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The Impact of U.S. Security Partnerships on Democracy and Governance in Africa

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between U.S. security partnerships and democracy and governance trends in Africa from 2005 to 2020. Overall, our findings are mixed in that there is either no relationship or a weak negative relationship between U.S. security cooperative activities and democratic quality in Africa. When looking closely at the potential mechanisms that drive this relationship, we find that U.S. military assistance can have a positive impact on governance; however, the impact on accountability and transparency are negatively affected by over-militarization of assistance. Specifically, as the proportion of U.S.-provided military assistance relative to the overall amount of development assistance increases, the negative impact of assistance on accountability indicators increases significantly. To tease this out further, we juxtapose Chad's emergence as a central partner in countering violent extremism in the Sahel with its democratic stagnation and failures. The paper shows that as U.S. security assistance increased relative to the overall amount of development assistance provided to Chad, democratic indicators deteriorated, or in some cases stagnated. Our findings suggest that a whole-of-government approach to security assistance that balances a country's security needs with support to grow its democratic institutions may help mitigate some of the negative effects of security cooperation.

1. Introduction

Democratic rule, or rule by the people, is a relatively recent invention. Humanity has much more often been subjected to various forms of non-democratic governments, such as monarchy and other forms of non-hereditary dictatorship, rather than afforded the rights and privileges that come with being a democratic citizen.¹ Modern democratic rule emerged in the 1700s in direct response to autocratic overreach. Since the 18th century, democratization has tended to occur in phases, influenced by both domestic and international factors.

In 1991, Samuel Huntington argued that democracy had thus far occurred in three “waves”; the first wave beginning in the 1820s and lasting for nearly a decade; the second wave beginning at the end of World War II; and the third wave beginning with the fall of the Portuguese dictator Salazar in 1974 and culminating in the demise of the Soviet Union.² As a result of the first wave, some 29 countries adopted democracy. After the second wave, by 1962, 36 countries were considered democratic. And after the third wave, in which countries in southern Europe, Latin America, and Africa transitioned in rapid succession over the course of two decades in the 1970s and 1980s, almost 60 countries in total were democracies. In 2021, depending on how you define and measure democracy, an estimated 92 countries, out of 178, are considered democratic. However, this figure has been slowly declining over the past decade.³

In addition to the temporal pattern of democracy’s spread, researchers have observed spatial patterns as regions and sub-regions of the world have tended to adopt democratic governance practices in groups. This is due to a confluence of international and domestic factors. The most recent third wave of democracy in Africa, for example, came about as the result of changing international norms in support of democracy and increasing domestic pressures. Against the backdrop of the fall of the Soviet Union, Africa’s first democratic transitions, which took place in Togo and Benin, resulted from national conferences that drew together civil society organizations that criticized the authoritarianism, human rights abuses, and poor economic policies of their states.⁴

While the waves’ crests are impressive, each of the three waves identified above has also seen a trough or reverse wave in the decades afterward. Most recently, several researchers have noted a global democratic recession, beginning around 2015.⁵ Beyond a broad consensus that countries democratize in groups, the driving cause of both the waves and reverse waves is still very much up for debate.

Many possible reasons have been put forward to explain why a number of countries from a variety of different regions have experienced a recent contraction in democracy—the fall of the Soviet Union, the ascendancy of the Chinese model of development, and the retreat of the United States as a global democracy promoter. From the domestic perspective, researchers have argued that populism and nativist appeals are bringing “strong men” to power through elections, and once in power, they then whittle away at democratic institutions.⁶

One salient argument, advanced by Larry Diamond (2020), identifies strategic decisions and partnerships the United States has made as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as a major contributing factor to democratic backsliding. Diamond argues that the United States has prioritized support in the GWOT, which in turn has enabled autocratic rulers to maintain and deepen control. At least three possible mechanisms that account for this relationship between the GWOT and the state of democracy today center on the impact that security cooperation could have on domestic outcomes. Security assistance and the training of military forces from external forces could be used for state repression to tamp down domestic demands for democracy. Alternatively, security assistance frees up government spending which can be used for clientelistic or other corrupt purposes and can enable governments to maintain power by securing the support of a select segment of the population, namely elites. Finally, security assistance, as an external source of revenue and materiel support, can render governments unaccountable to popular demands and pressures.

This paper examines the relationship between the United States’ security policies from the mid-2000s through 2020—the height of GWOT support to foreign partners—and Africa’s democratic indicators. Why do we examine Africa in particular? The third wave of democracy affected much of Africa in a relatively short amount of time. During the 1990s, roughly 75% of African countries began to transition to some form of democratic rule. There has been also both a massive uptick in security assistance and a proliferation of terrorist threats in the 2010s. Thus, there are a number of relatively new democracies in Africa, many with arguably shallow roots, that have been affected by the GWOT. We investigated the relationship of U.S. security cooperation on key indicators of democratization in Africa between 2005 and 2020, a timeframe encompassing the rise of violent extremist movements (2006); the creation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (2007); and new and persistent challenges to democratic governance, including electoral violence, the rise in social and protest movements, the decline in political rights and civil liberties, and the gap between demand and supply of democracy in Africa.

Analyzing Chad’s trajectory since its 1993 national conference, meant to introduce democracy to the country, shows the complex relationship between external donors’ security priorities, aid dependency, and the failure of democratic progress. Chad’s growing

importance to the United States' effort to stem the spread of violent extremism in the Sahel and West Africa, the increased reliance of the Chadian government on military assistance from the United States and other international donors, and the persistent repression of Chad's civil society organizations has muted opposition voices and facilitated authoritarianism. External partners' lack of attention to Chad's governance failures has exacerbated the Chadian government's authoritarian tendencies.

We acknowledge that U.S. security assistance may have multiple goals—which may not fully align with democratic progress. The objective with this study is to analyze the relationship of U.S. security assistance on democratic trends, regardless of other goals. Our findings, which suggest a weak, negative relationship between U.S. security cooperation and Africa's democratic indicators, are not sufficiently robust to demonstrate causation. Rather, additional analyses, encompassing a broader array of variables and more diverse case studies, are needed. However, we recognize that the United States is not the only actor—or even the most influential actor in many cases—providing significant assistance to African nations.

Nevertheless, the United States has been a staunch supporter, at least rhetorically, of the global spread of democracy as a fundamental part of its foreign policy for decades because of its value-laden commitment to promoting freedom; as a bulwark against communism during the Cold War; and under the belief (founded or not) in democratic peace theory, or the notion that democracies don't go to war with one another.

2. U.S. Security Partnerships in Africa

The United States faces a constellation of indirect security threats in Africa such as piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Somalia and terrorist activity in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin region, and the Horn of Africa. Over the past two decades, the United States has dramatically increased its security cooperation to African partners. Since 2001, the United States has provided at least \$5 billion in security assistance to a variety of African partners to help address a variety of security threats.⁷ Between 2009 and 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) increased spending to the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) by an estimated 650%, notifying Congress of more than \$400 million in Title 10 spending—security cooperation programs—in fiscal year 2016 (FY16), near the peak of security assistance to Africa.⁸ For FY21, the United States budgeted an estimated \$227 million for security cooperation programs and activities in AFRICOM’s AOR.⁹

Security assistance generally refers to training programs and equipment provided to a partner’s military forces as authorized by U.S. statutes; however, security cooperation entails much more than just assistance. The DoD defines security cooperation as:

[a]ll...interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations.¹⁰

Security cooperation includes joint exercises, military basing and overflight agreements, and assist and accompany missions, as well as programs to build partner capacity and strengthen defense institutions.

The U.S. government engages with African countries using various types of security cooperation for multiple reasons, not all of which are purely operational. Some assistance is motivated by the need for access and influence while some is directly related to improved security outcomes. Political motivations include access for basing or operating; support for regional operations and peacekeeping; projecting power against global rivals; and support in international disputes. Defense motivations include building partner capacity and capability to counter threats that may eventually reach the United States. More specifically, the intended operational outputs of U.S. security assistance to partner nations include increased security force capabilities and capacity, increased respect for human rights by security forces, strengthened defense institutions, and increased military professionalism. In the long term, strategic outcomes of security assistance include decreased trafficking and

increased interdictions; decreased terrorist group strength, support, and attacks; and increased perception of individual security of citizens in partner nations.

To fully measure security cooperation, it is important to look at a variety of factors in addition to the monetary value of security assistance provided to a partner. Additionally, due to the imprecise nature of security assistance data, especially DoD-reported data,¹¹ it is preferable to include data from diverse sources for a variety of indicators to better estimate the full impact of U.S. security cooperation.¹² We specifically collected data on different aspects of the security relationship between the United States and partner countries as a way of triangulating the impact and best representing the intensity of U.S. interest in a given country. We collected data on four different annual indicators that reflect U.S. security interests in a partner country: posture statement mentions; number of DoD personnel deployed in a country; the number of foreign troops trained; and amount of military assistance disbursed. Each indicator and its incidence in Africa is discussed in depth below. Most data are available beginning in the mid-2000s. We analyzed data from 2009 through 2020, or when the most recent data are available, for a total of 53 African countries.¹³ These years cover two different administrations (Barack H. Obama and Donald J. Trump), one Democrat and one Republican, and five different combatant commanders.

A. Posture Statement Mentions

Posture statement mentions can represent DoD interest in specific African countries.¹⁴ There is an annual congressional requirement that the commander of the geographic combatant command (GCC) testify before Congress as to GCC interests and activities in their AOR. Prior to the formal standup of AFRICOM in October 2008, the Commander for U.S. European Command (EUCOM) testified as it was then responsible for Europe and Africa. We tracked how many times each African country was mentioned in the annual posture statement reflecting AFRICOM priorities. Table 1 provides an overview of how frequently African countries are typically mentioned and a listing of those most often mentioned. In any given year, on average, between 50% and 75% of countries in Africa are mentioned at least once in the statement, and many countries are mentioned more than once. We believe that the more times a country is mentioned, the more interest and, potentially attention, the Command is paying to it, thus these countries could be more impacted by U.S. security cooperation.

Looking at the distribution of countries that are mentioned, it appears that AFRICOM Commanders made efforts to discuss both the challenges and potential opportunities that they faced in Africa. While many (but not all) countries with frequent mentions are experiencing conflict (Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Mali), posture statements also included many references to significant security partners (Ghana, Senegal, Botswana) and important regional hegemons (South Africa).

Table 1. U.S. Africa Command Posture Statements, 2009 to 2020

Year	Commander	Percent of African Countries Mentioned (number)¹⁵	Top Mentions^a
2009	General William E. “Kip” Ward	79% (42)	Ghana (15); Liberia (13); Senegal (13); Morocco (10); South Africa (9)
2010	Gen. Ward	79% (42)	Somalia (16); Uganda (15); Kenya (11); Liberia (11); Morocco (11)
2011	General Carter F. Ham	100% (53)	Somalia (14); Liberia (12); Uganda (10); Djibouti (7); Nigeria (7)
2012	Gen. Ham	62% (33)	Somalia (18); Nigeria (11); Libya (10); South Sudan (7); Algeria (5); Kenya (5)
2013	Gen. Ham	53% (28)	Mali (15); Somalia (13); Libya (9); Nigeria (9); Liberia (5); Senegal (5); Tunisia (5)
2014	General David M. Rodriguez	26% (14)	Somalia (12); Libya (6); Mali (6); Nigeria (4); Tunisia (4)
2015	Gen. Rodriguez	47% (25)	Libya (24); Somalia (21); Nigeria (10); Liberia (9); Central African Republic (8)
2016	Gen. Rodriguez	45% (14)	Somalia (17); Libya (16); Nigeria (13); Tunisia (10); Mali (7)
2017	General Thomas D. Waldhauser	41% (12)	Libya (20); Somalia (18); Tunisia (13); Nigeria (11); Mali (8)
2018	Gen. Waldhauser	45% (14)	Somalia (19); Niger (18); Libya (15) Nigeria (12); Chad (8); Tunisia (8)
2019	Gen. Waldhauser	66% (35)	Libya (35); Somalia (35); Djibouti (22); Nigeria (16); Niger (16)
2020	General Stephen J. Townshend	40% (21)	Somalia (15); Libya (7); Kenya (4); Mozambique (4); South Africa (4)

^a The column lists the top 5; in case of a tie, all countries are mentioned.

B. DoD Deployments¹⁶

The DoD reports the number of military and civilian personnel permanently assigned duty by country and makes these data publicly available. In Africa, the United States has only one permanent base, Camp Lemonier in Djibouti; two Forward Operating Sites; 13

Cooperative Security Locations; and 12 Contingency Locations in countries including Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Uganda, and Kenya.¹⁷ Compared to other regions, the U.S. government has a small footprint in Africa. On average, there were about 2,100 active duty military Service members deployed to Africa in 2010.¹⁸ This figure increased steadily to more than 6,400 troops deployed in 2017 and then precipitously declined to less than 2,000 in 2018, and less than 1,000 troops in 2019 and 2020. With between 22,000 and 48,000 overseas deployments annually, the number of troops stationed in Africa at any given time over the past 11 years has never been greater than 2.3% of all deployments.¹⁹ Countries with the largest number of U.S. troops include Niger (554 in 2017); Somalia (289 in 2017); Ethiopia (143 troops in 2011); Kenya (141 troops in 2012); Tunisia (106 in 2017); and Libya (105 in 2013). Table 2 and Figure 1 provide continental trends from 2009 to 2020.

Table 2. DoD Troops Deployed in Africa

Year	Number of Troops in AFRICOM's AOR	Percent of Global Deployments in Africa	Top 3 Countries (number of troops in parentheses)
2009	2215	0.46	Djibouti (1798); South Africa (108); Kenya (73)
2010	2171	0.48	Djibouti (1791); South Africa (134)
2011	3007	0.67	Djibouti (2215); Somalia (182); Ethiopia (143)
2012	3705	1.00	Djibouti (2764); Somalia (174); Kenya (141)
2013	3878	1.15	Djibouti (2623); Somalia (314); Kenya (135)
2014	3907	1.27	Djibouti (2827); Niger (120); Kenya (118)
2015	4928	1.74	Djibouti (3643); Somalia (237); Niger (157)
2016	4052	1.48	Djibouti (3406); Somalia (107); Uganda (84)
2017	6463	2.22	Djibouti (4715); Niger (554); Somalia (289)
2018	1931	0.85	Djibouti (1346); Somalia (60);

Year	Number of Troops in AFRICOM's AOR	Percent of Global Deployments in Africa	Top 3 Countries (number of troops in parentheses)
2019	665	0.29	Kenya (49) Djibouti (91); Somalia (85); South Africa (49)
2020	846	0.38	Djibouti (179); Somalia (73); Kenya (55)

C. Number of Foreign Military Personnel Trained

The Department of State reports to Congress the number of foreign military personnel trained by the United States on an annual basis.²⁰ This report covers several programs funded by both the Department of State and DoD including: Foreign Military Financing; International Military Education and Training; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, Anti- terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance; Global Peace Operations Initiative; Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism; the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership; the Global Security Contingency Fund; Section 333 Building Partner Capacity; Humanitarian Assistance; Regional Defense Combatting Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program; and Professional Military Education exchanges. Each report includes the total number of students trained, the number of courses provided, the relevant program, and the estimated dollar value of training.




Figure 1. Number of African Military Personnel Trained through U.S. Programming, FY09–18

Figure 1 displays the total number of African troops reported trained in the State Department's annual Foreign Military Training Report from 2009 to 2018.²¹ This number ranges from a low of 22,071 in 2014 to a high of 41,407 in 2015, with an average of roughly 32,000 African troops trained per year. For comparison, in FY18, the United States trained a total of 62,700 foreign military personnel worldwide, thus African countries comprise a significant portion of this training. Some countries receive a lot of training and some very little. Annually, the United States trains fewer than 10 troops from countries like Central African Republic, Guinea, Namibia, Madagascar, South Sudan, and Sudan. Other countries, such as Burundi, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda receive substantially more training. For example, the United States trained more than 9,000 Nigerian troops and more than 8,500 Ugandan troops in 2009 and 2017, respectively. The vast majority of this training is to support peacekeeping operations. Other topics include English language training and various counterterrorism and maritime security special topics.

Associated costs for these trainings range from just a few thousand to millions of dollars. The costs to some countries are small, especially relative to the number of troops trained. This could mean that the United States convened a training activity inside the country for a large number of personnel or that the training was a single day event. Conversely, some trainings, such as those provided as part of Professional Military Education, could be years-long engagements.

D. Military Assistance

This measure captures training and equipment provided by the United States to partner countries. Both the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) maintain online databases of assistance. These two sources present data in different ways and cover different time periods. The USAID version breaks down assistance into two categories: economic and military. Figure 2 details the amount of military assistance reported as disbursed to African countries annually from 2009 to 2020.²² These data reportedly include both State Department- and DoD-funded programs, but there are many suspected gaps.




Figure 2. Military Assistance to African Countries, 2009–2019

The United States provides hundreds of millions in military assistance to African countries and this amount has been increasing since the late 2000s. In 2009, the U.S. provided roughly \$265 million in military assistance to African countries; in 2019, this number had more than doubled to \$627 million. Again, there is wide variation in the amount of assistance provided both from year to year and across countries. Some countries receive little to no military assistance (Equatorial Guinea), while others are the recipients of significant assistance. Kenya, Uganda, Chad, Niger, and Tunisia, for example, have very large programs that amount to tens of millions in military assistance per year.

When looking across the different aspects of security cooperation, some trends emerge. Because all of these are different aspects of security cooperation, we find, not surprisingly, that many of these measures are loosely correlated. This could reflect the multiplicity of actors responsible for making decisions about who the United States should partner with in security matters and how. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, AFRICOM, the State Department, and at times the National Security Council all have different roles to play in partnership decisions. Table 3 provides correlation statistics for key independent variables. Posture statements are positively related to the DoD’s footprint, number of foreign military personnel trained, and military assistance totals, but the magnitude and significance does vary and is relatively small. The only negative relationship is that between the number of African military troops trained per year and the number of DoD personnel deployed in Africa, but again, the relationship is very weak. The strongest relationship is between posture statement mentions and total military assistance, perhaps reflecting that those countries the AFRICOM commander mentions most frequently in front of Congress are the countries in which the United States has a strong investment. DoD deployments are generally not strongly related to any of the other

aspects of security cooperation. This may be because the number of U.S. personnel deployed is so small that it does not represent any genuine priorities. This may also reflect AFRICOM’s “by, with, and through” approach to African conflicts, in which the United States prefers to provide support to partner militaries as opposed to directly intervening.²³

Table 3. Correlation Coefficients for Key Independent Variables

	AFRICOM Posture Statement Mentions	DoD Troops Deployed in Africa	African Foreign Military Troops Trained	Amount of U.S. Military Assistance Disbursed
AFRICOM Posture Statement Mentions	r=1.0	--	--	--
DoD Troops Deployed to Africa	r=0.09	r=1.0	--	--
African Foreign Military Troops Trained	r=.13	r=-.03	r=1.0	--
Amount of U.S. Military Assistance Disbursed	r=.39	r=0.30	r=0.08	r=1.0

3. U.S. Security Cooperation and Democracy Trends in Africa

Our multivariate regression analysis examined the relationship between U.S. security cooperation and democracy and governance. Because each of the four security cooperation variables is attempting to capture a different aspect of the relationship between the United States and a partner nation, we modeled each relationship separately using the appropriate control variables and model structure. Additionally, we used multiple measures of democracy and governance both as a robustness check to ensure that we fully captured what democracy entails and to help identify what aspect(s) of democracy security cooperation could be affecting. Specifically, we measured democracy and governance with data on the freeness and fairness of elections; respect for political rights and civil liberties; and the quality of governance. Finally, although the time lags we analyzed suggest a causal relationship, we are mindful that these are not robust enough to demonstrate causation and that we are reporting on associations that could potentially be explained by other variables.

To measure the extent that elections are free, fair, and produce accountable governments, we used data from the Electoral Democracy Index. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents a country where electoral democracy is not achieved and 1 represents a county where democracy is fully achieved.²⁴ For this indicator, the focus is on the responsiveness of the government to citizens through electoral mechanisms. While freedom is considered to some extent, factors like freedom of media and freedom of expression are linked more to electoral outcomes than other normative conceptions of liberal democracy.

We used data from Freedom House, a non-profit organization that receives much of its funding from the U.S. government. Freedom House's annual *Freedom in the World* report provides a numeric score for more than 200 countries and territories in the world. The score is the product of an analysis of 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators as assessed by a team of country experts.²⁵ Countries with lower scores (1-2.5) are considered Free; countries with moderate scores (3-5.0) are considered Partly Free; countries with the highest scores (5.5-7.0) are considered Not Free.²⁶

Finally, we included data from the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which provides an annual rating of the overall quality of a country's governance based on more than 100 factors broken down into 4 categories: security and rule of law; participation, rights, and inclusion; foundations for economic opportunity; and human

development. Of most relevance to this study, we examined sub-categories of data from IIAG on accountability and transparency, and efforts to fight corruption. Scores range from 0, indicating no governance capacity, to 100, representing high quality of governance.

Using different measures of democracy and governance helps us to get some purchase on the specific causal mechanisms that could be driving the relationship between security cooperation and democratic development. As with the descriptive analysis, our data are from 2009 to 2020 and cover 53 countries in Africa, for a total of more than 500 observations. Table 4 reports the summary results of all our models. Appendix A has more detailed results of our statistical analysis. We discuss each in turn below. We note that the relationships show some correlation, but do not show a causative relationship.

Table 4. Summary of Findings (Relationship between key variables in top row and democratization-related indices in left column)

	Posture Statement Mentions	DoD Personnel Deployments	Foreign Troops Trained	U. S. Military Assistance
Electoral Democracy Index	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive, short term impact • No impact in the medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not significant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No impact in the short term • Negative impact in the medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not significant
Freedom House	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive, short term impact • No impact in the medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negative impact, short and medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No impact in the short term • Negative impact in the medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not significant
Ibrahim Index of African Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negative impact, short and medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negative impact, short and medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No impact in the short term • Negative impact in the medium term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive overall impact on accountability and transparency • Negative impact as portion of overall assistance increases

A. Posture Statement Mentions

AFRICOM's annual posture statement to Congress outlines Africa's strategic environment and U.S. interests and objectives in Africa. Given that AFRICOM's posture statements are written and delivered by commanders who change every 3 years and whose speaking styles vary greatly, we normalized this variable to a fixed range (0-1) in an effort to minimize year-to-year variation. Because we are attempting to estimate level of democracy, we included economic variables that are traditionally believed to impact level of democracy as controls: gross domestic product per capita (logged due to the skewness of the data) and percentage of natural resources that comprise a government's income (also logged due to the skewness of the data). Using data from the Peace Research Institute Oslo, we also controlled for the presence of conflict in a country using a binary measure. Finally, because we believe that the impact of security cooperation on a country's quality of democracy is not immediate, we lagged our key independent variables by 1, 2, and 3 years. Our results on the relationship between posture statements and democracy and governance levels in Africa are inconclusive. Posture statements are positively related to a country's future level of democracy for a very short time, but this relationship does not last beyond a year or so (one lag). This is also true for the Electoral Democracy Index. On the other hand, there appears to be a persistently enduring negative relationship between posture statement mentions and IIAG scores. Countries that are more frequently mentioned in posture statements have lower governance scores for several years. Much like the descriptive analysis above, we believe it reflects that posture statements mention conflicts and security challenges, as well as highlighting African partners who are helping support AFRICOM's missions and U.S. security objectives.

B. DoD Troops Deployed

The number of DoD personnel deployed overseas in a given country is another measure intended to capture the broader definition of security cooperation. Troops and other non-military personnel may be deployed for multiple purposes: exercises, training, operations, or force projection, for example. Besides the sole U.S. military base in Africa, Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, deployments in Africa are relatively small in number, generally ranging from 0 to 553. The range for personnel deployed in Camp Lemonier is more substantial, from a low of 91 in 2019 to a high of 4,715 in 2017. Because Djibouti is such an outlier, we omitted it from this analysis. The relationship between DoD troops deployed and electoral democracy is generally insignificant, although there is some evidence that DoD troops are negatively correlated with protections for political rights and civil liberties and governance outcomes.

C. Foreign Military Personnel Trained

To measure the impact of military personnel training we used both the number of foreign personnel trained and the estimated cost of the training. While the number of foreign military personnel the United States trains per year, either directly or indirectly, appears to have no relationship to democratic quality in the immediate period after training occurs, there does appear to be a negative relationship in the medium term. For all three democracy and governance measures, the number of foreign military personnel trained is negatively related to the quality of democracy about 3 years after the training, although the coefficients are small. The total estimated financial cost of the training is not related to democracy quality in the short or medium term.

Several researchers have found a link between U.S. military training and coup attempts and coup successes. For example, Savage and Caverley (2017) argue that the increased professionalism that military training provides to partner nations results in increased ‘human capital’ that can then increase the power and capabilities of the military relative to the government or regime in power. While this is not the thrust of our analysis, it may be the case that increased military training plays a role in destabilizing regimes.

D. Military Assistance

Standard regression analysis is inappropriate for measuring the impact of military assistance because the decision to provide military assistance to a given country is not random, but rather heavily influenced by a country’s need (i.e., the security situation), and the security situation may, in turn, impact a country’s democratic quality. This is much more the case than our other measures of security partnership. Posture statement mentions are based on both the strength and quality of partnerships and the urgency of the situation. Foreign military training decisions, for example, are often more political and based on longer-term horizons. Most every African military receives training from the United States in some form or fashion and decisions on who to train may be made to reward strong partners or to improve a relationship. DoD personnel deployments, with the exception of those to Camp Lemonier, are often times in support of training programs.

We addressed the non-randomness of the amount of security assistance provided to a country by using a Heckman Selection model to control the selection bias of this key independent variable and to help isolate its impact on democracy and governance.²⁷ We included both the total amount of assistance provided and the percent of military assistance that comprised overall U.S. annual assistance (humanitarian assistance, development assistance, and democracy support). The relationship between democracy and our final measurement of security cooperation, the annual amount of military assistance reported by the State Department, is generally not statistically significant across our different measures of democracy and across multiple lags.

IIAG is an additive index and can be broken into its unique subcategories of governance, one of which is accountability and transparency, a key pathway or mechanism that could connect military assistance to democratic backsliding. Unpacking the components of governance, we found that U.S. military assistance is positively related to accountability and transparency, but the impact of the percentage of military assistance as a proportion of overall assistance is negative. In other words, the higher the proportion of military assistance relative to other types of assistance, the more negative the impact of security assistance on accountability and transparency indicators. This relationship holds for multiple (3–4 year) lags. Overmilitarized relationships may be counter-productive to long-term U.S. security *and* democracy goals in Africa.

In sum, the scorecard with respect to the impact of U.S. security cooperation on democratic trends in Africa is mixed, but the bulk of the evidence suggests a weak negative relationship. One potential avenue for addressing the negative impact of security partnerships—focusing on accountability and transparency of governance—has been identified. Furthermore, there is evidence that overmilitarized relationships are specifically problematic. To better assess if and how this is the case, we examined the U.S. security partnership with Chad in more depth. We did not assume that impacting democratic trends stood as an objective of U.S. engagement with Chad. Instead, we reviewed, independently of the actual goal of the U.S.’ assistance programs to Chad, whether and how democratic trends are impacted. We paid particular attention to the ways in which the United States could potentially exert its influence to impact democracy and governance. In Chad’s case, we focused on the accountability practices around equipment for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

4. Does U.S. Security Assistance to Chad Impede Democratic Progress?

Since the 2012 coup d'état in Mali, which precipitated the advance of violent extremist groups within the country—endangering not only its stability, but the region as well—the United States and other international partners have increased military assistance to governments in the Sahel. The violent extremist threat in the Sahel merged with the spread of Boko Haram's reach in the Lake Chad Basin heightens concerns of regional stability and national security beyond Africa's borders. In both the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Chad has played an important role; notably, it serves as the headquarters for the French Operation Barkhane and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Equally important, Chad contributes approximately 1,454 troops to United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); 1,000–1,500 troops to MNJTF; and 500 troops to the Group of Five (G5) Sahel Joint Force. Anecdotally, Chadian forces have cultivated a reputation as the most effective forces in the region.²⁸

In contrast to its importance to the security strategy for the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, many criticize Chad's regime for its domestic policies. Chad's government has failed to democratize, practice good governance, or respect human rights. In April 1993, Chad's former long-serving president, Idriss Déby Itno, who took power in a coup d'état in 1990, permitted the first multi-party presidential and legislative elections in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Déby and his party, the *Mouvement Patriotique du Salut* (Patriotic Movement for Salvation, MPS), won those polls, and each election since 1996, in largely unfair electoral environments. Moreover, while presidential elections have taken place regularly, legislative elections have not been held since 2011.²⁹ Furthermore, state security forces routinely repress opposition parties and their supporters, the government allows few civil liberties, and human rights are poorly respected.³⁰

Following Déby's death in April 2021, his son Mahamat Idriss Déby was appointed president, in contravention of the Chadian constitution—a sign that adherence to the rule of law and good governance will remain elusive. In fact, the international community did not issue any significant criticisms of the decision taken by the de facto government, the Transitional Military Council, to suspend the constitution and dissolve parliament in the wake of Idriss Déby's death. Could the outcome have been different? Does the United States, in particular, hold significant leverage over Chad to influence democratization? According to scholars, Western leverage and substantial links with Western donors can provide pressure for democratization.³¹ This case study examines the impact of U.S.

humanitarian, development, governance, and security assistance to Chad, on the country's democratization. It focuses on the mutual dependency of the United States, other prominent international actors, and Chad in advancing their national security objectives, and the challenges such a relationship presents to democratization.

A. Democracy and Governance in Chad

Chad persistently performs poorly on all indicators of democratic governance: electoral governance; political rights and civil liberties; and the IIAG's measures of rule of law, security and safety, accountability and transparency, and anti-corruption. From 2005 to 2020, Chad has scored on average 0.27 on the Electoral Democracy Index, indicative of Chad's struggle to obtain representative government through elections.³² According to the Freedom House measure of political rights and civil liberties, Chad is 'not free,' an assessment that has remained unchanged since Freedom House began publishing its annual dataset in 1973. Finally, Chad's average score of 32/100 by IIAG is well below the continental average score of 48/100 (from 2010 to 2019).³³ Indeed, reports on human rights in Chad by the U.S. State Department document a pattern of pervasive and far reaching abuses, including extrajudicial, unlawful, or arbitrary killing; inhumane prisoner conditions; biased judiciary; state repression against citizens; barriers to political participation; and harassment of political opponents.³⁴ Freedom of speech is widely restricted and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) require government permission, which is infrequently granted.³⁵

Rather than democratic advancement, Déby was more concerned with regime stability and continuity. Between 2011 and 2016, political reforms seemed possible, as the political opposition gained concessions to the liberalize the electoral process. However, the government's harsh response to popular protests in 2016—following the involvement of a military officer in a rape case, demonstrations against Déby's multiple terms in office, and protests arising from difficult economic conditions—dashed hopes that democratization could take root. Ahead of the 2016 elections, state security forces arrested protestors and leaders of the political opposition.³⁶ In 2018, Chad's parliament approved a new constitution that increased presidential powers, removed the prime minister's position, and allowed Déby to run for sixth and seventh terms, remaining in power theoretically until 2033 (even though term limits were reintroduced, they would not apply until after the 2021 elections).³⁷

Déby died unexpectedly in April 2021 during a battle against the *Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad* (Front for Change and Concord in Chad, FACT). The appointment of his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby, at the time a Lieutenant-General in the Chadian army, serves as the latest example of the Chadian regime prioritizing stability and continuity over democracy. While the Chadian constitution called for the organization of fresh elections within 90 days of a presidential vacancy and the appointment of the speaker

of parliament as interim president, the Transitional Military Council suspended constitutional provisions, imposed Déby's son as president, and instituted an 18-month transition period until elections.³⁸ Opposition groups and civil society organizations who took to the streets in protests, met the swift and harsh response of Chadian security officers, resulting in the deaths of nine people.³⁹

B. U.S. Development and Security Support to Chad

External partners can exert pressure to adopt democratic norms through the use of leverage and linkages with institutions.⁴⁰ Levitsky and Way (2015) refer to leverage as a function of an aid recipient's geographic size and military and economic strength; whether the state factors into a democratic donor's interests; and the access the aid recipient has to other sources of assistance from countries with less commitment to democracy. The greater the leverage of the donor countries, the higher the cost to the aid-receiving country for failing to abide by democratic norms and principles of good governance.⁴¹

In addition to leverage, linkages to institutions in democratic countries provide pressure to adopt democratic norms. Linkages refers to the "density of [a country's] ties to the United States, the EU [European Union], and Western-dominated multilateral institutions."⁴² In this regard, linkages could be through economic, geographic, social, communication, or transnational civil society.⁴³ Linkages enhance leverage, as they draw added attention in the West to abuses of human rights, corruption, violent elections, and other indicators of bad governance.⁴⁴


Tolsrup (2013) adds to the notion of leverage and linkage by drawing attention to a country's political and economic elites. Tolsrup classifies political and economic elites as gatekeepers: they determine how much access external actors have to domestic institutions and stakeholders to effect change. In other words, gatekeeper elites can moderate or enhance leverage and linkages, in turn determining if democracy can take root.⁴⁵

The United States has leverage over and linkages to Chad through its military and development assistance. Granted, these pale in comparison to the leverage and linkages possessed by France, Chad's former colonial power, which has maintained strong ties with Chad since independence in 1960.⁴⁶ Still, the level of U.S. military assistance, which has steadily increased in the last 8 years, plays an important role in Chad's domestic and regional goals, as well as the U.S. national security objectives, offering the possibility of using leverage to advance democratization.

1. Development Support

Chad ranks third poorest on the United Nation's (UN) Human Development Index, currently 187th out of 189 countries.⁴⁷ Various agencies of the U.S. government have provided development, humanitarian, and military assistance to Chad; from 2001 to 2019,

USAID, the Department of State, and DoD have provided 57%, 37%, and 5% of all assistance, respectively. Other agencies that have provided assistance to Chad from 2001 to 2019 include: the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and Interior; Peace Corps; and the U.S. African Development Foundation.⁴⁸




Source: USAID, Foreign Assistance Explorer

Figure 3. U.S. Government Assistance to Chad, 2001–2019

Overwhelmingly, funding from USAID and the Department of State has supported emergency responses to humanitarian crises, peaking in 2009 (Figure 3).⁴⁹ Notably, assistance to Chad for institutional reform and other factors supporting democracy has been low. Chad has needed humanitarian assistance for internal displacement caused by insurgencies, food insecurity, natural disasters, and conflicts and crises in neighboring states.⁵⁰ In 2009, when assistance peaked at \$214 million, Déby faced a serious challenge to his regime, as armed groups threatened the country’s stability, and conflict in the region intensified as the governments of Chad and Sudan accused one another of supporting opposition groups.⁵¹

The DoD has provided funding through the Global Training and Assistance program, Foreign Military Financing, and International Military Education and Training. The DoD comprises 6.2% of all assistance from 2005 to 2019, but it has grown rapidly in recent years; it rose steeply in 2013, the year following the coup d’état in Mali, which resulted in the spread of the violent extremist organization into broad areas of the country, threatening the Sahel. After peaking in 2014, DoD assistance to Chad began to rise again. In 2019, the DoD’s assistance of \$29.8 million stands as the highest since 2001.⁵² As a percentage of


total assistance to Chad, military assistance rose to an all-time high in 2019, at 25% (Figure 4).⁵³



Source: USAID, Foreign Aid Exporter

Figure 4. Percent Military Assistance out of Total U.S. Assistance to Chad, 2005-2019

U.S. security support to Chad can also be measured in the number of troops trained by the United States. Following the 2012 coup in Mali, U.S. training to Chadian military personnel increased (Figure 5); training of personnel increased steeply after 2016, reflecting perhaps the operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.




Source: “Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest.” U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/foreign-military-training-and-dod-engagement-activities-of-interest/>. For reports from 2000 to 2016 see: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm>. Data excludes Egypt

Figure 5. Chad: Number of Personnel Trained by the U.S., 2008–2018

Chad’s democratic indicators have been checkered over the last approximately 10 years. According to Freedom House data, while Chad has remained assessed as ‘not free,’ declines have occurred in both the categories of civil liberties and political rights, which Freedom House uses to rate countries and territories. In particular, since 2013, Chad has suffered backsliding in electoral processes (within political rights); rule of law (with civil liberties); and freedom of expression (within civil liberties). Notably, the declines occurred

around the time when Chad’s significance in combatting violent extremism in the Sahel ascended, accompanied by an increase in U.S. security assistance. Moreover, Chad has not improved in any areas since 2013.⁵⁴ See Figure 6, which notes a slight decline in scores around 2017.



Source: Freedom House, 2022

Figure 6. Chad: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2013 – 2021

A similarly uneven progress is evident in the indicators tracked by the IIAG. While on “Participation, Rights, and Inclusion,” Chad shows a slight improvement from 2010 to 2019 of 2.1 points (on a scale ranging from 0 or worst performing to 100 or best performing), there are several critical areas where democratic indicators have regressed. Table 5 lists a selection of those indicators.⁵⁵

Table 5. Change in Selected Governance Indicators in Chad: 2010–2019


Governance Indicators	Change: 2010–2019
Absence of Harassment of Civil Society	-26.8
Freedom of Association	-25
Absence of Media Censorship	-25
Absence of Online Censorship	-25
Promotion of Socioeconomic Integration of Youth	-25
Media Impartiality	-24.3
Media Freedom	-17.3
Absence of Media Censorship	-25
Media Impartiality	-24.3
Absence of Harassment of Journalists	-13.6
Press Freedom	-6.7

Governance Indicators	Change: 2010–2019
Absence of Harassment of Journalists	-13.6
Freedom of Association & Assembly	-12.5
Freedom of Association	-25
Election Monitoring Bodies & Agencies	-8.0

Source: IIAG

C. Efficiency and Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance

From 2005 to 2019, the Chadian government spent, on average, 20% of its budget on its military (Figure 7). However, the government spent more on its military from 2005 to 2011 than from 2013 to 2019 when violent extremists gained ground in the Sahel (data do not exist for 2012). These timeframes conform to the different security threats facing Chad. In 2006 and 2008, the United Force for Change, an armed opposition group supported by Sudan, nearly ousted Déby.⁵⁶ During this time, Chad’s government spent on average 24% of its budget on the military. In a second timeframe, 2013–2019, Chad spent approximately 15% of its budget on the military. Notably, U.S. assistance increased during the same timeframe as Chad spent less on its military (Figure 5). Between 2013 and 2019, military assistance comprised 25% of U.S. foreign assistance to Chad; whereas between 2005 and 2012 military assistance comprised 1% on average of U.S. foreign assistance to Chad. The reduced expenditure by the Chadian government, shown in Figure 7, may also reflect declining oil prices from which the Chadian government earns a majority of its revenue as the 10th largest producer of oil in Africa.⁵⁷ Specifically, just as Chad experienced reduced revenues from oil reserves in 2015, U.S. security assistance increased in 2016 (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). This rise in military assistance seems to have enabled Chad to increase its military expenditures in 2016 (Figure 7), allowing it to participate in the region’s counterterrorism effort and continue to build its armed diplomacy.



Note: No data available for 2012 and 2020.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

Figure 7. Chad: Military Expenditure, as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditure

As discussed above, the leverage available to external countries rests on the size of the aid-receiving country’s size and economic importance, while linkage measures the density of the relationship between external and aid-receiving countries.⁵⁸ In other words, the United States specifically could exert leverage due to Chad’s urgent development needs. Chad’s links to the United States are limited—paling in comparison to the enduring colonial ties and political-military relations forged from *Franceafrique*⁵⁹—but would include the long history of mainly development assistance.

The military was central to Déby’s retention of domestic, regional, and international power. Defining himself as a soldier, Déby’s domestic narrative of protector of the nation helped to legitimate his power, especially in the face of declining credibility of elections and criticisms of his 30 years in power. As such, as the United States increased its military assistance to Chad, Déby’s reliance on external funding to the military deepened, and the Chadian government spent less on its own military. In contrast, non-military U.S. assistance through USAID and the Department of State, focused on relieving humanitarian crises, did not factor as one of the areas Déby used to retain power.

A closer look at how the United States managed a key counterterrorism program lends a window into the leverage available to encourage Chad’s democratic progress. As one of 12 countries in the Sahel and Maghreb regions where the U.S. Departments of Defense and State and USAID operate the TSCTP, Chad’s military received funds for training, equipment, and logistical support. However, an audit by the State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 2020 found that the Department of State, which implements the TSCTP program, did not adequately monitor how countries used the funds or developed intended programs.⁶⁰

The OIG’s audit of six TSCTP contracts concluded that the Africa Bureau of the Department of State wasted \$201 million by failing to monitor the TSCTP funds provided to Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) and AECOM, an infrastructure consulting firm. Though the Africa Bureau relied on DoD contractors to inspect projects, these entities were not authorized to do so. Moreover, because the audited TSCTP contracts did not have monitoring plans, the OIG concluded that the Africa Bureau had mismanaged the funds.⁶¹ Chad received assistance from four of the six contracts reviewed (see Table 6).

Table 6. Projects Audited by the OIG, 2020

Project Name	Recipient	Purpose	Contract Amount
G5 Force Support	PAE	To provide training, equipment, and logistical support to militaries in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger.	\$113,167,134
Regional Boat Capability Program	PAE	To provide training and equipment to the Cameroonian and Chadian militaries.	\$10,165,351
Logistical Support for Counter Boko Haram	AECOM	To provide equipment, training, and logistical and maintenance support to militaries in Benin, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.	\$64,027,357
Demobilization, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation	International Organization for Migration	To facilitate the reintegration of former detained or defecting members of extremist groups in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger	\$7,758,024

Source: U.S. State Department, 2020

The OIG found that the projects lacked sufficient supporting documentation for the purchase of equipment, labor, training, and other expenses for goods and services.⁶² In some cases, inspections could not take place because Africa Bureau staff could not travel to the Sahel.⁶³ In other cases, the alternate staff designated by Africa Bureau conducted inspections in an *ad hoc* manner, as there were competing demands on time.⁶⁴ Moreover, the Contracting Officer’s Representative had not developed monitoring plans for any of the six contracts reviewed.⁶⁵ As one DoD official reported:

[S]he is not sure how it is possible to protect U.S. investments in some of these challenging locations. [Africa Bureau (AF)] officials acknowledged monitoring of AF TSCTP security assistance has been a challenge. They explained that monitoring would be resource-intensive because, unlike Afghanistan and Iraq where there are U.S. Government personnel to provide “eyes on the ground,” North and West Africa have very few U.S. Government personnel stationed in those countries to assist with oversight.⁶⁶

The review of the TSCTP depicts only one example, but reveals an important weakness in the U.S. leverage over Chad and other participating countries. The lack of verification of aspects of the TSTCP program does not only result in a failure of accountability, but also the absence of consequences for the contractors and host country personnel involved. It conveys the message that the United States is not focused on ensuring that its programs are implemented as agreed, giving contractors and host country personnel room to deviate from intended objectives. Any consequences assigned to the failure of upholding an agreement become weak.

The weak leverage conveyed by the lack of TSCTP oversight is further exacerbated by the centrality of the Sahel, and Chad in particular, to the counterterrorism effort. Chad's armed forces have emerged as key partners in countering violent extremism in the Sahel. Chad's regional influence stems directly from its intervention to mitigate insecurity in the Sahel.⁶⁷ Chad's armed forces are deployed along all frontiers of the country. On the east, the armed forces combat the insurgencies based in Darfur; the northern border is threatened by southern Libya's armed groups; to the west, Boko Haram operates at the Lake Chad basin; at Chad's southern border, the instability in the Central African Republic threatens to spill over.⁶⁸ The Chadian army has few peers in the Sahel. Its elite guard, the *Direction Générale des Services de Sécurité des Institutions de l'État* (General Directorate of Security Services for National Institutions, DGSSIE), is known for its ability to rapidly deploy and its extensive combat experience.⁶⁹ Déby stayed in power—continuing his repressive regime—through the influence that Chad wielded in the region with its army.⁷⁰ These very qualities render the force indispensable to the broad regional and international interests combating violent extremism.⁷¹ According to one official close to the presidency, Chad practices 'armed diplomacy,' where military interventions abroad result in advancing international relations.⁷²

Déby gained the support of powerful external allies who did not pressure him for democratic reforms.⁷³ For example, the Chadian government did not suffer any consequences for abandoning its 1999 agreement with the World Bank to maintain revenues from the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline for development and poverty reduction, instead using the money to reinforce its military to combat armed groups threatening the state.⁷⁴ In a similar fashion, ahead of the August 2007 elections, the Chadian government and the EU agreed to reforms to the civil service; the initiative did not take place, with no ramifications from the EU.⁷⁵ Years later, after the Déby government threatened, harassed, and jailed his political opponents ahead of the August 2016 election, the French Minister of Defense still attended Déby's inauguration to his fifth term.⁷⁶ These demonstrable weaknesses in Chad's governance lie behind the backsliding of key indicators such as electoral laws, freedom of speech and assembly, and rule of law. Most recently, following the installation of Déby's son after his death, against the process outlined in the constitution, the French President announced that France would not abandon Chad.⁷⁷ As

summarized by Tubiana and Debos (2017): “To allow Chad to continue to play the role of a regional policeman, Paris and Washington have to ignore calls from international NGOs to hold the regime accountable for its human rights abuses and undemocratic practices.”⁷⁸

Chad, among the world’s poorest nations, is a key partner to the U.S.’ counterterrorism effort in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Bad governance, lack of respect for human rights, and persistent political oppression have ensured its designation as “not free,” for nearly 50 years. Beset by repeated insurgencies and coup attempts, Chad’s government has focused on maintaining regime stability at the cost of democratic reforms. Within the central African region, Chad has earned a reputation for military intervention, using its propensity to deploy its forces to meet its foreign policy objectives.

Following the 2012 coup in Mali, U.S. assistance to Chad soared, as the United States viewed the growing violent extremism in the Sahel as a threat to national security. The dependence of Chad on external partners to fund its military created the opportunity for the United States to leverage its relationship to effect democratic progress. However, this equation missed the mutual dependency between the United States and Chad: given the centrality of Chad to counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, the United States, as well as other international partners, hesitated to criticize the country for poor governance and undemocratic behavior. Most recently, the unconstitutional appointment of Mahamat Idriss Déby as president did not elicit criticism from the United States (or France, a country with stronger links to Chad). Furthermore, the inadequate monitoring and weak oversight of one of the largest programs in the counterterrorism effort, the TSCTP, also sent a message that the United States did not value accountability. Coupled with the silence on democratic transgressions from Chad’s significant external partners, the leverage to insist on good governance and democracy diminished.

5. Conclusion

This research project investigated the relationship between U.S. security cooperation and key indicators of democratization in Africa between 2005 and 2020. The timeframe is shaped by the availability of specific data, but encompasses a number of key developments in Africa's security landscape that have shaped U.S.–Africa policy: namely, the creation of AFRICOM in 2007 and its standup in Germany in 2008, and the rise of violent extremist movements in the mid-2000s. At the same time, democratic governance faced new challenges and persistent old ones: electoral violence, expected to decline with the adoption of democratic norms, remained stubbornly constant;⁷⁹ in 2005, social and protest movements began to rise sharply in Africa;⁸⁰ after a steady rise, civil liberties and political rights began to decline in 2006;⁸¹ finally, demand for democracy has consistently outstripped its supply by African governments.⁸² In the context of the timeframe's fluid security and governance context, we examined the relationship between democratic trends and high-level security attention on countries through posture statement mentions, the number of DoD personnel deployed in a country, the number of foreign troops trained, and the amount of military assistance disbursed. Democratic indicators measure good governance, through the IIAG; civil liberties and political rights, through Freedom House; and free and fair elections, through the Electoral Democracy Index.

Overall, the relationship between U.S. security cooperation and democratic indicators in Africa has a mixed, albeit generally moderately negative track record. However, it is important to note that while our findings of the effects of U.S. security assistance demonstrate correlation and suggestion, we do not conclude that they are causative relationships. Posture statement mentions, the number of DoD personnel deployed, and the number of foreign troops trained correlate with a negative, but short-lived impact on democratic indicators. However, the greater the amount of U.S. military assistance to African countries, the stronger the negative impact on democratic indicators. Closer analysis highlights that as military assistance rises, it correlates with weakened accountability and transparency. In other words, overmilitarized relationships present challenges to advancing democratic governance.

Examining the U.S. security cooperation programs in Chad demonstrates the multiplicity of factors impacting democratic indicators while highlighting how military assistance can undermine progress on democratic governance. To be sure, Chad's failure to progress on democratic governance is not due solely to U.S. security cooperation; there are many domestic factors at play and other important international actors who have influenced Chad's current trajectory. However, our case study highlights that the mutual

reliance by Chad and the United States on security cooperation for Chad's domestic objectives has resulted in little to no democratic progress. Chad's role as a critical actor in maintaining regional security—rather than improving democratic governance—served to preserve Idriss Déby's regime. Concurrently, the reliance by the United States (and others in the international community) on Chad to combat violent extremism in the Sahel has resulted in a failure to criticize the Chadian government for violations of the tenets of good governance. More recently, the sharp rise in security cooperation in 2016 not only reflected a worsening security landscape and increased reliance on Chad, but also coincided with a fall in revenues from oil and gas, and resulted in Chad's even greater dependency on external donors. Moreover, the poor monitoring of the TSCTP may have portrayed the United States as inattentive to accountability; it weakened the leverage the U.S. government had over partner nations, like Chad, that may flout accountability to purported commitments to norms of good governance.

Still, these results do not suggest a definitive and strong causative relationship between U.S. security assistance and Africa's democratic indicators. Rather, the results suggest the need for additional analyses that include a more expansive set of variables, a longer time frame, and a more diverse group of case studies. Richer and more in-depth research can help to conclusively understand both the impact of security assistance and the factors affecting democratization.

Appendix A.

Results of Regression Analysis

For all models discussed, the results of the GLS regression analysis with random-effects at the country level are displayed below. Model coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses. The Electoral Democracy Index ranges from 0 (low, not a democracy) to 1 (high, full democracy). Freedom House scores range from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). IIAG scores range from 0 (low governance) to 100 (high governance).

Table A-1. Relationship between Posture Statement Mentions and Democracy and Governance in Africa: GLS Regression Models with Random-Effects

Significance levels: *<.10; **<.05; ***<.01

	Electoral Democracy Index			Freedom House			IIAG		
	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags
Posture Statement Mentions	.04** (.02)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.02)	-.03** (.11)	-.13 (.11)	-.11 (.11)	-1.9*** (.51)	-1.5*** (.46)	-1.3** (.48)
GDP per capita (logged)	.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.16* (.09)	-.22** (.10)	-.31** (.10)	1.8*** (.43)	1.95*** (.43)	1.70***
Conflict	.007 (.01)	.004 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.07 (.07)	.14** (.07)	.17** (.07)	-.21 (.27)	-.22 (.27)	-.29 (.29)
Natural Resource Rents (logged)	-.02** (.08)	-.02** (.008)	-.02** (.008)	.10** (.05)	.10** (.05)	.08 (.05)	-.99*** (.22)	-.91*** (.22)	-1.08*** (.24)
Constant	.34	.34	.31	5.27	5.65	6.39	37.26	36.23	38.55
Wald chi2	13.05	8.88	12.13	12.16	14.74	20.48	67.83	63.68	51.28
Observations	508	457	406	508	475	406	457	457	406
Groups (Countries)	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52

Table A-2. Relationship between DOD Personnel Deployments and Democracy and Governance in Africa: GLS Regression Models with Random-Effects

Significance levels: *<.10; **<.05; ***<.01

	Electoral Democracy Index			Freedom House			IIAG		
	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags
DoD Personnel Deployments (square root)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	-.001 (.002)	.01* (.008)	.03** (.01)	.02** (.01)	.06 (.03)	.08** (.04)	.13** (.04)
GDP per capita (logged)	.01 (.01)	.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.15 (.09)	-.23** (.10)	-.33*** (.10)	1.99*** (.43)	1.97*** (.43)	1.48*** (.41)
Conflict	.008 (.01)	.004 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.04 (.07)	.10 (.07)	.14* (.07)	-.37 (.27)	-.39 (.27)	-.53** (.29)
Natural Resource Rents (logged)	-.02** (.009)	-.20** (.009)	-.02** (.12)	.11** (.05)	.13** (.05)	.11** (.06)	-1.01*** (.23)	-.99*** (.22)	-1.08*** (.25)
Constant	.39	.36	.33	5.05	5.59	6.34	36.16	36.18	39.90
Wald chi2	10.23	8.75	11.53	9.99	21.77	25.42	56.71	58.35	56.55
Observations	503	452	401	503	452	401	452	452	401
Groups (Countries)	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51

Table A-3. Relationship between Foreign Troops Trained and Democracy and Governance in Africa: GLS Regression Models with Random-Effects

Significance levels: *<.10; **<.05; ***<.01

	Electoral Democracy Index			Freedom House			IIAG		
	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags
Foreign Troops Trained (square root)	.0002 (.0003)	-.002 (.0003)	-.006* (.0003)	-.002 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.005** (.002)	.008 (.007)	-.001 (.007)	-.02** (.008)
GDP per capita (logged)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.12 (.09)	-.20** (.10)	-.31*** (.10)	2.18*** (.43)	2.19*** (.43)	1.75*** (.47)
Conflict	.008 (.01)	.005 (.01)	-.008 (.01)	.07 (.07)	.15** (.07)	.16** (.07)	-.32 (.28)	-.30 (.28)	-.32 (.30)
Natural Resource Rents (logged)	-.02** (.008)	-.02* (.008)	-.02** (.008)	.11** (.05)	.11** (.05)	.10** (.05)	-1.10*** (.22)	-1.08*** (.22)	-1.42*** (.24)
Constant	.38	.35	.32	4.98	5.53	6.26	34.58	34.61	38.9
Wald chi2	10.2	9.69	15.59	9.64	14.7	28.28	55.97	54.06	60.04
Observations	508	457	405	508	457	405	457	457	405
Groups	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52

Table A-4. Relationship between U.S. Military Assistance and Democracy and Governance in Africa: Heckman Selection Model to Address Non-Randomness of Security Assistance Decisions

Significance levels: *<.10; **<.05; ***<.01

	Electoral Democracy Index			Freedom House			IIAG		
	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags	1 Lag	2 Lags	3 Lags
Military[^] Assistance Total	.0004 (.0006)	.0006 (.0004)	-.0002 (.0009)	.0007 (.004)	.004 (.004)	.006 (.006)	.15** (.05)	.13** (.05)	.14** (.07)
Conflict	-.23** (.12)	-.28*** (.05)	-.30** (.11)	-.26* (.14)	-.29** (.14)	-.36** (.13)	.07 (.10)	-.15 (.13)	-.20 (.12)
Military Assistance as Percent of overall Assistance	-.0007* (.0004)	-.0003 (.0002)	-.0003 (.0005)	.005* (.003)	.005 (.003)	.005 (.004)	-.12** (.04)	-.12** (.04)	-.11** (.04)
GDP per capita (logged)	.006 (.011)	.03** (.01)	.007 (.01)	-.14* (.08)	-.13 (.08)	-.14 (.09)	1.87** (1.03)	1.96** (1.04)	1.81 (1.11)
Natural Resource Rents (logged)	-.04*** (.006)	-.02*** (.007)	-.04*** (.007)	.36*** (.04)	.35*** (.05)	.35*** (.05)	-4.79*** (.55)	-4.73*** (.56)	-4.69*** (.60)
Constant	.61	.40	.59	3.84	3.87	3.87	27.92	39.84	41.16
Wald chi2	70.19	38.28	54.42	104.13	92.55	80.06	113.55	106.56	91.59
Observations	550	492	440	550	492	440	519	492	440
Selected	340	303	265	340	303	265	309	303	265
Non-selected	210	189	175	210	189	175	210	189	175

[^]Military assistance predicted by conflict.

End Notes

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14. ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the relationship between U.S. security partnerships and democracy and governance trends in Africa from 2005 to 2020. Overall, our findings are mixed in that there is either no relationship or a weak negative relationship between U.S. security cooperative activities and democratic quality in Africa. When looking closely at the potential mechanisms that drive this relationship, we find that U.S. military assistance can have a positive impact on governance; however, the impact on accountability and transparency are negatively affected by over-militarization of assistance. Specifically, as the proportion of U.S.-provided military assistance relative to the overall amount of development assistance increases, the negative impact of assistance on accountability indicators increases significantly. To tease this out further, we juxtapose Chad's emergence as a central partner in countering violent extremism in the Sahel with its democratic stagnation and failures. The paper shows that as U.S. security assistance increased relative to the overall amount of development assistance provided to Chad, democratic indicators deteriorated, or in some cases stagnated. Our findings suggest that a whole-of-government approach to security assistance that balances a country's security needs with support to grow its democratic institutions may help mitigate some of the negative effects of security cooperation.					
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