitimate citizens of MN, and its 2014 census barred their voting rights in the country.⁵ The Rohingya minority group has been vocal about their rights since the Burmese independence, which led to many clashes periodically between 1977 and 2017.⁶ The worst military crackdown against Rohingya occurred in August 2017, including reported rape, murder, and arson, killing about 6,700 people and resulting in hundreds of thousands fleeing across the border into BD. The Rohingya fled their own country to escape the “genocidal intent” of the MN military backed by its government.⁷ According to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, “Rohingya people have always been one of, if not the, most discriminated people in the world, without any recognition of the most basic rights starting by the recognition of the

³ Albert and Maizland, “The Rohingya Crisis.”

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Anealla Safdar, “Myanmar’s 2015 Election: Who are the Rohingya?” *Al Jazeera*, October 28, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/10/28/myanmars-2015-election-who-are-the-rohingya>.

⁶ Doctors without Borders, “Timeline: A visual history of the Rohingya refugee crisis,” August 21, 2020, <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/timeline-visual-history-rohingya-refugee-crisis>.

⁷ BBC, “Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis,” *BBC News*, January 23, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561>.

right of citizenship by their own country- Myanmar.”⁸ The UN has denounced the cruel military operation against Rohingya as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”⁹

As per the definition from the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, the term “ethnic cleansing” means the expulsion, imprisonment, or killing of an ethnic minority by a dominant majority to achieve ethnic homogeneity.¹⁰ However, the *ethnic cleansing* in MN might be beyond a humanitarian or sectarian issue. It might have far-reaching implications on MN’s infrastructure development projects, relocation plans, and is likely influencing its economy.¹¹ Regrettably, whenever there is a persecution of Rohingya minorities, BD and other neighboring countries bear the load of Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN). As a result, from 1970 until today, approximately 1.1 million Rohingya fled from their own country and have taken shelter in BD.¹²

⁸ United Nations, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” *UN News*, July 2, 2018, <https://news.un.org/en/focus/rohingya-refugee-crisis>.

⁹ Joe Watts, and Caroline Mortimer, “Downing Street says Burma’s treatment of Rohingya Muslims looks like Ethnic Cleansing,” *Independent*, November 13, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/downing-street-burma-rohingya-muslims-theresa-may-ethnic-cleansing-military-forces-a8052031.html>.

¹⁰ “Definition of ethnic cleansing,” Merriam Webster, accessed April 05, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethnic%20cleansing>.

¹¹ Saskia Sassen, “Is Rohingya persecution caused by business interests rather than religion?” *The Guardian*, January 4, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jan/04/is-rohingya-persecution-caused-by-business-interests-rather-than-religion>.

¹² The Associated Press, “U.N. and Bangladesh sign deal to aid Rohingya relocated to island in Bay of Bengal,” *NPR*, October 11, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/11/1044977066/un-and-bangladesh-sign-deal-to-aid-rohingya-relocated-to-island-in-the-bay-of-be>.

MN's military conducted the latest cleansing operation in 2017 on the Rohingya people. It did so after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a Muslim militant organization, attacked several Myanmar's Border Guard Police (BGP) posts.¹³ Reportedly, ARSA has been the main culprit in the last two cleansing operations on Rohingya, which led to their forcible displacement in BD. MN authority has labeled ARSA as an terrorist organization that has links with extremists from Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.¹⁴ BD, along with other regional actors, China and India, also determined ARSA as an extremist group.¹⁵

BD Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina allowed the Rohingya to enter BD on humanitarian grounds following the ethnic cleansing. At the same time, BD started political negotiations with MN to repatriate the Rohingya. BD foreign minister met MN officials in October 2017 and agreed to form a "joint working group" to repatriate Rohingya refugees who had fled to BD.¹⁶ Accordingly, GOB signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with GOM on November 23, 2017 on the repatriation of

¹³ Ronan Lee, "Myanmar's Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA): An Analysis of a New Muslim Militant Group and its Strategic Communications," *ISSN Journal* 15, no. 6 (December 2021): 61.

¹⁴ BBC, "Myanmar: Who Are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?" *BBC News*, September 6, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41160679>.

¹⁵ Charlotte Gao, "On Rohingya Issue, Both China and India Back Myanmar Government," *The Diplomat*, September 13, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/on-rohingya-issue-both-china-and-india-back-myanmar-government/>.

¹⁶ Reuters Staff, "Bangladesh, Myanmar agree on 'working group' for refugee plan: minister," *Reuters*, October 02, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh/bangladesh-myanmar-agree-on-working-group-for-refugee-plan-minister-idUSKCN1C70XA>.

Rohingya refugees.¹⁷ Following, GOB and GOM signed bilateral agreements to repatriate Rohingya citizens in January 2018, which mentioned that GOM would accept return of the Rohingya citizens within the next two years.¹⁸ The UN and the GOM also signed an MOU to repatriate Rohingya on June 06, 2018.¹⁹

BD Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina brought the issue to the United Nations member countries and significant powers, including the US, EU, China, and other regional forums, through the UN General Assembly and different bilateral meetings. Despite the efforts made by BD, the Rohingya repatriation issue is still unsettled. MN has officially refused to accept the return of any Rohingya. Over the last four years, MN did not receive even a single Rohingya into the country. The Rohingya people have been residing in the BD since 2017 amidst the uncertainty of repatriation. The majority of the Rohingya refugee population reside in the Cox's Bazar district of Chittagong Division. It is a bordering district with MN, said to be the home to the world's largest refugee camp.²⁰

The Rohingya issue is not merely a refugee issue now; it also has critical regional and national security implications. Moreover, ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya has

¹⁷ Al Jazeera, News Agencies, "Myanmar, Bangladesh Signs Rohingya Return Deal," *Al Jazeera*, November 23, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/23/myanmar-bangladesh-sign-rohingya-return-deal>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ United Nations, "UN Signs Myanmar Access Deal amidst Rohingya Repatriation Fears," *UN News*, June 6, 2018, <https://dunyanews.tv/en/World/442758-UN-signs-Myanmar-access-deal-amid-Rohingya-repatriation-fears>.

²⁰ Indrajit Sharma, "Indefinite Hosting of Rohingya Refugees a Growing Concern for Bangladesh," *The Diplomat*, July 09, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/indefinite-hosting-of-rohingya-refugees-a-growing-concern-for-bangladesh/>.

attracted religious extremists from South and Southeast Asia. The Rohingya crisis has become a rallying cry for jihadists which is developing into a security threat that will hurt peace in the region.²¹ In addition, Rohingya are involved in various trans-border crimes including drug trafficking, robbery, murder, fake nationality claims, and political and social unrest, to name a few.²²

Furthermore, the mass influx of Rohingya refugees concentrated in a specific area of BD has raised several humanitarian, economic, environmental, and social concerns.²³ With this backdrop, this paper intends to examine the Rohingya refugee crisis in the context of the national security of BD. Additionally, the paper will consider the additional effects of the economic, social and environmental impacts of the Refugee concentration to determine a suitable means of solving Bangladeshi security issues related to the Rohingya refugee influx.

“The protracted presence of Rohingya refugees has put pressure on BD’s resources, causing conflict and insecurity for locals, which is detrimental to the internal political stability of the country.”²⁴ BD’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina mentioned that

²¹ Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq, “The Rohingya Crisis: Regional Security Implications,” Reliefweb, December 5, 2016, <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/rohingya-crisis-regional-security-implications>.

²² Sharma, “Indefinite Hosting of Rohingya Refugees a Growing Concern for Bangladesh.”

²³ Kudrat E.-Khuda, “The impacts and challenges to host country Bangladesh due to sheltering the Rohingya refugees,” *Cogent Social Sciences* 6, no. 1 (2020): 3, DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2020.1770943.

²⁴ Sharma, “Indefinite Hosting of Rohingya Refugees a Growing Concern for Bangladesh.”

the Rohingya people pose a considerable security threat to BD and the region during the 9th Moscow conference on International Security on June 2021.²⁵

Problem Statement

The Rohingya influx in BD has caused national security concerns, including intensified insurgency, border crimes, increased violence in the area, drug trafficking, and a general decrease in law and order especially within the regions of the camps. Moreover, the Rohingya refugee crisis has exacerbated BD's economic, social, and environmental challenges. Unsolved, these problems may lead to national security crises, and BD may continually face grave economic, social, and ecological challenges. Therefore, BD requires a pragmatic solution to settle the Rohingya Refugee crisis favorably for BD while preventing a return to ethnic cleansing or worse against the Rohingya. The main problem is: "How can the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) reduce (or eliminate) the national security challenges associated with the Rohingya refugee crisis without removing the Rohingya population by force?"

Purpose of Study

This research attempts to understand the security implications of the Rohingya crisis on BD. The study also includes the examination of second-order effects due to prolonged Rohingya migration in the country. While the study's primary purpose is to find plausible solutions for the Rohingya repatriation to MN, the study will also identify

²⁵ Sharma, "Indefinite Hosting of Rohingya Refugees a Growing Concern for Bangladesh."

obstacles to a safe repatriation process. The research will further include credible policy options for Bangladesh besides the repatriation process to favorably solve the associated issues.

Research Questions

The Primary Research Question of the study is to find a solution to the question:
How can BD settle the Rohingya crisis and maintain the national security of the country?

To answer the primary question, the selected secondary questions are:

1. What are the challenges to the Rohingya repatriation process?
2. What are the necessary steps BD should take to ensure the desired security situation?
3. What options are available to BD if Rohingya Repatriation has not occurred by 2030?

Assumptions

Certain assumptions are critical to this research. First it is assumed that India and China's influence regarding the Rohingya situation will remain unchanged. The researcher assumed that Myanmar's strategies towards Rohingya will remain stable. Therefore, the security situation in MN would prevent safe repatriation of the refugees. The researcher also assumed that the MN government will continue its hard stance against an amicable solution to the problem. Except for China, India, and the international organizations (UN, ASEAN) there is no means of applying pressure on the Government of MN for a quick solution to the humanitarian crisis.

Definition of Terms

Refugee. The term refugee refers to someone who has been compelled to leave their country because of a pogrom, war, or violence. To meet the criteria of becoming a refugee one must cross an international border to find safety in another country. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has recognized the Rohingya as refugees.²⁶

Repatriation. Repatriation is the procedure of returning a person spontaneously or strenuously to their place of origin or citizenship. It is the most desired and durable solution for refugees whose rights, privileges, and security will be vouched.²⁷

Smart Power. Smart power is the integration of hard and soft power. While the military might form hard power, diplomacy forms soft power. Smart power emphasizes on the alliance, partnership, institution to influence and establish the legitimacy of actions.²⁸

DIME. DIME is the acronym of the Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy, and considered as the instruments of National Power. A nation achieves its national objectives by integrating the instruments of National Power.²⁹

²⁶ “What is a Refugee?,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed April 23, 2022, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/what-is-a-refugee.html>.

²⁷ “Definition of repatriation,” Merriam Webster, accessed April 11, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/repatriation>.

²⁸ Jessica Dargiel, “Smart Power: A change in U.S. diplomacy strategy,” E-International Relations, June 21, 2009, <https://www.e-ir.info/2009/06/21/smart-power-a-change-in-us-diplomacy-strategy/>.

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, *Strategy* (Washington, DC: JCS, April 25, 2018), 3.

National Security. “National security is the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.”³⁰

Scope

The term security encompasses a wide range of meanings and explanations. There are different dimensions and elements of national security according to many scholars. Military security is the primary element of national security. However, Longley opined that national security is no longer confined to protection within a military security understanding only.³¹ National insecurity may emanate from non-state actors, political instability, environmental hazards, economic crisis, organized crime, natural disasters. The researcher will limit the scope of the paper to national security aspects emerging from the migration of Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh.

Limitations and Delimitations

The available research time for this thesis is nine months which is a limitation of the research. The research subject also depends on the current situation in MN, which may change over the research period. The situational change thus may influence the researcher’s work. Moreover, the research topic needs an expert opinion from BD and

³⁰ Harold Brown, *Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 281.

³¹ Robert, Longley, “National Security Definition and Examples,” Thought Co, September 24, 2021, <https://www.thoughtco.com/national-security-definition-and-examples-5197450>.

MN to maintain an unbiased analysis. Due to time constraints, the researcher will not conduct any survey or expert interviews.

Since the research is related to Bangladesh's national security, the research work will highlight the use of the instruments of National Power to develop a plausible solution to the crisis. However, because of the time available for the research and the complexity of concern, all the instruments may not be equally examined; instead, the paper will stress the use of smart power with a primary examination of diplomatic solutions. The research work also does not involve research on human subjects.

Significance of the Study

The Rohingya crisis in BD has caused national security concerns in the country. The study will help to identify the significant security concerns requiring attention. The study will also determine the impediments to the Rohingya repatriation process as a potential BD solution. Recognizing the challenges will help the policymakers address the issues and take appropriate measures. Moreover, the research will address alternative options to solve or reduce the Rohingya crisis if the country does not achieve the potential solution. Thus, BD leadership will be able to find other short-term options to maintain the desired security environment of the country. Moreover, this research will enable future research or development of potential solutions to this problem and similar national and international problems.

Summary

The influx of Rohingya in BD has caused critical threats to the nation's security. Along with the increase in the Rohingya migration, BD has experienced increased

violence, drug trafficking, and rise of non-state terrorist organizations all of which pose severe problems for national security.³² The research will highlight the possible concerns and suggest potential responses to improve the security situation. The study will also identify the critical tasks for the leaders of BD to implement the potential solution or any other feasible short-term solutions. Thus, this paper will contribute to the knowledge enhancement of the leaders and academicians to deal with the crisis. The next chapter will describe pertinent literature on the topic and identify critical findings and gaps for subsequent analysis and potential solutions.

³² Saddam Hossain, Zhang Hao, Sajjad Hosain, and Li Yun, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Security Concerns for Bangladesh,” *South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics* 8, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 24-34, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740351>.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Located to the southwest of the Union [Burma] is ‘Rakhine’ There are two townships [there] called Maungdaw and Buthidaung. The majority of the nationals residing in those townships are Rohingya who are Muslims.

— Prime Minister U Nu, 1954, quoted in U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma’s Path to Genocide: Timeline”

Introduction

This chapter aims to review the available literature on the Rohingya crisis to identify the basis of the problem. The chapter will initially highlight the history of the Rohingya. After that, the recent persecution of the Rohingya in MN and related consequences to the persecution will be analyzed. Subsequently, the author will discuss the bilateral relationship between BD and MN and how the Rohingya issue impacts the relationship. Next, the researcher will describe the international community’s response to the issue. Finally, the chapter will highlight the implications of the problem for the BD government. To summarize, this chapter will describe the state of the literature concerning the problem and what solutions have already been tried and failed or had less than good results. Thus, the chapter will provide necessary background information related to the primary and secondary research questions. The primary research question is: How can BD settle the Rohingya crisis to maintain the national security of the country? The secondary questions are:

1. What are the challenges to the Rohingya repatriation process?
2. What are the necessary steps BD should take to ensure the desired security situation?

3. What are the options available to BD if Rohingya Repatriation has not been possible within 2030?

History of Rohingya

The history of the Rohingya community in MN goes back to the 8th century as they claimed to be the original settlers of the Rakhine state and traced their ancestry to the Arabs, Moors, Pathans, Moghuls, Central Asians, Bengalis, and some Indo-Mongoloid people.³³ MN is located in southeast Asia. It shares a border with China to the east and northeast. Laos and Thailand are located east and southeast. India and BD are to its west. BD's southeastern districts (Bandarban and Cox's Bazar) share a boundary with the Rakhine state of MN, where the Rohingya historically lives for ages. MN recognizes 135 minor ethnic groups, and Rohingya are not included.³⁴ They are considered foreigners and illegal "Bengalis" who want to take over the Rakhine state eventually.³⁵ The ethnic Rohingya are followers of Islam with distinct culture and civilization of their own. The word Rohingya means "*inhabitant of Rohang*," the previous Muslim name for

³³ Akbar Ahmed, "The Rohingya: Myanmar's outcasts," *Al Jazeera*, January 30, 2012, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/1/30/the-rohingya-myanmars-outcasts>.

³⁴ Nick Cheeseman, "How in Myanmar National Races Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 47, no. 3 (2017): 461-483, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1297476>.

³⁵ Ishrat Hossain, "After Humanitarianism: Bangladesh's Evolving Rohingya Policy," (GIGA Focus Asia Number 6, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, 2020), 2, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27059>.

Arakan.³⁶ For centuries, no one raised questions over their citizenship rights in the region.

Figure 1 shows the map of MN where the Rohingya resides.




Figure 1. Map of Myanmar Showing Rakhine State and Location of Rohingya

Source: Sakeeb Asrar, "Rohingya Crisis Explained in Maps," *Al Jazeera News*, October 28, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/28/rohingya-crisis-explained-in-maps>. Modified by author.

In 1784, the Buddhist Burman King Bodawpaya annexed the Arakan region and integrated the region into his kingdom of Ava in central Burma.³⁷ As a consequence of

³⁶ Sarah Wildman, "The world's fastest-growing refugee crisis is taking place in Myanmar. Here's why," *Vox*, September 18, 2017, <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/18/16312054/rohingya-muslims-myanmar-refugees-violence>.

³⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Part II: Historical Background," *Burma/Bangladesh Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution* 12, no. 3(C) (May 2000), <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm>.

the invasion, refugees fled to the Cox's Bazar district (location shown in Figure1) of BD and organized an invasion under the insurgent leader Chin Baya.³⁸ The incursion succeeded in 1811. Chin Baya sought British support to hold the seized town, who had been ruling the Bengal part during that time.³⁹ However, they could not retain the kingdom as the British did not support the cause. Ultimately, the Rohingya settled in BD's Cox's Bazar district of Chittagong division.⁴⁰ The British colonized Burma in 1824 and the persecution of Rohingya in Rakhine ceased. Moreover, the British rulers encouraged more migration into Rakhine and gave certain autonomy to those who settled there.⁴¹

The Arakan littoral was divided into Northern Arakan and Central- southern Arakan when the Arakanese court was overthrown by the Konbaung dynasty (the last Buddhist dynasty that ruled Burma from 1752 to 1885).⁴² Muslims absorbed northern Arakan while Theravada-Buddhist took central and southern Arakan.⁴³ In 1942, religious and ethnic confrontation exploded in the Northern Arakan during the short period of anarchy between the British evacuation and the Japanese occupation at Mayu Frontier in

³⁸ Human Rights Watch, "Part II: Historical Background."

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Michael Caster, "The History of Statelessness," *The Daily Star*, last updated September 9, 2017, <https://www.thedailystar.net/star-weekend/the-history-statelessness-1458850>.

⁴² Aye Chan, "The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan State in Burma," *SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2005): 3.

⁴³ Ibid.

Burma.⁴⁴ The Japanese organized the Patriot Arakan Force taking advantage of the Buddhist Arakanese. On the other hand, the British promised the Rohingya a separate north-Arakan state if they supported the Allies during the Burma Campaign and helped them defeat the Japanese.⁴⁵ The initially defeated British force regained the Arakan region after launching a counter-attack with assistance from the Muslim guerilla troops (known as the ‘V’ force) in 1944.⁴⁶ However, the British did not keep the promise of a Rohingya state after World War II was over.

The political conflict continued in both communities, Muslim and Buddhist Arakanese, after independence of Burma.⁴⁷ The Muslim leaders were divided into two groups. One group led by M.A. Rashid and U Razzak supported Anti-Fascist Peoples’ Freedom League (AFPFL) which was led by Aung San (1915-1947).⁴⁸ This group sought the autonomy of Arakan state. The other group, led by Zafar Kawal (known as Mujahideen), was more aggressive and opted for integrating Maungdaw and Buthidaung into BD (what was then known as East Pakistan).⁴⁹ On the other hand, the political

⁴⁴ Chan, “The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan State in Burma,” 3.

⁴⁵ Jon A. Wiant, “Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (February 1982): 428–430, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2055023>.

⁴⁶ Chan, “The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan State in Burma,” 3.

⁴⁷ Tanenbaum, “The Rohingya Origin Story: Two Narratives, One Conflict,” (Fact Sheet, Center for Interreligious Understanding, New York, NY), accessed April 23, 2022, <https://tanenbaum.org/>.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Tinker Hugh, *The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Year of Independence* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1961), 357.

leaders of the Buddhist Arakanese were also divided into two groups. One group joined with AFPFL led by Buddhist monks U Pinnyathiha and the other was anti-AFPFL led by Buddhist monk U Seinda, based on strong Arakan nationalism.⁵⁰

After the independence of Burma, Buddhist Members of Parliament (MP) desired to establish the State of Arakan within the larger Burmese Union but the Muslim MPs strongly disagreed.⁵¹ It was clear that the Rohingya would not be allowed autonomy, and that resulted in political violence in the Arakan in the 1950s.⁵² MN's Prime Minister U Nu did not support the Rohingya cause and ordered counter insurgency operations to stop a rebellion in the region.⁵³ Later, a military coup led by General Ne Win replaced the civilian AFPFL government in 1962, and began dissolving Rohingya political and social organizations to further diminish the Rohingya movement.⁵⁴ The Rohingyas' dream for a separate state/sovereign province died with the military in power and control within MN.

In 1973, Ne Win's government preached drafting a new constitution. The Muslim leaders submitted a proposal to create a separate Muslim state or at least a division to the constitution committee. However, the council rejected the proposal. During the election

⁵⁰ Hugh, *The Union of Burma*, 357.

⁵¹ Maung Zarni and Alice Cowley, "The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya," *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal* 23, no. 3 (June 1, 2014): 683, <https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol23/iss3/8>.

⁵² Human Rights Watch, "Part II, Historical Background."

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

in 1974, the Muslims were not allowed to vote as per the amended 1974 constitution.⁵⁵

Thus, they were denied the right to elect their representatives to the “Pyithu Hlut-taw” (People’s Congress).⁵⁶

Subsequently, MN took a systematic approach to eliminate Rohingyas from their land. The 1947 Constitution defines citizens, who belong to an “indigenous race,” have a grandparent from an “indigenous race,” are children of citizens, or lived in British Burma before 1942.⁵⁷ In 1982, an amended Citizenship Law was passed, recognizing three categories of citizenship within MN: citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen.⁵⁸ Under this law, citizens are required to obtain a National Registration Card (NRC), while non-citizens are given a Foreign Registration Card (FRC).⁵⁹ “Full citizens were descendants of residents who lived in Burma prior to 1823 or were born to parents who were citizens at the time of birth.”⁶⁰ Associate citizens acquired citizenship through the 1948 Union Citizenship Law. “Naturalized citizens lived in Burma before 4 January 1948 and applied for citizenship after 1982.”⁶¹ The Rohingya are not considered part of MN’s ethnic citizenry. So, most of them do not belong to any type of three categories and

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Part II, Historical Background.”

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Caster, “The History of Statelessness.”

⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch, “Part II, Historical Background.”

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

behold the Foreign Registered Citizenry (FRC). They face restrictions on their freedom of movement, discriminatory limitations on access to education, and arbitrary confiscation of property if they fail to provide conclusive evidence as per the 1982 citizenship category.⁶² Besides, the Rohingya whose parents hold FRCs are not allowed to run for public office. However, the Burmese citizens in MN are not considered as foreign residents and they avail the resident ship status based on how one's forbearers acquired their own citizenship category.⁶³ Therefore, the MN government has politically and historically attempted to deny the Rohingya of their legal rights. Military measures symbolize its intention to clean the Rohingya from the nation, which will be discussed subsequently.

Rohingya Persecution in Myanmar

The Rohingya exodus is not a new phenomenon. MN Army conducted ethnic cleansing operations in 1784, 1800-1811, 1950-1954, 1978, 1992, and 2016 respectively before the 2017 operation.⁶⁴ The 1784 annexation of the Arakan by Burman King Bodawpaya initiated the killing on the Rohingya. It continued until the British colonized Burma in 1824. The Rohingya were also targeted post World War II and U Nu government conducted operations to control political and armed violence. However, prior to 1977 the scale of the violence and persecution was comparatively lower in magnitude.

⁶² Human Rights Watch, "Part II, Historical Background."

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Hossain, "After Humanitarianism," 2.

In 1977, MN launched Operation Nagamin (Dragon King) to register citizens and screen out foreigners prior to a national census.⁶⁵ This military campaign targeted the civilians which resulted widespread killings, rape and destruction of mosques and further religious persecution. In Arakan, the incident degenerated into massive human rights abuses against Rohingya by government authorities, military forces and local Rakhine citizens.⁶⁶ By 1978, more than 200,000 Rohingyas fled to BD following the operation of the MN army.⁶⁷ BD sought support from the international community, as it led to social and economic challenges to the nation.⁶⁸ The Ne Win government agreed to allow the Rohingyas to return because the UN assured support for MN on this issue.⁶⁹ BD and MN conducted negotiations during June and July 1978 and agreed on the repatriation of refugees to MN. The operation commenced on August 31, 1978 and ended on December 29, 1979 and involved repatriation of 187,250 Rohingyas from BD to Arakan.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Part II, Historical Background.”

⁶⁶ Imtiaz Ahmed, *The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas: Responses of the State, Society & the International Community* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2010), 1-5.

⁶⁷ Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (London: Zed Books, 1991), 241.

⁶⁸ Tony Reid, “Repatriation of Arakanese Muslims from Bangladesh to Burma, 1978-79: Arranged Reversal of the Flow of an Ethnic Minority,” (Paper presented to the 4th International Research and Advisory Panel Conference, University of Oxford, January 1994), 13-14.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Another mass outflow from Arakan to BD took place in 1991 and 1992, when more than 250,000 Rohingya refugees fled forced labor, rape and religious persecution at the hands of the Burmese army.⁷¹ With the assistance of UNHCR and non-governmental relief agencies, the BD government established 19 camps and sheltered the refugees in the border district known as Cox's Bazar.⁷² Again, MN launched Operation Pyi Thaya during 1991-1992 (Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation) with the purpose of ethnic cleansing. Consequently, it led to the forced displacement of the Rohingya to BD. The governments of the two countries tried to settle the issue with the help of UNHCR, and other UN agencies. MN agreed to repatriate the Rohingyas after re-verifying the residence status of the displaced citizens. During the period 1993-1997 some 230,000 refugees returned to Arakan.⁷³

In 2012, sectarian violence took place in MN allegedly sponsored by the government itself. Violence broke out between Rohingya and Burmese Citizens within Rakhine communities followed by a wave of state-sponsored persecution of Rohingya.⁷⁴ The proponent of the plot was the Buddhist Monk Warithu, known as Buddhist Bin Laden. As such, a series of vicious crimes led to widespread violence, abuse, and displacement of Muslim communities in four townships of MN. The violence continued

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch, "Part II, Historical Background."

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Human Rights Watch, "Part II, Historical Background."

⁷⁴ Andrew R.C. Marshall, "Special Report: Myanmar gives official blessing to anti-Muslim monks," *Reuters*, June 26, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-969-specialreport/special-report-myanmar-gives-official-blessing-to-anti-muslim-monks-idUSBRE95Q04720130627>.

from 2012 through 2013 resulting in more than 500 Muslims killed and 140,000 Rohingyas displaced.⁷⁵

In 2015, another round of sectarian violence caused hundreds of thousands Rohingyas to displace from their own states and fled to BD, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos and neighboring countries.⁷⁶ By May 2015, BD reported an influx of Rohingya exceeding previous registrations as some 32,000 Rohingya entered BD. Reportedly, between 100,000 and 300,000 Rohingya refugees fled from MN to BD shores, while several thousand more were believed to be trapped with little food or water on the boats floating at sea.⁷⁷

The number of Rohingya refugees in BD increased dramatically after late August 2017 once the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) assaulted Border Guard Police posts which resulted in the persecution of the Rohingya community.⁷⁸ The brutal massacre caused a mass exodus of about 750,000 Rohingya.⁷⁹ MN military forces denied

⁷⁵ Marshall, “Special Report: Myanmar gives official blessing to anti-Muslim monks.”

⁷⁶ James Hookway, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis Likely to Ease During Monsoon, but Only Temporarily,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May 22, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/rohingya-refugee-crisis-likely-to-ease-during-monsoon-but-only-temporarily-1432283124>.

⁷⁷ Agence France-Presse, “Bangladesh plans to move Rohingya refugees to island in the south,” *The Guardian*, May 27, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/28/bangladesh-plans-to-move-rohingya-refugees-to-island-in-the-south>.

⁷⁸ International Crisis Group, *A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh; Introduction*, Asia Report No. 303 (Brussels, Belgium, December 27, 2019), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/303-sustainable-policy-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh>.

⁷⁹ International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh-Myanmar: The Danger of Forced Rohingya Repatriation*, Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 153 (Brussels, Belgium,

the operation was a genocide. However, more than 6,700 Rohingya citizens including 730 under the age of five were killed, a vast majority of the women were raped and abused, and 288 villages were looted and burned according to the consolidated reports by the Human Rights Watch, Medicine San Frontiers (MSF), Amnesty Internationals.⁸⁰ The UN declared the incident a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”⁸¹

Existing Myanmar-Bangladesh Relations

BD-MN relations did not thrive since the BD’s independence despite immense geostrategic and geo-economic prospects. BD and MN share 271 km land border. MN was amongst the first nations who recognized BD’s independence. Soon after the independence of BD, both countries moved towards establishing closer bilateral cooperation. The *Look East policy* of BD and relentless diplomatic efforts brought some positive results.⁸² However, for the last four decades relations between these two countries have been marked by complex developments. Uddin highlighted that “The key challenges in BD-MN relations are i) Rohingya refugee crisis, ii) tension in BD-MN border, iii) transnational crimes, iv) lack of connectivity, and v) insignificant trade.”⁸³

November 12, 2018), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b153-bangladesh-myanmar-danger-forced-rohingya-repatriation>.

⁸⁰ BBC, “Myanmar Rohingya.”

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² M. Jashim Uddin, “Prospects for Attaining a New Height in Bangladesh Myanmar Relations: Bangladesh Perspective,” *BIISS Journal* 35, no 1 (2014): 1, <https://www.biiss.org>.

⁸³ Ibid., 5.

The Rohingya crisis is the key challenge impeding development of healthy relations between the two nations.⁸⁴ According to Christina Frank, “BD has been extremely frustrated by the Burmese regime’s refusal to take back all the Rohingya refugees and its continued harsh policies towards the Rohingya in Burma which, cause yet more Rohingya to flee to BD.”⁸⁵ During the previous crises in the 1970s and 1990s, BD provided shelter to the Rohingyas (see figure 2).⁸⁶ At the same time, they settled the issue with MN to repatriate them through diplomatic negotiation.⁸⁷ However, there were hundreds of thousands of documented and undocumented Rohingyas residing inside BD.⁸⁸ The Rohingya crisis was aggravated once again when more than 750,000 Rohingyas took shelter inside BD following the persecution in 2017. Presently BD shelters more than a million Rohingyas in different camps, which is more than they live in MN.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Mahfuz H. Chowdhury and Nasir Uddin, “Bar Between Brothers: Rohingya-Issue in Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations,” in *To Host or To Hurt: Counter Narrative on Rohingya Refugee Issue in Bangladesh*, ed. Nasir Uddin (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Institute of Culture & Development Research, September 2012), 42.

⁸⁵ Christina Frank, *Living Silence in Burma: Surviving Under Military Rule* (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2009), 253.

⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, *A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh*.

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Part II, Historical Background.”

⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, *Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State*, Crisis Group Asia Report No. 261 (Brussels, Belgium, October 22, 2014), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-politics-rakhine-state>.

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, *A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh*.

How Myanmar expelled the majority of its Rohingya to Bangladesh

After the recent influx of a half-million Rohingya into Bangladesh, the country now hosts more Rohingya than Myanmar.




Figure 2. Rohingya Influx in BD

Source: Sakeeb Asrar, "Rohingya Crisis Explained in Maps," *Al Jazeera News*, October 28, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/28/rohingya-crisis-explained-in-maps>. Modified by author.

BD attempted to negotiate with MN to repatriate the Rohingyas immediately after the 2017 migration to BD. Both nations signed a memorandum of agreement to coordinate repatriation, and accordingly set up a Joint Working Group to coordinate a safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation process.⁹⁰ However, the process did not succeed as of today due to many reasons. The key challenges include: lack of positive intent of the MN government; unwillingness of the Rohingyas to return; political

⁹⁰ Sakeeb Asrar, "Rohingya Crisis Explained in Maps," *Al Jazeera News*, October 28, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/28/rohingya-crisis-explained-in-maps>.

upheaval in MN; lack of effective pressure by international organizations; and silence of regional powers.⁹¹

Bordering tension is a notable issue between the two countries. Tensions erupted in different times, e.g., in 1991 MN attacked and ransacked Rejupara a border outpost (BOP) of BD. MN forces killed three members of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and looted all the arms and ammunition, which resulted in BD deploying military forces along border.⁹² In November 2008 MN violated the maritime boundary to explore potential gas and oil reserves. Though MN withdrew their activities later in the face of strong protest from BD but made it very clear that they would come back in the same area in future.⁹³ Again in 2012, when the verdict on BD-MN maritime dispute was about to be delivered, MN amassed soldiers along its border with BD.⁹⁴ Strains ran high in BD-MN border areas after the news of the MN forces deployment. In 2014, one member of Bangladesh Border Guard named Lance Naik Mizan was shot dead near the Rejupara BOP and the body was taken inside MN by the MN forces which aggravated the tension between the countries. This resulted in deployment of security forces all along the BD-MN borders.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Asrar, “Rohingya Crisis Explained in Maps.”

⁹² Obayedul Hoque Patwary, “Bangladesh - Myanmar Relations: The Security Dimension,” (BIPSS Focus, Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2009), 3, https://www.academia.edu/35128717/Bangladesh_-_Myanmar_Relations_The_Security_Dimension.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Uddin, “Prospects for Attaining a New Height in Bangladesh Myanmar Relations,” 9.

⁹⁵ Staff Correspondent, “Border Still Very Tense,” *The Daily Star*, June 1, 2014, <https://www.thedailystar.net/border-still-very-tense-26535>.

The rigidity has worsened since the 2017 Rohingya crisis began. This situation created distrust and resulted in frequent border skirmishes and deployment along borders.

Trans-border crimes, smuggling, drug trafficking, lack of key road networks, lack of trade, and lack of mutual trust all contribute to the BD-MN tensions.⁹⁶ Among those issues, drug trafficking has been a constant problem for BD. BD is considered a critical trafficking point to connect India and far west.⁹⁷ According to research from Uddin, the trafficking of Yaba (methamphetamine) increased 14 times between 2011 and 2013.⁹⁸ The trend is rising causing immense concern for the Government of Bangladesh (GOB). Other trans-border crimes like smuggling, and arms trafficking also pose significant local and national threats for the country. All of these issues are more pronounced in the Cox's Bazar region and around the Rohingya refugee camps. For example, MN officials seized 6.96 million Yaba pills from Rakhine state, which were supposed to reach BD through the Teknaf (the closest locality to Rakhine under the Cox's Bazar district. Also, several Rohingya camps are located here).⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Uddin, "Prospects for Attaining a New Height in Bangladesh Myanmar Relations," 11-13.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Michael Van Ginkel, "Rohingya Refugees Smuggle Drugs for Insurgents in Myanmar," *New Security Beat*, May 25, 2020, <https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2020/05/rohingya-refugees-smuggle-drugs-insurgents-myanmar/>.

Impact of Rohingya Influx in BD

The mass Rohingya influx in BD has caused many problems in the recent years. The key issues are deterioration of law and order leading to local and national security concerns, economic problems, environmental hazards, and degradation of social living standard of the area. On top of that, security hazards have become the primary concern at present due to several incidents. In recent times, there was strife due to resource constraints, inflation, disruption of essential services and labor displacement.¹⁰⁰

The major security concern for BD is the rise of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) inside the country. ARSA is an extremist insurgent group originating in MN which believes in armed resistance to regain the lost territory in Rakhine state, MN. According to the report of UN envoy Mr. Tom Andrews, credible reports suggest that members of ARSA have killed, tortured, abducted, and threatened Rohingya refugees.¹⁰¹ Allegedly, ARSA killed Mr. Mohibullah, the chief of Rohingya Solidarity Group recently in a camp inside BD.¹⁰² Lately, the security situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT; the bordering region of BD with MN) has worsened. A terrorist group with modern weapons attacked an army patrol on August 18, 2019. The terrorists also used improvised

3. ¹⁰⁰ Hossain, “After Humanitarianism: Bangladesh’s Evolving Rohingya Policy,”

¹⁰¹ Jasmin Papri, “UN Rapporteur: Rohingya Militants Kill, Abuse Refugees in Bangladesh Camps,” *Benar News*, December 20, 2021, <https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/arsa-present-in-bangladesh-rohingya-camps-12202021154656.html>.

¹⁰² Ibid.

explosive devices (IEDs), which was unprecedented in the region.¹⁰³ These incidents pose significant threats to national security of BD.

Rohingya camps are located in a part of the country where the influence of extreme Islamist organization Hefazat-e-Islam (Protectors of Islam) is strongest.¹⁰⁴ The different extremist groups including Hefazat-e-Islam declared Jihad against the MN government and stated that BD should cut its ties with MN.¹⁰⁵ Of late, BD has witnessed a number of processions, mass demonstrations, and manifestation in and around the camps on various issues.¹⁰⁶ The bulk of the minority people of BD as per caste, creed, religion and diversity live in the southeastern part of BD. The extremist groups might turn the crowd to communal violence with rogue intentions and vested interests leading to a national security crisis at any moment.¹⁰⁷

Drug trafficking and associated crimes increased significantly in last five years. Between 2017 and 2018, more than 100 Rohingya were arrested on drug trafficking charges.¹⁰⁸ Recent violent clashes due to illegal drug trade and local power have

¹⁰³ Nahid Khan, “Necessity of Restructuring Infantry Battalions to Face Hybrid Threats,” (Paper, Defense Services Command and Staff College, 2021), 15.

¹⁰⁴ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar/Bangladesh: A Humanitarian Calamity and a Two-country Crisis,” January 31, 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmarbangladesh-humanitarian-calamity-and-two-country-crisis>.

¹⁰⁵ Sharma, “Indefinite Hosting of Rohingya Refugees a Growing Concern for Bangladesh.”

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar/Bangladesh: A Humanitarian Calamity and a Two-country Crisis.”

¹⁰⁸ Ginkel, “Rohingya Refugees Smuggle Drugs for Insurgents in Myanmar.”

compelled the authorities to further tighten security in the region.¹⁰⁹ The law enforcement agencies have encountered dozens of Rohingya and Bangladeshi drug dealers in recent years.¹¹⁰

Armed violence in the area has also increased.¹¹¹ There are multiple reports of criminal activities perpetrated by the Rohingya in the recent past. The Cox's Bazar police headquarters statistics showed that between August 2017 and August 20, 2020, a total of 725 criminal cases involving Rohingyas have been filed against 1,664 individuals.¹¹² Criminal activity associated with the camps has increased. At the outset, the criminal activities were confined within the camps' boundaries. But recently, the criminal activity has gone beyond the camp borders. So far, around 200 Rohingyas have died due to internal conflicts or by the actions of law enforcement agencies.¹¹³ Criminal activity statistics of BD shows the sharp rise of crimes immediately after the Rohingya influx in 2017 (see figure 3).

¹⁰⁹ Ginkel, "Rohingya Refugees Smuggle Drugs for Insurgents in Myanmar."

¹¹⁰ International Crisis Group, *A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh*.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Muktadir Rashid, "Many Rohingyas involved in Crime," *New Age*, August 25, 2020, <https://www.newagebd.net/article/114440/many-rohingyas-get-involved-in-crimes>.

¹¹³ Ibid.




Figure 3. Increase of Crime Rates in BD in 2018 after the Rohingya Influx

Source: “Bangladesh Crime Rate & Statistics 2000-2022,” Macrotrends, accessed April 14, 2022, Bangladesh Crime Rate & Statistics 2000-2022. www.macrotrends.net.

Since the influx of the Rohingya refugees, local residents are becoming jobless which is raising their dissatisfaction with the Rohingya.¹¹⁴ The local people have lost their regular livelihood and much of the living space to provide living spaces for the Rohingya. Locals are also worried over the local security issues vis a vis the experts are getting concerned whether the long-term effect will erupt another Chittagong Hill Tracts

¹¹⁴ “Bangladesh Crime Rate & Statistics 2000-2022,” Macrotrends, accessed April 14, 2022, Bangladesh Crime Rate & Statistics 2000-2022. www.macrotrends.net.

upheaval similar to the events between 1977 to 1997.¹¹⁵ A survey has been conducted recently that identifies growing dissatisfaction of the locals due to many issues. The summary is highlighted in figure 4:




Figure 4. The Rohingya amongst Us Bangladeshi Perspectives on the Rohingya Crisis

Source: “The Rohingya Amongst Us: Bangladeshi Perspectives on the Rohingya Crisis Survey,” Xchange, accessed April 03, 2022, <http://xchange.org>.

National and International Response on Rohingya Issue

In late 2017, BD initiated the repatriation process immediately after the forced displacement of Rohingyas. Both the countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on November 23, 2017 to repatriate the Rohingyas on the basis of verification

¹¹⁵ International Crisis Group, *A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh*.

that they previously lived in MN.¹¹⁶ BD provided detailed information about approximately 600,000 Rohingyas that entered BD between 2018 and 2020.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, BD also signed an MoU with UNHCR to set favorable conditions for the voluntary repatriation of MN citizens.¹¹⁸ Similarly, MN also signed MoUs with UNHCR and the UNDP for the safe repatriation, and reception of MN citizens. However, MN has not repatriated Rohingya citizens despite these actions. MN seems reluctant to repatriate the Rohingyas.¹¹⁹ Although, BD has raised this issue with the UN, MN has paid little attention to the repatriation. As per the report of International Crisis Group, Rohingya citizens are willing to return, however they fear recurring persecution, and thus are unsure of their future safety if they are repatriated in the near future.¹²⁰

BD has taken steps to gain the favor of its neighbors, regional powers, and internationally on the issue. The international organizations including UN, UNHCR have responded from a humanitarian perspective. UNHCR Chief Mr. Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein pointed the Rohingya persecution as the “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Savitri Taylor, “A closer look at Repatriating the Rohingya,” Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, September 04, 2020, <https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/closer-look-repatriating-rohingya>.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group, *A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh*.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ United Nations, “UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar,” UN News, September 11, 2017,

Besides, the UN officials also urged all-other nations to “push for a stronger, more coordinated international response” to the crisis.¹²² The Prime Minister of BD has sought robust international support for the repatriation of Rohingyas during her speech in 2020, and again in 2021.¹²³ The Prime Minister proposed five steps for the Rohingya repatriation in the UN General Assembly in her September 26, 2021 speech. The key points include: to ensure sustainable repatriation, finding a resolution to the crisis, increased pressure by ASEAN, effective role by UN and partners to create a conducive repatriation condition in MN, accountability for the Rohingya persecution and put increased pressure on MN.¹²⁴

The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is commonly known as *Annan Commission*. The commission deliberately researched the periodic persecution of the Rohingya citizens in MN and published a final report on August 24, 2017.¹²⁵ It has a few specific recommendations regarding the

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar>

¹²² United Nations, “UN expert underscores importance of human rights for Rohingya,” UN News, December 19, 2021, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108392>.

¹²³ United Nations, “Bangladesh urges greater international action on Rohingya status,” UN News, September 26, 2020, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1073882>.

¹²⁴ United Nations, “Bangladesh - Prime Minister Addresses General Debate, 76th Session, United Nations General Assembly,” UN Web TV, September 2021, <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1z/k1z9cperce>.

¹²⁵ Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, *Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine: Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State*, August 24, 2017, <https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/mediation-and-crisis-resolution/rakhine-final-report/>.

fundamental rights and development of the lives of Rohingyas. The key points included “Withdrawing restrictions, reconsidering 1982 citizenship law, building infrastructure and providing facilities for improving their living conditions, ensuring the security for the Rohingya.”¹²⁶

Gambia filed a lawsuit in the UN’s top court, International Court of Justice (ICJ) on November 11, 2019 alleging Myanmar’s persecution against the Rohingya was in violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention.¹²⁷ The ICJ gave a verdict that MN should prevent any further genocide of Rohingya, which is considered a historical verdict for a humanitarian issue.¹²⁸ According to the verdict, MN’s government must take necessary actions to “prevent recurring genocide, prevent further atrocities by the MN military, must avert further destruction, and submit a report within four months.”¹²⁹ Notably, the verdict also matches the Annan commission report submitted in 2017, and two major investigations dictate the systematic ethnic cleansing in MN. However, MN denied the ICJ verdict as a false and fabricated report.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, *Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine*.

¹²⁷ Sreeparna Banerjy and Anuradha B. Chaudhury, “ICJ’s judgement on the Rohingya and its challenges,” Observers Research Foundation, February 10, 2020, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/icjs-judgement-rohingya-its-challenges-61233/>.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ International Court of Justice, *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)*, (France: United Nations, 28 January 2021), 6, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/decisions>.

¹³⁰ Banerjee and Chaudhury, “ICJ’s judgement on the Rohingya and its challenges.”

BD hoped that its neighbors, India and China, would support and assist with its claim of Rohingya repatriation. However, both the nations supported MN because of vested interests in the country. MN plays an important role in China's Belt and Road initiative. China invested 7.3 billion USD in building a deep-sea port in the Kyaukpyu area near Rakhine state.¹³¹ It also built a USD 2.45 billion oil and gas pipeline project linking the remote coast of Rakhine to Yunnan province. Both projects reflect China's ambition for greater access to the Indian Ocean as well as the increased global connectivity this could provide.¹³² China considers the persecution on the Rohingya as an act of internal terrorism and continue their military and economic engagement with MN.¹³³

India considers MN a major trading partner and contributor to its "Look East Policy"¹³⁴ India and MN have recently signed different treaties to extend their economic and geo-strategic relationship. The major projects are Kaladan Multi-Modal transit-transport project, and defense agreements to supply aircraft, missiles, tanks, and light

¹³¹ Adrienne Joy, *Understanding China's Response to the Rakhine Crisis*, Special Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2018), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/02/understanding-chinas-response-rakhine-crisis>.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ K. Yhome, "Examining India's stance on the Rohingya crisis," (ORF Issue Brief No. 247, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, India, July 11, 2018), 3-4, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/examining-indias-stance-on-the-rohingya-crisis/>.

vehicles among other military items.¹³⁵ India's prime minister and top-level leaders visited MN to strengthen the relationship as part of their foreign policy. Consequently, India also mentioned the Rohingya persecution as an act of *terrorism* and did not support BD's position concerning repatriation. Hence, BD did not get expected support from its close neighbour nor the major regional power.

The US and the EU condemned MN's persecution against Rohingyas. Then US Vice President Mike Pence condemned MN in an UN General Assembly meeting calling the event "atrocities without an excuse" and "violent persecution"¹³⁶ whereas US ambassador Nikki Haley said that the US reports on Rohingya persecution aligns with the UN report. In addition, she said, "the world can no longer avoid the difficult truth of what happened." However, her speech did not include the term "genocide."¹³⁷ Similarly, in response to Rohingya crisis, the EU tabled a human rights resolution at the UN Human Rights Council and established a fact-finding mission in 2016.¹³⁸ The EU also extended a ban on selling arms to MN and prolonged sanctions against high-ranking officials over

¹³⁵ Angshuman Choudhury, "India Continues to Play Safe with Myanmar Over the Rohingya Issue," *The Diplomat*, December 20, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/india-continues-to-play-safe-with-myanmar-over-the-rohingya-issue/>.

¹³⁶ Vaughn Hillyard, "Vice President Mike Pence confronts Myanmar's Suu Kyi over Rohingya persecution," *NBC News*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/pence-confronts-suu-kyi-over-rohingya-persecution-n936041>.

¹³⁷ Rodrigo Campos, "Haley says U.S. Rohingya report 'consistent' with U.N. findings," *Reuters*, August 28, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/haley-says-u-s-rohingya-report-consistent-with-u-n-findings-idUSKCN1LD2BO>.

¹³⁸ Martin Banks, "EU Remains concerned over Rohingya Crisis," *The Parliament Magazine*, January 24, 2018, <https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/eu-remains-very-concerned-about-rohingya-crisis-parliament-told>.

their role in the Rohingya crisis disallowing any visits by those officials to the EU nations. On the other hand, Russia made it clear that it would not support forming any resolution against MN in the UNSC. Russia and MN have arms deals and shared economic interests which maybe influencing the Russian position.

The ASEAN could play a pivotal role in solving the Rohingya crisis. The stakeholders of ASEAN visited BD refugee camps in 2019, where they promoted the National Verification Card (NVC) instead of acting as a bridge between two nations.¹³⁹ ASEAN failed to set conditions for safe repatriation. Also, the organization is not pressuring MN to stop the recurring persecution. ASEAN also exhibited poor organizational structure, command, leadership, and organizational capability to develop and implement a solution to the Rohingya crisis in the region.¹⁴⁰

Implications for BD Government

The Rohingya influx in BD has caused different problems for the country. The author tried to provide an in-depth idea reviewing available literature on this subject. The findings suggest that the Rohingya have been persecuted for ages beginning in the 18th Century. MN does not recognize them as legal citizens. The persecution of the Rohingyas was systematic and planned. MN is also unwilling to accept a return of the Rohingya shortly. Therefore, BD needs to adopt a solid strategy to pressure MN for safe repatriation.

¹³⁹ “Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis exposes ASEAN weaknesses: Report,” *Al Jazeera*, October 20, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/20/myanmars-rohingya-crisis-exposes-asean-weaknesses-report>.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

BD's national and local security remains at stake unless the Rohingya crisis is solved. Rohingya influx has aggravated the law-and-order situation, and increased number of killings, abductions, and many other conflicts. Trans-border crimes, drug trafficking, smuggling and other associated crimes have increased since 2017. Moreover, the increase in refugees has affected the wage-earning abilities of local residents, impacted the local economy to a considerable extent, and increased local dissatisfaction with the government and the refugees themselves. In addition, the area has lost natural attractions and there is a risk of increased environmental hazards due to deforestation, water shortages, and problems with other basic needs (see figure 5).



Figure 5. Security Concerns of BD

Source: Created by author based on Literature Review.

Therefore, BD's policymakers need to pay attention to track and solve the national security issues associated to the Rohingya. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina expressed her concern that the Rohingya influx might raise regional instability by harboring terrorist groups like ARSA and spreading extremism. Many humanitarian and international organizations also expressed similar concerns. Unchecked, the refugee crisis may contribute to the spread of extremism in the region.

BD took several diplomatic efforts to ensure the repatriation as per the MoU signed between the nations. The UN, UNHCR, international community have supported BD in sheltering the Rohingya within the camps. However, the international partners have only viewed the problem as a humanitarian crisis, not as a security concern for BD. Moreover, the immediate neighbors and regional powers did not support BD as expected. Therefore, BD diplomatic approach has not succeeded, and the country needs to pay particular attention to the security problems associated with the migration.

BD has always considered Rohingya repatriation as the potential solution to the crisis. However, the present situation does not promise that outcome in the near future. BD does not have the means to formulate other policy options at this time.

BD-MN relationships have not progressed but have worsened due to lack of economic trade, people to people exchange, cultural exchange, lack of connectivity and many other issues. BD's approach must be reconsidered. In light of above, BD needs to formulate policy and strategy utilizing all instruments of National Power. Though, the primary solution lies in diplomacy, the GOB needs to identify the *missing links* of the attempts and *fill in gaps*. Integration of economic, military, and informational instruments of National power along with diplomacy, can result in an effective process and solution to the problems related to BD National security and Rohingya repatriation.

Summary

The researcher tried to provide a comprehensive idea of the existing situation in this chapter. He reviewed existing literature, international reports, journals, and web sources to provide a reasonable understanding on the history of Rohingyas. After that, the author highlighted the history of persecution, and provided idea how it affected the BD-

MN relationship. The review further presented the impact of the crisis on BD's security. Subsequently, the chapter discussed the international response on the issue and implications on BD government based on current situation. The available literature highlighted some of the challenges. However, it was not comprehensive.

Most of the previous research identified the issue as more of a humanitarian crisis than a security concern. The literature review suggests that the crisis impacts BD's national security. Therefore, the researcher will critically analyze ways and means to find out potential solutions to the identified problems. Also, the analysis will include how best BD can apply instruments of National Power to achieve the desired solutions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 1 focused on the background and events leading to the Rohingya influx in the BD. It also highlighted the impacts of prolonged and increasing presence of Rohingya in BD. Chapter 2 reviewed literature that explains the genesis of the Rohingya conflict in MN and persecution of Rohingya in both countries. Chapter 2 also identified the major security concerns faced by the BD and actions taken so far to settle the Rohingya crisis. This chapter will describe the methods used to collect and analyze the information required to answer the primary and secondary questions of the thesis. The primary question is: How can BD settle the Rohingya crisis to maintain the country's security situation? The associated secondary questions are:

1. What are the challenges to the Rohingya repatriation process?
2. What are the necessary steps BD should take to ensure the desired security situation?
3. What are the options available to BD if Rohingya Repatriation has not been possible within a short period?

Qualitative Research

The researcher will use qualitative research methodology in this thesis. “Qualitative research interprets events or situations and inquiries into patterns and

reasons that govern behavior.”¹⁴¹ The research topic is related to the National security of BD. Developing potential solutions for the problem requires a comprehensive understanding of the socio-political dynamics of the migration of Rohingya refugees from MN into BD. This migration has caused concerns for the BD government to maintain national security. Similarly, the issue may also impact the regional stability and relationships amongst the south Asian and south-east Asian countries. The purpose of the thesis is to understand the long-term security implications of this situation, the potential solutions and possible options open to BD to maintain its security, and the potential of repatriation of Rohingya to MN. Hence, the topic is subjective and can barely be judged from an objective viewpoint. Qualitative analysis is personal and focuses more on the *why* than *what*. The researcher did not use quantitative research methodology as this research does not seek to understand causal relationships or rely on observed or measured data. The researcher does not intend to test hypotheses or systematically measure any variables. Instead, he enquires about the challenges (why) and attempts to solve the problem (how). Therefore, quantitative research was not a viable option; instead, a qualitative research methodology was suitable for this study.

Case Study Method

A case study is a qualitative method that examines an aspect of historical explanation related to other events.¹⁴² The researcher found the comparative case study

¹⁴¹ Gretchen B. Rossman, and Catherine Marshall, *Designing Qualitative Research* (India, SAGE Publications, 2014), page 5.

¹⁴² Ellen Taylor-Powell, and Marcus Renner, “Analyzing Qualitative Data,” (Program Development & Evaluation, University of Wisconsin-Extension, Cooperative

method more suitable for this project than any other methodology. The researcher will conduct in-depth analysis of the subject through multiple case studies, using cross-analysis of the facts to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Yin suggested that case study method “is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within the real-life context.”¹⁴³ Since the Rohingya issue is a contemporary phenomenon, the researcher can apply the case study approach to this situation. Ragin stated that in case-oriented research, investigators study the cases to fit the results as they make sense.¹⁴⁴ Comparative case studies cover two or more causes in a way that produces more generalized knowledge about causal questions, for example, how and why particular policies succeed or fail.

Data Collection

For the research, the author selected multiple cases that have similarities to the situation in BD and the Rohingya Refugee Crisis. The cases are the Greco-Turkish population exchange, the Refugee crisis in Syria, and the genocide in Sudan and Rwanda. The researcher collected data on those cases from both primary and secondary resources. The research reports and books were the primary sources of data collection. The secondary source of data collection was based on peer-reviewed journals, relevant

Extension, Madison, WI, 2003), 1, <http://learningstore.uwex.edu/assets/pdfs/g3658-12.pdf>.

¹⁴³ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2009), 240.

¹⁴⁴ Charles C. Ragin, “Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Study Causal Complexity,” *Health Services Research* 34, no. 5, part 2 (December 1999): 1235.

national and international scholarly articles, reports of international organizations, and other sources. The author will use the cases to analyze and synthesize the similarities, differences, and patterns related to the research question.

The data collection is a continuous process, and the researcher is the primary data collector. The researcher will ensure reliability of the information through the cross-analysis, validation of the sources, and applying his judgment. The researcher will follow the constructivist approach to deeply understand the subject matter and reflect on the situation through his conscious judgment. A constructivist approach allows a researcher to construct ideas or theories from the data or information that emerges from the research.

Case Selection Criteria

Case selection or sampling is significant in finding solutions through a Case Study based research methodology. According to Miles and Huberman, “Sampling involves two actions. The first is setting boundaries that define what you can study and connect directly to the research questions. The second step is creating a sample frame to help uncover, confirm, or qualify the basic processes or constructs that underpin the study.”¹⁴⁵ Similarly, Gerring suggested that random case selection is not a feasible idea while conducting research with a small number of cases.¹⁴⁶ According to him, the cases should be purposive. Samples should be “typical, mixed, extreme, deviant, difficult, most similar

¹⁴⁵ Chris A Voss, Nikos Tsikriktsis, Mark Frohlich, “Case Research in Operation Management,” *International Journal of Operations and Product Management* 22, no. 2 (2002): 202.

¹⁴⁶ Jason Seawright, and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008): 294–308, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20299733>.

and most different.”¹⁴⁷ The researcher has selected four cases for review. He chose the instances based on a few criteria. The Greco-Turkish population exchange in the year 1923 successfully avoided mass genocide and atrocity, where two countries agreed to solve the issue through population exchange. The Rwandan genocide is an example of the role of a government in perpetrating genocide within its own country, where the refugee return was not successful. The Sudanese case also involved similar state-sponsored genocide. However, the displaced population could return to the country. Finally, the Syrian migration crisis provides an insight into how best the refugee situation can be handled by involving regional and influential actors and international organizations. All the selected cases had varied outcomes with essential lessons to help solve the researcher’s problem. The researcher will be able to find results by analyzing the possibilities. Subsequently, it will help to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

Factors to Consider

The researcher will look for certain factors to draw lessons from the selected cases. While some of the selected cases succeeded in solving or mitigating crises, others did not. Some cases found alternative solutions that worked for the time. The researcher has chosen primarily a few following factors for analysis listed below:

1. Reasons why refugee return was successful or failed.
2. Role of regional countries or IOs to solve or mitigate the crisis.

¹⁴⁷ Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” 294–308.

3. Trends of return movements in long-lasting refugee situations.
4. How are return trends and refugee decisions affected by how the refugees have been treated in host countries?
5. How do other host countries deal with a refugee situation?
6. Key policy and strategic lessons, operational lessons.

The factors are not conclusive, and it will adjust based on the analysis in the subsequent chapters. The researcher will develop and examine these factors based on the selected data analysis plan mentioned in this chapter.

Data Analysis

The researcher will use the Qualitative Comparative Analysis technique to analyze the available data. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a methodology that enables the analysis of multiple cases in complex situations.¹⁴⁸ QCA is a case-based approach that helps to systematically analyze multiple case studies to generate findings and options for the researcher.¹⁴⁹ The core of the analysis will be based on the six-step data analysis process suggested by Scholz and Simister. Figure 6 shows the steps.

¹⁴⁸ Nigel Simister and Vera Scholz, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” (INTRAC, Oxford, UK, 2016), 1.

¹⁴⁹ Barbara Befani and Carrie Baptist, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis – A Rigorous Qualitative Method for Assessing Impact,” Coffey How To, June 2015, https://www.academia.edu/18997072/Qualitative_Comparative_Analysis_A_Rigorous_Qualitative_Method_for_Assessing_Impact.




Figure 6. Six Step Data Analysis Process following QCA Technique

Source: Nigel Simister and Vera Scholz, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” (INTRAC, Oxford, UK, 2016), 1.

Step 1: Initially, the researcher will identify the theory of change he is interested in for the research. In this research, the researcher has set the problem “How can the Government of BD reduce (or eliminate) the national security challenges associated with the Rohingya refugee crisis without removing the Rohingya population by force?” Understanding the problem suggests that the author is interested in finding plausible solutions to the national security challenges associated with the Rohingya crisis. In this step, the researcher will develop a *theory of change* that will take him to solutions. After

that, in this step, the researcher will justify the necessity to change. Subsequently, it will help unfold the factors that can lead to change.¹⁵⁰

Step 2: The next step in the process is to identify the cases for the study. The researcher identified four cases for the study. Scholz and Simister suggested for the QCA to work appropriately, a researcher should identify two different instances in which an *outcome* happened and where *outcome* did not happen.¹⁵¹ The researcher selected the Sudanese Case Study where the *outcome* was successful. Similarly, he selected the Rwanda Genocide case, where the *outcome* was absent due to inappropriate action taken by the international community to prevent the genocide. Next was the Greco-Turkish exchange case where the *population exchange* and associated treaty ended the conflict and ensured a lasting peace. The fourth issue involved the Syrian case that provides *other options* besides repatriation. This step will assist the researcher in plotting the next step.

Step 3: In this step, the researcher will develop a set of factors (conditions) to apply the theory of change. This set of factors will help the author identify the critical reasons affecting the idea of change. The researcher will identify the elements based on his literature review and analyze the cases to validate the factors. The researcher will expand the aspects of collecting more information, and thus it will help the researcher analyze these factors in the next step.

Step 4: In this step, the researcher will score each factor based on the significance to apply the change. The analysis will focus on addressing each factor in turn across all

¹⁵⁰ Simister and Scholz, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” 1-5.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

the cases and developing some criteria for how it should be scored.¹⁵² After that, using each factor the researcher will follow the *crisp set* style to score the factors. Scholz and Simister suggested that in a crisp set QCA the score remains between ‘0’ to ‘1’ – ‘0’ meaning an absence and ‘1’ a presence.¹⁵³ According to the QCA analysis:

QCA scoring based on binary scores is known as ‘crisp-set QCA.’ It is the most common type of QCA, and is almost always used in manuals and guidance documents as it is easier to understand. However, some QCA studies use ‘fuzzy-set’ analysis. In a fuzzy set, scores can be set at different levels, although always between ‘0’ and ‘1’. For example, scores could be rated as ‘0’, 0.33’, 0.66’ or ‘1’. Fuzzy sets make it easier to rate factors that cannot be simply classified as present or absent. For example, if a factor is ‘*dissatisfaction with regime*’, fuzzy set analysis would allow people to distinguish between regimes where there was a very low level of dissatisfaction (‘0’), regimes where there was some articulated dissatisfaction in some areas (‘0.33’), regimes where dissatisfaction amongst some groups had led to organized protest (‘0.66’) and regimes where there was widespread dissatisfaction and protest (‘1’). The main difference between crisp and fuzzy set analysis is in the processing and interpretation of data.¹⁵⁴

Therefore, the researcher found the *crisp-set QCA* more appropriate for this research. However, the researcher will apply more subjective method applying ‘+’, or ‘-’ signs while scoring the factors. The topic is complex and scoring by figures may not interpret the correct finding. Hence, the research will focus on scoring factors from a *positive* and *negative* standpoint only.

Step 5: In this step, the researcher will analyze the scores based on scanning and pattern analysis of the cases. The study will help the researcher identify the significant contributing factors (both positive and negative) towards the end state of each case

¹⁵² Simister and Scholz, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” 1-5.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 2.

examined. The researcher will then cross-analyze the factors with the current situation and draw relevance. In this case, both positive and negative factors will be counted to find several solutions to the problem. The factors which match more relevance to the existing situation will be identified as potential ways to solutions. After analyzing the data set, there may be more than one set of combinations, meaning that more than one pathway can lead to the same *outcome*.

Step 6: In this step, the researcher will interpret the findings. It means going back to the individual cases and asking whether or not the results make sense. First, the researcher will analyze and interpret the negative factors and correlate them with the Rohingya issue, that will allow the researcher to answer his Secondary Research Question 1. Then, the researcher will highlight the policy options/strategy necessary to implement the theory of change using the instrument of the National Powers. Thus, the researcher will derive the answer to Secondary Research Question 2. From this step, once all the pathways to the desired solution have been considered, it will provide alternative options to the solution process. The process will help the researcher to answer Secondary Research Question 3.

Ragin identified that the QCA analysis has a few shortcomings. The four main issues are (1) limited diversity, (2) contradictory outcomes, (3) use of categorical data, and (4) analyses that are not explicitly causal in nature.¹⁵⁵ The researcher will mitigate the issues by considering multiple cases with varied outcome. The six-step analysis approach will enable the researcher to answer all three Secondary Research Questions.

¹⁵⁵ Ragin, "Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Study Causal Complexity," 1235.

Once the researcher finds the answers to these questions, the *theory of change* or the *revised theory of change* will be proposed. Ultimately, that will answer the Primary Research Question.

Ethical Considerations

This research is designed to find plausible solutions to the Rohingya refugee crisis. The research topic does not include human subjects. Thus, the researcher's primary concern will be maintaining an unbiased approach as the issue relates to his country's interests. While the potential solution to the problem may be to ensure the safe repatriation of MN citizens to their home country, the analysis might suggest otherwise. Therefore, the most important ethical consideration will be overcoming the author's own bias and analyzing the subject unbiased.

To help overcome personal bias, the researcher will give due cognizance to the opinions of the subject matter experts. Their varying perspectives will assist the researcher in an unbiased analysis. The researcher will also select the majority of the cases, articles, and journal write-ups from internationally recognized sources and sites to avoid bias. The researcher will further mitigate any bias by analyzing the process described above. Additionally, the researcher has selected multiple cases to prevent prejudice and achieve desired objectivity.

Summary

The researcher will follow the qualitative research method and analyze the relevant archival records, documents, journals, and resources to understand the background of the situation, the likely concerns of the security dynamics, and the causes

for the unsettled repatriation. Subsequently, the case study analysis will help the researcher answer the other research questions and find plausible options.

The researcher will apply the six-step QCA process to analyze the cases and find plausible solutions. The QCA analysis will assist the researcher in answering the *why* and *how* of the research. Through the analysis, the researcher will find the answers to SRQs. Subsequently, it will lead him to answer the primary question of how BD can settle the Rohingya crisis to maintain the country's security.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter attempts to analyze and interpret evidence produced by the research on cases and describes how this evidence answers the research questions identified in the first chapter. Chapter 1 provides a brief background on the Rohingya influx on BD, outlines the thesis's primary and secondary research questions, and explains the significance of this study. Chapter 2 provides insight into the available literature on this topic and narrates the historical background of the conflict in the MN and its effect on the existing BD-MN bilateral relationship, security issues caused by the Rohingya influx in BD, and implications of the crisis on BD. Chapter 3 delves into the methods used to carry out this research. In this chapter, the researcher will analyze four cases from a comparative perspective to provide answers to the primary and secondary questions raised in the first chapter. It answers questions about challenges to the Rohingya repatriation process. The necessary steps BD should take to ensure the desired security situation and the options for BD if Rohingya Repatriation has not occurred by 2030. Answering the questions helps the researcher answer his primary question, "How can BD settle the Rohingya crisis and maintain the country's national security?" This chapter examines the contributing factors to the success or failure of the solution to the refugee crisis to draw lessons for solving the current situation. This chapter aims to identify the conditions that eliminate or reduce BD's national security concerns associated with Rohingya without forcing them to return against their will.

An Analysis to the Rohingya Persecution

It is always necessary to verify whether the Rohingya persecution was a *genocide* because the UN is obliged to respond militarily to stop any genocide. The term *genocide* was coined by a Polish-Jewish lawyer named Raphael Lemkin in 1944. According to him, “Genocide is a coordinated plan of different actions aiming to destroy essential foundations of the life of national groups, to annihilate the group themselves.”¹⁵⁶ The UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocides says,

Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, such:

1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹⁵⁷

The article also suggests that any act, whether a “genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; an attempt to genocide, or complicity to genocide, will be punishable under the UN convention.”¹⁵⁸ Based on the

¹⁵⁶ Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupational Europe* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations, “Genocide,” Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Accessed April 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml>.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

merit of the crime, the UN has the authority to adopt various coercive and non-coercive measures.

Was Rohingya persecution a genocide?

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that MN must “take all measures within its power to prevent the killing of Rohingya or to cause bodily or mental harm to members of the group, including by the military or any irregular armed units.”¹⁵⁹ The verdict came as Gambia filed a petition against MN alleging the state planned the execution of the Rohingya Muslims. The ICJ verdict also imposed *provisional measures* against MN to be decided by the UN. The verdict unanimously favored the Gambian claim and asked MN to abide by the UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Regrettably, MN has not abided by the ruling and continued aggression on the remaining 600,000 Rohingya by imposing confinement, burning villages, not allowing the IOs and humanitarian relief, and depriving them of the basic human needs.¹⁶⁰ The judgment, and MN’s subsequent acts indicate the Genocidal intent of the Government of Myanmar (GOM) to eliminate the Rohingya from the Rakhine state for good.

The Rohingya persecution can be termed as *genocide* according to the UN’s article II provision of the Genocide Convention. The analysis is shared as follows:

¹⁵⁹ United Nations, “Top UN court orders Myanmar to protect Rohingya from genocide,” *UN News*, January 23, 2020, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1055841>.

¹⁶⁰ “Developments in Gambia’s Case Against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice,” Human Rights Watch, February 14, 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/14/developments-gambias-case-against-myanmar-international-court-justice#>.

Table 1. MN's Genocidal Act based on Analysis	
Criteria	Proof
Killing	Approximate 10,000 people ¹⁶¹
Causing serious bodily or mental harm	Women and girls were taken to nearby houses, gang raped, then killed or severely injured ¹⁶²
Physical Destruction to deliberately inflicting group condition of life	At least 288 villages were destroyed and burnt during the August 2017 attack ¹⁶³
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group	As per the report of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), at least 730 children below the age of five were killed ¹⁶⁴
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group	Not identified through analysis

Source: Created by author.

¹⁶¹ “No one was left: Death and violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, Myanmar,” Médecins Sans Frontières, March 9, 2018, <https://www.msf.org/myanmarbangladesh-%E2%80%98no-one-was-left%E2%80%99-death-and-violence-against-rohingya>.

¹⁶² United Nations Human Rights Council, *Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar*, 39th Session (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations, September 12, 2018), <https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNA2D835BE27880710211bf168c74b583d093e65a667a232e3cd40861b204fd35a84ca93608c7f>.

¹⁶³ BBC, “Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis.”

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.




Figure 7. Destroyed Villages in MN's Rakhine State

Source: "Burma: 40 Rohingya Villages Burned Since October," Human Rights Watch, December 17, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/18/burma-40-rohingya-villages-burned-october#>.

Does this require growing international attention?

The UN investigators warn of the risk of occurring/recurring genocidal actions should the Rohingya residing in Rakhine not be protected.¹⁶⁵ The researcher's findings can sight two remarkable examples where the failure of the International Community to act in a timely manner cost many lives, the genocide of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda and

¹⁶⁵ BBC, "Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis."

the non-Arab civilian population in Sudan. The atrocity in MN is similar to these government-sponsored persecutions. The UN failed to respond against the genocide in Rwanda. Ms. Power mentioned that the UN and the Clinton administration did not focus on the genocide. Instead, they withdrew forces and evacuated civilians that gave freedom of movement to the Rwandan government.¹⁶⁶ It resulted in the death of 800,000 Rwandan (mostly Tutsi, moderate Hutu and a few political members) within the 100 days.¹⁶⁷

Similarly, the UN did not respond to the Sudan genocide promptly. A UN commission responded that the Sudanese incident was not a genocide but was a crime against humanity.¹⁶⁸ Though the Bush administration and US Congress labelled the case as *genocide*, the US and international actors were uninterested in sending troops to Sudan.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately, two million died, one million sought refuge. Four million were internally displaced.¹⁷⁰ The two incidents and a similar incident in MN suggest that Rohingya persecution in MN requires growing attention. However, to date, the US and EU mostly responded by enacting sanctions on the military leaders, providing humanitarian aid and relief, and placing an embargo on arms purchases. The UN has not

¹⁶⁶ Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and Age of Genocide* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 9.

¹⁶⁷ BBC, “Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter,” *BBC News*, April 04, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506>.

¹⁶⁸ Scott Strauss, *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention* (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016), 12.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Alan Kuperman, “Genocide: The Cases of Rwanda and Sudan,” *Footnotes* 12, no. 15 (May 2007). <https://www.fpri.org/article/2007/05/genocide-the-cases-of-rwanda-and-sudan/>.

done much other than asking MN to ensure Rohingya citizens' safety and stop further aggression. The UN did not use any coercive measures, and the non-coercive means included only a few preventive diplomatic measures.

The Rohingya community received rays of hope after the US Secretary of State Mr. Antony Blinken declared, "Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar were victims of genocide and crimes against humanity."¹⁷¹ Mr. Blinken specifically pointed out MN's military for the genocide intended to destroy the Rohingya "in whole or in part."¹⁷² The declaration can be fruitful if the US initiates new talks with ASEAN and countries dealing with Myanmar's refugees - especially Bangladesh, India and Malaysia.¹⁷³ In addition, MN military should be held accountable with military and economic sanctions to weaken its influence.

The first part of the chapter discussed whether the Rohingya persecution was a genocide or not. It further discussed the importance of paying attention to this matter. The author's analysis suggests that the Rohingya persecution was conducted to commit/with the intention of *genocide*. The identification gives various options to the policymakers of BD to pursue its desired solution. Strauss mentioned that as per the fundamentals of mass atrocity and genocide prevention, any perpetrated genocide or genocidal intent could be

¹⁷¹ Nahal Toosi, "Five years on, U.S. recognizes Rohingya as victims of genocide," *Politico*, March 21, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/21/us-recognizes-rohingya-genocide-myanmar-00018858>.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Josh Rogan, "Opinion: Biden's Rohingya genocide declaration can't just be empty words," *Washington Post*, March 24, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/24/us-genocide-designation-rohingya-myanmar-prevention-atrocity/>.

prevented by appropriate prevention and response measures.¹⁷⁴ The prevention measures can be divided into domestic and international prevention, whereas the response measures include the generic actions and graduated military options for genocide prevention.¹⁷⁵ At this juncture, BD needs to develop the theory of change to explore solutions. The problem suggests that a solution to the Rohingya refugee crisis will eliminate or reduce the national security concerns of BD. Thus, the next part of this chapter will develop the theory of change.

Develop the Theory of Change

“Theory of Change is essentially a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context.”¹⁷⁶ The theory works as a *missing middle* to *fill in* the gaps towards the desired changes.¹⁷⁷ It describes “why a particular way of working will be effective, and shows how change happens in the short, medium and long term to achieve the intended impact.”¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, a theory of change should be testable, credible, achievable, and supported.¹⁷⁹ At first, the researcher explored the situation to determine a potential theory

¹⁷⁴ Straus, *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention*, 135-146.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ “What is theory of change?” Center for Theory of Change, accessed May 05, 2021, <https://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-of-change/>.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ NVCO, “How to Build a Theory of Change,” KnowHow, last updated October 12, 2020, <https://knowhow.ncvo.org.uk/how-to/how-to-build-a-theory-of-change#>.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

of change for BD. It is a fact that the Rohingya influx has threatened BD's national security. Unsolved, BD will face serious political, economic, social, environmental, and safety threats. However, the Rohingya cannot be forced back to MN as it contradicts BD's policy. BD has attempted several options before; it did not succeed. Hence, the researcher explored the missing links, and gaps to propose the theory of change. The researcher proposes a theory of change on the current situation that attempts reexamination of the problem and explores possibilities to solve the problem. The researcher does not intend to propose a theory that abruptly departs from the existing BD policy on the Rohingya issue i.e., diplomatic solution. Hence, his theory of change is, "How can the Government of Bangladesh increase international pressure on MN to accept repatriation through the use of predominant diplomatic actions at the UN and other IOs and actors?" The researcher proposes this theory to combine all the instruments of National Power instead of only resorting to solely a diplomatic option.

Identify the Cases of Interest

The researcher selected a total of four cases for the analysis. The cases vary in terms of result, situation, approach, background, and complexity, which occurred due to state-sponsored genocide or the outbreak of wars. However, the researcher found similarities in these cases for a possible outcome of the current situation in MN. The issues are the Rwanda genocide, the Sudanese genocide and return, the Greco-Turkish population exchange, and the Syrian migration crisis.

Case 1: Rwanda Genocide

Rwanda is a landlocked country located in the Central African region. Geographically, it has borders with Uganda to the north; Congo borders its south and western part, Tanzania to the east and Burundi to the south. Rwivanga mentioned that 85 percent of the Rwandan population belongs to Hutu, 14 percent are Tutsi, and 1 percent are Twa; a Pygmy group.¹⁸⁰ Rwanda was initially part of East Germany (1897-1918); later Belgium ruled the country from 1918-1962.¹⁸¹ The Europeans built a hypothetic perception that the Tutsis are superior to the Hutus and the Belgian rulers placed Tutsi aristocrats in various important positions.¹⁸² It developed a perception that Tutsis would reign over the Hutus. It created the initial enmity between the two groups and the Hutu minority used to attack the Tutsi minority over the era.¹⁸³

A Hutu-driven revolution in 1959 forced 330,000 Tutsis to flee the country. Rwanda became independent in 1962, and Hutu-led government ruled till Major General Habyarimana took power in 1973.¹⁸⁴ Habyarimana formed a new political party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD), and continually ruled for two decades. In 1990, a rebel group named the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF),

¹⁸⁰ Roland Rwivanga, "The Role of the Government in Perpetrating Genocide: A Comparative Analysis of the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and 2003 Sudan Genocide," (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2013-01), 7.

¹⁸¹ History.com Editors, "Rwandan Genocide," History, last updated April 19, 2022, <https://www.history.com/topics/africa/rwandan-genocide>.

¹⁸² Rwivanga, "The Role of the Government in Perpetrating Genocide," 7.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 7-10.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

consisting primarily of Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. Habyarimana accused Tutsi minority involvement and killed hundreds of Tutsis between 1990 and 1993.¹⁸⁵ The killing ended with a cease fire agreement between the government and RPF in 1992, following which Habyarimana declared transition government in 1993.¹⁸⁶ The agreement was signed in Arusha, Tanzania. It agitated the Hutu extremists as it allowed the RPF to gain power.

On April 6, 1994 rebels shot down the plane carrying Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundi's president Cyprien Ntaryamira in Kigali, where all the passengers died.¹⁸⁷ The violence started within hours on the same day when the presidential guard, Rwandan Army, and Hutu rebel forces brutally killed Tutsi groups and moderate Hutus in response to the apparent assassination.¹⁸⁸ On April 7, the Hutus killed the prime minister (who was a moderate Hutu) and 10 Belgian peacekeepers.¹⁸⁹ This caused a power vacuum, forced the Belgian peacekeepers to withdraw, and the UN asked its forces to ensure safety only.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ History.com Editors, "Rwandan Genocide."

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

The state-sponsored violent killing continued, and it led to 800,000 deaths.¹⁹¹ The RPF retaliated, and by July, it gained control evicting the government-sponsored military and terrorist groups. The civil war caused two million displacements to neighboring countries by July 1994. Furthermore, it affected regional stability, led to a new war that dragged in six countries, resulted in the creation of numerous armed groups and increased the internal fighting, ousted the Mobutu Sese Seko government in DR Congo, caused 5 million deaths over 10 years (1994-2003).¹⁹²

The reasons behind the genocide were manifold. Firstly, the UN and powerful actors repeatedly ignored the killing from 1990 through 1993. Secondly, when the actual genocide began, the world was already focused on the Yugoslavian crisis and ignored the actions that led to the Rwandan genocide.¹⁹³ The UN General Assembly passed a resolution to withdraw troops and restrict United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to humanitarian assistance only once the violence escalated.¹⁹⁴ In his book about the limits of humanitarian intervention, Allan Kuperman argues that the US government and other actors could have reduced the effect by taking minimal actions. The immediate sending of 5,000 international troops could have halted some killings.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ History.com Editors, “Rwandan Genocide.”

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Kuperman, “Genocide.”

In addition, the elements of National Power do appear in this Genocide. Rwivanga mentioned the Rwanda government implemented the genocide through “strong diplomatic relations with external players (D), well-planned information network (I), well-equipped military (M), and foreign-financed economic programs (E).”¹⁹⁶ His analysis also included other issues like the involvement of the French military to strengthen the Rwandan Army and arms and equipment supplied by Egypt and South Africa was one of the reasons behind the state-sponsored genocide. Furthermore, the UN’s refusal of the recommendation of Commander of UNAMIR General Roméo Dallaire facilitated the genocide.¹⁹⁷ The UN ultimately sent troops to Rwanda, but by then, the genocide had ended.

The Rwandan genocide ended in July 1994. However, the repatriation of two million ethnic Hutus did not succeed. A report from Médecins Sans Frontières highlighted the key reasons for this failure, “Fear of reprisal killings, arbitrary mass arrests, reports about grossly overcrowded prisons, the lack of an effective judicial system and the control exercised by their leaders over the camps.”¹⁹⁸ Other mentionable reasons were political instability, the fragile response of the international community, shambled economy, and the creation of multi-rebel groups.¹⁹⁹ The Rwandan refugees returned voluntarily once the condition in their home country changed. After the RPF government took over from Hutu led

¹⁹⁶ Rwivanga, “The Role of the Government in Perpetrating Genocide,” 29.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 29-32.

¹⁹⁸ “Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill,” Medecins Sans Frontieres, July 20, 1995, <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/deadlock-rwandan-refugee-crisis-repatriation-virtually-standstill>.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

government, it adopted a policy of “unity and reconciliation.”²⁰⁰ In 1996, Rwandan government encouraged voluntary repatriation of the Hutu group, and the government announced to accommodate them within 15 days.²⁰¹ The government formed a National Emergency Committee and each prefecture repatriation committees ensured basic facilities like security, transport, food, health, and social integration issues.”²⁰² However, some of the international organizations termed the event as forced repatriation.²⁰³ Though the situation was not conducive, the overall effort by the new government, rehabilitation plan, UN and IO aid, US funding and governance helped to repatriate 1.3 million Rwandans in 1996.²⁰⁴

The government formed a new constitution to prevent further ethnic strife in 2003.²⁰⁵ In 2006, the Rwandan government reformed to avoid any ethnic strife by replacing the previous 12 prefectures with five larger multiethnic provinces. The country’s economy, good governance, and debt relief by World Bank and International

²⁰⁰ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “The Rwanda Genocide,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, last updated April 5, 2021. <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-rwanda-genocide>.

²⁰¹ United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, *U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1997 – Rwanda* (Arlington, VA, January 1, 1997), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8b90.html>.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Rene Lemarchand and The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Genocide and aftermath,” Britannica, accessed April 12, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda/Moving-forward>.

Monetary Fund (IMF) further made the situation more conducive for return.²⁰⁶ Table 2 summarizes the researcher's findings on the Rwanda case.

Table 2. Finding on Rwanda Case based on Analysis		
Causes of Genocide/Violence	Why Repatriation Failed Initially	What influenced the end state
Inaction by UN and powerful actors prior to Genocide	Fear of Mass killing	Constitution amendment
Support to Rwandan Army by external actors and Uganda to RPF to perpetrate genocide	Poor Judicial system, Governance	Restructuring governance, balancing power, arranging basic needs
Historical strife between Hutu and Tutsis	Control by the camp leaders to return	Power sharing effort by government
Lack of reaction and interest in this region	Lack of a secured future	IMF, World Bank, UN and IO involvement

Source: Created by author.

Case 2: Sudanese Genocide

The Sudanese genocide was another example of state-sponsored atrocity where the government and its backers, Northerner Arab Muslims, committed genocide against the Southerner African Muslims. However, hostility was rooted in the British colonial era. The British always favored the northern Arabs, allowing the expansion of the north at the cost of the south and dividing Sudan into two uneven factions.²⁰⁷ British developed Sudan in a manner so that inhabitants of Khartoum, Gejira and another one or two states

²⁰⁶ Lemarchand and The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Genocide and aftermath."

²⁰⁷ Rwivanga, "The Role of the Government in Perpetrating Genocide," 11.

enjoy the maximum facilities whereas other areas suffered.²⁰⁸ Following the independence of Sudan in 1956, the country engaged in civil wars for rest of the century as the southern part and its African Muslims, and non-Muslims suffered disparity in terms of political, economic and social rights.²⁰⁹



Figure 8. Sudan Map

Source: “List of Cities in Sudan,” Wikipedia, accessed April 9, 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cities_in_Sudan#/media/File:Su-map.png.

The Sudanese government did not rectify the disparity. Instead, the Arab tribes such as the Shaygiyya, Danaqla and the Ja’aliyyin enjoyed urbanization at the expense of

²⁰⁸ Rwivanga, “The Role of the Government in Perpetrating Genocide,” 11-12.

²⁰⁹ World Without Genocide, “Darfur Genocide,” Mitchell Hamline School of Law, last updated January 2021, <https://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/darfur-genocide>.

other tribes in the periphery.²¹⁰ Such discrimination caused the rise of two major rebel groups named the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) who attacked a Sudanese Air Force Base at El Fasher, North Darfur in 2003 igniting the fuel for the war crime.²¹¹ In reply, the government perpetrated genocide by militias known as the Janjaweed (which loosely translates to *devils on horseback*) or Rapid Support Forces (RSF).²¹² “The Janjaweed killed the people, burnt houses, raped and tortured women, polluted waters ultimately resulting in 480,000 killed and more than 2.8 million people displaced.”²¹³

Eric Reeves in his book *Compromising with Evils* mentioned that the Sudanese genocide was a slow version of the Rwandan Genocide, where yet again the UN/AU failed to respond quickly.²¹⁴ Moreover, initially the international community termed it as a *humanitarian crisis* and the report made by the UN independent commission did not identify the incident as *genocide*.²¹⁵ Though the Bush administration declared the event as *genocide* they were less interested in Sudan after exhausting troops in Iraq and

²¹⁰ Richard Cockett, *Sudan, Darfur and the Failure of an African State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 7.

²¹¹ World Without Genocide, “Darfur Genocide.”

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Eric Reeves, “Genocide in Darfur: How the horror began?” *Sudan Tribune*, September 3, 2005, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article11445>.

²¹⁵ Strauss, *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention*, 11-12.

Afghanistan.²¹⁶ Although the African Union deployed troops, it basically performed in a protection role. The initial efforts by the UN, IOs, AU and powerful actors were limited to diplomacy, which miserably failed. In 2005, the case was shifted to ICJ, which announced it as *genocide* and accused Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir of being responsible for the situation.²¹⁷ The UN passed resolution in 2007, and issued a hybrid United Nations-African Union mission (UNAMID) to maintain peace in Darfur.²¹⁸ However, it was too late and the deployment was delayed as “China and Russia presumably would have vetoed any resolution that included sanctions against the government or authorized direct U.N. intervention.”²¹⁹ When the UN was asking for action, China owned a 40 percent share of Sudan’s main oil producing field and Russia was the main arms supplier to the Sudanese government.²²⁰

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The CPA resulted in the establishment of Republic of South Sudan (RSS) in July 2011. The CPA allowed 2 million refugees to return to South Sudan and relocated 300,000 people.²²¹ During the

²¹⁶ Strauss, *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention*, 11-12.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ World Without Genocide, “Darfur Genocide.”

²¹⁹ “The United Nations and Darfur,” Human Rights Watch, January 2005, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/darfur/3.htm>.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Niels Harild, Asger Christensen, and Roger Zetter, “Sustainable Refugee Return: Triggers, Constraints, and Lessons on Addressing the Development Challenges

period 2005-2010, 330,000 people voluntarily returned, and UNHCR assisted the return of 170,000 people between 2012 and 2013.²²² However, a significant percentage opted to stay in their current locations as they had been availing themselves of the various facilities that were better than in their homeland. A vast majority of the Sudanese refugees took shelter in Uganda. They were registered in the particular state, given a small amount of land to farm, and earned a living of limited means.²²³ The refugees who aspired a better living, relocated at their own expense and exploited better opportunities. Some settled elsewhere, some extended their families both in Sudan and Uganda to explore opportunities in both countries, again some denied the formal UNHCR repatriation procedure to seek better options.²²⁴ Table 3 summarizes researcher's findings:

of Forced Displacement,” (GPFD Issue Note Series, The World Bank Group, Washington, DC, August 2015), 132.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid., 132-133.

²²⁴ Ibid.

Table 3. Finding on Sudan Case based on Analysis		
Causes of Genocide/Violence	What facilitated the Repatriation Process	What other things happened
Government's role to conduct genocide	Spontaneous repatriation following the CPA	Integration
Delayed action by the UN and IOs. Non-interest by the powerful actors to deploy troops	Assisted repatriation by the UNHCR	Settlement
Russia and China's role to exploit the situation	Independence of South Sudan	Migration to third country
Failure of UN to declare Darfur as a 'Safe Zone'	UNAMID's role in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)	UN and IO involvement

Source: Created by author.

Case 3: Greco-Turkish Population Exchange

The Greco-Turkish population exchange was a great treaty signed in Lausanne, Switzerland, on January 30, 1923, between the Government of Turkey and Greece.²²⁵ The deal prevented the genocide of the orthodox Christians living in Asia minor. After World War I Greece and Turkey engaged in a short-lived war. They committed atrocities.²²⁶ During World War I, almost three million Greek citizens were displaced from their own country, primarily seeking refuge in Turkey. However, they were not welcomed in Turkey primarily because of religion. As a result, they were driven out of the city and given shelter in remote areas.

²²⁵ Jason B. Faulkenberry, "The 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange: Successful Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities," (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 1.

²²⁶ Ibid.




Figure 9. Treaty of Sèvres Map

Source: “Treaty of Sèvres map partitioning Anatolia,” Wikimedia Commons, accessed April 13, 2022, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres_map_partitioning_Anatolia.png.

After World War I, the British divided the Ottoman empire into pieces leaving a thin slice to the Turks (figure 9). The British gained control of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and further pressured the Sultan to sign the Treaty of Sevres to dismantle the Ottoman empire.²²⁷ The Ottoman Sultan agreed to sign the treaty, but the military-political leader, Kemal Ataturk, would not sign the treaty. He aimed for Turkish independence and desired a restoration of the lost territory, predominantly west Anatolia (Asia Minor). Kemal Ataturk gained immense popularity after the battle of Gallipoli and gradually rose as the de-facto leader of the Turks. He poised troops to oust

²²⁷ Faulkenberry, “The 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange,” 1-5.

the Greek Christians to gain control of Asia Minor.²²⁸ The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, convinced Greece to enter the war, and France, Italy, and British assured support for them.²²⁹

Kemal revolted against the Sultan and declared a reformist government on April 23, 1920 to regain Turkish pride. He initially targeted Armenia, gained support from the Bolsheviks, made a treaty with Russia, and defeated Armenia (figure 9) by November 1920.²³⁰ His ultimate target in combatting the Greeks was Asia Minor. Sensing a defeat, the British tried to negotiate a truce. In contrast, France and Italy broke the alliance with the Greeks and joined Kemal.²³¹ Thus, Kemal Ataturk single-handedly regained the territory and defeated the Greeks. Millions of Greeks feared death and mass killing after the war.

Following the Greco-Turkish war, both countries agreed to exchange populations by the peace treaty to avoid mass killing and genocide. The peace conference was held in Switzerland and lasted 11 weeks, from November 11, 1922 to July 24, 1923.²³² The conference aimed to amend the treaty of Sevres, which denied Turkey the straits and much of its lands. However, during the meeting, the Turkish representative proposed the

²²⁸ Faulkenberry, "The 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange," 1-5.

²²⁹ Glenn E. Curtis, *Greece: A Country Study*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 47-49.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Faulkenberry, "The 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange," 15-19.

²³² Ibid.

banishment of the Christian minority within two weeks.²³³ The leaders of the conference, the powerful actors, and the Greeks felt the urgency and assessed that removing the population would be the best solution to save the people. As a result, 1.2 million Christians were expelled from Turkey even though they were citizens of Constantinople (Istanbul), Asia Minor (Anatolia), and Izmir. On the other hand, over 300,000 Muslims left western Thrace and returned to Turkey. Thus, Turkey and Greece avoided mass atrocity and a potential genocide by facilitating mass movement of two populations. The summary of the findings is listed below:

Table 4. Finding on Greco-Turkey Population Exchange based on Analysis		
Causes of Genocide/Violence	What facilitated the Exchange Process	What other things happened
Restoring Turkish Pride	Assistance of International actors	Reintegration of population in both countries
Treaty of Sevres	Leadership	Involvement of other actors like Russia
British influence and role play influenced the situation	League of Nation Involvement	France and Italy's role in the issue suggesting the phenomenon, there is no permanent enemy or friend in international relationship

Source: Created by author.

Case 4: Syrian Migration Crisis

The Syrian refugee crisis is an ongoing crisis created due to the conflict between President Bashar Al Assad's government and various other actors. The conflict began in

²³³ Faulkenberry, "The 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange," 15-19.

March 2011 with the Syrian Civil War and has continued for the last decade. The civil war caused 6.8 million Syrians to seek refuge in the neighboring countries.²³⁴ Another 6.7 million people are internally displaced, meaning more than half of its population has been suffering forced displacement. The neighboring countries, such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, have hosted approximately 5.5 million refugees.²³⁵ Turkey alone hosts an enormous population – 3.6 million. Across Europe, over one million have been granted either refuge or asylum. Germany hosted 59 percent, Sweden 11 percent, the remaining refugees were split between France, Netherlands, Austria, and Greece.²³⁶

Turkey has undertaken several projects to improve the condition of the Syrian refugees including the Syrians Under Temporary Protection (SUTP) program, involving the World Bank and EU, to address the humanitarian and developmental challenges for refugee and host communities.²³⁷ 95.6 percent of refugees have moved out of camps and settled in urban and rural areas with the hopes of better living.²³⁸ Turkey has also

²³⁴ Kathryn Reid, “Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs, and how to help,” World Vision, July 13, 2021. <https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts>.

²³⁵ “Syria Refugee Crisis – Globally, in Europe and in Cyprus,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, March 18, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/cy/2021/03/18/syria-refugee-crisis-globally-in-europe-and-in-cyprus-meet-some-syrian-refugees-in-cyprus/>.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ The World Bank, “10 Years On, Turkey Continues Its Support for an Ever-Growing Number of Syrian Refugees,” World Bank Group, June 22, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/06/22/10-years-on-turkey-continues-its-support-for-an-ever-growing-number-of-syrian-refugees>.

²³⁸ Ibid.

implemented the Employment Support Project for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Turkish Citizens (ISDEP) which provides refugees and host communities with skills and language training, job counseling, and job placement services.²³⁹ Furthermore, it has taken steps for the children's education under the Education Infrastructure for Resilience project, infrastructure development under the Municipal Service Improvement Project, and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) program to address more complex and evolving issues.²⁴⁰ Turkey undertook the projects with the World Bank and EU assistance. For an example, the FRiT project involves a total of €6 billion allotments in humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support for Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey.²⁴¹

Germany's refugee integration process has become very effective in recent years. In 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a famous promise "We can do this," accepting the influx of about one million Syrian refugees.²⁴² Many including the former US President Donald Trump believed that her acceptance will cause security, social and economic concerns for Germany and Europe. However, Germany has successfully dealt with the integration process till now with wide-ranging plans. The plans include arranging vocational training for the refugees, arranging integration involving the federal,

²³⁹ The World Bank, "10 Years On, Turkey Continues Its Support for an Ever-Growing Number of Syrian Refugees."

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Lily Hindy, *Germany's Syrian Refugee Integration Experiment* (New York: The Century Foundation, September 16, 2018), <https://tcf.org/content/report/germanys-syrian-refugee-integration-experiment/>.

state, city, and local governments, civil society, and of course the refugees themselves.²⁴³ Germany, learning lessons from the previous Turkish migration, has ensured “fair distribution” of the Syrian refugees among Germany’s sixteen states using a calculation of the states’ tax revenue and population to ensure equitable distribution of the refugees.²⁴⁴ Refugee children are receiving education and the adults also participate in a cost-free *integration* course. The course involves 600 hours of German Language, and a sixty-hour *orientation course* including information on German law, history, culture, and values.²⁴⁵ Germany, however restricted the refugee’s opportunity of family integration, and their entry to skill-based job sectors.²⁴⁶ The country spent 20 billion euro in 2016 and expect to spend 78 billion euro by 2022.

Globally, Lebanon hosts the second-largest number of refugees in terms of to the ratio to the native population. UNHCR statistics show that Lebanon hosts 865,530 registered Syrian refugees and 1.5 million refugees overall, whereas its population is 6.8 million.²⁴⁷ Lebanon failed to tackle the refugee crisis effectively. Around 90 percent of

²⁴³ Hindy, *Germany’s Syrian Refugee Integration Experiment*.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ “Integration courses – what are they?” Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, accessed April 23, 2022, <http://www.bamf.de/EN/Willkommen/DeutschLernen/Integrationskurse/InhaltAblauf/inhaltablauf-node.html>.

²⁴⁶ Hindy, *Germany’s Syrian Refugee Integration Experiment*.

²⁴⁷ Omer Karasapan and Sajjad Shah, “Why Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a crisis within a crisis,” Brookings, April 15, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/15/why-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-are-a-crisis-within-a-crisis/>.

refugee households remain in extreme poverty, up from 55 percent in 2019.²⁴⁸ The country's GDP dropped drastically, and it cannot provide basic humanitarian needs to the refugees. Moreover, the Lebanese security forces threaten to force the refugees to return to Syria, which has pressured them to migrate to a third country. Jordan hosts 650,000 refugees, approximately 7 percent of its population.²⁴⁹ Jordan has given a work permit to 230,000 refugees, yet 86 percent of refugees live below the poverty line outside the camps.²⁵⁰ The World Food Program supports 500,000 refugees with food. It provides an allowance of \$32 per refugee per month. Still, 90 percent of the refugees remain hungry. Zaatari is the largest refugee camp and shelters 80,000 refugees. Refugees living in Zaatari do not have the basic needs there even though the government seems willing to help them.

Interestingly, up until the media projection of the death of a Syrian Refugee, Aylan Kurdi, people did not seem focused on the humanitarian crisis in Syria.²⁵¹ The Syrian boy's lifeless body was found on the Greek shore when his family attempted to travel by a rubber boat - capsized. This incident shook the emotion of the world community, and government, non-government organizations, and IOs focused intensely

²⁴⁸ Karasapan and Shah, "Why Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a crisis within a crisis."

²⁴⁹ "10 Facts about the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan," World Food Program USA, last updated May 12, 2022, <https://www.wfpusa.org/articles/10-facts-about-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-in-jordan/>.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Diane Cole, "Study: What Was the Impact of The Iconic Photo of The Syrian Boy?" *NPR*, January 13, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/01/13/509650251/study-what-was-the-impact-of-the-iconic-photo-of-the-syrian-boy>.

after five years of the crisis. For instance, people donated 55 times greater in the week after the photo (around \$214,300) than the week before (\$3,850) to the Red Cross fund.²⁵² Thus, the Syrian crisis gives a powerful lesson about the media's importance in solving present-day conflicting and humanitarian issues.

The researcher explored the Syrian refugee crisis to analyze the strategy adopted by different nations to address this crisis that impacts nations in the Middle East and Europe. The table below identifies major findings from this analysis:

Table 5. Finding on Syrian Migration Crisis based on Analysis		
Syrian Refugees in different countries	Strategy adopted	What are the Key factors/Challenges/facilitators
Turkey (3.6 million)	- Integration to urban and local areas - Involving them in local economic project - Education - Infrastructure development	- EU and World Bank Funding - Turkish land area vis-à-vis population - Religion and Language - Media Projection
Germany (Over 700,000)	- Integration State, local, and Federal coordination to accommodate as per state revenue, income - Germany's vocational training scheme - Germany's integration scheme	- German economy - Involvement of NGO and volunteer group - German Land area vis-à-vis population - German infrastructure to support integration - Security management system
Lebanon (1.5 million)	- Camps and controlled areas - Migration to a third country	- Poor economy and continuous inflation - Poor ratio between citizen and refugees - Lack of support from the IOs - Limited Land area and settlement options

²⁵² Cole, "Study: What Was the Impact of The Iconic Photo of The Syrian Boy?"

Jordan	- Job Market opening - Displacement outside camps	- Jordan's economic and national capability - Limited opportunity - Less funding
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Source: Created by author.

Developing the Set of Factors

The researcher explored different case studies to find plausible options to reduce/eliminate National Security threats in BD that are associated with the Rohingya refugees. He analyzed four cases, and his findings included key factors whose presence or absence may contribute to the *outcomes*. Scholz and Simister mention that the factors may also be considered the *conditions* to implement the theory of change.²⁵³ Table 2-5 summarizes the researcher's critical findings on specific cases. Table 6 will highlight the common factors/conditions applicable to implementing the change theory.

Table 6. Contributing Factors to the Theory of Change based on the Case Analysis	
Desired Outcome	Contributing Factors (Presence/Absence)
BD is capable of reducing/eliminating threats related to Rohingya refugee crisis without forcibly returning them	Formulating and facilitating sustainable return involving DIME (Sudan)
	Proposing the exchange of Rohingya population to other nations (Turkey)
	Settlement of Rohingya refugee to different nations (Syria)
	Rohingya Management, Security enforcement and surveillance scheme (Syria/Rwanda)
	Integration of Rohingya within BD (Syria)
	Creating International pressure on Myanmar to prevent Genocide (Turkey, Sudan)
	Powerful Media Projection (Sudan, Syria)
	Role of powerful actors and IOs (All cases)

²⁵³ Simister and Scholz, "Qualitative Comparative Analysis," 2.

	Lack of bilateral relationship (Turkey)
	Lack of political stability (Syria, Rwanda)

Source: Created by author.

Scoring the Factors

The factors identified above have both positive and negative contributory effects to achieve the desired outcome. BD needs to exploit the positive contributory factors to achieve the desired outcome. However, before that, the negative efforts should be eliminated or controlled in some manner. The researcher will score the factors based on positive and negative aspects to maintain the subjectivity of the research.

Table 7. Scoring Factors (+/-) based on the Researcher's Case Study Analysis	
Positive Factors	Negative Factors
Sustainable Return Policy/Strategy	Recurring persecution
Rohingya Management, Security enforcement and surveillance scheme	Lack of political instability
Bordering security enforcement	Inadequate Role of UN/IOs
Projection of the issue through informational campaign	Inadequate pressure on MN by other actors
Exploring population exchange option	Ethnic clash and economic reasons
Integration within BD	Bilateral relationship

Source: Created by author.

Analyze the Data Set

The findings from the case study analysis indicate that the return of refugees to their home country is the ultimate solution to any security situation. And the return is best for the refugees when their own country creates favorable conditions. Rwanda and Sudanese cases suggest that the genocide occurred due to state-sponsored persecution, ethnic

inaction or slow action by the various actors including the UN, and other IOs. However, the situation changed whenever the international actors pressured the host nations, those who had accepted refugees and were supporting them through housing, food, education, and employment to create a situation conducive to repatriation, and when those host countries agreed to assist in the repatriation of refugee populations. Hence, the voluntary or assisted return of Rohingya to MN may be the ultimate long-term solution to maintain the national security of BD. Unfortunately, it is not the immediate solution, and the answer may take years. Therefore, it is imperative to identify why the Rohingya repatriation has not taken place. The researcher will analyze the data based on the negative scores specified in step 4.

What are the challenges to Rohingya repatriation?

Recurring Persecution

Systematic persecution is one of the prime reasons why the Rohingya are unwilling to return. The history is similar to the Sudanese genocide case. Since Sudanese independence in 1965, the Arab-Muslim tribes in the northern region of Sudan repeatedly suppressed and killed the African-Muslims and non-Muslims of the south.²⁵⁴ Similarly, since Burmese independence in 1948, the military, backed by the government, conducted cleansing operations in 1978, 1991, 2012, and 2017.²⁵⁵ Additionally, Darfur did not experience economic development equal to that in the rest of Sudan. Since independence, the Rakhine state of Burma did not undergo development much like Darfur. The conflict

²⁵⁴ Rwivanga, “The Role of the Government in Perpetrating Genocide,” 11-12.

²⁵⁵ Hossain, “After Humanitarianism,” 2.

raised the factions or militia-type groups like Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) which are similar to the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) found in Sudan. Moreover, the genocide also had a similar beginning, an attack by the ARSA on MN Police posts was comparable to attacks by the SLA and JEM on the airfields. Both attacks were followed by the government-approved persecution of the minorities within the region or country. Similarly, recurring persecution of MN can be compared to the Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi minority who were suppressed since 1959 and continued till 1994.²⁵⁶ The periodic persecution increased after forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), consisting mostly of Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990.²⁵⁷ It led to the Rwandan government, military, and affiliated state-sponsored organizations killing hundreds of Tutsis between 1990 and 1993. The Rohingya persecution story is also identical (mentioned earlier while comparing the Sudanese case). Henceforth, recurring persecution is a negative factor towards any sustainable repatriation process.

Political Instability

On February 1, 2021 the MN military staged a coup-de-tat and overthrew the elected government of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the First State Counsellor – Aung San Suu Kyi government.²⁵⁸ The coup happened after the military backed party, the

²⁵⁶ History.com Editors, “Rwandan Genocide.”

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Melody Khuoltaikim Singson, “The Struggle For Political Stability In Myanmar And Its Critical Implications On Human Rights,” Human Rights Pulse,

Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) unanimously lost in the 2020 elections.²⁵⁹ Since then, the military has used coercive tools to subdue the opposition, and consolidate power which has led to the country's instability. The February 2021 coup and following violence in MN has pushed the country to the brink of a "Civil War," killing almost 1300 people and arresting nearly 10,000 citizens.²⁶⁰ The uprising is similar to the Syrian pro-democracy demonstrations against the repressive rulers that initiated use of deadly arsenals against the dissents.²⁶¹ The violence in Syria rapidly escalated and resulted in a Civil War. Over the last one decade, 3.6 million Syrians took refuge to different nations, as the ongoing war has not provided options to return. Similarly, since the 2021 coup, estimated 800,000.²⁶² MN nationals have been internally displaced and 240,000 have taken shelter in neighboring Thailand.²⁶³ Amidst such uncertainty, the

February 14, 2022, <https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/the-struggle-for-political-stability-in-myanmar-and-its-critical-implications-on-human-rights>.

²⁵⁹ Lindsay Maizland, "Myanmar's Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict," Council on Foreign Relations, last updated January 31, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya>.

²⁶⁰ Russell Goldman, "Myanmar's Coup: Explained," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html>.

²⁶¹ BBC, "Why has the Syrian war lasted 11 years?" *BBC News*, March 15, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229>.

²⁶² United Nations, "Number of Internally Displaced in Myanmar Doubles, to 800,000," *UN News*, February 11, 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1111812>.

²⁶³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Thailand: Inter-Agency Update - April 2022 (Myanmar Emergency)," Inter-agency Update, last updated April 18, 2022, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/92085>.

previously displaced Rohingya have less hopes of return, unless the political situation stabilizes.

Inadequate Role of UN and Powerful Actors

The UN's role in solving the Rohingya crisis has not been influential since the Rohingya persecution. The UN has asked the MN government for a peaceful Rohingya solution, but that has not occurred. The targeted killing of Rohingya continues. The UN has also failed to ensure provisional acts against MN even though the UN's top court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), ruled against MN. The ICJ imposed provisional measures against MN on January 23, 2020, in which it dictated that MN must "prevent all genocidal acts against the Rohingya, to ensure that the military and other security forces do not commit acts of genocide, and to take steps to preserve evidence related to the case."²⁶⁴

The UN has also carefully avoided using the term *genocide* and described the persecution as "a textbook example of ethnic cleansing."²⁶⁵ This deliberate action has resulted in a limited, non-military international response. The UN could not pass any military-response based resolution as China and Russia voted against any resolution on MN that included military action. Similarly, the powerful actors did not pay adequate attention to preventing genocide or pressuring MN to enforce the provisional acts. Instead, MN confined 600,000 Rohingya within camps and denied them freedom of

²⁶⁴ "Developments in Gambia's Case Against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice," Human Rights Watch.

²⁶⁵ United Nations, "UN human rights chief points to 'textbook example of ethnic cleansing' in Myanmar."

movement or basic needs.²⁶⁶ Similarly, the conditions remain unchanged for another 1,300,000 Rohingya. They have been arbitrarily held in the open-air detention camps since 2012.²⁶⁷ It is a case similar to the Rwanda and Sudanese issue where the UN or the powerful actors ignored certain Rwandan and Sudanese minorities over other priorities. Their slow action or inaction led to mass killings. It prevented the sustained return for a long period, which viewed the Rohingya as less significant to their national interest than other groups. It is contradictory to events following the Armenian genocide, where Britain, France, Italy, the League of Nations, and other organizations were very proactive in preventing the genocide of the Christian minorities living in Asia Minor, helping them reintegrate and settle in Greece. Therefore, the current role of the UN and international actors is a negative contributory factor to sustainable repatriation.

Inadequate Pressure on MN Military

Myanmar's military forces have carried out the atrocities against the Rohingya. However, the global reaction was insufficient to pressure the government or leaders to stop the atrocities. The Trump government identified the incident as having *genocidal intent* and banned the top military leaders from visiting the US. Similarly, the EU imposed an arms embargo and a few trade sanctions. Those diplomatic actions did not put any pressure on MN which is exemplified by the ousting of the elected government in February 2021. MN continues to gain favor of neighboring India, China, and Russia.

²⁶⁶ Watts and Mortimer, "Downing Street says Burma's treatment of Rohingya Muslims looks like Ethnic Cleansing."

²⁶⁷ "Developments in Gambia's Case Against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice," Human Rights Watch.

China backs the military government, and ironically due to China's influence, the US and other members of G8 nations did not take any punitive actions against MN to force them to accept return of the refugees. The same factor also negatively contributed to the case of Sudan, where UN and influencing actors failed to exert timely sanctions on the Sudanese government due to an expected veto of China and Russia. Similarly, inaction happened in the case of the Rwandan genocide, where France, South Africa, or Egypt did not stop the government and Hutu extremists. Instead, they continued supplying the Rwandan government with arms and equipment. The nations cited above maintained good terms with the Rwandan Government.²⁶⁸ Thus, the inaction of powerful actors negatively contributes to the solution, which applies to the MN military as well.

Ethnic Clash and Economic Reasons

The Buddhists are the majority in the Rakhine state. They fear that the Rohingya will overthrow them and establish a Muslim state if not controlled.²⁶⁹ The local Buddhists inspired by the 969 movements in MN have conducted several coercive attacks on the Rohingya; in addition, they boycotted their financial products and isolated them.²⁷⁰ The MN Buddhist government supported the fundamentalists and maintained its stance

²⁶⁸ Rwivanga, "The Role of the Government in Perpetrating Genocide," 29-31.

²⁶⁹ Siegfried Wolf, "Myanmar's Rohingya conflict 'more economic than religious'," interview by Shamil Shams, *Deutsche Welle*, April 6, 2015, <https://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-rohingya-conflict-more-economic-than-religious/a-18496206>.

²⁷⁰ Nathan G. Thompson, "The 969 Movement and Burmese Anti-Muslim Nationalism in Context," Buddhists Peace Fellowship, July 6, 2013, <https://buddhistpeacefellowship.org/the-969-movement-and-burmese-anti-muslim-nationalism-in-context/>.

against Rohingya reconciliation.²⁷¹ Rakhine state is the second poorest state in MN. The Buddhist majority thinks the Rohingya degrade their employment and economic opportunity. The government also plans to systemically clear the Rohingya from the state to lessen its burden and facilitate building mega-infrastructure projects to extend economic prosperity.²⁷² The situation resembles the Rwandan genocide, where the Hutu majority wanted to eliminate the perceived *superior* Tutsis. Also, it matches Turkish genocide against Greeks in Asia Minor where the Ottoman Empire felt that the Asia Minor was being threatened by the indigenous Greek people.²⁷³ In addition, it felt that the Greeks would taint the population and tarnish the Turkish image as the *Muslim majority state*.²⁷⁴ As a result, the Empire forced a solution of *genocide* to rid the Greek contaminants. Thus, the ethnic clash and economic reasons negatively contribute to the peace process.

Lack of Infrastructural Development to Facilitate Return

Four essential conditions may encourage refugees' return: security, access to adequate services, housing, and livelihood opportunities.²⁷⁵ During the Sudanese repatriation, the government utilized all the elements of National Power to create a

²⁷¹ Wolf, "Myanmar's Rohingya conflict 'more economic than religious'."

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Brianna Summ, "10 Important and Little-Known Facts About the Greek Genocide," *Latest News* (blog), *The Borgen Project*, December 11, 2017, <https://borgenproject.org/10-facts-about-the-greek-genocide/>.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Harild, Christensen, and Zetter, "Sustainable Refugee Return," 20.

conducive situation for the return. The Sudanese government facilitated rehabilitation, accommodation, employment, and security.²⁷⁶ The situation in MN is just the opposite. After five years of the crisis, MN has not addressed the issues to create a conducive condition for the Rohingya return. Instead, it is fair to say that the development of infrastructure is being used to isolate and repress/oppress the Rohingya instead of preparing space for their return. The 600,000 Rohingya remaining in the Rakhine confined, suffer from apartheid, and severe deprivation of liberty.²⁷⁷ Thus, infrastructural development and employment opportunities facilitate the return process and vice versa.

Lack of Bilateral Relationship

BD and MN do not maintain an amicable bilateral relationship thus reducing the potential to solve the Rohingya issue. BD's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with MN is significantly less compared to other South-Asian nations. BD does not have any communication link with MN. Even transportation is limited, for example there are no direct flights between the two neighboring countries. People-to-people exchanges between the countries at the state, military, or student levels have been minimal. MN does not consider BD as its potential economic partner. Instead, its Kaladan multi-modal mega-gas project with India has lessened its dependence on BD. The same factor heated the Ottoman empire to conduct genocide against the Greek minors because Turks and Greeks were historic rivals on the issues of bordering disputes (prior to 1922), control

²⁷⁶ Harild, Christensen, and Zetter, "Sustainable Refugee Return," 37.

²⁷⁷ "Developments in Gambia's Case Against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice," Human Rights Watch.

over Cyprus, Aegean Sea, preceding wars, and roles of Greek pre and during World War I.²⁷⁸ However, they could settle the issue with the involvement of regional countries and European powers Britain, France, or Italy, who had access to both nations.

However, the neighbors of BD and MN (India, China, Thailand) do not have a harmonious relationship based on mutual trust, partnership, and cooperation, who could settle the issue as third parties. BD has significantly lacked in its *look east policy* and placed maximum reliance on its eastern neighbor India. Bangladesh's increased relationship with India has reduced its relationship with China. On the other hand, reliance on India did not help BD solve Rohingya situation apart from providing promises and false hope. Therefore, BD's deteriorating relationship with MN and a reduced level of friendship with China nor improved relations with India have not improved the prospects for Rohingya repatriation.

BD's Way Forward to Maintain Desired Security Situation

The previous analysis showed many challenges to the Rohingya repatriation process. Though achievable, it may take a considerable period to create a conducive situation for the assisted or voluntary refugee return. Most importantly, the process of repatriation is not solely reliant on the actions of BD. Instead, it depends mainly on MN, who must create safe conditions for the Rohingya to return to their home country. If we analyze the positive contributory factors (derived from case analyses) for ensuring the desired

²⁷⁸ Alexis Heraclides, "The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity," (GreeSE Paper No. 51, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, October 2011), 1-10.

security situation, we find specific issues BD can do independently and other issues for which BD requires assistance from other nations to accomplish. Therefore, BD policy should develop a two-fold parallel strategy to approach and solve these problems. BD's policy should focus on formulating and implementing a sustainable return strategy (strategy 1) through devising ways and means that contribute to the safe return of the refugees. BD's policy and strategy should include schemes to diplomatically pursue the issue in the UN, influence external actors, and gain support of regional actors, IOs and humanitarian organizations all to exert multi-front pressure on MN. Besides, GOB should implement strategies (strategy 2) for security enforcement, surveillance and management of the living space and camps as an immediate step to improve national security internally. A first step should tighten border security to enforce existing laws and reduce the influx of refugees.

The priority should be negotiating with the influential actors for settling Rohingya in other countries or supporting BD in pressuring MN to create a conducive situation to return. The immediate priorities should also focus on reducing or eliminating the negative factors highlighted in Table 7 to create a conducive condition to return. The entire strategy relies on the successful integration of BD's instruments of National Power to achieve near-term, permanent solutions. BD should orchestrate separate lines of effort to attain each objective leading to the desired end-state. The planning, preparation, and execution should target a positive outcome by 2030 through implementing this theory of change. If the strategy succeeds, then the return of the Rohingya will be a significant accomplishment in preventing genocide and mass atrocities. If it fails, then BD should apply an alternative approach, which will be discussed subsequently in the paper.

Interpreting the Theory of Change: Safe Return as the
Permanent Solution to the Security Situation

“Comprehensive and durable return require related repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction processes within an overarching framework of institutional collaboration between humanitarian, development, government and private sector actors.”²⁷⁹ The case studies analyzed in this research indicate that proper application of the elements of National Power in a post-mass atrocity environment is critical to successful repatriation and an improved security situation for the countries involved. This is true for the countries that are housing and protecting the refugee population and for the country of origin once the repatriation begins.

Therefore, BD needs to integrate its instruments of National Power (DIME) to create conducive return conditions for the Rohingya. BD should use the diplomatic component of National Power to engage the powerful international actors, the UN and IOs, to generate pressure on MN. Players within the information domain should conduct media campaigns and psychological operations to earn sympathy for the Rohingya by making the plight of the group known around world-wide. The military component should continually depict force projection and maintain credible deterrence on the border. The economic component should exploit opportunities for building economic and financial relationships between BD and MN while attempting to influence India and China to convince MN of an amicable solution to the Rohingya migration and potential repatriation.

²⁷⁹ Harild, Christensen, and Zetter, “Sustainable Refugee Return,” xvi.

Diplomacy is the Strongest Tool

The researcher's case analysis suggested that the diplomatic attempts solved most of the previous refugee crises used for the analysis within this study. For example, the Greco-Turkish case was solved through diplomatic negotiations. The Syrian refugee crisis could be mitigated by politically accepting the refugees into multiple countries. Furthermore, the Sudanese government brought significant political reforms to create conducive return conditions for the fleeing refugees. Thus, BD's diplomacy should include how to engage the UN, powerful actors, regional actors, IOs, improve relations with MN, and implement of ICJ verdict and Annan commission report to ensure the safe return and a permanent solution for the Rohingya that eliminates future persecution.

Involving UN

The Rohingya persecution is an apparent genocide by definition and spectrum and, of late, recognized by the US. Strauss mentioned that as per the fundamentals of genocide and mass atrocity prevention convention, the policy action against a genocide involves prevention and response.²⁸⁰ The preventive measures include actions before the atrocity. The response measures involve the after-action steps.²⁸¹ BD should project the issue through the UN to approve a resolution in support of responsive action because the preventive diplomacy involves domestic prevention and external prevention measures, which fail to stop a state-sponsored genocide because of the length of time required to respond to the events. In the early stage of the Sudanese genocide in 2003 and 2004, the

²⁸⁰ Strauss, *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention*, 133.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

UN, AU, European, and US diplomats asked for a peaceful solution to the crisis through dialogues, participation, and diplomatic means.²⁸² Unfortunately, those requests were dismissed or denied, and the diplomatic solution failed, the genocide occurred. Strauss suggests that the responsive measures include both coercive and non-coercive measures.²⁸³ A few of the essential non-coercive steps include mediation, negotiation, UNSC resolution, fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry, and observer missions.²⁸⁴ If the UN can initiate the non-coercive response measures, the facts of the situation will promulgate throughout the international community. By making the international community more aware of the situation the actors may generate action plans to prevent further violence, persecution, and mass atrocities.

Involving Regional Power

India, Japan, and China are major regional powers and have a responsibility to help solve the crisis. Historically, the Greco-Turkish population exchange was successfully dealt with because of influential European nations Britain, Italy, France, and the League of Nation's involvement. Similarly, the Syrian refugee crisis has been mostly absorbed by its neighboring nations Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon. Some European countries like Germany have taken in Syrian refugees. BD maintains solid economic and diplomatic relations with all the nations mentioned. BD thus should endeavor to involve these nations in dialogue and negotiations and find possible peaceful solutions. In this

²⁸² Strauss, *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention*, 154.

²⁸³ Ibid., 144.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

regard, China may not respond like the other two nations. To mitigate this potential difference in response, BD may should reassure China about its growing bilateral and economic relations. Mentionable, China is the largest trading partner of BD that received a net FDI of US \$1.159 billion from China in Fiscal Year 2019, making it the top receiver in South Asia.²⁸⁵ The GOB should pursue China to elevate the relationship to a “strategic partnership of cooperation.”²⁸⁶ China’s influential role on the Rohingya issue may allow it to use BD’s road and sea network for economic expansion.

Japan has been a reliable friend to BD since independence. BD should request Japan act as a “Gap Bridger” because the Rohingya crisis may directly affect the QUAD (US, Australia, India, and Japan) countries’ strategic and economic vision as the crisis will create further instability if left unsolved.²⁸⁷ BD may also request Japan seek support of the US on this issue as Japan and the US are close allies and share similar visions on humanitarian matters.

Similarly, BD must remind India about its role in the repatriation process. India pledged to fund MN USD 25 million on “a project to build prefabricated housing in Rakhine State to meet the immediate needs of returning people.”²⁸⁸ Indian external

²⁸⁵ Tanmaya Das, “Trade ties between China, Bangladesh on the rise,” *Sunday Guardian Live*, last updated March 19, 2022, <https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/world/trade-ties-china-bangladesh-rise>.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Parvej Siddique Bhuiyan, “Japan’s Silence on Rohingya issue is Puzzling,” *South Asia Monitor*, September 21, 2021, <https://www.southasiamonitor.org/open-forum/japans-silence-rohingya-issue-puzzling>.

²⁸⁸ Yhome, “Examining India’s stance on the Rohingya crisis.”

minister Swaraj also assured BD they would support a sustainable Rohingya return and urged MN to ensure “safe, speedy and sustainable return of displaced persons to Rakhine State” in her 2018 visit to MN.²⁸⁹ BD and India maintain a warm relationship, and geo-strategically BD remains as a very important partner to India for its access to Seven Sisters (especially to contested Arunachal Pradesh, because of the geography along BD-Nepal-India border). BD, thus needs robust diplomacy to breach any missing links to gain India’s support in solving the crisis. Through differing approaches to the various regional powers, BD can influence to settle the issue of Rohingya.

Involving Powerful Actors (US, EU, G8 Nations)

Greco-Turkish case was solved by negotiation of powerful actor Britain. Similarly, Turkey and Germany greatly contributed to the settlement of the Syrian. BD should approach the most powerful actors related to this situation in a similar manner to obtain an ultimate solution. Notably, the US Secretary of State, Mr. Antony Blinken, formally declared that “Myanmar’s army committed genocide and crimes against humanity in its violence against the Rohingya minority” and warned that the population would not be safe if the military junta ruled the country.²⁹⁰ The GOB should use this opportunity to gain more support from the US to pressure MN to stop the atrocity and

²⁸⁹ Yhome, “Examining India’s stance on the Rohingya crisis.”

²⁹⁰ Antony J. Blinken, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken on the Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in Burma,” (Remarks at the Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, March 21, 2022), U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-united-states-holocaust-memorial-museum/>.

create conditions for the Rohingya to return. Similarly, BD should request the US to ask the ASEAN to be more proactive in settling the crisis.

Moreover, BD can use the recently signed agreement with France related to “Defense Cooperation” to its advantage because the countries “shares the same idea of a free, open, peaceful, secure and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, based on international law and with shared prosperity for all.”²⁹¹ BD also maintains a cordial relationship with the UK and other EU nations and has earned respect as a secular democratic nation. BD should exploit these opportunities to gain support from powerful actors to pressure MN to create conducive conditions for the Rohingya return. BD needs to use intense diplomacy to convince powerful actors to respond to MN’s military junta. Those diplomatic actions could include withdrawal of diplomatic relations, travel bans, enforcement of the ICJ verdict, implementation of the Kofi Annan commission report and economic sanctions among other tools and actions.²⁹² BD must convince the US and other allies of the geostrategic importance of MN in maintaining freedom of navigation and a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific Region. Such a diplomatic endeavor may prompt further coercive responses against MN should the initial non-coercive measures fail.

Involving the Regional and International Organizations

BD should seek involvement of as many organizations and government agencies as possible to ensure a successful repatriation process. IOs and regional organizations

²⁹¹ Reuters, “US rules Myanmar’s military committed genocide against Rohingya,” *France 24*, March 21, 2022, <https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220321-us-rules-myanmar-military-committed-genocide-against-rohingya>.

²⁹² Straus, *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention*, 144.

must play a significant role in the Rohingya repatriation. After the genocide in Darfur, the UN, the AU, many European nations, humanitarian organizations like MSF and the UNHCR, as well as the World Bank, and IMF all contributed to ensuring the safe return, reintegration, rehabilitation, and employment of the Sudanese population.

Similarly, the Syrian refugees in Turkey received assistance from the government and non-governmental organizations for their settlement. UNHCR reports mention that MN has the solution to the crisis, and IOs can support MN to create necessary rehabilitation, reintegration, and employment opportunities.²⁹³ BD should seek the support of ASEAN countries, primarily Indonesia (the most significant Muslim majority) and Malaysia, to pressure MN through the regional forum. In addition, BD can also assist IOs by providing relevant data and statistics for fact-finding.

Improving Bilateral Relationship

Greece and Turkey fought four significant wars between each other. Still, the relationship improved with the event of “earth-quake diplomacy,” where both countries supported each other, and extended humanitarian assistance to face the disaster.²⁹⁴ Similarly, the relationship between BD and MN can improve and ultimately the two countries can settle the issues peacefully. Both countries need to overcome the mistrust through the people-to-people level exchanges at state, diplomatic, military, and social

²⁹³ “Rohingya Crisis needs lasting solutions,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, August 21, 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/8/5f3e60124/unhcr-rohingya-crisis-needs-lasting-solutions.html/>.

²⁹⁴ Niels Kadritzke, “Forgetting a Remembered History: Greece’s Earthquake Diplomacy,” *Le Monde diplomatique*, June 2000, <https://mondediplo.com/2000/06/06greece>.

levels.²⁹⁵ Uddin suggested that BD and MN can develop a bilateral relationship if BD exports energy (electricity), trains human resources and develops skills, opens the education sector, and provides agricultural and medical support.²⁹⁶ Also, BD and MN should work on establishing road and rail connectivity, which would lessen the distance between the nations, physically and figuratively.²⁹⁷ Most importantly, BD may offer MN expertise on industrialization and extend maritime cooperation. The country can assist MN in developing its garment production, fishery sector, and facilitating other micro-credit economic aspects,²⁹⁸ should MN agree to settle the Rohingya issue. The increased connectivity will not only reduce the tension but also assist BD to extend its connectivity to the southeast Asian nations.

Informational Operations

Media Campaign

The latest Russian-Ukraine war indicates that strong information campaigns could significantly influence the outcome of a situation. Similarly, a single picture of Aylan Kurdi shook the world resulting in extension of humanitarian relief to Syria.²⁹⁹ Sudanese government also used information operations for the assisted and spontaneous return of

²⁹⁵ Uddin, “Prospects for Attaining a New Height in Bangladesh Myanmar Relations,” 18-23.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 15-18.

²⁹⁷ Uddin, “Prospects for Attaining a New Height in Bangladesh Myanmar Relations,” 15-23.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Cole, “Study: What Was the Impact of The Iconic Photo of The Syrian Boy?”

refugees projecting the development of infrastructure, humanitarian support, relief work, rehabilitation scheme, and other employment opportunities.³⁰⁰ BD should integrate its IO campaigns to project the humanitarian disaster and thus gain support from the actors and organizations. BD's strategy in this regard should also include a two-fold approach. The primary method should be the projection of the Rohingya life in BD, including their camp conditions, food, hygiene, accommodation, sanitation, and social life. BD should provide access to the camps for renowned correspondents in print and electronic media to transmit the actual picture of the situation. There are two potential positive implications of the projection. International actors will feel more urgency to solve the issue and increased international aid.

Secondly, the media campaign should expose MN's human rights violations, atrocity, and genocide to create a *name and shame* campaign against MN. BD cannot implement this effort independently but, it would play a critical role by providing access to the refugee population for members of the media. BD may project the issues with relevant data, statistics, and proof to the United Nations General Assembly to pressure MN. Additionally, BD may sensitize the population of democratic nations like the US, India, and people of the countries where human rights get maximum attention. Thus, BD will be able to create a widespread consensus against the MN's military junta, and it might cause the leaders in MN to accept a *bargaining term* toward the repatriation.

³⁰⁰ Harild, Christensen, and Zetter, "Sustainable Refugee Return," 132.

Psychological Operations

One of the essential aspects of the information operations campaign is conducting psychological operations. Rohingya repatriation depends on voluntary or assisted repatriation of the Rohingya. So, the Psychological Operation should include *winning the hearts and minds* of Rohingya to convince them of a sustainable voluntary and assisted return. They should be updated regarding the latest repatriation process and updated on the reintegration scheme. Similarly, they should be motivated to provide information to prepare National Verification Card (NVC) as a MN's prerequisite to return their home country. Again, regular motivation, pacification, self-monitoring, and alertness mechanisms may also positively affect the security situation and ultimately influence them to return. This can only work if MN is treating Rohingya fairly and eliminates persecution altogether.

Military Operations

The military lines of operation should be part of BD's prevention mechanism against any subversion, infiltration or unstable situation that may preclude the Rohingya return. Besides, it will keep the border stable for a sustainable return. However, for the return of Rohingya refugees, the military should be a supporting effort, not a decisive effort. The military should not act as an aggressor, even under the MN military's provocation. In Lebanon, one of the weaknesses of the Syrian refugee management was application of force by the military to leave the country (economy was the main

reason).³⁰¹ Any false step militarily will jeopardize the politically led repatriation process and create further distrust amongst nations and could potentially lead to unintentional civilian casualties.

A desire to protect civilians and improve national relationships should not prevent the BD military from protecting the country. In this regard, the anti-terrorism and anti-narcotic operations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts should continue in full swing. These operations should focus on finding MN based terrorist organizations like ARSA that have taken refuge in BD. Once found, the terrorists should be handed over to the MN government to cement BD's intent to eliminate terrorism or extremism from the country. At the same time, BD should man and equip and fulfill the organizational requirement of the newly formed division in Ramu, Cox's Bazar (bordering district of BD with MN) which is designed for force projection and deterrence.

Additionally, the military should continue intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, maintain patrols, and conduct joint exercises regularly within the border regions. The maritime components should protect sea lines of communication, dominate the territorial water and exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and air force elements should observe the air space. GOB should fulfill the organizational requirement of the military based on the DOTMLPF-P need of the Armed Forces. The actions will prevent rogue elements from MN or terrorists from conducting subversive activities aimed at precluding the repatriation of Rohingya. Instead, proper military

³⁰¹ "10 Facts about the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan," World Food Program USA.

actions it will facilitate the other elements of National Power and assist development of a sustainable repatriation process.

Economic Instrument

BD can muster its economic instrument of power to reduce the tension between the two nations and agreeing on a solution on the Rohingya issue. The Greco-Turkish population exchange brought negative economic changes to Turkey as the Christian exiled citizens were involved in trade, culture, and commerce.³⁰² The exchange was uneven, Turkey exiled 1.2 million to Greece and received 355,635.³⁰³ Similarly, MN may not regard the Rohingya as a burden and cleansing of the minority may not prove to be a solution to the economic crisis of the Rakhine region. BD may offer MN technological supports, and vocational training for the Rohingya as exchange to sustained repatriation.

BD's Total imports from MN in Fiscal Year 2018-2019 amounted to USD \$90.91 million, while the export was USD \$25.11million.³⁰⁴ BD-MN bilateral relations will only improve if the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between the two nations significantly increases. GOB's Finance, Commerce, Agricultural, and Foreign Ministry can work in hand to explore economic opportunities and increase the FDI. BD and MN are members of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation

³⁰² Aytek Soner Alpan, "The Economic Impact Of the 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange upon Turkey," (Thesis, Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, August 2008), 129-138.

³⁰³ Faulkenberry, "The 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange," 56-57.

³⁰⁴ Pathik Hasan, "Strengthening Myanmar-Bangladesh Trade and economic ties," *Modern Ghana*, March 16, 2022, <https://www.modernghana.com/news/1145452/strengthening-myanmar-bangladesh-trade-and-economi.html>.

(BIMSTEC). Both countries can reap financial benefits of being part of this geostrategic group, provided they agree solving the crisis amicably. MN can connect South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries through BD's corridor. Similarly, BD can utilize connectivity through MN to connect to ASEAN countries.³⁰⁵

Both countries can develop maritime, air, and land connectivity to widen the economic opportunities.³⁰⁶ BD may also extend economic cooperation to MN through maritime cooperation, development of the energy sector, transferring agro-technology, granting access to fisheries, medicines, cement, and industrial products, among other economic activity. MN can materialize its Blue Economy dream by building a strategic partnership with BD.³⁰⁷ On the other hand, BD may import natural gas and minerals, woods, garment products, and food items from MN. Cross-border trade can help reduce the tension and mistrust and grow relationships between the people of BD and MN and contribute to the local economy. The GOB may also encourage BD's renowned business groups to increase the exports and imports of goods with MN counterparts. Thus, the economic instrument can play a significant role to convince MN settle the disputes for the mutual benefits.

³⁰⁵ Hasan, "Strengthening Myanmar-Bangladesh Trade and economic ties."

³⁰⁶ Shazzad Hussain, "Bangladesh-Myanmar Economic Opportunities: Problems and Prospects," *South Asia Journal*, August 19, 2021, <http://southasiajournal.net/bangladesh-myanmar-economic-ties-problems-and-prospects/>.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

Interpreting the Theory of Change: Rohingya Management within BD as an Immediate Solution to the Security Situation

The immediate solution to National Security issues associated with the Rohingya may include managing the Rohingya within camps, strengthening camp security, camp management, relocation of the Rohingya, and providing them limited economic opportunity. The existing refugee camps are very congested and unhygienic. Moreover, the camps are not fenced and are vulnerable to attack from all directions. They are devoid of adequate exit and entry control and substantial surveillance measures. Presently, the camp security issues involve but are not limited to widespread cross-border drug and human trafficking, the threat of radicalization, health and sanitation problems, uncontrolled births, and the spread of pandemics and diseases. Unsolved, the issues will lead to more significant security concerns. Because the Rohingya population will quickly surpass the size of the local population by a big margin, drug trafficking and other trans-bordering crimes will increase, and health and environmental hazards will go beyond control.

Existing Camp Management

Government of Bangladesh (GOB) is primarily responsible for the Refugee camp management. Camp management includes camp administration, governance, camp security, judiciary, and maintenance of the law-and-order system.³⁰⁸ GOB should involve the Refugees through democratically elected person(s), local administrative authority,

³⁰⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Camp Security,” in *UNHCR Regulations* (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations), accessed April 03, 2022, 152-155, <https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org>.

law enforcement agencies, UNHCR, NGOs, members of the local community for ensuring the overall management is adequate and focused on improving the living conditions within the camps. The existing camp management should involve camp-wise systematic and total accountability of the displaced Rohingyas in BD for security, their own protection and to check uncontrolled dispersion. Within each camp, the area may be divided into sub zones, and a leader or coordinating body should be selected by the refugees. It is essential to segregate the camp and provide some level of self-governance for accountability, administration, and monitoring because of the vast population residing in the camps.

The local administration should maintain a periodic population update according to gender and age group. Furthermore, the sub-zone commander should inform the local administration of any intrusion or departure from the camp area. GOB should coordinate basic human needs like food, shelter, health, education, social security, and limited work opportunities through integrated efforts of government agencies, security forces, UN organizations, IOs, and NGOs.³⁰⁹ Thus, GOB should delineate a clear policy and guidelines through a Memorandum of Understanding to all agencies involved in supporting the Rohingya refugee camps.

Security Enforcement

As per the UNHCR, camp security is the responsibility of the State. The local government, refugees, UNHCR, NGOs working in the area, and the local community

³⁰⁹ UNHCR, “Camp Security,” 152-155.

should assist the process.³¹⁰ However, the current security arrangement and physical security measures are inadequate resulting in increased rates of violence and unlawful activities of various groups within the camps. Therefore, BD local administration should devise a 24/7 security camp monitoring and alert mechanism in each camp. The security system can be threefold. Rohingya refugees should form part of the first layer of security through monitoring, alertness, and surveillance mechanisms. Article 2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention states: “Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conforms to its laws and regulations and measures taken for the maintenance of law and order.”³¹¹ Therefore, the Rohingya representatives should be involved in the decision-making, camp alertness, and the monitoring mechanism. This would help the refugees to understand the consequences of militancy and perhaps develop a sense of belonging within BD. The local community, UNHCR, and NGOs will also be involved in providing early warning and information sharing within the first security layer.

The second layer of security should involve the BD Police, BD Para-military forces, and Intelligence organizations to offer overt and covert security. GOB must remember that most camps are close to the border and vulnerable to military attacks, infiltration attacks by insurgents, saboteurs, and subversive activities. The Border Guard Bangladesh should provide the border security to prevent any trans-border crimes. Thus,

³¹⁰ UNHCR, “Camp Security,” 152-155.

³¹¹ Ibid.

the second layer of security will seal off the border, and guard against any infiltration or subversive actions.

The military forces deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region and Cox's Bazar will form the third layer of security to maintain the country's sovereignty. The deployed in Counter Insurgency operations should also remain vigilant to ensure the protection and security of the south-eastern area where the camps are located. They will maintain a close liaison with the law enforcement agencies, local administration, and intelligence organizations. Army will not remain deployed throughout the year. However, they will maintain situational alertness and act as the *striking force* whenever the situation emerges, and the civil administration calls for its support.

Relocation from Existing Area

Figure 10 shows the updated camp location and the number of Rohingya residing within the area.

international envoys, IO, human rights watch, and NGOs.³¹² However, it has been a successful step for BD so far, as EU Ambassador Charles Whiteley remarked after diplomats visited the island in March 2022. “Insightful visit to Bhasan Char where 23,000 Rohingya refugees now live; good opportunity to see firsthand the infrastructure, livelihood opportunities, health and education services put in place,”³¹³ Ambassador Whiteley said.

Similarly, BD can follow Turkey and Germany for the relocation plan in the future. Turkey involved Syrians under the Temporary Protection (SuTPs) Project that deals with the socio-economic development of the refugees and not merely the displacement issue.³¹⁴ Similarly, Germany redistributed the refugees among the 16 states of the country based on the state’s population and revenue.³¹⁵ BD may relocate the refugees based on the limited available islands and char areas floating and adjacent to the Bay of Bengal or remote places and seek assistance from the UNHCR, NGOs, IOs, and World Bank to ensure proper living conditions are established in those areas. The Rohingya may also be allowed to earn a livelihood through fishing, cattle and goat

³¹² “Bangladesh: Halt Forced Relocation of Rohingya Refugees,” Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/24/bangladesh-halt-forced-relocation-rohingya-refugees#>.

³¹³ “10 diplomats visit Bhasan Char,” *The Business Standard*, March 4, 2022, <https://www.tbsnews.net/rohingya-crisis/10-diplomats-visit-bhasan-char-379591>.

³¹⁴ The World Bank, “Turkey’s Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Road Ahead,” World Bank Group, accessed April 10, 2022, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/publication/turkeys-response-to-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-and-the-road-ahead>.

³¹⁵ Hindy, *Germany’s Syrian Refugee Integration Experiment*.

farming, hatchery, poultry, and local labor, as part of limited employment opportunities. However, the security analysts opine that the Rohingya should not be allowed to *integrate* as the immediate option. The direct integration may preclude the permanent solution of a sustainable return. Therefore, BD may focus on relocating with limited employment options for the time being.

Interpreting the Theory of Change: If Rohingya Repatriation by 2030 Fails or Stalls

BD's solution to the Rohingya crisis involves a parallel two-fold approach. While the permanent policy will be to press for sustainable return by 2030, the nearest process will reduce the security issues by 2030 through enforcing camp management, security enhancement, and a relocation strategy. However, a *sustainable return policy* theory of change may fail or stall. BD's policymakers should have branches and a sequel plan associated with its long and short-term strategy. The branches of the long-term strategy (sustainable return) should be *settlement*. The sequel to the short-term process (relocation) should be *integration*. The researcher will subsequently present the *ways and means* to these alternative solutions based on the reviewed case studies.

Settlement

Settlement to a third country is considered one of the three potential solutions to the Rohingya crisis. Since the Rohingya persecution, 90 percent of Rohingya have taken shelter in BD. BD is the 8th largest population globally and cannot provide adequate economic and living opportunities to the Rohingya over a long period of time. Figure ten shows the existing Rohingya population based on the UNHCR registration (2020). It is important to note that an estimated 200,000 Rohingya have been living in BD since the

beginning of persecution in 1977. These people are considered unlisted in any accounting of the BD population.




Figure 11. The Displaced and Stateless of Myanmar in the Asia Pacific Region

Source: “The Displaced and Stateless of Myanmar in The Asia-Pacific Region,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 2021, <https://reporting.unhcr.org>

Figure 11 shows that BD currently has the majority of the Rohingya refugees within the region. By 2030, the Rohingya will have been displaced from their home country for more than 13 years. The Asian continent includes 48 countries. A country like China (65 times bigger than BD), India (22 times larger), Indonesia (13 times Muslim majority), Malaysia (2.2 times Muslim Nation), Thailand (MN’s neighbor, 3.5 times bigger), and Mongolia (11 times larger than BD, only two people per square mile) could easily share the load to host the refugees. If the refugees need asylum in Muslim majority

nations, based on the Turkish historical example, they can migrate to Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other Middle Eastern or north-African countries. Syria's neighbors hosted 70 percent of the Syrian refugees and the European Nations accepted the remaining 30 percent. The Syrian refugee migration is an example of how the Rohingya people may even migrate to other nations, where they will have a better opportunity to live and more economic prospects than are available in BD.

BD's government through diplomacy should explore these possibilities, and BD should involve the OIC to negotiate with the Islamic nations to accept a portion of the refugee population should the repatriation fail. Similarly, BD should ask the ASEAN countries (MN is a member of ASEAN) to share the load. BD should seek support from the US, EU, India, and China in this regard. BD should also raise the issue continuously to the UN General Assembly until it is solved by eliminating the persecution of the Rohingya in MN. Here, BD should follow the Turkish exchange model, where international actors like the British Prime minister, France, Italy, and the League of Nations settled the crisis. Thus, if the stakeholders fail to develop a sustainable plan for return, BD should seek further attention for a branch plan for the settlement of Rohingya to a third country.

Integration

The Integration of Rohingya into BD society should be BD's last resort (sequel) and used only if neither repatriation nor settlement in a third country succeeds. BD as a country should follow the Turkish and German models for the integration of Rohingya. However, there is a concern with this sequel in that both countries were economically and geographically superior to BD is when they acted in the particular situation. Therefore,

BD's strategy should modify Germany's approach. While Germany redistributed the refugees to all 16 states based on density and state income, BD should disperse based on the density or economic prospects of the area. For example, Dhaka might have a profitable opportunity from an economic perspective, but it will not merit integration based on population and land area.

Germany emphasized the vocational training of the refugees. Similarly, BD should give the refugees vocational training. Germany made language proficiency and history education compulsory. BD may make such policy before integration that learning the Bangla language, having zero criminal records, and willingness to contribute to the country economically will be mandatory. After five years, Germany maintained the employment ratio between Germans and Syrians at 95 percent to 49 percent.³¹⁶ Similarly, BD may provide economic opportunities to the Rohingya to ultimately increase the labor market and boost the economy.

BD may follow the Turkish model and involve the World Bank and IOs to address the humanitarian and developmental challenges for refugee and host communities.³¹⁷ BD may undertake projects for community development with the help of NGOs and humanitarian organizations so that both the locals and refugees benefit from the projects. Furthermore, BD may pursue Foreign humanitarian assistance and funding to develop the

³¹⁶ "Jordan issues record number of Work permits to Syrian refugees," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 25, 2022, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-work-permits-syrian-refugees.html>.

³¹⁷ The World Bank, "10 Years On, Turkey Continues Its Support for an Ever-Growing Number of Syrian Refugees."

education sector, municipal service improvement, and facility enhancement.³¹⁸ Thus, with the integration process, the Rohingya will feel a belongingness to BD. As the Syrian refugee-related crime decreases in Germany and Turkey, BD will be able to reduce or eliminate crises related to national security.

Summary

This chapter highlighted the researcher's analysis of the data. The study followed Scholes and Simister's six-step Qualitative Comparison Analysis methodology to propose a theory of change, "How can the Government of Bangladesh Increase international pressure on MN to accept repatriation through the use of diplomatic actions at the UN and other IOs and actors?" Analysis of the selected case studies revealed the factors involved in implementing the theory of change. The scoring of the factors allowed the researcher to identify the positive and negative aspects of the different cases. Then the researcher analyzed the data to find *why* the negative factors prevail and *how* these factors can be reduced or eliminated to interpret the change. The result of the *why* included reasons for systematic persecution, lack of political stability, inadequate international pressure on MN, inadequate roles by the UN and powerful actors, regional issues, and lack of bilateral trade are critical challenges to the BD's desired end state. Thus, the researcher answered Secondary Research Question 1.

Next, the researcher interpreted the analysis to find solutions. Interpretation of the analysis suggested a permanent (long-term) and an immediate (short-term) answer. While

³¹⁸ The World Bank, "10 Years On, Turkey Continues Its Support for an Ever-Growing Number of Syrian Refugees."

the study of the cases suggested the sustainable return as the permanent solution, it requires overcoming many challenges. The researcher found that the integration of the instruments of National Power (how) can solve or mitigate many of the challenges to a large extent. Besides, the immediate solutions will reduce the associated national security risks. Thus, the researcher proposed a two-fold strategy to achieve the desired change and answered the Secondary Research Question 2.

Finally, the researcher proposed alternative solutions to reduce or eliminate national security challenges associated with the Rohingya. He found that the Syrian refugee settlement in multiple countries absorbed the crisis to a large extent. He proposed similar solutions should the desired solution fail or stall. After that, he offered a further alternative; even if the settlement to a third country would become unsuccessful, BD should apply the *integration* model to integrate the refugees and accept them within the community. The researcher cited the Turkish and German integration scheme and related it with the BD's perspective to propose alternatives. Thus, the researcher answered Secondary Research Question 3 and concluded his analysis.

The researcher will summarize and conclude the thesis in the next chapter and explain how he answered his Primary Research Question. Following the conclusion, he will highlight the key recommendations from the research. Chapter 5 will end with the researcher's proposal for further study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

BD and MN are close neighbors who share both land and maritime boundary. The two nations' relationship hardly flourished due to a lack of political will, Rohingya exodus, trans-border issues, lack of connectivity, and prevailing misconceptions. Since 2017, the forcible displacement of the Rohingya to BD has caused strain in the relationship. GOB allowed the influx of Rohingya on humanitarian grounds and has hosted 1.1 million Rohingya since 2017. Historically, the MN military under the government's banner has carried out *ethnic cleansing* on the Rohingya minority since 1977 and has done so with *genocidal intent*. However, the country agreed to repatriate the displaced Rohingya minority every time they fled after the cleansing operations. But the recent *genocide* has surpassed all previous attempts and resulted in the deaths of 6,700 people (official figure from MN), displaced over a million, involved rape and sexual violence, and destroyed through fire approximately 50% of the accommodations and villages where the Rohingya resided. World leaders have denounced Myanmar's brutal security operation against Rohingya as genocide and a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.

BD has hosted 1.1 million Rohingya since 2017. Despite the MOU signed between MN and BD, MN has not repatriated any Rohingya to date. BD has tried to settle the Rohingya crisis peacefully through diplomatic negotiations with no success. The Rohingya reside in different camps in the Cox's Bazar district supported by the UN

organizations, IOs, NGOs, and other nations. BD, despite its efforts, failed to provide a better living for the Rohingya comparing to a minimal living condition.

The Rohingya influx in BD has caused many problems in recent years. The key issues include the rise of Islamic extremism, traditional security threats, transnational smuggling and trafficking, destabilization of the local labor market, the tension between refugees and hosts over a land dispute, price hike and disproportionate aid distribution, gender-based violence, economic imbalances, and environmental degradation, and severe health issues. If unsolved the refugee crisis could pose significant threats to BD's national security. BD is particularly concerned about the Rohingya Terrorist Group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Harakah Al-Yakin, and similar organizations now operating and residing inside BD. The other extremist groups in the region, including the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda Indian Subcontinent, have expressed their solidarity with ARSA. Arguably, the longer the Rohingya suffer persecution or face forced displacement, "ARSA will bend towards Islamism and Islamist militant groups and will conduct violence on their behalf."³¹⁹

The term Rohingya has been used to refer to the Sunni Muslims living in the former Arakan or Rakhine State of Myanmar for generations. The idea of the Rohingya as a stateless people is a Burmese military construct. There is historical proof that the Rohingya have lived in the Arakan (presently Rakhine) state since the 8th century. However, GOM does not recognize the Rohingya as one of its ethnic minorities. It claims

³¹⁹ C. Christine Fair, "Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army: Not the Jihadis You Might Expect," *Foreign Policy Essay* (blog), *Lawfare*, December 9, 2018, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/arakan-rohingya-salvation-army-not-jihadis-you-might-expect>

that the Rohingya are the BD migrants. The Rohingya historically declared an independent *Rakhine* state since the Burmese independence in 1948. Initially, MN's government denied it and later started oppressing them. There are certain reasons that MN conducts periodic cleansing operations to exile the Rohingya from the Rakhine state. Rakhine state is rich in minerals and gases. Rakhine is close to *the Bay of Bengal*, and MN needs the area for its geo-strategic and geo-economic importance. Already, MN has an ongoing *Kaladan multi-modal transit transport project* with India that connects India's Kolkata port with the Sittwe port in Rakhine. It significantly reduces India's travel distance to the eastern states (the seven sisters) and becomes a win-win for both nations.

Similarly, MN is building the *gas and pipeline project with China* that connects the Kyakpau port of Sittwe (Rakhine state) to Kunming, China, with a capacity of transporting 12 tons of crude oil per year. China invests in pipelines to *bypass* the Malacca Strait and protect its oil imports from possible interdiction during a conflict.³²⁰ The Rakhine state is part of MN's mega projects. GOM needs a buffer to build infrastructures and economic zone to reap geo-economic fruits. Hence, ethnic cleansing of the minority Muslims living in this region seems a viable option to the MN government.

GOM conducted the latest persecution through sectarian violence. Rohingya Muslims do not constitute the majority in the Rakhine state; instead, Buddhists do. The

³²⁰ Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, "China's Oil Security Pipe Dream- The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports," *Naval War College Review* 63, no. 2 (2010): 10-12.

Rakhine state's poverty level is 78 percent, and other facts like poor infrastructure, and a lack of employment opportunities, have consistently raised tensions between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya.³²¹ In 2012, the violence was exacerbated by the issue of the rape of a Buddhist woman by the ARSA activists. The sectarian violence began when the GOM supported the 969 movements. It killed hundreds of Rohingya Muslims, displaced thousands, and created permanent hatred between two religious' populations. Following the incident, MN claimed that terrorist groups like ARSA grew exponentially and were backed by the Rohingya. MN systematically conducted a cleansing operation to uproot the Rohingya from the Rakhine state.

The Rohingya residing in BD have little hope of returning to MN even though two-thirds of the Rohingya express an intent to return. Impatience, dissatisfaction, frustration, and agitation all increase in the refugee population as they remain cramped in overpopulated camps for years. The conditions in the camps contribute to BD's growing national security challenges like the rise of terrorist outfits, trans-border crimes, local economic competition, strife between locals and Rohingya, killing, violent procession, possible infiltration and radicalization possibilities, environmental hazard, food, water, and health hazards. Regrettably, MN did not show any positive signs of allowing a voluntary return of the refugees. The latest coup in MN by General Min Aung Hlaing has further lessened BD's hope of diplomatic negotiations and a quick return. BD lies in a situation where the national security threat associated with the Rohingya is increasing and hopes of repatriation are going down. Against this backdrop, the researcher attempted to

³²¹ Albert and Maizland, "The Rohingya Crisis."

find the answer to the problem, “How can Bangladesh settle the Rohingya crisis and maintain the country’s national security?”

Researcher’s Answer to the Primary Question

The researcher selected the qualitative research methodology suitable for the research because of the subjectivity of the issue. He followed the Case Study methodology and the QCA approach applying Scholes and Simister’s six-step analytical framework to answer his primary question. To answer his question, he proposed a theory of change “how can the BD reduce/eliminate the national security threats associated with Rohingya without forcing them to return?” Then he analyzed four cases to draw relevant factors appropriate to his theory of change. Then he scored the aspects based on the ‘+’ and ‘-’ parameters. He identified systematic persecution, political instability in MN, lack of pressure on MN military by international actors, strong support by Russia, China, and India, inadequate pressure by the UN, IOs on MN, and a feeble bilateral relationship between BD-MN as the main challenges to the Rohingya repatriation process.

Next, the research work interpreted the findings from the cases to lead to the potential solutions to the problem. The analysis suggested the answer is not straightforward. Indeed, it is a complex solution involving a two-fold, parallel approach. While the *sustainable refugee return* remains the permanent solution to the security issue, it cannot occur unless MN improves the situation voluntarily or is pressured by the international community to allow the return of the Rohingya (findings of Secondary Research Question-1). Therefore, to address the security concerns, the immediate solution involves issues like camp management, camp security enhancement, and a relocation strategy. The GOB, BD’s local administration, the refugees, the local

inhabitants, the UN, UN organizations, NGOs, and international actors are the key stakeholders to successfully implement the plan.

The long-term and permanent solution to the crisis is challenging yet attainable. It is difficult because the sustainable refugee return depends almost solely on the willingness of the government of MN. It is achievable because similar incidents like the Rwandan genocide, Sudanese genocide, and Turkish atrocity of the Greeks have had solutions where either the repatriation or a population exchange were successful. However, it requires time and a comprehensive approach. For a sustainable refugee return, BD acting alone will not be able to make headway. Therefore, the research findings include extensive use of all BD's National Power instruments to influence the change. The hidden truth is that regional politics make Bangladesh almost isolated in the Rohingya episode. Thus, the only viable option left for GOB is to turn to the global agencies and powers - the UN, the US, the powerful actors, IOs, regional organizations, and NGOs. BD should approach the situation by persuading these actors to pressure MN to implement the Annan Commission report, create a conducive situation for safe return, and ensure security and rehabilitation projects are in place prior to the Rohingya return to their home country. However, suppose MN ignores the international pressure. In that case, BD should pursue the UN and the US and powerful actors to act according to provisions of the Genocide and atrocity prevention convention and other pertinent international laws. Any international response must include measures that result in creating a safe zone, potentially sending chapter VI/VII missions into the region, extending military and economic sanctions on MN, and compelling MN to move to the negotiating table.

The information campaign should include the media campaign for a globalized projection of MN's atrocities to revitalize the issue and earn popular support for the permanent solution. It involves creating a sense of urgency amongst the regional powers and Western nations. Militarily, the BD Army needs to maintain a credible deterrence posture to prevent any sabotage, infiltration, or attack by the perpetrators against the Rohingya or bad actors who are taking advantage of the current situation to effect BD politics. The Border Guard should seal off and protect the borders. Police and other paramilitaries should be alert to maintain the law and order situation. The economic instrument of power and diplomacy should strive to enhance political and economic relations with MN and offer a people-to-people exchange, connectivity, maritime cooperation, technological assistance, and increasing bilateral trade to solve the crisis peacefully. Thus, a whole-of-government approach can help solve or reduce the concerns and bring about a positive change leading to repatriation.

Despite all efforts, MN may not agree to repatriate Rohingya, and BD may not have the necessary capacity to be a permanent solution for the refugee population. BD's approach then should include the branch plan proposing *settlement* of the Rohingya in other nations. Nations like China and India contain 22 and 13 times more land, respectively, than BD, and some nations have low population density like Mongolia, which only has two people per square mile. So, BD could strive for a separate diplomatic track to settle the Rohingya in a third country, or possibly multiple countries. BD can also offer population exchanges to the Middle Eastern countries and European markets where the labor market is better. That would allow BD to settle some of the Rohingya to lessen the crisis.

If the resettlement to a third country does not occur, then BD should plan to *integrate* the Rohingya as the sequel to the original plan. In this case, BD should follow the German and Turkish integration model with modifications for rehabilitation, employment, economic contribution, and overcoming security concerns. The integration scheme should include vocational training, education concerning adherence to the law-and-order construct within BD, history, education, municipality, and infrastructure development that integrates the World Bank, IMF, UNHCR, donors, IOs, and NGOs. Integration should contribute to BD's local and national economy and positively impact growth in the long term.

Thus, the researcher answered his primary question and proposed his theory of change. The answer to his question is shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12. Researcher's Answer to Primary Question

Source: Created by author.

Recommendations

1. GOB should pursue repatriation in MN through the UN, IOs, and international actors to end the Rohingya genocide in the Rakhine, create a conducive condition for a sustainable Rohingya return, and accept Rohingya return as soon as possible.
2. GOB should enhance diplomatic maneuvers with India, China, and Japan to act as the *gap bridger* for the peaceful negotiation of the process. Simultaneously, BD should attempt to enhance the bilateral relationship with MN and offer a strategic partnership for mutual benefits in exchange for repatriation.
3. BD needs intense diplomacy to convince powerful actors to respond to MN's military junta inaction or continued ethnic cleansing if necessary. This would include withdrawal of diplomatic relations, implementation of travel bans, enforcement of the ICJ verdict, implementation of the Kofi Annan Commission report, and severe economic sanctions to pressure the GOM for a sustainable return process.
4. GOB should formulate a Rohingya management and relocation policy, propose it to the UN, arrange an agreement between UNHCR and GOB, and implement the plan.

Areas for Further Research

1. Further study may be conducted on the possible settlement options of the Rohingya to different nations within and beyond the region.
2. Further study may be conducted on the feasibility of Rohingya integration within BD, possible challenges, and ways ahead.

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