When Strongmen Invade, They Bring Their Pathologies With Them
Abstract
This article describes general events, military misadventures, and implications of Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980. It focuses on civ-mil relations, military effectiveness, and readiness under an authoritarian model, and then discusses implications for examining the Russian case in the unfolding war in Ukraine. A paranoid but intelligent authoritarian leader decides to invade a neighboring country with little notice. He seeks to improve his country's regional heft, settle historical grievances, and fight against revolutionary ideas. He expects to achieve significant military objectives in a matter of days, and therefore has insufficient plans and logistics for the long-term conflict that ensues. He wants to exploit his enemy's internal political instability, but the invasion only solidifies popular support for the neighboring government. He overvalues his military's sizable numerical advantage, but undervalues less quantifiable factors, such as morale, combat effectiveness, and the operating environment. He has selected his advisors and officer corps based on loyalty instead of competence, and so he believes them to be unstoppable. He is shocked when they perform poorly. He tries to narrow his objectives and still claim victory. He is not Vladimir Putin. He is Saddam Hussein. The epigram above is an Iraqi general describing the 1980 invasion of Iran, not the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2022
- Accession Number
- AD1211272
Entities
People
- Akar Bharadvaj
- Kevin M. Woods
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses