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**THESIS**

**MEASURING A CONDUCTIVE ENVIRONMENT  
FOR TOXIC LEADERSHIP AT USNA**

by

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June 2023

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## ABSTRACT

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Based on the analysis of 183 survey responses, we determined that there is a moderate conducive environment to allow toxic leadership to enact negative effects at the Naval Academy among midshipmen, officers, and senior enlisted personnel.

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—Nick Hall

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—Kenneth Shim

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. BACKGROUND

Commissioning approximately 1,100 new military officers every year, the United States Naval Academy dons the responsibility to supply the United States Navy (USN) and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) with the highest caliber leaders possible. In doing so, midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy (USNA) undergo three semesters of formal leadership training in a classroom environment, serve in leadership positions that range from leading a handful of their classmates to the entire student body, and partake in various summer training sessions that allow them to see leadership throughout the USN and FMF. As a result, USNA is often referred to as a “leadership laboratory” Despite the Naval Academy’s illustrious reputation for developing some of the fleet’s best and brightest officers, aspects of toxicity remain in the ranks of the Brigade of Midshipmen.

While the topic of destructive leaders often focuses on the characteristics of the individual in a position of power, seldom does the research apply a systems perspective that focuses on the confluence of the leader himself, the followers, and the environment that allowed it to inflict negative effect on the followers and the organization (Padilla et al., 2007). The purpose of this research is to examine the environmental factors present at the United States Naval Academy (USNA) that contribute to a toxic leader at the institution imparting destructive effects on his or her followers.

Focusing research of destructive leadership on the leader alone ignores significant factors that may have contributed to his or her behavior, such as the environment surrounding the leader. Throughout our literature review we have come across many articles examining specific aspects of a work environment that contribute to the development of leadership skills, and more specifically, the relationship between the Naval Academy environment and the cultivation of specific leadership attitudes and behavior. Padilla et al. states, “Leadership of any type springs from the interplay of an individual’s motivation and ability to lead, subordinates’ desire for direction and authority, and events calling for leadership” (p. 179). Our research will attempt to identify and examine these

events to broaden our understanding of which aspects of the USNA are stifling the development of constructive leadership, thus cultivating destructive forms of leadership. This research aims to answer the following questions: 1. Among the Brigade of Midshipmen at USNA, is there currently a conducive environment, as defined by Padilla et al.'s toxic triangle model, that would enable a toxic leader to inflict harm on his/her subordinates? 2. Which components of Padilla et al.'s definition of a "conductive environment" contribute the most to the environment at USNA? 3. Is there a correlation between perceived conducive environment at USNA and the perception of toxic leadership among underclass midshipmen at USNA?

## **B. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH**

The likely contributions of this study will point to environmental factors that allow a toxic leader to inflict negative effects on his or her followers and the institution in which the leader is a member. This study will provide insight into how an institution and prescribe methods to rectify a work environment so that it is not conducive to toxic leaders and susceptible followers that leads to negative ramifications on the organization, particularly in the context of the Naval Academy. Since the Naval Academy is a military commissioning source, this study could open the door for future studies at other commissioning sources (e.g., West Point, U.S. Air Force Academy, Officer Commissioning Schools, campus Reserve Officers' Training Corps) to expand on the exploration of potential conducive environments for toxic leadership. This in turn could yield downstream positive influence on military leadership, since this study and further studies can implement methods to identify toxic leadership and prevent those leaders from affecting their military units in a negative way.

## **C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS**

The scope of this research involves exploring into an avenue within leadership scholarship that focuses on testing a toxic leadership model. We elected to put Padilla et al.'s definition of a "conductive environment" within the toxic triangle model to the test within the context of the Naval Academy. This research does not intend to determine causation to any extent between a conducive environment for toxic leadership and

destructive leaders themselves at USNA. However, we do intend to delve into a specific aspect of a highly referenced framework (the toxic triangle) within leadership literature within the context of a military institution.

This research does assume some limitations. The first of these limitations includes the nature of how we collected the data: via survey. Since the survey only collects data from each individual at a single point in time, it may not truly represent the true conditions of the environment at USNA. In order to draw this conclusion via a survey, it would require gathering data from the same individuals multiple times at different points in time (i.e., different years). Additionally, surveys do not allow the subjects to elaborate on their answers in order to provide more insight into the intention of their answers. Thus, the data may not accurately reflect the true environment of the Academy. The survey is also limited by the number of questions it asks. Therefore, we could have missed inquiring about a significant environmental factor present at USNA and it would not naturally arise with those surveyed. Also, since we utilized a Likert scale to ask questions, this could lead to a disparity between the way different subjects answered those questions on the survey. As a result, this could skew the results in a direction that does not actually reflect the sentiment of those surveyed. Finally, our sample size of 183 completed surveys is a convenience sample of freshmen, sophomores, and juniors. This only accounts for four percent of the total student body and does not account for any seniors. Thus, this research may not accurately reflect the sentiment of the Brigade as a whole, though it shows a significant sample size.

#### **D. METHODOLOGY**

We conducted our research by administering a survey to fourth-, third-, and second-class midshipmen (freshmen, sophomores, and juniors). We chose to survey the junior ranking midshipmen because they are subject to first-class (senior) midshipman leadership, and their subordinate perspective potentially gives us indications of a conducive environment for toxic leadership. Our survey consisted of 50 total questions: 29 questions exploring a conducive environment for toxic leaders to inflict harm at the Academy, seven questions addressing the toxicity of the subject's first-level leader, and 14 demographic

questions to analyze trends among different categories of people, if any. The first 36 questions of the survey are in the Appendix of this thesis. The surveyed midshipmen answered the first 36 questions on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 6 with 1 representing a response of “strongly disagree” and 6 representing an answer of “strongly agree.” Generally, we worded the questions in such a way that the higher number represented a response that indicated a more conducive environment while a lower number represented a less conducive environment. 10 of the 36 questions indicated the opposite correlation, with a lower number indicating a more conducive environment and a higher number representing a less conducive environment. We worded all seven questions measuring toxic leadership in a general manner.

The 29 survey questions aimed at exploring USNA’s environment were broken down into four categories: instability (six questions), perceived threat (seven questions), absence of checks and balances/institutionalization (seven questions), and cultural values (nine question). Cultural values is further broken down into three sub categories: power distance (two questions), uncertainty of avoidance (three questions), and collectivism (four questions). We chose to categorize our questions into these categories because these are the categories that Padilla et al. use to define a conducive environment for toxic leadership. We will adopt Padilla et al.’s framework for conducive environments in our research to explore its reliability and discern if there is a conducive environment at the Academy.

We administered the survey during the first ten minutes of each midshipman’s respective leadership curriculum class: Preparing to Lead (NL110) for the fourth class, Ethics and Moral Reasoning (NE203) for the third class, and Leadership: Theory and Applications (NL310) for the second class. We issued paper copy surveys over a three-week period in January and February of 2023. We gave each student an informed consent form and required them to initial their copy to acknowledge their consent.

This process yielded 183 responses with an approximately even spread between fourth-class, third-class and second-class midshipmen. We transferred the responses to a program to use for further analysis, which we will address in the Data and Analysis section.

## **E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT**

The introductory chapter covers the intent and background of the study focused on toxic leadership, conducive environments for toxic leadership, and the Naval Academy. Chapter II is the literature review. This will cover Padilla et, al.'s "toxic triangle" with a strong emphasis on the "conducive environment" pillar of the triangle. We will also cover other research pertaining to toxic leadership, destructive leadership, dark leadership throughout our literature review. Chapter III covers the data analysis of our study. This section shows how the data was collected and why each variable was chosen from the data. Chapter IV shows the results of the study, focusing on the correlation between a toxic leader and a conducive environment as it pertains to the United States Naval Academy. Chapter V, the closing chapter, contains conclusions and recommendations. The Appendix includes the survey we fielded, both in its presented format and divided up into each of the measured categories

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## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper will examine Padilla et al.'s (2007) "The Toxic Triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Environments" with a focus on their claims regarding the role an environment plays in making a destructive leader. For a toxic leader to enable negative effects on his or her followers and organization, Padilla et al. developed the toxic triangle to explain the factors that must be present. The elements of the toxic triangle are "destructive leaders," "susceptible followers," and a "conducive environment." (p. 177). Padilla et al. (2007) use historical examples such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Fidel Castro, and Mother Theresa to explain their definition of a "destructive leader" versus a "constructive leader." Ultimately, the Padilla et al. define "destructive leadership" using the following five criteria:

1. Destructive leadership is seldom absolutely or entirely destructive.
2. [The process of] destructive leadership involves control and coercion, rather than persuasion, and commitment.
3. [The process of] destructive leadership has a selfish orientation; it is focused a leader's objectives and goals, as opposed to the needs of the constituents, and the larger social organization.
4. The effects of destructive leadership are outcomes that compromise the quality of life for constituents and detract from [the organization's] main purposes.
5. Destructive organizational outcomes also depend on susceptible followers and conducive environments. (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 179)

Padilla et al. (2007) explain that there is a definitional issue with the term "destructive leadership" and explain how they define it. Therefore, the reader can use this definition in the rest of the paper. They identified these five criteria for a destructive leader by identifying commonalities with other researchers' work.

Padilla et. al. (2007) recognize that the roles of constituents and environmental situations "have not received adequate attention" and therefore attempt to "remedy this focus," thus presenting a fuller picture of the "toxic triangle" (p.179).

## A. TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Academic literature abounds on the intricacies of negative leadership styles, many of which are described as “toxic.” The word “toxic” is often used in modern vernacular without much precision, so we will attempt to use it in such an ambiguous manner. Leadership scholarship over the last few decades has worked to define toxic leadership and systematize it, as the word “toxic” is used to describe a wide range of destructive or negative behaviors among leaders. Schmidt (2008) developed a scale to determine the left and right boundaries of toxic leadership upon reviewing decades’ worth of leadership literature that danced around the subject. Upon sifting through various definitions, Schmidt identified several common dimensions of toxic leaders:

1. They neglect the well-being of their subordinates, and may be harmful or abusive...[They] hold subordinates responsible for things beyond their control or tasks beyond their job description.
2. They [micromanage] their subordinates to the point [of]...stifling constructive criticism and [coercing them] to comply with ...the leader’s judgment and actions.
3. Toxic leaders are narcissistic...[They are] self-interested, [lack] empathy for others and have inflated opinions of their own importance. (Schmidt, 2008, pp. 4–5)

All three of these dimensions lead to two major negative effects: 1. They destroy morale. 2. They create a hostile work climate (Schmidt, 2008, p. 73).

Schmidt derived and validated a Toxic Leadership Scale (TLS) through an interview and survey-based study of varying types of subordinates. He developed questions that measure the supervisor or leader’s “self-promotion, abusive supervision, unpredictability, narcissism, and authoritarian nature” (p. 74) which each contain a specific factor loading that determine the strength of each question for each of the five scales (p. 75). We derive the questions in the “Toxic Leadership” category of our own survey from Schmidt’s validated toxic leadership scale.

Reed (2004) concurs with Schmidt in that toxic leadership fosters a negative work climate and reduces morale among workers (p. 67). He asserts that it is not necessarily a concrete behavior that is “toxic,” but that behavior’s effects on the leader’s followers that

makes the leader a “toxic leader” (p. 67). Reed’s three key elements of toxic leadership are as the following:

1. An apparent lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates.
2. A personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects organizational climate.
3. A conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest. (George, 2004, p. 67)

Reed, who has conducted considerable research on toxic leadership in the military, posits that perhaps military culture lends toward the perpetuation of toxic leadership, since “subordinates might not report toxic leaderships because nobody likes a whiner” and of “respecting the rank despite not respecting the person” (p. 68).

Lipman-Blumen (2005) posited that toxic leadership persists due to organizations and followers preserving and sustaining them, in addition to tolerating them. She describes these leaders as “having the effect of poison” wherever they go since “significant and enduring harm” follows them (hence the usage of “toxic”) (pp. 17–18). This set a foundation for Padilla et al. (2007) to explore more than the toxic leader him or herself – hence the toxic triangle was developed.

While several other authors dive into the nuances of a variety of types of negative or “dark leadership,” Schmidt followed up his 2008 toxic leadership scale with a 2012 study that determines two additional components of toxic leaders: self-promotion and unpredictability. It is this research on top of Lipman-Blumen’s assertions of toxic leaders that contributed to Milosevic et al.’s (2020) study on the nature of leadership and the role of followers, and determining the best way to overcome them.

Milosevic et al. define toxic leaders as “leader focused on maintaining position of control via toxic influence attempts...whose harmfulness, although relatively unintentional ...cause serious harm by reckless behavior, as well as by their incompetence” (p. 115). Milosevic et al. determined that toxic leaders’ primary concern with maintaining their positions of power or growing their influence through perpetuation ambiguous or uncertain work environments, where subordinates have a difficult time discerning their own performance as well as that of the toxic. This study also challenged Padilla et al.’s (2007)

notion that “susceptible followers” are merely passive components in the toxic triangle. Rather, they assert that followers can demonstrate considerable agency in an attempt to either thwart toxic leadership or fuel it (Milosevic et al., 2020).

Milosevic et al. also categorize toxic leadership into a type of “dark leadership” and compare it to three other dark leadership styles: abusive, destructive and ineffective. They compare each of these styles’ 1. degree of intent to harm others, and 2. the actual harmfulness of their influence (p. 119). Their study determines that toxic leaders generally have a medium level intent to harm, but harmfulness level that varies from medium to very high. Thus, toxic leaders tend to be less harmful overall than abusive or destructive leaders (Figure 1).

Now that we have a background understanding of varying interpretations of “toxic leadership,” we explore the three sides of Padilla et al.’s (2007) toxic triangle: the destructive leader, susceptible followers, and a conducive environment (p. 180; Figure 2).


Figure 1. Situating Toxic Leadership. Source: Milosevic et al. (2020).

Intent to harm \ Harmfulness of the influence	High			Medium			Low		
	Destructive goals	Narcissism	Relevant competence	Emotional outbursts	Position of control	Lack of relevant competence	Ineptitude to lead	Lack of initiative	Lack of responsibility
Very high	DL	DL	DL	AL	TL		TL		
High		AL	AL		AL				
Medium						TL	IL	TL	
Low							IL	IL	IL

Fear/Compliance
Powerlessness/  
Frustration
Workarounds/  
Agency

Note. AL = abusive leadership; DL = destructive leadership; IL = ineffective leadership; TL = toxic leadership

Figure 2. The Toxic Triangle Model. Source: Padilla et al. (2007).



## B. DESTRUCTIVE LEADERS

The first pillar of the “toxic triangle” is destructive leaders. These individuals “display charisma, personalized use of power explain what that means, narcissism, negative life themes explain what that means, and an ideology of hate.” (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 180). Although a leader displaying only one of these characteristics is not likely to become a destructive leader, they do not need to possess all five. The presence of the other two pillars of the toxic triangle matter (susceptible followers and conducive environment) and largely determines if an individual with the characteristics above will become a destructive leader (Padilla et al., 2007).

Additionally, Padilla et al. describe destructive leadership as a process that may display varying behavior that all ultimately lead to “undesirable outcomes” (p. 177). They

emphasize the necessity of both the process (i.e., malicious intention) and the outcome (i.e., undesirable effects) to be present in order for a destructive leader to manifest (p. 177). A bad-intentioned leader may produce positive outcomes and a good-intentioned leader may produce poor outcomes. Neither one of these leaders would be considered destructive under Padilla et al.'s explanation, though they may be considered another kind of negative leader. Padilla et al. describe five elements of a destructive leader:

1. Destructive leadership is seldom absolutely or entirely destructive.
2. [The process of] destructive leadership involves control and coercion, rather than persuasion, and commitment.
3. [The process of] destructive leadership has a selfish orientation; it is focused a leader's objectives and goals, as opposed to the needs of the constituents, and the larger social organization.
4. The effects of destructive leadership are outcomes that compromise the quality of life for constituents and detract from [the organization's] main purposes.
5. Destructive organizational outcomes also depend on susceptible followers and conducive environments. (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 179)

According to Milosevic et al. (2020), destructive leaders “internalize destructive goals, exhibit narcissism, and demonstrate relatively high levels of competence, which gives them perceived credibility to enact their harmful intentions” (p. 119). Similar to what Padilla et al. (2007) determines, Milosevic et al. (2020) concludes that destructive leaders can be “charming and engaging on the surface...but exploitative and quite ruthless,” thus leading to high levels of potential harm they can inflict (p. 120). They distinguish themselves from abusive or toxic leaders since destructive leaders “premeditate their intent to harm others on the path to self-promotion,” whereas a toxic or abusive leader's sole focal points are their own self-promotion and masking incompetence through uncertainty and unpredictability (p. 120).

### **C. SUSCEPTIBLE FOLLOWERS**

Padilla et al. (2007) look at the followers who are more susceptible to destructive leaders and conclude that these followers have “unmet basic needs, negative core self-evaluations, low maturity, ambition, congruent values and beliefs (individuals whose beliefs are consistent with those of a destructive leader), and unsocialized values” (p. 183).

As stated by Hogan (2006) “individuals who endorse unsocialized values such as greed and selfishness are more likely to follow destructive leaders and engage in destructive behavior.”

Susceptible followers are categorized into two types, under Padilla et al.’s model: the conformers and the colluders. Conformers “comply with destructive leaders out of fear” while colluders “actively participate in a destructive leader’s agenda” (p. 183). Conformers reflect a “damage control” approach to suspecting themselves to the leader, while colluders seek personal gain. Conformers are most vulnerable when basic needs are not met whereas colluders often times have similar behavioral traits or the destructive leader, as well as share the leader’s worldview (p. 183).

Seldom are the followers the focal point in research surrounding toxic leadership, however, Padilla et al., are not alone in addressing their contribution to the emergence of toxic leaders. Luthans et al. (1998) address this paradoxical situation of the followers suffering the effects of a toxic leader that they unknowingly had a part in creating. This is common in societies or institutions with high degrees of uncertainty avoidance and large power distance between those wielding legitimate power over those who do not (Luthans et al., 1998; Hofstede et al., 2005).

Milosevic et al. (2020) discerned that followers, while often neglected in leadership scholarship, play a critical role in enabling the destructive leader to enact harmful effects, despite the followers often times serving as the party that is harmed the most. They determined that a follower may also employ his or her own agency to stifle the negative influence of toxic or destructive leaders or minimize the damage they might cause. Self-agentic followers can do this by maintaining their own high level of competency and strategically promoting and employing workarounds to enable a positive work environment and effects on the organization and constituents, despite the presence of a toxic leader (Milosevic et al., 2020). Therefore, if subordinates can pursue professional competence and workarounds, then they are less likely to become conforming or colluding susceptible followers.

## **D. CONDUCTIVE ENVIRONMENT**

Padilla et al. (2007) look at the environment in which a leader can become destructive and concludes that some environmental factors contribute to the leader imparting negative effects: instability, perceived threat, cultural values, and absence of checks and balances and institutionalization (p. 185). The next section delves into the details of these factors.

### **1. Instability**

According to Padilla et al., “leaders can enhance their power by advocating radical change to restore order [during times of instability]” (p. 185). Unstable environments require quick change by a leader, and because the demand for change is so rapid, the proper time to vet out toxic leaders does not exist. Modern post-communist societies illustrate the impact of unstable breeding grounds for major policy changes from elites who carry major influence and take advantage of the uncertainty and discomfort of the populace (p. 185). Unstable environments are not limited to ones led by quick-acting leaders who are prone to radical decision making, but also “laissez-faire” leaders who cannot restore order by implementing necessary change (Skogstad et al., 2007). Skogstad et al. state that “laissez-faire leadership [is] a root cause of workplace stressors and strains and whereby the effects of laissez-faire leadership on psychological distress are mediated through role stressors, conflicts with coworkers, and bullying at work” (p. 83).

### **2. Perceived Threat**

Padilla et al. (2007) connect instability to “the perception of imminent threat” (p. 185). Scenarios such as sentiments of mass mistreatment, economic turmoil or social injustice may lend more towards a high “perception of threat” to a group (p. 185). A threat need not actually be present. Only the “perception of a threat,” since that will dictate the environment’s likelihood of enabling an assertive, charismatic leader to manifest (common traits among destructive leaders) (p. 185). The frequency of reminders of this potential threat also plays a significant role in its impact on the environment (p. 185). At the Naval Academy, the threat of the loss of privileges for a midshipman that fails the Physical

Readiness Test (PRT) could be an example of this, particularly since they are reminded of the repercussions on a regular basis.

*a. U.S. Naval Academy’s Conduct and Honor Systems*

The competitive nature of the Naval Academy, as well as strict honor and conduct systems serve as tools to commission high quality persons of integrity and honor into the naval service. Although put in place to thwart unacceptable behavior, these systems have also, to some extent, sown seeds of mistrust within the Brigade of Midshipmen. As discovered by Logazino & Parker (2022), “cynicism increases, so do conduct and honor [violations] because many have lost trust and faith in the institution. As the number of conduct and honor [violations] grow, this creates more cynicism because the other midshipmen see offenders still graduate and go on to lead Sailors and Marines” (Logazino & Parker, 2022, p. 12).

**3. Cultural Values**

“Dark leaders” are probable to develop in cultures that promote “the avoidance of uncertainty, collectivism (as opposed to individualism), and high power distance” (Hofstede et al., 2005; Padilla et al., 2007, p. 186). Additionally, the impact of toxic leadership on employees is stronger in societies where power is identified by formal status rather than specific aptitudes (Behery, 2018). “The relationship between supervisors’ and subordinates’ affective commitment was found to be more prominent among subordinates with low power distance orientation” (Loi et al., 2012, p. 472). When power distance is low, the leaders of those followers tend to engage in more ethical leadership styles than one might see on a societal level (Loi et al., 2012).

*a. Avoidance of Uncertainty*

The degree to which a culture or society feels threatened under unclear or ambiguous circumstances is “avoidance of uncertainty” (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 186). Milosevic et al. (2020) uses this component Padilla et al.’s framework to conduct case study interviews with workers in a variety of fields they considered to be “ambiguous” or “uncertain” work environments. They included sectors such as education, health care,

agriculture and information technology to compile their data, all of which they determined worked under “uncertain” conditions (Milosevic et al., 2020, p, 122).

**b. *Collectivism***

An organization or population which values the collective success of the group over individual initiatives could fall prey to a destructive leader. These groups stress “group loyalty” and “in-group/out-group distinctions” (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 186). Reed asserts that military culture fosters loyalty to the unit and service, which could potentially be at the detriment of smothering individuals’ critiques (Reed, 2004).

**c. *Power Distance***

Hofstede et al. describe power distance as “the difference in privilege and authority between high- and low-status individuals” (Hofstede et al., 2005). He goes on to expand on his power distance study years later when he says, “It is conceivable that abusive supervision occurs more frequently in countries with high power distance (e.g., India, Mexico, and Malaysia) where it is more acceptable to have unequal power distributions within social institutions and for organizational representatives to invoke legitimate authority” (Hofstede et al., 2005). The class structure at The United States Naval Academy is organized in a way that allows upperclassmen certain authority over underclassmen. This unequal distribution of power shares similarities to nations with high degrees of power distance, as described by Tepper (2007):

Power distance may also influence the occurrence of abusive supervision indirectly through its effect on norms toward abusive behavior. It is also possible that reactions to abusive supervision may be less intense in countries with high power distance compared with countries with low power distance (e.g., Denmark, New Zealand, and Israel), where hierarchy in organizations is perceived to be exploitative. (Tepper, 2007)

**4. *Absence of Checks and Balances***

If one or few leaders in the organization possess absolute power then this could lead to an absence of checks and balances. James Madison notes in *The Federalist Papers* the necessity for checks and balances in governments in order to avoid corruption. 19th century British politician Lord Acton coined the phrase “power corrupts; absolute power corrupts

absolutely.” Thus, the more checks and balances in place in a work environment, the more accountability there will be in place for the leaders of that organization. Wielding power alone does not turn a leader towards corruption, but rather amplifies preexisting personality traits that lend themselves towards toxic leadership (aggression, narcissism, selfishness) (Kipnis, 1972). Kipnis suggests that unchecked power is more likely to result in a self-serving and destructive leader.

Koo and Park (2018) conclude that organizations with greater power distance can lead to greater control, stating, “Leaders are endowed with greater discretion and control, and followers generally obey their decisions. Hence, the inherent power distance between leaders and followers may influence the leadership effect on organizational and strategic outcomes” (Koo & Park, 2018).

Padilla et. al (2007) emphasize the importance of “managerial discretion” in order to promote checks and balances (p. 186). This means that managers and subordinates of higher-level leaders feel empowered to exercise their own judgment in day-to-day decisions and to take ownership of their work, thus emboldening them to hold their superiors accountable.

## **5. Institutionalization**

The higher the level of centralized power that exists in an organization, the more likely it is to develop a “culture of dependency and apathy among followers” (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 186). This leads to institutionalization and a lack of dissidence among the constituents (Padilla et al., 2007).

Reed and Bullis (2009) discovered that senior military officers are largely unaffected by toxic leadership, and some are completely indifferent to them compared to positive leadership styles. They discern that the military context institutionalizes its members to some degree to become more calloused toward dark leadership styles, such as toxic or destructive leaders (p. 16).

## **E. SUMMARY**

In this literature review, we covered the various approaches to understanding toxic leadership. Most notably, toxic leaders neglect the well-being of their subordinates, micromanage to the point of stifling criticism, and are narcissistic (Schmidt, 2008). Toxic leaders do not necessarily always have to impart negative effects on the organization or their followers (Milosevic et al., 2020). Thus, all three sides of the toxic triangle must be present in order for the leader to have a damaging impact on the subordinates or organization (Padilla et al., 2007). The three sides of the toxic triangle are the destructive leader, susceptible followers, and a conducive environment (Padilla et al., 2007). In our study, we focus on gaining insight towards understanding if the Naval Academy has a conducive environment for a toxic leader to impart negative effects on the institution, based on the criteria set forth by Padilla et al.

## **F. HYPOTHESIS**

As there are aspects of a perceived threat at USNA, such as the external pressures of the physical and academic standards, along with the honor system, we hypothesize that there will be aspects of a conducive environment for toxic leadership according to the criteria set forth by Padilla et al. However, these instances will be atypical to the majority of the responses gathered through our survey. This research aims to view the Brigade of Midshipmen and its leadership through the lens of Padilla et al.'s toxic triangle to understand two things about leadership at the Naval Academy: Are the aspects of a conducive environment present among the brigade (instability, perceived threat, cultural values, and absence of checks and balances), and are these aspects manifesting themselves in the midshipman leadership?

### **III. DATA AND ANALYSIS**

#### **A. DATA**

##### **1. Introduction**

Data was collected from fourth-, third-, and second-class midshipmen (freshmen, sophomores, and juniors) utilizing a 50 question Likert-scale survey. A total of 188 surveys were collected from the respondents. The survey consisted of five sections with the first four sections testing variables of a conducive environment for toxic leadership and the last section testing for the presence of toxic leadership itself. Descriptive statistics of data gathered for each variable is listed under Appendix B.

##### **2. Missing Data**

Of the original 188 responses, five contained more than 10% missing data from respondents. All missing data originated from the demographic questions in the survey. These five surveys were discarded because the categorical data could not be imputed.

The frequency distribution of missing data confirmed that no variable crossed the 10% threshold for missing data. Therefore, any missing data among the continuous variables can be imputed utilizing the median (Lynch, 2007). Typically, with Likert-type data, the median replacement method is preferred over the mean replacement method because the mean is not as significant in this case (Lynch, 2007).

##### **3. Normality**

Normality for the observed variables was assessed by measuring skewness and kurtosis. For skewness, data is considered to be normally distributed if the values are between -2 and 2. None of the observed variables displayed significant skewness. Furthermore, skewness for data from Likert scales is not as meaningful compared to high kurtosis (George & Mallery, 2010).

Kurtosis refers to the frequency of outliers in a distribution of data. Data that have a large number of outliers will have high kurtosis. Generally speaking, if the “absolute

value of the Kurtosis is less than three times the standard error, then the kurtosis is not significantly different from that of the normal distribution” (Sposito et al., 1983). Five of fifty questions were deleted due to high kurtosis. These questions were CULTVAL 7, TOXLEAD 1, TOXLEAD 2, TOXLEAD 4, and TOXLEAD 7 and highlighted in red in Appendix A.

#### **4. Linearity, Homoscedasticity, Multicollinearity**

The imputed dataset was tested for linearity, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity to ensure it was prepared for structural equations modeling in confirmatory factor analysis. The independent variable (IV) and dependent variables (DVs) of the data displayed a significant value for deviation from linearity of greater than 0.05, which indicates sufficient linearity. A scatter plot was generated with each variable displayed on the y-axis and its residual on the x-axis to test for homoscedasticity. A consistent pattern was generated on each plot which indicates that homoscedasticity is not present in the dataset (Hair et al., 2010). Variable inflation factor (VIF) was generated for each independent variable by running a multivariate regression to test for multicollinearity. A VIF of less than three indicates that multicollinearity is not present in the data set (O’Brien, 2007). All independent variables had a VIF of less than three.

### **B. ANALYSIS**

#### **1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

Padilla et al. (2007) state that a conducive environment for toxic leadership is composed of primarily four factors: Cultural values, instability, perceived threat, and absence of checks and balances/institutionalization. Since the constructs have already been generated, this research seeks to confirm that the relationships exist between the measured variables and that they factor into their respective categories within the conducive environment construct. Thus, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Figure 3) was conducted first in order to confirm this a priori hypothesis. The objective is to determine whether the survey encapsulates the four variables and if it can accurately measure a conducive environment for toxic leadership at USNA.

The model generated for the CFA utilized five factors with four factors loading onto a second order factor, which was co-varied with the fifth factor. The second order factor in the model was named “Conducive Environment,” and the four factors that loaded onto it were the four variables that compose said environment according to Padilla et al. (2007). The second-order factor was directly correlated with the fifth factor, which was toxic leadership, in order to determine the correlation between the two factors.

18 items were dropped from the model due to poor loadings ( $<0.30$ ) (Fornell, 1981), leaving 32 items from the original survey. The dropped items are highlighted in red in Appendix A. The model fit statistics of the model fell within the acceptable range with the exception of the p-value due to a large sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1999): Chi square/df  $<3$ , CFI  $> 0.90$ , GFI  $> 0.90$ , AGFI  $> 0.80$ , SRMR  $< 0.09$ , RMSEA  $< 0.05$ , and p-close  $> 0.05$ . Validity and reliability checks were performed on the CFA model by calculating Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV), and Average Shared Variance (ASV). A CR greater than 0.7, AVE greater than 0.5, and an MSV less than the AVE are sufficient thresholds to confirm the model has validity and reliability (Hair et al. 1999). These tests were performed, and the model exceeded thresholds.

Lastly, the model was tested for Common Method Bias (CMB) by adding a Common Latent Factor (CLF) to all observed variables in the model and then comparing the standardized regression weights of this model to the standardized regression weights of the model without the CLF (Archimi et al., 2018). The average difference of the standardized regression weights was less than 0.20 in the model, which indicates that CMB is not present (Archimi et al., 2018).

## **2. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis**

With the CFA model achieving good model fit and exceeding the aforementioned thresholds, data from the six latent variables was imputed into SPSS to run a multiple linear regression analysis (Table 1). Conducive environment (CE) was selected as the dependent variable and its four factors were selected as the independent variables. The objective is to

determine which of the four factors of a conducive environment for toxic leadership is present at the Naval Academy.

### 3. Simple Linear Regression Analysis

A simple linear regression analysis (Table 2) was performed with CE as the independent variable and toxic leadership as the dependent variable to determine if a conducive environment is statistically significant in promoting toxic leadership, according to Padilla et al.'s model. Imputed data from the CFA model was also used for the regression analysis.

Table 1. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	-4.441E-16	.000		.000	1.000	.000	.000
	pcvdtht	2.205E-16	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000
	instab	.339	.000	1.000	29979438.861	<.001	.339	.339
	cultval	1.761E-14	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000
	acb	8.471E-17	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000


a. Dependent Variable: CE

Table 2. Simple Linear Regression Analysis

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.034	.156		.217	.829	-.275	.342
	CE	1.096	.149	.480	7.356	<.001	.802	1.390

a. Dependent Variable: toxlead

Figure 3. Conducive Environment Model in AMOS



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## IV. RESULTS

A good-fitting, empirical model of Padilla et al.'s conducive environment for toxic leadership construct was successfully created and confirmed at USNA via CFA. Of the four variables, instability and cultural values load highly with a conducive environment, while absence of checks and balances and perceived threat do not load as highly as the aforementioned two factors.

The survey items for the two weakly correlated variables display high loadings (correlations) to their respective latent variables, which indicate that we were able to fully encapsulate Padilla et al.'s understanding of the two factors into measurable questions. However, the data suggests that these two factors are not highly substantive in the establishment of a conducive environment for toxic leadership.

In answering the original hypothesis whether aspects of a conducive environment for toxic leadership are present at the United States Naval Academy, the multiple regression analysis indicates instability as the only factor that displays statistical significance in the dataset. In the CFA model, the cultural values factor correlates almost as highly as instability in the model, but it is not a statistically significant factor at the Naval Academy, according to the regression analysis.

Lastly, the simple linear regression analysis indicates that conducive environment (CE) is indeed significantly related to toxic leadership, confirming one of the three pillars of the toxic triangle in Padilla et al.'s model.

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## **V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. CONCLUSION**

We were able to successfully create an empirical model that measured a conducive environment for toxic leadership at USNA utilizing an 18-question survey. Four variables that Padilla et al. (2007) stated make up this construct: cultural values, instability, perceived threat, and absence of checks and balances. Of the four variables, instability and cultural values correlates highly with a conducive environment, while absence of checks and balances and perceived threat display some correlation but does not load as highly as the aforementioned two. The linear regression model determined that a conducive environment, as measured by instability, cultural values, absence of checks and balances, and perceived threat, is significantly related to toxic leadership. Moreover, this model is able to determine that instability was the most statistically significant of the four factors.

### **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Although Padilla et al.'s toxic triangle model serves as an accurate model of whether or not an environment is conducive at USNA to a toxic leader imparting harmful effects on his or her followers, we recommend that similar research is conducted to test the susceptibility of followers and the destructive leaders themselves. Thus, we recommend further study on the other two sides of the toxic triangle, as well as a refined study into instability at the Naval Academy.

#### **1. Instability**

Although instability is only one aspect of a conducive environment, it was statistically significant after accounting for the other aspects and warrants further research. Therefore, we recommend additional research into instability alone, which may uncover aspects of the Naval Academy ripe for change and lead to ways to stabilize the environment. In response to our survey questions pertaining to instability, the Naval Academy showed inconsistency in handling honor and conduct offenses. The Naval

Academy has a high turnover rate of leadership, lacks clarity in instructions, and espouses an unstable environment among the Brigade.

This perception of instability could be due to the fact that the military staff that command and govern the Brigade of Midshipmen are active-duty officers and enlisted personnel. Thus, the direct chain of command of the student body also rotate to and from their positions approximately every two to three years, as is the standard among active-duty military. Since different personnel handle conflict and problem in a variety of ways, there could be a sense that some midshipmen are treated unfairly and unequally compared to others who may have other active-duty members in their chain of command.

The Naval Academy also affords first-class midshipmen to serve in leadership capacities and command the Brigade in the ways they see fit, as long as they do not act contrary to their governing documents. Therefore, a midshipman may feel a vastly different sense of their work environment one semester versus the next. This may create an unstable climate. In light of this, we recommend that USNA emphasizes the importance of standardization of regulations across the Brigade to cultivate a sense of equity and justice. We also recommend the Academy stresses the regularity of turnover in the fleet and the importance for both leaders and subordinates to become flexible in a variety of leadership compositions.

Lastly, given that our model only used six metrics to measure instability and it was the most prominent factor in a conducive environment, further research is warranted. This could help substantiate the Academy's efforts to standardize the training at the midshipman level.

## **2. Susceptible Followers**

Of the remaining untested sides of Padilla et al.'s toxic triangle (susceptible followers and destructive leaders), an analysis of the susceptibility of the Naval Academy's Brigade of Midshipmen can reveal potential shortcomings of how we teach followership as well as leadership. Padilla et al. state that susceptible followers are a product of "unmet basic needs," "negative core self-evaluations," "low maturity," "ambition," "congruent values and beliefs," and "unsocialized values" (pp. 183–185). As an institution that

transforms adolescent civilians into members of the U.S. Navy charged with the rigor, discipline, and loss of autonomy synonymous with being in the military, we recommend an analysis of how the Naval Academy develops midshipmen in their first two years at the institution.

### **3. Toxic Leadership**

In order to have consistency among data pertaining to Padilla et al.'s toxic triangle, we recommend using the same questions pertaining to toxic leadership as the dependent variable in any future linear regression analysis. These questions can be found in the Appendix and are largely derived from Schmidt's (2008) "Toxic Leadership Scale" (TLS).

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## APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS

We are asking you to complete this survey because the results may help improve your or others' experiences at the academy or in your company. NO ONE except the researchers conducting this study will see your responses to this survey, and any information that personally identifies you will be removed. The written report of the survey's findings will relay only broad descriptions and no individual responses. Therefore, please BE AS OPEN AND HONEST AS POSSIBLE when answering this survey. YOUR VOICE MATTERS, and again, you will remain anonymous.

Using the response scale below, please choose the response that best reflects **your belief** or that best describes **how you feel**. There are no right or wrong responses. When "midshipman leadership" or "midshipman leader" is mentioned, please think of your **midshipman chain of command for Fall AY23 (fire team leader, squad leader, platoon commander, company commander or any striper billet)**. When "institution" or "Academy leadership" is mentioned, please think of **non-midshipman leaders at the Academy that impact the Brigade (COs, SELs, Commandant Staff, etc.)**.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

For the following questions, please answer according to the above scale:

1. <b>INSTAB 1. There is a high turnover rate among the Academy officers and senior enlisted leadership.</b>	
2. PCVD 1. The Academy has high standards of performance for the Brigade.	
3. CULT 1 There is a great degree of power distance between me and the midshipman leaders at the Academy.	
4. <b>ACB 1 Discipline and criticism are administered fairly by midshipmen leadership.</b>	
5. ACB 2 The Academy's institutional leaders give midshipman leaders enough space and discretion to do their jobs.	
6. <b>CULT 2 I am more dedicated to the midshipmen in my company than to the Academy.</b>	

7. PCVD 2 The Academy is an environment where individuals must get ahead of their peers in order to be successful.	
8. INSTAB 2 There is a high degree of instability among the Brigade of Midshipmen.	
9. INSTAB 3. Academy leadership handles situations (i.e., honor offenses, conduct offenses, policy changes, etc.) in a consistent manner.	

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

For the following questions, please answer according to the above scale:

10. CULT 3 There is a great degree of power distance between the midshipmen leaders at the Academy and the Academy officer and senior enlisted leadership	
11. ACB 3 There is a high degree of oversight from Academy leadership over midshipman leadership.	
12. CULT 4 The institution and its leaders prefer to avoid uncertain circumstances.	
13. PCVD 3 A lot of pressures are placed on midshipmen at the Academy.	
14. INSTAB 4. Midshipman leadership handles situations (i.e., honor offenses, conduct offenses, policy changes, etc.) in a consistent manner.	
15. PCVD 4 The Academy’s primary decision makers will ignore ideas that are contrary to their own.	
16. CULT 5 There are clear distinctions between the “in-group” and “out-group” midshipmen with regard to how the Academy’s leadership treats them.	
17. ACB 4 Power within midshipman leadership is highly centralized.	
18. CULT 6 It is important to cooperate with the Academy’s leadership and the policies that they set in place for the Brigade.	
19. PCVD 5 Midshipman leaders are under threat of losing their billets at all times.	

20. INSTAB 5. Academy leadership gives ambiguous and/or confusing instructions on a regular basis.	
21. PCVD 6 I feel threatened by the Academy's policies for forwarding midshipmen for separation.	

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

For the following questions, please answer according to the above scale:

22. CULT 7 There is a high degree of structure and regulations at the Academy compared to other organizations.	
23. ACB 5 Midshipman leadership is empowered to make impactful decisions.	
24. CULT 8 The midshipmen I work with believe that everyone has worth and value, regardless of how they identify (for example, gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other identities).	
25. PCVD 7 There is a lot of pressure on midshipmen to perform.	
26. ACB 6 Midshipman leaders have been empowered to take disciplinary action when necessary.	
27. INSTAB 6. The Academy is a stable environment.	
28. CULT 9 Academy leadership has a high tolerance for ambiguity.	
29. ACB 7 I feel apathetic toward the decisions that midshipman leaders make within the Brigade.	

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Please consider your “**first-level midshipman leader**” (fire team leader, squad leader, platoon commander or company commander). Answer according to the above scale for the following statements beginning with the phrase: “**My first level midshipman leader...**”

30.	<b>TOX 1 Has explosive outbursts.</b>	
31.	<b>TOX 2 Accepts credit for successes that do not belong to him/her.</b>	
32.	TOX 3 Drastically changes his/her demeanor when his/her supervisor is present.	
33.	<b>TOX 4 Will only offer assistance to people who can help him/her get ahead.</b>	
34.	TOX 5 Varies his/her degree of approachability.	
35.	TOX 6 Holds subordinates responsible for things outside their job descriptions.	
36.	<b>TOX 7 Publicly belittles subordinates.</b>	

## **QUESTIONS BY CATEGORY:**

### **Instability**

1. There is a high turnover rate among the Academy's officers and senior enlisted leadership.
2. There is a high degree of instability among the Brigade of Midshipmen.
3. Academy leadership (COs, SELs, Commandant Staff, etc.) handles situations (honor offenses, conduct offenses, policy changes, etc.) in a consistent manner.
4. Midshipman leadership handles situations (honor offenses, conduct offenses, policy changes, etc.) in a consistent manner.
5. Academy leadership gives ambiguous and/or confusing instructions on a regular basis.
6. The Academy is a stable environment.

### **Perceived Threat**

1. The Academy has high standards of performance for the Brigade.
2. The Academy is an environment where individuals must get ahead of their peers in order to be successful.
3. A lot of pressures are placed on midshipmen at the Academy.
4. The Academy's primary decision makers will ignore ideas that are contrary to their own.
5. Midshipmen leaders are under threat of losing their billets at all times.
6. I feel threatened by the Academy's policies for forwarding midshipmen for separation.
7. There is a lot of pressure on midshipmen to perform.

### **Cultural Values**

#### **Power Distance**

1. There is a great degree of power distance between me and the midshipmen leaders at the Academy.
2. There is a great degree of power distance between the midshipmen leaders at the Academy and the Academy officer and senior enlisted leadership.

#### **Uncertainty of Avoidance**

3. The institution and its leaders prefer to avoid uncertain circumstances.
4. There is a high degree of structure and regulations at the Academy compared to other organizations.
5. Academy leadership has a high tolerance for ambiguity.

#### **Collectivism**

6. I am more dedicated to the midshipmen in my company than to the Academy.
7. There are clear distinctions between the "in-group" and "out-group" midshipmen with regard to how the Academy's leadership treats them.

8. It is important to cooperate with the Academy's leadership and the policies that they set in place for the Brigade.
9. The midshipmen I work with believe that everyone has worth and value, regardless of how they identify (for example, gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other identities).

#### **Absence of checks and balances/institutionalization**

1. Discipline and criticism are administered fairly by midshipmen leadership.
2. The Academy's institutional leaders give midshipman leaders enough space and discretion to do their jobs.
3. There is a high degree of oversight from Academy leadership over midshipman leadership.
4. Power within midshipman leadership is highly centralized.
5. Midshipman leadership is empowered to make impactful decisions.
6. Midshipman leaders have been empowered to take disciplinary action when necessary.
7. I feel apathetic toward the decisions that midshipman leaders make within the Brigade.

#### **Questions towards the toxic leadership at midshipmen (assess behavior and not the personality):**

Please consider your “**first-level midshipman leader**” (fire team leader, squad leader, platoon commander or company commander). Answer according to the above scale for the following statements beginning with the phrase: “**My first level midshipman leader...**”

1. publicly belittles subordinates.
2. varies his/her degree of approachability.
3. has explosive outbursts.
4. accepts credit for successes that do not belong to him/her.
5. will only offer assistance to people who can help him/her get ahead.
6. drastically changes his/her demeanor when his/her superior is around.
7. holds subordinates responsible for things outside their job descriptions.

## APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

**Statistics**

		instab1	pcvdtht1	cultval1	acb1	acb2	cultval2	pcvdtht2
N	Valid	185	188	188	188	188	188	188
	Missing	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.83	4.77	3.82	3.69	3.85	3.71	4.14
Median		4.00	5.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Std. Deviation		1.039	.923	1.252	1.105	1.228	1.341	1.396
Variance		1.079	.851	1.568	1.222	1.507	1.799	1.949
Skewness		-.412	-.809	-.059	-.360	-.396	-.093	-.607
Std. Error of Skewness		.179	.177	.177	.177	.177	.177	.177
Kurtosis		-.433	.602	-.539	-.485	-.570	-1.077	-.549
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.355	.353	.353	.353	.353	.353	.353
Range		5	4	5	5	5	5	5

**Statistics**

		instab2	instab3	cultval3	acb3	cultval4	pcvdtht3	instab4
N	Valid	188	188	188	187	186	188	187
	Missing	0	0	0	1	2	0	1
Mean		3.11	3.49	4.10	4.33	4.43	5.24	3.53
Median		3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	5.00	5.00	4.00
Std. Deviation		1.084	1.405	1.229	1.080	1.109	.861	1.305
Variance		1.176	1.973	1.510	1.167	1.230	.742	1.702
Skewness		.321	-.311	-.272	-.474	-.627	-1.257	-.349
Std. Error of Skewness		.177	.177	.177	.178	.178	.177	.178
Kurtosis		-.577	-1.151	-.596	.080	.169	1.695	-.824
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.353	.353	.353	.354	.355	.353	.354
Range		5	5	5	5	5	4	5

**Statistics**

		pcvdtht4	cultval5	acb4	cultval6	pcvdtht5	instab5	pcvdtht6
N	Valid	185	187	187	188	188	186	188
	Missing	3	1	1	0	0	2	0
Mean		3.49	3.80	3.75	4.65	3.15	3.41	2.72
Median		3.00	4.00	4.00	5.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Std. Deviation		1.152	1.359	1.230	.932	1.304	1.146	1.324
Variance		1.327	1.848	1.512	.869	1.700	1.313	1.752
Skewness		.160	-.012	-.070	-1.258	.467	.390	.550
Std. Error of Skewness		.179	.178	.178	.177	.177	.178	.177
Kurtosis		-.513	-.880	-.791	3.069	-.782	-.700	-.380
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.355	.354	.354	.353	.353	.355	.353
Range		5	5	5	5	5	5	5

**Statistics**

		cultval7	acb5	cultval8	pcvdth7	acb6	instab6	cultval9
N	Valid	187	187	187	187	187	187	181
	Missing	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
Mean		5.49	3.75	4.84	5.33	4.56	3.91	3.35
Median		6.00	4.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.00	3.00
Std. Deviation		.750	1.079	1.137	.760	.868	1.153	.998
Variance		.563	1.165	1.293	.578	.754	1.330	.997
Skewness		-1.845	-.325	-1.155	-1.085	-.848	-.692	.021
Std. Error of Skewness		.178	.178	.178	.178	.178	.178	.181
Kurtosis		4.605	-.387	1.070	.997	.969	-.158	.138
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.354	.354	.354	.354	.354	.354	.359
Range		4	5	5	3	4	5	5

**Statistics**

		acb7	toxlead1	toxlead2	toxlead3	toxlead4	toxlead5	toxlead6
N	Valid	185	187	187	187	186	186	186
	Missing	3	1	1	1	2	2	2
Mean		3.62	1.35	1.55	2.01	1.52	2.12	2.03
Median		4.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
Std. Deviation		1.117	.750	.951	1.268	.890	1.324	1.178
Variance		1.247	.563	.905	1.607	.791	1.752	1.388
Skewness		.128	2.482	2.600	1.270	2.309	1.056	1.130
Std. Error of Skewness		.179	.178	.178	.178	.178	.178	.178
Kurtosis		-.421	6.246	8.121	.717	6.325	.252	.749
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.355	.354	.354	.354	.355	.355	.355
Range		5	4	5	5	5	5	5

**Statistics**

		toxlead7
N	Valid	187
	Missing	1
Mean		1.31
Median		1.00
Std. Deviation		.718
Variance		.516
Skewness		2.800
Std. Error of Skewness		.178
Kurtosis		8.200
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.354
Range		4

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