Deterrence By Denial in the Taiwan Strait: How the United States should approach deterrence to prevent War with the People's Republic of China over Taiwan
Abstract
How the United States approaches deterrence in the Taiwan Strait could determine if there is a war between the United States and the People Republic of China over Taiwan. Embracing a Deterrence by Denial Strategy to deter war with the Peoples Republic of China over Taiwan is the best strategy that the United States can bring to bear in the Pacific to accomplish its objectives. For any Deterrence Strategy to work it is imperative that the United States understands the perspectives of the PRC and its Leadership. Only the Chinese Communist Party can decide if they are deterred. Through garnering an understanding of the PRCs perspective, the United States can execute a Deterrence by Denial Strategy that does not create a security dilemma with the PRC making war more likely. Through embracing a Deterrence by Denial Strategy that does not create the perception that the PRC is being contained will the allow the United States to retain freedom of maneuver both diplomatically and militarily. The Deterrence by Denial Strategy that United States should adopt consists of three parts: Active Denial, Working with Partners and Allies, and investing in a Porcupine Strategy with Taiwan. Embracing those components allows the United States to continue its One China Policy while giving the United States the latitude to defend Taiwan or disengage from the conflict based on strategic imperatives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 27, 2023
- Accession Number
- AD1211036
Entities
People
- David Adamic
Organizations
- Naval War College