Implications of Outbound Investment Controls
Abstract
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee: Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am the president and CEO of RAND, a nonprofit and nonpartisan research organization. Before RAND, I served on the National Security Council and in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as a commissioner on the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, as assistant director of national intelligence, and as director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, which develops advanced technologies for the U.S. intelligence community. For the past 75 years, RAND researchers have conducted research in support of U.S. national security, and we currently manage four federally funded research and development centers for the federal government: one for the Department of Homeland Security and three for the Department of Defense. RAND researchers have analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of outbound investment controls as a feature of U.S. industrial strategy.3 That analysis is not available to the general public, but I am happy to arrange a briefing from the research team to this committee. My testimony today is based in part on that analysis and based in part on my work on this topic for several years prior to my joining RAND. Currently, investments by U.S. entities in foreign technology firms based in or owned by strategic competitors are essentially unlimited unless the foreign firm is sanctioned. Restricting such investments would have several costs and benefits.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 17, 2024
- Accession Number
- AD1219102
Entities
People
- Jason Matheny
Organizations
- RAND Corporation