We Are All Gonna Die: How the Weak Points of the Power Grid Leave the United States With An Unacceptable Risk
Abstract
Federal regulations aim to ensure grid reliability and harden it against outages; however, widespread outages continue. This thesis examines the spectrum of regulations to evaluate them. It outlines their structure, the regulations intent, and weighs them against evolving cyber and physical threats and natural disaster risks. Currently, the regulatory structure is incapable of providing uniform security. Federal standards protect only the transmission portion of the grid, leaving the distribution section vulnerable to attack due to varying regulations from state to state, or county to county. The regulations cannot adapt quickly enough to meet dynamic threats, rendering them less effective. Cyber threats can be so agile that protectors are unaware of vulnerabilities, and patching requirements are too lengthy, which increases the risk exposure. No current weather mitigation or standard is capable of protecting the grid despite regular natural disasters that cause power shutdowns. The thesis concludes that bridging these gaps requires not increasing protection standards, but redundancy. Redundancy, mirrored after the UKs infrastructure policy, is more likely to reduce failure risk through layered components and systems. Microgrids are proven effective in disasters to successfully deliver such redundancy and should be implemented across all critical infrastructure sectors.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2023
- Accession Number
- AD1212940
Entities
People
- Michael D. Matthews
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School