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U.S. Army Transformation of Land Power in the Indo-Pacific

May 2020

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Foreword

1. (U//FOUO) The Army's role in the Indo-Pacific. The Army has launched into full-scale force transformation to allow the United States to dominate in land-based competition, crisis, and conflict in direct support of Defense objectives and Joint all-domain operations. We will contribute to maintaining security and peaceful competition, but if that fails, we need the wherewithal to counter any threat rapidly and decisively and return our Nation to a favorable geostrategic position. What matters in the Indo-Pacific is Joint all-domain operations—including on, from, and through land—the domain where competition is waged directly and armed conflict is finally arbitrated. Redesigned land power in the Indo-Pacific is the foundation of force transformation and, given our operational experience and focus of the last two decades, the Army will need resources and authorities to cement in the minds of our potential adversaries that American land power is retooling to win against major power rivals.

2. (U//FOUO) Need for land power in the Indo-Pacific. The Army's land-based forces for all-domain operations are essential to ensuring our Nation's defense strategy, capacity, capabilities, and budgetary priorities are linked. To sufficiently threaten potential adversaries with costs that outweigh the potential gains of military aggression requires Army forces and capabilities that credibly signal overmatch at every level of war. This signaling to keep aggressive competition from spilling over into armed conflict will also require that potential adversaries understand and believe that Army force (forward) presence is enough to bring decisive land power to bear in any crisis. Army support to the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific is a game-changer. Joint Force lethality is dependent on Army command and control (at operational scale), long range precision and area fires, integrated air defense, operational sustainment and operational maneuver at strategic distances.

3. (U//FOUO) Joint operational problems in the Indo-Pacific. China leverages military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the region in support of their political and security interests. In the Far East, Russia is modernizing its main battle tank inventory, increasing and improving its long range surface-to-air missile formations, and fielding its nuclear capable Kh-31 Krypton supersonic air-to-surface anti-radiation missile to bolster their anti-access, area denial capabilities. North Korea uses extensive missile forces to discourage U.S./coalition action against the regime. Our competitors in the region pursue their aims by destabilizing neighbors but to a level that remains below the traditional threshold for triggering armed conflict. They are also able to project a defense in depth based on layered standoff. These challenges make it harder for the Joint Force to maneuver and close with and destroy threat formations.

4. (U//FOUO) The Army solution to joint operational problems in the Indo-Pacific. Posture equals relationships. Building competition- and combat-credible forces means the

right capabilities are in the right formations, commanded and controlled at the right echelon, forward at critical points in the Indo-Pacific—and all of this comes together with the right connections across the Joint Force and with key allies and partners. Our multi-domain capable formations will lay the groundwork for a new generation of combined arms—made new by the introduction of advanced cross-domain capabilities. Our calibrated force posture—a pillar of the Multi-Domain Operations future operational concept—is growing to take on global proportions. The proof of principle will be how we can redesign our forces for the western Pacific. Our force development and global posture plans support the Joint Force, joint operations, and the USINDOPACOM Commander.

5. (U//FOUO) Way ahead. Operationalizing the *Army Transformation of Land Power in the Indo-Pacific* strategy supports the most important National Defense Strategy objectives including protecting Joint Force advantages, deterrence of armed conflict, and supporting interagency efforts. To resource this strategy after two decades of focusing on different kinds of threats in very different operational environments will take nationally-focused leadership and an enduring commitment to invest in new arms and new ways. The Army's future operational concepts are built on advanced capabilities, in redesigned formations, postured in new ways, and supported by reinvigorated agreements with key Indo-Pacific powers. To maintain our modernization momentum and to get decisive force west of the International Date Line, our current resourcing requirements include: funds for standing up a Multi-Domain Task Force in the theater (something the Chinese Communist Party leadership will have to factor into their security decision making); resources for improved training ranges; for establishing new cooperative security locations; and for expanding command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—all in support of strengthening the ability of joint force commanders to shape the environment and assure allies and partners. This plan is the grand strategic roadmap to prepare the Army for twenty-first century security challenges.



Lieutenant General Charles A. Flynn
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
United States Army

Table of Contents

1. PURPOSE	9
2. OVERVIEW	9
3. PROBLEM	9
4. SOLUTION	9
5. CONCEPT OF ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS	13
6. CONCEPT OF DOMINANT MANEUVER	17
7. CONCEPT OF FIRES AND EFFECTS	21
8. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT	25
9. CONCEPT OF COMMAND, CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE	28
10. MEANS	33
11. CONCLUSION	34

Figures

Figure 1.	Problem: Army Indo-Pacific Posture Challenges	10
Figure 2.	Solution - Geographical Orientation: First Island Chain and South China Sea	12
Figure 3.	Solution Narrative: Five Overarching Functional Systems for Change	14
Figure 4.	Regional Objectives and Priorities: Concept of Alliances and Partnerships	16
Figure 5.	Army in the Indo-Pacific: Theater Geographical Approaches	18
Figure 6.	Operational Exercises, Advantage, and Protection: Concept of Dominant Maneuver	20
Figure 7.	DEFENDER Pacific: Transformed Army Land Power in the Indo-Pacific	22
Figure 8.	Concept of Fires and Effects: Integrated All-Domain Strikes at Range	24
Figure 9.	Concept of Operational Support: Reach and Sustainment of Operations and Campaigns	26
Figure 10.	See Better, Farther, Faster Across Dominant Architecture: Concept of Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	29
Figure 11.	Army Intelligence: Current and Near Term Efforts across USINDOPACOM	32


1. (U) PURPOSE. This strategy describes the Army's comprehensive posture approach to transform land power in the Indo-Pacific for 2028 and beyond. The Joint Force faces challenges in access, force projection, and operational maneuver in the region. This strategy presents the Army's enterprise-wide answer to those Joint problems.

2. (U//FOUO) OVERVIEW. This strategy implements the National Defense Strategy by directly supporting its central objectives. An expanded Army posture footprint in the Indo-Pacific region **sustains Joint Force military advantages**. An increased presence deters Beijing from aggression against our vital interests and discourages destabilizing behavior that threatens regional interests. A Joint Force forward presence supports the ability of interagency counterparts to advance national influence while targeted agreements with key regional powers will help maintain a favorable regional security balance and frustrate Chinese attempts to seize hegemonic power. Redesigned land power in the region allows us to shape and drive competition to guarantee national advantage is always protected and to ensure opportunities for promoting a stable region are not lost. This strategy will enable the Joint Force to **compete short of armed conflict and win without fighting**. Our access, presence, and influence are key to reducing People's Liberation Army options and deterring aggression from escalating to armed conflict. We continue to develop and forward posture cross-domain and advanced capabilities to offer Joint Force Commanders more and varied **options in competition and armed conflict**. We will deter by demonstrating expeditionary, all-domain warfare capability at operational scale.

3. (U//FOUO) PROBLEM. Army Indo-Pacific posture is hampered by three pressing challenges: 1) forces are not sufficiently deterring China in competition—our stance is heavy in the northwest Pacific and light in the southwest; 2) footprints are inflexible and circumscribed to the benefit of Chinese interests—we are not properly arrayed to effectively influence Chinese security behavior in and around the South China Sea; and 3) alliances and partnerships are not fully aligned to U.S. national security interests. (See figure 1 on page 10 for Army Indo-Pacific challenges.) China seeks to displace the United States and establish itself as the regional hegemon. China's military-civilian infrastructure investments in the region are encircling the key terrain, including the South China Sea, and the Army has few footholds to counter this offensive—our stance is not secure for competition, crisis, or contingency. As China works to erode our competitive military advantage, U.S. assurances and security guarantees to allies and partners weaken, and U.S. conventional deterrence and the coercive impact of our national military power diminishes.

4. (U) SOLUTION.

a. (U//FOUO) Named Operation. The Army's answer to the Indo-Pacific competition problem begins with the authorities and resources to re-posture Army capabilities in the first island chain and in key locations surrounding the South China Sea. (See figure 2 on page 12



(U) Figure 1. Problem: Army Indo-Pacific Posture Challenges

for a map of the region.) The Army and the Department of Defense require the authorities pursuant to a named operation to improve scope, scale, and focus of DEFENDER Pacific, Pacific Pathways, site surveys, and other theater development activities. To enable this solution requires that USINDOPACOM is fully armed with a named operation which allows USARPAC to plan long-term, integrate resource-intensive activities over space, time, and purpose, to achieve National Defense Strategy objectives and protect the nation's interests in ongoing competition with China. Establishment of a named operation for the Indo-Pacific will be the engine on which transformational change is resourced and enacted.

b. (U//FOUO) Access Agreements and Resources. Additionally, critical are the authorities that are associated with full access agreements with partners, focused on Thailand, Indonesia, and policy permitting, the Philippines. It is ultimately in the Joint Force's interest that we have Status of Forces Agreements with these key partners. In order to capitalize on future access agreements, the Army requires additional funding to expand Army prepositioned stocks; to station a Multi-Domain Task Force in the region, and for related rotational activities; for training areas, facilities, and infrastructure; for ammunition storage; and for command and control, and intelligence facilities.

c. (U//FOUO) Increased Presence. The key idea that underlies the Army's vision for transformed land power in the Indo-Pacific—and the strategic lever to regain a competitive stance against China—is increased presence of forces. Joint forces designed and developed for the theater and to counter the PLA, using high-end capabilities to demonstrate all-domain overmatch, are a means to force the Chinese Communist Party and People's Liberation Army leadership to restrain their ambitions and compete constructively inside the U.S.-led international order. Army brings essential command, control, intelligence, fires, sustainment, as well as cross-domain maneuver capabilities to these Joint demonstrations of power. The decisive geography for the Army to leverage this key idea is in the first island chain, ringing the South China Sea.

d. (U//FOUO) Solution Narrative. Our alliances and partnerships provide the menu of operational options that can only come from multinational security cooperation and mutual defense commitments. By investing in and developing leap-ahead technology and all-domain concepts, Army formations are able to demonstrate the dominant maneuver that can create operational facts on the ground that maximize the decision space of our national leadership and allow for favorable conflict resolution. Through fires and other effects, Army formations are able to frustrate adversary decision making and produce the kind of attrition and disruption that exhausts adversary will to compete and fight in armed conflict. High-end, high-intensity, all-domain warfare requires prodigious amounts of supplies and only transformed operational support capabilities allow us to strengthen and expand the capacity of our northern, central, and especially southern strategic line of communications across the Pacific. In the emerging operational environment, we have to "fight" intelligence-based battles, including in the information environment and cyberspace, in some cases well before lethal engagements of fire and maneuver to close combat. To go along with information operations, high-technology intelligence methods, and long range precision fires, the Army is investing in command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities



(U) Figure 2. Solution - Geographical Orientation: First Island Chain and South China Sea

that allow us to engage, understand, direct, fire, and maneuver under constant adversary observation and in close combat. (See figure 3 on page 14 for a summary of the solution narrative.)

5. (U) CONCEPT OF ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS. (See figure 4 on page 16.)

a. (U) Near-term alliances and partnerships (to 2022).


(1) (U//FOUO) Army posture is a tangible expression of U.S. national interests and priorities abroad. Calibrated posture presents competitors with security dilemmas that make it harder for them to advance their aims through military force, which incentivizes them to accept more internationally acceptable ways. The Army is prioritizing building access, presence, and influence in the Indo-Pacific to deter state-based aggression and counter attempts to coerce partners in the region. To this end, the Army synchronizes all of the security cooperation tools at its disposal—including engagement, training, security assistance, and exercises—for maximum effect. Strengthening key alliances and partnerships through engagement, expanding posture, balancing key capabilities, and increasing interoperability with partner armies in the central, southern, and western approaches, policy permitting, will be the Army’s near-term focus. (See figure 5 on page 18 for a map of the regional approaches.)

(2) (U//FOUO) The Army will focus on strengthening relations with key allies and partners in the central, southern, and western approaches to allow for a more dynamic and distributed presence and access to locations across the region. The Army will support priority partners with increased high-level engagement; additional education, training, and exchange opportunities; exercises that are expanded in scope and scale; and where possible, enhanced security assistance, armaments cooperation, and information sharing. Army efforts will focus on enhancing interoperability and building partner capacity. Where the United States and partner nations share mutual interests, the Army will support prepositioned stocks, Security Force Assistance Brigade rotations, and rotational presence of other units. The Army will heavily invest in these key relationships in a manner that builds on mutual respect, shared values, and genuine partnership, not dependence.

(3) (U//FOUO) Army engagement in the region will continue to be rooted in our long-standing alliances and partnerships. To advance a free and open Indo-Pacific in line with our national strategic objectives, and to promote a networked security architecture, where possible, we will coordinate engagements and other cooperative activities. Together the United States and like-minded regional armies can present a concerted alliance/partnership message that free world nations offer an alternative to coercive behavior and a transactional approach to the region.

b. (U) Far-term alliances and partnerships (2023 to 2028).

(1) (U//FOUO) The Army will continue to fortify and extend our cooperative defense arrangements as U.S. land forces and capabilities are brought on line at various points along the boundary between the central, southern, and PRC’s counter-intervention approaches. We



(U) Figure 3. Solution Narrative: Five Overarching Functional Systems for Change

are planning to expand senior leader engagements and supporting military engagements to demonstrate U.S. resolve and an enduring regional commitment. Additionally, personnel exchanges through formal programs such as military personnel exchange program (MPEP) and professional military education (PME) will be prioritized to key partners in these approaches. Security assistance, including foreign military sales (FMS), will also be prioritized, where possible, as we improve interoperability with these key partners. As our relationships strengthen, we are planning to expand intelligence and information sharing opportunities and capabilities.


(2) (U//FOUO) The Army is coordinating to maintain a combat-credible, competition-primed land power presence in the northern approach and adjacent region, and to extend that deterrence layer to the other approaches. As we increase our presence across the approaches, logistics and sustainment with our partners will become increasingly important, particularly during crisis. In accordance with these ends, we are changing our activities to better assure regional allies and partners, including acting on options to preposition capabilities and stocks.

(3) (U//FOUO) To increase access, presence, and influence longer-term, the Army promotes multilateralism and a shared perception of regional threats. A key enabling objective of stronger alliances and partnerships for a free and open Indo-Pacific is promoting the regional leadership of partners like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. In the far-term, the Army will also work to build posture with multiple partners in addition to the partners identified in near-term initiatives.

(4) (U//FOUO) Over the 2020s, the Army will continue to strengthen interoperability with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other strategically located allies and partners. Japan continues to be a particular focus for the Army due to the strategic value of its southern territory, close to potential flashpoints, and the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces' capabilities and capacity. The JGSDF has shore-to-ship and archipelagic capabilities and experience of special value to future Army land power in the region. Additionally, U.S. allies Thailand and the Philippines are high-payoff, high priority partners for the Army.

(5) (U//FOUO) To mitigate the risk of focusing too narrowly, the Army seeks to enhance access, presence, and influence with specific partners across the theater approaches—expanding options for our national leadership in competition, crisis, and contingency and supporting a networked security architecture. Taking the long-term approach to building military-to-military relations with these partners and promoting their regional leadership is critical to competition, and allows the Army to cultivate options. Additionally, the Army continues to partner with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and France to strengthen relations with partners in Oceania, an important supporting region astride the critical southern line of communications.

(U) Figure 4. Regional Objectives and Priorities: Concept of Alliances and Partnerships



6. (U) CONCEPT OF DOMINANT MANEUVER. (See figure 6 on page 20.)**a. (U) Near-term dominant maneuver (to 2022).**


(1) (U//FOUO) The DEFENDER Pacific exercises allow for the large-scale maneuver and synchronization of joint forces in preparation for high-intensity, large scale combat operations. (See figure 7 on page 22.) Such activities deter Chinese opportunism and coercive behavior, strengthen joint logistic systems, and measure ally and partner dedication to a free and open Indo-Pacific. USARPAC is planning to employ a Multi-Domain Task Force in the northern approach during Pacific Pathways and as part of DEFENDER Pacific. USARPAC also plans to employ a second Multi-Domain Task Force in the central approach. Additionally, in the near-term, USARPAC is planning to demonstrate distributed Long Range Precision Fires capabilities in Brunei and Indonesia, as well as operational maneuver in an archipelagic environment.

(2) (U//FOUO) China is exploiting the current coronavirus disease (COVID-19) international environment to reinforce its narrative of rising regional dominance and press its attempts to recast the international order in Beijing's favor. The Army is ready to exploit opportunities resulting from Chinese missteps including openings to the Joint Force for transparent and cooperative post-COVID-19 assistance in key areas of the region. The Army demonstrates resolve through presence of credible combat forces west of the International Date Line in Pacific Pathways and DEFENDER Pacific exercises as it adapts to the post-pandemic environment. USARPAC will scope, scale, and tailor exercises and activities focusing on enhancing the ability of allies and partners to operate within a pandemic environment while responding to crises and satisfying mutual security interests.

b. (U) Far-term dominant maneuver (2023 to 2028).

(1) (U//FOUO) To counter threat anti-access, area denial systems and approaches in the first island chain, the Army plans to forward station a Multi-Domain Task Force with full-build all-domain operations capabilities in a decisive area of the western Pacific. Priority options include various locations in the central approach or at current U.S. facilities in the northern approach with established barracks, motor pools, and training areas. Importantly, the Multi-Domain Task Force would rotate often to operationally relevant points in the northern approach to signal the ability to project land power capabilities in areas of strategic value to potential adversaries. Army all-domain operations capabilities support, enhance, and extend the impact of joint all-domain operations.

(2) (U//FOUO) To protect fixed sites, including airfields and ports, enable maneuver, and preserve friendly forces by scanning for drones, missiles, and planes coming from all directions at once, the Army requires advanced air and missile defense capability. There are plans to employ air and missile defense units with Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) air and missile defense radar in the northern, central, and southern approaches. This provides dispersed protection of critical joint warfighting forces and capabilities. Army advanced air and missile defense radar and other related systems,



(U) Figure 5. Army in the Indo-Pacific: Theater Geographical Approaches

including long range fires, in the northern approach would augment Japan Ground Self Defense Force capabilities and promote both interoperability and combined operations.

(3) (U//FOUO) The Army employs air and missile units with Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC), providing advanced air and missile defense against rockets, artillery and mortars as well as unmanned aircraft systems and cruise missiles, in the northern, central, and southern approaches. IFPC in depth in the region is critical to protecting fixed sites, enabling maneuver, and preserving friendly forces and combat power.


(4) (U//FOUO) To expand operational freedom of action and allow for employment of modernized capabilities including long range precision fires, the Army establishes a cooperative security location at a location in the central or southern approach with facilities for training, projecting, and sustaining joint, allied, partner, and coalition forces. Army expansion of the theater footprint is essential to joint and Army future warfighting concepts.

(5) (U//FOUO) To mitigate the challenges posed by the extensive geography of the Indo-Pacific, the Army establishes an operating location in a developed area in the southern or compact states approach with access to air and maritime ports, or other comparable location along the southern line of communications. This additional footprint increases the operational depth of joint and coalition operations in competition and armed conflict and unmistakably demonstrates U.S. resolve to counter threats to a secure and peaceful region. There are potential legal and diplomatic challenges to establishing a main operating base in this region, but there is strategic value in enabling a continuous rotational presence in this critical area for national security. Operating from an advanced point along the southern line of communications will support our ability to conduct operational maneuver in the archipelagic environment.

(6) (U//FOUO) To defend key locations and concentrated forces in large scale combat operations, the Army employs combat and support units with the capability and capacity for operational maneuver from strategic distances into hostile areas dominated by many islands of various sizes. This future capability includes the possibility of a new type of Shallow Draft High Speed Ship (SDHSS) or comparable capability for rapid intra-theater transport of troops and sustainment. Decisive land power in the large archipelagic areas of the Indo-Pacific mandates that the Army develop and demonstrate the ability to operate in complex land-shore-sea environments at the operational level of war.

(7) (U//FOUO) To improve coalition warfare preparedness, the Army examines establishing a multinational cooperative security training exercise under key partner leadership (in a full hosting role) with select allies and partners in the region. Japan is a key partner that could host a multinational defense exercise involving U.S. Army forces. This is to promote clear indigenous regional leadership that complements the U.S. security guarantor role.

(8) (U//FOUO) To better shape the battlefield, the Army plans to develop and employ combat units for archipelagic warfare in the central and southern approaches to enable land-based archipelagic defense. These future units are equipped with fires, maneuver, command



(U) Figure 6. Operational Exercises, Advantage, and Protection: Concept of Dominant Maneuver

and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and sustainment capabilities tailored to the particular challenges of operating in complex terrain made up of mixed land-littoral-sea areas. An archipelagic warfare capable formation also serves as a testbed for modernization capabilities critical to warfighting scenarios in the western Pacific.

(9) (U//FOUO) It is critical that the competitor-adversary balance with China is modulated to protect U.S. interests, and to this end the Army executes progressive engagement, training, and exercises that strengthen prioritized alliances and partnerships with key regional powers (Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Philippines, India, and Indonesia). Transformed Army land power strengthens U.S. regional security leadership while reinforcing relationships with allies and partners that demonstrate mutual support for common defense interests.

(10) (U//FOUO) To provide transformed Army land power to the Joint Force, the Army will repeatedly test, demonstrate, and exercise all of these far-term dominant maneuver initiatives in the DEFENDER Pacific series of theater exercises. Ultimately, DEFENDER Pacific is the nation's high-profile investment in a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

7. (U) CONCEPT OF FIRES AND EFFECTS. (See figure 8 on page 24.)

a. (U) Near-term fires and effects (to 2022).

(1) (U) The Army is pursuing multiple advanced fires capabilities. The leading capabilities include Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC), and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).

(2) (U//FOUO) To increase the ability of Joint forces to target Chinese anti-access, area denial complexes and enable joint maneuver across all domains, the Army is employing a Multi-Domain Task Force with full-build all-domain operations capabilities, including intelligence, fires, and protection, in the region. To begin shifting the military balance against potentially hostile forces as quickly as possible, the initial focus for operations will be in the northern approach, in critical zones between friendly island territory and potentially contested seas.

(3) (U//FOUO) Building on the successes of the Multi-Domain Task Force (Full-Build), USARPAC is employing the core elements of a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) with partial-build all-domain operations capabilities in the region, focused on the southern approach and on the PRC's counter-intervention zone. To develop better understanding of potential conflict areas in the region, and prepare to counter PLA anti-access, area denial systems and approaches, this MDTF will operate at times in areas along the northern periphery of the southern approach, given the proper access and agreements.

DEFENDER PACIFIC WILL:

- Demonstrate the Joint Force's ability to deploy a Combat Credible Force in support of National Defense Strategy implementation by integrating Contact, Blunt, and Surge forces in to the Indo-Pacific
- Conduct strategic movement into the Second Island Chain / Operational maneuver forward into the First Island Chain
- Demonstrate rapid response to aggression and will focus on countries critical to OPLAN support

ENDSTATE: US Army demonstrates the ability to project a combat-credible force in and around the South China Sea capable of responding to crisis and **detering** potential adversaries. Advances a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, shows commitment to our allies and partners, builds readiness, facilitates AOR reconnaissance and OPLAN rehearsals.

OBJECTIVES:

- Dynamic Force Employment of Contact, Blunt, and Surge Forces
- Power Projection / Mobilization
- Multi-Domain Operations
- Joint Forcible Entry Operations
- JRSOI / Theater Opening
- Operational Maneuver into the A2AD Environment Utilizing Waterborne Capabilities
- Sustainment in a Distributed Littoral Environment
- C2 Operations / CPX
- Explore Southerly Lines of Communication

MESSAGING: Must avoid overt Counter-China or Anti-China messaging. Must allow plausible deniability and space for each country to shape it's own narrative.

(U) Figure 7. DEFENDER Pacific: Transformed Army Land Power in the Indo-Pacific

b. (U) Far-term fires and effects (2023 to 2028).

(1) (U//FOUO) The Army goal is to have the ability to employ tactical fires units with Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) in the central and western approaches. To leverage these potential firing point locations will require policy changes. Improved tactical fires capabilities allow Army forces to target PLA assets in and near littorals to interdict, destroy enemy formations, and enable friendly maneuver to dominant points from which to launch decisive operations. For both all-domain operations and archipelagic warfare, the Army needs a broader range of firing and maneuvering positions than current posture allows.

(2) (U//FOUO) At various locations in the region, including in the compact states approach, the Army employs one or more strategic fires batteries equipped with Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) capabilities. This allows Army to test out new equipment, experiment with new tactics, and new ways to train soldiers to employ LRHW, while demonstrating a combat-credible capability to provide strategic precision fires. The ability to hold Chinese very high value targets at risk is bedrock to restoring conventional deterrence and advancing our national defense.

(3) (U//FOUO) Employment of electronic warfare (EW) units with advanced ground-based jamming capabilities in the central approach, policy permitting, to disrupt adversary command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and to deny, degrade, and disrupt threat radars and communications, will improve force survivability and enable joint maneuver. As modernized EW capabilities become available, they will be fielded, tested, and trained with in forward line formations, for maximum deterrent effect.

(4) (U//FOUO) To interdict and destroy adversary formations and enable joint maneuver, the Army employs operational fires units with Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), or a comparable surface-to-surface, all weather, precision-strike guided missile fires capability, in the northern, central, and western approaches. Operational fires are needed to range critical threat systems, including the “carrier killer” Dongfeng-21D (DF-21D), the twin-engine Chengdu J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter, the JL-2 SLBM, and the DF-17 hypersonic boost-glide missile. The Army must have the ability and opportunity to signal the PLA that their high-end, high-priority systems cannot operate at will.

(5) (U//FOUO) The Army is committed to demonstrating cross-domain fires in operational conditions and especially advanced anti-ship fires. To enable joint operational maneuver in the maritime domain, the Army employs fires units with anti-ship strike capabilities in various littoral areas of the central and southern approaches. The Army’s modernization and concept development is committed to bringing various cross-domain capabilities to the Joint Force and shore-to-ship fires is a key part of this goal.

(6) (U//FOUO) The Army continues to contribute land power to shore up U.S. regional interests by demonstrating the capability to penetrate peer adversary defensive capabilities and engage high-value targets at strategic ranges. To hold adversary strategic targets at risk, the Army employs strategic fires units with Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC) at one or

more points in the northern, central, compact states, and western approaches, policy permitting.

(7) (U//FOUO) To demonstrate combat-credible power against the PLA requires that the Army possess access to a durable, defensible, and responsive digital network. To enhance Joint force protection and survivability, the Army establishes a joint integrated fires network with capabilities to rapidly, accurately, and seamlessly integrate and synchronize fires planning and coordination across Joint forces (and enable long range strike, and advanced missile defense systems capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging advanced air, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats from all azimuths). The Army will bring a campaign-quality, adaptable, survivable, and combat-worthy information capability to the Joint fight.


8. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. (See figure 9 on page 26.)

a. (U) Near-term operational support (to 2022).

(1) (U//FOUO) Any armed conflict, as well as ongoing major power competition, against China in the Indo-Pacific will depend on substantial capabilities and capacity to maneuver, resupply, and maintain forces at decisive points in the theater. Given the geographic expanse of the region, and especially the length of lines of communications, we must prioritize leveraging allies and partners to provide sustainment support and significantly lighten the burden of logistical requirements on U.S. joint forces in combined warfare over large areas and over time.

(2) (U//FOUO) Leap-ahead advancements in operational support, including campaign-scale logistics, will allow Army forces in the Indo-Pacific to address several of the National Defense Strategy core operational problems. Transformed Army operational support will allow for sustainment of moving and dispersed forces while under attack, generation of theater combat power while under all-domain attack, maneuver operations without continuous domain superiority, and resilient C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) while under attack. Modernized operational support will also be necessary for Army formations to operate as inside forces. Inside forces begin any potential armed conflict with China already positioned within threat anti-access, area denial zones, under direct surveillance and within range of adversary fires.

(3) (U//FOUO) The Army is coordinating to develop a Stryker storage site at Lopburi, Thailand for initial positioning of up to seventeen (17) Stryker combat vehicles to build military-to-military trust and increase our interoperability with the Royal Thai Army. Employing U.S. Stryker combat vehicles alongside RTA Stryker vehicles during annual exercises will facilitate the Army's long-term posture goals, in addition to expanding Joint Force Commander operational options in armed conflict. This priority initiative is critical to demonstrating to the leadership in Beijing that the United States can build new, operationally-credible relationships with nations in the region and near the strategic line of communications through the Malacca Strait.



(U) Figure 9. Concept of Operational Support: Reach and Sustainment of Operations and Campaigns

(4) (U//FOUO) Expanding sites for Army prepositioned stocks provides timely humanitarian assistance and disaster relief supplies. This initiative builds multinational defense relations in anticipation of later repositioning of warfighting stocks nearer potential areas of conflict. Initial priority of effort is in the western approach, however to fully develop this opportunity, the Army is assessing multiple contingency sites in the central and southern approaches as well. With warfighting stocks in position at points that dominate maritime entrances to the South China Sea, the Army will be better able to support decentralized, distributed, and integrated combined and joint operations.

(5) (U//FOUO) The Army has identified the need and has already begun to substantially reposition littoral movement and maneuver systems from the Central region to the Indo-Pacific, as the first stage in the longer-term modernization of waterborne capabilities. With modernization resources and development, the Army is planning to employ transportation units with fully-capable operational and littoral movement and maneuver capabilities from ports in the northern, central, and southern approaches to improve responsiveness and depth. Improved movement and maneuver capabilities allow Army forces to provide prompt, cross-domain movement of combat configured forces, equipment and sustainment supplies. This initiative is foundational to the Army's plans to develop archipelagic warfare.

(6) (U//FOUO) As a part of more operationally-relevant logistics, the Army is assessing how to reposition the basing, support, and maintenance of Army prepositioned stocks afloat (Number 3) from the United States east coast to sites inside the Indo-Pacific region. By orienting stocks afloat from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, to across the Pacific directly, the Army improves operational readiness of combat-relevant prepositioned stocks and support to objectives that counter Chinese coercive behavior against allies and partners.

b. (U) Far-term operational support (2023 to 2028).

(1) (U//FOUO) Over a number of stages stretching out to the far-term, the Army is planning to redesign land-based prepositioned stocks in the region. In the first stage, to increase readiness for short-notice contingencies, the Army will update Indo-Pacific prepositioned stocks with critical ammunition, priority weapon systems, and upgraded equipment and supplies in various sites. Prepositioning supplies assures allies and partners, and deters competitor behavior by demonstrating strategic power projection capability. The correlation between Chinese power projection in their sphere of interest and our power projection to protect global interests needs to be rebalanced to mitigate the drivers of potential conflict between Beijing and Washington. In the second stage, to support joint combat operations at scale, and at high-intensity, the Army updates Indo-Pacific prepositioned stocks with combat configured contents in various sites. Combat configured stocks will provide ammunition, weapon systems, and other key combat capabilities for very rapid response in armed conflict. Finally, in the third stage, the Army updates Indo-Pacific prepositioned stocks with High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD), or comparable capabilities, at various sites in the region to support Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (JSEAD). This is another critical

investment in operational protection that allows Joint forces, including all-domain operations capable formations, to get in near PLA forces for decisive combat action.

(2) (U//FOUO) To enable the full range of joint operations and employment of capabilities, in competition and armed conflict, the Army establishes one or more cooperative security locations with facilities for training, projecting, and sustaining forces in locations adjacent to the PRC's counter-intervention approach, and in the southern approach.

(3) (U//FOUO) The Army has begun making progressive improvements to operational logistics capabilities over the long-term based on modernization research, development, testing and evaluation. To expand operational reach and capacity for large scale combat operations, the Army employs support units with improved operational logistics capabilities at multiple sites across the region. These sites are spread across the western, southern, and central approaches, policy permitting. Over time, improved logistics capabilities will be fielded to support units with operational amphibious lift capabilities, including for employment in littoral areas, to enable archipelagic warfare. In the future, the Army also employs support units with improved operational lift capabilities to complement other modernized operational support capabilities. The Army needs to be able to lift combat-credible, combat-durable forces in a mass sufficient to achieve dominant maneuver.

9. (U) CONCEPT OF COMMAND, CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE. (See figure 10 on page 29.)

a. (U) Near-term C2ISR (to 2022).

(1) (U//FOUO) Starting in 2018 and continuing through 2022, the Army's multi-discipline intelligence capability has drastically increased within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. Specifically, the Military Intelligence Brigade supporting USARPAC transitioned to a forward posture employing its Counterintelligence and Force Protection capability in a manner better positioned to inform our counter China campaign and other threat actions.

(2) (U//FOUO) USARPAC and supporting intelligence personnel have developed a concept of operations for increasing open source intelligence reporting to assist with developing joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment in the region. This is in conjunction with using the USINDOPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Exercise Program as a way to test, assess, and refine new capabilities in the environment.

(3) (U//FOUO) The Army employs elements of a Security Force Assistance Brigade with theater-specific security force assistance capabilities to build partner conventional forces capacity in the region. The focus for security force assistance activities will be on the East China Sea through the northern approach, and secondarily, on various partners in the southern, central, and western approaches. This initiative is to train, assist, accompany and enable operations with allied and partner nations to develop their security force capabilities, and to bolster the ability of allies and partners to resist Chinese coercion. This SFA capability provides multinational and regional understanding to improve preparation of the operational



(U) Figure 10. See Better, Farther, Faster Across Dominant Architecture: Concept of Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

environment for competition and armed conflict. Furthermore, the targeted employment of some SFAB elements may help improve the ability of key friends and partners to defend against external coercion.

(4) (U//FOUO) USARPAC requires task organization enhancements and a supporting C4ISR network that integrates with the Joint Force, the interagency, allies, and partners to improve operational command and control for large scale combat operations. USARPAC has identified key capability gaps that need to be filled to perform its organizational roles and responsibilities as a Four-Star Theater Joint Forces Land Component Command headquarters and as a Combined Joint Task Force headquarters. In the near-term, the Army is accelerating introduction of target development, joint targeting, and information warfare capabilities to enable competition, and respond to crisis and armed conflict across all warfighting domains.

(5) (U//FOUO) USARPAC utilizes SECRET//REL FVEY, CENTRIX-Korea, CENTRIX-Japan, and All Partners Access Network (APAN) to communicate essential information with allies and partners. Over the near-term, the Army supports development of a joint-centric Mission Partner Environment (MPE) to consolidate these communication networks into a single workstation. However, USARPAC requires enhancements in all relevant facilities and expansion of its existing infrastructure so that current coalition networks reside in all command and control facilities. Absent a NATO-like collective defense architecture, USARPAC must expand MPE to rapidly share information and communicate with allies and partners.

(6) (U//FOUO) USARPAC is considering options to forward position an operational command post west of the International Date Line and reinforce United States Army, Japan with theater and campaign-level sustainment capabilities that enable competition and rapid transition to armed conflict.

(7) (U//FOUO) The Army will look at actions to support the expansion and improvement of alignment between USINDOPACOM and ally and partner policies, strategies, plans, and operations across the region to improve operational planning for competition-conflict and enable broader and increased regional engagement. This initiative is focused on the national military levels, down through the service, theater, and operational command levels. A comprehensive harmonization of multinational security approaches serves as the basis for command and control of future combined military operations.

(8) (U//FOUO) As part of ongoing modernization, the Army employs combat and related support units, trained and equipped for forward reconnaissance and surveillance, and irregular warfare capable, with select capabilities (including TITAN, Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node) in various locations in the region to enable command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for long range strikes.

b. (U) Far-term C2ISR (2023 to 2028).

(1) (U//FOUO) Looking out to the 2028 time horizon, Army Intelligence is developing material solutions and organizations to provide commanders better understanding through

multi-discipline intelligence in depth across the region. Coordinating through and with allies and partners in the region, the intelligence enterprise will build greater forward presence for assets and capabilities to provide the necessary information to support commander decision making.


(2) (U//FOUO) Current initiatives that support expanded operational intelligence theater-wide include upgrades and modernization to our integrated signals intelligence collection capabilities, and our ability to detect, identify, and track hostile targets across varied sensors. We are also developing the Multi-Domain Sensing System to better collect against identified threat communications and radar capabilities. Additionally, the employment of more collection assets and the development of signals intelligence platforms at key points in the western Pacific will allow for increased situational understanding of threat actions and intent. With the fielding of TITAN and TLS (Terrestrial Layer System), the Army will be seeing across the terrestrial, air, and space layers; providing increased integration across the Joint Force; and providing more responsive sensing to support joint targeting across the region and in support of all-domain operations. (See figure 11 on page 32.)

(3) (U//FOUO) To improve friendly command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in competition and as part of joint, coalition operations, the Army employs one or more improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance task forces with select capabilities (including TITAN) in the region, at various operational sites in the northern approach, and between the northern and southern approaches.

(4) (U//FOUO) Given the geostrategic dynamics of major power competition in the Indo-Pacific, and to enable cost-effective competition-conflict over the long term, the Army conducts activities to promote a military defense network with select allies and partners in the northern, central, southern, and western approaches. Historical animosities and differences may preclude a collective defense agreement, but a cooperative security arrangement should be practicable. One or more networks, building on military-to-military relationships, may fall well short of mutual defense agreements but they will promote security burden-sharing in a way that serves U.S. national security interests.

(5) (U//FOUO) To increase command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability against PLA threats in all domains, the Army plans to employ a layered, in depth mission command architecture to command and control operational movement and maneuver across the Indo-Pacific region. This builds on USINDOPACOM's requirement for an agile and defensible mission command network infrastructure to ensure sufficient command and control in competition, crisis, and armed conflict.

(6) (U//FOUO) Improving battle networks with alternative space- and ground-based architectures in the region, including at key points in the compact states, central, and western approaches, increases operational survivability and preserves friendly command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for Army and Joint forces.



(U) Figure 11. Army Intelligence: Current and Near Term Efforts across USINDOPACOM

(7) (U//FOUO) To build command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resiliency and depth across the Indo-Pacific, the Army employs intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units with high-altitude, low-observable, extended range, multi-purpose capabilities in unmanned aerial systems in the southern and compact states approaches. The C2ISR demands in all-domain warfare will be immense and the Army is preparing the theater architecture and capacity to meet the challenge.

(8) (U//FOUO) The Army plans to develop combat and support formations to extend fires deep into adversary support areas by leveraging operations with allied and partner forces. These forces will be forward deployed, trained and equipped for reconnaissance and surveillance, capable of irregular warfare, to provide asymmetric competition-conflict advantage and assist in the defense capacity of allies and partners in the western and central approaches, and in the area between the northern and central approaches, after the proper policy arrangements have been approved. These formations will be equipped with advanced communications and precision-guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles, will have ready access to remote extended-range fires, and will be able to advise multinational forces in the employment of U.S. advanced communications and fires capabilities.

10. (U) MEANS. The Army needs sufficient authorities, agreements, and funding to transform land power and implement posture objectives through 2028.

a. (U//FOUO) AUTHORITY NEEDED – NAMED OPERATION. The Army seeks the authorities of a named operation to improve the ability of the Army Service Component Command to scope, scale, and refocus, as the operational environment changes, DEFENDER Pacific exercises, Pacific Pathways, and site surveys. Transitioning Pacific Pathways to a named operation facilitates employment of Continental United States-based Brigade Combat Teams, Multi-Domain Task Forces, and a Security Force Assistance Brigade to deploy for training with allies and partners, while simultaneously positioning capabilities west of the International Date Line to rapidly respond to crisis and transition to conflict. Furthermore, a named operation helps the Army Service Component Command gain authorities to raise and lower the public profiles of key capabilities and thereby enhance its competition options.

b. (U//FOUO) AGREEMENTS. The Army seeks full U.S. agreements with key partners in the region, focused on the triangle of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Agreements give the United States full-function access to enter foreign countries with little delay and the ability to protect troops, infrastructure, and equipment overseas. These agreements are needed to ensure long-term ground presence, training, and other operational activities. Additional agreements are needed throughout the region as the Army seeks to expand training and presence outside of the first island chain, to include Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and a number of island nations.

c. (U) RESOURCING. The Army is making substantial investments in modernization, force posture improvements, and expanding capabilities to contribute to competition and the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region.

(1) (U//FOUO) In the President's Budget (PB) for fiscal year (FY) 2021, the Army has programmed \$4.82B in direct support of USINDOPACOM. This funding includes the Army's investments in Alaska and Joint Base Lewis McChord, Washington to support the Army elements assigned to USINDOPACOM. These forces deploy early in any contingency in support of USINDOPACOM operational plans. In PB21, the Army is also investing \$7.57B in Cross-Functional Team modernization development efforts in support of USINDOPACOM.

(2) (U//FOUO) In accordance with the fact that the Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense's priority theater, the Army has developed a carefully calibrated posture campaign plan to address shortfalls in capability, capacity, and posture (including access, presence, and influence) in the region. As USINDOPACOM shifts to a widely dispersed and more mobile operational footprint, Army sustainment capabilities must expand to fully enable the operational level of competition and war. The Army is refining prepositioned stock requirements to ensure the right capabilities are forward in the region to enable all-domain operations and sustain Joint forces for all contingencies.

(3) (U//FOUO) Resource priorities. The Army's top near-term resource priorities for support to USINDOPACOM include a Security Force Assistance Brigade; expansion of Army Prepositioned Stocks; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; critical munitions; and operational movement and maneuver into littoral areas. In the far-term, we will prioritize development of all-domain operations capabilities, including long range precision fires, tactical cyberspace, and future vertical lift. In line with these priorities, the Army is planning to establish command and control nodes west of the International Date Line to support distributed Joint operations. Furthermore, to meet operational movement requirements, the Army is prioritizing development of transportation capabilities for rapidly positioning forces and supplies across long distances. The Army will continue to address these priorities in the near-term (Program Objective Memorandum 22-26) and in the far-term (POM 23-27, POM 24-28, and POM 25-29).

11. (U//FOUO) CONCLUSION. To get Army forces to decisive terrain in the first island chain will require posture decisions to be made today—to develop the theater for adversarial competition and armed conflict on terms favorable to the United States. The Army is conducting a global campaign to redesign posture that integrates readiness, modernization, and force planning, beginning with the Indo-Pacific region. Our long range, area and precision fires, air and missile defense, operational network, combat vehicles, and other critical combat systems and enablers, must signal to the PLA that we dominate in battle. This land power enables competition and sets the nation up to be in the best possible circumstance if we transition to armed conflict. Our land power sustains the deterrence necessary to allow successful competition below the level of armed conflict. By incorporating next-generation and leap-ahead capabilities into formations, at the front lines of major power competition, while maintaining needed readiness to assure allies and partners, and deter competitors, the Army is providing the foundation for national security.

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