

GOING ALL IN: STAGE FOUR MOBILIZATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN
ARMY AND THE ENDURING ISSUES RELATED TO SUSTAINING
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

GOING ALL IN: STAGE FOUR MOBILIZATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE ENDURING ISSUES RELATED TO SUSTAINING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP, by MAJ McLeod Wood, 121 pages.

The mobilization of national economies, industries and armed forces for war has long been a complex problem. The process of taking a peacetime military and rapidly expanding it to achieve national military objectives is no easy task. Mobilization, at the national level, brings a wide range of complex problems that government officials and military staffs must navigate for them to be successful. As great power competition increases in the Indo-Pacific region it behooves military professionals to consider what enduring issues might confront the Australian Army if it entered Stage Four Mobilization. By understanding these issues, the Australian Army will be better placed to deal with global threats and the prospect of having to enter Stage Four Mobilization.

Specifically, this research analyses Stage Four Mobilization in the Australian Army and the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership. It concludes that the Australian Army is confronted by four enduring issues: a lack of mobilization doctrine; difficulties associated with developing new junior leaders; no clear understanding of the time required to develop tacit experiences and professional military leadership; and the slowness with which the Army capitalizes on and uses civilian skills.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The mobilization of national economies, industries and armed forces for war has long been a complex problem. The process of taking a peacetime military and rapidly expanding it to achieve national military objectives is no easy task. For this reason, nations around the world choose to maintain smaller professional armies that can achieve limited peacetime objectives. However, when called upon, nation states can mobilize their entire national power base to generate forces for either aggressive or defensive purposes. Mobilization, at any stage, brings a wide range of complex problems that government officials and military staffs must navigate for them to be successful. Addressing all of these issues is beyond the scope of this research. It is why this thesis will focus on mobilization in the Australian Army and subsequently seek to understand the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership. Without understanding the enduring issues associated with sustaining professional military leadership it is likely that the Australian Army will experience organizational shock and be at a significant disadvantage in a large-scale combat operation scenario.

Considering its short history, Australia has mobilized land power in pursuit of national objectives on average every 10-15 years: The Second Boer War 1899-1902, World War I 1914-1918, World War II 1939-1945, Korea 1950-1953, Vietnam 1962-1972, East Timor 1999-2000, Iraq War 2003-2009, Afghanistan 2001-2021, The National Bushfire Emergency 2019 and finally COVID 19. What is common between these examples is that the Australian Army was mobilized to achieve national objectives. What

is uncommon are the two periods which required the nation of Australia to mobilize every instrument of national power to achieve its objectives: those being World War I and World War II. These two specific periods are of great importance as they provide a detailed understanding of how Australia previously entered periods of national mobilization. The Australian Army refers to this as Stage Four–National Mobilization which requires capability beyond the permanent and reserve force.

The Australian Army currently has a permanent force of 29,631 personnel and a reserve force of 19,673 personnel.¹ These forces have been used extensively in the last two decades conducting largely counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. Whilst these forces have performed their duties in accordance with national direction both the current and future operating environment looks bleak. The global security landscape and specifically the Pacific region is amid a major strategic realignment. It is seeing trends such as military modernisation, technological disruption and the risk of state-on-state conflict increasing.² Australia's primary operating environment is now at the center of great strategic competition between the major regional powers of the United States and China. The risk of large-scale combat operations, regardless of its likelihood, demands considerable attention by military professionals and government officials.

¹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 20-21* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2021), 120-121.

² Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *2020 Department of Defence Strategic Update* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 5.

Attention is required as the very character of war has changed. The character of war has been altered by the interconnections of a globalized world, the increased lethality of weapon systems, destabilizing grey-zone activities, technological proliferation and increases in operational and tactical tempo.³ Learning how to operate in this type of warfare and how to successfully integrate all available means of the joint force requires significant investment in time and practical application. Under conditions of national mobilization, the Australian Defence Force, and specifically the Army, may be faced with leadership shortages, knowledge management problems and transformational discontent. Under mobilization conditions, professional military leadership, rooted in deep learning and tacit experiences, will be required to successfully transition from a peacetime army to a rapidly expanded army. Whilst the Army can impart explicit knowledge easily through courses and assessments the ability to impart tacit knowledge is much harder and greatly reduces the performance of the force.⁴ This has wide ranging impacts on the ability of the Army to provide professional military leadership to, and the ability to develop new leaders for, a rapidly expanding force. These issues will only serve to increase the time required to bring a mobilized force into action.

The current global security landscape has parallels to that of the 1930s. It is characterized by a complex web of international alliances and partnerships where great

³ Azar Gat, “The Changing Character of War,” in *The Changing Character of War*, ed. Hew Strachan and Subyllle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27-47.

⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Statistics Canada, *Measuring Knowledge Management in the Business Sector: First Steps, Knowledge Management* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2004), <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264100282-en>.

power competition is steadily increasing between authoritarian and liberal democratic states. In both World War I and World War II mobilization was not implemented in Australia until after war was declared. A study into the enduring issues encountered by mobilizing the Australian Army beyond its present force structure is prudent, given the current climate. To do this, this thesis will utilize a fictional intelligence (FICINT) scenario in which it can analyse the impacts of mobilization on the Australian Army and, more specifically, the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership. This scenario will be based in the future and provides a lens through which military professionals can identify and address identified issues. It will provide an understanding of where enduring friction points exist and what issues might need attention to steel the force, should it be called upon for large-scale combat operations.

Ultimately, understanding the impacts of national mobilization and the changing characteristic of war is critical to the Australian Army achieving combat success. More specifically, without understanding the enduring issues associated with sustaining professional military leadership in the Australian Army it is likely that they will experience organizational shock and be at a significant disadvantage in a large-scale combat operation scenario.

Problem Statement

The thought of mobilizing the Australian Army, beyond its current force structure, for large-scale combat operations is a prospect that people would prefer to avoid. Despite the unpleasantness of the circumstances that might warrant such a mobilization, it is essential that the Australian Army understands the requirements that mobilization places upon the force and the enduring issues associated with sustaining

professional military leadership across that force. Given the increased prevalence of technological systems, improved weapons lethality, and the requirement to fight in a joint setting the Australian Army will require professional military leadership with the requisite knowledge and experience to function on this complex battlefield. Therefore, it is essential that the Australian Army understands what enduring issues confront the forces' ability to sustain professional military leadership following mobilization for large-scale combat operations.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to understand Stage Four Mobilization (the mobilization of the entire nation) in Australia and the enduring issues it places upon the Australian Army.⁵ Whilst there is the possibility to identify a myriad of enduring issues the study will focus upon those that relate to sustaining professional military leadership in a mobilized force. The success of the Australian Army, on any future battlefield, will be greatly influenced by the nation's ability to sustain professional military leadership across those mobilized forces. The technologically congested and lethal current operating environment only emphasizes the importance of sustaining professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization. The exploration of the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership will be relevant regardless of the size of expansion. The identification of enduring issues is intended to aid both current and future planners in understanding friction points associated with Australia undertaking Stage

⁵ Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.2, *Preparedness and Mobilization*, edition 2, Executive Series (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), 45.

Four Mobilization. These enduring friction points could also be utilised to inform the current Australian Defence Force review into mobilization⁶ and the Army's Training Transformation towards a Future Ready Training System.⁷

Research Questions

The primary research question for this study was: What enduring issues currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following stage four mobilization for LSCO? The following secondary research questions were identified to help narrow the research to three common areas and support linkages to current studies being undertaken by the Australian Defence Force:

1. What issues does mobilization place on current leadership? This question relates to understanding issues associated with knowledge management and differing leadership styles. These components will be critical to identifying the enduring issues associated with sustaining professional military leadership during Stage Four Mobilization.

2. What issues, relating to sustaining professional military leadership, has Stage Four Mobilization placed upon the Australian Army in the past? This question is related to identifying the common issues present under previous mobilization conditions.

⁶ Colonel James Davis, from the Office of the Chief of Army, informed the author that a 2-year review was commenced in mid-2020 into mobilization. This review is due to incorporate not just military planners but a whole of government approach to the issues that might arise under Stage 4 mobilization.

⁷ Australian Defence Force, Australian Army, *The Future Ready Training System: Transformation Program Strategy* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 2-12.

3. What issues are present within current literature, doctrine, or policy? This question is related to understanding if there are shortfalls in current literature, Defense or Army doctrine, and policy as it relates to Stage Four mobilization.

Assumptions

When dealing with hypothetical problems it is important to articulate the assumptions that have been introduced to allowing an analysis to occur. The assumptions critical to this research are:

1. Australia is required to enter Stage Four Mobilization in the near future. This contrasts with the future operating concepts of the Australian, United Kingdom and United States of America. Respectively, these documents are titled The Future Operating Environment 2035 (AS), Global Strategic Trends & the Future Operating Environment (UK), and the Joint Operating Environment 2035 (US) which indicate a 10-year strategic warning timeline for large scale combat operations.⁸

2. The preparation for, and activation of, national mobilization is not a phenomenon of the past. Whilst global powers have the capacity to survive initial major clashes and missile exchanges their ability to end conflict is uncertain based on their underpinning ideology; either authoritarian or democratic.⁹ Nations must consider the

⁸ Australian Defence Force, *Future Operating Environment: 2035* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), iii.

⁹ Robert Kaplan, *The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response* (Washington, DC: Centre for a New American Security, May 2017), 35.

strategic approaches of annihilation, attrition, or exhaustion if they are to emerge victorious from conflict.¹⁰

3. The possibility of conflict opening with a nuclear exchange remains unlikely. Nations will focus on using non-conventional and conventional forces to achieve their aims. Whilst this assumption downplays the impacts of nations using nuclear weapons it does not discount the possibility of them being used as a last resort. It is hypothesized that this action is more likely to be undertaken when a nuclear nation identifies that either their survival, or objectives, are genuinely threatened or already lost.

Definition of Terms

Mobilization. The Australian Defence Force defines mobilization as “The process of moving from the prepared state for a range of contingencies to being ready to execute a specific operation.”¹¹ This definition is very broad and does not necessarily assist in understanding the levels of mobilization being discussed. To assist with this, the term mobilization is further broken into the following stages within Australian Doctrine:

Stage 1–Selective Defense Mobilization. Individuals or Units are selected for mobilization within existing Defense resources to meet specific Government objectives¹² e.g., Small scale peacekeeping or humanitarian aid and disaster relief mission.

¹⁰ Gordan A. Craig, “Delbruck: The Military Historian,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 341-344.

¹¹ Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.2, 61.

¹² Ibid., 43.

Stage 2–Partial Defense Mobilization. Involves raising significant Defense resources to a specific level of capability to achieve longer-term Government objectives¹³ (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan commitments).

Stage 3–Defense Mobilization. Involves bringing the joint force up to a specific level of capability and then sustaining it indefinitely. Importantly, Stage 3 occurs when an expansion of the force, or the calling up of the Reserves, is required¹⁴ (e.g., Australia’s commitment to Vietnam or the calling up of major Reserve forces for COVID19).

Stage 4–National Mobilization. Occurs in the face of a significant threat and involves total Defense mobilization and national effort to enable profound increases in capability to achieve national objectives¹⁵ (e.g., World War One and World War Two).

Large Scale Combat Operations. The United States Army doctrine states that “Large-scale combat operations occur in circumstances usually associated with state-on-state conflict, formally declared or otherwise. Combat between large formations operating in all domains characterizes these operations. Large-scale combat operations usually occur within the framework of a larger joint campaign with an Army headquarters forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates.”¹⁶

¹³ Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.2, 44.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 45.

¹⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 2021), 1-11.

Professional Military Leadership. Professional Military Leadership is defined as the combination of technical skills, theoretical knowledge, and practical experiences which allow someone the ability to lead a military organization (of any size) to effectively employ and integrate all available means to achieve their objectives.¹⁷ Professional Military Leadership is gained through active involvement in the profession of arms either in the permanent or reserve military forces.

Accelerated Warfare. The Australian Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Rick Burr, explained that the greatest challenge facing the Army is Accelerated Warfare.¹⁸ The Army describes Accelerated Warfare as “...changes occurring in global, regional, and domestic operating environments. Army’s teams have always adapted to new challenges, but we are now experiencing changes to the character of warfare at a rate faster than many of our processes, concepts, capabilities, and structures were designed for.”¹⁹ To deal with these challenges the Australian Army responds by being an Army in Motion whose organizations are simultaneously *ready now* and *future ready* for cooperation, competition, and conflict.²⁰

¹⁷ This definition has been created by the author. It was developed following a period of exchanges with Major General Stephen Day, DSC, AM, on leadership between January 2020 and September 2021. Major General Day was the author of the Australian Defence Force Leadership publication ADF-P-0, released in 2021.

¹⁸ Australian Defence Force, Australian Army, *Accelerated Warfare Statement* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 1-2.

¹⁹ Ibid., 1.

²⁰ Ibid., 2.

Training Transformation. Is a term used by the Australian Army to explain the required changes needed in its training system to meet the demands of Accelerated Warfare. Training Transformation achieves this by capturing bottom-up ideas to deliver training faster and at the point of need.²¹ Training Transformation contributes to providing Army a Future Ready Training System.

Explicit Knowledge. Is knowledge that can be easily articulated, codified, and stored.²² In terms of the military, explicit knowledge is captured in doctrine and imparted through dedicated training courses and instruction.

Tacit Knowledge. Is knowledge that is derived from participation in an experience and within a specific context.²³ Importantly, it is not gained through instruction and demonstrates a person's ability to use previously gained explicit knowledge. In terms of the military, tacit knowledge is gained over successive participation in training exercises and operational deployments. Tacit knowledge enables military practitioners to successfully employ the full range of joint capabilities within Defense's arsenal.

Organizational Shock. Organizational shock is described as a period of time when any organization enters survival mode due to either external or internal influences. This is triggered by the organization being confronted with a situation in which it is unprepared for and lacks the operating procedures to handle the significant changes required to

²¹ Australian Defence Force, Australian Army, *Army in Motion: Army's Contribution to Defence Strategy*, edition 2 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 43.

²² Jyotsna Bhatnagar, "Correlates of Organizational Learning Capability: An Empirical Analysis," *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations* 42, no. 1 (July 2006): 45.

²³ Ibid.

address the situation. Organizational shock dissipates over time. As time progresses the shock felt by the organization reduces and is accompanied by clearer directions and guidance on how to deal with the situation that confronts it.²⁴

Low Risk. Low risk is defined as an organization only requiring minimal adjustments to its current systems or standard operating procedures to adjust to the threat confronting it.

Medium Risk. Medium risk is defined as an organization requiring large adjustments to its current systems or standard operating procedures to adjust to the threat confronting it.

High Risk. High risk is defined as an organization requiring major adjustments, or complete re-designing, to its current systems or standard operating procedures to adjust to the threat confronting it.

Scope

This study explored the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership under mobilization conditions within the Australian Army. Chapter 2 was utilised to focus data collection on the primary and secondary research questions. The enduring issues identified in this study are intended to inform Australian Defense reviews of mobilization, the development of a Future Ready Training System, and their overarching doctrine and policy.

²⁴ This definition was created by the author. It is based in lessons from 17 years of military service and studies conducted during post-graduate work in the disciplines of Project Management and Business.

Limitations

The time available and access to research material which is physically located in Australia were limitations associated with this study. These limitations were unavoidable based upon the structure of, and attendance at, the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Despite these limitations the ability to conduct valuable research was still possible.

This study specifically discusses Stage Four Mobilization–National Mobilization. Another limitation associated with this research is the author’s lack of experience and exposure at the strategic level. This limitation also provides the benefit of fresh eyes on the subject providing an unbiased and evidence-based perspective on the issue of sustaining professional military leadership in the Australian Army under mobilization.

Delimitations

A multitude of delimitations were imposed upon the research to reduce its scope and assist in focusing the study. First, the study is only focused on national mobilization within the Australian Army and specifically the enduring issues relating to sustaining professional military leadership. When considering the military as an instrument of national power, it is acknowledged that focusing on the Army excludes considerations and issues that might also be found within the Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal Australian Navy, or other Governmental departments.

National mobilization calls upon all instruments of national power and not just the military. The remaining instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, or informational) are beyond this studies capacity to investigate. It is however acknowledged that action within any single domain will have a correlating impact on the

others. This is most easily observed in the exchange between economic and military capacity. The military is limited in scale by the national economy's capacity to produce and supply material for the military services.

Finally, whilst the study highlights issues with sustaining professional military leadership in an expanded Australian Army it will not discuss or address what type of forces these may be or how those forces may be employed. There are two reasons for this. The first is that force structures are determined based upon a needs analysis of the threat which is being faced. This study cannot predict what the future threat will be and therefore cannot state whether the Army will need armored, mechanized infantry, light infantry, or sustainment forces. Secondly, how mobilized forces will be employed will be based on the threat and the geographic region those forces are being employed within. It is beyond this studies capacity to suppose how Australian forces might be employed, whether as front-line combat units, rear area security forces or even as garrison units.

Significance of the Study

This study uses historical national mobilization events to build an understanding of the enduring issues that the Australian Army has confronted in the past. It then uses a fictional future case study to identify the enduring issues that inhibit the Australian Army in sustaining professional military leadership during a possible national mobilization event. Presently, there is a significant gap in knowledge relating to national mobilization across the Defense enterprise and, more specifically, the Australian Army. The findings of the study provide focus areas for the Australian Army to address through updated doctrine and policy. It also emphasizes the importance of commencing a broad dialogue with current serving Army personnel about the enduring issues which will be faced by the

Australian Army under Stage Four–National Mobilization. By addressing the identified issues, and commencing a dialogue across the force, the Australian Army will be able to reduce the effect of organizational shock when it is ordered to mobilize for large scale combat operations. Most importantly, this study identifies further research opportunities related to the impacts of mobilization on the Australian Army.

Summary

This chapter has provided a general overview of why study into Stage Four Mobilization, within the Australian Army, is relevant to modern military practitioners. The chapter has explained how the research will focus upon mobilization and the subsequent enduring issues that inhibit the Australian Army's ability to sustain professional military leadership.

The purpose of this study is to understand Stage Four Mobilization (the mobilization of the entire nation) in Australia and the enduring issues it has placed upon the Australian Army.²⁵ As the enduring issues are identified the study will focus in on those enduring issues that relate to sustaining professional military leadership in a mobilized force. These issues will be explored through the primary and secondary research questions of:

Primary–What enduring issues currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following stage four mobilization for LSCO?

Secondary–What issues does mobilization place on current leadership?

²⁵ Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.2, 45.

Secondary—What issues, relating to sustaining professional military leadership, has Stage Four Mobilization placed upon the Australian Army in the past?

Secondary—What issues are present within current literature, doctrine, or policy?

The exploration of these issues is significant as it will assist the Australian Army in understanding shortfalls in its current doctrine and policies relating to both command and management and collective training. It will also help prevent the likelihood of organizational shock, should Stage Four—National Mobilization be required. Chapter 2 will build on this general overview to provide relevant literature and research into the problem set. Chapter 2 will identify multiple enduring issues as they relate to mobilization and will be used to form the qualitative research basis for the remaining chapters in this study.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Chapter 2 will review key literature relating to Stage Four Mobilization in an Australian context. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key themes and enduring issues that have been encountered previously under Stage Four Mobilization, understanding Australia's contemporary views on mobilization, and the implications on knowledge management and leadership as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership in the Australian Army. The transition between these three themes is important as mobilization in a modern context will undoubtedly be confusing and complex. Therefore, understanding what enduring issues confront the Army with sustaining professional military leadership in a mobilized force will ultimately help to reduce the complexity and confusion faced. To that end, the literature review will focus on three topic areas.

The first topic will be a chronological review of Australia's mobilization during the World Wars. To help limit the scope of the paper, the paper will only review the years leading to war and the first two years of actual war. This topic will establish when the Australian Army was asked to enter Stage Four Mobilization, who they appointed to lead their new formations, how long it took to train new leaders and what doctrine supported the Army's expansion. Understanding the problems confronting the Australian Army during these focal points will support the identification of enduring issues as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization conditions.

The second topic of the literature review will be to address contemporary views on mobilization in Australia. To do this the review will consider recent papers from the Australian National University, Research and Development–Australia, and current Australian Defence Force doctrine. This topic will support the identification of literature gaps.

The final topic will address Knowledge Management and Leadership Theory. A brief review of knowledge management theory and the concepts of tacit and explicit knowledge will be conducted. Leadership theory will also be addressed as understanding the concepts of transformational, visionary, and commanding leadership styles play a large role when considering mass organizational change. These concepts are important to this study as they provide a basis for understanding the intellectual issues related to sustaining professional military leadership.

Based on the review of these three topics, this thesis will be prepared to conduct an analysis of the information gained. Figure 1 graphically represents how understanding the theoretical concepts, historical context and contemporary views combine to support the primary research question. With this information, it is envisaged that Australian planners will be able to implement change to address the identified enduring issues that confront them in relation to Stage Four Mobilization.




Figure 1. Graphical Depiction of the Literature Review

Source: Created by author.

Primary Qualitative Research Questions

The primary qualitative research question for this study was: What enduring issues currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following stage four mobilization for LSCO? The following secondary research questions were identified to help narrow the research to three common areas and support linkages to current studies being undertaken by the Australian Defence Force:

1. What issues does mobilization place on current leadership? This question relates to understanding issues associated with knowledge management and differing leadership styles. These components will be critical to identifying the enduring issues associated with sustaining professional military leadership during Stage Four Mobilization.

2. What issues, relating to sustaining professional military leadership, has Stage Four Mobilization placed upon the Australian Army in the past? This question is related to identifying the common issues present under previous mobilization conditions.

3. What issues are present within current literature, doctrine, or policy? This question is related to understanding if there are shortfalls in current literature, Defense or Army doctrine, and policy as it relates to Stage Four mobilization.

The World Wars–Issues Relating to Mobilization

The World Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 were periods where Australia needed to escalate its mobilization level to Stage Four–National Mobilization in response to external threats. In both cases, the Australian Government declared war in support of their closest ally at the time–Great Britain. These two periods represent the last time that Australia mobilized en-masse. They provide the windows to enable the identification of enduring issues which may restrict the current Australian Army from sustaining professional military leadership during a Stage Four Mobilization event. This portion of the literature review will focus on the years leading up to the wars and the first year/s of conflict. This is done deliberately to focus the review on the initiation of Stage Four Mobilization and the friction that was encountered as a result. Throughout this portion of the review, it may become evident that there is either insufficient literature or that the literature does not exist to support research in these areas.

The First World War (WWI)

Two key texts will be used to draw primary and secondary source information regarding Australian mobilization in WWI. The first will be *The Official History of*

Australia in War of 1914-1918, written by C.E.W. Bean and first published in 1923. This seminal text has formed the basis of WWI research for nearly a century and will support this research. The second key text is *A Military History of Australia* by Jeffrey Grey and published in 1999. This text provides an overview of Australia's involvement in war but critically outlines its evolving defense strategy and policies over the years.

The First World War was Australia's first significant trial by combat as a new nation. Whilst colonial forces had participated in the Māori Wars of 1845-1872 and the Second Boer War of 1899-1902 the scale of involvement was small with approximately 18,000 Australians serving in each conflict.²⁶ In these previous conflicts the Australian Government, only federated in 1901, had not required national mobilization to support military objectives. Between 1905 and 1914 the global political landscape slowly deteriorated, and the newly formed Australian Government began to take an interest in national defense on a much larger scale.

At the beginning of 1905 the Russians and Japanese were fighting a land and naval campaign against each other in Manchuria (where modern day far North Korea, eastern China, and Eastern Russia converge). The Russo-Japanese War brought the defense of Australia to the forefront of political and military minds. The defeat of the Russian Fleet in 1905, by the Japanese, signaled two major shifts in defense thinking for the Australians. The first was that Australia required a naval force to protect its interests and second that Australia's military planning was inadequate to confront an external

²⁶ Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 31.

threat. This realization prompted the Australian government to reinvigorate military planning and saw defense issues gain a prominence in the years leading up to WWI.²⁷

Following the 1907 Colonial Conference, the Australian Government considered the introduction of a Defense Scheme. The Scheme comprised of a standardised approach to the training and equipping of the Army, a version of universal service and a precautionary stage of mobilization which Great Britain would provide warning for.²⁸ Of the component parts of the Scheme only the precautionary stage of mobilization was adopted. Despite the limited adoption of prudent pre-war measures, the Australian Chief of Staff of the Australian Forces, Colonel William Throsby Bridges, started a Defense Scheme of his own.²⁹

Bridges' Scheme was designed to provide the six states, and three military districts, within Australia explicit instructions on how to conduct mobilization as a part of the Commonwealth Military Forces. Over the next six years Bridges drafted plans that included how to raise units, how to use the media and what limitations needed to be placed upon the media.³⁰ Whilst the Scheme was incomplete at the outbreak of WWI it did provide initial direction to the District Commandants and supported Great Britain's call for Australia entering the precautionary stage of mobilization. Whilst the literature

²⁷ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 71.

²⁸ Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean, *The Official History of Australia in War 1914-1918*, vol. 1, *The Story of ANZAC: From the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915* (Sydney: University of Queensland Press, 1923), 9.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

does not specify what format the direction to the states and military districts took, it is assumed that they are a version of orders and/or standard operating procedures.

Between 1907 and late 1908 parliamentary debate ensued regarding the introduction of universal military service. In early 1909, following considerable debate, the Australian parliament introduced the Universal Training Scheme. It was colloquially known as Boy Conscription as only 18–21-year-old men were brought in for service.³¹ Despite its introduction in 1909 the scheme wouldn't register men until 1911 and training didn't commence until July 1912.³² Following the adoption of a Universal Training Scheme the Australian Government invited Field Marshall Lord Horatio Kitchener, Great Britain's most famous general, to review Australia's defenses.

In November of 1909, Field Marshall Kitchener commenced a six-week tour of Australia to assess its defenses. Kitchener's conclusion was damning—he stated that the Australian defense preparations were inadequate in number, training, and organization.³³ Of interest, is that despite Australia only having a population of 4,323,960,³⁴ Kitchener's recommendation was for Australia to use the Universal Training Scheme to raise and

³¹ Bean, *The Story of ANZAC*, 22.

³² Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 76.

³³ Horatio Kitchener, *Report on the Defence of Australia by Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener* (Melbourne: J. Kemp, Government Printer for the State of Victoria, 1910), 2, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=98464>.

³⁴ Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Commonwealth Population: Its Distribution and Fluctuation 1901–1912," accessed 20 January 2022, 84, [https://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/154B66EA61877590CA257AEE0014E999/\\$File/13010_1901_1913%20section%204.pdf](https://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/154B66EA61877590CA257AEE0014E999/$File/13010_1901_1913%20section%204.pdf).

train the Commonwealth Military Forces up to 80,000 personnel.³⁵ This force would consist of 84 Infantry Battalions, 28 Regiments of Light Horse, 49 field batteries, 7 howitzer batteries, 7 communication companies and 14 Field Engineer Regiments.³⁶ This would represent approximately 1.8 percent of the population trained for war service—a major investment and change from current practices. A key limitation of the Universal Training Scheme, however, was that personnel called for service were unable to be utilised outside of Australia or its territories.³⁷ This would have significant future ramifications for the Australian Government as they prepared to support Great Britain. Kitchener also made recommendations to fix a major deficiency in professional military leadership.

Australian Army officers at this time were not professionally trained. Officer selection prior to WWI would be viewed by modern commentators as an informal affair bordering on farcical. There was no formal application process to a centralized authority. Instead, a vacancy at a unit had to exist and a candidate must be recommended directly to the Commanding Officer. Potential officers received no formal professional military education and selection often owed much to their social status and level of education.³⁸ Officers were trained based on the interest of the Commanding Officer and skill levels

³⁵ Kitchener, *Report on the Defence of Australia by Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener*, 5.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁷ Ian Bell, *Australian Army Mobilization in 1914*, Australian Army History Unit Occasional Paper Series (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 2020), 24.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

varied widely across the force. To rectify this shortfall in professional military leadership, Kitchener recommended the creation of a Royal Military College based on the model of West Point in the United States of America.³⁹ In Kitchener's report he states that to ground an officer in the military profession requires no less than three years dedicated study.⁴⁰ Interestingly, the role of the military college was not to produce officers to staff the 80,000 strong Army but to fill the Staff Corps. The Staff Corps were intended to oversee and provide professional military leadership to the 215 training districts required to raise and train the proposed force. Under this model, a professionally trained lieutenant-captain would oversee six training districts which might include several battalions or regiments.⁴¹ Here, professional officers were valued for their professional knowledge, organizational skills, and logistical expertise rather than command ability.

The citizen officer was not forgotten. Kitchener proposed that officers providing leadership to the remaining force must be appointed as early in their career as practical. This was to ensure that citizen officers were provided opportunities for education, repetition of military drills, study of their duties and study of their profession.⁴² Finally, the process of identifying officer candidates and appointing them was left to the Staff Corps training district commanders. Many candidates were chosen from the ranks and

³⁹ Kitchener, *Report on the Defence of Australia by Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener*, 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 12.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 14.

placed on a probationary period.⁴³ The probationary period was decided upon by the Commanding Officer whom had wide ranging powers to confirm officer appointments. A positive outcome of the creation of the Commonwealth Military Forces, the introduction of the Universal Training Scheme, and the creation of the Royal Military College was that professional military education and leadership was taken seriously and likely improved the quality of the officer corps.

In 1911 the Royal Military College–Duntroon was opened, and Kitchener’s recommendations were being implemented. However, Kitchener’s recommendations only dealt with the defense of Australia and did not include provision for actions within an enemy country.⁴⁴ The Australian Government had defined mobilization as “the process by which an armed force passes from a peace to a war footing.”⁴⁵ This definition only told the government, and military, what mobilization was. The government lacked a plan for what it would do under mobilization and had little political appetite to qualify the requirements. However, between the period of 1910-1913 the Minister for Defense undertook studies to determine how Australia and New-Zealand could respond to an offshore military scenario⁴⁶. In 1912, a joint planning team from New-Zealand and Australia determined that both countries could raise and support a combined Division for operations offshore. New-Zealand would contribute 8,000 men and Australia 12,000 to

⁴³ Bell, *Australian Army Mobilization in 1914*, 34.

⁴⁴ Bean, *The Story of ANZAC*, 27.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 615.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 27.

the combined Division. The work conducted on the combined Division would form the underlying basis and forethought for both Australia and New-Zealand when committing troops to WWI.⁴⁷ Having a conceptually pre-prepared force structure and size increased both countries ability to rapidly provide initial ground force capability to Great Britain at the commencement of WWI.

In the months of June and July 1914 Australian attentions were not focused on the growing discontent in Europe. This is not to say that Australians were unaware of European events but interested in other issues that hit closer to home. Australian attention was focused on the looming constitution crisis in Ireland that might lead to a civil war and the pending Australian federal elections which were scheduled for 5 September 1914.⁴⁸ On 30 July, the Australian Government, and other dominion governments, were notified of imminent war in Europe. On the same day, New-Zealand offered 8,000 troops, on 31 July Canada offered 30,000 troops and by 4 August Australia had offered 20,000 troops. The numbers of troops offered by Australia and New-Zealand are important as they represent nearly identical contribution to those proposed in the combined division of 1912. Bell suggests that the mobilization of 20,000 Australian troops was based largely off the combined division planning model as the government knew it could mobilize the force within six weeks to be ready for overseas deployment.

It must be remembered that as of 30 July, and the receipt of warning for imminent war, a declaration of war did not exist between Great Britain and any other nation.

⁴⁷ Bean, *The Story of ANZAC*, 28.

⁴⁸ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 80.

Following the offer of troops from the dominions Great Britain issued a precautionary mobilization order on 2 August 1914.⁴⁹ A notice of the declaration of war between Germany and Great Britain followed on 5 August 1914 coupled with acceptance of Australia's troop offer.

The Commonwealth Military Forces commenced mobilization to fulfill a force request of 20,000 personnel on 10 August 1914.⁵⁰ The force was structured as an all-volunteer force as personnel enlisted under the Universal Training Scheme could not deploy outside of Australia. The force would primarily be infantry with contingents of light horse, artillery and supporting arms. An unintended effect of the Universal Training Scheme was the development of indigenous military industry to support the manufacturing of small arms, ammunition, clothing, and military supplies.⁵¹ This industry supported the mobilization of the newly termed Australian Imperial Force (AIF). Mobilization for the AIF was completed by 31 August 1914 and constituted a force of 881 officers and 19,745 soldiers.⁵² Of note, is that officers were primarily drawn from old militia lists, or volunteers from the part-time force, rather than the Staff Corps.⁵³ Many Staff Corps officers were instead retained for service within Australia to ensure the functioning of the Commonwealth Military Forces.

⁴⁹ Bean, *The Story of ANZAC*, 9.

⁵⁰ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 81.

⁵¹ Bell, *Australian Army Mobilization in 1914*, 12.

⁵² Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 84.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

At this time, The Royal Military College–Duntroon hurriedly graduated its first class of cadets so that they could join the AIF. The 35 cadets of the first graduating class had only completed three years of training and not the designated four.⁵⁴ These 35 newly promoted lieutenants were distributed amongst the combat units of the AIF. As the 2nd Division of the AIF was raised a second class was also graduated early. The literature does not explain how these decisions were reached or whether the Royal Military College–Duntroon reduced its training curriculum to increase throughput for the war. Given that only 181 Royal Military College–Duntroon graduates served overseas in the AIF it would appear that the curriculum remained focused on quality over quantity despite the ongoing war.⁵⁵ The value of the Commonwealth Military Forces and citizen soldiers was demonstrated in 1914 as the officers, NCOs and soldiers of the force provided the core of personnel to the AIF units and, critically, provided training to the subsequent AIF enlistees.⁵⁶

The raising of the AIF within three weeks represents a significant mobilization achievement on the part of the Australian Government and the Commonwealth Military Forces. However, the AIF suffered from poor training and poor personnel selection because of the hasty mobilization.⁵⁷ Bean notes that “early in the history of the AIF it became clear that the right selection and training of officers was the problem vital beyond

⁵⁴ Bell, *Australian Army Mobilization in 1914*, 55.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 56.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 22.

⁵⁷ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 87.

any other in the creation of the Australia Army.”⁵⁸ Bean further suggests that provided with quality officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Australian forces could be trained in a matter of months.⁵⁹ The crux of the problem identified by Bean is that whilst personnel and equipment can be provided the effective provision of professional military leadership is essential to the performance of an Army in the field.

Based on the rates of enlistment in 1914 and 1915 the problem and scope of providing effective professional military leadership can be seen. In 1914, between August and December, 52,561 personnel enlisted into the Australian Army. By the end of 1915 another 165,912 personnel had enlisted.⁶⁰ Within 15 months of WWI commencing approximately 4.3 percent of the Australian population had joined the military. To provide officers for this rapidly expanding force candidates were selected from the ranks. Those showing aptitude and capacity to serve as officers were granted commissions. Grey states that the “...majority of officers in the AIF enlisted originally as privates.”⁶¹ The process of commissioning officers from the ranks was practical given the very limited number of officers in pre-war service and given the varying quality of those officers. However, the literature does not explain how, once selected, the officers or NCOs were provided training in their respective professional fields. It is hypothesized

⁵⁸ Bean, *The Story of ANZAC*, 48.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁶⁰ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 87.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 86.

that they learnt their skills on-the-job with education provided by their commanding officers (albeit with varying levels of interest).

The years leading up to WWI in Australia were defined by profound changes in their defense policy and approach to mobilization. The deteriorating global security landscape, starting in 1905, forced the issue of national defense into the minds of politicians and military professionals alike. The debates and eventual establishment of the Universal Training Scheme had several significant positive impacts on the country's ability to mobilize (readily available forces/force structures/defense industry) but also imposed major restrictions (limited to service within Australia). The reviewing of Australia's defenses by Field Marshall Lord Kitchener also provided a growing sense of urgency for Australia to better prepare itself for mobilization and its own national defense. This was especially true in the need to establish and provide professional military leadership to both the Commonwealth Military Forces and the AIF. The Australian experience at the outset of WWI demonstrated that the pre-prepared combined division force structure aided in the rapid mobilization of the AIF. The short durations between precautionary mobilization, declaration of war and dispatch of the AIF support the need of pre-prepared mobilization plans. However, the rapid mobilization of the AIF encountered issues with sub-standard leadership within the officer corps and non-commissioned officer ranks. Mobilization over 1914-1915 in Australia during WWI is characterized by ready access to personnel but limited access to professional military leadership that could provide the training, discipline and command and control to the newly raised forces.

The Second World War (WWII)

Two key texts will be used to draw primary and secondary source information regarding Australian mobilization in WWII. The first will be the *Australia in the War of 1939-1945: Army* written by Gavin Long and first published in 1952. This text has informed the research of WWII studies for nearly 70 years. The second key text is “A Military History of Australia” by Jeffrey Grey and published in 1999. As described previously, this text provides an overview of Australia’s involvement in war but critically outlines its evolving defense strategy and policies over the years.

The Second World War, and the conditions which led to it, occurred in a relatively short period of time (two decades). The effects of the First World War were still sharp in the minds of politicians, the serving military, military veterans, and the Australian public. To demonstrate the depth of Australia’s involvement in WWI, it is important to understand that nearly 10 percent of the population enlisted for service (416,809 of a population of approximately 5,000,000).⁶² Of these enlistees more than 60,000 were killed and 156,000 wounded, gassed, or taken prisoner.⁶³ The scale, and cost, of this commitment explains many of the circumstances that led to Australia’s preparation, mobilization for, and involvement in the Second World War. It also explains why the interwar years were a depressing time for defense policy and the military.⁶⁴

⁶² Australian War Memorial, “First World War 1914-1918,” accessed 16 December 2021, <https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/first-world-war>.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 119.

Following the conclusion of WWI, Australia went through a period of demobilization. The Australian Imperial Force was returned home from the European Theatre and the nation returned to a civilian economy. Of note is that following demobilization, the militia in 1921 numbered some 100,000 compulsory enlisted men with a cadre of only 3,150 officers and men in the permanent force.⁶⁵ This represented a growth of about 150 permanent positions from the 1914 force and would represent a high-water mark for professional military personnel until WWII was well underway. Defense policy in 1922 was altered significantly and saw a major reduction across all arms of the Australian military. The reductions in this year were based upon three guiding principles. First, was that the possibility of another war was remote—as described by H. G. Wells and the United States President, WWI was the war to end all wars. Second, was that Australia had significant war debts to repay and needed to restrict spending. And thirdly, was the belief that if another war did occur Britain could be relied upon to defend Australia from forward bases in Singapore.⁶⁶ These guiding principles set the tone of the interwar years and started with major force reductions.

Major force reductions were introduced in 1922 by the Australian government. They saw the permanent military forces for the Army halved, from 3,150 to 1,600, and the militia forces reduced by nearly 70 percent to from 100,000 to 31,000.⁶⁷ The reduction of the permanent forces had severe impacts on the now professionally trained

⁶⁵ Gavin Long, *Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One—Army*, vol. 1, *To Benghazi* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), 3.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*

Royal Military College–Duntroon graduates. Duntroon graduates who performed admirably in the AIF and rose to the rank of Major found themselves reduced in pay to subalterns or captains with no prospect of promotion for 10 years or more. The NCOs and Warrant Officers, some of whom gain promotions up to Lieutenant Colonel in the AIF, were disbarred from the Officer Corps and resigned to fulfilling duties well below their worn rank and capabilities.⁶⁸ The lack of promotion prospects, their employment in junior roles and with reduced responsibilities introduced resentment into the military—particularly the permanent force. Many officers and warrant officers took their professional military skills and left Australia for service in the Indian or British Armies abroad. The situation was not much better in militia.

Following the drastic reduction in the militia force in 1922 the citizen forces were again provided the task of defending Australia from invasion. Their use was again limited to service within Australia which, as at the beginning of WWI, would create administrative issues during mobilization for WWII. The militia retained its construct of four infantry divisions and two light horse divisions but in effect they were skeleton units at roughly 25 percent strength.⁶⁹ The ability to conduct training and education for the militia was further eroded when the Government matched the personnel reductions with a reduction in funded training days to only a few continuous days per calendar year.⁷⁰ Following the carnage of WWI service in the militia lost its pre-war prestige and soldiers

⁶⁸ Long, *To Benghazi*, 5-9.

⁶⁹ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 120.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

and soldiering were in particularly bad taste during the 1920s.⁷¹ What experience was gained by officers and soldiers from WWI was lost on a force reduced in size and restricted in time to impart lessons or practice them.

By the late 1920s the ability for the military to train young Australians and impart professional military leadership skills would be further eroded still. In October of 1929 the Wall Street stock market crash led to an acute trade depression across the world. In Australia, to save further government expenditure, the Universal Training Scheme was suspended on 1 November 1929 as well as five infantry battalions and two light horse regiments being abolished.⁷² By 1931 the Australian permanent and militia forces were in dire straits. Funding for training, equipping and salaries had been reduced by 50 percent in a 12-month period from £6,536,000 in 1928-1929 to £3,859,000 in 1930-1931. To compare military strength, in 1931 the Australian military force consisted of 1,544 permanent forces and 27,400 militia forces which is a force lower than that which existed in 1901 at Federation and despite nearly a 90 percent increase in population over that time.⁷³ Australia's Army was diminishing with professional military experience and capabilities atrophying as each year passed.

The atrophy of experience was also felt in the Royal Military College–Duntroon. From 1911 the College had increased its class sized from 35 to approximately 60 cadets per year in the 1920s. The College was producing professional military leaders with the

⁷¹ Long, *To Bengazi*, 12.

⁷² Ibid., 13.

⁷³ Ibid., 14.

requisite skills to perform command and staff appointments across a wide range of functions. However, as the effects of the Great Depression took hold the decision was made to reduce cadet numbers and to close the Duntroon barracks in favor of movement to Victoria Barracks in Sydney.⁷⁴ By 1931 barely 30 cadets were being trained yearly. Come 1939, this decision would deny the military access to 270 professionally trained military officers.

The drastic budgetary and personnel reductions were conducted under the belief that the security of Australia would be guaranteed by Britain and their forward defense strategy focused on a major naval base and force in Singapore. Britain, and her dominions, also believed in the 10-year-rule which held that no war would occur within a warning time of 10 years.⁷⁵ The global security landscape deteriorated rapidly between 1931 and 1939 which invalidated the concept of the 10-year-rule and proved the Singapore strategy to be grossly ineffective. Australia watched as in 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria, the Nationalist Socialist Workers Party gained control of Germany in 1933, Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and the Spanish Civil war erupted in 1936. The combination of these events prompted military and governmental officials to reconsider their defense policy and posture.

From the mid-1930s Australian defense spending increased in conjunction with the deteriorating global security landscape. Despite the increased spending, Australian defense policy remained focused on the navy supporting the forward defense strategy

⁷⁴ Long, *To Bengazi*, 15.

⁷⁵ Richard Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices and Consequences* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 14.

centered on Singapore with the Army only providing a force capable of defending against an invasion of Australia.⁷⁶ At the 1937 Imperial Conference it was discussed that the earliest phase of any war would be the most dangerous to Britain and the dominions. The conference discussed the importance of military measures being taken during peace to enable contribution early in any conflict; the inference, as explained by Long, was that divisions sent earlier rather than later would be of more value to the war effort.⁷⁷ Despite the discussions at the 1937 Imperial Conference Australian policy remained focused on an Army that was limited to service in Australia.

At this time the Army developed three degrees of mobilization which supported the governments defense policy of the defense of Australia. The first degree of mobilization was the provision of soldiers towards Australia's coastal defenses based on a war with distant enemy. The second was to meet a situation in which minor raids onto Australian soil might be expected and required a force of approximately two divisions (roughly the size of the serving militia). Finally, the third degree of mobilization—full mobilization—was to counter full invasion and required the raising of five infantry divisions and two light horse divisions.⁷⁸ The third degree of mobilization proposed upwards of 200,000 personnel and necessitated a whole of government approach to build the force. Note however that none of the mobilization plans included service overseas.

⁷⁶ Long, *To Bengazi*, 22.

⁷⁷ Excerpts taken from the “Imperial Conference, 1937, Summary of Proceedings,” in Long, *To Bengazi*, 21.

⁷⁸ Long, *To Bengazi*, 25.

The suspension of the Universal Training Scheme meant that to mobilize any force within Australia required a completely voluntary approach. In 1938 the militia was authorized to expand, and a recruiting campaign initiated. Contrary to the 1920s anti-war sentiment, the late 1930s Australian population was acutely aware of the threat posed by Japan in the Pacific and the rise of Fascist Germany in Europe. As a result, the recruitment campaign was a raging success. The militia went from a force of 35,000 in September of 1938 to 70,000 in March 1939.⁷⁹ As experienced in WWI, Australian men were willing to volunteer in large numbers for service. Whilst the militia remained confined to service within Australia its value wasn't in its capability to meet, on equal terms, an army of the European type. The militia was the vessel through which Australia could access a nucleus of dedicated officers and NCOs who were experienced in commanding platoons, companies, and battalions.⁸⁰ Despite the increases in personnel, the Army of 1939 was little different to that of 1914 in terms of size, equipment, preparedness, and training.

With the threat of war looming the Australian Government hastily developed the Commonwealth War Book. This loose-leaf document was designed to provide co-ordination of departmental action on the occurrence of strained relations and on the outbreak of war.⁸¹ In reality, Grey explains, that the Commonwealth War Book was a

⁷⁹ Long, *To Benghazi*, 26.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸¹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Commonwealth war book: summary of important action to be taken by government departments/Department of Defence* (Melbourne: Department of Defence, 1939).

necessary measure but amateurishly executed.⁸² The book was released without chapters on manpower and supply and excluded considerations for the mobilization of the civilian populace. When the declaration of war was announced between Britain and Germany on 3 September 1939, Australia was ill-prepared.

Mobilization of the Army commenced shortly after the formal declaration of war. The coastal defenses of Australia were crewed, and the militia was mobilized at a rate of 10,000 per every 16 days to provide guards to vulnerable points.⁸³ As with the Australian experience of WWI, the British government again requested (on 8 September) an expeditionary force for overseas service at the earliest possible time. The Australian military was not structured for such a request and policy still precluded use of the militia outside of Australian territory. As such, the Army was faced with the necessity of mobilizing the militia for homeland defense at the same time as mobilizing a division (the 6th Division of the 2nd AIF) for service overseas.

Lacking plans for the mobilization of a force for overseas service the Australian government decided on making ready a single division as they had done in 1914. This was despite the population having grown by nearly 40 percent during the interwar years. On 15 September 1939 the Australian Government confirmed the raising of the 6th Infantry Division, 2nd AIF, for service overseas. At the same time, the mobilization of the militia was increased from lots of 10,000 to lots of 40,000 men and training days

⁸² Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 140.

⁸³ Long, *To Bengazi*, 35.

increased from 16 to 30.⁸⁴ Long notes that whilst nearly all the senior military leaders, division commanders, brigade commanders, and most unit commanders had served as regimental officers during WWI there was an extreme shortage of professional regular officers to fill key staff posts.⁸⁵ The pre-ponderance of regular officers were kept in key positions and staff appointments across the military districts of Australia. Their exclusion from command appointments in the 6th Division, as directed by the Prime Minister, caused annoyance and disappointment across the permanent military officers.⁸⁶ The organizational skills of permanent officers were favored to keep the militia, their training and the Army headquarters operating over their inclusion in the mobilized division.

The lack of training was acutely felt in the newly raised 6th Division. Come November the division was embarked and sent to North Africa. Prior to departure it had only achieved platoon level training, at best, and required a further six months of training to bring it up to standard.⁸⁷ The impact of training day reductions, access to equipment and professional military leadership were keenly felt.

The permanent officers overlooked for command appointments had, in many cases, languished in positions as subalterns or captains for periods of eight to twelve years during the interwar period. In comparison, officers in the militia had achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel in just ten years. The practice of militia officers receiving

⁸⁴ Long, *To Benghazi*, 40.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 42.

⁸⁷ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 151.

command appointments over permanent officers continued as the 7th Division and the 8th Division were raised in February and June of 1940 respectively. Long highlights that in these divisions the commanders were lucky if they had access to 10 permanent officers in total.⁸⁸ Whilst the literature emphasizes that militia officers were granted commands at a rate far higher than their permanent counterparts the exact reasons and justifications are not listed. What is clear from the literature is the resentment felt by permanent officers who had held rank positions for extended periods of time without the chance of promotion and then overlooked again once operational service became available.

As with WWI, the Army in WWII had little difficulty in meeting its personnel targets based on the mobilization of three divisions and the militia. By July 1940 the three division had the necessary enlistments and the Army had received an additional 50,000 enlistees with which they could fill an additional two divisions at their discretion.⁸⁹ Grey notes that not all officers and their units performed as well as others and suffered from poorly trained reinforcements.⁹⁰ As a result, from the raising of the 9th Division, permanent force officers were integrated at higher rates than those of the 6th to 8th Divisions.⁹¹ It must be noted that the reviewed literature did not make clear how NCOs were selected or appointed during this period. It is assumed that the practice from WWI

⁸⁸ Long, *To Benghazi*, 40.

⁸⁹ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 148.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 154.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 148.

of Commanding Officers having the authority to identify and promote NCOs of capability from private soldiers was still in practice.

Australia was no more prepared for WWII than it was for WWI. The lessons of mobilization from WWI were not integrated into policy, the psyche of military, or governmental officials. The Australian Army suffered from a lack of permanent officers and NCOs and reductions in the militia during the interwar years further denied access to professional military leadership. The cessation of the Universal Training Scheme also reduced the Army's ability to recruit NCOs from the ranks of trained private soldiers. The decisions to reduce Royal Military College–Duntroon class sizes further diminished the Army's capacity to build a cadre of professional officers. Whilst the military was battling with the shortage of professional talent, successive Governments of the interwar years pursued strategies that had already proven ineffective such as the retention of militia forces for use exclusively in Australia. Preparation for mobilization was also undermined by the concept of the 10-year-rule which only saw the Government develop a national mobilization plan in July of 1939, just two months before the outbreak of WWII. It was fortuitous that the Australian population was galvanized in support of WWII and provided ample personnel to fulfill the bill of Army's mobilization.

Contemporary Australian Views on Mobilization

Over the last 25 years the Australian Army has conducted various forms of mobilization. From actions in Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, Iraq, Fiji, Vanuatu, and the Philippines, to name a few, the Army has grown accustomed to conducting Stage One and Stage Two mobilization in pursuit of the nation's interests. Since late 2019 and early 2020, in response to the Australian Bushfire Crisis and COVID

19, the Army commenced, for the first time since Vietnam, Stage 3 mobilization. This saw major callouts of the Army Reserve in support of the regular Army to achieve defense aid to the civil community (DACC).

Australian views on mobilization are likely to have been shaped by several factors. The carnage of WWI and WWII, and its impact on society, reduced the likelihood of the nation's willingness to enter large scale combat. The establishment of the rules based international order following WWII introduced a long and stable period of growth and prosperity. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the last major credible threat to United States power on the planet. Finally, the development of nuclear weapons and their destructive power further reduced the plausibility of raising, maintaining, and fighting in large scale conflict. Based on the above factors, it could be surmised that Australian's viewed Stage Four Mobilization of the scale conducted in WWI and WWII, a thing of the past.

The imperative to understand national mobilization has not been supported by the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Government's approach to conflict over the last 30 years. Whilst this is understandable given Australia's commitment to the War on Terror for two decades, it has left a considerable gap in knowledge within the organization. The last serious analysis of national mobilization by the government and subordinate departments was in 1990 and conducted as a part of the Wrigley Report: The Defense Force and the Community.⁹² The report noted that whilst the career military

⁹² Joanne Nicholson, Peter Dortmans, Marigold Black, Marta Keep, Sarah Grand Clement, Erik Silfversten, James Black, Theodora Ogden, Livia Dewaele, and Pau Alonso Garcia-Bode, *Defence Mobilization Planning Comparative Study: An Examination of Overseas Planning* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), xv.

professional is essential to the maintenance of defense in peacetime the ability for the force to be bolstered, perhaps massively, by civilians cannot be overlooked.⁹³

The Australian Defense White Paper in 2000 stated that inter-state conflict was as likely in the Pacific as it was anywhere else in the world and added that this type of conflict had a very low likelihood.⁹⁴ The 2009 Australian Defense White Paper all together considered whether major war was a concept of the past. It concluded that whilst major wars are not likely over the period to 2030 such wars should not be ruled out. It concluded by stating that intra-state conflict would be the most common form out to 2030.⁹⁵ The 2009 White Paper addresses mobilization very briefly. It highlights that national mobilization will not be undertaken lightly and significant planning would be required to pursue it effectively -but that is as far as its explanation goes.⁹⁶ The 2016 Australian Defense White Paper continues by stating that inter-state conflict is unlikely and does not mention mobilization as a planning requirement or consideration within defense strategy.⁹⁷ The natural bushfire disaster in late 2019, the COVID 19 pandemic of early 2020 and the deteriorating global security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region revitalized the need for mobilization planning and preparation.

⁹³ Nicholson et al., *Defence Mobilization Planning Comparative Study*, xvi.

⁹⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2000* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), iv.

⁹⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2009* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), 22.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁹⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2016* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), 43.

In mid-2020 two key actions were taken by the Department of Defense in relation to mobilization and large-scale combat operations. In June of 2020 the Vice-Chief of the Australian Defence Force established a directorate within the Force Design Division to ensure a mobilization planning framework exists across Defense.⁹⁸ This was done in response to significant changes in Australia’s strategic outlook. The changes that prompted the Vice-Chief’s actions were released in the Department of Defense 2020 Strategic Update. The update confirmed that Australia’s strategic environment has deteriorated more rapidly than predicted and requires adjustments to defense policy.⁹⁹ The update also reevaluated the possibility of large-scale combat operations—it stated that the Australian Defence Force must be better prepared for high-intensity conflict as the prospect of such conflict is now less remote.¹⁰⁰ Critically, the update removed the planning assumption of a ten-year strategic warning time for major conventional actions and stressed the uncertainty of the global security landscape.¹⁰¹ The reduction in warning time for major conflicts further emphasizes the importance of reconsidering mobilization planning across Defense as directed by the Vice-Chief.

Since mid-2020 the reinvigoration of mobilization planning and consideration across defense has sparked several academic papers to be published. In July of 2020 the Australian National University published a paper titled “How to Mobilize Australia.”

⁹⁸ Nicholson et al., *Defence Mobilization Planning Comparative Study*, iii.

⁹⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *2020 Department of Defence Strategic Update*, 3.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

This paper was aimed at the whole-of-government level and included assessments on supply chains, the Australia-United States Alliance, military scaling, preventing the Army being a glass cannon and the need for a universal service scheme. The paper discusses the human resources required to lead, train, and maintain any expanded force. It proposes that the military requires the ability to build redundancy into the Australian Officer Corps through two methods.¹⁰² The first is to greatly increase officer intakes and then, upon graduation, allow a significant proportion of them to enter the civilian workforce and be placed on an active reserve list. The second is to more closely track junior officers that separate from military and again place these members on an active reserve list.

The paper also discusses that the Australian Army may be fielding a glass cannon force. It explains that the Army may be fielding a force that is “capable of striking an adversary with force initially but is unable to sustain it or absorb a counterstrike.”¹⁰³ Critically, the paper posits that whilst the Australian Army has become a highly trained, highly capable force equipped with modern capabilities its mobilization readiness and the ability to reconfigure itself for scale has greatly atrophied. To prevent the glass cannon force the paper proposes that the Australian Army needs to assess how its forces can be structured to scale up in the future in response to further degradation in the global security landscape.

¹⁰² Peter Layton, Zach Lambert, Nathan Kinnery, and Chris Barrie, “How to Mobilize Australia,” (Paper, Australian National University, 2020), 21.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 25.

Interestingly, the paper posits that Australia needs a universal service scheme to cope with the challenges being faced by an uncertain security outlook and increasing environmental events. It explains that the challenges being confronted from bushfires, pandemics, climate change and a changing regional order in the Indo-Pacific will require more capability than the Australian Defence Force can currently meet.¹⁰⁴ The paper however is more focused on understanding how Universal Service would be perceived within Australia than dictating what specific capability it should provide. The desired end state of the paper is that a genuine national debate into the nature, form, requirements, and incentives for a universal service scheme be immediately initiated.¹⁰⁵

In August of 2020, the Australian National University published an occasional paper titled “National Mobilization During War: Past Insights, Future Possibilities.” In this paper Dr. Peter Layton reviews mobilization from 1914 through 2003 and then assesses mobilization across four different alternative futures. He stresses that throughout Australia’s military history, and the alternative futures, that the common requirement has been to produce expeditionary forces and expand the Army structure to match national objectives.¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately, Layton focusses more upon the resources and equipment required by mobilization rather than how the military would expand to meet the mobilization requirements of his alternative futures. The theme throughout Layton’s paper is to describe how mobilization has occurred in the past and to act as a guiding rail

¹⁰⁴ Layton et al., “How to Mobilize Australia,” 33.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 41.

¹⁰⁶ Peter Layton, “National Mobilization During War: Past Insights, Future Possibilities,” (Paper, Australian National University, 2020), 56.

for modern day governmental and military planners to understand future problems. He concludes by stating that “...for the ADF there is a certainty: if another war is fought, national mobilization to some degree will be necessary.”¹⁰⁷

In 2021, the Research and Development Corporation (RAND) Australia was engaged by the Australian Department of Defense to study mobilization planning. This was in response to the growing trend of the Australian Defence Force being used to defend against natural and human-made disasters, grey zone activities and the possibility of war. The paper conducted a comparative study of nations that had a Total Defense Model which included Singapore, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States of America. It also conducted a review of Australia’s history of mobilization, its ability to deal with supply and demand of mobilization and a narrative on national resilience.¹⁰⁸ The paper highlights that as the threat has increased in the Indo-Pacific region the focus of defense planning has moved much closer to home for Australia.¹⁰⁹ It notes that Australia is now in need of a Total Defense Concept that incorporates all elements of governmental and non-governmental capabilities. A key component of that concept is ensuring ready access to enough skilled, trained, and prepared personnel to support national mobilization.¹¹⁰ Whilst the paper provides an in-depth comparison of nations

¹⁰⁷ Layton, “National Mobilization During War,” 58.

¹⁰⁸ Nicholson et al., *Defence Mobilization Planning Comparative Study*, v.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 120.

with Total Defense it does not provide specific insights into issues that would be faced by Australia under the conditions of mobilization.

Of the documents available that describe a contemporary view of mobilization in Australia, the primary focus is at the national level. Other than the description of the Australian Army as a glass cannon, there is a lack of literature that considers the specific issues that might be faced under national mobilization by the Army. Mobilization issues relating to leadership, training, structure, and time do not yet appear to have entered consideration within academia or the military. A factor that may contribute to this is that within Australian Defense doctrine national mobilization is only briefly described in one doctrinal publication.¹¹¹ Within Army specific doctrine, there are no subordinate publications to assist Army planners with understanding the considerations for mobilization, the issues likely to be confronted and possible pathways to overcome them. It could be surmised that the contemporary view of the Australian Army is that it will only be required to execute Stage 1 through 3 Mobilization within its extant structure. The lack of literature on modern considerations for Stage 4 Mobilization presents as a significant shortfall in knowledge.

Shortfalls in knowledge can be overcome. In this specific case, Stage Four Mobilization has occurred previously and there are lessons that can be captured. Knowledge Management holds one key to overcoming the lack of literature on Stage Four Mobilization. In concert with Knowledge Management to overcome shortfalls in knowledge will be the employment of effective leadership to forestall periods of

¹¹¹ Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.2, 45.

organizational shock. Effective leadership and the presence of professional military leadership will be key factors in how effective Stage Four Mobilization will be in the Australian Army. To further explore these concepts the literature review will now explore both concepts in more detail.

Knowledge Management and Leadership Theory

Knowledge Management

Knowledge Management is a relatively new field of study but one that has arguably been in existence since the first cave paintings were used to record hunting practices. Knowledge Management recognizes that leveraging already accumulated knowledge is the most beneficial way in which organizations can increase their competitive advantage.¹¹² In essence, Knowledge Management deals with the intellectual capital that is contained within a workforce and how it is trained, maintained, and then utilised. This statement, however, does not define Knowledge Management. So, what then is Knowledge Management, what are the different types of knowledge and how does it provide competitive advantage?

Knowledge Management has its roots in post-war America of the 1950s. The introduction of the GI Bill and the scientific advancements from the Second World War produced a workforce who harbored vast amounts of knowledge. In 1959 the term knowledge worker was coined by Peter Drucker.¹¹³ He explained that, due to higher

¹¹² Carl Frappaloro, *Knowledge Management* (Southern Gate Chichester: Capstone Publishing Ltd., 2006), 3.

¹¹³ Peter Drucker, *Landmarks of Tomorrow* (New York: Harper Collins, 1957), 67.

levels of education, workers had an unprecedented ability to learn and then apply theoretical and analytical knowledge. In 1966, Michael Polanyi provided the pre-eminent explanation on knowledge and provided definitions on the two types of knowledge: explicit and tacit knowledge.¹¹⁴ By the 1990s Knowledge Management had become mainstream in the business world and an academic discipline. Both academia and the corporate world had recognized the importance of Knowledge Management and how it contributed towards competitive advantage.

Based on the literature, defining Knowledge Management would appear to be a difficult prospect. It includes aspects of technology, to manage and enable the passage of information. Effective leadership is critical to ensuring Knowledge Management is incorporated and applied with strategic direction. And it requires a culture that is based in collectively sharing and thinking about problems. There are a multitude of definitions depending upon the literature being read. Some of those definitions are:

Knowledge management is the leveraging of collective wisdom to increase responsiveness and innovation.¹¹⁵

Knowledge management is the systematic, explicit, and deliberate building, renewal, and application of knowledge to maximize an enterprise's knowledge-related effectiveness and returns from its knowledge assets.

Knowledge management is getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time so they can make the best decision.

¹¹⁴ Frappalolo, *Knowledge Management*, 26.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 8.

Knowledge management is the formalization of and access to experience, knowledge, and expertise that create new capabilities, enable superior performance, encourage innovation, and enhance value.¹¹⁶

In relation to this thesis, the fourth definition is more conducive to understanding the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization in the Australian Army. This is the definition that will be carried forward throughout this thesis.

Supporting Knowledge Management are the two underlying typologies of knowledge itself. The two types of knowledge are explicit and tacit. Knowledge can be classified according to its complexity based on a continuum from explicit to tacit. Explicit knowledge is knowledge that is articulated in formal language and can be easily transmitted to others.¹¹⁷ Conversely, tacit knowledge is knowledge that is imbedded in individual experience and involves intangible factors such as beliefs, instincts, and values.¹¹⁸ Understanding explicit and tacit knowledge are key factors in ensuring an organization has the expertise to perform at a superior level.

Organizations such as the Australian Defence Force use core documents such as doctrine to store data, techniques, and procedures. The production of doctrine, for the military, is the organizations way of capturing and recording explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be a range of data, text, sounds, and images that can be expressed to learners through books, lessons, oral briefs, or physical examples. One of the issues

¹¹⁶ Jay Liebowitz, *Knowledge Management Handbook* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999), 1-6.

¹¹⁷ Frappalolo, *Knowledge Management*, 91.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 99.

however with explicit knowledge is its sheer volume. The study of explicit knowledge enables people to understand their role and function within in an organization, but it doesn't provide them the intuitive ability to perform those roles and functions.

Tacit knowledge is gained through the experiences of individuals and builds upon foundations in explicit knowledge. One of the fundamental components of tacit knowledge is that it is difficult to translate into an explicit form. An example of this is riding a bicycle; people learn how to do it but it is incredibly difficult to explicitly explain how to achieve balance before doing it. Because of this reason tacit knowledge is acquired through a process of socialization where an individual learns skills through immersion.¹¹⁹ As another example, despite military schools teaching the theory, component parts, and mechanics of a platoon attack students only have a rudimentary capacity to perform the function. This is because the student lacks immersion in the skill being performed. Only through continual immersion will the student be able to build their tacit knowledge and achieve cognition.

Cognition is the cumulative impact of both explicit and tacit knowledge. Cognition is the linkage between these two types of knowledge and how an individual links that knowledge to a process.¹²⁰ The process being referred to is that of how an individual makes a decision based on their available knowledge and their application of that knowledge in each situation. Figure 2 graphically depicts how knowledge leads to cognition using the building blocks of explicit and tacit knowledge. In essence, cognition

¹¹⁹ Harry Collins, *Tacit and Explicit Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 90.

¹²⁰ Frappalolo, *Knowledge Management*, 21.

is achieved through the application of accumulated experiences to determine the best outcome to a threat or an opportunity. Therefore, individuals who are capable of cognition in their professions provide their organization a competitive advantage.

Organizations that understand and incorporate Knowledge Management into their developmental models are attempting to gain a competitive advantage over their adversaries. People who can achieve cognition in their professional field provide their organization with greater capacity to deal with threats, make superior decisions and are able to seize opportunities. Knowledge Management is an essential element to achieving organizational performance.




Figure 2. Knowledge Leading to Cognition

Source: Created by author.

Leadership Theory

Leadership theory is not a new field of study however it still commands a powerful position as a research field and attracts constant global attention. Academic research is used to further codify leadership and how it influences organizational performance, relationships, and structures. Whilst leadership has been a constant aspect of life from primal to civilized times, the effort to provide substantial leadership theories wasn't undertaken until the early 19th century.

Since the 1840s there have been four eras of leadership theory.¹²¹ They represent the way in which the academic community has progressively interrogated leadership as a social phenomenon. The four eras of leadership theory are:

1. Trait Era (1840s-1940s). Focused on the Great Man and Trait theories.
2. Behavioral Era (1940s-1960s). Focused on the actions and skills of leaders.
3. Situational Era (1960s-1990s). Focused on Contingent and Situational theories.
4. New Leadership Era (1990s-today). Focused on Transactional & Transformational theories.

Initially, leadership theories were focused on the inherent skills and capabilities of a leader. The core belief of the Great Man theory is that leaders are born and not made.¹²² During this period the prevailing belief was that few people possessed the inherent skills

¹²¹ Sihame Benmire and Moyosolu Agboola, "Evolution of Leadership Theory," *BJM Leader* (2021): 3-5, <https://bmjleader.bmj.com/content/leader/early/2021/01/08/leader-2020-000296.full.pdf>.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 3.

to be successful leaders. Historical figures such as Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon were espoused to be natural born leaders with characteristics that permitted them to lead individuals successfully. Eventually, this gave way to theorists focusing on the individual traits being exhibited rather than the man. Theorists tried to develop lists of traits that produced perfect leadership. However, by the late 1940s a single list of leadership traits to predict success ultimately proved elusive.

However, this era did produce an understanding of the three skills approach. Here, it was important for leaders to have skills spanning technical, human, and conceptual domains.¹²³ The main goal of the research was to explain the underlying elements of a leader's effective performance. Figure 3 demonstrates the three components of the skills model. Note how cognitive ability and knowledge link to provide effective problem solving and performing.

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Figure 3. Three Components of the Skills Model

Source: Peter Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 8th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2018), 47.

¹²³ Peter Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 8th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2018), 47.

Following trait theory were the concepts relating to behavioral leadership. Under this approach theorists focused on the behaviour of the leader and emphasized their personality characteristics. It suggests that leaders engage in two primary types of behaviors: task behaviors and relationship behaviors. How leaders use these two behaviors to influence others is the focus of the behavioral approach.¹²⁴ A criticism of this approach is that despite nearly 20 years of research it was unable to identify a universal style of leadership that could be effective in almost every situation. The research did however strengthen the understanding that regardless of leadership position, leaders are required to balance tasks and relationships to be effective and successful in any given situation.

By the late 1960s leadership theory had progressed to understanding leadership in situations. The principle of the situational approach is that different styles of leadership are required in different situations.¹²⁵ From this theoretical approach, leaders must be able to adapt their leadership style based on the situation they find themselves in. It also requires a leader to match their style to the competence and commitment of their subordinates. Situational leadership involves both *directive* and *supportive* behaviors. Directive behaviors are those that provide direction, tasks, and timelines; they can sometimes be expressed through one-way communication. Supportive behaviors involve two-way communication and include replies that show both social and emotional support. Through these behaviors, leaders can determine if they should use leadership styles

¹²⁴ Northouse, *Leadership*, 91.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 95.

ranging from directing (high directive and low supportive behavior), coaching (high directive and high supportive behavior), supporting (high supportive and low directive behavior), and delegating (low supportive and low directive behavior).¹²⁶

Situational based leadership theory also requires leaders to understand the competence and commitment of their followers. By understanding where their followers sit on this scale, leaders can determine which style to employ.¹²⁷ For example, if followers are low in commitment and low in competence situational leadership theory recommends leaders to use a directive style. In this way situational leadership is prescriptive and different from the two previous eras which were descriptive.

Finally, the New Era of leadership theory focusses on transactional and transformational characteristics. This approach was developed in the late 1980s and entered mainstream circulation in the early 1990s. It was developed in response to a complex and challenging world that was rapidly changing as globalization accelerated.¹²⁸ This theory was valuable as it gave methods to help deal with the fast pace of change and increasing complexity of problems that organizations were being confronted with.

Transformational leadership assists leaders in any process that changes or transforms people. It is primarily focused on the underlying values, ethics, standards, goals and emotions of individuals and groups to influence them to achieve more than

¹²⁶ Northouse, *Leadership*, 97.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹²⁸ Benmire and Agboola, “Evolution of Leadership Theory,” 4.

what is usually expected of them.¹²⁹ Within this model, leaders focus on fulfilling the needs of their followers, encouraging creativity, and inspiring a collective vision to achieve organizational performance. As a result, transformational leadership often incorporates elements visionary or charismatic leadership.

Conversely, transactional leadership relies on the ability for leaders to motivate their followers through authority. This approach focuses on the exchanges that occur between leaders and their followers. Typically, the leader will exchange rewards for performance and punishments for those who do not.¹³⁰ Transactional leadership exchanges are very common. They are frequently found in established organizations that have clearly defined structures and roles—these reinforce the status quo and support a transactional approach.¹³¹ The primary difference between transactional and transformational leadership is that transactional leaders do not focus on the needs of followers or on their personal development but rather on meeting assigned objectives.

The New Era of leadership focuses on one of the most encompassing approaches to leadership (transformational leadership). This era of leadership theory research has been focused on understanding how certain leaders are able to inspire followers to accomplish set objectives.¹³² Transformational leaders are recognized as change agents than can exert great influence upon followers. However, followers must also be conscious

¹²⁹ Northouse, *Leadership*, 164.

¹³⁰ Benmire and Agboola, “Evolution of Leadership Theory,” 4.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Northouse, *Leadership*, 193.

of the negative impacts of a transformational leader's influence. History is replete with examples of visionary or charismatic leaders who have transformed followers to execute nefarious or immoral actions.

Transformational leadership has gained emphasis in the modern era as change has occurring more frequently and at an increased pace. However, most leaders will accept their organizations as they find them and lead them as they are.¹³³ Due to this, organizations that have lost their ability, or desire, to change pay a heavy price when they are finally forced to change through crisis.¹³⁴ These dynamics highlight that leaders must be comfortable with the idea of change and have the capability to lead their organization through change. Therefore, understanding what leadership styles successfully support leading in a culture of change is relevant and critical in the modern era.

Until recently, there have been very few qualitative studies conducted to demonstrate what leadership styles generate positive results on their related organization. In 2000, a major qualitative study was undertaken by the consulting firm Hay/McBer which involved 3,871 executives globally and identified six different leadership styles.¹³⁵ The six leadership styles identified were:

Coercive—the leader demands compliance

Authoritative—the leader mobilizes people toward a vision

¹³³ John Gardner, *On Leadership* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 122.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 123.

¹³⁵ Daniel Goleman, *Leadership That Gets Results*, Harvard Business Review Classics (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2017), 3, <https://search-ebscohost-com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e076mww&AN=1798773&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

Affiliative—the leader creates harmony and builds emotional bonds

Democratic—the leader forges consensus through participation

Pacesetter—the leader sets high standards for performance

Coaching—the leader develops people for the future.¹³⁶

Of interest from the research was that leaders regularly switched between these leadership styles and used their emotional intelligence to determine which style fit the scenario they faced. All the leadership styles identified were able to influence and motivate followers in their respective organizations. However, when considering leading through change, the styles of coercive and pacesetter had negative impacts on a leader's ability to generate and maintain change.¹³⁷ For current leaders, the understanding of which leadership styles support change, and the theories of transformational leadership are imperative. Without this knowledge, leaders, and organizations are at a disadvantage to deal with the rapidly changing environment they face.

Leadership theory has progressed through four broad theoretical eras over the last two centuries. Reviewing how trait, behavioral and situational leadership theories have developed into the New Era theories provides an effective roadmap to understanding how leadership is currently viewed by the academic community. It also provides a lens through which to understand how organizations can leverage leadership to improve their organizational effectiveness in periods of change through the correct use of the discussed leadership styles.

¹³⁶ Goleman, *Leadership That Gets Results*, 5; Michael Fullen, *Leading in a Culture of Change* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001), 35.

¹³⁷ Goleman, *Leadership That Gets Results*, 68.

Summary

This chapter has reviewed key literature relating to Stage Four Mobilization in an Australian context. The purpose of this chapter was to identify the key themes and enduring issues as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership in the Australian Army under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. The review focused on three topic areas: the first, a chronological review of Australia's mobilization in both the World Wars, the second, a look at contemporary views of mobilization in Australia and finally, Knowledge Management and Leadership Theory.

The chronological review of Australia's mobilization during the World Wars helped to identify enduring issues under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. Whilst the review touched on issues of equipment and supply the purpose of this thesis is to identify the enduring issues as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership under mobilization. Based on the review of WWI and WWII the following issues were identified that were common to both conflicts:

1. Where does the Army draw personnel from to constitute an expeditionary force? In both wars the government and the military struggled to balance where they would draw personnel from. The policy of precluding militia service outside of Australia restricted their use. The determination to keep permanent officers within Australia to fill key staff appointments further reduced personnel availability. Finally, the number of raw recruits through volunteer efforts had to be carefully managed so as not to send an entirely green force offshore.

2. Who does the Army get to command its forces? In both wars the Army opted for prioritizing militia officers over permanent officers to lead the expeditionary units.

Permanent officers were retained in Australia to organize and maintain key staff roles and the military districts responsible for militia training. Also, in both wars, retired officers and members on the inactive lists were brought back into service to account for leadership shortfalls. This created great tension and animosity amongst officers of the permanent force.

3. How does the army train professional military leaders? Throughout both wars the preponderance of officers and NCOs were drawn from the pre-existing militia. Their knowledge of training, operations, and discipline was gained over years of part-time service. It was service in the militia that allowed personnel to develop the tacit knowledge required of them to gain cognition in the military art. It's important to note that as war became more technical the requirement for more formalized education was identified; this led to the necessity for centralized officer training. Lord Kitchener's report in 1911 was the driving force to create the Royal Military College—Duntroon to rectify this shortfall.

4. What Army organizational structure is required to meet the governments objectives? At the outbreak of both wars, overseas service had not been a part of governmental planning—defense policy was focused only on the physical defense of Australia. The requirement to send large forces was somewhat of a surprise to the governments of the day and the military who hastily worked to achieve their government's direction. Fortunately, a joint planning team, initiated by the defense minister in 1912, determined that Australia could raise and support a combined division. This work directly contributed towards Australia sending the 1st AIF and then the 2nd

AIF with a strength of 20,000 personnel based off one infantry division and supporting units.

5. How long does the Army need to train its mobilized forces before deployment?

In both wars the expeditionary forces, with new recruits, were raised and dispatched overseas within six and eight weeks respectively. The comments of British senior leadership at the 1937 Imperial Conference ring true in that—“divisions ready to serve in the main theatre as soon as war broke out would be worth far more than an offer to raise, train, and arm divisions for later operations...”¹³⁸

The review of contemporary views on mobilization in Australia highlight several key shortfalls and interesting topics of debate. The identified shortfalls were in current literature that deals specifically with how the Australian Army might mobilize under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. The hypothetical scenarios and requirements are not addressed by academic or military writings. Furthermore, the Australian Defence Force is currently lacking doctrine that describes to its own forces their roles or processes under Stage Four Mobilization. These shortfalls are currently being explored by the establishment of a directorate within the Force Design Division of the Vice-Chief of Defense Force Group. Whilst this group will be addressing how Defense as whole responds to Stage Four Mobilization it is likely that subordinate elements would need to be established within the single services (Army, Navy, Air Force) to address the specifics of how each service would contribute towards mobilization.

¹³⁸ Long, *To Benghazi*, 21.

The current literature raised two topics of debate that are crucial to understanding the issues related to sustaining professional military leadership in the Australian Army.

They are:

1. The concept of the Australian Army as a glass cannon. This concept speaks to the issues of what Army organizational structure is required to meet the governments objectives? and how long does the Army need to train its mobilized forces before deployment? It also raises the issue of sustainment and what forces could be maintained for a protracted period during major combat.

2. The call for open debate about the need of a Universal Service Scheme in Australia. This concept speaks to the issues of Where does the Army draw personnel from to constitute an expeditionary force? Who does the Army get to command its force?, and How does the army train professional military leaders?.

The final topic of Knowledge Management and Leadership Theory revealed several key insights. The literature explained that Knowledge Management is the formalization of and access to experience, knowledge, and expertise that creates new capabilities, enable superior performance, encourage innovation, and enhance value.¹³⁹ Critically, the literature revealed that whilst explicit knowledge is easy to accumulate and impart the difficulty lies with how individuals gain and retain tacit knowledge. The accumulation of tacit knowledge is achieved through immersion in an environment and based upon practicing the skill. Only once an individual can combine explicit and tacit knowledge can they achieve cognition. In relation to professional military leadership this

¹³⁹ Liebowitz, *Knowledge Management Handbook*, 1-6.

has significant impacts. It implies that whilst explicit knowledge of the military can be imparted relatively quickly through training courses the ability to develop tacit knowledge only comes with time and the opportunities to practice those skills. When considering Stage Four Mobilization, and a rapid force expansion, this indicates that personnel with tacit knowledge of military operations will be in high demand and low supply.

The review of leadership theory complimented the information gained on Knowledge Management. Most critically, the literature revealed that during periods of transformation specific styles of leadership were more suited than others. In the context of mobilization, and the raising of new units, the theory indicated that leaders with the ability to use styles other than pacesetting or coercion would be more successful in navigating change.

This chapter has reviewed key literature relating to Stage Four Mobilization in an Australian context. The purpose of this chapter was to identify the key themes and issues as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership in the Australian Army under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. The issues and themes identified throughout this chapter will support the chosen research methodology and the subsequent analysis and drawing of conclusions. They will form the basis of analysis to understand whether the issues identified are in fact enduring or were specific to historical conflicts.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Background

The purpose of this thesis is to determine what enduring issues currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following Stage Four Mobilization for LSCO. The exploration of these enduring issues is significant as it will assist the Australian Army in understanding shortfalls in its current doctrine and policies relating to both command and management, and collective training. It will also help prevent the likelihood of organizational shock, should Stage Four Mobilization be required. Chapter 1 introduced a definition for professional military leadership being the combination of technical skills, theoretical knowledge, and practical experiences which allow someone the ability to lead a military organization (of any size) to effectively employ and integrate all available means to achieve their objectives. Chapter 1 also provided an overview of mobilization in Australia and explained how the current deterioration in the global security landscape has parallels to that of the 1930s. It emphasized that the likelihood of large-scale combat is now more likely in the Indo-Pacific region placing greater importance on understanding Stage Four Mobilization and the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership.

Chapter 2 reviewed existing research on The World Wars: Issues relating to mobilization, contemporary views on mobilization within Australia, and Knowledge Management and Leadership theory. From the review in Chapter 2, common issues and themes were able to be drawn out that will aid with the analysis in this thesis. The literature review concluded that Stage Four Mobilization has occurred twice in Australia

with common issues pertaining to both conflicts. Lessons from these conflicts do not appear to have been integrated into governmental policy or defense doctrine and planning.

Research Methodology

This thesis will use a qualitative research methodology which is based on a futuristic case study to answer the primary research question: What enduring issues currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following stage four mobilization for LSCO. The research will be broken into two parts.

Stage Four Mobilization–Future Fictional Intelligence Scenario

The first section will identify a future scenario, that has been developed by a contemporary fictional intelligence (FICINT) author/s, that might require Australia to enter Stage Four Mobilization. This scenario provides a plausible, feasible, and professionally published potential for future war that can be effectively used as a case study.

Stage Four Mobilization–Issues and Risks

The second section will use the identified FICINT scenario to analyze the enduring issues that are present when Australia enters Stage Four Mobilization. Entering Stage Four Mobilization will be premised upon the Australian Governments Strategic Defense Objective (SDO) of “...respond[ing] with credible military force, when

required.”¹⁴⁰ This will allow for a qualitative review of Army’s enduring issues in sustaining professional military leadership when trying to meet the identified mobilization scenario. This section uses three evaluation criteria to identify what enduring issues as they relate to professional military leadership are present under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. In this way, the analysis will confirm what issues are genuinely enduring based on historical precedent and future possibility. Figure 4 highlights the three selected evaluation criteria.




Figure 4. Chosen Evaluation Criteria

Source: Created by author.

¹⁴⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, 2020 *Department of Defence Strategic Update*, 25.

A short explanation of each criteria is listed below:

Doctrine and Training—To what extent does current Australian Defence Force doctrine support the development and placement of new leadership under Stage Four Mobilization conditions and support/explain the amount of time it takes to grow new professional military leadership and provide tacit experiences?

Personnel and Leadership—The extent to which there is there sufficient access to professional military leadership to staff the mobilized units.

Scalability—The extent to which there are possibilities to expand beyond the current force structure and provide professional military leadership to the mobilized force.

It should be noted that other evaluation criteria were considered prior to selecting those indicated in Figure 4. Other criteria considered were the three validity criteria (feasible, acceptable, suitable) as explained in United States Joint Doctrine,¹⁴¹ and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's¹⁴² six criteria used to determine the merit, or worth, of an activity (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability).

The three chosen evaluation criteria have been selected as they more closely align with the Australian Defence Force's Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC). The FIC is designed to encompass all the inputs that enable the effective and ongoing generation of

¹⁴¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), III-41.

¹⁴² Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). *Applying Evaluation Criteria Thoughtfully* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1787/543e84ed-en>.

Defense capabilities.¹⁴³ For United States readers, the Australian concept of FIC is similar the DOTMLPF-P framework which analyzes capabilities within the Joint Capability Integration and Development Systems.

The analysis conducted in the next chapter, Chapter 4, will allow the enduring issues, as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization, to be drawn out for conclusion in Chapter 5.

¹⁴³ Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.2, 24.

CHAPTER 4

DATA FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this research is to understand Stage Four Mobilization (the mobilization of the entire nation) in Australia and the enduring issues it places upon the Australian Army.¹⁴⁴ Whilst there is the possibility to identify a myriad of enduring issues the study will focus upon those that relate to sustaining professional military leadership in a mobilized force. The success of the Australian Army, on any future battlefield, will be greatly influenced by the nation's ability to sustain professional military leadership across those mobilized forces. Sustaining professional military leadership broadly includes the Army's access to trained personnel and its ability to train new personnel for an expanded force. The technologically congested and lethal current operating environment only emphasizes the importance of sustaining professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization.

The exploration of the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership will be relevant regardless of the size of expansion. The identification of enduring issues is intended to aid both current and future planners in understanding friction points associated with Australia undertaking Stage Four Mobilization. These enduring friction points could also be utilised to inform the current Australian Defence

¹⁴⁴ Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.2, 45.

Force review into mobilization¹⁴⁵ and the Army's Training Transformation towards a Future Ready Training System.¹⁴⁶

To do this, the chapter is broken into two parts. The first part will provide a summary of a published future intelligence scenario that would require Australia to mobilize. The scenario will act as the case study in which to analyse what issues, relating to Stage Four Mobilization and sustaining professional military leadership, are present within an Australian Army context.

The second part of this chapter will use three evaluation criteria explained in Chapter 3 to analyse the case study. This analysis will then be used to answer the primary and secondary research questions of:

1. Primary—What enduring issues currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following stage four mobilization for LSCO?
2. Secondary—What issues does mobilization place on current leadership?
3. Secondary—What issues, relating to sustaining professional military leadership, has Stage Four Mobilization placed upon the Australian Army in the past?
4. Secondary—What issues are present within current literature, doctrine, or policy?

¹⁴⁵ Colonel James Davis, from the Office of the Chief of Army, informed the author that a 2-year review was commenced in mid-2020 into mobilization. This review is due to incorporate not just military planners but a whole of government approach to the issues that might arise under Stage 4 Mobilization.

¹⁴⁶ Australian Defence Force, Australian Army, *The Future Ready Training System*, 2-12.

With the analysis of the case study complete the thesis will be able then transition to Chapter 5–Summary and Conclusions.

Future Intelligence Scenario–World War 4 Case Study–The Chinese Civil War

In 2016 Captain Douglas Alan Cohn, USA (Ret.), published nine future conflict scenarios in his book, *WW4*. His scenario, entitled *The Chinese Civil War* has been selected as the futuristic case study for this thesis. It has been selected for three key reasons. They are:

1. The scenario specifically singles out the involvement of Australia and Australian forces in the conflict,
2. The scenario would require Australia to enter Stage Four Mobilization, and
3. Involvement in the conflict conforms with Australia’s current Strategic Defense Objectives to employ military power to shape the strategic environment, to deter actions against Australia’s interests, and to respond with credible force when required.

The following is a summary of *The Chinese Civil War* as described by Cohn.¹⁴⁷ The primary threat to China comes from internal instability. The threat of Han Chinese fighting Han Chinese due to issues surrounding representation, economic growth and authoritarianism are all too real. To emphasize this point, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is made up of 83 million members which makes up less than 6 percent of China’s population (1.4 billion).¹⁴⁸ As China’s economic growth slows, public discontent rises as the access to goods becomes more difficult and the cost of living more expensive. As the

¹⁴⁷ Douglas Alan Cohn, *World War 4* (Guilford: Lyons Press, 2016), 82-97.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 84.

CCP continues to refuse to permit intellectual freedom, democratic participation, governmental transparency, and a reliable rule of law their market economy is further weakened. These conditions result in a revolt of the urban haves (with democratic sympathies) against the more rural have nots (with communist sympathies).

Fighting between the Nationalists and Communists commences in the capitol, Beijing, and in the major economic hubs along the eastern seaboard. Given that 120 nations have China as their primary export partner, world trade is severely impacted and the conflict is brought to the forefront of the global media and the global population.¹⁴⁹ With Communist China fighting for its continued existence its ally, North Korea, decides to send 500,000 troops to their aid. Despite both Nationalists and Communists having access to nuclear weapons, neither side is willing to use them on Chinese soil. As the fighting intensifies world support for the Nationalists grows. The United States starts to put together a coalition to support the Nationalist movement in China.

A coalition (The Allies), based on the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and the Philippines, mobilize to support the Nationalists. Given the disruption to world trade, and that most Nationalists are from urban centers, the Allies start by occupying major commercial cities on the eastern seaboard. Noting that many of these are mega-cities the Allies are required to send large numbers of troops to effectively secure them. The US, conscious of North Korea's involvement, also reinforces the DMZ with available Allied troops.

¹⁴⁹ "China's booming foreign trade brings benefits to the world," China International Import Expo, March 24, 2021, <https://www.cii.org/zbh/en/news/exhibition/news/20210324/27370.html>.

In an unexpected move, Russia commences a ground invasion of Manchuria and North Korea. This is reminiscent of their actions at the end of World War II. To take pressure off the Nationalists in central China and the occupied commercial hubs, the US and coalition partners take advantage of the Russian actions and launch an offensive into North Korea. Concurrently, Vietnam in a chance to rid itself of Communist Chinese government interference launches an attack from the south.

Threatened with total defeat the Chinese Communists are beset by an internal coup-d'état in which a new social democrat party emerges. After vicious fighting across China the Nationalists emerge victorious; they agree to form a government in which the new social democrats have a minority stake. As the old Communist China gives way to a new Democratic China much care must be applied lest the result be like Russia's attempts at democracy following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 which is in stark comparison to Japan's transition from authoritarianism to democracy following World War II.

Australia: A Possible Response

The purpose for providing a possible response to the previous section is not to explain how Australia would react. In contrast, it is to demonstrate the scale of professional military leadership required to field a force under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. In this way, the enduring issues faced by the Australian Army will become more apparent and support the analysis conducted throughout each of the following evaluation criteria.

In response to the Chinese Civil War the Allies request Australia and New Zealand to contribute a combined ANZAC Corps. This request is supported by both governments and requires both nations to undergo Stage Four Mobilization. Australia

agrees to provide a Corps Headquarters, 2x Combat Divisions, 1x Combat Support Division, whilst the New Zealanders provide the final Combat Division.

The Australian Army decides, in contrast to its WWI and WWII experience, to keep the Army Reserve for use in Australia and deploy the permanent force. Based on the Army's current order of battle it can immediately provide the Allies with one Combat Division and requires mobilizing the remaining forces from the citizen base of Australia. Based on historical precedent, Australia expects to mobilize the remaining forces within six to nine months.¹⁵⁰ Table 1 depicts the numbers of officers required to staff the mobilized forces and those currently available within Australia. Of note is that the Australian Army would experience shortages of professional military leadership immediately at the critical ranks of lieutenant and captain.

It is important to note at this point that this section has been specifically designed to highlight the scale of professional military leadership required to address a Stage Four Mobilization event. It is not within the remit of this thesis to address the additional requirements of mobilization such as equipment, recruitment, or the necessary government policies to support such actions. What is crucial however, is understanding the Australian Army's capacity to provide and sustain professional military leadership to the mobilized force.

¹⁵⁰ By July 1940 the three [expeditionary] divisions had the necessary enlistments and the Army had received an additional 50,000 enlistees with which they could fill an additional two divisions at their discretion (as explained by Jeffrey Grey in *A Military History of Australia*, 148).

Table 1. Numbers of Officers Required for Mobilization					
	Corps HQ	Combat Division x2	Sustainment Division	Available permanent force officers	Deficit/ Surplus officers after mobilization
LTGEN	1	0	0	4	+3
MAJ GEN	2	2	1	21	+15
BRIG	5	12	6	61 ¹⁵¹	+38
COL	16	6	3	c190	+165
LTCOL	38	120	60	c700	+482
MAJ	36	800	400	c1800	+564
CAPT	12	1600	800	c1700	-712
LT	0 ¹⁵²	1300 ¹⁵³	650 ¹⁵⁴	c950 ¹⁵⁵	-1000

Source: Created by author.

With the China Civil War case study and Australia's possible response explained it's now possible to analyse both events. This will be achieved using the three chosen evaluation criteria outlined in the Chapter 3 Methodology.

¹⁵¹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 20-21*, 126.

¹⁵² Steven Aftergood, "US Army Table of Organization and Equipment: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Corps," Federation of American Scientists, 2000, <https://man.fas.org/dod-101/army/unit/toe/52401L100.htm>.

¹⁵³ These number are an amalgamation of information drawn from the United States Army Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS) and drawn from the authors experience as the Acting Deputy Commander of the Australian 7th Combat Brigade. Thanks to CAPT V. Rosendale, US Army, Adjutant General Branch, for supporting my analysis.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ These numbers are based on the authors personnel knowledge of the Australian Army's Total Workforce numbers across separate rank bands.

Stage Four Mobilization–Issues and Risks

This section will use three evaluation criteria to draw out the issues and risks related to sustaining professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. This will then permit the research to identify the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership.




Figure 5. Chosen Evaluation Criteria

Source: Created by author.

Doctrine and Training

The purpose of this evaluation criteria is to understand to what extent current Australian Defence Force doctrine supports the development and placement of new leadership under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. It is also to understand to what extent doctrine supports/explains the amount of time it takes to grow new professional

military leadership and provide tacit experiences. This evaluation criterion is important as it supports the primary research questions and all secondary research questions.

The literature review provided an overview of the current doctrine and policy available to the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Army. The review demonstrated that Australia has a critical shortage in doctrine as it relates to Stage Four Mobilization. Specifically, the only doctrine to mention Stage Four Mobilization (ADDP 00.2, *Preparedness and Mobilization*) is at the Defense Force level and doesn't provide direction or processes to support its enactment. In this way, Australian doctrine fails to support, direct, or guide the development and placement of new leadership under Stage Four Mobilization.

A lack of doctrine in relation to mobilization is not a new phenomenon for the Australian Army. During both World War I and World War II the Australian Army mobilized without clear publications to support their actions. During both wars, doctrine did not support staff planners in understanding how they were to raise new units, who was to lead those units, and how they would train personnel to fill leadership positions. As a result of limited mobilization doctrine, tensions existed between the permanent forces and those of the militia (reserve forces). These tensions existed as permanent forces were primarily kept in Australia to maintain staff functions and provide the nucleus of training staff for the newly mobilized units. In both wars it appears that the permanent forces were surprised by these decisions and as a result animosity grew. The risk for Australia is that given its lack of doctrine dealing with how mobilization occurs, and where personnel are placed, it is possible that the issues of World War I and II will repeat themselves.

Critically, the literature review also reveals a current doctrinal shortfall in explaining how new professional military leaders are trained and the time it takes to ready them for use across a mobilized force. Historically, Australia was able to draw on its militia force whom had at least some tacit experiences in military maneuvers and the requirements it placed on those personnel in positions of leadership. Whilst this was most relevant to the World War I experience it was also, albeit to a lesser extent, true of the Australian experience in World War II. To make up for this shortfall in the training of new personnel for leadership positions the armies of both wars drew heavily on promoting soldiers from the ranks who had built tacit experiences through initial service.¹⁵⁶ As early as World War I, the lack of officers and the inability to train new officers was noted as a critical shortfall in military planning.¹⁵⁷ Despite being over 100 years old, it would appear this issue is yet to be resolved. This issue is likely to be compounded by the Australian Army's ability to only call on a small reserve force component.

To account for this low number of reserve forces, ADDP 00.2 mentions that under Stage Four Mobilization conditions it is likely that Australia will introduce some form of mandatory service.¹⁵⁸ This is presumably to account for the rapid expansion of the Army and a belief that Australians will not volunteer for service on the scale at which they did for World War I and World War II. Despite the statement that rapid expansion and

¹⁵⁶ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 86.

¹⁵⁷ Bean, *The Story of ANZAC*, 48.

¹⁵⁸ Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.2, 45.

mandatory service is likely, the Australian Army doctrine for training makes no reference to such conditions or how it would likely have to respond.¹⁵⁹ This lack of preparation for mobilization within Australian Army doctrine increases the risk that it will be slow to provide and sustain the necessary levels of professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization conditions.

The Australian Army's training doctrine does indicate that knowledge management is fundamental to Army's ability to validate, manage, update, and distribute knowledge.¹⁶⁰ It fails however to explain the differences in explicit and tacit knowledge and how long professional military leaders need to develop proficiency. This is highly relevant as it directly impacts how long it takes to train professional military leaders to sustain a mobilized force. Without stating how long it takes to train personnel for roles/positions as NCOs or Officers it is difficult to understand how rapidly, or how slowly, mobilized forces can be brought into action. Furthermore, limited access to facilities to train an expanded number of trainees will only compound the difficulties of sustaining professional military leadership in the mobilized force.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, Land Warfare Publication-General 7-0-1, *The Conduct of Training-Interim* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2015).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 94.

¹⁶¹ Australia trains its Officers through courses run by the Royal Military College-Duntroon. The college is limited, in terms of throughput, by its current access to accommodation for the trainees. To the authors knowledge, there is no plan to expand these facilities or plans that articulate alternate locations to train officers during Stage Four Mobilization.

The current Australian Defence Force and Australian Army doctrine are singularly focused on only training current force structures. There is very limited acknowledgement of the issues surrounding mobilization or how the Australian Army would sustain professional military leadership in a mobilized force. As a result, the Army carries a large amount of risk when considering Stage Four Mobilization. Under the current construct of doctrine and training the Army would be forced to relearn fundamental lessons, write doctrine to support its mobilization, and greatly alter and expand its training to provide a mobilized force with professional military leadership.

It must be noted that it is possible that the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Army hold doctrine, or plans, for Stage Four Mobilization at a higher security level than the author currently holds or has access to. The possibility of doctrine existing that contains answers to the issues highlighted in this section is assessed to be unlikely. This assessment is based on historical precedent for the rapid creation of mobilization doctrine (the Commonwealth War Book of 1939), the lack of consideration in base doctrine publications towards Stage Four Mobilization, and the Vice Chief of Defense's activation of a two-year review into mobilization.

This evaluation criteria has highlighted key shortfalls in mobilization doctrine and the necessary minimum training standards to achieve war-time explicit and tacit knowledge requirements. It has emphasized that the lack of preparation, in the training and doctrine space, will likely slow the Australian Army's response to a Stage Four Mobilization event. Now, with an understanding of how doctrine and training impacts Stage Four Mobilization it is necessary to understand to what extent the Australian Army has sufficient access to professional military leadership. This is important as personnel

numbers are indicative of the organization's depth in leadership resources (people and their professional military leadership skills). To analyse these factors the next section will address the evaluation criteria of Personnel and Leadership.

Personnel and Leadership

The purpose of this evaluation criterion is to understand the extent to which there is sufficient access to professional military leadership to staff mobilized units. This evaluation criterion supports answering the primary research question and secondary research question one.

Chapter 2 revealed that Australia had poor access to permanent military forces and lacked a deep pool of professional military leaders from which to draw upon for mobilization. As a result of long training times, especially for new junior officers (4 years at the Royal Military College–Duntroon), the Army was forced to promote personnel from the ranks in a bid to sustain professional military leadership across the mobilized force. But does Australia, and the Australian Army, suffer from the same personnel shortages and shortages of professional military leadership as it has historically? It could be argued that the Australian Army, as of 2021, has access to a more significant pool of professional military leadership than it has done previously. Table 2 provides a comparison of the number of personnel available to the Australian Army prior to World War I, World War II and as of 2021.

Table 2. Comparison of Australian Army Numbers, 1914-2021					
	Permanent	Reserve/Militia	Total Force	Australian Population	Total Force as a % of Population
1914	c3,000	c45,000	c48,000 ¹⁶²	4,971,778 ¹⁶³	0.96%
1938	c1600	c35,000	c36,600 ¹⁶⁴	6,935,909 ¹⁶⁵	0.52%
2021	29,631	19,673	49,304 ¹⁶⁶	25,739,256 ¹⁶⁷	0.19%
Change over time	+987%	-56%	+2.7%	+417.7%	-.802%

Source: Created by author.

The data presented in Table 2 is significant as it indicates that as of 2021 the Australian Army has an absolute numerical advantage in permanent professional military leadership than it did prior to both World War mobilization events. At this point, it may be beneficial to re-introduce the definition of professional military leadership. Professional military leadership is defined as the combination of technical skills, theoretical knowledge, and practical experiences which allow someone the ability to lead

¹⁶² Bell, *Australian Army Mobilization in 1914*, 7.

¹⁶³ Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2019,” Cat.no. 3105.0.65.001, ABS Historical Population, 2019, Table 1.1, accessed 14 March 2022, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/historical-population/latest-release>.

¹⁶⁴ Long, *To Benghazi*, 79.

¹⁶⁵ Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2019.”

¹⁶⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 20-21*, 120-121.

¹⁶⁷ Australian Bureau of Statistics, “National, State and Territory Population 2021,” Cat.no.3101.0, ABS Population, September 2021, Data1, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/national-state-and-territory-population/latest-release#data-download>.

a military organization (of any size) to effectively employ and integrate all available means to achieve their objectives. Professional Military Leadership is gained through active involvement in the profession of arms either in the permanent or reserve military forces.

The significance of this absolute numerical advantage in professional military leadership cannot be understated. For example, as of 2021 the Australian Army has 6,506 officers.¹⁶⁸ Of these, approximately 60 personnel hold the rank of Brigadier (One-Star) and approximately 700 hold the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.¹⁶⁹ Disregarding that most of these personnel hold staff appointment across various senior headquarters, it demonstrates that the Australian Army has the residual professional military leadership base to command 60x brigades and 700x battalions across a wide range of military branches. Obviously, this example is extreme and simplistic in nature, however it reveals the significance of increasing the permanent force strength over the last 100 years and the current depth of professional military leadership. It also reveals the extreme shortage in officers and senior non-commissioned officers that would be experienced if these formations were raised. This point has also been highlighted in Table 1 where immediate shortfalls in officers at the ranks of lieutenant and captain were observed.

Whilst the data presented in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrated clear benefits at the senior ranks it is the inverse at lower levels, particularly at the rank of lieutenant. Whilst

¹⁶⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 20-21*, 120.

¹⁶⁹ Numbers are based off information from the Australian Defence People Group–Directorate of Strategic Workforce and Planning Analysis. Exact numbers cannot be provided as they have not been released in any unclassified documents.

increases in the permanent military establishment is beneficial to sustaining professional military leadership at the more senior ranks it does not translate to personnel excesses at the lower ranks. If we assume that there are a minimum of 15 lieutenants per battalion, the Australian Army will need 10,500 of them to fill the 700 battalions previously mentioned. Based on Australia's possible Stage Four Mobilization response to the Chinese Civil War this shortfall was demonstrated (Table 1) and extended to the rank of Captain where further significant shortfalls were seen.

To further highlight this issue, there are approximately 1000 lieutenants in service across the Australian Army with approximately 300 new lieutenants being graduated yearly.¹⁷⁰ Should a Stage Four Mobilization event occur, rapidly training new lieutenants with the required explicit and tacit knowledge required would remain difficult and take a significant amount of time. Supposing that the Royal Military College–Duntroon was able to shorten the course from 18 months to 9 months (a 50 percent reduction) it would still take 27 months to fill the lieutenant shortfalls (1,000) identified in Table 1. These newly graduated lieutenants would still not be sufficient in number to make up for the shortfall in captains or for replacements due to casualties. These shortfalls are of significant concern to the Australian Army and are further exacerbated by its declining representation within the Australian population at large.

Of note from the analysis in Table 2 is the decline in the number of Australian citizens who make up the Australian Defence Force. This decline is not insignificant and

¹⁷⁰ Graduation rates vary based on the size of classes at the Royal Military College–Duntroon. Exact graduation statistics are not available. The approximate number of 300 is based on the authors experience whilst serving at the Royal Military College–Duntroon for two years as an instructor (2013-2014).

is worthy of a brief discussion. Whilst access to professional military leadership amongst the permanent force has improved in absolute terms since 1914 the data suggests that in relative terms the Australian Army is underrepresented as a percentage of society when compared to WWI. The significance of this relative decline is that Australia has a reduced pool of citizens with previous military experience that the Australian Army can draw upon given the declining representation of people in the military vs. the size of the population when contrasted against WWI and WWII. The delta between the size of the military and the total population further contributes towards the Australian Army's difficulty in developing new professional military leadership under mobilization conditions. It is not the place of this thesis to argue or comment on the size of the Australian Army. What is clear from the data however is that the percentage of Australians with military experience is lower now (2021) than it has been since 1914 in relative terms as demonstrated in Table 2. This will have implications for the Australian Army should it enter Stage Four Mobilization and need to draw upon experience across the Australian population.

Based on the analysis, the Australian Army has the potential to sustain professional military leadership at the senior ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and above during Stage Four Mobilization. However, to sustain professional military leadership in the mobilized force the Australian Army is likely to be confronted with two key risks. The first, is the Australian Army's willingness to move senior military staff away from headquarters positions and into line formations to provide the requisite professional military leadership. This would be most keenly felt at the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel. The second, is the Australian Army's ability to develop professional military

leadership in newly recruited officers and NCOs quick enough to match the pace of mobilization. These challenges will require leaders with highly adaptive skill sets and that are comfortable, or at least willing, to lead the organization through a great period of change.

Before moving forward, it is important to note that this section has dealt largely with statistics and the possibilities of providing/ sustaining professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization. What this section must also consider is the personal & transformational side to leadership that will be required to raise, train, and sustain new formations during Stage Four Mobilization. The leadership literature covered in Chapter 2 was clear in that the leadership styles of pacesetting and coercion have negative impacts on followers when change is required. Stage Four Mobilization will be a significant period of change for the military. Therefore, professional military leaders that use the styles of pacesetting and coercion will likely face issues in morale, efficiency, and effectiveness. Whilst officer performance reports do not record if a person displays specific leadership traits¹⁷¹ the Australian Defence Force doctrine also fails to articulate that some leadership traits have negative impacts on organizations and teams given certain situations.

Throughout this section, the analysis has revealed that the Australian Army has an absolute advantage in access to professional military leadership than it did prior to both World Wars. However, whilst it has a depth of professional military leadership experience in the more senior ranks it is hypothesized that it would have significant

¹⁷¹ The author is not suggesting this should occur. Rather that leadership observations are subjective and difficult to attribute correctly or accurately.

shortfalls of professional military leadership at the more junior levels (especially at the lieutenant rank). The generation of professional military leadership at the lower ranks will be a continuing issue for the Australian Army. Despite the same problem existing in World War I it would appear to still be present–unresolved. The Australian Defence Force leadership doctrine emphasizes that different situations require different styles.¹⁷² It however leaves the reader without an understanding that pacesetting and coercive leadership styles negatively impact leaders during period of change.

The risks to the Australian Army from this section are clear. The Australian Army is holding a high level of risk in its access to, and generation of, professional military leadership at the junior officer level. It is holding a low amount of risk in its access to professional military leadership at senior officer levels providing it is willing to transfer roles away from staff or headquarter positions. Finally, the understanding of which leadership styles provide negative outcomes during periods of change poses a low risk to the Australian Army. Based on these risks, it is now important to address scalability and the extent to which there are possibilities for the Australian Army to expand beyond its current force structure and provide professional military leadership to the mobilized force.

¹⁷² Australian Defence Force (ADF), Lessons and Doctrine Directorate, ADF Philosophical Doctrine, 0 Series: Command, *ADF Leadership*, edition 3 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Directorate of Information, Graphics and eResources, Lessons and Doctrine Directorate, 2021), 27.

Scalability

The purpose of this evaluation criterion is to understand the extent to which there are possibilities to expand beyond the current force structure and provide professional military leadership to the mobilized force. This evaluation criterion supports answering the primary research question and secondary research question two.

The literature review revealed that the Australian Army has had the ability in the past (World War I and World War II) to expand beyond its pre-war force structures. However, in both wars the Army was confronted with significant issues in providing professional military leadership to the force and, as a result, drew heavily on promotions from within the ranks to fill these shortfalls.

Based on historical precedent the Australian Army has used two methods of scaling their forces to achieve the requirements of Stage Four Mobilization. They have been:

1. The drawing of volunteers from the permanent and militia/reserve components of the force to field expeditionary units
2. The mass recruitment of citizen soldiers at the entry rank of private

It is undeniable that these methods have worked in raising combat units to achieve the government's objectives. In many cases, however, units were dispatched lacking professional military leadership skills and tacit knowledge in military tactics. An example of this is the 6th Division of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force in World War II. Whilst the division was raised in 6 weeks it could only achieve platoon level training (at best) and required a further 6 months of training once it reached North Africa before it could

be considered combat ready.¹⁷³ Contributing to the lack of professional military leadership was the repeated preference to retain permanent military soldiers and officers within Australia. It is possible that there is a better way for the military to leverage the citizens of Australia and their experience to free up permanent military members for service in mobilized units and thus improve the provision of professional military leadership across the force. The review of World War I and World War II did not reveal a method by which civilians were offered military rank to fill positions within Australia to sustain professional military leadership in the mobilized force. Likewise, current Australian doctrine makes no reference to the ability to provide civilians with temporary rank to leverage their skills under mobilization conditions. The ability to leverage civilian skills, to provide and sustain professional military leadership, would appear to be an issue that will impact scalability now and into the future.

To combat shortages in professional military leadership, the Australian Army has promoted from within the ranks of private soldiers to fill shortfalls in officer appointments. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the reviewed literature did not reveal how this process occurred. Whilst the Australian Army currently has a system for identifying and promoting soldiers or NCOs to officer ranks it is tightly controlled by the personnel agency. To assist with shortfalls in junior officer positions it might be necessary for the Australian Army to consider battlefield promotions under mobilization conditions. The US Army currently makes provisions for such promotions in Army Regulation 601-50:

¹⁷³ Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 151.

Appointment of Temporary Officers in the Army of the United States Upon Mobilization.¹⁷⁴

The concept of professional military leadership can be broken in three fundamental components. Those being professional, military, and of leadership. In terms of skills, it is possible to find some of these components outside of military personnel. Table 3 demonstrates that it is possible for civilians to have experience in at least two of the three aforementioned components. This is important as leveraging these skills within the Australian Army has the potential to improve scalability and support the provision of professional military leadership to the mobilized force.

Table 3. Access to Skills–Military vs. Civilians

	Professional Experience	Military Experience	Leadership Experience
Military Personnel	YES	YES	YES
Civilians with previous military experience	YES	YES	YES
Civilians	YES	NO	YES

Source: Created by author.

The issue being judged in Table 3 is whether the Australian Army has considered how it might leverage civilian skills in case of Stage Four Mobilization. To illustrate this point let's consider that 400 of the 700 Lieutenant Colonels mentioned in the previous

¹⁷⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 601-50, *Appointment of Temporary Officers in the Army of the United States Upon Mobilization* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), 3.

section are employed in roles such as project management, contracts, materiel acquisitions and logistic sustainment. Based on the skills in Table 3, the question is would it be possible for the Australian Army to find civilians with professional and leadership skills in project management, contracts, materiel acquisitions and logistic sustainment? These personnel could be appointed as military civilians or offered temporary military rank with limitations on where they could serve. In this way, the Australian Army could gain access to an additional 400 Lieutenant Colonels to provide and sustain the mobilized force with professional military leadership. A secondary question might be would it be possible to use ex-defense personnel, who are currently civilians, and not in the Reserve, to fill roles that would free up permanent force personnel? In this way the Army could leverage skills from the civilian sector, capitalize on previous military experience and release permanent force personnel for active duty. It's also worth noting that duty solely within Australia might allow for personnel of greater age and reduced fitness levels to serve in support of the nation.

World War I and World War II demonstrated that Australian citizens are willing to volunteer in large numbers for military service. Whilst the training of private soldiers can occur relatively quickly the training of junior officers has posed greater limitations on the Australian Army in the past. The current ability for the Royal Military College—Duntroon to scale-up its throughput of junior officers will directly impact how well the Australian Army can provide professional military leadership to the mobilized force. Given that the current training doctrine makes no reference to war-time training or reduced training continuums it is likely that the current training programs for officers (12-18 months full time) will continue during a Stage Four Mobilization event. The time

it takes to produce a lieutenant will have significant impacts on the scalability of the Australian Army. Shortfalls in lieutenants during Stage Four Mobilization, as highlighted in Table 1, will ultimately reduce the Army's ability to provide and then sustain its soldiers with professional military leadership at the tactical level.

The issues of scalability will confront the Australian Army during any Stage Four Mobilization event. Given this, there are two key risks to consider based. The first risk to the Australian Army is whether it has considered additional possibilities for how it might up-scale the force and simultaneously continue to provide professional military leadership. With limited historical precedent, and no consideration in Australian doctrine, to understand what positions civilians might be brought in to relieve permanent military personnel the Army is carrying a medium level of risk by not considering its scalability options. Without change, many mid-level and senior-level military personnel would be unable to support the sustainment of professional military leadership in the mobilized force due to having to occupy staff positions in Australia. The second risk is how the Army trains sufficient lieutenants in a timely manner to provide professional military leadership within the newly raised platoons/troops. With historical examples of shortages in junior officers and promotion from within the ranks, as well as limited expansion capabilities at the Royal Military College–Duntroon, the Australian Army is carrying a high degree of risk in its ability to provide professional military leadership to a mobilized force.

Findings

The analysis conducted throughout this chapter, shown against a futuristic case study, has revealed several key findings. They are:

1. The Australian Defence Force and Australian Army doctrine remains ill-equipped to support the organization in understanding the issues related to Stage Four Mobilization and how they sustain professional military leadership in mobilized forces.

2. Australian Army training doctrine whilst defining knowledge management does not describe explicit or tacit knowledge. This leads to a failure to articulate how long it takes to train personnel for a war scenario or for the peace-time army.

3. Australian Army doctrine does not indicate who would staff training establishments (permanent vs. reserve) during Stage Four Mobilization

4. The Australian Army, as of 2021, has an absolute advantage in access to professional military leadership to deal with Stage Four Mobilization than it did in either World War I or World War II.

5. Whilst the Australian Army has improved access to professional military leadership it is being utilized in roles centered on headquarters and administration. These roles could, hypothetically, be filled by leveraging civilian skills to free-up permanent military personnel for use in the mobilized forces.

6. During a Stage Four Mobilization event, the Australian Army would experience significant shortfalls of professional military leadership at the junior officer level (lieutenant–captain).

7. The training throughput of lieutenants will be a critical limiting factor in how rapidly the Australian Army can up-scale its force structures in response to Stage Four Mobilization.

8. There is a lack of understanding as to what types of leadership styles negatively impact organizations as they transition through great periods of change.

Summary

In summary, this chapter used a case study methodology to analyze and present the key findings as it relates to this research study. The findings and interpretation of the research will be explained and presented in the context of the research questions in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter will combine the information gained through Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 to answer the primary and secondary research questions, outline the significance of the research, and will also make recommendations for future study. The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the findings which have been gained through the case study methodology.

Research Questions–Answers

The primary qualitative research question for this study was: What enduring issues currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following stage four mobilization for LSCO? The secondary research questions were:

What issues does mobilization place on current leadership?

What issues, relating to sustaining professional military leadership, has Stage Four Mobilization placed upon the Australian Army in the past?

What issues are present within current literature, doctrine, or policy?

To answer the primary qualitative research question, there were four enduring issues that currently confront Australia with sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following Stage Four Mobilization for LSCO. They are:

Enduring Issue 1. A lack of mobilization doctrine increases the time taken to mobilize and generates friction internal to the Army. Insufficient doctrine reduces the

Army's ability to sustain professional military leadership across its force as it makes rapid decisions without historical context and consideration of second or third order effects.¹⁷⁵

Enduring Issue 2. The difficulties associated with developing new junior officers and NCOs (facilities and timelines) will severely limit the Army's ability to sustain professional military leadership into, and within, mobilized units.

Enduring Issue 3. There is no defined time for how long it takes to provide tacit experiences and the development of professional military leadership for mobilized units.

Enduring Issue 4. The Army is slow to recognize the potential of civilian skills to supplement professional military leadership within the permanent or reserve components of the force.

Table 4 provides a visual representation of the enduring issues as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership in the Army following Stage Four Mobilization for LSCO and links them with a corresponding level of organizational risk as outlined in Chapter 1 and discussed in Chapter 4.

The levels of risk in Table 4 have been based off the following definitions. Low risk is defined as an organization only requiring minimal adjustments to its current systems or standard operating procedures to adjust to the threat confronting it. Medium risk is defined as an organization requiring large adjustments to its current systems or standard operating procedures to adjust to the threat confronting it. High risk is defined as

¹⁷⁵ This can be seen by the repetition in World War II of maintaining permanent military members in Australia vs. using their expertise in the mobilized units. Without doctrine to support the issues generated by this decision, history is likely to rhyme.

an organization requiring major adjustments, or complete re-designing, to its current systems or standard operating procedures to adjust to the threat confronting it. Appendix one contains a risk matrix used to support the development of Table 4.

Table 4. The Enduring Issues and Associated Organizational Risk		
	Description	Risk Level
Enduring Issue 1	Doctrinal Shortfalls	HIGH
Enduring Issue 2	Difficulties in developing new professional military leaders	HIGH
Enduring Issue 3	Time to develop tacit experiences and professional military leadership	LOW
Enduring Issue 4	Army is slow to capitalize on, and use, civilian skills	MEDIUM

Source: Created by author.

To answer the first secondary research question, there were three issues that mobilization places on current leadership. They are:

1. Whilst Stage Four Mobilization is unlikely, it presents high levels of organizational risk that are only just being considered in a modern context.
2. Australian Army personnel, in particular officers, should be prepared to be withdrawn from staff roles in headquarters to fill command and staff appointments in the mobilized force.
3. Is Army leadership willing to consider using civilians, with the requisite skills, to fill Army positions to mobilize permanent military personnel with professional military leadership skills?

To answer the second secondary research question, there were four issues that Stage Four Mobilization has placed upon the Australian Army in the past as it relates to sustaining professional military leadership. They were:

1. The tension in understanding how to divide professional military leadership between home forces and those being mobilized for war. This played out in two ways; the first, being the decision to prioritize militia/reserve officers for command appointments in the mobilized forces. Second, being the decision to keep those permanent personnel with professional military leadership skills in Australia.

2. A shortfall in the provision of professional military leadership by means of new lieutenants to the mobilized forces.

3. The experience of World War I saw the removal of the Universal Service Scheme ultimately reducing the Australian Army's access to reserve personnel and their professional military leadership skills for future wars.

4. A lack of understanding in how long it takes to train explicit and tacit knowledge to provide professional military leadership to the mobilized force. This was evident in the rapid deployment of divisions on expeditionary service. Rapid deployment forced the conduct of an additional six months of training in theatre before being combat ready.

To answer the third and final secondary research question, there were three issues that appeared within the current literature, doctrine, or policy. They were:

1. There is very limited literature on how the Australian Army, historically or currently, mobilizes under Stage Four Mobilization conditions.

2. The available doctrine to support the Australian Defence Force and Australian Army is insufficient to navigate a Stage Four Mobilization event.

3. There is a gap in public and policy debates surrounding the strengths and weaknesses of a Universal Service Scheme and how it would impact a Stage Four Mobilization scenario.

Implications of Research

The findings of this study indicate that the Australian Army is confronted by four enduring issues as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership following Stage Four Mobilization for LSCO. A combination of the literature review and the Chapter 4 analysis reveals that the Australian Army is carrying high organizational risk in two critical areas. The first is in a lack of doctrine that supports how the Australian Army would undertake Stage Four Mobilization and the associated issues with implementing such a degree of change. The second, is in the knowledge of critical professional military leadership shortfalls at the tactical level should Stage Four Mobilization require the rapid expansion of the force.

The key research findings raise valid issues regarding the Australian Army's ability to sustain professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization conditions. Positively, the research revealed that Australia is, in absolute terms, in a better position now (2021) to sustain professional military leadership during Stage Four Mobilization than it was during either World War I or World War II.

The findings of the secondary research questions provide further context into which issues have been deemed to be enduring. They have also provided further depth

into the subordinate issues that relate to sustaining professional military leadership in the Australian Army.

Without understanding the enduring issues associated with sustaining professional military leadership from past Stage Four Mobilization events it is highly likely that they will be repeated and remain unresolved. The primary implication of this research is focused for those Army personnel who are currently serving in command and staff appointments that have responsibility over doctrine, training, mobilization, and preparedness.

Recommendations for Future Research

This research has been exploratory in nature and has not supposed to solve the issues it has revealed. This research will provide a strong basis, therefore, for the conduct of future research into the issues that confront the Australian Army in sustaining professional military leadership during Stage Four Mobilization for LSCO. Some suggested areas for future research undertakings are outlined below:

1. What factors should be incorporated into Stage Four Mobilization doctrine in the Australian Army?
2. What are the factors inhibiting the rapid development of junior officers in the Australian Army during Stage Four Mobilization?
3. How much time is required to develop tacit military experiences that contributes to professional military leadership?
4. How might the Australian Army prevent a shortfall of junior officers during the conduct of a Stage Four Mobilization event?

5. What factors prevent/inhibit the Army's consideration of using civilians, and their skills, to sustain professional military leadership under Stage Four Mobilization conditions?

6. Is leadership theory in the Australian Army sufficient to prepare personnel for periods of significant change such as Stage Four Mobilization?

7. How would a Universal Service Scheme contribute towards Australia's preparedness for a Stage Four Mobilization event?

8. What are the social factors that would prohibit a Universal Service Scheme being effective within Australia?

9. Is the size of the Australian Defence Force appropriate for the current global security environment?

10. How might the Australian Army's training system be improved to prepare for Stage Four Mobilization?

11. How did the Australian Army identify and promote soldiers from the ranks to fill officer shortfalls during WWI and WWII?

12. How might the Australian Defence Force leverage civilian industry skills to support national mobilization without denuding the civilian sector?

Conclusion

The mobilization of national economies, industries and armed forces for war has long been a complex problem. The process of taking a peacetime military and rapidly expanding it to achieve national military objectives is no easy task. For this reason, nations around the world choose to maintain smaller professional armies that can achieve limited peacetime objectives. However, when called upon, nation states can mobilize

their entire national power base to generate forces for either aggressive or defensive purposes. Mobilization, at any stage, brings a wide range of complex problems that government officials and military staffs must navigate for them to be successful. As explained during Chapter 1, addressing all these issues was beyond the scope of this research. It is why this thesis has focused on mobilization in the Australian Army and subsequently sought to understand the enduring issues related to sustaining professional military leadership. Without bringing these enduring issues to the forefront of people minds it is likely that the Australian Army will experience a period of organizational shock and be at a disadvantage in a large-scale combat operation scenario.

This study has reviewed the historical literature based on the last two occasions that Australia has entered Stage Four Mobilization, the current views on mobilization and revised Knowledge Management and Leadership theories. The study has used a fictional intelligence scenario, based on The Chinese Civil War, to analyse the issues that might be present under Stage Four Mobilization. This paper has asserted that the Australian Army is confronted by four enduring issues as they relate to sustaining professional military leadership during Stage Four Mobilization for LSCO. Those issues relate directly to a lack of mobilization doctrine, the difficulties associated with developing new junior leaders, the time required to develop tacit experiences and professional military leadership, and the slowness with which the Army capitalizes on, and uses, civilian skills. By identifying these enduring issues, it is hoped that the Australian Army will be better informed with the risks that confront it during mobilization.

APPENDIX A

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Risk Assessment Matrix		Likelihood to impede Stage Four Mobilization				
		Certain	Highly Likely	Likely	Somewhat Likely	Unlikely
Severity	Major organizational adjustment	HIGH	HIGH	MED	MED	LOW
	Large organizational adjustment	HIGH	HIGH	MED	MED	LOW
	Minor organizational adjustment	MED	MED	MED	LOW	LOW
	No organizational adjustment	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW

Table 5. Stage Four Mobilization Risk Assessment Matrix

Source: Created by author.

Enduring Issue 1. It has been assessed that the lack of doctrine relating to Stage Four Mobilization in the Australian Army carries a HIGH level of risk. It has been surmised that the current lack of doctrine would require a large organizational adjustment and would certainly impede Stage Four Mobilization.

Enduring Issue 2. It has been assessed that the difficulties associated with developing new professional military leaders carries a HIGH level of risk. It has been surmised that the to correct these difficulties would require a major organizational adjustment and would certainly impede Stage Four Mobilization.

Enduring Issue 3. It has been assessed that shortfalls in understanding the amount of time it takes to develop tacit experience and professional military leadership carries a LOW level of risk. It has been surmised that this intellectual issue could be solved with minor organizational adjustment and would somewhat be likely to impede stage four mobilization.

Enduring Issue 4. It has been assessed that the Australian Army's slowness to capitalize on, and use, civilian skills carries a MEDIUM level of risk. It has been surmised that this issue is likely to impede Stage Four Mobilization and would require a large organizational adjustment to correct.

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