Protecting Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict: Don't Count on Deterrence
Abstract
Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is the backbone of the United States nuclear deterrence strategy, ensuring that nuclear weapons are always available for use by the president and never by an unauthorized actor. Since the late days of the Cold War, NC3 has faced a growing array of non-kinetic threats, which fall below the traditional threshold of armed conflict. Malicious non-kinetic activity continues to intensify in potency and prominence, creating fear among U.S. leaders that an adversary could utilize means short of war to significantly compromise NC3 systems and, by extension, the United States nuclear deterrent. Responding to such concern, this paper argues that deterrence is an ill-suited strategy for managing non-kinetic threats to NC3. Rather than hoping for deterrent protection that may never materialize, the United States should take a proactive approach by 1) creating and implementing survivability and resilience standards to counteract the threat of non-kinetic attack at every stage of subsystem life-cycles and 2) actively searching for vulnerabilities in NC3 subsystems, subjecting them to constant testing, red-teaming, and reassessment. By openly assuming that the adversary can and will compromise NC3 below the threshold of armed conflict, the United States does not forego the opportunity to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Through embracing an emphasis on resilience, the United States can demonstrate its ability to actively respond to below-the threshold attacks on NC3, overall providing for a nuclear deterrent that is more credible in the eyes of adversaries and allies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1221070
Entities
People
- Kayla T. Matteucci
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses