

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 09-05-2023			2. REPORT TYPE FINAL			3. DATES COVERED (From - To) N/A			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Declassified Intelligence and its Ability to Strengthen Coercive Threats						5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A			
						5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A			
						5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A			
6. AUTHOR(S) Ryan Schiffner, Lt Col, USAF						5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A			
						5e. TASK NUMBER N/A			
						5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Writing & Teaching Excellence Center Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207						8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A						10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A			
						11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A			
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.									
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the curriculum. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.									
14. ABSTRACT: Under the Biden administration, the United States has increased its use of intelligence as a source of national power, using it to publicly disclose adversary intentions and deter adversary actions. Based on recent cases in Russia and China, declassifying and sharing intelligence strengthens deterrence because it makes coercive threats more potent and credible. As the United States looks to deter escalation in Ukraine and aggression in the Indo-Pacific, it must continue using declassified intelligence to build coalitions and bolster coercive threats. First, the author explores the value of intelligence and the salient points of coercion theory to identify a potential opportunity for U.S. foreign policy. Next, an analysis of two recent examples of coercion shows that declassifying and sharing intelligence increases the potency and credibility of the coercive threat. Looking to the future, the United States must continue declassifying and sharing intelligence to build coalitions and strengthen deterrence around the globe. Exposing malicious intentions and declassifying wargaming results present two possible opportunities as the Biden Administration attempts to build strong and broad coalitions to coerce and thwart adversarial powers.									
15. SUBJECT TERMS (Key words) Coercion, Deterrence, Intelligence, Ukraine, Taiwan									
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:						17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED		b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED		c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		N/A		Director, Writing Center	
									19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-6499

**Declassified Intelligence and its Ability to Strengthen
Coercive Threats**

INTRODUCTION

Under the Biden administration, the United States has increased its use of intelligence as a source of national power, using it to publicly disclose adversary intentions and deter adversary actions. Is such a use of intelligence effective? Is it wise? Based on recent cases in Russia and China, declassifying and sharing intelligence strengthens deterrence because it makes coercive threats more potent and credible. As the United States looks to deter escalation in Ukraine and aggression in the Indo-Pacific, it must continue using declassified intelligence to build coalitions and bolster coercive threats. First, exploring the value of intelligence and the salient points of coercion theory identifies a potential opportunity for U.S. foreign policy. Next, an analysis of two recent examples of coercion helps determine if sharing intelligence added substantive value.

INTELLIGENCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

Intelligence is a key but often overlooked tool within the United States' arsenal of power and influence. Former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director Robert Gates characterized intelligence as a critical instrument in America's "Symphony of Power,"¹ useful for multiple purposes. First, intelligence provides a "river of information" to senior leaders, informing them of daily events, enemy capabilities, and states' intentions. Second, intelligence offers a venue for strengthening partnerships and building trust amongst allies. Third, the intelligence community enables nations to conduct covert operations and advance national interests without attribution.² Fourth and less discussed, intelligence can provide advantages in diplomatic exchanges. Intelligence can specifically increase the credibility and potency of coercive threats.

¹ Robert M. Gates, *Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 40.

² Gates, *Exercise of Power*, 40-41.

COERCION AND DETERRENCE

Coercion has existed since stronger humans discovered they could force their will upon weaker humans, and coercive threats are still prevalent today. In 416 B.C., the Greek city-state of Athens sought to conquer the weaker city-state of Melos. Before attacking, Athens issued a potent coercive threat, demanding Melos accept subjugation or face destruction. According to the Athenians, “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”³ Ultimately, the Melians chose not to submit to Athenian coercion; the Athenians enacted their threat, and Melos was destroyed and subjugated.⁴ The Melian dialogue is one of the earliest recorded examples of coercion and serves as an exemplar to describe coercion theory.

Coercion capitalizes on the bargaining power of force to change a target nation's behavior. First, the coercing nation must issue a credible threat to impose future harm on the target nation. However, the harm can be averted if the target nation takes or refrains from a specified action. In the case of the Melian dialogue, Athens issued a credible threat to slaughter the inhabitants of Melos unless the Melians took the desired action of surrendering and accepting Athenian subjugation. To be effective, the target nation must view the coercive threat as credible and damaging enough to alter its perceived costs and benefits, forcing the nation to reassess and revisit its decision.

However, coercion is never straightforward because it depends on the target's perception of the environment and their, sometimes unstated, objectives. In the Melian dialogue, Athens's clear and credible threat convinced Melos that freedom was impossible, and their revised decision was between death and subjugation. Therefore, Athens perceived a Melian surrender as

³ Robert B. Strassler, ed. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 352.

⁴ Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*, 350-357.

the most rational outcome. However, the supremacy of honor as an unstated objective drove Melos to choose death on the battlefield over the humiliation of forced subjugation.⁵ Due to cognitive differences between states, as demonstrated here, coercion always retains a measure of uncertainty. Additionally, the ultimate outcome of coercion always remains outside the coercer's hands because it hinges on the target's decision. For example, Athens could not force Melos to surrender; Melos always retained control of its choice and subsequently its fate. A coercer is never able to guarantee success.

Coercion Theory subdivides into two categories: deterrence and compellence. Deterrence employs threats to prevent a target nation from taking action, while compellence uses threats to force a target nation into action.⁶ In the Melian dialogue, Athens employed compellence to coerce Melos into surrendering without a fight. As a counter-example, during the Age of Sail, the dominance of the Royal Navy deterred many foreign powers from invading Great Britain.

Deterrence and compellence can each employ two strategies to achieve their objective: punishment and denial. When using punishment, a coercing state threatens to impose unacceptable costs on the target nation if it does not choose the desired course. In the Melian dialogue, Athens threatened to slaughter all the inhabitants of Melos as "punishment" for not complying with its demands. During the Cold War, the United States threatened mutually assured destruction, an extreme punishment, against any nation that launched a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. When using denial, a coercing state threatens to reduce or deny the target nation the benefits of the undesired action, making such a choice irrational. For

⁵ Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*, 356-357.

⁶ Tami Davis Biddle, "Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners," *Texas National Security Review* 3:2 (Spring 2020): 94-109.

example, France constructed the Maginot Line prior to World War II to deter a German invasion. In the Germans' minds, these mighty fortifications increased the costs of launching an invasion and decreased the likelihood of a German victory. The deterrent forced the Germans to reassess their decision, ultimately choosing to attack through Belgium instead. Across all forms of coercion, the most important aspect is the perceived power of the threat being issued. The more credible and potent the threat, the more likely coercion will succeed. Declassified intelligence, if deftly employed and smartly shared, can fill this nexus between intelligence and coercion, and it can provide substantial value for the United States in the modern era.

LEVERAGING INTELLIGENCE TO STRENGTHEN COERCION

Since 2021, the Biden Administration has begun declassifying and sharing intelligence to build coalitions, galvanize public opinion, and strengthen coercive threats. Similar disclosures have occurred before with mixed results,⁷ but the current administration appears to be taking a more focused approach. In at least two cases, the Biden Administration used declassified intelligence to help deter a target nation from pursuing an undesirable policy. Examining these cases provides insight into how the United States leveraged intelligence to strengthen coercive threats and whether such intelligence provided substantive value.

Case 1: Leveraging Intelligence to Deter a Russian Invasion of Ukraine

In late 2021, the United States used intelligence to deter Russia from invading Ukraine. During a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, U.S. President Joseph Biden stated,

⁷ During the Cuban Missile Crisis President Kennedy chose to disclose intelligence to strengthen domestic support for his decisions. For more information on this case see: Graham Allison, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Foreign Policy: Theories Actors Cases*, 3rd edition (Oxford University Press, 2016), 256-279. More recently, the Bush Administration disclosed vast amounts of intelligence in various forums in an attempt to convince the international community Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction and in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. For more information on this case see: Joseph Stieb, *The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 195-207, 231-240; and John Mearsheimer and Walt, Stephen, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy* 134 (January-February 2003): 52-59.

“The U.S. and our Allies would respond with strong economic and other measures” if Russia escalated the military situation in Ukraine or violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity.⁸ The White House released a public summary of the conversation later that day. Less than a week later, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, alongside other Group of Seven (G-7) foreign ministers, issued a public statement warning Russia that “further military aggression against Ukraine would have massive consequences and severe cost in response.”⁹ Combined, these statements represent a clear but unspecified threat to deter Russia from invading Ukraine. However, by remaining unspecified the United States retained the flexibility to pursue deterrence through either punishment or denial. The U.S. could invoke economic sanctions as coercive punishments, or provide financial support and lethal aid for Ukraine to deny Russian objectives. Ultimately, the United States decided to pursue both.

In the weeks and months following its deterrent threat, the United States declassified and shared intelligence with allies and partners. The U.S. disclosed Russian troop movements, attributed false-flag attacks to Russian operatives, and refuted Russian reports of Ukrainian attacks and atrocities.¹⁰ By undermining Russia’s disinformation campaign, the United States deprived Russia of key victories in the information domain, making it more challenging to achieve its military objectives and contributing to a strategy of deterrence through denial. As support for the U.S. position grew, additional leaders from various nations threatened Russia with economic sanctions, military build-ups, and energy boycotts while promising aid and

⁸ White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Video Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” December 7, 2021, accessed 3 May, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/07/readout-of-president-bidens-video-call-with-president-vladimir-putin-of-russia/>.

⁹ U.S. Department of State, “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Russia and Ukraine,” December 12, 2021, accessed 3 May, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/12/g7-leaders-statement-4/>.

¹⁰ Institute for the Study of War: Russia Team, “Ukraine Conflict Update” (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project, February 18, 2022), 2-3.

support for Ukraine. In this instance, the multiple statements from the United States and Western nations represent clear and credible threats employing a mixture of punishment and denial strategies designed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine. Declassifying and sharing intelligence enhanced both approaches and made them each more effective.

Case 2: Leveraging Intelligence to Deter Chinese Lethal Aid to Russia

In Feb 2023, the U.S. employed intelligence to deter China from providing lethal aid for Moscow's war against Ukraine. In a meeting with China's top foreign policy official, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated the United States possessed intelligence showing "that [China] is considering providing lethal support to Russia in the war against Ukraine."¹¹ The intelligence, which the United States shared with many of its allies, claimed China had already "approved the incremental provision" of weapons, including artillery and ammunition, but intended to keep these shipments secret from other nations.¹² Secretary Blinken further explained that if China proceeded to provide lethal support to Russia, the United States would consider this action "a serious problem." Finally, Secretary Blinken publicly disclosed his conversation to the US media and a worldwide audience.¹³

This diplomatic exchange represents a resolute but unspecified coercive threat supported by intelligence and issued in a public forum. Although it's impossible to be certain, the deterrent seemed to have worked; China has not yet provided Russia with lethal aid.¹⁴ At a minimum, publicly sharing intelligence and linking it to a coercive threat placed China on the defensive,

¹¹ Julian E. Barnes and Entous, Adam, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook to Expose Russia's War Plans," *The New York Times*, February 24, 2023.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/us/politics/intelligence-russia-us-ukraine-china.html>

¹² Karen DeYoung and Ryan, Missy, "Russia says China agreed to secretly provide weapons, leaked documents show," *The Washington Post*, April 13, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/13/russia-china-weapons-leaked-documents-discord/>.

¹³ Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

¹⁴ DeYoung and Ryan, "Russia says China agreed to secretly provide weapons."

forcing them to reassess, delay, and potentially cancel their plans. Without intelligence sharing, deterrence would have likely failed.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DECLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE

In these case studies, declassified intelligence strengthened deterrent threats in several ways. First, the United States used intelligence to increase the threat's credibility. Biddle argues that unspecific threats, like the ones issued against Russia and China, can occasionally be effective because they complicate an adversary's decision calculus but maximize future decision space for policymakers.¹⁵ However, the target could also view unspecific threats as less credible because they leave room for misinterpretation. The United States overcame this deficiency by disclosing these deterrent threats, and the intelligence that supported them, to a worldwide audience. These pronouncements placed the United States under a public obligation to fulfill the threat, thereby increasing its credibility.

Second, the United States used intelligence to align multiple allies behind its policy and strengthen the scope and magnitude of the coercive threats. According to Evelyn Farkas, a senior Pentagon official under President Obama, "You can't convince people to go along with your policies if they are suspicious about what those policies are based on."¹⁶ To convince its allies to support a policy of deterring Russia through economic punishment, the United States shared intelligence with the G-7, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom. Eventually, all four groups decided to threaten Russia with economic sanctions.¹⁷ Since NATO and the EU both operate as consensus-based organizations, diplomatic alignment within the group was a prerequisite to realizing unified action. However,

¹⁵ Biddle, "Coercion Theory," 100.

¹⁶ Quoted in: Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

¹⁷ Institute for the Study of War: Russia Team, "Ukraine Conflict Update" (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project, February 22, 2022), 5-6.

once aligned, the destructive power of economic sanctions from 45 countries and 679 corporations¹⁸ is far greater than what the United States could achieve alone. Furthermore, European and international support for Ukraine greatly contributed to a strategy of deterrence through denial. Strengthening Ukraine diplomatically, militarily, and financially would stress Russia's ability to achieve its military objectives. In this instance, declassifying and sharing intelligence enabled the United States to forge a multilateral approach, leading to a more potent deterrent against Russia.

The United States also took a multilateral approach to deter China. Prior to threatening China, US intelligence agencies shared information with key allies about Chinese intentions. Allies viewed the information as credible because previous releases about Iranian and North Korean support for Russia had proven true.¹⁹ In response, multiple nations joined the United States's threat, increasing the cumulative damage economic sanctions could inflict on the Chinese economy. Moreover, sharing declassified intelligence in a public forum "exploited a divide" within the budding alliance,²⁰ slowing Russo-Sino cooperation at a critical juncture and decreasing benefits to both adversaries. Through diplomatic alignment, enabled by intelligence sharing, the United States increased the costs it could impose on China, thereby strengthening its deterrent threat.

Skeptics may claim that declassified intelligence does not strengthen coercive threats because the threats issued to Russia did not deter it from invading Ukraine. However, Russia's decision to invade despite multiple threats is not a shortcoming of intelligence; it merely

¹⁸ Robyn Dixon, "Breaking up with Russia is hard for many Western firms, despite war," *The Washington Post*, April 15, 2023.

¹⁹ Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

²⁰ Kori Schake, "Uncommon Knowledge with Peter Robinson: Kori Schake On Civil-Military Relations" (video, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute, November 10, 2016), <https://www.hoover.org/research/can-united-states-maintain-top-notch-military-when-few-american-are-willing-join-all>.

demonstrates the limits of coercive theory. Putin's justification for the invasion of Ukraine revolved around national identity and foreign power projection, while potential economic losses "hardly played a role."²¹ This case exemplifies Biddle's claim that coercion depends on the target's, sometimes unstated, objectives and their perception of how those objectives might be realized or denied.²² Even though the deterrent failed, declassifying and sharing intelligence was still perceived as useful because it ensured "everybody was on the same sheet of music" when the war started.²³ That cohesion led to more victories on the battlefield and within the halls of diplomacy. Furthermore, by proving the intelligence correct, Russia's invasion indirectly strengthened the power of declassified intelligence for future deterrents. In total, declassifying and sharing intelligence added significant value to both cases, despite the mixed success rates of the deterrent threats.

THE CONCERN OF DISCLOSING SOURCES AND METHODS

The strongest counterargument against declassifying intelligence to strengthen coercive threats comes from the Intelligence Community. Since all forms of coercion necessitate communicating a clear threat to the adversary, sometimes in a public forum, including declassified intelligence in these threats risks disclosing valuable sources and methods. According to William J. Burns, Director of the CIA, "The surest way to lose sources of good intelligence is to be reckless in your handling of them."²⁴ Such recklessness could lead to the compromise of a collection asset and the subsequent loss of potentially priceless intelligence in

²¹ Sabine Fischer et al, "Russian Attack on Ukraine: A Turning Point for Euro-Atlantic Security." *Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik*, March 3, 2022, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russian-attack-on-ukraine-a-turning-point-for-euro-atlantic-security>.

²² Biddle, "Coercion Theory," 97-98.

²³ Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

²⁴ Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

the future. The recent Discord Leaks and the resulting problems showcase this risk.²⁵ When confronted with the challenge of disclosing information, policymakers must decide if the immediate benefit is worth the risk of decreased intelligence in the future. In cases of deterrence, where stakes are high and intelligence improves the odds of success, disclosure is often worth the risk.

Declassifying intelligence could also disclose covert actions that the U.S. government has not acknowledged, subsequently damaging international relationships or undermining U.S. credibility. For example, in 1953 the U.S. and Great Britain launched Operation Ajax, covertly orchestrating a coup to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and place the Shah in power instead. When the U.S.'s role was eventually disclosed, it sowed distrust and resentment between the U.S. and Iran, which continues today.²⁶ The past WikiLeaks and present Discord Leaks provide further evidence²⁷ that disclosing intelligence, intentionally or unintentionally, can come with substantial risks or long-ranging consequences.

Despite the risks of compromising a source, it's still valuable to declassify and share intelligence in certain circumstances. Sun Tzu expounds on the value of intelligence, stating "The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move... is foreknowledge."²⁸ Additionally, a proliferation in communications technology and open-source think tanks has allowed the Intelligence Community to disclose intelligence while

²⁵ Ishaan Tharoor, "The U.S.'s gloominess on the war in Ukraine is now clear to see," *The Washington Post*, April 14, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/14/gloom-united-states-outlook-ukraine-russia-outcome-leak/>.

²⁶ Rosenbach, Eric and Peritz, Aki J., *Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center's Intelligence and Policy Project, 2009), 34.

²⁷ Shane Harris, and Lamothe, Dan, "Intelligence leak exposes U.S. spying on adversaries and allies," *The Washington Post*, April 8, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/08/intelligence-leak-documents-ukraine-pentagon/>.

²⁸ Quoted in Samuel B. Griffith, *The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 144.

protecting their tradecraft.²⁹ Instead of revealing classified sources, analysts leverage open-source information, such as commercial satellite images or information from social media accounts, to paint a picture that points readers to the same conclusion as a classified source. Reports crafted by the Institute for the Study of War provide one example.³⁰ The early results of these new protections are positive. Over the past 14 months, the United States has not lost a single intelligence source due to intentional disclosures.³¹

Lastly, the opportunity costs of not declassifying intelligence can be significant. In 2014 the Obama Administration decided not to declassify intelligence disclosing Russian military activities in the Donbas. As a result, skepticism and division dominated NATO.³² Facing a fractured Europe, Russia capitalized by stoking a frozen conflict in the Donbas and seizing the Crimean peninsula. Had the U.S. leveraged declassified intelligence to disclose Russian intentions, a more united Europe might have produced a different outcome.

FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

These two cases are ongoing, and new information is being released daily, but a preliminary analysis still yields several insights about how intelligence can improve coercion. First, declassifying and sharing intelligence strengthens a coercive threat by increasing the magnitude of the potential punishment. In both cases, intelligence helped increase the size of the coercing coalition, increasing the potential costs it could impose on the target and improving the effectiveness of deterrence through punishment. Second, intelligence strengthens a coercive threat by increasing the chances of denying the target nation the benefits they seek. In the Russian case, intelligence helped disclose Russian disinformation and aligned governments

²⁹ Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

³⁰ ISW: Russia Team, "Ukraine Conflict Update," February 18, 2022.

³¹ Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

³² Barnes and Entous, "How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook."

supporting Ukraine, degrading Russian power and strengthening allied cohesion. While the deterrent was ultimately unsuccessful, intelligence increased the effectiveness of deterrence through denial, and it set conditions for more effective military operations. Third, intelligence strengthens a coercive threat by increasing the credibility of an unspecified threat. In both cases, the United States publicly disclosed the threat to a worldwide audience, placing themselves under a public obligation to act. This obligation proved the weight of U.S. resolve, increasing the threat's credibility.

Leveraging Intelligence to Deter Escalation in Ukraine

Applying these lessons to contemporary challenges yields a few recommendations. As a start, the United States should leverage intelligence to deter Russia from escalating the Ukrainian conflict. To date, the United States and its allies have succeeded in keeping Russia primarily isolated and the conflict mostly contained, but it must continue to build on this success. If the United States Intelligence Community discovers Russian preparations to expand the conflict to neighboring states, recruit additional allies, or make plans to employ tactical nuclear weapons, it must act immediately. The nuclear threat is the most worrisome. According to former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, "If the United States gets intelligence that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon... the information should be publicized immediately."³³ Perry realizes the power of declassified intelligence. Disclosing nefarious Russian intentions could enable the United States to build another broad and diverse coalition, harness its coercive power, and threaten extreme punishment upon Russia. Such a potent threat would force Russia to recalculate its potential gains and losses, likely deterring them from such an undesirable policy.

³³ Eric Schlosser, "What If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?" *The Atlantic*, June 20, 2022, 6.

Leveraging Intelligence to Deter a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

Looking to the future, the United States should leverage intelligence to deter China from conducting a military invasion of Taiwan. If the United States Intelligence Community learns of Chinese plans to reunify with Taiwan militarily, it must use that intelligence towards multiple ends. First, the U.S. must disclose and share intelligence to build a broad and powerful coalition, as it did in Ukraine, to strengthen a deterrence through punishment strategy. NATO, the EU, the G7, India, and Australia will be key. With its combined economic and diplomatic might, such a coalition could issue coercive threats potent enough to force a Chinese recalculation.

Second, the United States should use declassified intelligence to credibly prove the Chinese invasion will fail, thereby enhancing a strategy of deterrence through denial. On several occasions, President Biden has publicly committed to defend Taiwan and deny China from achieving its military objectives. This represents a coercive threat, intended to increase costs, deny benefits, and deter China from invading. The United States often simulates Chinese invasions of Taiwan to discover shortcomings in U.S. defensive plans. Several organizations within the United States have recently begun disclosing results from these wargames, including CSIS,³⁴ the Republican Party,³⁵ and Congress.³⁶ While these disclosures are intended to build support for various foreign and domestic policies, they can also support deterrence; these disclosures demonstrate U.S. resolve and provide China with a more precise assessment of the heightened costs and decreased benefits of a Taiwan invasion.

³⁴ Chris Gordon, "CSIS Simulation Offers a Rare Look at US-China Clash over Taiwan and the World of Wargaming," *Air and Space Forces Magazine*, January 9, 2023.

³⁵ Olivier Knox, "GOP war-games a Chinese attack on Taiwan," *The Washington Post*, March 28, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/28/gop-wargames-chinese-attack-taiwan/>.

³⁶ Olivier Knox, "Lawmakers will (literally) game out a Chinese attack on Taiwan," *The Washington Post*, April 19, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/04/19/lawmakers-will-literally-game-out-chinese-attack-taiwan/>.

The Department of Defence should build on these deterrents and selectively disclose results from classified wargames, especially in cases that credibly show the Chinese invasion failing or leaving Taiwan as a “broken nest.”³⁷ As the undesirable outcome becomes clearer and more convincing in China’s mind, the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. coercive threat dramatically increases. If the United States can use intelligence to prove to China that any attempt to invade Taiwan will lead to a less desirable end-state, then deterrence is strengthened and more likely to succeed.

CONCLUSION

Since 2021, the United States has increasingly used intelligence as a source of national power, especially when making coercive threats to potential adversaries. Analyzing two recent cases demonstrates that declassifying and sharing intelligence increases the potency and credibility of the coercive threat. Disclosing intelligence involves risk, but the Intelligence Community can institute precautions to avoid negative outcomes. In the future, the United States must continue declassifying and sharing intelligence to build coalitions and strengthen deterrence in Ukraine and across the Taiwan Strait. Exposing malicious intentions and declassifying wargaming results present possible opportunities. In his 2022 National Security Strategy, President Biden advocates using “the strongest and broadest possible coalition” to thwart the threats posed by adversarial powers as they seek to attain their dark visions.³⁸ Coercion remains a powerful tool to help the United States realize this vision, and declassifying and sharing intelligence increases its potency.

³⁷ Jared M. McKinney and Harris, Perer, "Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan," *Parameters*, 51:4 (2021), 23-36.

³⁸ Biden, Joseph, "National Security Strategy." The White House, October 2022, 7.