From Trust to Treachery: Unraveling Soviet Intelligence Tactics in the 1920S and 1930S
Abstract
This thesis examines why the Soviet Union's intelligence services, in its efforts to neutralize the White Russian movement, chose strategic deception as its primary tactic in the 1920s and political violence in the1930s. The research effort uses variables common to criminal investigations (victim, means, motive, and opportunity) as a framework to evaluate the decisions made by Soviet intelligence and political leaders in their respective decades. The thesis uses Soviet intelligence operations drawn from each decade as case studies to further refine the comparison. The exercise yields two conclusions. First, the steady consolidation of White Russian leadership after the Russian Civil War was a significant factor in the Soviet choice of political violence in the 1930s. Second, the increase in Soviet intelligence capacity for foreign operations was another significant factor in the move toward political violence. In contrast, Soviet motivations in attacking the White Russians, and the opportunity to do so, did not change significantly from the 1920s to 1930s, and thus did not impact Soviet decision-making. The research result is a refined understanding of how Soviet intelligence adapted to different foreign threats in the interwar period, and the refinement of a research tool to apply to Soviet and Russian intelligence operations up to the present, and those of services trained by the Soviets.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2023
- Accession Number
- AD1224875
Entities
People
- Daniel J. Atherton
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School