Building U.S. Responses to Russia's Threats to Use Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Brinkmanship

Abstract

Using a game theory approach, we examine U.S. tools and levers to respond to Russia's potential employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). We do so by first providing an overview of Russia's nuclear doctrine and capabilities, considering its discourse on nuclear escalation and declaratory policies relevant to the possible use of NSNWs. We then look at Russia's nuclear escalation through the lens of game theory, examining which potential levers for shifting decision making and outcomes exist in the game. Finally, we assess how a particularly relevant historical example, the Kargil War, sheds light on possible U.S. responses for avoiding escalation without conceding to adversary demands.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 01, 2023
Accession Number
AD1212429

Entities

People

  • Anthony Vassalo
  • Christopher Dictus
  • Clint Reach
  • Gabrielle Tarini
  • Krista Langeland

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Power
  • Anti-Ballistic Missiles
  • Ballistic Missiles
  • Command And Control
  • Doctrine
  • Game Theory
  • International Relations
  • International Security
  • National Security
  • Nato
  • New York
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Recreation
  • Security
  • Short Range Ballistic Missiles
  • Strategic Weapons
  • Treaties
  • Unified Combatant Commands
  • United States
  • Warfare
  • Weapons

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Strategic Security Studies