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THESIS

**PORT VISIT SUPPORT STRATEGIES:
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
BETWEEN HSP AND NON-HSP**

by

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June 2023

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BETWEEN HSP AND NON-HSP**

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Navy utilizes various port visit support frameworks around the world. This research evaluates the various frameworks and develops a model that can be used to inform planners and policy makers in determining which framework or combination thereof is best for a given port. It examines previous research on the topic of husbanding service providers (HSP) and explores notable concerns about overreliance on them, such as allegations of fraud in certain ports, operational security vulnerability, and limits of contractor support during a major theater conflict. Through discussions with subject-matter experts, extensive personnel experience, and a review of available databases, this research provides valuable analysis between HSP, non-HSP, and hybrid support frameworks. A comparative case study was conducted to highlight the differences and benefits of the three primary support structures. Three foreign ports were evaluated on five enabling factors: auditability, flexibility, reliability, vulnerability, and durability. We concluded that there was no perfect answer for every port. It depends on the mix of force enablers that are desired for a specific port. Recommendations include in-depth market research, investments of organic capabilities in strategic locations, and a standardized policy and quality assurance process for every support strategy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PURPOSE.....	3
B.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	3
C.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	4
D.	SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS.....	5
E.	ORGANIZATION OF STUDY	5
II.	BACKGROUND	7
A.	PURPOSE OF PORT VISITS	7
B.	U.S. NAVY POLICY AND GUIDANCE.....	8
C.	CHAPTER SUMMARY.....	9
III.	LITERATURE REVIEW	11
A.	THE GDMA SCANDAL THROUGH AUDITABILITY THEORY	11
B.	THE NAVY GLOBAL MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACT.....	12
C.	NAVFAC FUNDING MODEL TRANSITION.....	14
D.	COMMERCIAL PORT VISIT SUPPORT APPROACH	14
E.	OPSEC IMPLICATIONS OF HSP.....	17
F.	PORT VISIT SUPPORT DURING MAJOR THEATER CONFLICTS	24
G.	SUMMARY	25
IV.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	27
A.	DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY	27
B.	COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY.....	27
C.	SUMMARY	28
V.	SUPPORT FRAMEWORKS IDENTIFIED	29
A.	STANDARD PORT VISIT PROCESS.....	29
B.	HSP SUPPORT FRAMEWORK	30
C.	NON-HSP SUPPORT FRAMEWORK	32
D.	ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES.....	35
E.	SUMMARY	38

VI.	CASE STUDY DEVELOPMENT	39
A.	AUDITABILITY	39
1.	Auditability Triangle	40
2.	Grading Scale	42
B.	FLEXIBILITY	42
1.	Mission First	43
2.	Grading Scale	43
C.	RELIABILITY	45
1.	Contracting Considerations: Past Performance and Quality Assurance	45
2.	Quality Assurance for Organic Support	46
3.	Grading Scale	47
D.	VULNERABILITY	48
1.	Historical and Current Geopolitical OPSEC Threats	48
2.	The Contractor Factor	49
3.	Grading Scale	52
E.	DURABILITY	53
1.	Lessons from the Mighty “Ulithi”	53
2.	The “Other” Non-HSP Support	55
3.	Grading Scale	56
F.	CASE SELECTION	57
VII.	CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS	59
A.	AUDITABILITY	59
1.	Internal Controls: Enforced, Monitored, and Reported	59
2.	Processes: Institutionalized, Measured, and Improved	61
3.	Personnel: Educated, Trained, and Experienced	63
4.	Auditability Considerations and Scoring	64
B.	FLEXIBILITY	65
1.	Short-Notice Port Visits	65
2.	Changes in Requirements	68
3.	Flexibility Considerations and Scoring	71
C.	RELIABILITY	72
1.	Reliability in HSP Support	72
2.	Reliability in Non-HSP Support	74
3.	Reliability in Hybrid Support	75
4.	Conclusion	75
D.	VULNERABILITY	76
1.	Vulnerability in HSP Support	77

2.	Vulnerability in Non-HSP Support	77
3.	Vulnerability in Hybrid Support.....	78
4.	Vulnerability Considerations and Scoring	78
E.	DURABILITY	79
1.	Durability in HSP Support.....	79
2.	Durability in Non-HSP Support	80
3.	Durability in Hybrid Support.....	80
4.	Durability Considerations and Scoring	81
VIII.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	83
A.	PORT VISIT SUPPORT FRAMEWORK FINDINGS	85
B.	RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS	86
C.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	88
APPENDIX A.	EXAMPLE LOGREQ	91
APPENDIX B.	GLOBAL STANDARD LOGREQ PROCEDURES.....	97
LIST OF REFERENCES		119
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		127

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Port Visit Support Process Flows	30
Figure 2.	HSP Support Process Flow. Source: OPNAV (2020).	32
Figure 3.	Generic Non-HSP Process Flow	35
Figure 4.	Generic Hybrid Process Flow	36
Figure 5.	Auditability Triangle. Source: R. G. Rendon and J. M. Rendon (2015).....	41
Figure 6.	U.S. Navy Forward Deployed Bases. Source: Masters (2019).....	54

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Purposes of Limiting Husbanding Agent Power. Source: Verrastro (1996).....	17
Table 2.	OPSEC Threat Evaluation Tool. Source: Elliot et al. (2020).	23
Table 3.	Auditability Grading Scale	42
Table 4.	Flexibility Grading Scale	44
Table 5.	Reliability Grading Scale.....	47
Table 6.	Vulnerability Grading Scale	52
Table 7.	Durability Grading Scale	56
Table 8.	Auditability Scores.....	65
Table 9.	Flexibility Scores	71
Table 10.	Reliability Scores	76
Table 11.	Vulnerability Scores.....	79
Table 12.	Durability Scores	81
Table 13.	Results of Comparative Case Study.....	84

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
BAH	Kingdom of Bahrain
BOS	Base Operations Support
BQC	Supply Corps Basic Qualifications Course
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CFA	Commander Fleet Activities
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CNIC	Commander Naval Installations Command
COA	Course of Action
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
COSO	Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
DBIDS	Defense Biometric Identification System
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations
DFAS	Defense Financial Accounting System
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
EPU	Expeditionary Port Unit
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FDNF	Forward-Deployed Naval Force
FFP	Firm-Fixed-Price
FLC	Fleet Logistics Center
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GDMA	Glenn Defense Marine Asia
GF	General Fund

GFE	Government-Furnished Equipment
HA	Husbanding Agents
HN	Host Nation
HSP	Husbanding Service Providers
HSPortal	Husbanding Service Portal
IDIQ	Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity
JTF-PO	Joint Task Force–Port Opening
KO	Contracting Officer
LOGREQ	Logistics Requirements
LOGSU	Logistics Support Unit
LSO	Logistics Services Officer
LSR	Logistics Services Representative
MCCS	Marine Corps Community Services
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSPS	Mina Salman Pier Services
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
NAVCHAPGRU	Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command
NAVSTA	Naval Station
NAVSUP	Naval Supply Systems Command
NCHB	Naval Cargo Handling Battalion
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSA	Naval Support Activity
NWCF	Naval Working Capital Fund
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPSEC	Operational Security

OSBP	Off-Ship Bill Pay
PC	Patrol Coastal
PVST	Port Visit
QA	Quality Assurance
QAP	Quality Assurance Plan
QASP	Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
QCP	Quality Control Plan
RFQ	Request for Quote
RMAC	Regional Multiple Award Contracts
RTOP	Request for Task Order Proposal
SA	Ship's Agent
SAC	Single Award Contract
SAS	Sasebo
SME	Subject Matter Experts
SODHC	Supply Officer Department Head Course
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreements
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPOD	Seaport of Debarkation
SUPPO	Ship Supply Officer
TBX	Transportation Brigade Expeditionary
TYCOM	Type Commander
UAE	United Arab Emirates
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command

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I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships conduct port visits for repairs, resupply, diplomatic engagement, and rest and relaxation for Sailors and Marines after operations. Ships require extensive industrial support services (also known as husbanding services) while entering/leaving port and while on the pier or at anchorage (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations [OPNAV], 2020). At U.S. Navy ports on U.S. territory, these services are primarily provided via U.S. Navy assets and/or standalone service contracts (OPNAV, 2011). For the purposes of this study, this type of port service is known as non-husbanding service provider (HSP) support. When a ship pulls into a foreign port with limited or no U.S. Navy infrastructure, the ship receives industrial support via a contract with an HSP (OPNAV, 2020). The U.S. Navy manages multiple ports and bases in foreign territory. Units visiting or homeported at these forward-deployed bases can receive industrial support via HSPs, non-HSPs, or a combination of multiple sources. The purpose of this research is to provide policy-makers and naval planners with a model that can be used when developing proposals and budgets for future port operations. This study is meant to ensure the Navy utilizes the framework that provides the best combination of port visit attributes for the current operational environment.

When conducting a foreign port visit, the services a ship receives can come from various providers. The HSP is a part of the local business community and speaks the local language; this allows them to act as a central liaison to coordinate/direct services for a ship while in port (Elliot et al., 2020). The HSP either provides the required service directly or subcontracts to another supplier. The HSP program has gone under extensive review and realignment since the well published Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) corruption case (Naval Audit Service, 2019a). The Navy has increased HSP program oversight and implemented greater contract competition in the process, but the program is not perfect (Elliot et al., 2020). The most notable concerns are excessive port visit costs, allegations of fraud in certain ports, and operational security (OPSEC) implications in sharing ship's schedule information with non-Department of Defense (DOD) entities (Elliot et al., 2020). The HSP program is improving, but is it the right answer for every foreign port?

An HSP port visit to a non-U.S. Navy-managed port is a major event requiring input from numerous entities. Numbered fleets direct ships to conduct port visits through the operational chain of command and provide contracting officer's representative (COR) services to ensure proper execution of the port visit and HSP contract. The Department of State (DOS) engages with host nation (HN) counterparts to attain diplomatic clearance for the vessel if there is not a standing agreement in place already. HSP contracts are managed by Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) contracting officers (KOs) (OPNAV, 2020). Comparably, a non-HSP port visit in a U.S. Navy-managed foreign port relies on organic assets and/or standalone non-HSP contracts managed by Commander Naval Infrastructure Command (CNIC) Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC). HSP support requires extensive procedures to ultimately award an individual task order for every ship conducting a port visit. On the other hand, non-HSP contracts are established regardless of whether a ship is in port or not, which alleviates the common uncertainty of not knowing which vendor will be the supporting HSP until the individual task order is awarded. Non-HSP contracts have lower costs because they are not subject to the markups typically applied in HSP contracts. They streamline port services by cutting out the middleman and mitigate the risk of OPSEC breaches (Oteromatos, 2015). Despite the advantages of non-HSP contracts, they are still not used in some of the busiest U.S.-managed ports overseas.

Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain includes management of the foreign port Mina Salman. The U.S. Navy utilizes HSPs to provide services when ships pull into Mina Salman. In addition to ships on deployment, some ships are permanently homeported on Mina Salman as Forward-Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) assets. FDNF units receive port visit services under a separate HSP contract that allows them to receive services while pulling in and out via monthly task orders. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, the HSP program executed a total of 941 port visits globally, not including certain FDNF assets in their home port, accounting for \$85 million in invoices paid. Forty-four of those port visits were non-FDNF in Mina Salman, accounting for \$5.8 million. Comparably, another U.S. Navy-managed port, NSA Sasebo, Japan, executed 69 port visits during the same year but only accounted for \$2.7 million (Naval Supply Systems Command [NAVSUP], 2021). There

are obvious differences in the economies and support arrangement of the two ports, but the main driver for the disparities is that all services are HSP-provided on Mina Salman, but only potable water and miscellaneous services are HSP-provided on Sasebo; all other services are provided through NAVFAC. The two port visit support strategies have their benefits and drawbacks. This study evaluates the various strategies to determine which framework provides the best value for the port in question.

A. PURPOSE

Following the GDMA scandal, the U.S. Navy embarked on an extensive overhaul of the way they perform and pay for port visits outside the United States and its territories. These changes have resulted in significant successes in the areas of auditability and speed to award for service contracts, but they have also had unintended consequences such as vulnerabilities in OPSEC, and an overreliance on contractor-provided support that may not be reliable/available during a major conflict. The HSP port visit support model is not the only support structure utilized by the U.S. Navy. This study explores the various port visit support models utilized by the Navy at ports around the world. This research is intended to inform naval planners on support strategies in order to develop policies and strategies for future operations.

The U.S. Navy manages multiple ports and bases on foreign territory. Units visiting or homeported at these forward-deployed bases can receive industrial support via HSP, non-HSP, or a combination of multiple sources. There is no established policy on when which framework is utilized. The purpose of this study is to develop a framework that U.S. Navy planners can utilize when establishing policy, planning support strategies, and funding decisions for those strategies in foreign ports.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) submitted Naval Research Program Topic NPS-22-N173: *Husbanding vs. Port Operations Support in FY22*. The submission highlights the lack of standardized policy governing how ships are supported in foreign ports, including homeported FDNF ships and transient units homeported elsewhere. The questions relayed in the submission are below:

1. Would it be most effective if permanent organic assets were positioned at Navy installations rather than rely on the HSP contract?
2. Would a separate permanent, non-HSP port operations contract be the most effective solution for Navy installations without organic assets?
3. Would a modified HSP-like homeport services contract (30-day task orders) be the best support solution for Navy installations without organic assets?

This research explores the various support strategies to answer the questions provided in OPNAV's submission and develop a model that planners can utilize to determine the support strategy that provides the best value for the port in question.

C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study primarily relies on prior studies of related topics, formal and informal standard operating procedures (SOPs), data collected from subject matter experts (SMEs), and our extensive experience in conducting and supporting foreign port visits as supply officers and KOs.

The primary support strategies for U.S. Navy ships in foreign ports are HSP and non-HSP. The strategies vary in many ways depending on the port. Some ports utilize a hybrid form where both strategies are utilized to some extent. Other ports vary in what entity is overall responsible for the contract(s) covering the port visit. Differences are out there, but the overall frameworks remain the same.

To properly compare the strategies, a comparative case study was used to grade the support strategies in place for two ports: one using primarily non-HSP and the other using primarily HSP. The strategies were evaluated based on their ability to deliver specific qualities identified as key aspects of a port support strategy. In addition, a quantitative comparison of one of the primary services was conducted for each port to compare HSP contracts to traditional NAVFAC service contracts within the same markets. The benefits and drawbacks of the strategies were compared, and findings and recommendations were provided.

D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

There is one primary limitation to this study: the lack of comparable data for port visit service costs in like markets. This lack of data precludes an outright business case analysis for HSP versus non-HSP. By defining a basic framework for each support strategy, this study compared the benefits and drawbacks of the various support strategies. An outright cost–benefit analysis involving market research in various foreign markets was beyond the scope of this study. A quantitative comparison on one primary port service was done to highlight the potential benefits between the support frameworks in the two ports compared in the case studies, but it would require years of market observation and data collection to perform a complete cost savings study. For this reason, our research focused on the qualitative aspects of different port visit support strategies.

E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This study is arranged as follows: Chapter II establishes the background of why the U.S. Navy conducts port visits and outlines how the current forward-deployed force operates. Chapter III explores existing research applicable to this study, providing a historical lens to compare the strategies and the analysis during the study. Chapter IV outlines the primary support strategies as well as important outliers that utilize the frameworks in unique ways. Chapter IV also describes the case study ports and their respective frameworks. Chapter V describes the analysis of the case study and the results. Chapter VI reflects on the results of the study and provides recommendations for policy-makers and opportunities for further research.

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II. BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the reasoning behind port visits and how and why they are conducted. This includes the historical and diplomatic importance of port visits, a review of the notorious DGMA scandal, the resulting changes in HSP and port visit management, and a review of current and past U.S. Navy policy and guidance.

A. PURPOSE OF PORT VISITS

“A ship in port is safe, but that’s not what ships are built for.”

—Rear Admiral Grace Hopper, *The Last Safeguard*

Although it is true that a ship is meant to be at sea, the ship will inevitably need to pull into port sometime. U.S. Navy, MSC, and other DOD vessels all pull into port for the same things: refuel, resupply, repair, rest and relaxation, and diplomatic engagement.

- **Refuel:** All U.S. vessels utilize some form of fuel, including nuclear-powered units that refuel aircraft and utilize traditional combustion engines and generators as backups.
- **Resupply:** Except for unmanned vessels, all ships require food and repair parts to stay on mission and operational.
- **Repair:** The sea is a demanding and unforgivable place; the inherent nature of salt water is to corrode/penetrate the vessels that sail on and under it; all units require maintenance.
- **Rest and Relaxation:** Operating or even just riding on a military vessel is a demanding way to live; the men and women that serve on ships require breaks.
- **Diplomatic Engagement:** From Theodore Roosevelt’s *Great White Fleet*, to operating with partner and ally navies, to providing humanitarian relief

during natural disasters, using warships as diplomatic tools is an exceptionally important reason to pull into port.

The U.S. Navy has expanded its ability to remain on station and operate beyond what many ever thought possible. Many of the requirements for port visits can even be provided at sea, but at some point, those vessels must return to land, even if it just to be decommissioned.

B. U.S. NAVY POLICY AND GUIDANCE

The relationship between the CNIC and NAVFAC is one of collaboration and partnership. According to the official website, CNIC works closely with NAVFAC to “be the sole provider of shore capability, to sustain the Fleet, enable the Fighter, and support the Family” (Commander, Navy Installations Command [CNIC], n.d.-b). To further reinforce this partnership, CNIC and NAVFAC are equivalently ranked independent systems commands (SYSCOM), reporting directly to the chief of naval operations (CNO) (Department of the Navy, n.d.).

In practical terms, this collaboration between CNIC and NAVFAC can take many forms. For example, NAVFAC may work with CNIC to design and build new facilities or to upgrade and maintain existing ones. CNIC also provides input to NAVFAC regarding the needs and priorities of naval installations, helping to ensure that new construction and maintenance projects are aligned with the overall mission of the U.S. Navy.

It is important to note that the roles and responsibilities of CNIC are broad; servicing port visits is one among many. The organization generally sets requirements and funds the execution of the requirement. NAVFAC is the primary executor of those requirements. Similarly, NAVFAC’s role and responsibilities are also broad but mainly focus on entire installation and expeditionary requirements with port operations as a small subset (OPNAV, 2021). However, there seems to be a perception that they are the default port visit support structure if HSP support is absent or inadequate, which underscores the fact that other SYSCOMs exist, such as NAVSUP, to augment port visit requirements. The implication of these dynamic relationships may cause confusion among fleet customers who are not familiar with the area of responsibility (AOR) or cause tension among

stakeholders regarding funding streams or who will execute the requirement. Nevertheless, despite the ambiguity, all organizations tasked with supporting the fleet during their port visit still strive and manage to cooperate to fill gaps in their customer's requirements.

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter described the historical and established policy governing port visits and supporting elements tasked to execute them. Due to the lack of standardized policy for certain forms of port visit support, this section is limited, but this study is meant to aid the development of further guidance and more consistent policy governing port visit support.

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III. LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the days of John Paul Jones and the six original frigates, the U.S. Navy has executed visits to foreign ports, and no matter what fundamental technology was adopted, ships still needed support while in port. Technology and times may have changed, but the fact that ships require support while in port will never change. HSP support is not new, and the study of it by warrior scholars will likely never end. Exploring the historical database of studies on HSP support and other relevant topics is crucial in understanding the different support frameworks utilized around the world. This chapter examines existing research on port visit support, including analysis of past and current best practices in contracting and port visit execution, as well as related topics that have potential impact on this study.

The topics covered in this chapter include an assessment of the GDMA scandal through an auditing lens, a summary of the current HSP Global Multiple Award Contract (GMAC), a description of NAVFAC's transition from the Naval Working Capital Fund (NWCF) to the General Fund (GF), a comparison of the traditional HSP process to the commercial process utilized by civilian agencies, a review of the unintended consequences of the current HSP process, and a discussion on the limitation of the HSP framework during a major conflict with a near-peer adversary.

A. THE GDMA SCANDAL THROUGH AUDITABILITY THEORY

In *Contracting for Navy Husbanding Services: An Analysis of the Fat Leonard Case*, the GDMA scandal is examined through an auditability lens (Whiteley et al., 2017). Because of the GDMA scandal, the Department of the Navy revolutionized how port visits are contracted and administered and how they are ultimately paid. Although the researchers' scope was limited to publicly available data, the authors had enough information to perform their analysis and concluded that the form of fraud favored by GDMA was collusion. Each of the 1,194 allegations of fraud was categorized into six different procurement fraud schemes, with collusion being responsible for 1,094, or 91.62%, of the allegations of fraud (Whiteley et al., 2017).

The authors used the “five components of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Internal control framework” (COSO, 2013, p. 6). The COSO components are:

- Control Environment
- Risk Assessment
- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring Activities (COSO, 2013)

Their findings indicated that control environment and information and communication components were the most prevalent deficiencies. These authors also reviewed all 1,194 acts of alleged fraud, concluding that 621—representing 52% of the allegations—involved the control environment component. Deficiencies of information and communication represented 452, representing 38% of the 1,194 internal control failures. Some of the recommendations presented by Whiteley et al. (2017) included the creation of a husbanding services contracting course, protecting classified ships’ schedule information, and improving and enhancing monitoring activities in the administration of husbanding services contracts. They recommended further research employing the methodology used in their analysis of other cases of procurement fraud within the DOD.

B. THE NAVY GLOBAL MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACT

Hauser et al. (2022) conducted research that focused on the cost of husbanding services and the utilization of MACs. They found that the cost of husbanding services has decreased since FY 2016, overlapping with NAVSUP’s transition to the use of MACs. The researchers performed regression analyses on a historical dataset of port visits extracted from HSPortal from October 1, 2009 to June 2020. They strengthen the statistical validity of their study by focusing on frequently visited ports and frequently used ship types by setting a minimum condition of 15 visits per port and 15 visits per ship type. Their filtering process resulted in a final dataset encompassing 8,727 observations. They found evidence of cost reduction when MACs were used instead of SACs for awarding port visit task orders. Additionally, the authors concluded that the OSBP initially increased costs, but its impact became minimal over time.

The most recent Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis studying the topic of HSPs focused on the transition from Regional Multiple Award Contracts (RMACs) to the use of Global Multiple Award Contracts (GMACs). In *Navy Global Multi-Award Contract: Effects of Competition on Pricing of Port Visits*, the authors looked to see if factors such as hull type, contractor, and competition, impacted the overall effectiveness and cost saving of the contract. This was done through studying data collected from 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets. The GMAC proved to provide much more competition and a decrease in daily costs overall (Cahill et al., 2022).

Cahill et al. (2022) reviewed pricing, competition, and supporting vendor ratings of task orders for port visits executed from the start of RMAC in 2015 to January 2022, including GMAC data since implemented in FY2021. A cross tabulation methodology was utilized, showing significant savings following the shift to the GMAC. Cost savings were not observed uniformly across the world because prices overall have “actually increased 22% (adjusted for inflation) since 2018” (Cahill et al., 2022, p. 30). The authors pointed out that higher prices were driven by outliers; ports where competition actually drove up prices.

Cahill et al. (2022) separated the lowest-priced ports from the highest-priced ports in order to perform a deeper review of the trends. With the exception of certain outliers, such as Mina Salman, the busiest port in the 5th Fleet, daily prices were decreased across all of the Fleets observed. They acknowledged that the implementation of GMAC had coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, meaning that data could have been skewed because ships executed fewer port visits than prior to COVID-19, and COVID-19 created additional requirements such as Wi-Fi services on the pier. Therefore, they recommended further research on the impact of GMAC over a longer period. According to Cahill et al. (2022), Mina Salman was a well-established port that is used as a critical resupply point for ships operating in the 5th Fleet.

Moreover, Mina Salman may benefit from government-furnished equipment (GFE) more than the current lease of assets via HSP to “combat rising prices” (Cahill et al., 2022, p. 37). Owning these assets could allow for more flexibility in supporting unforecasted requirements such as short notice port visits. However, their research did not take into

consideration the FDNF Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and Patrol Coastal (PC) ships, which are homeported at Mina Salman. Research has not been performed to determine what contract arrangements provide the best value to the U.S. government.

C. NAVFAC FUNDING MODEL TRANSITION

NAVFAC conducted its operations utilizing both the NWCF and GF financial systems prior to October 2019 but transitioned solely to the GF financial system to increase auditability and accountability (Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command [NAVFAC], 2019). In fact, over \$63.8 million of NAVFAC overhead was realigned from NWCF to GF for FY2020 under Base Operations Support (BOS) (CNIC, 2020). One of the major drivers may have been issues that arose from the organization's management of NWCF. A snapshot of NAVFAC's financial performance from 2006 to 2008 revealed factors that led to unanticipated losses. According to Duong et al. (2009), the variance between net operating results (NOR) between 2006 and 2008 spiked from 28.85% to 904.89%.

Another factor is that “the variance analysis of command budget showed that expenses consistently and dramatically outpaced revenues over the 3-year period analyzed” (Duong et al., 2009, p. 54). This is spurred by the deflated average hours worked per employee compared to the budgeted average hours worked within those 3 years, costing NAVFAC \$9,696,150 (Duong et al., 2009). These two factors highlight the challenges of maintaining a sufficient NWCF stabilized rate and preserving the integrity of the fund, which is difficult to bridle once variances skyrocket. It is no surprise that NAVFAC moved to terminate NWCF stabilized rates and charge fully burdened actual costs (NAVFAC, 2019). This historical transition may have implications for NAVFAC's presence or absence in certain ports and the services they provide.

D. COMMERCIAL PORT VISIT SUPPORT APPROACH

The husbanding support and contract award/management models previously described for the DOD appear similar to the commercial approach at first glance, but they differ in vast ways. Understanding the similarities and differences between these two approaches could allow for the development of better support models moving forward.

Verrastro (1996) explored the similarities and differences between the DOD and commercial approaches in his 1996 NPS thesis: *Applying Commercial Practices to Navy Husbanding Services Contracts*.

The major similarities between the two approaches can mostly be seen in the services provided to the visiting ship. Whether it is a U.S. Navy ship, a Disney cruise liner, or a Panamax oil tanker, the services needed for the ship are very similar. All require things such as tugs and pilots, food stores, fuel transfer, bunks, visa/customs services, and materiel/personnel movement support (Verrastro, 1996).

The major differences between the approaches can primarily be seen in the contract award and administration processes. The most notable difference is the roles and responsibilities of the agent. As mentioned, the DOD utilizes husbanding agents (HA), while the commercial industry utilizes ship's agents (SA). At first look, it appears that they provide the same services, but the major distinction appears when reviewing their ability to make choices on behalf of the customer. SAs work as agents for the principal (ship owner), in that they are awarded the authority to make decisions and obligations on behalf of the principal, including an advance of funds that allow the SA to prepay for supplies and services. This authority is the primary difference between the SA and the HA. The HA has no authority to obligate the DOD and, therefore, must get preapproval from the DOD, and no funding is provided until after supplies and services are provided. These extra steps result in an extensive administrative burden and lead time for the HSP support model (Verrastro, 1996).

It is important to note that the DOD preapproval process described by Verrastro has changed significantly since the publishing of his research. The previous process only required approval from the ship's supply officer, but due to the ethical failures identified in cases such as the GDMA scandal, this process has significantly expanded (Dickstein, 2018; Verrastro, 1996). The current process allows the KO to obligate the government after the COR validates and endorses requirements from the ship's supply officer (NAVSUP, 2015).

Other major differences between the two can primarily be seen in the contract award process and the administrative burden. These areas are some of the largest barriers to entry for many would-be HSPs (Verrastro, 1996).

The commercial approach relies on long-standing, long-term contracts for commercial fleets and visits that occur on such a regular basis that they do not require regular renegotiation. When establishing new contracts, the commercial industry mainly utilizes in-person, verbal contract negotiations that follow a relatively standard framework that allows for less administrative burden and, when coupled with the advance payments, allows for significant flexibility for the SA (Verrastro, 1996).

The DOD model described by Verrastro (1996) has changed since 1996, but the administrative burden and contract award process for the DOD is still a significant hurdle for potential vendors. The first difference between the two contract models is that the DOD relies heavily on written communication, as opposed to the in-person/phone agreements the commercial industry favors. The second difference is the excessive administrative burden found in DOD contracts. The average HSP contract is over 100 pages long and in such detail that it is intimidating to vendors, especially when English is not their primary language. The third major difference is the need for security. It will be explored extensively later in the literature review, but the DOD requirement to limit knowledge of ship movements and the volatility of a Navy ship's schedule can result in extensive costs to a vendor that is making their best attempt to support the DOD within the contract guidelines (Verrastro, 1996).

So, if the DOD utilizes the same services used by commercial ships, why does the DOD utilize a different model? The limited power of the HA allows the DOD the ability to control how U.S. taxpayer funds are spent, and while the administrative hurdles seem excessive, they serve important purposes that are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Purposes of Limiting Husbanding Agent Power. Source: Verrastro (1996).

Operational Security	Quality of Services/Supplies	Reduced Ambiguity Across Cultures
Is the ship's schedule being shared too much? Have the bus drivers been vetted by NCIS?	Is the food acquired from reputable sources and stored properly? Has the crane been weight-tested?	Is English the primary language? If not, could a word or phrase be misunderstood when translated?

The primary reason for the differing model is that the DOD has a different mission/goal than the commercial entity, and that difference means that the DOD cannot afford to relinquish control the same way a principal can. The commercial entity is out to make a profit, while the DOD is out to perform a mission. There are approaches and best practices that can be applied to help streamline the HSP process, but with the inability to relinquish control, the commercial model will not be able to be utilized by the DOD when working with commercial port service providers (Verrastro, 1996).

That last note is the primary takeaway from this research. The DOD cannot work with commercial vendors like other shipping companies do, but there is no reason these practices cannot be used when working with other members of the DOD. If the DOD owns all supplies/services being provided to the ship, could they follow a similar model? Could the DOD establish its own on-site personnel with the training, experience, and—most importantly—authority to act as a U.S. Navy ship's agent?

E. OPSEC IMPLICATIONS OF HSP

The article “An Overview of Operational Security Considerations for Husbanding Service Providers of the U.S Navy” appeared in the October 2020 issue of the *Journal of Transportation Security*. This article discussed the unintended consequences of sharing ship's schedule information with HSPs and subcontractors. The article highlights the threat of this lapse in OPSEC, and they conclude with courses of action to alleviate those threats (Elliot et al., 2020).

Elliot et al. (2020) began the article with a description of one of the primary missions of the U.S. Navy: to maintain forward presence for the United States. A primary way for the Navy to accomplish this mission is by conducting port visits in foreign countries. When a ship pulls into port, they require extensive industrial support and resupply of food, parts, and fuel. “The Navy uses a network of organic, host nation, and contractor-furnished support to operate and conduct port visits in other nations” (Elliot et al., 2020, p. 274).

In foreign ports, these types of support may be hard to coordinate and acquire due to language barriers and unfamiliarity with the local businesses. The Navy utilizes HSPs to coordinate and execute port support services and resupply for Navy ships when they pull into port. Due to the complexities in coordinating the required supplies and services, the Navy shares sensitive information (the ship’s schedule) with the HSP to enable them to coordinate the requirements in time to meet the ship. Sharing sensitive information with only those that *need to know* is imperative, but there is always the risk that the information goes beyond those that need to know. This article analyzed the current vetting and OPSEC processes built into the HSP process, highlighted OPSEC risks, and concluded with courses of action (COA) that can be implemented to alleviate risk (Elliot et al., 2020).

The introduction described the most well-documented example of HSP fraud, waste, and abuse. The GDMA case was the turning point for business with HSPs. Elliot et al. (2020) highlighted the impact poor OPSEC had on GDMA’s ability to influence the Navy. The GDMA scandal is still under investigation, and the Navy’s port visit practices have been forever changed. In the aftermath, the Navy implemented extensive cultural and policy overhauls to realign leader ethical standards and contracting requirements to emphasize competition, transparency, auditability, and execution. The refocus on the contracting process was important for OPSEC in that it “strengthened internal controls” (Elliot et al., 2020, p. 275), but it is not enough to truly deter an adversary.

The next section of the article emphasized why the Navy utilizes HSPs. As mentioned, one of the primary benefits the HSP provides is their knowledge and network connections in the local market. The article stated, “HSPs’ local knowledge and professional connections enable more responsive and efficient support than a contracting

officer (KO) deployed with the force or based remotely would be able to deliver” (Elliot et al., 2020, p. 275). DOD contracting offices have gathered tremendous amounts of HSP data as well as tested various contract vehicles over the last decades. The Navy has also managed and operated some organic-foreign ports and bases, where the KO has established business relations directly with local vendors. Would it be feasible for the U.S. government to work directly with the local businesses to establish long-term support as opposed to working through a middleman (HSP) for every port visit? That question is related to the topic of this study.

Elliot et al. (2020) described the current and prior contracting practices used for HSP support. Currently, HSP support is primarily coordinated through an indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ), firm-fixed-price (FFP) GMAC. This contract vehicle is extremely flexible and emphasizes competition between vendors to allow the Navy to execute individual task orders tailored to the needs of the ships. Elliot et al. (2020) described the concept and importance of OPSEC. Historical examples of OPSEC failures resulting in catastrophic consequences, such as the bombing of the USS *Cole*, were used to emphasize the potential threat caused by sharing information (Slater, 2008). More recent threats to OPSEC, such as social media leakage and cybersecurity risks posed by hacking and aggregating information, are used to relay the continuous threat vector that is OPSEC. It is a true threat to the Navy, and it must be maintained to ensure safety and security, even if it impacts contract execution (Elliot et al., 2020). Furthermore, Admiral Vernon Clark noted in his statement before Congress that the “key to implementing force protection are multiple, complementary initiatives to deter and prevent terrorist attacks” (*Lessons Learned*, 2001). To bolster OPSEC within HSP networks is a small but crucial element to the security layers required for a successful port visit.

The researchers described the logistics requirements (LOGREQ) message process, in that the ship releases the message stating the support they need for the port visit. A request for quote (RFQ) is released by NAVSUP FLC, and quotes are received from GMAC-eligible contractors. An award is made via a task order, and the HSP coordinates the required support. This process should begin with a LOGREQ 30+ days from the port visit; however, not all ships submit the LOGREQs 30 days in advance. From a contracting

perspective, 30 days is sufficient time to build a robust timeline to award, but from an OPSEC perspective, 30 days means more time for sensitive information to leak from those who need to know to those that do not, including adversaries that could use the information to target the ship (Elliot et al., 2020). This OPSEC risk would be minimized by disaggregating port support using organic support assets and/or standalone contracts for port services.

The article emphasized the importance of OPSEC in contract execution. The two are not mutually exclusive, but there are some aspects that contradict the other. The right balance must be maintained. Two things need to occur: OPSEC must be maintained as high as possible, and the port visit must be executed. There are multiple layers to each process, and the researchers emphasized this with discussion on vetting of contractors, with emphasis on subcontractors (Elliot et al., 2020).

An HSP that has conducted business with the Navy for years and has a good reputation may not seem like much of a threat, but many of the requirements they provide are coordinated through third-party subcontractors, and an audit initiated by the Navy's chief information officer (CIO) found examples of subcontractors not being vetted properly and having access to potentially sensitive information (Naval Audit Service, 2011). This example did not identify the contract or the vendor/subvendor, but the researchers extrapolated this finding by pointing out how many subcontractors are involved in a port visit. It is not hard to imagine sensitive information being passed to a subcontractor, even if it is just to ensure the equipment is on the pier and ready for when the ship pulls in (Elliot et al., 2020).

The potential threat of near-peer competitors, rogue states, and non-state actors is emphasized to identify the OPSEC threat vectors and identify how those potential threats are expanding or have expanded their influence. Not seen since the Cold War, there is a renewed great power competition that has been accelerating over the years and highlighted by Russia's invasion of Ukraine; however, a more insidious strategy is China's clandestine acquisition of foreign ports and bases (O'Rourke, 2022a).

Elliot et al. (2020) identified the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as one of those threats. BRI initially appears as a staging move, where the Chinese use their influence and support to establish ports and bases around the world, but in addition to staging, it poses a potential OPSEC threat in that China's influence is growing (Fanell, 2019). It is not hard to imagine sharing sensitive information to a vetted HSP and that information reaching a Chinese-backed subvendor or agent that can utilize that information to develop intelligence that can be used against the United States and its allies and partners. This is quickly becoming a possibility with Congress pushing for a less globalized supply chain for military components, citing supply chain vulnerabilities that are impacted by the global impact of worldwide issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic and growing global competition with near-peer competitors such as China or Russia (O'Rourke, 2022b).

With limited access and intelligence to evolving U.S. military technology, there is a high potential these adversaries could exploit their sphere of influence through their husbanding agents and vendors to act as double agents and provide this information. Ingrained in their strategic perspective for overseas basing requirements, China is poised to "involve the use of local intermediaries or agents who can manage complex logistics transactions. The PLA would need to develop relationships with local agents who could work with DHL" (Yung et al., 2014, p. 40). Elliot et al. (2020) emphasized the global need for vendor and subvendor vetting.

Elliot et al. (2020) examined potential vulnerabilities in the HSP process and tools that can be used to help evaluate the need for increased scrutiny during contract development. The nature of the GMAC, in that it is a global process, means that there is intentionally vague language used in the contract. This universal and ambiguous approach to contracting is great for competition, but it allows for holes where sensitive information can be mishandled. The researchers also described two tools that can be used to help KOs identify potential OPSEC threats: the Global Terrorism Index and the Corruption Index. The researchers described using both indexes in a combined manner to identify potential OPSEC threats (Elliot et al., 2020).

The researchers also discussed current OPSEC requirements and best practices being used for vendor vetting and contract management. The use of biometric identification

called Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) has great promise in streamlining actual operations when the truck arrives at the gate, but it does not have much impact early in the contracting process (Elliot et al., 2020).

During the Iraq and Afghan campaigns, increased vendor background checks were introduced to improve OPSEC, but the workload to conduct these checks proved to be daunting. These checks are a best practice and, therefore, not required in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARS) and other publications governing contracts (Elliot et al., 2020). The DFARS require extensive work from KOs and CORs. Adding additional security vetting to that workload would require additional staffing and funding for billets. Establishing an IDIQ single award contract (SAC) for pier services in conjunction with organic materiel may limit the need to constantly screen new vendors because the same vendors could be used for extensive periods.

In Elliot et al.'s (2020) findings and conclusions section, the authors provided an OPSEC threat evaluation tool developed by combining the Global Terrorism and Corruption Indexes (see Table 2). The higher the score, the larger the potential threat in the country. They highlighted Bahrain and other countries that are allies and FDNF hubs. Those countries have some of the highest scores on the list and therefore pose a large threat (Elliot et al., 2020). Limiting potential OPSEC threats in these countries is an especially important goal, and utilizing contracting practices that allow for better vendor vetting would go a long way to help maintain OPSEC in these high-threat areas.

Table 2. OPSEC Threat Evaluation Tool. Source: Elliot et al. (2020).

Country	Corruption Index Score (1-100)	Terrorism Index Score (0-10)	Combined Threat Score (0-200)	Port Visits During FY21
Egypt	33	6.932	136	7
Philippines	33	6.790	135	9
Turkey	38	5.651	119	9
Greece	49	4.849	99	78
Ecuador	36	2.766	92	9
United States of America	67	4.961	83	64
Italy	56	3.687	81	40
Bahrain	42	2.145	79	92
Djibouti	30	0.000	70	23
Dominican Republic	30	0.000	70	9
United Kingdom	78	4.770	70	53
Panama	36	0.000	64	40
Croatia	47	0.000	53	9
Oman	52	0.000	48	20
Japan	73	1.460	42	118
South Korea	62	0.000	38	15
United Arab Emirates	69	0.000	31	145
Norway	85	1.109	26	17
Singapore	85	0.000	15	32
Denmark	88	0.291	15	10

The article provided three COAs:

1. Develop a status quo option with a better understanding of the potential threats to OPSEC and an understanding that personnel involved in contracting with HSP hold themselves and the vendors they are working with to higher standards.
2. Expand security, such that HSPs are required to have their subvendors vetted through standing contractor vetting processes.
3. Utilize logistics support representatives (LSRs) to act as another liaison between the HSP and contracting team.

The combined Terrorism and Corruption Index is a great tool, and the three COAs provided have the potential to help decrease the threat of OPSEC in the HSP process, but there is more that can be done (Elliot et al., 2020).

The article concluded by emphasizing that the changes implemented after the GDMA scandal were needed and have made great strides in limiting fraud and improving

contract execution, but the threat posed by OPSEC cannot be ignored. The Navy will continue to maintain a foreign presence, and potential adversaries are growing in number and complexity. The Navy must find a way to maintain OPSEC beyond what is currently the status quo (Elliot et al., 2020).

The potential benefits from utilizing organic support or SACs for port services with expanded security vetting would be extensive. Bahrain is the Number 8 threat on Table 2, so there are clearly potential adversaries in the country. Utilizing whatever tool available would be highly beneficial for the Navy and the DOD in the region.

F. PORT VISIT SUPPORT DURING MAJOR THEATER CONFLICTS

Coordination of port visits are challenging enough during peacetime; for various reasons, these challenges are often compounded in times of conflict. Petrinovic et al. (2019) examined the current HSP-centric model for port visits through an operational lens in a major conflict. The concern is that in a major theater conflict, HSP may not be able or willing to support the U.S. Navy in ports near to the conflict.

Port visits in foreign ports may not be available because these locations could “come under the threat of attack or seek to avoid becoming involved for political reasons” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2021, p. 18). This is driven largely by the whims of the local population, who are influenced by geopolitical loyalties and national self-determination, even in U.S.-managed foreign ports.

Although both HSP and non-HSP frameworks rely on contracted local labor, HSP-centric models contract locals as the bulk of their workforce, whereas non-HSP frameworks rely on a mixture of organic GFE, uniformed personnel, DOD civilians, and vetted local contractors to execute their services. This key difference determines their endurance during surges, and awareness of which model is suitable during theater conflict is strategic for the success of the United States.

G. SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed existing scholarly works related to the topic of this study. This topic is related to many similar articles, but this study takes aspects and results from each and utilizes them to better understand the question of port visit frameworks, when one should be used over another, and how standardizing the frameworks will allow for a better value for the U.S. Navy overall.

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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to outline how and why this study was conducted in the way it was. The vast variations between different frameworks and lack of common policy and guidance meant that this study required extensive data collection and formulation of a model that could be used to compare them.

A. DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY

Some support frameworks are governed by thorough policy and guidance, but others rely on nonstandard, local procedures that vary from port to port. The lack of common guidance for those frameworks required data collection from SMEs and reliance on our significant experiences as supply officers conducting and supporting port visits. The data collected from SMEs ranged across support entities and were collected from various ports, with vastly different support strategies. Our experiences include serving as KO in the HSP branch for the 5th Fleet AOR, two supply officer tours aboard FDNF ships stationed in the 5th and 7th Fleet AORs, one supply officer tour aboard a West Coast homeported ship with multiple western Pacific deployments, and one supply officer tour aboard a West Coast homeported ship with a U.S. Southern Command deployment. Through available data, guidance, data collected from SMEs, and our experiences, a proper understanding of the various support strategies was attained.

B. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

Comparing the various support strategies proved to be just as complex as the variation in support frameworks; therefore, a comparative case study was used. The variability found in the different support strategies and the lack of concrete market research that could be utilized to perform a traditional cost–benefit analysis, such as that described in OMB Circular No. A94, limited the options available for comparing the support strategies. To answer the questions posed by OPNAV, we decided to conduct a comparative case study as described in *Case Study Research and Application: Design and Methods* (Yin, 2017).

The comparative case study scores the different support strategies on criteria desired in various port visit scenarios. Ranging from peacetime, when affordability and ease of support is mostly highly desired, to potential port visits during a major theater conflict. The model developed in this study is meant to be a tool used by planners to develop strategies and policy that will help prepare for port visit support strategies in the future.

C. SUMMARY

This chapter outlined the barriers to research and the strategies utilized to overcome those barriers. We also explained how the data collected were used to develop a tool to inform future plans across the U.S. Navy.

V. SUPPORT FRAMEWORKS IDENTIFIED

The U.S. Navy and MSC execute port visits around the world. Each port visit and each port is different. To properly evaluate the various support strategies, they were sorted into three buckets: HSP, non-HSP, and a hybrid of the two. This chapter outlines the basic frameworks of the port visit support strategies identified through current guidance, historical practice, data collected from the SMEs, and our extensive experience.

A. STANDARD PORT VISIT PROCESS

The essential process for requesting port visit services does not vary between the frameworks. The differences occur in the performance of the requested services and in the administrative processes to pay for and fund the various strategies. Figure 1 depicts the process flow for the different strategies.

The basic process for requesting port visit services begins with the ship's release of a naval message known as a LOGREQ message. The LOGREQ contains the applicable information and services required by the ship and the crew. Information includes the ship's schedule, draft, number of Sailors/Marines/civilians, and so on. Services can range from crane and forklift requirements to food and fuel. Appendix A contains an example of a LOGREQ from one of our previous units. The LOGREQ for HSP and non-HSP port visits tend to mirror each other, although the HSP LOGREQ is based on a global standardized format for each individual hull type. This is discussed further in the HSP section.

The LOGREQ is released via Naval Message and received by various interested parties. These parties include the ship's operational chain of command, the numbered fleet they are operating in, the U.S. Embassy in the HN, the servicing FLC, and local Port Operations. The last two highlight the splitting point between the two primary support strategies, HSP and non-HSP. FLCs fall under NAVSUP. The HSP process is contracted through FLCs. U.S.-managed Port Operations is a business function of the installation's Public Works Office, which falls under CNIC and NAVFAC. Note that the term *Port Operations* is also utilized by civilian-owned/managed ports, and therefore can be

misconstrued. In the interest of clarity, this study only utilizes the term in reference to CNIC- and NAVFAC-managed facilities.




Figure 1. Port Visit Support Process Flows

B. HSP SUPPORT FRAMEWORK

There is a significant difference between the HSP and non-HSP frameworks. The HSP framework follows a port visit-centric model. A port visit-centric model is reactionary, in that the effort to support that event is only authorized once the individual task order is awarded. This requirement to prevent any “prework” follows the Antideficiency Act clause preventing a contractor from providing supplies or services without an approved obligation to do so (Limitation on Voluntary Services, 2010). The added emphasis on this rule’s significance is a remnant of the lessons learned from the GDMA scandal. The HSP process has gone through significant streamlining and operational improvements, but each task order is still awarded for a specific ship pulling into a specific port and therefore remains reactionary by design.

The HSP framework currently utilizes the GMAC, which is a 5-year, multiple-award, IDIQ contract that spans the entire world. The GMAC supports commercial HSPs for all *standard* services a ship may require during a port visit, including “force protection, water, tugs, waste removal” and provides “electricity, phone lines and transportation to a visiting ship and its crew” (Dortch, 2020). Similarly, OPNAVINST 4400.11A calls for a global standard LOGREQ that outlines the authorized services ships can request for a pending port visit (OPNAV, 2020; see Appendix B for an example). The standardization of requestable services was a significant change following the GDMA scandal. It has improved the uniformity and auditability of HSP-supported port visits.

The process to conduct an HSP-supported port visit begins with the LOGREQ submission. Once authenticated through the operational chain of command, the fleet COR and the FLC LSR and KO validate the requested services against the global standard LOGREQ. Any services requested beyond the authorized services are vetted through a standard LOGREQ deviation request.

Once the requested services are vetted, the KO releases a request for bids to vendors on the GMAC. Following a bidding period, the KO releases a task order to one vendor to provide all services to the requesting ship. The supply officer reviews the task order for any changes or modifications required. The KO makes any necessary modifications to the task order, and the vendor prepares for the ship’s arrival.

Upon arrival, the HSP provides the services in accordance with the task order. During the event, the vendor, supply officer, and COR conduct daily reconciliation of the services provided. Prior to the departure, the group performs a final reconciliation to ensure quantities and qualities meet the requirements set forth in the task order.

Upon departure, the vendor provides an invoice to the KO for services rendered. The ship’s supply officer fills out and the commanding officer signs the Port Visit Checklist, and the supply officer and COR fill out and sign the material inspection and receiving reports (DD Form 250). These forms and supporting documents are finalized and documented in HSPortal.

Upon confirmation of services rendered, the KO completes the contract, and the vendor is paid via the Defense Financial Accounting System (DFAS). The source of funds for HSP port visits is the cognizant fleet's operations and maintenance (O&M) budget. Figure 2 depicts the process, including various caveats that may occur during the process, including nonstandard services, disputes on quantities, and administrative steps that occur outside of the purview of the operational environment.




Figure 2. HSP Support Process Flow. Source: OPNAV (2020).

C. NON-HSP SUPPORT FRAMEWORK

While the HSP framework utilizes one source (vendor) to provide all of the services for a specific port visit, the non-HSP framework uses a variety of sources. The non-HSP sources of service can be bucketed into two subcategories: organic or contracted.

Organic services include GFE, DOD civilian and military labor, and the ship's embarked equipment and/or labor. Examples include civilian-operated cranes that are property of the DOD and shipboard forklifts operated by ship's forces. In addition to DOD-

owned and -operated GFE, some ports utilize GFE operated by contracted labor, or vice versa. The benefits of owning and operating the equipment required for port visits is undeniably high but not always cost-effective or operationally feasible. Therefore, vendors are contracted to provide services and support when the organic infrastructure is unable to support.

Contrary to the HSP framework's reactionary, event-centric contracting model, the non-HSP contracting model is preemptive and service-centric by design. It is preemptive in that it relies on long-term forecasting to contract for an individual service well in advance of need. It is service-centric in that the contracts are written to provide a specific service anytime during a contract period, as opposed to a single contract, such as an HSP task order, which provides a variety of services during a specific event.

Non-HSP service contracts tend to be included or mirrored in already established base service contracts, known as BOS contracts. BOS provides all or most of the resources to operate bases, installations, and ports. These contracts range from trash removal and sewage processing to landscaping and electric utilities. Including port visit services in BOS contracts allows the Public Works Office to establish a baseline of support as long as the support is in accordance with the wording of the contract. Port visit support from BOS-related contracts allows for contract management to be consolidated by the BOS provider.

In the non-HSP framework, services can be provided through multiple entities. The most common service providers/coordinators for a non-HSP event are Port Operations, Public Works, FLC, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)–Logistics, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR). Some entities act directly on the LOGREQ, but others require additional request forms or external coordination between support entities.

The primary liaison between a ship and the support entities is an FLC LSR. Upon receipt of a LOGREQ, an LSR is tasked with supporting the ship's logistics requirements while in port. LSRs perform many of the same functions an HA provides during an HSP-supported port visit. Their primary role is communicating and coordinating with the ship and the various support entities, including the HSP if applicable. For example, some entities act directly on the LOGREQ, but others require additional request forms and/or

funding documents; an LSR would work with the ship to get the required forms and funding set up prior to pulling in.

Unlike HSP support, the funding source for non-HSP port visits varies between support entities, ports, and even individual events. Common support entities include

- **Regional NAVSUP FLC:** LSR, food, mail, hazmat, and fuel
- **DLA Distribution:** materiel movement
- **MWR:** crew support
- **CNIC and NAVFAC:** installation and industrial support

The primary support entity for non-HSP port visits is NAVFAC through Port Operations and Public Works offices under CNIC. That is, CNIC owns the facilities utilized by ships during port visits, but CNIC does not provide the actual support. Instead, the support is provided by NAVFAC in various ways. Prior to 2019, NAVFAC operated as a part of the NWCF, but beginning in 2019 they transitioned to the GF and established a new relationship with CNIC. This relationship highlights CNIC as the requirement generator and resource (fund) provider, and NAVFAC as one of many resource providers (CNIC, 2020; NAVFAC, 2019).

Through this proactive model, CNIC generates requirements (forecasts base and port operations), and the NAVFAC operations and contracting offices coordinate enablers to support those requirements. The support provided for those requirements can range from DOD civilians operating GFE or contracted services such as trash removal and crane crews. Those enablers are in turn funded by CNIC or other resource sponsors. Most NAVFAC-supported ports follow this proactive forecasting model, but some ports still utilize the older, reactionary model, requiring individual funding documents from the ship requesting the support.

Figure 3 contains a flow chart example of a generic non-HSP port visit. The non-HSP framework essentially comes down to self-sufficiency in one form or another. This

self-sufficiency has its benefits and drawbacks, which will be evaluated in the following chapters.




Figure 3. Generic Non-HSP Process Flow

D. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The three primary support strategies include fully HSP, fully non-HSP, and a hybrid model. Hybrid models are often the norm for U.S.-managed foreign ports, as the complexities of supporting ships in port vary so much that it is impossible to cover all eventualities, and a mix of support strategies evolves to become the SOP for the port. Figure 4 contains a flow chart example of a generic hybrid port visit.




Figure 4. Generic Hybrid Process Flow

A prime example of a port that utilizes a hybrid model is White Beach, Okinawa, Japan—a U.S.-managed port primarily utilized to embark and disembark Marines and their equipment onto ships in an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). White Beach is primarily a NAVFAC, non-HSP supported port, but the flexibility it shows in utilizing other sources is important to note. When pulling in, the ships in the ARG can receive support from upwards of eight different entities:

- **NAVFAC:** Port operations tugs and fuel, and Public Works trash removal
- **NAVSUP:** Contracted busses and FLC-coordinated food stores and mail
- **HSP:** Busses
- **DLA:** Materiel movement
- **MWR:** Busses and crew support
- **Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS):** Busses
- **Marine Corps:** Heavy equipment

- **Air Force:** Heavy equipment

This non-HSP-centric hybrid model is similarly utilized for HSP-centric port visits. For example, commercial ports tend to be completely supported through the HSP, although they may be augmented by other entities, such as an HN Coast Guard patrol boat used for force protection.

Other examples of alternative support strategies center around utilizing the standard support models in unique ways. The first example this study identified was FLC Bahrain's (FLCB's) unique HSP support contract for FDNF ships homeported at the U.S.-managed Bahraini port, Mina Salman. FLCB used an innovative IDIQ contract framework that allows monthly task orders for those homeported ships. It is known as the Mina Salman Pier Services (MSPS) contract. The unique missions and small sizes of those units tend to require frequent short-notice port visits. This monthly task order model allows the units to pull in and out as needed during the month without having to start from scratch with every port visit.

In addition, FLCB has expanded a similar monthly task order model for PCs visiting Jubel Ali, on the coast of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), within the scope of the HSP GMAC. This is significant, as Jubel Ali is a commercial port that is not managed by the United States, while Mina Salman is a part of NSA Bahrain.

The second alternative support approach is not unique in design, but it is unique in its structure. NSA Rota, Spain, uses a standard non-HSP model, but the service contracts for base and port visit support are contracted through the NAVSUP FLC Detachment Contracting Office (Code 200), as opposed to the NAVFAC Public Works Contracting Office. Prior to establishing this model, Rota utilized an HSP-centric model, augmented by organic equipment owned and operated by NAVFAC. The Code 200 office in Rota primarily manages the HSP events in the region, but establishing a BOS model instead of continuing the use of an HSP model allows for significant efficiencies for the base and the contracting office.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter describes the various port visit support frameworks identified during the study. Support frameworks vary from port to port, but they tended to either follow a fully HSP, fully non-HSP, or a hybrid style utilizing both formats. This chapter described the standard processes to attain services from the various frameworks, how those frameworks are managed and paid for, and how some ports are finding creative ways to provide support to visiting and homeported ships.

VI. CASE STUDY DEVELOPMENT

The support strategies identified through this study vary in many ways. No two ports are the same; therefore, it is understandable that the support strategies would differ. The question remains: Is one framework more suited to a specific port than another? This study uses a comparative case study approach in which ports are examined and graded on the primary criteria desired in a support framework.

The port visit support criteria chosen for this study include *auditability*, *flexibility*, *reliability*, *vulnerability*, and *durability*. These criteria were chosen as each provides a specific enabling ability to the U.S. Navy and the units receiving the services provided. This chapter expands on the importance of each criterion and explains the scoring utilized to evaluate the ports being assessed. The chapter concludes with the selection of case study ports, and why they were chosen.

A. AUDITABILITY

“The time is always right to do what is right.”

—Martin Luther King Jr., *King*

This section analyzes HSP and non-HSP frameworks through the lens of auditability using the auditability triangle, which encompasses the five components of COSO’s internal control framework, as well as key personnel and processes. This analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of their internal controls, the capability of processes, and the competence of key personnel. Additionally, the HSP framework points out some of the major improvements made to the HSP process after a decade of reflection and revamping spurred on by the now infamous GDMA corruption case. The analysis begins with a background on the policy for HSP and non-HSP frameworks. It then defines the three elements of auditability. Next, it goes into detail about the five COSO components of internal controls. The section ends with the grading scale utilized to score port visit support strategies in the comparative case study in the next chapter.

The U.S. Navy’s overarching policy for the HSP program is OPNAV Instruction 4400.11A, dated June 26, 2020 (OPNAV, 2020). The U.S. Navy recognized that it relies on a “network of organic, host nation and contractor provided support to conduct Port Visits (PVSTs) around the world” (p. 1). This policy describes the standards to perform husbanding services “in a controlled, consistent, and well-documented manner” and aims to “utilize internal controls and end-to-end business processes to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse” (p. 3). However, this policy only applies to husbanding service contracts administered by NAVSUP FLCs. It does not regulate any of the non-HSP-supported ports. Therefore, the elements of auditability apply differently to various locations. There is no OPNAV guidance that addresses standardization of non-HSP services across U.S.-managed ports overseas. Non-HSP is too varied to assess as a single entity, at least in terms of auditability.

1. Auditability Triangle

Auditability is a key measure for the Navy to ensure accountability, transparency, and integrity of the acquisition process for port visits around the world. In his theory on organizations and auditability, Michael Power (2007) defined *auditability* as “a condition of possibility of all inspection and auditing practices and also a mode of organizational transformation” (p. 14). He explained that the transformation occurs when the organization embraces the concept and practice of being transparent and ready to be audited as a tool to proactively improve its management performance using data collection and documentation systems (Power, 1996, p. 289). To assess the auditability of the two support frameworks, this study used three components of the auditability triangle, which are depicted in Figure 5.

Auditability theory emphasizes the importance of maintaining “effective Internal Controls, Capable Processes, and Competent Personnel” (J. Rendon & R. Rendon, 2015, p. 715). These three pillars are essential for the Navy to retain and improve public trust. The relationship between these three pillars of auditability is widely known as the auditability triangle, which is depicted in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Auditability Triangle. Source: R. G. Rendon and J. M. Rendon (2015).

According to Rendon and Rendon (2015b), the *process* aspect of auditability refers to “the capability of organizational processes for performing procurement related activities” (p. 716). The Processes leg of the triangle emphasizes institutionalized processes that are monitored, refined, and integrated into the day-to-day business of the organization. (Rendon, 2008). Rendon and Rendon (2015b) described the Personnel leg focused on the training and capability of the people performing the audited functions. The *internal controls* aspect generally comprises five internal control components established by the COSO (2013) of the Treadway Commission: “control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities” (p. 6). The five components of the internal control framework are outlined below.

- **Control Environment:** Leadership must create a culture within the organization the reinforces the importance of auditability (Tan, 2013).
- **Risk Assessment:** Determine potential auditability threats to the organization, and prepare countermeasures to protect the organization (COSO, 2013).
- **Control Activities:** he countermeasures for the threats identified in the Risk Assessment (J. Rendon & R. Rendon, 2015).

- **Information and Communication:** Intentional communication in all directions and sharing information with all parties is crucial to maintaining internal controls in an organization.
- **Monitoring:** Managing the Control Activities through frequent assessment and evaluation to ensure the effectiveness of internal controls (J. Rendon & R. Rendon, 2015).

2. Grading Scale

A determination is made for each of the three support frameworks regarding the effectiveness of their internal controls, capable processes, and competent personnel. Each of the three pillars of auditability are graded between 1 and 5, with 5 being the highest level. The three scores are averaged for each support framework to provide an individual score for the auditability criteria. The respective grade determination is based on our interpretations of auditability theory along with data gathered from SMEs, established policy, and our experiences. Table 3 depicts the auditability grading scale.

Table 3. Auditability Grading Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Auditability Average	Marginal Auditability Average	Satisfactory Auditability Average	Very Good Auditability Average	Exceptional Auditability Average

B. FLEXIBILITY

“We will either find a way or make one.”

—Hannibal, Masters of Success

This quote from the great Carthaginian, General Hannibal, exemplifies what is needed to support warships at sea and when they pull into port. Flexibility is measured by a support framework’s ability to support the dynamic schedules that are hallmarks of naval

operations. Ship requirements change with little notice; a support structure's ability to support shifts in requirements is imperative in ensuring port visit support remains just that: support, not a hindrance. To properly understand the importance of this enabling capability, a discussion on the requirement for flexibility follows. Finally, the scoring is established for this criterion.

1. Mission First

Through our significant operational experiences and discussions with SMEs, both on the pier and on the ship, flexibility was established as one of the key enabling factors of a port visit support framework. There are two primary subcategories of flexibility that need to be evaluated to properly understand the flexibility of a given port visit's support strategy.

The first subcategory of flexibility occurs before the ship pulls in. Ship and port schedules are variable by nature. Equipment breaks, injuries occur, damage is taken in battle, and schedules change. These shifts in schedule are not rare, but they can require vastly different efforts depending on the support framework. For the most part, the ship will pull in as soon as a berth is open, but the support framework's ability to flex to support the emergent port visit is a key factor in this criterion. Therefore, the ability to support *short-notice port visits* is the first subcategory of flexibility.

The second subcategory focuses on changing the status quo. As discussed previously, the requirements of a ship in port can vary greatly, from port to port and from ship to ship. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to accurately forecast all services needed to support every port visit. The ability for a support structure to shift to provide added or different services can be just as important as supporting a last-minute port visit. The ability to support *changes in requirements* is the second subcategory.

2. Grading Scale

Each of the three frameworks are assessed regarding their ability to support sudden changes in schedule and requirements for individual port visits. Flexibility to support short-notice port visits and changes in requirements are graded between 1 and 5, with 5 being

the highest level of flexibility achieved. These scores are averaged to provide an individual score for each port visit support framework regarding flexibility.

The HSP flexibility subscores are determined through a combination of quantitative analysis of HSPortal data and qualitative data drawn from SMEs, applicable guidance, historical port visits reviews, and our experiences. The data drawn from HSPortal include all HSP-supported port visits from FY2021 to FY2022. These data are broken down to the case study ports for analysis. The primary quantitative measure utilized is average speed to award for last-minute port visits. This score is determined by comparing the LOGREQ message release date and the task order award date. The quantitative score is augmented by qualitative data, and an individual score for support of short-notice port visits is provided. Support for changes in requirements is primarily based on qualitative analysis described above.

Due to the lack of dedicated port visit data sets for non-HSP, the scoring for flexibility is qualitative in nature, and the logic supporting the scoring is described in the next chapter when the scores are assigned. The scoring for the individual subcriteria for non-HSP is based on our interpretations of flexibility regarding established policy, data gathered from SMEs, and our experiences.

The scoring for hybrid ports takes into consideration the positive and negative aspects of the two primary frameworks utilized in the port, and the scores are weighted depending on the impact of the sub-framework on the port's ability to provide flexible support. The individual sub-framework aspects' weight on the flexibility scale is based on their individual impact on the flexibility of the hybrid support framework as a whole. Table 4 depicts the flexibility grading scale.

Table 4. Flexibility Grading Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Flexibility Average	Marginal Flexibility Average	Satisfactory Flexibility Average	Very Good Flexibility Average	Exceptional Flexibility Average

C. RELIABILITY

“Whoever is careless with the truth in small matters cannot be trusted with important matters.”

—Albert Einstein, *Address on the Occasion of the 7th Anniversary of Israel’s Independence*

Reliability is essential to ensuring that port visits run smoothly and efficiently. It is known as consistent satisfactory performance that can be trusted. It focuses on the expectation that support for the port visits will perform as required. Ships normally submit their LOGREQs once the ship has received diplomatic clearance from the HN to conduct the port visit. Therefore, the ship expects timely and satisfactory services immediately upon arrival, regardless of what contractors are involved in the port visit. A reliable port visit framework is one that can support the requested port visit without disrupting shipboard schedule and operations. Additionally, a support framework that consistently performs satisfactorily is more reliable than one that has historical performance issues.

Multiple factors impact a framework’s reliability. These factors may even include elements of auditability that were previously discussed in Section B of this chapter: people, processes, and internal controls. The way the support contracts are structured, administered, and monitored plays a critical role in maximizing the support framework’s reliability. In the context of port visits executed overseas, reliability of the HSP, non-HSP, and hybrid frameworks are evaluated based on quality assurance (QA) data and consideration of the factors that impact such performance. To understand the importance of a support strategy’s reliability, a discussion about past performance and QA for contracted services and organic services follows. This section ends with the reliability scoring we established.

1. Contracting Considerations: Past Performance and Quality Assurance

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is the set of rules and regulations that governs government contracting. As such, the FAR directs KOs to evaluate contractors’ past performance. To do this, KOs, evaluate available data such as historical performance

on other U.S. government contracts. The age, source, context, and resulting trends found in this data must be considered when evaluating for past performance (FAR 15.305, 2023). Therefore, a contractor's record of past performance is a significant factor evaluated during the selection of contractors for new contracts. If a contractor has performed poorly in previous contracts, such a negative record of accomplishment increases the likelihood of similar mediocre performance in future contracts.

A contractor's previous success does not guarantee that a new contract will be performed flawlessly. In fact, contractors submit a Quality Control Plan (QCP) or Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) in their proposals. The QCP and the QAP describe the efforts the vendor will make in order to remain in accordance with required QA standards. By using the QCP and QAP, the KO makes the contractor responsible for maintaining quality control. If the contractor is chosen, they use the QCP to document the management and quality control actions to achieve the desired outcomes.

In addition to a contractor's QCP, a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) is implemented to monitor the contractor's quality control efforts. It also ensures QA metrics are surveilled in accordance with the contract or task order (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.). QASPs vary in complexity—depending on the value of the contract, the nature of the contract, and the importance of the intended performance results. In some cases, the KO shares its intended QASP in order to ensure the vendor adequately plans their QCP in order to align with the QASP (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.). The QASP is developed simultaneously with and traceable to the Performance Work Statement (PWS). The U.S. government performs its due diligence to ensure the contractor meets its contractual obligations. Inspections and customer satisfaction surveys are traditional tools to assess the contractors' performance. Such surveys can be used routinely with every single customer or checked randomly.

2. Quality Assurance for Organic Support

In addition to services contracted through the Navy base IDIQ contracts, non-HSP support may also include organic support. Examples of organic support may include government-owned and -operated cranes, vehicles, bays, and other equipment used to

sustain ships in port. DOD labor, such as line handlers or stevedores, would be considered organic as well. There is no standardized QA data collection source for organic support. Therefore, data from SMEs and the authors' experience are utilized to evaluate the reliability score for organic support.

3. Grading Scale

Each of the frameworks are assessed regarding their reliability based on QA data and consideration of the factors that impact such performance. The reliability to support port visits is graded between 1 and 5, with 5 being the highest level of reliability. The HSP reliability is determined through a combination of quantitative analysis of HSPortal data and qualitative data drawn from SMEs, applicable guidance, historical port visits reviews, and our experience. The data drawn from HSPortal includes all HSP-supported port visits from FY2021 to FY2022.

Due to the lack of a port visit-specific QA collection system for non-HSP ports, scoring for reliability is qualitative in nature, and the logic supporting the scoring is described in the next chapter when the scores are assigned. The scoring for reliability of the non-HSP framework is based on our interpretations of reliability regarding local operating procedures, data gathered from SMEs, and our experience.

The scoring for hybrid ports takes into consideration the positive and negative aspects of the two primary frameworks, and the scores are weighted depending on the impact of the sub-framework on the port's ability to provide reliable support. The individual sub-framework aspects' weight on the reliability scale is based on their individual impact on the reliability of the hybrid support framework as a whole. Table 5 depicts the reliability grading scale.

Table 5. Reliability Grading Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Reliability	Marginal Reliability	Satisfactory Reliability	Very Good Reliability	Exceptional Reliability

D. VULNERABILITY

“Loose lips sink ships.”

—War Advertising Council, *Our History*

Vulnerability to OPSEC threats is a concern that must be considered when evaluating port visit support strategies. A National Defense University (2012) publication stated, “OPSEC Vulnerability [is] a condition in which friendly actions provide OPSEC indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time to provide a basis for effective adversary decision making” (p. II-1)

These effective adversary decisions could lead to successful espionage or subversive actions. OPSEC indicators are “detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information” (National Defense University, 2012, p. II-1). These can vary from something routine such as the name or class of the ship to more critical information such as the ship’s schedules or crucial repair requirements. Through discussion of lessons learned from past OPSEC failures to evidence that reveals China’s growing ambition to disarm U.S. OPSEC at home and abroad, OPSEC remains of utmost importance to U.S. national security and must be considered when weighing the best port visit framework for the establishment of a U.S.-managed foreign port. This chapter describes how the threat to OPSEC is evaluated and how the case study ports are graded on their vulnerability.

1. Historical and Current Geopolitical OPSEC Threats

According to Elliot et al. (2020), painful events in U.S. history, such as the bombing of the USS *Cole*, have displayed the tenacity of our enemies to exploit the gaps in security rendered by port visits (pp. 276–277). These risks drastically increase when the HN is known to be internally corrupt or harbors known terrorist groups (p. 280). China, a major power competitor, has also increased the threat level by purchasing a port from Djibouti next to a U.S. military base and port frequently utilized by U.S. warships (Dobbins et al., 2018). With the recent news of a downed Chinese spy balloon revealed to have gathered intelligence of sensitive U.S. military sites deep in the heart of the U.S. mainland, China

could use the proximity of these ports to collect similar intelligence for potentially nefarious reasons as well (Kube & Lee, 2023).

Moreover, there is a growing list of countries that accrued Chinese loans and are now struggling to repay their debts. These loans are usually difficult to repay due to higher interest rates compared to Western governments and a short repayment period of 10 years or less compared to 28 years from other lenders that accommodate developing countries (Wang, 2022). Although China claimed to have “supported countries in debt distress, it has done so selectively and with limited effectiveness ... due partly to the internal fragmentation of Chinese creditors and partly to China’s reluctance to join international debt relief initiatives” (Kern & Reinsberg, 2022, p. 12). Once in the throes of China’s debt trap, the HN is “vulnerable to pressure from Beijing” (Wang, 2022). These pressures could extort or coerce an HN’s government or population to undermine the presence of the United States by sharing sensitive information in exchange for loan forgiveness or deferment.

The threat posed by near-peer competitors and transnational terrorist groups remain a primary concern for all operations, but the potential vulnerabilities present during a port visit must remain a continuous concern for everyone involved. Therefore, the potential threats those bad actors pose must be considered when considering a port visit support framework.

2. The Contractor Factor

Contractors are an important asset to the DOD. According to Peter (2023),

Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations ... freeing up uniformed personnel to focus on military specific activities; providing supplemental expertise in specialized fields, such as linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a surge capability to quickly deliver critical support functions tailored to specific military needs. (p. 1)

The risk associated with contractors and their subcontractors is that they could employ many foreign nationals from third countries or the HN.

A defense contractor is defined as “any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the

DOD to furnish services, supplies, or construction” (Operational Contract Support, 2011, p. 682). This statute does not bar non-U.S. citizens from becoming defense contractors or subcontractors. In fact, in Iraq and Syria, in the last quarter of FY2022, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported that out of 7,908 contractors in the region, only around 34% were U.S. citizens, 38% were third-country nationals, and 27% were host-country nationals (p. 2). Furthermore, these third-country nationals were hired from developing countries such as “Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, India, Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa and Uganda” (Li, 2015, para. 5).

Foreign nationals are force multipliers due to their abundant availability and accessibility. Their importance is recognized by the DOD by authorizing combatant commanders to employ them in their AOR at their discretion (Department of Defense [DOD], 2011). Moreover, welcoming foreigners and integrating them into society and the workforce is a party of American cultural heritage. According to Air Force News (2021), “America remains a land of opportunities, and because many foreigners from all over the world come to live in the U.S., cultural diversity is cited as one of the country’s strengths.” In fact, “Since the Revolutionary War, legal permanent residents are eligible to enlist in the military. Roughly 35,000 non-citizens are serving in active-duty military, and about 8,000 join each year” (Air Force News, 2021).

The DOD civilian sector also shows this diversity. Once vetted successfully, foreign nationals and non-U.S. citizens in the U.S. military, DOD civilians, and contractors receive base access just like their U.S. citizen counterparts (DOD, n.d.). The concern is that their loyalty does not necessarily lie with the United States, and their interests may lean more towards their native country, their profit margins, or a separate bad actor. Vetting contractors in port visit frameworks like “HSPs and gaining a true understanding of a vendor’s intentions and background is difficult” (Ferrer, 2019, p. 4). The DOD accepts these risks for the benefits non-U.S. citizens offer to the U.S. Armed Forces. However, there are mitigations in place to control their access to sensitive information such as the establishment of the NOFORN (no foreign national) policy (DOD, 2020).

U.S. military personnel and DOD civilians, regardless of citizenship status, are required to undergo a vetting process for their base access. Their credentials are processed

through DBIDS, which employs a wide array of identification tools and requires background checks to mitigate risks of infiltration (Elliot et al., 2020, pp. 282–283). For HSP support, contractor vetting is also required. In fact, since 2017, all contractors who seek base access must obtain DBIDS credentials (CNIC, n.d.-a). Through the vetting process, these contractors are also subjected to intelligence-based threat assessment with clear requirements for background checks and security credential issuance (GAO, 2009, 2017).

However, most of the risks seem to lie with subcontractors, which is the mainstay of HSP support. Subcontractors do not necessarily have to enter a U.S. base or port to conduct port visit support. For example, a subcontractor may provide vehicles to a prime contractor who will deliver them to the visiting ships. Although the prime contractor is credentialled to drive the vehicles to the base and deliver them to the ships, the subcontractor must be informed of the ship's schedule to provide the service. The prime contractor may be cautious not to reveal the class of the ship as well, but the requested number of rental vehicles or liberty boats often reveals that information because crew sizes are predictable for each class, and it is risky to change quantities on a LOGREQ, especially if the numbers on the last port call were adequate.

To combat internal control weaknesses highlighted during the GDMA scandal, the U.S. Navy pushed to diversify husbanding service providers within an area to mitigate issues of familiarity and implemented the GMAC (Elliot et al., 2020, p. 284). However, this shift also carries inherent OPSEC risks in that

the security and scheduling information may be compromised since more contractors require access to ship data to build task order proposals. Since there is not a requirement to disclose which subcontractors a vendor will employ for a task order, there is no screening of the subcontractors. (Elliot et al., 2020, p. 280)

In USCENTCOM, for example, there was a futile attempt to mitigate this issue by requiring all foreign vendors and subcontractors to register to a website to be vetted by the vendor vetting branch if potential contract value was above \$50,000 (United States Central Command, 2019). However, many contract values fall below \$50,000, and registering to the vendor vetting branch website morphed into an administrative drill with little

practicality for subcontractors to apply because of the 2- to 3-month process lead time (NAVSUP, personal communication, April 15, 2023).

USINDOPACOM did not fare well either. According to the Government Accountability Office (2017), “PACOM does not fully account for contractor personnel in a steady-state environment and does not have a process to vet foreign vendors... subsequently issued accountability guidance in November 2016, but it is limited in that it excludes foreign-national contracts” (p. 9). This suggests that some foreign subcontractors are still under the radar.

Although foreign national employees of the DOD and contractors are important enabling forces, they still pose a threat to the mission. The amount of reliance on foreign nationals and contractors in particular must be considered when deciding on a port visit support framework.

3. Grading Scale

Each of the frameworks is assessed based on their reliance on contractors and subcontractors to support port visits. A framework’s vulnerability score spans between 1 and 5, with 5 having no reliance on contractor support and 1 having full reliance on contractor and subcontractor support. These frameworks are expressed in qualitative data drawn from SMEs, applicable guidance, historical port visit reviews, and our experiences. Table 6 shows the detailed grading scale by which each framework is evaluated. Table 6 depicts the vulnerability grading scale.

Table 6. Vulnerability Grading Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Full Reliance on Contractors	Heavy Reliance on Contractors	Balanced Reliance on Contractors	Low Reliance on Contractors	No Reliance on Contractors

E. DURABILITY

In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to proceed within the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to advance and establish yourself again, and always prepare to have within reach of your army your resources and your requirements.

—Frederick the Great, *Instructions for His Generals*

The long arm of the United States, the U.S. Navy, cannot project its power without foreign ports. History has shown that success in American wars was largely owed to overseas nodes that rapidly established a sustainability train to support resource-intensive equipment. As challenging as a single port visit is, a surge in times of conflict brings a different dimension of complexity to port visit support. The key to success in these ports is the ability to expand support to an influx of ships of different classes and maintain that support for an extended period, to surge. Through this lens, the case study ports are analyzed and rated based on historical insights and the current geopolitical context.

1. Lessons from the Mighty “Ulithi”

In times of major theater conflict, power projection is one of the most critical naval capabilities. It is the Navy’s ability to “threaten or direct strikes—from ballistic-missile attacks to amphibious assaults—against targets ashore for sustained periods” (Masters, 2021, para. 11). It is a capability that offers significant operational advantage and must be considered in the enemy’s calculus by providing defenses from or destroying that capability. However, the proximity and support of forward-deployed bases and foreign ports are required to sustain power projection. Figure 6 depicts the locations of U.S. Navy Forward Deployed Bases. For example, in the Pacific theater during World War II, the United States conducted an island-hopping campaign to slowly retake Japanese-occupied islands and progress towards the main islands of Japan. One tiny and unassuming island in the area became famous as America’s most potent power projection platform. An abandoned Japanese weather station with limited military assets, Ulithi Atoll, was assumed to have no strategic value but was quickly taken by the Americans and transformed into a sprawling port for 617 U.S. and allied vessels by the war’s end (Brimelow, 2022). According to Brimelow (2022), U.S. Navy Seabees converted the island into the world’s

largest naval facility with all the amenities and purposes of a modern port visit, including respite for the crew, casualty repair, rearmament, and resupply. Ulithi Atoll's operational importance not only brought to bear the firepower of America's Pacific fleet and its allies within striking distance of the enemy but also provided sustainment for that firepower.

Fast forward to today, China is using the same principle to set the stage for a future conflict. Its encroachment and militarization of the Spratly Islands with offensive and sustainment capabilities suggest that its expansionist ambition is not defensive in nature (Reed, 2022). Moreover, China's establishment of foreign bases like Djibouti suggests a global expansion that places U.S. overseas bases at a premium. It is crucial that these bases are supported with the appropriate port visit frameworks, with surge capacity to counter China's growing threat. Evidently, the durability of a foreign port and its port visit framework is critical to maintaining the lead in the great power competition.



Figure 6. U.S. Navy Forward Deployed Bases. Source: Masters (2019).

2. The “Other” Non-HSP Support

Up to this point, NAVFAC and NAVSUP have become synonymous with non-HSP support. However, there is a lesser-known entity that is only activated during times of major theater conflict, hence its obscure nature. The Joint Task Force–Port Opening (JTF-PO) is a non-standing task force comprised of elements from the Air Force, Army, and Navy (Turner, 2015). It is activated by the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to support combatant commands that require their specialty in a conflict zone. The JTF-PO is further broken down into two classifications depending on the type of port they are opening: Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) and Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD). According to Turner (2015),

The JTF-PO SPOD may include the Army RPOE, Navy Expeditionary Port Unit (EPU), as well as elements of the regional port battalion headquarters or elements of Naval Cargo Handling Battalion-1 (NCHB) or elements of the Army 7th Transportation Brigade Expeditionary (TBX). (p. 6)

Although the Army elements are vastly responsible for establishing the ports, it is the Navy elements that interface with the ships.

Expeditionary port units (EPUs) are one such example. The EPU’s mission is to “provide liaison and ship husbandry support for forward-deployed port operations” (Military Sealift Command, n.d.). According to the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command (n.d.), they are the “manpower solution for surge mission sets.” Furthermore, the active-duty component of the Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group (NAVCHAPGRU), the Naval Cargo Handling Battalion, and the Navy Reserve Construction Battalions “are a renowned team of skilled construction professionals who build and defend airfields, bases, ports, and more around the world” (Navy Reserve, n.d., p. 6). They are manned by Seabees, a flexible group of specialists that could fill in many roles required for port visits, especially during surges in preparation for a major conflict.

Seabees proved their worth during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, where “over 20,000 Reserve sailors deployed to Southwest Asia to provide surge support and expertise in port security, field medicine, air logistics, and mobile construction” (Braun, 2015). Some Seabee battalions do not require conflict to maintain proficiency and

are even integrated into the daily peacetime routine in some bases to provide port visit support. For example,

All U.S. Naval ships that pull into port at Naval Station (NAVSTA) Rota receive support from Seabees, host nationals and civilians stationed at the Public Works Department (PWD) Rota aboard NAVSTA Rota. A handful of Seabees are trained to operate cranes that on-load missiles, administrative supplies, food, drinks and much more even though most of these Seabees have never spent a day at sea in their career. (Green, 2020, para. 3)

They may not be the typical personnel Sailors would encounter during a peacetime port call, but their prowess in port security and pier-side support, their inventory of organic support equipment, and their ability to construct ports in the most austere locations are indispensable capabilities to the U.S. arsenal. Therefore, an existing port visit support framework's ability to integrate with these types of capabilities are significant factors that must be taken into account when choosing a support framework.

3. Grading Scale

Each of the frameworks are assessed based on their potential for surge capacity. A framework's durability score span between 1 and 5, with 5 having full support capabilities—including surge capacity—and 1 having no ability to provide standard support. These frameworks are expressed in qualitative data drawn from SMEs, applicable guidance, historical port visit reviews, and our experiences. Table 7 provides the detailed grading scale that each framework is evaluated on.

Table 7. Durability Grading Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Unable to Support	Standard Support Limited	Unable to Surge Support, Standard Support Available	Limited Surge Capacity Beyond Standard Support	Fully Support, to Include Surge Capacity

F. CASE SELECTION

With the case study scoring criteria established, the case study ports were determined. Throughout this study, we researched many ports and regions that utilize one of the three port visit strategies identified previously. Since most ports fall on a spectrum of how much of each support strategy is utilized, we decided to identify two ports that fall on the opposite ends of that spectrum and one that falls in the center. One HSP-centric port, one non-HSP-centric port, and one that utilizes a balanced hybrid model.

The three ports selected were chosen for their predominant reliance on one of the three support strategies. Multiple ports fit this requirement, but our extensive experiences in these ports and a supportive network of SMEs ensured a smooth and unbiased comparative case study. The ports chosen were

- **HSP:** NSA Bahrain's Mina Salman port, in the Kingdom of Bahrain
- **Non-HSP:** NSA Sasebo's port, in Sasebo, Japan
- **Hybrid:** NSA Souda Bay port, in Souda Bay, Greece

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VII. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter compares the ports and, in turn, the port visit strategies. The ports are evaluated on their scores in the five support criteria developed in Chapter VI. The scores are based on our assessment of the available data and our experience, but it is important to note that these scores are subjective.

A. AUDITABILITY

This section analyzes the HSP framework in Bahrain, the non-HSP framework in Sasebo, and the hybrid framework in Souda Bay through the lens of auditability using the auditability triangle, which entails effectiveness of their internal controls, the capability of processes, and the competence of key personnel. Additionally, the HSP framework points out some of the major improvements made to the U.S. Navy after a decade of reflection and reform following the infamous GDMA corruption case. The analysis starts by applying each of the three pillars of auditability to the three separate frameworks. Next, we assign a grade to each of the three elements of auditability. The analysis closes with a determination of how auditable each framework is based on the relative merits of the frameworks in terms of auditability.

1. Internal Controls: Enforced, Monitored, and Reported

The internal controls of HSP in Bahrain and across the globe have been revamped since the GDMA fraud case. NAVSUP successfully transitioned from SAC IDIQs to MAC IDIQs, and most recently to GMACs, which now operate worldwide using standardized procedures. The control environment component represents the tone at the top from the CNO, extending to the commanders deployed afloat with their assigned personnel. The HSP control environment is much more robust than it was a decade ago. Oversight responsibility for the program is designed at the appropriate levels with OPNAVINST 4400.11A calling the program's oversight "Commander's business" (OPNAV, 2020, p. 2).

The risk assessment component implies that the Navy identifies risks to the achievement of its port visit objectives. Navy leadership received a black eye from the

GDMA fraud case. Consequently, performance and fraud risks have been identified. The HSP framework is not free of risk, but its policies mitigate the fraud risks that were identified over the last decade.

The control activities component covers the policies, procedures, checklists, and self-assessments used regularly while receiving port visit services. HSP guidance set by OPNAVINST 4400.11A directs intentional segregation of duties in which all requirements from the supply officer are validated by the COR before they can be approved by the KO (OPNAV, 2020). Moreover, commanding officers are directed to ensure that other ship department heads support the supply officer in port visit execution.

The information and communication component addresses how U.S. Navy leaders communicate with customers and vendors, and how they demonstrate transparency in the eyes of the public. The HSPortal serves as “the official repository for all HSP data” (OPNAV, 2020, p. 4). It includes standardized LOGREQs, historical pricing information, and a robust set of metrics to provide full visibility to all HSP stakeholders.

In order to ensure internal controls are effective and remain effective, the Monitoring Activities should regularly observe and adjust as necessary (R. G. Rendon & J. M. Rendon, 2015). This component addresses the activities used to confirm the effectiveness of the internal controls and procedures of the contract support framework. The HSP program has been an interest item for OPNAV and even more so for NAVSUP. HSP OPNAV quarterly metrics are periodically reviewed, and designated commands also track their assigned metrics for compliance and efficiencies.

Despite the completeness of COSO’s internal control frameworks, they do not offer absolute assurance of achieving the desired objectives. They only provide reasonable assurance by considering the effectiveness of operations, compliance with regulations, and the reliability of financial reporting (COSO, 2013). Nevertheless, the HSP program is overall effective based on historical QA reports; this can be attributed primarily to standardized procedures that enable port visit contracting flexibility. The HSP support framework effectively leverages all five COSO internal control components. Therefore, it is graded at 5 on a scale of 1 to 5.

The non-HSP support framework utilized in Sasebo does not have an overarching OPNAV policy that sets the tone across all non-HSP ports. However, OPNAVINST 5450.339 covers the mission, function, and task of CNIC (OPNAV, 2011). This instruction describes CNIC functions and tasks, including “support of nearly all shore support functions, such as air and port operations” (OPNAV, 2021, p. 5). Therefore, the control environment in Sasebo is set by the local CNIC and NAVFAC commands, which work in cohesion to generate and execute long-term port visit requirements.

The non-HSP port of Sasebo has not been involved in a fraud scandal of the same magnitude as GDMA. Therefore, the risk assessment component implies that CNC and NAVFAC should consider fraud when planning the efforts to achieve their mission.

The information and communication component of non-HSP is not as transparent and complete because it does not have an official repository for port visit support such as HSP’s HSPortal. It also lacks an overarching OPNAV guidance to set the tone at the top. However, non-HSP contracts are handled by contracting professionals and technicians who consistently perform in their assigned areas. Additionally, the non-HSP framework involves less variation when compared to HSP. Therefore, the non-HSP framework is graded at 3 on a scale of 1 to 5.

Souda Bay’s hybrid framework includes aspects of both HSP and non-HSP that are relatively equal. This means that the same drivers that impacted the scores for Bahrain and Sasebo impact the individual sub-frameworks for Souda Bay. Therefore, Souda Bay is awarded an averaged grade of 4 on a scale of 1 to 5.

2. Processes: Institutionalized, Measured, and Improved

The current HSP process has been in use for almost a decade. The full acquisition of supplies and services for port visits is complex but may be broken down into simple planning, contracting, oversight, and payment phases. NAVSUP is responsible for the “acquisition and contracting policy and oversight for all HSP procurements” (OPNAV, 2020, p. 4). NAVSUP specifies the procedures for the contracting process via Enclosure 15 of the NAVSUP contracts handbook, titled *Husbanding Service Provider and Port Visit*

Support Policies and Procedures (Naval Supply Systems Command, n.d.). Such specific HSP procedures serve as direct evidence for achieved institutionalization.

Fleet CORs are responsible for utilizing HSPortal to document a QA file for each port visit in accordance with the husbanding contracts. The QA data is readily available to KOs as well as other HSP stakeholders. “The HSP governance structure reviews, validates, and oversees compliance with all HSP policy, procedures, and business processes” (OPNAV, 2020, Encl. 2). This includes an HSP working group that meets monthly, an HSP audit committee that meets quarterly, and the HSP board of directors—consisting of voting members from OPNAV N41, NAVSUP, and the naval component commands. The HSP process has improved, and it is continuously monitored to address procedural or performance issues as they arise. The HSP process is fully established, providing all stakeholders with capable procurement processes assessed with metrics that are divided among the responsible commands. Therefore, it is graded at 5 on a scale of 1 to 5.

The non-HSP process is also fully established and capable of supporting port visits by utilizing existing contracts, rather than awarding individual task orders for every single port visit. The non-HSP framework in Sasebo relies on four separate IDIQ contracts, which include essential port visit services such as sewage disposal, port operations, rigging, and custodial services. The planning, execution, and implementation of the separate IDIQ contracts managed outside of HSP may be an intensive process, but such contracts allow for a specific contractor to get fully established and monitored over time to assess areas for improvement. The current non-HSP framework in Sasebo lacks a customer-driven QA process to identify such areas for improvement. Therefore, it is graded at 4 on a scale of 1 to 5.

Souda Bay’s hybrid framework includes aspects of both HSP and non-HSP that are relatively equal. This means that the same drivers that impacted the scores for Bahrain and Sasebo impact the individual sub-frameworks for Souda Bay. Therefore, Souda Bay is awarded an average grade of 4.5 on a scale of 1 to 5.

3. Personnel: Educated, Trained, and Experienced

There are many people involved in performing the functions related to conducting an HSP port visit, from the time a LOGREQ is initiated until services have been rendered and the contractor has been paid. The number of personnel involved in the execution of non-HSP port visits may seem less complex because funding and contracting oversight often take place without much involvement from the ship. For this analysis, the main personnel considered are the ship's supply officers, because they play a central role in both HSP and non-HSP ports.

Supply officers receive introductory HSP and off-ship bill pay (OSBP) training prior to their first tours during the Supply Corps Basic Qualifications Course (BQC), and they receive more thorough training during the Supply Officer Department Head Course (SODHC). In addition, type commanders (TYCOMs) are responsible for ensuring "all units are adequately trained in off ship bill pay procedures, prepared to execute a port visit, and properly utilize HSP contracts" (OPNAV, 2020, p. 3). This requirement is emphasized and evaluated during regular training events and certification inspections.

Despite multiple HSP training opportunities during the career of a supply officer, the variability of operational schedules, mission sets, and different warfare areas result in varying levels of experience for supply officers. One supply officer may be stationed on a DDG and conduct 30 HSP port visits during their 3-year tour, and another may only conduct non-HSP port visits. Other supply officers may not even conduct a port visit due to their unit being in a long-term maintenance availability, or they may not even step aboard a ship if they are assigned to a different warfare community, such as logistics support (LOGSU) for Navy SEALs. Supply officers are educated and trained as required in HSP, but their experience often falls short. Therefore, personnel is graded at a 4 on a scale of 1 to 5 for HSP.

On the other hand, supply officers are not required to be formally educated or trained on non-HSP port visits because local NAVFACs perform most of the coordination and administrative requirements. For example, supply officers in Sasebo follow local NAVFAC procedures to request port visit support, and it is NAVFAC personnel who make

the necessary arrangements. In some non-HSP ports, supply officers provide funding documents to NAVFAC to receive requirements included in NAVFAC contracts, but overall, the administrative requirements pushed on to the ship for scheduling, monitoring, and paying for services is significantly lower than an HSP port visit. Therefore, personnel is graded at 5 on a scale of 1 to 5 for non-HSP.

Souda Bay's hybrid framework includes aspects of both HSP and non-HSP that are relatively equal. This means, the same drivers that impacted the scores for Bahrain and Sasebo impact the individual sub-frameworks for Souda Bay. Therefore, Souda Bay is awarded an average grade of 4.5 on a scale of 1 to 5.

4. Auditability Considerations and Scoring

The DOD has made progress in efforts to achieve auditability, but it falls short in many aspects. According to DOD News, the under secretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer reported that “the results of the fifth annual DOD-wide financial audit will be a disclaimer of opinion for DOD as a whole” (Garamone, 2022). The HSP program has come a long way since GDMA, and it can be argued that the HSP framework is auditable based on trained personnel, established procedures, and effective internal controls. The HSP program can track every penny obligated, and all the services included in the contracts offer transparency and contain a paper trail that enforces segregation of duties. The non-HSP framework is also auditable but offers much less transparency to the customer because almost all administrative functions are outside of the supply officer's role.

The ports and, in turn, their support frameworks received the following score for the auditability port visit support criterion (see Table 8).

Table 8. Auditability Scores

HSP Average Auditability Score: 4.66 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Auditability Average	Marginal Auditability Average	Satisfactory Auditability Average	Very Good Auditability Average	Exceptional Auditability Average

Non-HSP Average Auditability Score: 4.00 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Auditability Average	Marginal Auditability Average	Satisfactory Auditability Average	Very Good Auditability Average	Exceptional Auditability Average

Hybrid Average Auditability Score: 4.33 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Auditability Average	Marginal Auditability Average	Satisfactory Auditability Average	Very Good Auditability Average	Exceptional Auditability Average

B. FLEXIBILITY

In this section, the three ports are evaluated in their abilities to flex to support the mission. The discussion begins with the ports' abilities to support short-notice port visits, followed by their ability to support changes in requirements. Each port receives an individual score for each subcategory of flexibility. The two subcategory scores are averaged to provide each port with a single score for flexibility.

1. Short-Notice Port Visits

The need to support unscheduled port visits will always be a possibility and, therefore, every support framework must be able to support as best they can. The way in which they support can differ in many ways, but to the ship and the mission, the requirements do not change.

One of the primary drivers that allowed GDMA to commit illegal acts unchallenged for so many years was their ability to support whatever was needed for the ships. This level

of service drove countless personnel to look the other way, hoping to prevent losing the level of service provided. In the wake of the GDMA scandal, the HSP program underwent multiple changes (Cahill et al., 2022). The initial changes were focused on solidifying the program against fraud, waste, and abuse, but many of the follow-on changes focused on streamlining and improving support for the ship and the mission. The current GMAC and OPNAVINST 4400.11A allow for significant flexibility in supporting changes in schedule and requirements.

OPNAVINST 4400.11A established LOGREQ timeline goals:

- **LOGREQ submission:** 30+ days prior to arrival
- **LOGREQ processing by COR:** 15+ days prior to arrival
- **Task order awarded by KO:** 7+ days prior to arrival (OPNAV, 2020)

The processes and timeline outlined in the OPNAV's policy tend to be transparent to the ship's crew. However, the ship's supply officer is heavily involved in all aspects of the port visit planning and execution. Further, OPNAVINST 4400.11A emphasized this point by calling port visits "Commander's business" (OPNAV, 2020, p. 2). With this added emphasis, the timeliness of LOGREQ has improved, but short-notice port visits still occur. HSPortal considers a port visit as "short notice" if the port visit requirement is entered in HSPortal by the COR within 10 days of the requested arrival date.

There are three key features that enable the HSP framework to operate rapidly in response to short-notice port visits. First, TYCOMS provide bulk funding to support their ships executing port visits. This prevents delays in funding the event and allows the KO to act as soon as the port visit requirement is received in HSPortal. Second, the HSP program allows the KO to award a task order with a minimal request for task order proposal (RTOP) timeline of as little as several hours to a few days. This allows the KO to shorten the solicitation period and award as soon as possible. Lastly, the GMAC includes well-established contractors, meaning they understand the complexities in a warship's schedule, they are adept at working with the DOD, and they operate in the most common ports ships

pull into. Therefore, they tend to already have resources or subcontractors available to support at short notice.

The HSP program is designed to be flexible and supportive; this can clearly be seen in the historical port visit records contained in the HSPortal. During FY2021 and FY2022, the HSPortal collected data on 74 port visits to Mina Salman, Kingdom of Bahrain. Note that these port visits do not include the Bahrain homeported U.S. Navy MCM and PC ships that are not tracked on the HSPortal. Of the 75 port visits, 45 were categorized as short notice. The average speed to award from LOGREQ release date to task order award was 5.2 days. This means that with a maximum of 10 days, the HSP contracting branch at FLC Bahrain was able to award task orders exceptionally quickly.

Following the review of the established policy and quantitative analysis, NSA Mina Salman and, therefore, the HSP framework is graded at a 5 out of 5 for flexibility in supporting short-notice port visits.

The non-HSP framework has two main factors that differ from HSP regarding supporting short-notice port visits. Firstly, CNIC is required to support operationally relevant port visits. Secondly, the non-HSP support framework, whether it be contracted, organic, or a combination thereof, is designed to be flexible and therefore able to flex to support.

OPNAVINST 5450.339 established policy that delegated authority to CNIC to provide base operations support, which includes port operations support. The services provided by CNIC are to be provided in support of “operational requirements identified by the [Chief of Naval Operations], combatant commanders, and Navy component commanders” (OPNAV, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, if a berth or anchorage is available, CNIC is required to support operationally relevant port visits from U.S. Navy and MSC ships.

The non-HSP’s forecasted support model allows the framework to offer support with relatively little additional administrative burden. The NSA Sasebo BOS contracts and organic assets owned and operated by NAVFAC provide nearly all services for the base and homeported and visiting ships. The non-HSP framework in Sasebo consists of four separate NAVFAC IDIQ contracts with varying periods of performance extending up to 8

years, funded annually through CNIC O&M bulk funding. Yearly task orders are issued against the four NAVFAC IDIQ contracts, including the full range of services required for base operations and ship port visits at NSA Sasebo. This means that most services needed to support a port visit already have coverage under the NAVFAC IDIQs and corresponding yearly task orders. If an emergency port visit is required, port operations just need to find space on the pier because support services are already under contract.

NSA Sasebo's non-HSP support structure is resilient and supportive to unforeseen port visits for units operating in the area. Homeported ships are assigned semi-permanent berths and, therefore, are accommodated for nearly every port visit, no matter how short notice. Non-homeported units can utilize vacant homeport berths and unutilized berths/ anchorages. Therefore, if the port has a berth or anchorage that can accommodate the ship and the ship has a valid need, the port visit will be supported.

Due to the requirement for CNIC to support and the built-in flexibility of the BOS contracts and organic support offered by NSA Sasebo, the port and therefore the non-HSP support framework is graded at a 5 out of 5 for flexibility in supporting short-notice port visits.

Souda Bay shares the factors that provided perfect scores for both HSP and non-HSP and therefore is also awarded a 5 out of 5 for flexibility in supporting short-notice port visits.

2. Changes in Requirements

Some of the examples of unforeseen changes in requirements we have experienced include brows shifting, requiring short-notice cranes operations; potable water pumps failing, requiring bottled water delivery at 0100; pandemics hitting, requiring quarantine measures on the pier; and heavy equipment breaking, requiring larger than normal cranes to lift. These changes in requirements are not rare, and they can range from last-minute requests in the middle of the night to requirements that go beyond the standard contract scope. Some of these services are extensive, but they are nonetheless required. A port visit framework's ability to flex to support this type of requirement is a significant enabler.

Without the ability to support these unusual requirements, the port can end up hindering the mission and even allow damage or injury to occur.

Within the HSP framework, once the task order is awarded, the need to adjust the task order is limited, but due to unforeseen circumstances, it does happen. The GMAC enables KOs to make changes as long as the requirements are within the original contract scope (FAR 52.243-1, 1987). The KO can authorize changes instantly: either orally or by electronic communication. Oral authorizations without a formal contract modification are considered authorized-to-proceed (ATP) approvals and must be formalized via a contract modification within 3 business days of ATP execution. This substantial enabling factor allows the HSP program to quickly respond to support new requirements or expanded requirements without having to wait for a drawn-out approval process.

In addition, the HSP program acknowledges that the commanding officer retains authority of their vessel and enables them to act without prior approval to prevent loss of life or limb. This action allows the ship to request additional services without prior approval from the KO. These emergency requirements are to be relayed to the KO via the COR as soon as possible so they can be rectified. The ability for an operational unit to act when needed allows for significant flexibility in the face of an emergency.

Due to the multiple ways in which the HSP program can support changes in requirements, NSA Bahrain and, therefore, the HSP support framework is assigned a 5 out of 5 for flexibility in supporting changes in requirements.

For NSA Sasebo, the flexibility in supporting short-notice port visits described in the previous section also applies to changes in requirements, although not in every case. The BOS contracts managed by NAVFAC are forecasted to provide support based on predicted demand from homeported and expected non-homeported ship operations. The services are scheduled via the LOGREQ or local request form, and they are provided in accordance with the BOS contracts or SOP. Due to the bureaucratic nature of the non-HSP framework, some services require minimum request time frames, such as 3 business days to schedule crane operations or scheduled times for trash removal. The framework allows for expedited support for emergency situations, such as crane support for a brow that

requires realigning, but not all requirements can be met outside of the minimum time limits, and some requirements are not supported under the NAVFAC contracts at all.

Requirements beyond what was forecasted in the yearly NAVFAC task orders require additional funding and/or individual task orders to support. This additional administrative burden may delay services, and some requirements may even be outside of scope and require standalone contracts. In those cases, the requirements are passed to another service provider. Ships at NSA Sasebo receive most of their services via NAVFAC's Port Operations or Public Works offices. There are other entities that can provide/contract services if NAVFAC is unable to support. The primary alternative service provider is the FLC Yokosuka–Sasebo Detachment, which can award standalone contracts for the required services or handle the requirement through the HSP framework if needed.

NSA Sasebo's ability to work together to support requirements is truly impressive, but some requirements cannot be supported. Examples of unsupportable requirements we experienced include

- **Potable water at anchorage:** provided via HSP subcontracted barge.
- **Short-notice heavy lift or high reach crane support:** available through NAVFAC, but significant lead time is required to support and therefore short-notice support tends to fall to FLC for either a standalone contract or an HSP task order.
- **Long-distance bus charters:** NAVFAC provides bus service locally and within a specified range, but beyond that range a standalone contract through FLC or an HSP task order is required.

Although limited, the implications of the non-HSP framework not being able to support all requirements without augmenting with HSP support is a limiting factor that cannot be ignored. For that reason, NSA Sasebo and therefore the non-HSP framework is graded at 4 out of 5 for flexibility in supporting changes in requirements.

The hybrid framework's dual-path approach allows the HSP to cover down if a requirement is not covered or not available via the non-HSP. Therefore, the HSP sub-

framework in Souda Bay outweighs the limitations of the non-HSP sub-framework, giving Souda Bay a score of 5 out of 5 for flexibility in supporting changes in requirements. It is important to note that Sasebo and nearly all other ports are covered under the GMAC and, therefore, are also able to leverage the HSP to cover limitations in support if needed.

3. Flexibility Considerations and Scoring

Having a port visit support framework that can provide adequate assurance that all requirements will be met within a reasonable time frame is a highly desirable resource for the U.S. Navy. Flexibility is a key enabling factor for every port visit; without the ability to receive required support when needed, a ship runs significant risk to the mission, the hull, and the personnel on board. When establishing policy and guidance on how U.S.-managed ports should be supported, planners should ensure that the right level of flexibility is available.

The ports and, in turn, their support frameworks received the following score for the flexibility port visit support criterion (see Table 9).

Table 9. Flexibility Scores

HSP Average Flexibility Score: 5.00 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Flexibility Average	Marginal Flexibility Average	Satisfactory Flexibility Average	Very Good Flexibility Average	Exceptional Flexibility Average

Non-HSP Average Flexibility Score: 4.50 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Flexibility Average	Marginal Flexibility Average	Satisfactory Flexibility Average	Very Good Flexibility Average	Exceptional Flexibility Average

Hybrid Average Flexibility Score: 5.00 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Flexibility Average	Marginal Flexibility Average	Satisfactory Flexibility Average	Very Good Flexibility Average	Exceptional Flexibility Average

C. RELIABILITY

In this section, the three ports are evaluated for the reliability of the services provided from their support framework. The discussion begins with a description of the factors that go into assuring reliable quality for HSP-supported port visits at Mina Salman. A score for HSP is assigned based on quantitative QA data drawn from the HSPortal and qualitative data collected during this study. Next, the CFA Sasebo's non-HSP framework's ability to consistently provide satisfactory support is evaluated. The score for non-HSP is assigned based on qualitative data collected during this study. The hybrid framework compares the impact of the HSP and non-HSP aspects of the port, and an individual score is assigned.

1. Reliability in HSP Support

The HSP program has built in QA measures that track and grade vendors on the DOD's confidence in them to provide quality and reliable services. In Bahrain, QA is a very collaborative process between the ship's Supply Officer (SUPPO), COR and KO. OPNAVINST 4400.11A requires every port visit to include a QA report, and this is provided to the ships in the OPNAV 4400/4 Port Visit Checklist. This checklist includes all elements in monitoring compliance with the port visit task order and in turn quality and reliability of the HSP.

The OPNAV 4400/4 is initiated by the ship's SUPPO and signed by the ship's Commanding Officer (CO) prior to submission to the COR. The COR then performs his own assessment of the contractor's performance based on contractual obligations, and he submits the QA ratings electronically in HSPortal to the KO to make a final decision of the QA ratings (OPNAV, 2020, p. 4). The assessment includes the following six performance objectives: quality, schedule, management, regulatory compliance, cost controls, and utilization of small businesses (not applicable in OCONUS). Each performance objective is graded on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is unsatisfactory, 2 is marginal, 3 is satisfactory, 4 is very good, and 5 is exceptional.

Through a review of 76 port visits to Mina Salman from FY2021 to FY2022, encompassing six of the 21 eligible GMAC contract holders in Bahrain, we established an

average QA score. Note that this data set did not include the homeported FDNF ships that are managed under the MSPS contract. The average cumulative QA score for Mina Salman was 4.053 out of 5. HSPs servicing ships visiting Mina Salman provide quality that is slightly above the global average of 4.040 for 550 port visits. This measure is an important factor in determining the reliability of services from HSPs, but it is important to understand how this score fits into the acquisition process that leads to these companies providing services.

Once the rating for the port visit has been finalized, the rating becomes historical QA data for the corresponding contractor and tracked in HSPortal. The vendors' scores greatly impact their future business prospects, as task orders are awarded based on three factors: technical acceptability, past performance, and price. In addition to the FAR, Enclosure 15 of the NAVSUP contracts handbook sets the HSP contracting process and its use of vendor past performance (Naval Supply Systems Command, n.d.). A technically acceptable proposal is one that includes prices and meets all requirements and quantities solicited in the Request for Task Order Proposals (RTOP). A proposal rated technically unacceptable is not considered for award.

The past performance and price of technically acceptable proposals will then be subject to the best value trade-off process, with past performance being more important than price (Naval Supply Systems Command, n.d.). Furthermore, the government has the discretion to conduct the past performance evaluation beyond HSPortal, using other information in the government's possession or otherwise available to the government. The government's discretion to award based on past performance criteria represents an increased chance that the chosen vendor will be a reliable one. This factor highlights the importance the HSP framework puts on reliability.

The HSP framework is built to provide the best fit to support the requirements to the mission, but sometimes that fit may not be perfect. Despite the heavy reliance on a contractor's past performance, some port visits may not go as planned due to the short-fused nature of the visit. Such urgent port visits do not give the contractor sufficient time to provide the requested services because the contractor does not have all the required assets on the pier. The HSP must leverage its network of contractors, meaning that

availability of critical equipment such as generators may not be available. Due to potential volatility in the husbanding market and considering the average QA score of 4.053, Mina Salman and therefore the HSP program is awarded a 4 out of 5 for reliability.

2. Reliability in Non-HSP Support

The non-HSP framework in Sasebo, Japan consists of organic services and contracted services. The most common organic services include crane, forklift, manlift, shore power, and CHT (collection holding and transfer, sewage) barge services. The services received via the IDIQ contracts include trash removal, bilge pumping, sewage processing, and general utilities. Other services and providers include crew support via MWR, food stores via the FLCY Det-Sasebo, and material delivery via DLA.

Contracted base services consist of four separate NAVFAC IDIQ contracts with varying periods of performance and options for coverage up to 8 years. They are funded annually through CNIC O&M bulk funding. Yearly task orders are issued against the four contracts to include the full range of services required for base operations and ship port visits at NSA Sasebo. The service contracts include their own QA reporting, but there are three factors that limit their applicability to this study.

First, the services are for the entire base and not specific to supporting ships while in port. Therefore, it is not possible to assign a port visit-specific score for non-HSP because the task orders include many other services that are not relevant to port visit support. Second, the non-HSP base task orders span a full year, rather than just a few days to cover a specific port visit. The level of effort, coordination, and performance for providing services for a few days is not equal to year-round performance. Last, the base contract performance ratings are assigned without direct input from the customer, specifically the ship; therefore, it is inappropriate to comparably score this QA collection process in the same way the HSP QA data are scored. For those reasons, the QA data for base services contracts were not included in the reliability scoring of non-HSP port visit support in Sasebo.

Scoring for the reliability of port visit support in Sasebo follows similar logic to that used in the flexibility scoring discussed previously. OPNAVINST 5450.339 requires

CNIC to provide support for operationally relevant port visits (OPNAV, 2011). Therefore, CNIC can be relied upon to provide satisfactory support for operationally relevant port visits. The way in which CNIC provides those services is not outlined in established guidance, but in Sasebo and most established ports, NAVFAC provides those services through organic equipment and infrastructure, and base operating contracts as described above. NAVFAC is not the only service provider, but there is a precedence established throughout most established U.S. Navy-managed ports that NAVFAC is the primary provider of non-HSP port visit support.

The requirement to provide support for operationally relevant port visits does not outline the level of service provided. Therefore, it can only be assumed that satisfactory support will be provided. With the lack of a non-HSP port visit-specific QA tracking system, the scoring is based on similar criteria to that used to grade HSP during an HSP-supported port visit: 1 is unsatisfactory, 2 is marginal, 3 is satisfactory, 4 is very good, and 5 is exceptional.

Through input from SMEs and our experience, it is noted that CFA Sasebo provides consistently satisfactory and sometimes very good support. Considering this—and that it is assumed that services must be at least satisfactory for a non-HSP port visit—Sasebo, and in turn the non-HSP framework, is scored at a 3 out of 5 for reliability.

3. Reliability in Hybrid Support

The hybrid framework utilized in Souda Bay, Greece, shares the same benefits and drawbacks highlighted in the HSP and non-HSP frameworks. Out of 186 port visits during FY2021 to FY2022, Souda Bay's average QA score from the HSPortal was 4.05. Considering the hybrid framework's ability to leverage the HSP's reliability and the quantitative score drawn from HSPortal, Souda Bay—and in turn the hybrid framework—is scored at a 4 out of 5 for reliability.

4. Conclusion

Reliably providing satisfactory support is a key enabling factor for any port visit framework. The HSP framework clearly provides more than satisfactory reliability, but the framework has other drawbacks that must also be considered. Conversely, the non-HSP

framework can reliably provide satisfactory service, but sometimes just satisfactory service is all that is needed, and the framework may provide another enabling factor that is more important than more reliable quality depending on the mission. The hybrid framework's ability to leverage the good aspects of both primary frameworks allows it to flex as needed to ensure reliability is attained. These points emphasize the importance of finding the right mix of enabling factors when planning for a port visit support strategy.

The ports, and in turn their support frameworks, received the following score for the *reliability* port visit support criterion (see Table 10).

Table 10. Reliability Scores

HSP Reliability Score: 4 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Reliability	Marginal Reliability	Satisfactory Reliability	Very Good Reliability	Exceptional Reliability

Non-HSP Reliability Score: 3 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Reliability	Marginal Reliability	Satisfactory Reliability	Very Good Reliability	Exceptional Reliability

Hybrid Reliability Score: 4 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unsatisfactory Reliability	Marginal Reliability	Satisfactory Reliability	Very Good Reliability	Exceptional Reliability

D. VULNERABILITY

NSA Bahrain and CFA Sasebo are both U.S.-managed foreign ports; NSA Souda Bay is jointly managed by the U.S. Navy and the Hellenic Navy. Each port utilizes a different port visit support framework. This section analyzes these ports with regard to their vulnerability to OPSEC threats.

1. Vulnerability in HSP Support

Although the United States manages a significant portion of Mina Salman, the limited NAVFAC footprint on NSA Bahrain translates to a much smaller portfolio of base support contracts. As mentioned previously, the base support contracts for NSA Bahrain do not extend to supporting the ships that pull into port. Therefore, ships rely on HSPs for support.

In addition to forces homeported there, Mina Salman also serves British Royal Navy Mine Countermeasure forces. U.S. MCMs and PCs that are homeported there primarily pull into a separate U.S.-only pier, known as NSA 2. Visiting ships and other navies primarily utilize an area known as the “finger pier,” which is controlled by Bahrain defense forces. All the piers are serviced and accessible to HSPs and their subcontractors.

The homeported ships utilize the MSPS contract, and visiting ships utilize the GMAC, which are competed among 21 eligible GMAC contract holders in Bahrain. The MSPS contractor and the GMAC contractors in Bahrain may utilize the same or a different pool of subcontractors. This award process reduces the chance of familiarity between the ships and the prime contractor but increases the interaction between different subcontractors and the ships. This poses an increased risk of an OPSEC breach.

The increased competition in the MSPS and GMAC utilized in Bahrain has resulted in significant gains in the auditability and transparency of HSP contracts, but that transparency has also increased the frameworks’ susceptibility to OPSEC threats. NSA Bahrain has security and vetting steps established, but the significant footprint of contractors poses a significant threat to OPSEC. For those reasons, NSA Bahrain and the HSP framework is awarded a 2 out of 5 for vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability in Non-HSP Support

Ships that pull into CFA Sasebo are primarily supported through a non-HSP framework. Contracted services are provided through NAVFAC-managed contracts for base-wide services that are extended to homeported and transient ships. NAVFAC support also includes organic equipment such as cranes and transport vehicles operated by Japanese nationals employed by CFA Sasebo. Should NAVFAC be unable to support a requirement,

FLC Yokosuka Det Sasebo can award a standalone contract to cover the requirement. About half of the non-HSP employees are U.S. military personnel and DOD civilians, while the other half of the workforce are local foreign nationals and contractors. This means that employees of these organizations are vetted through security and granted base access.

CFA Sasebo relies heavily on local employees, and to a lesser extent contractors, but due to the long-term nature of the NAVFAC base support contracts and the robust vetting process, the impact and potential OPSEC threat is significantly lower than Mina Salman. Therefore, CFA Sasebo and the non-HSP framework is awarded a 4 out of 5 for vulnerability.

3. Vulnerability in Hybrid Support

NSA Souda Bay utilizes a balanced portfolio of organic and contracted base services as well as HSP support. Although using the organic and long-term contracts limits the impact of vulnerabilities posed by HSPs and their subcontractors, the threat they pose remains. In addition, the uncertainty of sharing ship schedule information with ever-changing contractors means that the OPSEC threat seen in the HSP framework is not diminished. Therefore, Souda Bay and the hybrid framework are awarded a 3 out of 5 for vulnerability.

4. Vulnerability Considerations and Scoring

Organizations with employees comprised primarily of contractors tend to be more at risk of attacks on OPSEC compared to those whose labor pools are mainly internal to the DOD. The same is true for the main service provider for a particular port. However, since personnel turnovers and geopolitical and economic change is dynamic, OPSEC is always a priority. It has been 23 years since the bombing of the USS *Cole* and 17 years since the first activities of the GDMA scandal were revealed, which suggests that policies and procedures in place to detect OPSEC weaknesses are working. However, U.S. adversaries never rest, taking advantage of technological leaps and geopolitical changes to bypass current defenses. Table 11 depicts the Vulnerability scores for each framework.

Table 11. Vulnerability Scores

HSP Vulnerability Score: 2 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Full Reliance on Contractors	Heavy Reliance on Contractors	Balanced Reliance on Contractors	Low Reliance on Contractors	No Reliance on Contractors

Non-HSP Vulnerability Score: 4 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Full Reliance on Contractors	Heavy Reliance on Contractors	Balanced Reliance on Contractors	Low Reliance on Contractors	No Reliance on Contractors

Hybrid Vulnerability Score: 3 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Full Reliance on Contractors	Heavy Reliance on Contractors	Balanced Reliance on Contractors	Low Reliance on Contractors	No Reliance on Contractors

E. DURABILITY

NSA Bahrain and CFA Sasebo are both U.S.-managed foreign ports; NSA Souda Bay is jointly managed by the U.S. Navy and the Hellenic Navy. Each port utilizes a different port visit support framework. This section analyzes these ports regarding their durability in times of major theater conflict.

1. Durability in HSP Support

Despite the United States' long history with defense contract administration and port visit contracts, there is little evidence that the HSP framework could support a surge alone. According to Ferrer (2019), the challenges of a port visit during a major theater conflict would be too drastic, and using the HSP framework would rapidly prove problematic and could jeopardize the mission of the U.S. Navy. There are a few factors that contribute to this dilemma. Lead time is required to vet new employees and subcontractors to support the influx of customers. Geopolitical factors might come into

play, and the HN and its population may choose not to support the United States in the surge. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) may limit or prohibit a surge. HSP contractors do not have the magnitude of capital, trained personnel, assets, and infrastructure compared to the DOD to support a surge. Finally, the influx of surge deployers arriving to an unfamiliar port with specific protocols, like NSA Bahrain, may cause confusion and chaos that is difficult for the HSP's limited resources to handle. Therefore, NSA Bahrain and the HSP support framework is awarded a 3 out of 5 for durability.

2. Durability in Non-HSP Support

Ulithi Atoll was a case in point of the U.S. military's ability to surge utilizing organic assets. However, the seizure of the atoll occurred late in the war, which suggests that most of the American and allied assets were already in the area. Although the U.S. still commands a significant presence in that AOR, it may not be enough to suppress an adversary. If a conflict ever arose in the Indo-Pacific region with China, the U.S. organic footprint in Sasebo may only be enough to support a limited surge and would have to wait for reinforcements from the mainland and other parts of the globe to fully surge. The JTF-PO is not a standing task force, and many surge enablers like the Seabees are reservists and take time to deploy. For these reasons, CFA Sasebo is awarded a 4 out of 5 for durability.

3. Durability in Hybrid Support

The advantage of a hybrid framework is that it allows HSP to be a stop-gap support for naval assets that are in the operational area while non-HSP support handles the surge. The deployment of assets, materiel, reorganization, and new construction to handle the large influx of ships and submarines requires time. NSA Souda Bay's balanced portfolio of port visit frameworks is well-poised to support this. In fact, the port is no stranger to increased operational tempo, servicing surge deployers in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terror because it "presents an ideal centralized location to maintain rapidly deployable surge capacity" (The Jewish Institute for National Security of America, 2021, p. 19). For this reason, NSA Souda Bay is awarded a 5 out of 5 for durability.

4. Durability Considerations and Scoring

Due to heightened tensions with China, long-abandoned naval facilities like Ulithi Atoll may again serve the United States. The decision to determine which port visit framework to employ to fill these empty shells should not be taken lightly since U.S. national security is at risk. The wrong decision could cripple U.S. naval capabilities before the first shots are even fired and would not be revealed until it is too late. With the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's larger number of hulls, it is important that the United States be able to surge comparable capabilities and support to ports in the region. Table 12 depicts the durability scores for each framework.

Table 12. Durability Scores

HSP Durability Score: 3 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unable to Support	Standard Support Limited	Unable to Surge Support, Standard Support Available	Limited Surge Capacity Beyond Standard Support	Fully Support, to Include Surge Capacity

Non-HSP Durability Score: 4 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unable to Support	Standard Support Limited	Unable to Surge Support, Standard Support Available	Limited Surge Capacity Beyond Standard Support	Fully Support, to Include Surge Capacity

Hybrid Durability Score: 5 out of 5

1	2	3	4	5
Unable to Support	Standard Support Limited	Unable to Surge Support, Standard Support Available	Limited Surge Capacity Beyond Standard Support	Fully Support, to Include Surge Capacity

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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our research analyzed the port visit support frameworks utilized at various ports around the world. We utilized a comparative case study to assess the three primary support frameworks: HSP, non-HSP, and hybrid. The research highlighted the importance of considering the unique requirements of a specific port and the geopolitical environment in determining the best support framework to achieve the desired end state from that port. Five components were identified as enabling factors for port visits: auditability, flexibility, reliability, vulnerability, and durability. The three ports compared in the case study were evaluated on their ability to deliver on these enabling factors. The results indicate that each of the three support frameworks has its strengths and weaknesses when evaluated based on these metrics. The findings of this research show that the optimal support framework is dependent on the specific needs of the U.S. Navy. The scoring for each port the enabling criteria is displayed in Table 13.

Table 13. Results of Comparative Case Study

1	2	3	4	5
Auditability				
Unsatisfactory Average Auditability	Marginal Average Auditability	Satisfactory Average Auditability	Very Good Average Auditability	Exceptional Average Auditability
				HSP
			Non-HSP	
			Hybrid	
Flexibility				
Unsatisfactory Average Reliability	Marginal Average Reliability	Satisfactory Average Reliability	Very Good Average Reliability	Exceptional Average Reliability
				HSP
			Non-HSP	
			Hybrid	
Reliability				
Unsatisfactory Reliability	Marginal Reliability	Satisfactory Reliability	Very Good Reliability	Exceptional Reliability
			HSP	
		Non-HSP		
			Hybrid	
Vulnerability				
Full Reliance on Contractors	Heavy Reliance on Contractors	Balanced Reliance on Contractors	Low Reliance on Contractors	No Reliance on Contractors
	HSP			
			Non-HSP	
		Hybrid		
Durability				
Unable to Support	Standard Support Limited	Unable to Support Surge	Limited Surge Capacity	Full Support, Including Surge
		HSP		
			Non-HSP	
				Hybrid

A. PORT VISIT SUPPORT FRAMEWORK FINDINGS

Application of the three frameworks revealed that the HSP framework has evolved over the last 2 decades to become the prevailing support framework enabling the U.S. Navy to project power overseas. It is important to note that this reliance on HSP has occurred primarily during peacetime. The research shows that HSP has substantially improved in auditability since the infamous GDMA scandal. This can primarily be accredited to increased oversight, transparency in contracting, reinforced efforts to enable competition, and extensive policy and training implementation. HSP is best suited for ports that demand the most flexibility and reliability. However, HSP falls short in the enabling factors of vulnerability and durability, as the OPSEC threat is much more difficult to defend against using the HSP framework and the potential for interruptions in support during a major theater conflict is always present when relying on contracted support rather than organic enablers.

The non-HSP framework is much less susceptible to OPSEC concerns and able to support more surge capacity than HSP. However, its ability to deliver on other factors is hindered by the bureaucratic nature of the framework. The primary benefit of the non-HSP framework is that it is primarily controlled by DOD personnel, so units get what they need, but it may take longer, and the framework may not be able to support requests that are beyond the minimum requirement.

The hybrid framework combines elements of both HSP and non-HSP and provides a balance between security and flexibility, making it a viable option for ports with varying requirements. However, the implementation of a hybrid framework can be complex and requires careful planning and execution to ensure the best possible outcomes.

Overall, this research emphasizes the importance of carefully evaluating the specific needs of U.S. forces around the world. The decision-making process should take into consideration the five crucial factors, as well as other relevant factors such as cost, scalability, and ease of implementation. By doing so, planners and decision-makers can choose the most appropriate support framework to achieve their desired end state and

ensure the United States gets what it needs out of these ports when using the military as an instrument of national power.

B. RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Would it be most effective if permanent organic assets were positioned at Navy installations rather than rely on the HSP contract?

The benefit of having organic assets positioned at strategic locations around the globe is significant. By utilizing organic assets, the DOD would not be limited by contractual requirements or timelines. This would allow the Navy to operate when and how they wanted in order to meet the mission.

In addition to determining where those assets should go, the question of who will be operating them should also be included in the discussion. Contracted operators allow for more reliability and are less of a burden on manpower, but they may not be as flexible. In addition, they may be threat vectors that an enemy can exploit to impact OPSEC, and their reliability could be questionable during a major theater conflict.

DOD owned and operated equipment in strategic areas would be exceptionally beneficial to current operations. In addition, it would allow the ports, personnel, and units involved to train like they will fight, instead of relying on contractors to do the work. Although it would require a high initial investment of funds and manpower, the tangible benefits of having those assets and trained personnel would be bolstered by the intangible benefit of knowing the port's support framework is durable and can support as needed.

2. Would a separate permanent, non-HSP port operations contract be the most effective solution for Navy installations without organic assets?

The spectrum of port visit support frameworks we reviewed highlighted that there is not a one-size-fits-all answer for the Navy with regard to supporting port visits. For frequently visited ports with limited desire to invest in organic capabilities, shifting to a more service centric framework may allow for cost savings. The service centric framework seen in non-HSP support contracts limits the reliance on HSPs who include a mark-up in their contract to cover their support. Contracting directly with the vendors for specific

services allows for longer-term contracts that tend to be easier to manage. These services could also be included in already established BOS contracts, allowing for less redundant contracting efforts.

The primary benefit of using an HSP is that the HA is the sole point of contact for everything a ship needs. This is extremely beneficial in seldom visited ports with limited U.S. presence, but what we observed in Sasebo proved DOD personnel can provide this same benefit if they are empowered and train to do so. The LSR in Sasebo performs this function every day.

The other major benefit is the HA's knowledge of the local economy, culture, and language. As mentioned before, in a port where the U.S. has had presence for significant time, this capability can be replicated with DOD or HN personnel. The benefit of the HA in seldom visited ports is clear, but HSP is not always the only answer.

3. Would a modified HSP-like homeport services contract (30-day task orders) be the best support solution for Navy installations without organic assets?

The MSPS utilized in Bahrain provides a substantial mission capability and relief of administrative burden on the homeported ships and the FLC contracting team that utilize it. By allowing ships to pull in and out with little notice, the COs and their leadership are not limited in their operations. In addition, by utilizing the same vendor and sub-vendors through the 30-day period, the time required to set up and tear down HSP support is cut significantly, allowing for faster response times and less rework on the contracting teams and the vendor's part. By performing 30-day task orders, the on and off-ship administrative burdens are far less than the traditional format. This allows the Supply Department more time to perform their other countless duties, and it lessens the strain on the busy contracting team.

This model provides considerable benefits in Mina Salman, but the homeported ships in Bahrain have unique designs and mission sets that allow for integration into this framework. What remains to be seen is how the MSPS contract's ability to issue monthly task orders could be used within the GMAC for other ports that have FDNF ships. The

incorporation of 30-day task orders into the GMAC has potential for standardizing support for FDNF units, but it requires more in-depth study to determine if it provides enough benefit to make such addition to the GMAC.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research conducted, several recommendations can be made regarding the use of port visit support frameworks by the U.S. Navy. These recommendations are as follows:

1. **Further research utilizing the scoring model developed in this study:** Conduct a survey of current and experienced contracting officers, and other subject matter experts with experience in HSP, non-HSP, and hybrid port visit support frameworks. Compare their scoring through a statistical analysis to establish credible scoring for the different frameworks.
2. **Conduct in-depth market research for ports under consideration for changes in their support framework:** While the qualitative research conducted in this study provides valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of different port visit support frameworks, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy conduct more in-depth market research to better understand the local conditions and specific needs of each port. This will help inform decisions about which support framework or combination thereof is best suited.
3. **Invest in organic capabilities in strategic locations:** The research highlighted the importance of having organic capabilities in strategic locations, such as port security forces and material handling and port operations equipment. This will mitigate OPSEC vulnerabilities and ensure continuity of operations during a major theater conflict. Therefore, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy invest in these capabilities in key strategic locations that are most susceptible to rising tensions with strategic competitors.

4. **Standardize policy and QA processes for all port visits:** The research found that there were variations in QA processes between different port visit support frameworks, which can lead to inconsistencies in the level of service provided. Therefore, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy standardize policy and QA processes regardless of support strategy to ensure consistency and quality service.

The findings of this research provide valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of different port visit support frameworks. The recommendations provided can inform planners and policy-makers in making decisions about which support framework or combination thereof is best suited for a given port and help the U.S. Navy improve its port visit support capabilities.

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APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE LOGREQ

ROUTINE

R 040550Z FEB 20 MID110000383067U

FM USS AMERICA

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR YOKOSUKA JA
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR SINGAPORE
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR CHINHAE KOR
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR MARIANAS GU
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR SASEBO JA
COMLOG WESTPAC
CTF 70
CTF 73
CTF 76
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
NAVCRIMINVSERVFO FAREAST YOKOSUKA JA
NAVFAC FAR EAST YOKOSUKA JA
SOPA ADMIN SASEBO JA
COMEXSTRIKGRU SEVEN
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA
USS GREEN BAY
USS GERMANTOWN
USS BLUE RIDGE
USS AMERICA

BT

UNCLAS

MSGID/GENADMIN/USS AMERICA/-/JAN//

SUBJ/USS AMERICA ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE LOGREQ LAEM CHABANG//

REF/A/TYPE:DOC/NWP 1-03.1 CHG 4/OPNAV/01MAR2018//

REF/B/TYPE:DOC/COMTHIRDFLT OPORD 201/C3F/14DEC2015//

REF/C/MSGID:MSG/COMSEVENTHFLT/260150ZJAN19//

NARR/ REF A IS NWP 1-03.1 CHANGE 4, OPERATIONAL REPORTS./
REF B IS COMTHIRDFLT OPOD 201./ REB C IS INTERIM CHANGE TO
THE C7F OPOD 201 - LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS.//
POC/FAHNER,M./CDR, SUPPO/UNIT:USS AMERICA/NAME:INPORT/
TEL:808-653-7391/EMAIL:SUPPO(AT)LHA6.NAVY(.SMIL).MIL//
POC/HISCOCK,K./CDR, OPS/UNIT:USS AMERICA/NAME:INPORT/
TEL:808-653-7390/EMAIL:OPS(AT)LHA6.NAVY(.SMIL).MIL//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. INFORMATION CONCERNING U.S. SHIP'S
OPERATIONS,
MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES IS POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE AND SHALL
ONLY BE
PASSED TO INDIVIDUALS WHO MUST KNOW IT TO PERFORM THEIR JOB.
ONLY
THE MINIMUM REQUIRED INFORMATION SHOULD BE SHARED.

2. IAW REFS A THRU B THE FOLLOWING ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE
LOGREQ IS
SUBMITTED FOR LAEM CHABANG:
ALFA: (1) ETA 07 MAR 2020, 1100L.
BRAVO: (1) REQUEST THREE (3) 2500 HP Z-PELLER TUGS AND ONE ENGLISH
SPEAKING PILOT FOR ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE. REQUEST PILOT
PICKUP IVO 13°02.1'N 100°47.3'E, 0930L.
(2) PORT SIDE TO BOW OUT.
(3) REQUEST SOUTHERN BASIN
(4) LOA 844 FT / 257.3M
LW 780 FT / 237.8M
BM (WATERLINE) 106 FT / 32.3M
BM (OVERALL) 196 FT / 59.8M
DFT 31.9 FT / 9.7M
HGT 191.6 FT / 58.4M
DISP 44,971 LONG TONS / 45,693 METRIC TONS
CHARLIE: PASSENGER AND TROOPS FOR EMBARK/DISEMBARK.
(1) EMBARK: CURRENT ESTIMATE TWO (2) PERSONNEL FROM BKK.
(2) DISEMBARK: QTY TBD.
(3) REQUEST CUSTOMS AND PASSPORT PROCESSING SUPPORT.
(4) REQUEST TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM BKK.
DELTA: REQUEST FLEET FREIGHT, MAIL, AND STORES DELIVERY UPON
SHIP'S ARRIVAL IN PORT; AND SUBSEQUENT DAY(S) OF PORT VISIT.
INDIA: (1) NAVIGATION INFORMATION PROVIDED SEPCOR.
(2) REQUEST ADVISE OF ANY UNPUBLISHED NAV HAZARDS.
JULIET: REQUEST SCHEDULE OF EVENTS THAT REQUIRE CO, XO, CMC
ATTENDANCE WITH NOTIFICATION IN LOGREQ REPLY.

KILO: (1) REQUEST FOUR (4) 6X10 FT FENDERS. PNEUMATIC/YOKOHAMA TYPE

FENDERS ARE TO BE USED EVENLY SPACE ALONG SHIP BERTH IAW NAVAL SHIPS TECHNICAL MANUAL CHAPTER 611.

(2) REQUEST FOURTEEN (14) LINE HANDLERS.

(3) REQUEST CHT SERVICES VIA 4 INCH HOSE WITH CAMLOCK FITTINGS SHIP ESTIMATED DAILY OFFLOAD QUANTITY IS 250 CM.

(4) REQUEST DAILY TRASH SERVICES. ESTIMATE OF 100 CM TO BE REMOVED PER DAY.

(5) REQUEST ONE 30-40 FT BROW FOR ELEVATOR WITH ONE 20-25 FT BROW STAND FOR AIRCRAFT ELEVATOR ACCESS.

(6) REQUEST CRANE SERVICE TO LIFT RAMP (14,624 LBS) TO PIER AND PLACE RAMP AT SIDEPORT. REQUEST CRANE SERVICE TO RESTOW PRIOR TO SAIL.

(7) REQUEST ONE FORKLIFT TO MANEUVER RAMP.

(8) REQUEST ONE 75T MOBILE CRANE FOR THE FOLLOWING SERVICES:

(A) MOVEMENT OF SINGLE BROW ON STAND TO ELEVATOR.

(B) ONE MOBILE CRANE WILL BE ARRANGED FOR VESSEL ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE.

(9) OFFLOAD OF USED/EXCESS HAZMAT

(10) TWO (2) MANLIFTS, 120 FT, 96 HOURS

LIMA: (1) ETD 11 MAR 2020, 1100L.

MIKE: (1) REQUEST POTABLE WATER DAILY VIA 2.5 INCH HOSE WITH FEMALE COUPLING FOR CONNECTION. ESTIMATE USAGE OF 250 MT PER DAY.

OSCAR: (1) 14 MEDICAL OFFICERS; 02 DENTAL OFFICER.

PAPA: (1) REQUEST FREE PRATIQUE.

(2) NO KNOWN ILLNESSES AND INOCULATIONS ARE CURRENT.

(3) LAST PORT: WHITE BEACH, OKINAWA, JAPAN.

(4) SSCES (DE-RAT) CER EXP DATE: 07 JUL 20.

QUEBEC: (1) REQUEST CUSTOMS CLEARANCE.

UNIFORM: (1) FROST, LUKE, CAPT, USN, COMMANDING OFFICER, LINEAL 01651450.

(2) NAVY 87 OFFICERS AND 936 ENLISTED ONBOARD.

(3) MARINE CORPS 152 OFFICERS AND 964 ENLISTED ONBOARD.

(4) 18 U.S. CIVILIANS EMBARKED.

VICTOR: (1) BRIDGE TO BRIDGE 156.80 MHZ CH 16

(2) BRIDGE TO BRIDGE 156.65 MHZ CH 13

(3) BRIDGE TO BRIDGE 156.475 MHZ CH 12

(4) SHIP WILL MONITOR BRIDGE TO BRIDGE VHF CH 16, CH 13, AND CH 12.

(5) SATCOM.

ZULU:

(1) FLEET LANDING

(A) THREE (3) FLEET LANDING LOT CONSISTING OF:

1. OPEN/CLOSED TENTS, TABLES, CHAIRS, AND LIGHTING.
TO SUPPORT BUS EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION;
THE TENT PACKAGE SHALL INCLUDE AN OPEN/CLOSED
TENT, LIGHTING, CEILING FANS, TABLES AND CHAIRS,
ELECTRICAL HOOKUPS, CABLE FOR POWER SUPPLY, AND
A GENERATOR WITH FUEL ALREADY FILLED TO MAXIMUM
CAPACITY THAT EMITS SOUND LEVELS OF LESS THAN
84 DECIBELS. MINIMUM (150) PERSON CAPACITY. THE
TENTS MUST BE ANCHORED DOWN AND STRONG ENOUGH
TO WITHSTAND INCLEMENT WEATHER. LIGHTS WILL
PROVIDE SUFFICIENT UNIFORM ILLUMINATION OF THE
SPACE BETWEEN 750-1000 LUX.
2. DAILY CLEANING OF THE EQUIPMENT AND THE FLEET
LANDING AREA; AND
3. TRANSPORTATION, REPOSITIONING, MOBILIZATION,
DEMOBILIZATION, STAND-BY FEE AND LABOR
REQUIRED TO PERFORM THE ABOVE
4. TWO (2) MIST FANS
(B) FOUR (4) PORTABLE SANITARY FACILITIES, SERVICED
DAILY
(C) FOUR (4) PORTABLE HAND WASH STATIONS, SERVICED
DAILY
(D) REQUEST WI-FI INTERNET CONNECTION
(2) FORCE PROTECTION:
(A) JERSEY TYPE BARRIER, LAND FIFTEEN (15) METERS
(B) CONEX BOX BARRIER, (360) METERS
(C) FLOATING BARRIER / CONTINUOUS LINE OF DEMARCATION
(450) METERS PER DAY
(D) METAL PEDESTRIAN CONTROL FENCE, TEN (10) EA
(E) ARMED SECURITY GUARDS-PORT PROVIDED, FOUR (4) EA
(F) TWO (2) EA WALK-THRU METAL DETECTORS WITH
TRAINED OPERATORS
(G) TWO (2) EA TRAINED X-RAY BAGGAGE SCANNER OPERATOR
WITH TWO (2) EA X-RAY BAGGAGE SCANNING MACHINE
(H) DIVING AND VETTING SERVICE
(I) K9 UNIT REQUESTED TO CONDUCT RANDOM SWEEPS
THROUGHOUT DURATION OF PORT VISIT
(J) 24/7 ARMED WATERBORNE SECURITY TO MAINTAIN A BUFFER
ZONE; REQUEST PERMISSION TO PLACE ONE UNARMED SAILOR
ON EACH PICKET BOAT
(K) REQUEST TWO ARMED BOATS WHEN ENTERING AND EXITING PORT,

REQUEST ESCORTS BE ARMED WITH CREW SERVED WEAPONS M240S.

(L) CONTROLLED AREAS SIGNS ONE (1) EA

(M) THREE (3) SETS STURDY TABLE WITH FOUR (4) FOLDING CHAIRS

(N) FOUR (4) EA OPEN TENT OR AWNING, 3MX3M

(O) PORTABLE FLUORESCENT LIGHTING, EIGHT (8) EA AT ALL ECPS FOR GUARDS, AND TWO (2) EA FOR WATCHSTANDERS

(3) REQUEST THE FOLLOWING VEHICLES WITH ENGLISH SPEAKING DRIVERS

(A) SHIP:

1. TWELVE (12) 40 PAX BUS

2. SIX (6) 15 PAX VANS

3. ONE (1) SEDAN

(B) CPR:

1. FOUR (4) 15 PAX VANS

2. ONE (1) SEDAN

(C) ESG:

1. FOUR (4) 15 PAX VANS

2. ONE (1) SEDAN

(D) MEU:

1. FIVE (5) 40 PAX BUS

2. SIX (6) 15 PAX VANS

3. ONE (1) SEDAN

(E) COMREL:

1. THREE (3) 40 PAX BUS

(4) CELLULAR PHONES (OR SIM CARDS) READY FOR USE WITH EQUIVALENT

PRELOADED AIRTIME, EQUIVALENT SIM CARDS OR TOP-UP CARDS. IF APPLICABLE, HSP TO ACCEPT RETURN OF ANY UNUSED CARDS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF SHIP. ALL PHONES ARE TO HAVE INTERNATIONAL DIRECT DIALING CAPABILITY AND ARE TO BE PROVIDED WITH CHARGERS COMPATIBLE TO U.S. CONFIGURED 110V ELECTRICAL OUTLETS. CELLULAR PHONES TO BE FULLY CHARGED AND LABELED BOTH NUMERICALLY AND WITH INDIVIDUAL PHONE NUMBER.

(A) SHIP: FORTY (40)

(B) CPR: TEN (10)

(C) ESG: TEN (10)

(D) MEU: TWENTY-FOUR (24)

(5) REQUEST HSP PROVIDE A PHONE LIST OF LOCAL EMERGENCY NUMBERS

FOR SHIP'S USE. NUMBERS PROVIDED SHOULD INCLUDE:

(A) HSP REPRESENTATIVE

(B) TUG DISPATCHER / PORT OPERATIONS

(C) LOCAL HOSPITALS

(D) FIRE DEPARTMENT

- (E) POLICE DEPARTMENT
- (F) LOCAL, STATE, AND NATIONAL AGENCIES THAT MUST BE CALLED FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIAL AND/OR SPILLS.
- (5) REQUEST ARRIVAL PORT BRIEF INCLUDE NCIS/LOCAL AUTHORITIES BRIEF FOR FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, OFF LIMIT AREAS, SPECIAL EVENTS, OR OTHER LOCAL EVENTS SCHEDULED WHILE INPORT.
- (6) REQUEST ADVANCE NOTICE OF OTHER HARBOR MOVEMENTS.
- (7) REQUEST ADVANCE NOTICE OF ANY UNPUBLISHED NAVIGATIONAL HAZARDS.
- (8) REQUEST IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION ON PILOT AND PILOT BOAT, INCLUDING PILOT BOAT NAME AND DESCRIPTION.
- (9) REQUEST SUPPORT OF ADVANCED PARTY, SIX (6) PERSONNEL.
- (10) THIS LOGREQ IS IAW THE QUANTITIES SPECIFIED IN THE STANDARDIZED GLOBAL LHA PIERSIDE LOGREQ TEMPLATE.//

BT

APPENDIX B. GLOBAL STANDARD LOGREQ PROCEDURES

Standard LOGREQ Procedures

Review the LOGREQ template below. **Highlighted** information requires validation from the ship. *Ships shall only order quantities required to meet operational requirements. Quantities in excess of approved standard LOGREQ quantities require a LOGREQ deviation request.* Deviation instructions are found at the bottom of this document.

Contact the appropriate Numbered Fleet COR for deviation format. UNCLASS LOGREQs are required to be submitted NLT 30 days prior to a scheduled port visit or as soon as operationally possible. Failing to comply with this timeline places your port visit at risk of reduced support or potential non-availability of critical requirements.

Country: TBD
Port: TBD
Ship: LHA (CLASS IV)
Location: Pier Side

1: INFORMATION CONCERNING U.S. SHIP'S OPERATIONS, MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES IS POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE AND SHALL ONLY BE PASSED TO INDIVIDUALS WHO MUST KNOW IT TO PERFORM THEIR JOB. ONLY THE MINIMUM REQUIRED INFORMATION SHOULD BE SHARED.

2. IAW REFS A AND B, THE FOLLOWING ARRIVAL LOGREQ IS SUBMITTED FOR (PORT AND LOCATION):

ALPHA: ETA DD MMM YY, XXXX LOCAL

BRAVO: (1) THREE (3) TUGS AND ONE (1) ENGLISH SPEAKING PILOT FOR

ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE

(2) PILOT PICKUP AT (LOCATION) AT (TIME) LOCAL.

(3) LOA 844FT / 253.7M

LW 738FT / 225.7M

BM (WATERLINE) 106FT / 32.3M

BM (WIDEST) 186FT / 56.7M

DFT 28FT / 8.6M

HGT 187FT / 57.2M

DISP 45,600 TONS

GT

CHARLIE: PASSENGER AND TROOPS FOR DISEMBARKATION (OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

DELTA: REQUEST FLEET FREIGHT, MAIL, AND STORES DELIVERY UPON SHIP'S

ARRIVAL IN PORT; AND SUBSEQUENT DAY(S) OF PORT VISIT.

ECHO: VOYAGE REPAIR, SHIP MAINTENANCE (OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

FOXTROT: FUEL REQUIREMENTS (SEE NOTES) (OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

GOLF: AMMUNITION OR ARMAMENT STORES **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**

HOTEL: PROVISIONS REQUIREMENT (SEE NOTES) **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**

INDIA: NAVIGATION INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SHIP

JULIET: REQUEST SCHEDULE OF EVENTS THAT REQUIRE CO, XO, CMC ATTENDANCE

WITH NOTIFICATION IN LOGREQ REPLY.

KILO: (1) **FOUR (4)** PNEUMATIC TYPE FENDERS TO BE USED PER NAVAL SHIPS

TECHNICAL MANUAL CHAPTER 611, FENDER POSITION WILL

BE

PORT/STBD METERS FROM BROW

(2) REQUEST LINEHANDLERS/STEVEDORES **(SPECIFY QTY)**

(3) CHT REMOVAL SERVICES. DISCHARGE ESTIMATE OF **250** CZ

PER DAY.

CHT OFFLOAD SCHEDULE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE CONTRACTOR

AND WILL BE PROVIDED DURING THE ARRIVAL BRIEF OR EARLIER.

ESTIMATE DOES/DOES NOT INCLUDE GREY WATER OFFLOAD REQUIREMENTS. CHT DISCHARGE POSITION IS METERS FROM BROW

(4) DAILY TRASH REMOVAL SERVICES, ESTIMATE OF **100** CZ

TO BE

REMOVED PER DAY

(5) OILY WASTE/BILGE WATER REMOVAL SERVICE. SHIP

ESTIMATED DAILY

OFFLOAD QUANTITY IS **25** CZ. SHIP REQUESTS OFFLOAD ON DAY(S)

(SPECIFY WHAT INPORT DAY(S) OILY WASTE/BILGE WATER REMOVAL

IS REQUIRED). OILY WASTE DISCHARGE POSITION

(PORT/STBD

METERS FROM BROW) PNEUMATIC TYPE FENDERS ARE TO BE USED.

ONE (1) XXX FT HOSE WITH 2.5 INCH CAMLOCK (FEMALE) FITTING

(6) **ONE (1)** PAINT FLOAT DELIVERED AFTER SHIP IS MOORED

(7) OIL BOOM POSITIONED AROUND THE SHIP **(ONLY**

REQUEST IF

TRANSFERRING FUEL, REQUESTED FOR ATPF, OR WHEN REQUIRED BY THE PORT)

(8) **ONE (1)** 15-40FT BROW AND ONE 61-80 FT BROW WITH BROW STANDS;

(SPECIFY STAND SIZE AND PLACEMENT)
 (9) SHORE POWER VIA XXX (XX) XXXA SHORE POWER CABLES
 WITH
 STANDARD NAVY CONNECTORS.
 (10) **TWO (2)** MANLIFT (SPECIFY SIZE / # OF DAYS) **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 (11) **ONE (1)** FORKLIFT (SPECIFY SIZE / # OF DAYS) **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 (12) **ONE (1)** MOBILE CRANE (SPECIFY SIZE 15,40,75,100 TON / # OF DAYS REQUIRED) **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 (13) **ONE (1)** LIGHT DUTY TRUCK
 (14) OFFLOAD OF USED/EXCESS HAZMAT **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 LIMA: ETD **DD MMM YY, XXXX** LOCAL
 MIKE: POTABLE WATER BY PROPERLY FENDERED BARGE. **XXX** FT HOSE WITH 2.5 INCH FEMALE COUPLING FOR CONNECTION. ESTIMATE USAGE OF **250** MT PER DAY
 NOVEMBER: (1) CURRENCY EXCHANGE ONBOARD UPON ARRIVAL / DAILY
 (2) BUY BACK SERVICES PROVIDED ONBOARD LAST FULL DAY OF PVST
 OSCAR: **ONE (1)** INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN AND **TWO (2)** ADDITIONAL CORPSMEN EMBARKED
 PAPA: (1) FREE PRATIQUE **(MAKE COMMENT AS TO STATE OF HEALTH IF OTHER THAN SATISFACTORY)**
 (2) NO KNOWN ILLNESSES AND INOCULATIONS ARE CURRENT.
 (3) LAST PORT: **XXXXXX, XXX**
 (4) SSCES (DE-RAT) CERT EXP DATE: **DDMMYYYY**
 QUEBEC: CUSTOMS CLEARANCE **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 ROMEO: ANTICIPATED FLIGHT SCHEDULE **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 SIERRA: AIRCRAFT TO TRANSFERRED ASHORE **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 TANGO: REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT REQUIRED **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
 UNIFORM: (1) NAVY **XX** OFFICERS AND **XXX** ENLISTED ON BOARD.
 (2) **XX** FOREIGN NATIONALS OR U.S. CIVILIANS EMBARKED.
 VICTOR: (1) BRIDGE TO BRIDGE 156.80 MHZ CH 16
 (2) BRIDGE TO BRIDGE 156.65 MHZ CH 13
 (3) BRIDGE TO BRIDGE **XXX.XX** MHZ CH **XX**

(4) SHIP WILL MONITOR BRIDGE TO BRIDGE VIA VHF CH 13,
CH14, AND
CH 16

WHISKEY: DO NOT USE

X-RAY: CARGO OFFLOAD / ONLOAD **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**

YANKEE: VIP LIST **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**

ZULU:(1) ADVANCED DETACHMENT REQUIREMENTS
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS AVAILABLE FOR ADVANCED
DETACHMENT PERSONNEL
(5 DAYS PRIOR TO PORT VISIT)
(A) **TWO (2)** FIFTEEN (15) PASSENGER VANS WITH
DRIVERS TO
BE TURNED OVER TO SHORE PATROL UPON ARRIVAL
OF LHA
(B) **SIX (6)** CELL PHONES AND SIM CARDS WITH PREPAID
AIR TIME AND DATA

(C) **TWO (2)** POCKET WIFI DEVICES
(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

(2) FLEET LANDING
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS AVAILABLE FOR FLEET LANDING, IF
REQUIRED PLEASE INCLUDE DATES REQUIRED **(OMIT IF NOT
REQUIRED)**:
(A) **ONE (1)** FLEET LANDING LOT CONSISTING OF THE
FOLLOWING:

1. 250 CHAIRS;
2. 50 LONG TABLES (APPROXIMATELY 2 METERS IN
LENGTH);
3. ONE (1) LARGE BBQ GRILL WITH THE
SUPPORTING
SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT; **(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)**
4. OPEN OR CLOSED TENTS (ASSORTED SIZES)
WHICH, WHEN
COMBINED, WILL COVER A ZONE OF 300 SQUARE
METERS,
WITH LIGHTS THAT WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
UNIFORM
ILLUMINATION OF THE SPACE BETWEEN 750-1000
LUX.
THE TENTS MUST BE ANCHORED DOWN AND
STRONG ENOUGH
TO WITHSTAND INCLEMENT WEATHER;
5. THREE (3) ICE COOLERS; **(OMIT IF NOT
REQUIRED)**

6. THREE (3) MIST FANS;
 7. 20 110-220VAC US OUTLETS;
 8. DAILY CLEANING OF THE EQUIPMENT AND THE
 FLEET
 LANDING AREA; AND
(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)
 9. TRANSPORTATION, REPOSITIONING,
 MOBILIZATION,
 DEMOBILIZATION, STAND-BY FEE AND
 LABOR REQUIRED TO
 PERFORM THE ABOVE
 (B) **THREE (3)** PORTABLE SANITARY FACILITIES,
 SERVICED DAILY
(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)
 (C) **THREE (3)** PORTABLE HAND WASH STATIONS,
 SERVICED DAILY
(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)
 (3) FORCE PROTECTION
 FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ARE DETERMINED BY
 THE NUMBERED FLEET AND VARY DEPENDING ON AREA AND
 THREAT CONDITION. THE FOLLOWING FORCE PROTECTION
 ITEMS, IF REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE
 IN-PORT SECURITY PLAN (ISP), CAN BE REQUESTED TO BE
 DELIVERED TO FLEET LANDING OR TO THE SHIP UPON
 ARRIVAL, INCLUDE DATES REQUIRED:
 (A) **(X)** ARMED SECURITY GUARD, TO MAN ECP 24/7
 UPON
 SHIP'S ARRIVAL, THROUGH SHIP'S DEPARTURE
 (B) 24/7 ARMED WATERBORNE SECURITY UPON SHIP'S
 ARRIVAL,
 THROUGH DEPARTURE
 (C) JERSEY TYPE BARRIER, FILLED WITH WATER **()** MR
 (D) JERSEY TYPE BARRIER, LAND **()** MR
 (E) CONEX BOX BARRIER, **()** MR
 (F) **(X)** TRAINED X-RAY BAGGAGE SCANNER OPERATOR WITH
(X) X-RAY BAGGAGE SCANNING MACHINE (SCHEDULE)
 (G) **(X)** WALK-THRU METAL DETECTORS WITH **(X)** TRAINED
 METAL DETECTOR OPERATORS (SCHEDULE)
 (H) **(X)** DIVING AND VETTING SERVICE
 (I) CONTROLLED AREAS SIGNS **()** DY
 (J) TIRE SHREDDING KIT **()** DY
(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)
 (K) LIGHT CARTS, **()** DY, SERVICED DAILY
(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)
 (L) UTILITY CART, FOUR PAX **()** DY, SERVICED DAILY

(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

(M) ☒ 3MX3M TENT, WITH SIDES FOR ECP

(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

(N) ☒ STURDY TABLES WITH EIGHT (8) FOLDING
CHAIRS

(O) ☒ ☐ KW PORTABLE GENERATOR, SERVICED DAILY, FOR
POWERING METAL DETECTORS AND BAGGAGE
SCREENING
EQUIPMENT IF ADEQUATE POWER IS NOT AVAILABLE

(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

(P) FLOATING BARRIER / CONTINUOUS LINE OF
DEMACATION ☐
METERS PER DAY

(Q) ☐ METAL PEDESTRIAN CONTROL FENCE (ONE 2X2
METER FENCE)

(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

(R) ☐ ARMED ESCORT VESSEL FROM PILOT PICKUP TO
ANCHORAGE

(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

(S) ☐ EXPLOSIVES DETECTION K9 W/HANDLER

(OMIT IF NOT REQUIRED)

(4) TRANSPORTATION:

IF REQUIRED, REQUEST THE FOLLOWING VEHICLES WITH
ENGLISH

SPEAKING DRIVER, INCLUDE DATES REQUIRED AND FOR USE
BY SHIP,

ADVANCED DET, COMREL PROJECTS OR EMBARKED STAFF
WHERE

APPLICABLE:

ALLOCATION	SEDAN	15-PAX VAN	40-PAX BUS
SHIP	1	6	12
CPR	1	4	-
ESG	1	4	-
MEU	1	6	5
CTF	1	4	-
COMREL	N/A	N/A	3

(REDUCE NUMBER OF VANS IF NOT REQUIRED)

(5) **CELLULAR PHONES AND SIM CARDS WITH PREPAID AIR
TIME AND DATA:** CELLULAR PHONES READY FOR USE
WITH SIMCARD, UNLIMITED LOCAL CALLS, UNLIMITED

DATA, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT DIALING CAPABILITY, CHARGERS COMPATIBLE TO U.S. CONFIGURED 110V ELECTRICAL OUTLETS, FULLY CHARGED AND LABELED BOTH NUMERICALLY AND WITH INDIVIDUAL PHONE NUMBER. IF REQUIRED BEFORE SHIP ARRIVAL SPECIFY HOW MANY AND FOR WHAT REASON I.E. BEACHDET ETC.

ALLOCATION	CELL/SIM
SHIP	40
CPR	10
ESG	10
MEU	24
CTF	10

(6) REQUEST HSP PROVIDE A PHONE LIST OF LOCAL EMERGENCY NUMBERS

FOR SHIP'S USE. NUMBERS PROVIDED SHOULD INCLUDE:

- (A) HSP REPRESENTATIVE
- (B) TUG DISPATCHER / PORT OPERATIONS
- (C) LOCAL HOSPITALS
- (D) FIRE DEPARTMENT
- (E) POLICE DEPARTMENT
- (F) LOCAL, STATE, AND NATIONAL AGENCIES THAT MUST BE

CALLED FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIAL AND/OR SPILLS.

(7) REQUEST ARRIVAL PORT BRIEF INCLUDE NCIS/LOCAL AUTHORITIES

BRIEF FOR FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, OFF LIMIT AREAS, SPECIAL EVENTS, OR OTHER

LOCAL EVENTS SCHEDULED WHILE INPORT.

(8) REQUEST ADVANCE NOTICE OF OTHER HARBOR MOVEMENTS.

(9) REQUEST ADVANCE NOTICE OF ANY UNPUBLISHED NAVIGATIONAL

HAZARDS

(10) REQUEST IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION ON PILOT AND PILOT BOAT,

INCLUDING PILOT BOAT NAME AND DESCRIPTION

(11) ALL REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY #F

COR.//

PLADS AND POINTS OF CONTACT

COMPACFLT COR Group (C3F/C7F):CPFCOR@navy.mil
PLAD: COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMTHIRDFLT
COMNAVREG SW SAN DIEGO CA
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR SAN DIEGO CA
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR PEARL
HARBOR HI
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR PUGET SOUND
WA
COMSEVENTHFLT
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR YOKOSUKA JA
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR SINGAPORE
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR CHINHAE KOR
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR MARIANAS GU
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR SASEBO JA
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR PEARL
HARBOR HI (Saipan port visits)

CTF-80 (C2F) COR Group: CTF 80
PLAD: COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
COMSECONDFLT
NORTH CAROLINA NORTHWARD COMNAVREG MIDLANT
NORFOLK VA
SOUTH CAROLINA SOUTHWARD COMNAVREG SE
JACKSONVILLE FL
BALTIMORE/WASHINGTON DC
COMNAVDIST WASHINGTON DC
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR NORFOLK VA
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR
JACKSONVILLE, FL
HALIFAX CANADA
QHM HALIFAX
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
MARLANTHQ HALIFAX
QUEBEC CITY
AMCONSUL QUEBEC
CANFLTANT HQ HALIFAX
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

C4F COR Group: COMUSNAVSO-
C4F_MYPT_LOGISTICS@navy.mil
PLAD: COMFOURTHFLT
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR
JACKSONVILLE, FL

C5F COR Group:
PLAD:

C5FHSPCOR@me.navy.mil
COMFIFTHFLT
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR MANAMA

BAHRAIN

C6F COR Group:
PLAD:

C6FCOR@eu.navy.mil
COMSIXTHFLT
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR SIGONELLA IT
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR SIGONELLA

DET NAPLES IT

MSC COR Group:
PLAD:

COMSC_N41_HSP_COR@navy.mil
COMSC NORFOLK VA

TYCOMS

COMNAVSURPAC SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVSURLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVSUBPAC SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVSubLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNECC NORFOLK VA
COMSC NORFOLK VA

LOGREQ NOTES

FORCE PROTECTION

1. SHIP MUST COORDINATE FORCE PROTECTION (FP) REQUIREMENTS WITH C#F ATFP, #FCOR AND EMBASSY PRIOR TO SUBMITTING LOGREQS. THE EMBASSY WILL DETERMINE WHICH FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY HOST NATION AND WHICH WILL NEED TO BE REQUESTED VIA HSP. ONLY HSP PROVIDED FP REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE LISTED IN THE LOGREQ AND DO NOT REQUIRE A DEVIATION.

FUEL

1. FUEL IS NOT PART OF THE HSP MAC CONTRACT
2. FUEL ORDERS MAY REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT LEAD TIMES; PROVIDE QUANTITY IN GALLONS AND DATE OF DELIVERY ON LOGREQ SUBMISSION, IF REQUIRED. SHIP WILL ORDER FIRST THROUGH DEFENSE FUEL SUPPORT POINT (DFSP), SECOND THROUGH FUEL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT (FEA) (IF AVAILABLE), THIRD THROUGH DLA SEACARD BUNKER OR OPEN MARKET CONTRACTS.

PROVISIONS

1. PROVISIONS ARE NOT PART OF THE HSP CONTRACT
2. PROVISION ORDERS MAY REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT LEAD TIMES; PROVISIONS ARE TO BE PLACED TO THE SUBSISTENCE PRIME VENDOR (SPV) PROGRAM
3. WHEN SUBMITTING A REQUISITION OUTSIDE OF THE SPV PROGRAM, UNITS NEED TO SUBMIT A REQUISITION ROUTING SHEET AND DD FORM 1149 FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL BY THE TYPE COMMANDER (TYCOM) N41 AND BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (BUPERS) PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE DD FORM 1149 REQUISITION TO THE FLEET LOGISTICS CENTER (FLC). SHIPS CAN ONLY ORDER ITEMS LISTED ON THE MASTER LOAD LIST (MLL).

OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS (ORF) / RECEPTION ITEMS

1. ORF REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT PART OF THE HSP CONTRACT
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFICIAL RECEPTIONS WILL NOT BE SUBMITTED IN THE STANDARD LOGREQS

3. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS (ORF) REQUESTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED

IAW SECNAVINST 7042.7K

4. SUBMIT RECEPTION REQUIREMENTS AT LEAST 30 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE

RECEPTION ON A DD 1149 DIRECTLY TO THE SUPPORTING FLEET LOGISTICS

CENTER, CONTRACTING DEPARTMENT

5. INDICATE IN PARAGRAPH ZULU IF ASSISTANCE WILL BE REQUIRED BY THE

HSP TO RESOURCE MATERIAL FOR ORF OR SPECIAL EVENTS

BOTTLED WATER

1. MAY BE FUNDED WITH OSBP FUNDS WHEN THE SHIP CANNOT PRODUCE/ACQUIRE

POTABLE WATER WHILE IN PORT. IF BOTTLED WATER IS DESIRED FOR ANY

OTHER REASON, IT MUST BE PURCHASED USING SHIPS CONSUMABLE OPTAR.

WHEN PORT PROVIDED FRESH WATER IS DETERMINED BY THE SHIPS MEDICAL

OFFICER AS UNFIT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION, SUBMIT A LOGREQ DEVIATION

REQUEST TO THE APPROPRIATE NUMBERED FLEET COR. INPUT BOTTLED WATER

REQUIREMENTS ON LINE MIKE.

CANCELLATION:

1. IAW THE HSP CONTRACT, SERVICES MUST BE CANCELED 48 HOURS IN

ADVANCE FOR PIERSIDE AND 72 HOURS FOR ANCHORAGE OR CANCELLATION

CHARGES MAY BE APPLIED. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO MINIMIZE

CANCELLATIONS OCCURRING WITH LESS THAN A 48 HOUR NOTICE.

2. IF A HSP HAS VALID CHARGES LINKED TO A CANCELLED PORT VISIT, THE

FLEET COR AND FLC KO WILL EXPLAIN THE PROCESS TO EACH SHIP ON HOW

TO MOVE FORWARD TO RESOLUTION. THE VESSEL WILL NEED TO COMPLETE A

DD250 LIKE A NORMAL PORT VISIT IN ORDER TO PAY THE HSP FOR VALID

CANCELLATION CHARGES.

DAMAGES:

1. IF A SHIP SUSTAINS DAMAGES CAUSED BY A HSP, IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE FLEET COR AND FLC KO. THEY WILL GIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO MOVE FORWARD WITH DOCUMENTATION AND PAYMENT. AT A MINIMUM, THE VESSEL SHALL DOCUMENT THE DAMAGE ON THEIR PORT VISIT CHECKLIST SIGNED THE SHIP'S CO/MASTER.

DEVIATIONS

1. THERE MAY BE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE SHIP REQUESTS A NON-STANDARD LOGREQ ITEM, OR AN INCREASE IN QUANTITY OF A STANDARD LOGREQ ITEM
2. THE SHIP SUPPO WILL SUBMIT A DEVIATION REQUEST TO THE NUMBERED FLEET FOR ANY DEVIATION
 - A. THE LOGREQ DEVIATION REQUEST FORMS ARE AVAILABLE ON HSPORTAL
3. THE SHIP WILL NOTE IN ZULU IF THERE ARE ANY DEVIATIONS, AND WHAT THE DEVIATIONS ARE. IF NO DEVIATIONS, THE SHIP WILL NOTE NO DEVIATIONS IN ZULU.
4. USE THE FOLLOWING VERBIAGE EXAMPLES AS THEY APPLY:
 - A. THIS LOGREQ REFLECTS DEVIATIONS(S); TENTS. REASON FOR DEVIATION: SHIP REQUIRED ONE ADDITIONAL TENT TO ACCOMMODATE AN UNEXPECTED INCREASE OF VISTORS DURING TOURS, AND POSSIBLE INCLEMENT WEATHER. EXCESS QUANTITY/DEVIATION HAS BEEN APPROVED BY #F COR.
 - B. THIS LOGREQ IS IAW THE QUANTITIES SPECIFIED IN THE STANDARD LOGREQ TEMPLATE. THERE ARE NO DEVIATIONS IN THIS LOGREQ.

OTHER:

1. IF DESIRED SHIPS MAY REQUEST VENDOR INFORMATION AND
AVAILABILITY OF WIFI DEVICE RENTAL OR PURCHASE FOR
PERSONAL USE BY
THE CREW. WIFI DEVICE RENTAL OR PURCHASE FOR PERSONAL USE
SHALL
NOT BE FUNDED BY OSBP FUNDS OR SHIPS OPTAR. SHIPS MAY ALSO
REQUEST LOCAL LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING SERVICES WITH
FIXED
PUBLISHED PRICES FOR PERSONAL USE AND PAYMENT BY THE
CREW.

AOR NOTES

CTF-80:

1. HAZARDOUS MATERIAL DISPOSAL (HAZMAT)/SHIPBOARD GENERATED INDUSTRIAL WASTE (SGIW). THE HSP SHALL NOT DISPOSE/OFFLOAD ANY HAZARDOUS WASTE REQUIREMENTS UNLESS PRIOR APPROVAL HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE APPROPRIATE NAVY ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE.

PORT SPECIFIC NOTES:

- (1) MOREHEAD CITY, NC
 - a. PAINTING IS NOT AUTHORIZED IN PORT.
 - b. FENDERS ARE PORT PROVIDED AT NO CHARGE.
 - c. ROLL ON/ROLL OFF RAMP IS AVAILABLE FOR USE.
 - d. LPD AUTHORIZED THIRD TUG. CLOSE COORDINATION REQUIRED AS THIRD TUG IS PROCURED OUT OF THE LOCAL AREA.
- (2) ST. THOMAS, VIRGIN ISLANDS
 - a. BROW/BROW STAND NOT AVAILABLE
 - b. HAZMAT (OILY RAGS, FUEL FILTERS, ETC.) DIFFICULT TO OFFLOAD.
- (3) PONCE, PUERTO RICO
 - a. NO JP-5 AVAILABLE.

3rd Fleet:

1. OILY WASTE REMOVAL PIERSIDE. OILY WASTE REMOVAL WILL BE VIA TRUCK. IN CASES WHERE A BARGE IS REQUIRED A DEVIATION REQUEST WILL BE SUBMITTED.
2. PICKET BOAT. SHIPS LARGER THAN LCS/DDG1000 CLASS WILL UTILIZE ORGANIC BOATS AND PERSONNEL FOR SECURITY.
3. PAINTING DURING PORT VISITS. UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUBMITTING PAINTING PERMITS. RENTAL OF CONTRACTED PAINTING SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IS CONTINGENT ON UNITS PROVIDING PROOF OF APPROVED PAINTING PERMITS.

4. COMPUTER, IT EQUIPMENT SERVICES, CONSUMABLES. ALL REQUESTS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING IT INSTRUCTIONS TO INCLUDE AN APPROVED ITPR. ORGANIC NAVY ASSETS TO BE USED PRIOR TO COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING.
5. BUS SERVICE. BUS RENTAL IN THE U.S. IS NOT FUNDED BY THE TYPE COMMANDER.
6. LANDING CRAFT UNIT BERTHS AND PIERSIDE SERVICES. SHIPS SHALL RELEASE ONE LOGREQ THAT COMBINES BOTH SHIP PORT VISIT REQUIREMENTS ALONG WITH ANY EMBARKED UNITS SUCH AS LCU, LCAC, ETC. UNITS SHALL PLAN ON UTILIZING DOD, NAVY, AND COAST GUARD PIER LOCATIONS. ORGANIC ASSETS WILL BE USED FOR MOORING SUPPORT AND SERVICES TO INCLUDE SAILORS FOR LINEHANDLING, AEL, AND ALLOWANCE ISSUED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT (BROW, FENDERS, LIGHTING, OTHERS). UNITS WILL ALSO UTILIZE ASSETS AND SERVICES ON THE SHIP EMBARKED ON PRIOR TO REQUESTING CONTRACTING SUPPORT. WHEN REQUESTING COMMERCIAL BERTHS AND SERVICES A DEVIATION REQUEST WILL BE SUBMITTED TO INCLUDE UNIT'S EFFORTS TO CONTACT THE LOCAL PORT AUTHORITY AND UTILIZE THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE PIER, BERTH, AND SERVICES AVAILABLE.

4th Fleet:

1. CUSTOMS:

IF SHIPS EXPECT TO OFFLOAD CARGO IN SUPPORT OF EXPEDITIONARY MISSION, REQUEST "CUSTOMS DUTY CLEARANCE" UNDER DELTA, AND EITHER DEFINE OFFLOAD REQUIREMENTS OR STATE THAT MANIFEST WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

2. HAZMAT:

THERE ARE NO HAZMAT OFFLOAD CAPABILITIES IN C4F. RETAIN ALL HAZMAT ONBOARD. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT HAZMAT MUST BE OFFLOADED FOR

SAFETY REASONS THEN STATE SPECIFIC HAZMAT TYPE AND QUANTITY AND IT WILL BE DEALT WITH ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

3. PERSONNEL LOGISTIC MOVEMENT SUPPORT (PLMS) AND AIRPORT TRANSFERS:

PASSPORT ENTRY STAMPS ARE NEEDED ONLY FOR PAX DEPARTING THE SHIP.

PERSONNEL ARRIVING WILL GET THEIR PASSPORTS STAMPED AT THE AIRPORT. LIST THE APPROX. NUMBER OF PAX DEPARTING UNDER ZULU. SHIP'S ADMIN OFFICE SHOULD PROVIDE DEPARTING PAX WITH A LETTER EXPLAINING HOW THE MEMBER ARRIVED IN COUNTRY. AIRPORT TRANSPORTATION SHOULD ONLY BE REQUESTED IF PERSONNEL ARE TRAVELING

BEFORE OR AFTER THE SHIP'S TIME IN PORT, AS THE SHIP'S RENTAL VEHICLES SHOULD USED THE WHILE THE SHIP IS IN-PORT. LIST THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PAX REQUIRING TRANSPORTATION BY THE HSP UNDER ZULU.

4. JP-5 IS ONLY AVAILABLE IN GTMO AND PANAMA. ORDERS ARE PLACED WITH DFSP-XX, FOR DELIVERY ON DD MMM YY, PAYMENT VIA 1149.

FOR JP-5 DELIVERIES OUT OF RODMAN (VNB PANAMA) TRANSPORTATION

COSTS ARE PAID SEPARATELY BY SHIP'S GCPC. REQUEST HSP COORDINATE

DELIVERY WITH FUEL VENDOR.

5th Fleet:

1. BRAVO - AUTOMATIC SHORE TENSIONING SYSTEM FWD/AFT AUTHORIZED IN SALALAH, OMAN DURING MONSOON SEASON – JUNE THROUGH SEPTEMBER.

2. FOXTROT - PER COMLOGFORNAVCENTINST M-4000.1, PARA 603.G, "IT IS

SHIP'S RESPONSIBILITY TO INCLUDE A FUEL ORDER QUANTITY IN SECTION

FOXTROT OF THE INITIAL LOGREQ SUBMISSION. THE FOXTROT SECTION SHOULD NOT STATE - PROVIDED SEPCOR. AS FUEL REQUIREMENTS CHANGE, IT IS THE SHIP'S RESPONSIBILITY TO UPDATE THE FOXTROT SECTION THROUGH LOGREQ CHANGE MESSAGES.”

3. KILO - STANDARD FENDERS ARE 2.5M; 3.5M AND 4.5M (FOR NESTING) ARE AVAILABLE UPON SPECIAL REQUEST.

4. KILO - CHT OFFLOAD – ADDITIONAL 80CZ AUTHORIZED PER DAY BETWEEN MAY AND SEPTEMBER OR IF SHIP IS IN MDVR STATUS. (KILO) OILY WASTE/BILGE WATER DISPOSAL – ADDITIONAL 30CZ AUTHORIZED PER DAY IF SHIP IS IN MDVR STATUS.

5. MIKE - ADDITIONAL 80MT OF POTABLE WATER AUTHORIZED BETWEEN MAY AND SEPTEMBER OR IF 75% OF CREW REMAINING ONBOARD.

6. MIKE - BOTTLED WATER FOR HOMEPORT PC AND MCM SHIPS ARE PREAUTHORIZED BY TYCOM DIRECTION.

7. GRAPH BELOW LISTS AUTHORIZED QUANTITIES FOR EACH CLASS OF SHIP OPERATING IN THE NAVCENT AOR AND WILL NOT REQUIRE A DEVIATION REQUEST.

Proposed NAVCENT LOGREQ Changes							
	DDG	CG	LHD	LPD	MCM	PC	CVN
CHT	50	65	300	-	40	-	700
TRASH	30	30	-	-	30	10	300
POT WATER	50*	50*	-	-	-	-	500
OILY WASTE	-	-	-	-	-	2	70
PAINT FLOAT	-	-	2	1	-	-	4
JLG	2	2	4	4	-	-	4

FORKLIFT	2	2	2	2	-	-	4
CRANE	2	2	2	2	-	-	3
SAN UNITS	5	5	30	10	-	-	60
HAND WASH	3	3	10	4	-	-	20
40 PASS BUS	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
ICE COOLER	5	5	20	-	-	-	-
TRASH CANS	12	14	15	10	12	-	50
GRILLS	2	2	4	-	-	-	6
FANS	4	4	10	5	-	-	20
REEFER	1	1	2	1	1	-	2
FLT LAND	1	1	4	2	-	-	8
FENDERS	3	-	-	4	-	-	-
TRAILER		-	1	-	-		2
Notes:							
* Denotes an increase of 80 CZ during the Summer period.							

6th Fleet:

1. WHEN ORDERING PROVISIONS TO BE DELIVERED PIER SIDE, ADD **XX** 4-6 TON FORKLIFT FOR **XX** HOURS FOR STORES (MINIMUM IS 4 HOURS/DAY AS PER CONTRACT).
2. GRAY WATER OFFLOAD REQUIREMENTS - WHILE PIER-SIDE IN MOST FOREIGN PORTS, U.S. VESSELS DO NOT PUMP GRAY WATER OVER THE SIDE; VERIFY LOCAL COUNTRY POLICY AND/OR RESTRICTIONS. ENSURE ESTIMATED OFF-LOAD OF GRAY WATER IS ANNOTATED IN PARA KILO (3).
3. HAZMAT OFFLOAD – HAZMAT OFFLOAD AND DISPOSAL IS ONLY AUTHORIZED WHEN VISITING ROTA, SPAIN, SIGONELLA, SICILY, AND LIMITED PRE-APPROVED QUANTITIES IN SOUDA BAY, GREECE. SHIPS SHOULD COORDINATE EXCESS OFFLOAD DURING RAS WITH CLF UNITS.

4. PERSONNEL LOGISTIC MOVEMENT SUPPORT (PLMS) AND
AIRPORT
TRANSFERS:

LIST THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARRIVING AND DEPARTING PAX
REQUIRING TRANSPORTATION HSP UNDER ZULU. PLMS AND
AIRPORT TRANSFER
SERVICE AUTHORIZED AS NEEDED.

PORT SPECIFIC NOTES:

- (1) PORTSMOUTH, UNITED KINGDOM - BUS SERVICE IS NOT
NEEDED AT THIS LOCATION. FLEET LANDING IS SITUATED
A SHORT DISTANCE (400 METERS) FROM A PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION HUB, RESTAURANTS, AND SHOPPING.
- (2) MARSEILLE, FRANCE - BUS SERVICE SHOULD BE KEPT TO
A MINIMUM AS THE BUS ROUTE IS SHORT AND DIRECT TO
ALL SHOPPING AND RESTAURANTS. HIGH TRAFFIC
CONGESTION AREA.
- (3) LISBON, PORTUGAL (ANCHORAGE) - CHALLENGES EXIST
WITH CURRENT
AND TIDE FLUCTUATIONS AT ANCHORAGE POINT. WATER
TAXI SERVICE AND SUPPORTING BREASTING BARGES
MAY EXPERIENCE SECURING ISSUES DUE TO THE RAPID
RATE OF RIVER CURRENT.
- (4) SOUDA BAY, CRETE
 - a. CHT AND POTABLE WATER PROVIDED ORGANICALLY. HSP
PROVIDES
FITTINGS AND CONNECTIONS. BASED ON QUANTITIES
REMOVED/PROVIDED (CVN, LHD, LPD, OR EQUIVALENT),
NAVFAC MAY
INVOICE TYCOM SEPARATELY.
 - b. PER RECOMMENDATION BY THE HELLENIC NAVY PILOT
STATION,
THREE (3) TUGS ARE REQUIRED FOR SOUDA BAY PILOT-
IN/PILOT-
OUT FOR T-A0/T-AOE/T-AKE.
 - c. SHIPS BERTHED AT K-10, K-12 AUTHORIZED ONE ADDITIONAL
40
PAX BUS FOR TRANSPORTATION TO/FM PIER K-14.
 - d. USN OWNED BROWS AND OIL BOOMS ARE PROVIDED BY
PORT OPS AT

NO COST TO THE SHIP. BROW STAND MAY BE REQUESTED FROM THE HSP. CRANE/FORKLIFT SERVICE MUST BE REQUESTED FOR BROW PLACEMENT/REMOVAL.

e. ORGANIC FENDERS ARE AVAILABLE AT ALL PIERS. T-EPFs REQUIRE FOUR 3.3M FENDERS.

f. MSC SHIPS REQUIRE COMMERCIAL LINE HANDLERS OUTSIDE OF NORMAL WORKING HOURS (0800-1600 LOCAL M-F).

(5) SPLIT, CROATIA - BUS SERVICE SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM AT THIS LOCATION. THE FLEET LANDING IS SITUATED A SHORT DISTANCE

(400 METERS) FROM THE HISTORIC DOWN TOWN DISTRICT. PIER SPACE DOES NOT SUPPORT EXCESSIVE BUS TRAFFIC.

(6) AUGUSTA BAY (ABAY):

- a. THREE (3) TUGS ARE REQUIRED FOR AUGUSTA BAY PILOT-IN / PILOT-OUT.
- b. ONE ADDITIONAL 40-TON MOBILE CRANE REQUIRED FOR REFUELING AT NATO PIER.
- c. ONE ADDITIONAL 8-TON FORKLIFT REQUIRED FOR REFUELING AT NATO PIER.

(7) GAETA:

a. REQUIRES TWO (2) PILOTS FOR ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE.

b. LINE BOAT IS REQUIRED FOR MOORING DUE TO PIER CONFIGURATION.

c. ONE BARGE WITH CRANE (INSERT SIZE 15, 40 OR 75 TON) IS AUTHORIZED FOR DURATION OF PVST DUE TO CONFIGURATION OF THE PIER.

d. ADD ELIN AV4L TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO OPEN AND CLOSE PORT SECURITY BARRIERS.

(8) DJIBOUTI:

- a. FOUR (4) FENDERS ARE REQUIRED PER DJIBOUTI REGULATION.

b. LINE BOAT IS REQUIRED FOR MOORING DUE TO PIER CONFIGURATION.

c. ADD ONE (1) PORTABLE LIGHTING CART, ONE (1) PORTABLE TOILET, AND 20 METERS JERSEY BARRIERS TO SUPPORT ECP WATCHSTANDERS ON THE PIER DURING EACH PORT VISIT.

d. CHT SERVICE AVAILABLE ONLY VIA ROUTED WAIVER REQUEST THROUGH PORT OPS.

e. WIFI SERVICE IS NOT AVAILABLE.

f. THE FOLLOWING SERVICES ARE NOT AVAILABLE WHILE MOORED AT

DOT REFUELING PIER: CHT/POTABLE WATER/ TRASH/ BROW AND BROW STAND.

g. DUE TO LIMITED SERVICES AVAILABLE, PVSTS LONGER THAN

24HRS ARE NOT RECOMMENDED ESPECIALLY FOR DDG/CG OR SHIPS

WITH LIMITED CAPACITY TO HOLD CHT ONBOARD FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME.

(9) LOCHSTRIVEN: LINE BOAT IS REQUIRED FOR MOORING DUE TO PIER CONFIGURATION.

(10) BATUMI: PEDESTRIAN FENCING REQUIRED WHEN BERTHED AT DOWNTOWN FERRY TERMINAL.

7th Fleet:

1. **BOTTLED WATER** - SHIPS ARE PREAUTHORIZED TO ORDER BOTTLED DRINKING WATER FOR THE CREW IN INDIAN, INDONESIAN, OR MARSHAL ISLANDS (MAJURO) PORTS AS FRESH WATER HAS BEEN DEEMED UNFIT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION. INPUT BOTTLED WATER REQUIREMENTS PARA MIKE.
2. **VEHICLES** - ALL VEHICLES FOR PERSONNEL TRANSPORT COME WITH DRIVERS. NO SHIP'S FORCE PERSONNEL ALLOWED TO DRIVE WHILE IN 7TH FLT AOR.

3. **HAZMAT OFFLOAD** – HAZMAT OFFLOAD AND DISPOSAL IS ONLY AUTHORIZED WHEN VISITING JAPAN (YOKOSUKA, SASEBO, AND WHITE BEACH), SINGAPORE OR GUAM. SHIPS SHOULD COORDINATE EXCESS OFFLOAD DURING RAS WITH CLF UNITS.

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