



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGY IN CONTESTED TERRITORIES:
LESSONS FOR NIGERIA**

by

Tarilado Collins Ogoina

December 2023

Co-Advisors:

Anshu N. Chatterjee
Letitia L. Lawson

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2023	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN CONTESTED TERRITORIES: LESSONS FOR NIGERIA			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Tarilado Collins Ogoina				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In the realm of state sovereignty, weakness can facilitate territorial contestation by violent non-state actors. Both Pakistan and Nigeria have grappled with the challenge of violent insurgent movements, stemming from their struggles to effectively govern their territories. In response to this shared predicament, both nations have employed an array of hard- and soft-power counterinsurgency strategies to address the growing security crisis. However, Pakistan has achieved greater success in this regard. This comparative case study delves into the counterinsurgency strategies pursued by Pakistan and Nigeria, seeking to unravel the factors underpinning Pakistan's superior outcomes, despite their similar capabilities. The study concludes that external aid from the United States notably fortified Pakistan's hard-power capabilities, enabling the substantial degradation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas more effectively than Nigeria's response to the Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria. Moreover, it emphasizes the critical role of hard-power measures in the early phases of countering violent insurgent movements, asserting that the effectiveness of soft-power strategies hinges upon their initial success. These findings are geared toward proffering policy recommendations to enhance Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS ungoverned space, insurgency, violent non-state actors, counterinsurgency strategy, hard power, soft power, terrorism			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 79	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
IN CONTESTED TERRITORIES: LESSONS FOR NIGERIA**

Tarilado Collins Ogoina
Squadron Leader, Nigerian Air Force
DPA, National Open University of Nigeria, 2021

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY AND STRATEGY)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2023**

Approved by: Anshu N. Chatterjee
Co-Advisor

Letitia L. Lawson
Co-Advisor

Afshon P. Ostovar
Associate Chair for Research
Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

In the realm of state sovereignty, weakness can facilitate territorial contestation by violent non-state actors. Both Pakistan and Nigeria have grappled with the challenge of violent insurgent movements, stemming from their struggles to effectively govern their territories. In response to this shared predicament, both nations have employed an array of hard- and soft-power counterinsurgency strategies to address the growing security crisis. However, Pakistan has achieved greater success in this regard. This comparative case study delves into the counterinsurgency strategies pursued by Pakistan and Nigeria, seeking to unravel the factors underpinning Pakistan's superior outcomes, despite their similar capabilities. The study concludes that external aid from the United States notably fortified Pakistan's hard-power capabilities, enabling the substantial degradation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas more effectively than Nigeria's response to the Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria. Moreover, it emphasizes the critical role of hard-power measures in the early phases of countering violent insurgent movements, asserting that the effectiveness of soft-power strategies hinges upon their initial success. These findings are geared toward proffering policy recommendations to enhance Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS	2
B.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS	3
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	4
	1. Counterinsurgency Strategy in Nigeria.....	4
	2. Counterinsurgency Strategy in Pakistan	8
D.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES	11
E.	RESEARCH DESIGN	12
F.	THESIS OVERVIEW.....	12
II.	ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED AREAS OF PAKISTAN.....	15
A.	ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE FATA FROM 2001 TO 2013.....	16
B.	ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN’S REVISED COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACH POST-2013	22
C.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	28
III.	COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA’S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AGAINST THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY	31
A.	COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AT THE EARLY STAGES OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY (2009– 2014).....	32
B.	ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S REVISED COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AGAINST THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY POST-2014.....	37
C.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.....	44
IV.	FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION	45
A.	COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FOR NIGERIA – KEY FINDINGS.....	45
	1. Inadequate Direct Foreign Military Assistance	46
	2. Border Porosity	47
	3. Inability to Hold Liberated Communities.....	47
	4. Lack of Integration between Counterinsurgency Components	48

B.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	49
C.	CONCLUSION	51
LIST OF REFERENCES		53
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		65

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ATA	Anti-Terrorism Act
ATC	anti-terrorism court
BH	Boko Haram
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FC	Frontier Corps
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GWOT	global war on terror
ISWAP	Islamic State for West Africa Province
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LGA	local government area
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NAP	National Action Plan
NEDC	North-East Development Commission
NSS	National Security Strategy
PMC	private military company
STTEP	specialized tasks, training, equipment, and protection
TDS	Tribal Decade Strategy
TPA	Terrorist Prevention Act
TTP	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
VNSA	violent non-state actor

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to God Almighty for His unwavering grace, strength, and wisdom that sustained me throughout my stay at the Naval Postgraduate School. I extend my heartfelt thanks to the Nigerian Air Force and the U.S. government for affording me the opportunity to embark on this intellectually enriching journey. Special recognition is due to my esteemed advisors, Professors Letitia Lawson and Anshu Chatterjee, whose meticulous guidance significantly contributed to the success of this academic undertaking. Their wealth of experience not only enhanced this thesis, but also refined my overall academic prowess in research and critical thinking. I am also indebted to my writing coaches, Dr. Cheryl Huddleston and Alison Scharmota, whose edits and insights greatly enriched my writing skills. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to my children, who, having had no say in choosing a family, have fearlessly embraced the challenges of growing up in a military household. Every day, I am committed to creating a better life for you, surpassing my own experiences. Thank you all.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

When a state fails to establish effective governance across its entire territory, the result is the existence of ungoverned spaces. While it is important to note that these areas are not truly ungoverned, they do suffer from weak and contested government presence. As defined by Clunan and Trinkunas, ungoverned spaces arise when “territorial state control has been voluntarily or involuntarily ceded in whole or in part to actors other than the relevant legally recognized sovereign authorities.”¹ While this study aligns with this definition, it chooses to refer to these areas as contested territories, using both terms interchangeably. These contested territories often attract violent non-state actors (VNSAs) who compete with the state for power. Nigeria has grappled with several VNSA challenges, each carrying distinct implications for national security. Notable among these challenges is the violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram (BH) terrorist group in northeast Nigeria.

The 2019 Federal Republic of Nigeria *National Security Strategy* (NSS) acknowledges the problem and existence of ungoverned spaces in the country’s northeast region.² The strategy identifies the need to ensure effective governance and monopoly of force in border and frontier communities. However, since the commissioning of the NSS in 2019, the policy has not effectively curtailed the security threats bedeviling the country. For instance, on August 8, 2020, at least 75 persons were killed when BH militants attacked Gwoza, a border community in northeast Nigeria.³ Similarly, on February 23, 2021, BH terrorists launched a series of rocket-propelled grenades in Maiduguri, killing 10 civilians

¹ Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces: Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority, and Softened Sovereignty,” in *Ungoverned Spaces? Alternative to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty*, ed. Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 17.

² See Federal Republic of Nigeria, *National Security Strategy* (Abuja, Nigeria: Office of the National Security Adviser, December 2019).

³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Boko Haram Incident Summary,” Global Terrorism Database, 2020, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=202008260024>.

and injuring many others.⁴ These attacks illustrate that BH remains a potent threat in northeast Nigeria.

A comparative study of countries grappling with ongoing challenges related to territorial contestation may shed light on how Nigeria could enhance its response to VNSAs exploiting its territory. Pakistan's struggle against insurgent groups in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now a part of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), presents an appropriate comparative case study, given the shared security challenges faced by Nigeria and Pakistan and the fact that Pakistan has achieved significant success in military operations in the FATA and is in the process of consolidating state power in the region.⁵ Pakistan commenced its battle against VNSAs in the FATA nearly a decade before Nigeria was presented with the BH terrorist challenge. As with the FATA, which lies along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Nigeria's fight with BH terrorists is prevalent in the northeast region along the border areas between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and the Niger Republic, and both countries' VSNA espouse Salafist Islamist ideology. Moreover, both Pakistan and Nigeria fall within the lower middle-income category according to the World Bank's classification, making them financially comparable and facilitating a more meaningful comparative study due to their similar economic conditions.⁶

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Two research questions stand out. First, how can weak states adapt their counterinsurgency strategies to effectively tackle territorial contestation? Second, what insights can Nigeria derive from Pakistan's efforts to eliminate terrorist elements in the FATA?

⁴ "Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis: Maiduguri Rocket Attack Kills 10," British Broadcasting Corporation, February 24, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56184033>.

⁵ Shahzad Akhtar, "Decline of Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA," *Asian Survey* 59, no. 4 (August 1, 2019): 693–716, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2019.59.4.693>.

⁶ Neil James Fantom and Umar Serajuddin, *The World Bank's Classification of Countries by Income*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7528 (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, January 4, 2016), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2741183>.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The threat posed by territorial contestation is diverse and transcends the borders of the state experiencing the problem, often impacting regional and, at times, even world peace. In Nigeria, the BH terrorist group contests part of the country's northeast region, with a spillover of violence in neighboring countries. The group, from its founding, declared its intent to establish a caliphate within the state.⁷ Thus, defeating the BH terrorist group has been Nigeria's top priority for the last decade. Since the onset of the insurgency in 2009, the Nigerian defense budget has consistently increased without a significant change in the security situation.⁸ This is part of a larger pattern: in Africa, ungoverned spaces have fueled insurgencies, trafficking in persons, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.⁹ The inability of African states to effectively control their borders has led to the growth of transnational terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Movement for Oneness and Jihad, Ansaru, and Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP), amongst others, in addition to BH.¹⁰ Meanwhile, since the 9/11 attacks, events such as the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005, respectively, highlight the threat that ungoverned spaces pose to developed countries: these attacks were planned and coordinated from Pakistan's tribal areas.¹¹

The research provides insight into Pakistan's successes and Nigeria's challenges in tackling the exploitation of their territories by VNSAs, in the context of weak state capacities. Though the searchlight is on Nigeria, the author envisages that strategies

⁷ J. Tochukwu Omenma, Ifeanyichukwu M. Abada, and Z. Onyinyechi Omenma, "Boko Haram Insurgency: A Decade of Dynamic Evolution and Struggle for a Caliphate," *Security Journal* 33, no. 3 (September 2020): 376–400, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00233-7>.

⁸ Moses M. Duruji et al., "Military Budget, War Against Boko Haram Insurgency, and Its Impact on Nigerian Politics and Economy," in *Handbook of Research on Military Expenditure on Economic and Political Resources*, ed. Ramesh Chandra Das, 427–47, Advances in Public Policy and Administration (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-4778-5>.

⁹ Ernest T. Aniche, Chris C. Nshimbi, and Inocent Moyo, "Borderlands in West Africa Are Ungoverned: Why This Is Bad for Security," *The Conversation*, July 1, 2021, <https://theconversation.com/borderlands-in-west-africa-are-ungoverned-why-this-is-bad-for-security-161453>.

¹⁰ Aniche, Nshimbi, and Moyo.

¹¹ Francis A. Galgano, "Ungoverned Space and Effective Sovereignty in the Global War on Terror," in *Modern Military Geography*, ed. Francis A. Galgano and Eugene J. Palka, 1st ed. (New York, Routledge: 2011), 442.

recommended from this study will be helpful to states across the world facing similar challenges. The thesis contributes to scholarly literature by linking counterinsurgency theories with the peculiar challenges that ungoverned spaces present.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical literature on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency has enjoyed significant expansion since the turn of the 21st century, primarily due to the growth of transnational terrorist organizations. Scholars have generally identified two broad strategies, hard and soft power, and debate which approach is most effective. These approaches can be traced to Martha Crenshaw, one of the pioneers in terrorism studies. In her work, *Theories of Terrorism*, she identifies instrumental and organizational approaches to terrorism.¹² The instrumental approach, which is likened to hard power, argues that terrorist actions are a means to a political end, and thus state counterterrorism efforts should focus on defense and deterrence. The defense strategy should aim to forcefully prevent the adversary from realizing its objectives, while deterrence seeks to reduce terrorism incentives by promulgating anti-terrorism laws and policies. The organizational approach, which connects with soft power, assesses terrorism as the outcome of internal group dynamics and argues that state action should focus on disintegrating the group's cohesion without exacerbating violence. It entails initiatives that dissuade radicalism such as addressing terrorist grievances. The theoretical debate between the hard and soft power camps is mirrored in the reviewed literature on the Nigerian and Pakistani cases.

1. Counterinsurgency Strategy in Nigeria

Scholars agree that Nigeria is struggling in its effort to tackle the BH menace. One school of thought blames the failure on the application of hard over soft power instruments. Emeka Njoku ties this to the relics of military rule that inculcated a repressive culture in

¹² Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (December 1987): 13–31, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398708437313>.

the military's approach to solving crises.¹³ Isaac Sampson posits that “the predominantly military approach to countering Boko Haram terrorism would continue to generate tensions between the government and the local people, unless a more robust counterinsurgency strategy is designed and implemented together with significant governance and political reforms, geared toward reversing the historic social and economic imbalance in northern Nigeria.”¹⁴ Similarly, Gana et al. contend that repressive military operations have denied the Nigerian government vital intelligence that would assist in addressing the grievances of the BH terrorist group.¹⁵ They argue for a more civilian-oriented approach, integrating affected civilian communities into counterinsurgency strategies.

Others in the soft power camp regard the BH insurgency as a fallout from state fragility, while still arguing against hard power measures. Aghedo and Osumah reflect on governance failures and institutional fragility as drivers for insecurity in northeast Nigeria and suggest that the state discard its repressive counterinsurgency approach in favor of one that would address socio-economic inequalities and human security.¹⁶ Likewise, Gana maintains that the Nigerian government should tackle socio-economic factors, as these are enhancers for BH recruitment and support.¹⁷ Nyadera et al. assert that Nigeria's military approach to counterinsurgency is costly and does not address the root causes arising from state fragility.¹⁸ They argue that implementing a soft approach to counterinsurgency does

¹³ Emeka T. Njoku, “‘Laws for Sale:’ The Domestication of Counterterrorism Policies and Its Impact in Nigeria,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*, ed. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk et al., Palgrave Handbooks (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 1003–20.

¹⁴ Isaac Terwase Sampson, “The Dilemmas of Counter-Bokoharamism: Debating State Responses to Boko Haram Terrorism in Northern Nigeria,” *Security Journal* 29, no. 2 (April 2016): 122, <https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2013.2>.

¹⁵ Modu L. Gana, Ku Hasnita Samsu, and Mohd M. Ismail, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Changing the Pattern of Counterinsurgency,” *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science* II, no. VIII (2018): 127–30.

¹⁶ Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, “The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?,” *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (June 2012): 853–69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.674701>.

¹⁷ Modu Lawan Gana, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: The Conduit for Ending Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria's North,” *European Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, July 1, 2018, 7–13, <https://doi.org/10.33422/EJBS.2018.07.61>.

¹⁸ Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, Michael Otieno Kisaka, and Billy Agwanda, “Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria: A Nexus of Just War and Fragile State,” *The Round Table* 109, no. 3 (May 3, 2020): 298–315, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2020.1760494>.

not render the state weak but rather helps foster national unity and spares the state expensive military operations. De Simone and Iocchi highlight the “African solutions to African problems” clause advocated by most African leaders refusing external intervention as a constraining factor to Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign.¹⁹ They argue that this restraint has limited Nigeria to hard power measures because the state does not have the capacity to implement soft measures such as active peacebuilding and socio-economic development without relying upon the assistance of extra-African states.

Still others focus on “hearts and minds” in advocating for a softer approach. Berlingozzi and Stoddard argue that, considering the relevance of population support to the BH insurgency, Nigeria needs to realign its counterinsurgency strategy to a more population-centric approach to challenge BH control over the population.²⁰ Equally, Akali Omeni asserts that regardless of the advantages of military prowess in battle, the population presents the battleground to a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Thus, he argues that the Nigerian government’s inability to isolate, win over, and provide long-term protection for its population is a multiplier effect of the state’s failed counterinsurgency effort.²¹

A second school of thought argues that hard instruments are appropriate since the BH group’s motive is to replace the state in its struggle for a caliphate and that it is rather the inadequacies of the Nigerian military that increase the survivability of the BH terrorist group. Abada and the Omenmas call for better military operations in combatting the BH insurgency, advocating a stronger offensive and proactive counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the group.²² Others, including Olumuyiwa Amao, contend that the ill-equipped state of the Nigerian military accounts for its failure to address the BH insurgency, thus calling

¹⁹ Sara De Simone and Alessio Iocchi, “The End of the Security–Development Nexus? Reflections from Counterinsurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria,” *Third World Quarterly* 43, no. 12 (December 2, 2022): 2757–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2104705>.

²⁰ Laura Berlingozzi and Ed Stoddard, “Assessing Misaligned Counterinsurgency Practice in Niger and Nigeria,” *The International Spectator* 55, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 37–53, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833472>.

²¹ Akali Omeni, *Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria: The Military and Operations against Boko Haram, 2011–2017*, Studies in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and National Security (London: Routledge, 2018).

²² Tochukwu Omenma, Abada, and Onyinyechi Omenma, “Boko Haram Insurgency.”

for a substantial increase in military capabilities.²³ Okolie-Osemene and Aluko conclude that porous borders hinder Nigeria's hard power strategy and advocate for a collaborative border security strategy with neighboring states to prevent terrorists from seeking safe havens across borders.²⁴

Hard power proponents have also examined the Nigerian military's limited success through the lens of state fragility. Lenshie et al. contend that state fragility compromises the military-led counterinsurgency operations by creating avenues for corruption and sabotage as well as poor welfare of combatant soldiers.²⁵ Likewise, Onuoha et al. argue that the inability of the state to provide effective oversight and hold the military more accountable is militating against the state's efforts and that the military has not done enough to defeat the BH terrorists.²⁶ Habibu Bappah ties military failures to the gradual erosion of military professionalism and indecisiveness of the political and military leadership to end the conflict.²⁷

Despite the debates over the implementation of hard or soft power in Nigeria's counterinsurgency strategy, there is a consensus among both camps about the vital role of intelligence in a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Caleb Ayuba concedes that the Nigerian military will remain ineffective in its counterinsurgency operations without an effective intelligence system.²⁸ Similarly, Hussein Solomon attributes military failures to

²³ Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao, "A Decade of Terror: Revisiting Nigeria's Interminable Boko Haram Insurgency," *Security Journal* 33, no. 3 (September 2020): 357–75, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00232-8>.

²⁴ James Okolie-Osemene and Benjamin A. Aluko, "Border Porosity and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria," in *African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration*, ed. Innocent Moyo and Chris C. Nshimbi, 1st ed., Border Regions Series (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019), 63–88.

²⁵ Nsemba Edward Lenshie et al., "Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria," *Armed Forces & Society*, September 13, 2022, 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221121656>.

²⁶ Freedom C. Onuoha, Chikodiri Nwangwu, and Michael I. Ugwueze, "Counterinsurgency Operations of the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram Insurgency: Expounding the Viscid Manacle," *Security Journal* 33, no. 3 (September 2020): 401–26, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6>.

²⁷ Habibu Yaya Bappah, "Nigeria's Military Failure Against the Boko Haram Insurgency," *African Security Review* 25, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 146–58, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2016.1151799>.

²⁸ Caleb Ayuba, "Mainstreaming Intelligence as a Strategy in the Counter-Insurgency Operations of Boko Haram Insurgency," *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* 2, no. 1 (2021): 5–22.

the dearth of human intelligence on BH terrorist activities.²⁹ Samuel Oyewole argues that military technologies, such as the use of aircraft for surveillance, will aid intelligence-gathering to achieve a more efficient application of firepower against BH terrorist camps.³⁰

While scholars have argued the relative merits of hard and soft strategies, only a few have investigated integrating these two approaches into a grand strategy to counter the BH menace, and none have developed practical pathways for doing so. Eugene Eji argues for a holistic approach to counterterrorism, drawing upon the United States and the United Kingdom's security apparatuses.³¹ Nigeria's current NSS seems to follow this advice, mimicking the USA Patriot Act and the United Kingdom's Counterterrorism Act.³² This strategy calls for a whole-of-the-government approach, adopting all elements of national power towards tackling the BH insurgency.³³ Whether this hybrid strategy suits Nigeria's peculiar threat environment and capabilities has not been investigated.

2. Counterinsurgency Strategy in Pakistan

Despite the relative success of the Pakistani counterinsurgency strategy in the FATA, scholars continue to debate the impact of hard versus soft power approaches. Criticizing Pakistan's attempt at decapitating the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Sara Mahmood argues that hard power measures lead to further grievances that fuel insurgencies. She proposes a more population-centric approach that comprises false ideology countermeasures and community development to address root causes.³⁴ Lionel

²⁹ Hussein Solomon, "Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram," *The RUSI Journal* 157, no. 4 (August 2012): 6–11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.714183>.

³⁰ Samuel Oyewole, "Making the Sky Relevant to Battle Strategy: Counterinsurgency and the Prospects of Air Power in Nigeria," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 3 (March 4, 2017): 211–31, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533>.

³¹ Eugene Eji, "Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs* 18, no. 3 (September 2016): 198–220, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2016.1242278>.

³² Njoku, "'Laws for Sale': The Domestication of Counterterrorism Policies and Its Impact in Nigeria."

³³ Federal Republic of Nigeria, *National Security Strategy*.

³⁴ Sara Mahmood, "Decapitating the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: An Effective Counter-Terrorism Strategy?," *International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research* 7, no. 6 (2015): 24–29.

Beehner agrees with Mahmood, asserting that using military force to extend state control in contested areas relocates the threat rather than eliminates it.³⁵ Furthermore, Marvin Weinbaum concedes that despite the relative success of Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, VNSA activities in ungoverned spaces will remain a challenge for Pakistan without a strategy of institution-building to reduce incentives to fall back to violent extremism.³⁶ Asghar Khan recommends a bottom-up approach to institution building, starting with tackling the root causes of insurgency, including political and socio-economic marginalization.³⁷

Proponents of soft power measures condemn the viability of a hard power-only solution to counterinsurgency in the FATA. Naeem Ahmed argues that despite an intensive military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the TTP, these terrorist groups are still able to coordinate attacks in the region.³⁸ Wilson and Akhtar assert that the failure of the Pakistani government to consult local tribal leaders before commencing its offensive operations created an anti-military reaction, leading to claims of genocide.³⁹ Rehman et al. argue that complementing military operations with a National Action Plan (NAP) providing soft power options in the FATA stands a greater chance of incapacitating terrorist networks and reducing violence.⁴⁰ They also insist that the Pakistani government's failure to address violent extremism can potentially extend terrorist networks to urban centers. Lastly, Fatima and Khan highlight the limitation of the state in sustaining hard power measures and

³⁵ Lionel Beehner, "Fragile States and the Territory Conundrum to Countering Violent Nonstate Actors," *Democracy and Security* 14, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 101–27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2017.1408009>.

³⁶ Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 34–56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1266130>.

³⁷ Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Mainstreaming the Tribal Areas (Ex-FATA) of Pakistan Bordering Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022): 287–351.

³⁸ Naeem Ahmed, "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: A Critical Overview," *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 55, no. 2 (2016): 1–16.

³⁹ Chris Wilson and Shahzad Akhtar, "Repression, Co-Optation and Insurgency: Pakistan's FATA, Southern Thailand and Papua, Indonesia," *Third World Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (April 3, 2019): 710–26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1557012>.

⁴⁰ Faiz Ur Rehman, Mohammad Nasir, and Mohammad Shahbaz, "What Have We Learned? Assessing the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Strategies in Pakistan," *Economic Modelling* 64 (2017): 487–95.

discuss public/cultural diplomacy as a means of building a narrative that counters the false religious narrative terrorists invoke to justify their actions.⁴¹

The hard power camp asserts that this approach was both necessary and effective in Pakistan. Warraich et al. contend that “the series of military operations have restored the writ of the state and strengthened its sovereignty along with ensuring peace and harmony in the country.”⁴² Equally, Umbreen Javaid asserts that the failure of the TTP to accept dialogue necessitates a comprehensive military operation.⁴³ He argues that Pakistan remains united because of the military and advocates for the government to maintain an “all clear out” policy to eliminate remnants of terrorists from their hideouts.

Pakistan’s border fencing and U.S. drone attacks are acknowledged among hard power scholars for turning the tide in the fight against insurgency in its border areas with Afghanistan. Avdan and Gelpi contend that border fencing provides a policy option for leaders desiring to combat the cross-border flow of VNSAs.⁴⁴ Evaluating Pak-Afghan border fencing, Ali et al. posit a significant decrease in terrorist activities from 2016, when the fence installation commenced.⁴⁵ Siegfried Wolf also agrees that the fencing will curtail the movement of cross-border terrorists but cautions about the long-term frustration and feelings of marginalization that may fuel another insurgency due to the fencing’s impact on the Pashtun tribes that live on both sides of the border.⁴⁶ In addition to border fencing, there is a consensus within the hard power camp that U.S. drone attacks on identified

⁴¹ Noor Fatima and Zahid Ali Khan, “Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy as Counter-Terrorism Measure in Contemporary International Politics,” *Global Social Sciences Review* III, no. II (June 30, 2018): 1–20, [https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2018\(III-II\).01](https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2018(III-II).01).

⁴² Saqib K. Warraich, Muhammad M.A. Khan, and Imran Alam, “Terrorism, Military Operations and Counterterrorism Strategies for Pakistan,” *Journal of Politics and International Studies* 7, no. 1 (2021): 44–45.

⁴³ Umbreen Javaid, “Zarb-e-Azb and the State of Security in Pakistan,” *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 53, no. 1 (2016): 159–70.

⁴⁴ Nazli Avdan and Christopher F. Gelpi, “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence,” *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2017): 14–27.

⁴⁵ Yousaf Ali et al., “Evaluation of Effectiveness of Fence on a Country’s Border: A Case Study of Pak-Afghan Border Fence,” *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 22, no. 2 (June 2021): 769–90, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00774-1>.

⁴⁶ Siegfried O. Wolf, *Playing the Hard Power Card. Pakistan’s Fencing of Its Afghan Border*, SADF Research Report 3 (Brussels, Belgium: South Asia Democratic Forum, 2020): 1–48.

terrorist camps had a significant and independent effect on counterinsurgency success. Scholars like Akhtar,⁴⁷ Mir,⁴⁸ and Johnston and Sarbahi⁴⁹ have argued that U.S. drone attacks contributed immensely to Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts.

A review of the literature demonstrates very little consensus on the most effective counterinsurgency strategy for tackling insurgency in contested territories. After many years of a hard power-driven counterinsurgency strategy, Pakistan has adopted a multi-pronged approach, integrating softer measures into its original hard power approach. The inclusion of FATA into the mainstream governance of Pakistan is indicative of Pakistan's efforts to address the grievances of the historical semi-autonomous region. However, it has yet to be ascertained how these recent measures have impacted the overall security situation in the region. Have the successes achieved thus far been solely due to hard power, or do soft power measures play a role in counterinsurgency by weak states? Moreover, what factors explain the notable successes the Pakistani state has achieved despite its weakness? These are the gaps that this thesis seeks to address.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis comparatively tests the hypotheses put forward by scholars in single case studies of Pakistan and Nigeria, respectively. The first hypothesis posits that both Nigeria and Pakistan have appropriately adopted hard power measures but are hampered, Nigeria much more than Pakistan, by a lack of military capacity when it comes to the measures' effective implementation. The second hypothesis asserts that over-reliance on hard power measures limited counterinsurgency effectiveness, again much more in Nigeria than in Pakistan. While Nigeria and Pakistan share similar challenges and have adopted comparable counterinsurgency strategies, the author seeks to unravel the underlying reasons for variations in their success, examining distinctions in strategy, capabilities, and external support as potential contributing factors. The author argues that a balanced

⁴⁷ Akhtar, "Decline of Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA."

⁴⁸ Asfandiyar Mir, "What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan," *International Security* 43, no. 2 (2018): 45–83.

⁴⁹ Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, "The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan," *The International Studies Association* 60, no. 2 (2016): 203–19.

approach is key to long-term success, but the effectiveness of soft power measures is contingent on the prior success of hard power approaches in the context of violent insurgent movements operating in ungoverned spaces, offering a resolution to the debate in the literature. The author elucidates the intricate relationship between military capacity and counterinsurgency strategy, as well as the factors contributing to divergent outcomes in the two cases.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

Nigeria and Pakistan are chosen for comparative study using a most similar systems design: they share many similarities and demonstrate a clear difference in the outcome of the counterterrorism efforts, as noted previously. In Pakistan, the number of terrorist-related deaths have fallen dramatically, from a peak of 2,876 deaths in 2013 to 196 deaths in 2021.⁵⁰ Contrary to Pakistan, terrorist-related deaths in Nigeria peaked at much higher numbers (despite similar population and territory sizes—7,775 deaths in 2014—before falling more moderately to 1,493 deaths in 2021.⁵¹ The thesis uses annual data on deaths from terrorism as its measure of the dependent variable, counterterrorism success. The timing of trends in these data serves to isolate the impact of each of the potential explanatory factors identified in the existing literature: military capacity, external support, and soft power, all of which are measured more qualitatively.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis consists of four chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by Chapter II, which delves into an evaluation of Pakistan’s strategy for countering insurgent groups in the FATA. Subsequently, Chapter III scrutinizes Nigeria’s responses to the BH insurgency, drawing comparisons with the findings from Chapter II. Finally, Chapter IV offers a comprehensive summary of the critical lessons drawn from this comparative

⁵⁰ START, “Pakistan – Terrorism Deaths,” Global Terrorism Database, 2021, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=fatalities&search=pakistan>.

⁵¹ START, “Nigeria – Terrorism Deaths,” Global Terrorism Database, 2021, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=fatalities&search=nigeria>.

analysis and provides policy recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED AREAS OF PAKISTAN

Terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) became a significant security challenge for Pakistan following the 9/11 attacks and the United States' declaration of the global war on terror (GWOT).⁵² The 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan caused fleeing Taliban and affiliates to seek refuge in the mountainous FATA region, which historically had a porous border between the two countries. In 2007, a new terrorist cell, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistan Taliban, emerged in the region and became the primary security threat to Pakistan's stability.⁵³ The TTP shared the Salafist ideology with the Taliban and aimed to implement their version of Sharia law within Pakistan.⁵⁴ Since the emergence of insurgency in the FATA, Pakistan has adopted several strategies comprising both hard and soft power counterinsurgency measures with varying degrees of success and failure. Meanwhile, the United States also played a significant role in Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign, providing military and financial support that has shaped counterinsurgency outcomes.

Pakistan did not initially respond to the insurgency in the FATA; when it did, it reacted with poorly controlled use of hard power, which alienated the local population. Following a decade of ineffective counterinsurgency in FATA, Pakistan revised its counterinsurgency strategy in 2014 with the National Action Plan (NAP). The new strategy saw better results, as illustrated by the decline in terrorist-related deaths and incidences.⁵⁵ This chapter presents an assessment of the various hard and soft power elements in

⁵² Stephen Watts, *Countering Others' Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 111–72.

⁵³ Shahzad Akhtar, *The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA*, Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics 34 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2023): 1–75.

⁵⁴ Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "Taliban and Salafism: A Historical and Theological Exploration," *Open Democracy*, December 1, 2013, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/1462675728?parentSessionId=nbrd4tZVJqK0I%2BMU80GlevvLNAK6ebZeBbBYMM7dgTk%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=12702>.

⁵⁵ "Datasheet – FATA: Number of Terrorism-Related Incidents Year Wise," South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2023, <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan>.

counterinsurgency operations in the FATA. The first section illustrates that Pakistan's early counterinsurgency strategy in response to the GWOT in 2002 and the rise of the TTP in 2007 was ineffective due to limited military capacity. The second section presents the argument that from 2014, Pakistan's improved counterinsurgency approach has been influenced most significantly by direct U.S. foreign aid, which enhanced the military's capacity in implementing a more effective hard power. With enhanced hard power, the FATA witnessed a decrease in terrorist-related deaths and more successes in fighting terrorists in the region. Prior to the second phase, the country had experienced a consistent increase in terrorist-related deaths, from 105 in 2002 to a peak of 2,876 in 2013. However, from 2014, there was a consistent gradual decline in terrorist-related deaths to fewer than 200 as of 2021.⁵⁶

A. ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN'S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE FATA FROM 2001 TO 2013

Pakistan's historical ties with the Taliban played a significant role in shaping its response to the Taliban's exploitation of the FATA. These ties trace back to the Afghan–Soviet War, during which Pakistan supported the mujahideen operating from the FATA.⁵⁷ These mujahideen were later succeeded by the Taliban, who proved to be more aligned with Islamabad's interests.⁵⁸ This alignment of interests made Pakistan reluctant to initiate any action against the Taliban in the FATA. The turning point came after the 9/11 attacks, when the United States pressured Pakistan to take action against the Taliban in the FATA or risk facing a potential invasion by U.S. forces. Faced with this ultimatum, Pakistan reluctantly launched military operations in 2002 as part of the U.S. GWOT effort.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ START, "Pakistan – Terrorism Deaths."

⁵⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan* (New York: Viking, 2012), 23–67.

⁵⁸ Rashid, 50.

⁵⁹ Sameer Lalwani, "Pakistan's Counterinsurgency Strategy," in *Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders between Terror, Politics, and Religion*, ed. Peter Bergen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 202–28.

However, these early operations aimed to expel foreign fighters, particularly Arab Al-Qaeda members who had infiltrated the FATA.⁶⁰

One crucial factor hindering military operations was the local population's sympathy and shared cultural ties with the Taliban. Historically, after Pakistan's formation in 1947, the state governed the FATA through the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), an agreement that allowed local elites, often known as the *maliks* and *jirgas*, to maintain their traditional governing systems.⁶¹ During the Afghan–Soviet War, this arrangement shifted as mujahideen and Islamic parties took control of the governing structures with Islamabad's blessing to facilitate recruitment for the war effort.⁶² When the GWOT began, the Taliban still had these deep-seated linkages and could recruit Pakistani Pashtuns politically and through financial incentives.⁶³ In essence, the absence of an effective government presence in the region and the strong Pashtun community ties that spanned the Afghan-Pakistani border created safe havens that the Taliban readily exploited. This complex historical backdrop underscores Pakistan's challenges in responding to the Taliban's exploitation of the FATA.

Pakistan also lacked the relevant structures to safeguard its borders against the influx of Taliban from Afghanistan. In the early years of the GWOT, Pakistan employed a defensive strategy, increasing the number of Frontier Corps (FC) personnel along its border with Afghanistan to prevent the free movement of terrorists.⁶⁴ The FC, predominantly drawn from the Pashtun tribe, is a paramilitary organization that had historically been the primary means by which the state provided security along its Afghan-Pakistani border.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink*

⁶¹ Bruce O. Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1–16.

⁶² Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink*

⁶³ Rashid.

⁶⁴ Lacin Idil Oztig, "Pakistan's Border Policies and Security Dynamics along the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 35, no. 2 (March 14, 2020): 211–26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2018.1545598>.

⁶⁵ Willaim G. Rosenau, *Irksome and Unpopular Duties: Pakistan's Frontier Corps, Local Security Forces and Counterinsurgency* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 2012), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562440.pdf>.

These FC personnel, as with the local population, had no control over the Taliban and allowed them unrestricted passage through the borders.⁶⁶ In 2007, President Pervez Musharraf conceded that the border guards were complicit in the flow of Taliban terrorists across the border.⁶⁷ This porous border made it nearly impossible for the Pakistani state to prevent the cross-border migration of terrorists into the FATA once it decided to do so with the militarization of the region.

In addition, since Pakistan had a weak state presence in the FATA due to historical tribal arrangements, its state laws were largely ineffective in deterring the region's exploitation by terrorist groups in the context of local support. Following the outbreak of insurgency in the FATA, Pakistan made several amendments to its Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), providing stiff penalties for terrorism. For instance, in response to the GWOT in 2002, the state amended the ATA, prescribing "severe punishment, including the death penalty for those involved in aiding and abetting terrorism."⁶⁸ Similarly, the amendments also allowed the security agencies to detain terrorist suspects for 12 months without filing criminal charges. Further modifications permitting extrajudicial confessions and shifting the burden of proof onto the accused were implemented in 2009.⁶⁹ However, the absence of an effective judicial system in the FATA and the overall weak state capacity in Pakistan made these laws difficult to implement. Terrorist suspects arrested in the FATA had to be transferred to special anti-terrorism courts (ATCs) established in other regions for trial, delaying the expeditious delivery of justice.⁷⁰ As of 2005, 11 ATCs within the Punjab province had over 700 pending cases due to "financial, manpower, and administrative constraints that continue to hamper the efficiency of the anti-terror courts or setup."⁷¹ The

⁶⁶ Akhtar, "The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA."

⁶⁷ "Musharraf Admits Border Problems," BBC News, February 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6323339.stm.

⁶⁸ Ahmed, "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: A Critical Overview."

⁶⁹ Ahmed.

⁷⁰ Tariq Parvez and Mehwish Rani, *An Appraisal of Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act*, USIP Special Report 377 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR377-An-Appraisal-of-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Anti-Terrorism-Act.pdf>.

⁷¹ Fayyaz Shabana, "Responding to Terrorism: Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Laws," *Terrorism Research Initiative* 2, no. 6 (2008): 18.

inability of the government to expeditiously try terrorist cases hindered the use of arrests as deterrence against engaging in terrorist activities. In addition, the delay in justice may have fueled radicalization when innocent victims served lengthy periods in custody with hardened terrorists.

Following increased U.S. pressure and an attempted assassination of President Musharraf in 2003, the Pakistani authorities launched their first direct offensive against the Taliban in 2004.⁷² However, Pakistan's initial military strategy resulted in poorly targeted attacks that had the unintended consequence of alienating the local population. The military's approach at the time was geared towards swift, albeit repressive, tactics to contain the escalating threat while acting with little reliable intelligence.⁷³ The army conducted house searches and destroyed villages using heavy artillery with correspondingly high levels of collateral damage due to the inability to distinguish between terrorists and the rest of the local population. Equally concerning was the military's decision to bypass seeking the support of the local elites, whose powers had been toppled by the Taliban's presence in the region, further distancing them from the locals.⁷⁴ Severing ties with the tribal elite was a major strategic flaw of the Pakistani military, which created the impression that it was fighting an American war. The decision to sideline the tribal elites might have been influenced by the Taliban's perceived control over the population, but it ultimately worsened the situation. Qazi argues that Pakistan's poorly controlled attacks and anti-American sentiments were among the factors that led to the emergence of the TTP in 2007.⁷⁵ The heavy reliance on poorly controlled hard power failed to quell the insurgency and exacerbated tensions within the local population. Establishing trust and confidence within the population could have been a valuable component of Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategy, but it was largely overlooked.

⁷² Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink*

⁷³ Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan's North-West Frontier," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): 73–88.

⁷⁴ Akhtar, "The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA."

⁷⁵ Shehzad H. Qazi, "Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 574–602, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.601865>.

The support that terrorist groups garnered from the local population in the FATA, exacerbated by the poor performance of the armed forces, provided them with a significant advantage, thereby compelling the government to negotiate amid rising losses. Multiple peace agreements were brokered within the early years following the emergence of the TTP, and the government took the contentious step of releasing and granting amnesty to militants in exchange for their renunciation of violence.⁷⁶ However, these peace deals proved short-lived as the insurgents persisted in demanding the implementation of their version of Sharia Law, a demand the government regarded as unconstitutional and potentially perilous to Pakistan's stability.⁷⁷ The government was negotiating from a position of weakness, enabling the growth and power of the insurgents. This dynamic situation highlights the challenges governments face when dealing with insurgencies, where a delicate balance must be struck between addressing the legitimate concerns of marginalized populations and upholding the rule of law. The lack of public support also illustrates the need for comprehensive strategies that encompass not only military operations but also efforts to win the population's support and address underlying grievances to achieve lasting peace in conflict-affected regions.

Another critical factor that significantly hindered an effective response was the military's weakness in projecting precise hard power, primarily due to a lack of appropriate training and equipment tailored for effective counterinsurgency operations. Historically, Pakistan's primary security concern revolved around its regional rivalry with India, which made it invest more in conventional warfare strategies despite its propensity to face insurgencies.⁷⁸ Pakistan had confronted a major insurgent movement in the 1970s when Baloch separatists sought their own state.⁷⁹ However, the Pakistani government managed to quell this insurgency mainly using conventional approaches and relying on overwhelming firepower. Consequently, there was limited emphasis on developing the

⁷⁶ Akhtar, "The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA."

⁷⁷ Javaid, "Zarb-e-Azb and the State of Security in Pakistan."

⁷⁸ Riedel, *Deadly Embrace*.

⁷⁹ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 249–81.

military's capacity in counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, recurrent losses in wars with India further reinforced Pakistan's commitment to bolstering its conventional capabilities.⁸⁰ This institutional weakness within the military became apparent in 2007 with the emergence of the TTP. It became increasingly evident that the Pakistani military was ill-equipped to address the challenges posed by insurgency in the FATA, particularly against a former ally with established linkages in the region. This recognition of the military's challenges in containing the insurgent threat resulted in a re-negotiated pact with the U.S. government that allowed more direct involvement in its counterinsurgency campaign.⁸¹

Although Pakistan began receiving substantial external support from the United States in 2009, the immediate effectiveness of this support was limited. Between 2009 and 2011, Pakistan received extraordinary financial allocations under the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants, with funds in 2010 and 2011 exceeding those of any previous or subsequent years.⁸² Additionally, U.S. drones played a pivotal role in disrupting terrorist networks, particularly in North Waziristan, a stronghold of the TTP.⁸³ However, despite this increased aid, terrorist-related deaths reached their highest levels in those years, increasing from 1,487 in 2009 to a peak of 2,876 in 2013.⁸⁴ The Pakistani military still lacked the capacity to exploit the effects of the United States' increased military involvement due to the United States' unpopularity in the country and Pakistan's inability to penetrate communities that hosted the TTP's strongholds. As a result, insurgents had ample time to recover, regroup, and persist with their attacks, highlighting the limitations of external assistance that is not complemented by effective domestic strategies and community engagement.

⁸⁰ Riedel, *Deadly Embrace*.

⁸¹ Mir, "What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan."

⁸² U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country – Pakistan," *ForeignAssistance.gov*, 2023, <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/pakistan/2010/disbursements/0>.

⁸³ Asfandiyar Mir, Tamanna Salikuddin, and Andrew Watkins, "Is Pakistan Poised to Take on the TTP?," *United States Institute of Peace*, February 14, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/pakistan-poised-take-ttp>.

⁸⁴ START, "Pakistan – Terrorism Deaths."

The impact of U.S. drone strikes became evident when they led to the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud, the founding leader of the TTP, in 2009.⁸⁵ Mehsud's death triggered a rift within the organization, with senior TTP commanders vying for leadership, leading to numerous defections within the group's ranks. Reports from the New America Foundation revealed that between 2008 and 2011, U.S. drone strikes successfully targeted and eliminated 25 al-Qaeda leaders and 10 TTP top commanders.⁸⁶ However, it is important to acknowledge that these drone strikes also had unintended consequences and caused collateral damage, which resulted in physical and psychological harm that strengthened the terrorists' narrative and recruitment efforts.⁸⁷ But again, the inability of the Pakistani military to penetrate the civilian population, combined with its hesitancy to participate in the American drone program, resulted in weak intelligence-sharing between the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which was responsible for overseeing drone operations, and the Pakistan Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence.⁸⁸ This limited cooperation hampered the full potential of drone strikes in achieving strategic goals. As a result, both states faced challenges that called for a shift in strategy, particularly in Islamabad, to better align their efforts for more effective counterinsurgency operations.

B. ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN'S REVISED COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACH POST-2013

In 2014, Pakistan adopted a more comprehensive NAP, which incorporated soft power measures into the hard power that enabled the country to decimate the TTP in the FATA.⁸⁹ The policy consisted of 20 agenda items; the military had two roles providing

⁸⁵ Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan," *Council on Foreign Relations* 90, no. 4 (2011): 12–18.

⁸⁶ Mir, "What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan."

⁸⁷ Shala Cachelin, "The U.S. Drone Programme, Imperial Air Power and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 15, no. 2 (April 3, 2022): 441–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.2013025>.

⁸⁸ Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, *The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017).

⁸⁹ Shahid Ahmad Afridi, "Pakistan's Counterinsurgency: Military and Civilian Approach," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* 36, no. 3 (2016): 21–37.

kinetic operations, while the remaining 18 points were non-kinetic measures under the domain of the civilian government.⁹⁰ Notable among the civilian roles was the extension of administrative governance and development reforms in the FATA. The NAP contributed to the effectiveness of Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign by unifying the effort between hard and soft power approaches to counterinsurgency. Operation Zarb-e-Arb, meaning "sharp and cutting strike," was launched in 2014 with a *Clear, Hold, Build*, and *Transfer* strategy.⁹¹ This strategy involved the Army stabilizing the security situation in the *Clear* and *Hold* phases, while the civilian government engaged the local population through reforms aimed at gaining trust and confidence in the *Build* and *Transfer* phases. From the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Arb in 2014, Pakistan's hard power measures became more effective in degrading the TTP's fighting capabilities. After terrorist-related deaths in Pakistan reached a peak of 2,876 in 2013, these numbers began consistently decreasing, with 2014 recording 2,411 deaths.⁹² Additionally, when Pakistan started implementing soft power measures in 2018 with the FATA reforms, the TTP's cohesion had been substantially degraded in the region. During this period, terrorist-related deaths had significantly reduced, from 1,076 in 2017 to 697 in 2018, and then to 196 in 2021. The soft power measures aimed at strengthening state authority in the FATA ensure the sustenance of the gains achieved through military operations.

The effects of U.S. assistance began to manifest in 2014, coinciding with the NAP, enhanced counterinsurgency training, and the deployment of modern equipment during Operation Zarb-e-Arb. This period marked the completion of deliveries of critical military platforms. Notable among the platforms received through FMF grants and foreign military sale agreements were 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters for the Pakistani Army and 18 of the newest models of F-16 fighter jets for the Pakistani Air Force.⁹³ The delivery of the F-16 jets was completed in 2014, and the jets were used extensively to aid military operations

⁹⁰ "National Action Plan," National Counter Terrorism Authority, 2014, <https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/>.

⁹¹ Akhtar, "The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA."

⁹² START, "Pakistan – Terrorism Deaths."

⁹³ Susan B. Epstein and Alan K. Kronstadt, "Pakistan: United States Foreign Assistance," *Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East* 3, no. 2 (2012): 241–92.

against the TTP strongholds in North Waziristan.⁹⁴ In addition to the direct involvement of the U.S. Special Operations Command in assisting Pakistani counterterrorism efforts on the ground, the Pentagon also provided training for Pakistan's FC personnel, who were now integrated into the military's operations.⁹⁵ The welfare of the FC personnel was also enhanced, with the U.S. facilitating better salaries and equipment for the paramilitary unit.⁹⁶ This aid attracted more persons to the FC, which partnered with the military in intelligence-gathering activities. This strategy enhanced the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency campaign due to the advantage of the FC's local knowledge. For instance, the FC's intelligence-gathering efforts established that insurgents always return for their dead after an attack, allowing the military to adjust its strategy and neutralize returning insurgents.⁹⁷ Overall, U.S. assistance played a vital role in enhancing the capabilities of the Pakistani security forces in implementing effective hard power, which was necessary to establish a secure environment and allow for other soft power measures.

Pakistan's enhanced military capability enabled a more precise use of force, destroying insurgents' strongholds while, at the same time, minimizing collateral damage.⁹⁸ The U.S. drone strikes, which continued to disrupt the cohesion of terrorist groups, were now followed by a ground invasion by a more effective Pakistani military that had also transformed from an enemy-centric approach, which resulted in very high collateral damage, to a more population-centric model that focused on protecting the civilian population while pursuing terrorists.⁹⁹ These enhanced operations are evident in the reduction in civilian deaths due to the military campaign. In 2013, civilian casualties stood at 2,713, declined to 1,471 in 2014, and fell consistently to 142 in 2019 (the last year

⁹⁴ "Pakistan – Air Force Summary," Janes, April 27, 2023, https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_1009/air-force.

⁹⁵ Epstein and Kronstadt, "Pakistan: United States Foreign Assistance."

⁹⁶ Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, "Recalibrating U.S.–Pakistan Relations," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (August 2012): 93–107, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706521>.

⁹⁷ Mullick.

⁹⁸ Akhtar, "The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA."

⁹⁹ Akhtar.

for which data is available).¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the military adopted a strategic shift by establishing small outposts in cleared areas instead of withdrawing to forward-operating bases, preventing insurgents from returning to their old camps.¹⁰¹ This strategy aligned with the NAP framework to “hold” cleared areas and allow other soft power approaches to be implemented by the civilian government. This shift in military strategy emphasizes the critical role of security stabilization in enabling soft power measures such as socio-economic development. Without a secure environment and population security, these soft power initiatives are inherently limited, as the support and trust of the population are prerequisites for their success.

Pakistan also bolstered its border management to prevent further infiltration of terrorists into the region, intensifying its 2,640 km border fencing initiative in 2017.¹⁰² This extensive project was fortified with surveillance cameras, infrared detectors, and approximately 1,000 forts.¹⁰³ Such an endeavor is integral to an effective counterinsurgency response for several reasons: it prevents an unrestricted influx of terrorists and their resources, promotes intelligence sharing, disrupts local support networks, and helps the state promote stability and development. These aspects had been starkly lacking in the historical handling of the FATA since Pakistan’s inception as a nation. The decision to fortify the border also aligned with previous efforts, particularly those supported by the United States, which allocated substantial funding to enhance the capabilities of the FC in border security.¹⁰⁴ Since the ramping up of the border fencing project, there has been a remarkable reduction in suicide attacks, frequently originating from the Afghan side of the border, with annual fatalities falling by about 90 percent in

¹⁰⁰ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Datasheet – Pakistan: Yearly Fatalities.”

¹⁰¹ Akhtar, “The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s FATA.”

¹⁰² Ali et al., “Evaluation of Effectiveness of Fence on a Country’s Border.”

¹⁰³ Abdul Basit, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Fence: A Step in the Right Direction,” Al Jazeera, February 25, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/2/25/the-pak-afghan-border-fence-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction>.

¹⁰⁴ Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Aids Pakistan’s Frontier Corps in Bid to Secure Border,” *Inside Washington Publishers*, August 14, 2008.

2018, compared to previous years.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the fence led to a notable reduction in cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, decreasing from 82 in 2019 to just 11 in 2020, before a slight uptick in 2021 following the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan.¹⁰⁶ The Taliban mainly planned these attacks to prevent Pakistan from completing the fence project. In May 2021, militants from Afghanistan ambushed and killed four FC soldiers and injured six others mobilizing for fencing operations.¹⁰⁷ Thus, the Taliban clearly recognize the fence's effectiveness in curbing the infiltration of terrorists into Pakistan.

Military action typically accounts for only about 20 percent of a successful counterinsurgency effort, with the remaining 80 percent relying on targeted political action to address the underlying factors.¹⁰⁸ With the TTP's strongholds effectively dismantled through military operations, Pakistan turned to soft power measures to sustain military gains and increase state authority in the region. The historic Constitutional Amendment, which merged the FATA with the adjacent province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in 2018, marked the first step in strengthening state-society relations that had been weak with the previous FCR that governed the region.¹⁰⁹ These improved relations are clear indicators of success in Pakistan's soft power efforts in the FATA. Notably, there has been an increasing engagement of tribal youths in the state's political process, driven by a heightened awareness of social and political issues, which is a fallout of improved security. In the year of the FATA merger, the region witnessed a rise in voter turnout, from 27.37 percent in 2008 to 35.05 percent in 2018.¹¹⁰ Additionally, since Pakistan began strengthening state institutions in the region, terrorist incidents originating from the FATA

¹⁰⁵ Ali et al., "Evaluation of Effectiveness of Fence on a Country's Border."

¹⁰⁶ Basit, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Fence: A Step in the Right Direction."

¹⁰⁷ Sanchita Bhattacharya, "Afghanistan: A Child's Nightmare," *South Asia Intelligence Review* 19, no. 47 (May 17, 2021), <https://www.satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-19-No-47>.

¹⁰⁸ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 1–10.

¹⁰⁹ Asghar Khan, *Mainstreaming the Tribal Areas (Ex-FATA) of Pakistan Bordering Afghanistan*.

¹¹⁰ Raja Qaiser Ahmed, Mohammad Ishaq, and Muhammad Shoaib, "The Changing Political Trends in Erstwhile FATA: A Study of the Last Three Elections," *International Area Studies Review* 24, no. 4 (December 2021): 335–48, <https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659211013652>.

have lessened. The number of terrorist incidents dropped from 129 in 2017 to 27 in 2018 and further decreased to just one in 2019.¹¹¹ This compelling trajectory underscores that, in the delicate realm of counterinsurgency, nurturing state-society relations and institutions is not merely advantageous, it is essential.

Addressing the prevalent socio-economic deprivation in the FATA was another facet of Pakistan's strategy to build trust within the local population. The FATA had long suffered from severe socio-economic marginalization, with approximately 60 percent of its population living in poverty.¹¹² Following the weakening of the TTP in the FATA and its merger with the neighboring KPK province, the Pakistani government formulated economic reforms to enhance the living standards of the locals. In 2020, the KPK administration launched a Tribal Decade Strategy (TDS), which aims to address the socio-economic disparities and bring the region in line with the national average.¹¹³ This initiative entailed an impressive 206 critical areas for intervention, spanning sectors such as education, healthcare, and community-driven development projects across the newly merged districts. The government also provided tax incentives to enhance regional trade and commerce.¹¹⁴ This strategy holds the promise of fostering economic development and generating job opportunities for the local population. Unfortunately, the initial years of the TDS coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in reduced funding that hampered the strategy's progress.¹¹⁵ While it is too soon for an assessment of the effectiveness of

¹¹¹ South Asia Terrorism Portal, "Datasheet – FATA: Number of Terrorism Related Incidents Year Wise," South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2023, <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/incidents-data/pakistan-fata>.

¹¹² Asmatullah Khan Wazir, *FATA Reforms: Journey So Far and the Way Forward* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, July 5, 2013), <http://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/270.pdf>.

¹¹³ Planning and Development Department. *Tribal Decade Strategy 2020–2030*, (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, May 2019), <https://pndkp.gov.pk/2020/11/30/tribal-decade-strategy-2020-2030/>.

¹¹⁴ "Sales Tax Exemption for FATA and PATA," Khyber Pakhtun Revenue Authority, March 15, 2019, <https://kpra.gov.pk/notification/sales-tax-exemption-for-fata-and-pata/>.

¹¹⁵ Mohammad Ashfaq, "Uplift Plan for Tribal Districts in Jeopardy over Funds Shortage," Dawn, October 5, 2020, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1583248/uplift-plan-for-tribal-districts-in-jeopardy-over-funds-shortage>.

these measures, they represent significant steps towards mending the historically strained state-society relations in the FATA.

Finally, it is noteworthy that at the time of this writing, Pakistan is experiencing a resurgence in violent activities perpetrated by non-state armed groups. Many of these new violent actions are rooted in the state collapse in Afghanistan and the reinstatement of the Taliban government.¹¹⁶ This has provided the TTP with an opportunity to regroup and find shelter under the auspices of the Taliban, with which the Pakistani government now has a strained relationship. This resurgence aligns with existing literature, which highlights the susceptibility of transitional phases to a resurgence of violence, particularly with a contiguous external state providing safe havens for insurgents.¹¹⁷ In this transitional period, Pakistan's counterinsurgency and state-building efforts must remain resilient and adaptable to safeguard the substantial gains achieved thus far and prevent any relapse.

C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategy has transformed to address the country's unique threat environment. The initial surge of insurgency in the FATA following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was primarily attributed to the absence of a robust state presence in the region and the application of inappropriate counterinsurgency strategies. Pakistan's tactics relied heavily on the use of force with insufficient regard for protecting the civilian population. This heavy-handed military approach contributed to the emergence of the homegrown Pakistan Taliban in 2007, a group determined to confront the Pakistani military, which the Pakistan Taliban perceived as fighting an American-led war. The state's mistakes provided insurgents with both the physical and the social space to challenge state authority.

Beginning in 2014, Pakistan began to witness notable success in its counterinsurgency efforts, with external military aid from the United States becoming

¹¹⁶ Imtiaz Gul, "Explaining the Resurgence of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan," East Asia Forum, March 29, 2023, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/29/explaining-the-resurgence-of-terrorist-violence-in-pakistan/>.

¹¹⁷ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3–75.

increasingly effective. With the military strengthened as an institution, Pakistan adopted a more population-centric approach to counterinsurgency with the NAP, minimizing collateral damage in its military operations. While strengthening the military was pivotal, this alone cannot account for the achievements made. The longstanding state weakness in the FATA necessitated other soft power measures to sustain the gains achieved through hard power approaches. This involved introducing fundamental aspects of state-building, such as strengthening state presence and addressing the historical grievances prevalent in the marginalized region.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AGAINST THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

The Boko Haram (BH) menace in Nigeria's northeast region has been the country's topmost security challenge over the last two decades. The group's first leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was adept in the Taliban's ideology, having received his training from Muhammad Alli, a former follower of the Taliban.¹¹⁸ Hence, BH shares a similar Salafist ideology with terrorist groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Though not initially formed as a violent organization, BH resorted to violence in 2009 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, who sought revenge against the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf in police custody.¹¹⁹ Since then, the group has employed several tactics, including suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices, and propaganda, to instill fear in the population while also operating as an insurgency.¹²⁰ In 2015, the Global Terrorism Index ranked the group as the world's deadliest terrorist organization due to the high number of deaths (5,567) associated with BH attacks.¹²¹

Like Pakistan, Nigeria adopted counterterrorism strategies comprising hard and soft power but has yet to achieve the same level of success as Pakistan. Nigeria's terrorist-related deaths peaked at a significantly higher number (7,775 deaths in 2014) compared to Pakistan (2,876 deaths in 2013), despite Pakistan having a slightly larger population.¹²² Additionally, while terrorist-related deaths have declined to the low hundreds in Pakistan, they remain in the thousands in Nigeria. This chapter presents an investigation of the

¹¹⁸ Ona Ekhomu, *Boko Haram: Security Considerations and the Rise of an Insurgency* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2020), 5.

¹¹⁹ Alaba Omolaye-Ajileye, "Legal Framework for the Prevention of Terrorism in Nigeria," *National Judicial Institute Law Journal* 11 (2015): 19-43.

¹²⁰ Gana, Samsu, and Ismail, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Changing the Pattern of Counterinsurgency," 128.

¹²¹ Institute for Economics and Peace, "Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism," ReliefWeb, 2015, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2015-measuring-and-understanding-impact-terrorism>.

¹²² START, "Nigeria – Terrorism Deaths."

factors that account for the variation in success between the two campaigns. The author argues that Pakistan and Nigeria faced similar challenges at the early stages of their counterinsurgency operations due to relatively weak capabilities, but Pakistan was able to improve its performance mainly due to more U.S. intervention and a shift toward a more balanced counterinsurgency strategy that incorporated soft-power elements after the TTP's presence was reduced in the FATA.

A. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AT THE EARLY STAGES OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY (2009–2014)

As with Pakistan, Nigeria lacked the institutional capacity to address the BH threat in 2009 when the group turned violent. Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, the country's state structures, national institutions, and state-society ties have been severely hampered by challenges associated with post-colonial state-building.¹²³ The adverse effects of these challenges are acutely felt in Nigeria's northeastern region, particularly in Borno State, the epicenter of the BH insurgency, because of its marginal geographic location and socio-economic conditions. In 2008, Nigeria's Central Bank reported that eight of the country's 10 poorest states were from the northern regions, with poverty rates there as high as 95 percent.¹²⁴ This alarming poverty rate starkly underscores the glaring inadequacies of state institutions in delivering effective governance to the region.

Even as early as 2002, ominous signs of BH extremism were apparent in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State, with repeated warnings from Muslim clerics.¹²⁵ However, the state's capacity to counter this nascent threat was notably lacking, and its efforts at the time merely succeeded in relocating the group to Kanama, a town along the border, where

¹²³ Ilufeye Sarafa Ogundiya, "Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and Some Explanations," *The Anthropologist* 11, no. 4 (October 2009): 281–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09720073.2009.11891117>.

¹²⁴ Hakeem Onapajo and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the State, and the International System," *African Security Review* 21, no. 3 (September 2012): 24–39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2012.687693>.

¹²⁵ Onapajo and Uzodike, 26.

it carried out extremist activities unrestricted.¹²⁶ By the time BH turned violent, it was able to disrupt the governance structure in most of the 27 local government areas (LGAs) within Borno State, establishing alternative governance in these areas between 2014 and 2015.¹²⁷ Notably, in 2014, BH declared the town of Gwoza, one of the largest LGA in Borno State, under Islamic rule and designated it as the headquarters of its self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate.¹²⁸ Historically considered weak and under-resourced, these LGAs proved highly susceptible to contestation by violent non-state actors (VNSAs).¹²⁹

Nigeria's early responses to BH bear similarities with Pakistan's early counterinsurgency approach: they were indiscriminate, alienated the civilian population, and inadvertently fueled the insurgent movement. Initially, the BH insurgency was perceived as a law enforcement issue, prompting the state to assign the preexisting anti-criminal, police-led Operation Flush to tackle the burgeoning security crisis.¹³⁰ However, the police, in the course of their duties, displayed poor judgment in several instances. A significant flashpoint occurred on June 11, 2009, when the police shot and killed 17 BH members attending a funeral procession. This incident unfolded after a confrontation arose over BH members' refusal to adhere to state laws requiring motorcyclists to wear crash helmets.¹³¹ Such unprofessional conduct continued unchecked and ultimately culminated in the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf while in police custody on July 30, 2009.¹³² Yusuf's death triggered an upsurge in BH violence as the group sought

¹²⁶ Andrew Walker, "What Is Boko Haram?," USIP Special Report 308 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2012), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf>.

¹²⁷ David Mickler, Muhammad Dan Suleiman, and Benjamin Maiangwa, "'Weak State', Regional Power, Global Player: Nigeria and the Response to Boko Haram," *African Security* 12, no. 3–4 (October 2, 2019): 272–99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2019.1667052>.

¹²⁸ Dave Bohon, "Boko Haram Declares Islamic 'Caliphate' in Nigerian Town," *The New American*, August 31, 2014, <https://thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/boko-haram-declares-islamic-caliphate-in-nigerian-town/>.

¹²⁹ Marissa Bell and Katja Starc Card, *Maiduguri: City Scoping Study* (Manchester, UK: African Cities Research Consortium, June 2021), <https://www.african-cities.org/maiduguri/>.

¹³⁰ Ekhomu, *Boko Haram*.

¹³¹ Ekhomu.

¹³² Abosede Omowumi Babatunde et al., *Managing Violent Religious Extremism in Fragile States: Building Institutional Capacity in Nigeria and Kenya* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2022), 109–110.

vengeance. With violence escalating and spreading to other states in the northeast region, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered a military offensive in 2011 codenamed “Operation Restore Order,” replacing Operation Flush.¹³³ From 447 terrorist-related deaths at the commencement of Operation Restore Order in 2011, this number spiked, leading to the peak of 7,775 terrorist-related deaths in 2014.¹³⁴ The Nigerian response and results bore similarity to Pakistan’s early counterinsurgency efforts, where the military’s response was also largely indiscriminate due to its incapacity to effectively differentiate terrorists and the civilian population, exacerbating the cycle of violence.¹³⁵ This ineffective approach limited the trust and confidence of the population, a crucial factor for acquiring credible intelligence on BH activities.

As in Pakistan, the ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s initial actions led the Nigerian government to seek—ultimately unsuccessfully—to appease the terrorists by negotiating a peace deal in 2013. Nigeria had previous experience negotiating with VNSAs that threatened its national sovereignty. In 2009, it granted amnesty to members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), an insurgent group causing turmoil in the oil-rich Niger Delta region.¹³⁶ This amnesty ended MEND’s insurgent activities. Consequently, Nigeria tried a similar approach with BH. In 2013, former president Olusegun Obasanjo brokered a peace deal with some BH members, providing \$300,000 as compensation to the family of the late Mohammed Yusuf.¹³⁷ Unfortunately, this peace deal was short-lived, as opposing sect members brutally murdered the compensation recipient a few days after the agreement, resisting any form of negotiation and reasserting their desire to establish an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria.¹³⁸ As also observed

¹³³ Mickler, Suleiman, and Maiangwa, “‘Weak State’, Regional Power, Global Player.”

¹³⁴ START, “Nigeria – Terrorism Deaths.”

¹³⁵ Freedom C. Onuoha, “The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend,” *Security Journal* 25, no. 2 (April 2012): 134–51, <https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2011.15>.

¹³⁶ Afeno S. Odomovo, “Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria,” *The Age of Human Rights*, no. 3 (2014): 46–62.

¹³⁷ Gana, Samsu, and Ismail, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Changing the Pattern of Counterinsurgency,” 129.

¹³⁸ Gana, Samsu, and Ismail, 129.

with the FATA insurgency, negotiating with religious-motivated groups can be challenging, as these groups are driven by core ideologies that make compromise difficult. Moreover, the attempts at negotiation in both cases occurred when the governments' weaknesses had been exposed through their initial ineffective and counterproductive actions.

In yet another parallel with Pakistan, an ineffective judicial system hindered the counterinsurgency response in Nigeria. In 2011, the Nigerian government enacted its first anti-terrorism law, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA), to prosecute acts of terrorism against the state.¹³⁹ Although the TPA met the UN's international standards with its 2013 amendments, the government's inability to fully implement the TPA's provisions has hindered its effectiveness as a counterterrorism measure. Prolonged detention of suspects without trial has fueled dissent by locals against the state and, in some cases, contributed to radicalizing innocent individuals held in custody alongside hardened terrorists.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, the trial of suspected terrorists has been slow, as judges have been reluctant to hear cases involving terrorist suspects, fearing reprisals against their families by BH terrorists.¹⁴¹ The initial indiscriminate actions by the military can also be tied to the ineffectiveness of the judicial system in both cases. The absence of expeditious delivery of justice can provoke summary execution from the military, which does not want to take responsibility for detaining suspects in its custody for long periods without trial.

Again as with Pakistan, Nigeria faced the challenge of ineffective border policing, allowing BH terrorists to cross the country's borders relatively easily. Nigeria's northeast borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon have historically been porous since these countries gained their independence.¹⁴² These three countries and Nigeria, collectively known as the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) countries, share cultural and ethno-religious

¹³⁹ E.U. Ejeh, A.I. Bappah, and Yusuf Dankofa, "Nature of Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Laws in Nigeria," *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence* 10, no. 2 (2019): 186–92.

¹⁴⁰ Michael D. Hanson, "Enforcement of Counterterrorism Treaties within the Framework of Terrorism (Prevention) Act in Nigeria," *African Journal on Terrorism* 9, no. 2 (2020): 71–86.

¹⁴¹ Onapajo and Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria."

¹⁴² Okolie-Osemene and Aluko, "Border Porosity and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria."

affinities, as do communities on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border.¹⁴³ When Boko Haram turned to violence in 2009, Nigeria lacked a clear border management capability, which insurgents exploited to smuggle weapons and recruit fighters from their tribal and religious kin in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.¹⁴⁴ This free movement across porous borders was eerily reminiscent of the Afghan-Pakistani border situation, where militants could traverse relatively easily, exploiting cultural affinities and community ties. Moreover, Nigeria, like Pakistan, initially adopted a self-reliant strategy for counterinsurgency, which proved ineffective, as insurgents easily launched attacks on troops and escaped through the communities around border areas.¹⁴⁵ This strategic failure underscored the pressing need for more robust border management, intelligence-sharing, and cross-border cooperation among the LCB nations to curb the menace of BH and secure the region.

In terms of external intervention, the U.S. government imposed restrictions on its assistance to Nigeria during the early years of the BH insurgency, which limited Nigeria's capacity to respond effectively. Following several reports from Amnesty International accusing the Nigerian military of human rights violations, the United States was hesitant to support Nigeria, citing the Leahy Act, which prohibits arms sales to governments engaged in human rights violations.¹⁴⁶ The United States also blocked arms sales from other U.S. allies to Nigeria, including American-built Cobra helicopters from Israel and A-29 Super Tucano fighter aircraft.¹⁴⁷ These platforms were critical for conducting precise air strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, which are essential in counterinsurgency operations. Thus, the arms embargo came at a critical juncture in

¹⁴³ Daniel E. Agbiboa, "Borders That Continue to Bother Us: The Politics of Cross-Border Security Cooperation in Africa's Lake Chad Basin," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 55, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 403–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2017.1312730>.

¹⁴⁴ Virginia Comolli, "The Regional Problem of Boko Haram," *Survival* 57, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 109–17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1068560>.

¹⁴⁵ Okolie-Osemene and Aluko, "Border Porosity and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria."

¹⁴⁶ Stephanie Burchard and Stephen Burgess, "U.S. Training of African Forces and Military Assistance, 1997–2017: Security versus Human Rights in Principal–Agent Relations," *African Security* 11, no. 4 (October 2, 2018): 339–69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560969>.

¹⁴⁷ Abimbola Joseph Owojori, Omolara Akinyemi, and Muhammad Danial Azman, "Counterterrorism Cooperation: A Critical Appraisal of Nigeria-United States Counterterrorism Cooperation," *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* 3, no. 2 (2022): 105–21, <https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.31920/2732-5008/2022/v3n2a5>.

Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign, when the military was ill-equipped and still relying on outdated weaponry last used during Nigeria's peace support campaigns in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s.¹⁴⁸ While Nigeria's human rights record was appalling, the United States was inconsistent in using such violations to withhold security assistance. In 2009, the U.S. Department of State assessed Pakistan's human rights record as poor, citing extrajudicial killings and torture.¹⁴⁹ As observed in Chapter II, the United States nevertheless dramatically increased its security assistance that year and those immediately following, perceiving a greater threat to its own security interests in Pakistan. External assistance alone did not improve counterinsurgency effectiveness in Pakistan, but in combination with an improved strategy and state-building initiatives, it proved critical.

B. ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S REVISED COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AGAINST THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY POST-2014

In parallel to Pakistan's evolving strategy, Nigeria in 2015 shifted away from its exclusive reliance on domestic capabilities and sought increased international support to bolster the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency campaign. This transformation marked the revival of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) among the LCB countries and Benin Republic, forming a collaborative front to combat the BH threat.¹⁵⁰ Such an approach, coupled with a brief engagement of a South African-based private military company (PMC), yielded notable successes in regaining territories previously seized by BH in Borno State.¹⁵¹ During this period, there was also a substantial reduction in terrorist-related deaths, dropping from 5,567 in 2015 to 2,174 in 2016.¹⁵² Despite these achievements, BH retained its potency and adapted its tactics, transitioning from holding

¹⁴⁸ Owojori, Akinyemi, and Azman, 114.

¹⁴⁹ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Washington, DC: Department of State, March 11, 2010), <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136092.htm>.

¹⁵⁰ Lanre Olu-Adeyemi and Makanjuola T. Shaibu, "Is There a Borderline in Nigeria's Northeast? Multi-National Joint Task Force and Counterinsurgency Operation in Perspective," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (May 31, 2020): 33–45, <https://doi.org/10.5897/AJPSIR2019.1198>.

¹⁵¹ Amao, "A Decade of Terror," 369.

¹⁵² START, "Nigeria – Terrorism Deaths."

territory to launching coordinated attacks from its hideouts along the border of the LCB countries and the Sambisa Forest in Borno State.¹⁵³

In January 2015, Nigeria enlisted the services of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection International (STTEP), a South African-based PMC.¹⁵⁴ The firm deployed personnel and advanced equipment, including helicopter gunships, seamlessly integrating with Nigeria's 72 Mobile Strike Force, training Nigerian soldiers and actively engaging in combat operations against BH.¹⁵⁵ One of STTEP's most valuable contributions was their ability to execute precise operations, especially during nighttime raids deep into BH-controlled territory, a capability the Nigerian military lacked at the time. STTEP's presence and actions profoundly impacted the morale of Nigerian military forces, directly contributing to the successful recapture of Gwoza and Bama LGAs from the clutches of BH.¹⁵⁶ However, despite their promising start, STTEP's contract was abruptly terminated in March 2015, barely three months into their operations, due to non-payment of entitlements.¹⁵⁷ The impact STTEP achieved within a short time underscores the poor state of the Nigerian military and highlights the valuable contribution external interventions by more capable states can make in enhancing counterinsurgency outcomes in weaker states, yet another parallel to Pakistan.

Nigeria's improved counterinsurgency effectiveness was due to its grudging decision to seek external assistance. This paradigm shift gained momentum following the election of Muhammadu Buhari in 2015.¹⁵⁸ Among President Buhari's first official travels

¹⁵³ Jacob Zenn and Zacharias Pieri, "Boko Haram," in *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, ed. Andrew Silke (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018), 278–91.

¹⁵⁴ Caroline Varin, "Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security Companies on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram," *African Security Review* 27, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 144–57, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1489863>.

¹⁵⁵ Antonino Adamo, "The Terrorist and the Mercenary: Private Warriors against Nigeria's Boko Haram," *African Studies* 79, no. 3 (July 2, 2020): 339–59, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2020.1788920>.

¹⁵⁶ Arise News, "South African Mercenary Speaks on War against Boko Haram," video, 36:00, YouTube, December 14, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=qKf371K_QHU.

¹⁵⁷ Arise News.

¹⁵⁸ Eyder Peralta, "Muhammadu Buhari Becomes Nigeria's President," NPR, May 29, 2015, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/29/410493750/muhammadu-buhari-becomes-nigerias-president>.

after his inauguration in May was a visit to Washington, where he solicited enhanced U.S. security assistance.¹⁵⁹ While his visit was successful, it only yielded indirect (non-lethal) U.S. assistance in counterinsurgency training, intelligence sharing, and access to U.S. advisory teams, as the United States continued to fear becoming implicated in human rights abuses.¹⁶⁰ The United States also included humanitarian aid and support to programs to counter violent extremism. Although these facets are vital, Nigeria's friendly bilateral relations with the United States have not translated to effective counterinsurgency outcomes as they did in Pakistan, due to U.S. priorities. Despite Nigeria being the hotbed of the BH insurgency, the United States has provided more direct aid to Nigeria's neighbors. In 2015, it sent 300 troops to Cameroon to stop the spread of BH in that country.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, in 2019, it established an Air Base in Niger, from which U.S. drone assets operate around the LCB region.¹⁶² Unlike in Pakistan, where the U.S. drone campaign effectively degraded TTP's cohesion, drones in Nigeria are used primarily for intelligence operations around the LCB region.¹⁶³ The indirect/non-lethal nature of U.S. assistance to Nigeria and the country's reluctance to actively participate in Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations explain much of the difference in counterinsurgency success between Nigeria and Pakistan.

Nigeria has seen more success in engendering support from its fellow LCB countries through the MNJTF, but the general lack of capacity among these states has limited its effectiveness against BH. The MNJTF was reactivated in 2015 (it was initially established in 1994), with its areas of responsibility mainly along the borders of the LCB

¹⁵⁹ Linda Thomas-Greenfield, "Boko Haram and Its Regional Impact," U.S. Department of State, February 9, 2016, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2016/252357.htm>.

¹⁶⁰ Victor Chidubem Iwuoha, "United States' Security Governance in Nigeria: Implications on Counterterrorism Strategies Against Boko Haram," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 54, no. 8 (December 2019): 1175–94, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909619862846>.

¹⁶¹ Mark Rivett-Carnac, "The U.S. Is Sending 300 Military Personnel to Cameroon to Help Fight Boko Haram," *TIME*, October 15, 2015, <https://time.com/4074393/cameroon-boko-haram-us-troops/>.

¹⁶² Carla Babb, "US-Constructed Air Base in Niger Begins Operations," *Voice of America*, November 1, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_us-constructed-air-base-niger-begins-operations/6178666.html.

¹⁶³ Babb.

countries.¹⁶⁴ The African Union mandated the Force to “eliminate Boko Haram in order to create a safe and secure environment and facilitate the stabilization in areas affected by the activities of BH and other terrorist groups, by using all the necessary means within its capacity.”¹⁶⁵ The efforts of the MNJTF have indeed contributed to a marked reduction in terrorist-related deaths, as previously highlighted, and the recapturing of Nigerian territories previously under the control of BH. Between February and March 2015, the MNJTF liberated 10 of the 14 LGAs that were under BH control in Borno State.¹⁶⁶ These efforts pressured BH, particularly along the borders where BH had often sought refuge. Despite these achievements, the MNJTF has not succeeded in eliminating BH or its capacity to conduct large-scale attacks across the LCB region. A grim illustration of this reality was the tragic 2020 attack on Koshobe, a fishing community in Borno State, which resulted in the brutal killing of over 80 fishermen and farmers.¹⁶⁷ Challenges such as inadequate funding have also limited the effectiveness of the Force. Nigeria’s defense spending is significantly higher than that of all other LCB countries combined, making these countries financially dependent on Nigeria to sustain the task force.¹⁶⁸ In 2018, Niger and Chad withdrew their troops from the border areas, citing a lack of resources.¹⁶⁹

In response to the military’s initial indiscriminate action, mainly due to a lack of local knowledge of the theater of operations, the government sought to enhance the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency operations by integrating locally formed militias into its operations. In 2015, it commenced a reinvigorated joint operation codenamed Operation

¹⁶⁴ Olu-Adeyemi and Shaibu, “Is There Borderline in Nigeria’s Northeast?”

¹⁶⁵ “MNJTF Mandate,” Multinational Joint Task Force, accessed September 26, 2023, <https://mnjtffmm.org/mandates/>.

¹⁶⁶ Vesselin Popovski and Benjamin Maiangwa, “Boko Haram’s Attacks and the People’s Response: A ‘Fourth Pillar’ of the Responsibility to Protect?,” *African Security Review* 25, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 159–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2016.1152987>.

¹⁶⁷ START, “Boko Haram Incident Summary,” Global Terrorism Database, 2020, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=202011280009>.

¹⁶⁸ “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed September 30, 2023, <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>.

¹⁶⁹ John Campbell, “Recent Boko Haram Attacks Along Nigeria-Niger Border,” *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog), November 30, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/recent-boko-haram-attacks-along-nigeria-niger-border>.

Lafiya Dole, or “peace by force,” which combined the Nigerian military with members of the Civil Joint Task Force (CJTF), a group formed in 2013 comprising youths who carried out self-defense functions in Borno State.¹⁷⁰ This new civilian-military approach yielded some success due to the local knowledge the CJTF brought to bear in the operations.¹⁷¹ The CJTF played a pivotal role in bridging the communication gap between the military and the local populace, identifying and arresting BH members and generating critical intelligence to enhance operations.¹⁷² In several instances, the CJTF led the military to BH hideouts. During Operation Lafiya Dole, the CJTF played a crucial role in unearthing a significant BH ammunition cache buried in the Sambisa Forest.¹⁷³ Another noteworthy achievement was the CJTF intelligence-driven operation in the Dikwa LGA, which resulted in the recovery of four vehicles laden with IEDs intended for large-scale attacks on both military and civilian targets.¹⁷⁴ The CJTF’s composition shares similarities with Pakistan’s FC, which was primarily comprised of the local Pashtuns. However, a crucial distinction between these organizations lies in their formal status and training. While the FC is an official paramilitary organization with a certain level of training, the CJTF is a community entity with little or no military training. Furthermore, unlike the FC, which benefited from professionalization efforts with the assistance of the United States, there has been no formalization of the activities of the CJTF akin to Pakistan’s incorporation of the FC into the KPK police after the FATA merger. A well-defined strategy to establish the CJTF as a paramilitary organization is needed, particularly now that CJTF members bear arms for self-defense.

Despite the achievements made through the integration of the CJTF into military operations, Nigeria still does not hold liberated territories effectively, thereby allowing

¹⁷⁰ Babatunde et al., *Managing Violent Religious Extremism in Fragile States*.

¹⁷¹ Ekhomu, *Boko Haram*.

¹⁷² J. T. Omenma and C. M. Hendricks, “Counterterrorism in Africa: An Analysis of the Civilian Joint Task Force and Military Partnership in Nigeria,” *Security Journal* 31, no. 3 (July 2018): 764–94, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-018-0131-8>.

¹⁷³ Seun Bamidele, “The Civilian Joint Task Force and the Struggle against Insurgency in Borno State, Nigeria,” *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 7, no. 2 (2017): 85, <https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.7.2.04>.

¹⁷⁴ Bamidele.

continuous (re)infiltration by BH. In 2019, the Nigerian military adopted a “Super Camp” strategy, in which the army withdrew its troops from suburban areas to major towns in the northeast—the exact opposite of Pakistan’s strategy of dispersing its forces to hold territory and support building and transferring control to civilians.¹⁷⁵ This strategy aimed to reduce the number of military casualties among those deployed in less fortified small posts while simultaneously consolidating power at a strong base from where the military projects force into BH camps.¹⁷⁶ Its adoption underscores Nigeria’s continuing inability to eliminate the BH threat decisively: force protection leaves small, unprotected villages vulnerable, potentially explaining the increase in terrorist-related deaths, which rose to 2,102 in 2020, up from 1,718 in 2019, coinciding with the implementation of the Super Camp strategy.¹⁷⁷ It also highlights the significant impact U.S. assistance had in helping Pakistan degrade the fighting capabilities of the TTP while strengthening the military’s ability to conduct both force protection and population security, thus allowing for the “build” and “transfer” phases of its counterinsurgency operations. Without such assistance, BH retains sophisticated capabilities and the Nigerian military still grapples with a lack of capacity: dispersing military forces only makes them more susceptible to BH attacks rather than providing protection to local communities.

Unlike Pakistan, Nigeria still lacks an effective border management strategy, as terrorists still exploit the country’s porous borders to their advantage. A notable incident occurred in February 2018, when BH terrorists abducted 110 female students from the Government Girls Science and Technical College in Dapchi, a border community in northeastern Nigeria, and then transported them across the border into Niger.¹⁷⁸ While BH no longer actively controls any community in the northeast, it remains spread diffusely across the region, particularly in the border areas, launching attacks on the civilian

¹⁷⁵ Marc Antoine Pérouse De Montclos, “The Nigerian Military Response to Boko Haram: A Critical Analysis,” *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 10, no. 2 (2020): 65, <https://doi.org/10.2979/africanconfpeacrevi.10.2.04>.

¹⁷⁶ Babatunde et al., Managing Violent Religious Extremism in Fragile States.

¹⁷⁷ START, “Nigeria – Terrorism Deaths.”

¹⁷⁸ Olu-Adeyemi and Shaibu, “Is There Borderline in Nigerias Northeast?”

population and security forces.¹⁷⁹ This persistence in cross-border movement and attacks emphasizes the critical need for Nigeria to develop a comprehensive and robust border management strategy that effectively curtails terrorist activities across its borders along the lines of Pakistan's border fencing initiative in the FATA.

Finally, the effectiveness of Nigeria's counterinsurgency measures has also been undermined by the lack of sequencing between the country's hard and soft power measures. While the military primarily conducts kinetic operations, the government implements non-kinetic measures to address issues considered fueling factors for the insurgency. In 2016, President Buhari inaugurated the Presidential Committee on Northeast Initiative to coordinate all humanitarian and socio-economic reforms in the Northeast region.¹⁸⁰ The activities of this committee were later subsumed into the North-East Development Commission (NEDC), which was established in 2018 to lead the reconstruction and development of the northeast region.¹⁸¹ While these reforms are critical, they have been ineffective as the military has yet to eliminate the BH threat in the region decisively. In 2021, Mohammed Alkali, the managing director of the NEDC, expressed his frustration with the continuous BH attacks, which forced the organization "back to the drawing board" after each incident.¹⁸² The haphazard implementation between the hard and soft power measures has sometimes undermined the "unity of effort" principle needed for an effective counterinsurgency campaign. The setbacks in Nigeria's soft power measures are prominent because the military has yet to defeat BH. In contrast to Nigeria, Pakistan's reforms in the FATA occurred when securitization had been achieved and terrorist-related deaths had been reduced to the low hundreds, thus reinforcing the population's confidence gained

¹⁷⁹ Olu-Adeyemi and Shaibu.

¹⁸⁰ "Presidential Committee on North-East Initiative," Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2016, <https://statehouse.gov.ng/policy/councils-committees/presidential-committee-on-north-east-initiative/>.

¹⁸¹ David Kieghe, "Nigeria Unveils North East Development Commission," *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog), February 6, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-unveils-north-east-development-commission>

¹⁸² Musa Njadvra, "Boko Haram Attacks Stifling Reconstruction, Development Process in Borno – NEDC," *The Guardian*, April 21, 2021, <https://guardian.ng/news/boko-haram-attacks-stifling-reconstruction-development-process-in-borno-nedc/>.

from providing security. In Nigeria, terrorist-related deaths are still in the thousands, making development efforts seem irrelevant to the local population.

C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Nigeria remains entrenched in the active combat phase of its ongoing battle against the BH insurgent group. This phase is marked by a distinct weakness in state capacity, particularly in the military realm. Regrettably, Nigeria has not received the level of external assistance required from more capable states to bolster its military capabilities. The Nigerian government's struggle to decisively decimate the fighting potential of BH underlines the significant challenges associated with containing such extremist movements, especially when faced with weak state capacity and limited external support. In the absence of substantial aid to enhance its military capabilities, Nigeria continues to grapple with the complex and enduring threat posed by BH.

The Nigerian military, in collaboration with the LCB countries and the locally formed CJTF, has achieved notable successes in its campaign against BH. However, these successes have primarily fragmented BH into smaller groups, allowing them to sustain their activities and execute effective attacks on both civilian and military targets. These ongoing challenges have hindered the effective implementation of crucial soft power measures, such as socio-economic development initiatives in the conflict-ridden region. Despite the gains made, the persistent threat of BH's scattered elements underscores the complexity of the conflict and the need for continued efforts to bring lasting stability and development to the affected areas.

IV. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

This study contributes to resolving the ongoing debate concerning the efficacy of hard versus soft power counterinsurgency strategies. It presents the conclusion that a well-rounded approach is essential for achieving sustained success, with the effectiveness of soft power measures dependent upon prior accomplishments in hard power strategies when addressing violent insurgencies in ungoverned spaces. The study underscores the implications of state fragility, which can enable territorial contestation, and emphasizes the significant role played by a strong third-party state in directly assisting a weak state in counterinsurgency efforts. The study primarily focused on two regions: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and northeastern Nigeria, with a particular emphasis on Borno State. The insight gleaned from this comparative case study offers Nigeria some valuable lessons from Pakistan's experiences confronting territorial contestation by violent non-state actors (VNSAs). This chapter synthesizes the comparative findings, ultimately providing recommendations for strengthening the Nigerian government's counterinsurgency initiatives.

A. COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FOR NIGERIA – KEY FINDINGS

This study identified the critical role of targeted hard power application in countering insurgencies once they escalate into violence. It becomes evident that many weak states often lack the capacity to execute this kind of precise and measured hard power, which perpetuates a vicious cycle of violence due to indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population. Consequently, the primary revelation from this comparative analysis emphasizes the paramount importance of external intervention aimed at directly bolstering the capabilities of such vulnerable states. However, it is essential to emphasize that, while instrumental in ending violent actions, external assistance may not guarantee enduring peace and security. Instead, it serves as a catalyst for halting violent activities, creating a conducive environment for implementing other state actions. Hence, a holistic strategy encompassing both military and non-military measures is imperative to end the immediate

conflict and prevent a relapse into violence, ultimately paving the way for long-term peace and stability.

Since gaining independence, Nigeria has confronted a series of significant security challenges, posing substantial threats to its stability. In response to these challenges, the valiant endeavors of the Nigerian security apparatus, often in collaboration with the country's neighboring states, have played a pivotal role in averting the nation's collapse. Nigeria's current National Security Strategy (NSS) rightly advocates for a whole-of-government approach to address the growing security threats. However, the strategy has fallen short of effectively containing the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency. This is partly due to inadequate military capacity to decisively degrade BH's fighting capabilities and ineffective synchronization of the hard and soft power components of Nigeria's counterinsurgency strategy. While commendable progress has been made in containing the BH insurgency, the persistent threat of insurgent attacks remains. Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign has been plagued by some shortcomings, which have collectively impeded the overall effectiveness of this vital mission.

1. Inadequate Direct Foreign Military Assistance

Nigeria has benefitted from its friendly relationship with its neighbors in enhancing its counterinsurgency campaign. However, the absence of external aid from a strong state directly assisting its counterinsurgency effort has limited the effectiveness of the whole campaign. The United States remains Nigeria's most significant strategic partner, mainly in terms of economics.¹⁸³ However, the Nigerian leadership has not been able to persuade the U.S. government to directly aid its efforts in degrading the fighting capabilities of the BH terrorists. While it is evident that national interest plays a significant role in the United States' more substantial and proactive stance in Pakistan, Nigeria also has failed to leverage its strategic partnership with the United States toward better counterinsurgency outcomes.

The affiliation of BH with the Islamic State, resulting in its renaming as the Islamic State for West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015, introduces a range of dynamics that can

¹⁸³ "The United States and Nigeria: Strategic Partners," U.S. Department of State, November 18, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-nigeria-strategic-partners-2/>.

potentially impact Nigeria and the international community.¹⁸⁴ Just as Pakistan's FATA once served as a haven for terrorists to receive training and plan global attacks, Nigeria's northeast region could become a similar breeding ground if left unchecked. The attempted bombing of an American airliner on Christmas Day in 2009 by a radicalized Nigerian citizen is a compelling example, demonstrating that the Islamic State can exploit its networks in Nigeria to orchestrate international acts of terrorism.¹⁸⁵ Despite these critical challenges and security concerns, Nigerian politicians have not demonstrated diplomatic dexterity in using their cordial bilateral relations with the United States to address the BH threat effectively. This shortfall represents a missed opportunity for enhancing counterinsurgency cooperation between the two nations.

2. Border Porosity

One of the glaring shortcomings in Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign is the persistent challenge of border security. Beyond the fact that BH gets some of its weaponry through its attacks on the Nigerian military, the porous borders have made it continuously possible for arms smuggling and recruitment of foreign fighters. This issue not only sustains the insurgency but also poses a grave threat to national stability, as it has the potential to fuel various forms of criminal activities within the state. Furthermore, the unchecked arms flow and cross-border recruitment can amplify the impact of the conflict, potentially worsening its implication on neighboring countries. Such a scenario could negatively impact international relations and regional stability, underscoring the urgent need for comprehensive and effective border security measures.

3. Inability to Hold Liberated Communities

The absence of an effective community policing system has contributed to the Nigerian government's struggle in combating the BH insurgency. While BH may not have

¹⁸⁴ J. Peter Pham, "Boko Haram: The Strategic Evolution of the Islamic State's West Africa Province," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2016.1152571>.

¹⁸⁵ Mercy Ette, "Nigeria as a Country of Interest in Terrorism: Newspaper Framing of Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Underwear Bomber," *Journal of African Media Studies* 4, no. 1 (2012): 45–59.

direct control over Nigerian towns, they rely on these communities for their sustenance and support. The inability of the Nigerian security forces to maintain its presence in liberated communities continually allows BH to infiltrate such communities to further their agenda. The current policing model, overseen by the federal government, does not offer the requisite tools for effective community policing. Police officers are frequently posted to regions of the country irrespective of their familiarity with local cultures and customs. While intended to promote national unity, this approach fails to address security issues, particularly in rural areas. The lack of awareness of cultural nuances hampers the development of a robust police-public relationship, which is crucial for effective community policing and addressing local security concerns.

4. Lack of Integration between Counterinsurgency Components

There is no adequate integration between Nigeria's military and non-military components in counterinsurgency. The disjointed efforts to rebuild conflict-ridden communities and address the root causes of the insurgency need to be integrated into a holistic strategy. Effective counterinsurgency extends beyond simply eliminating armed militants; it hinges on gaining the trust and confidence of the local population. Drawing from Pakistan's Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer strategy, it is clear that integrating both hard and soft power components into a comprehensive, hybrid strategy is paramount. This approach allows for the strategic delineation of the conflict's stages in each region, enabling a more accurate assessment of the required soft-power measures to alleviate hardships and reduce the recourse to violence. The current practice of implementing socioeconomic and development programs without ensuring the security of relocated civilians is counterproductive, eroding trust in the government's ability to provide population security. A unified and cooperative approach that seamlessly fuses both military and non-military elements is needed. This strategy is not solely about safeguarding the population from insurgent threats; it is also about cultivating an environment in which communities, liberated from the grasp of extremism and violence, can flourish.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Achieving lasting peace and security in Nigeria is an intricate task that demands a multifaceted approach to bolster the capabilities of the nation's security forces in tackling the ever-evolving security challenges. The recommendations presented here are not intended to advocate for a complete overhaul of the Nigerian security apparatus. Instead, the aim is to put forth a set of measures that can augment the effectiveness of Nigeria's dedicated efforts, ensuring that its strategies remain robust and sustainable in the face of ongoing threats.

First, the Nigerian state must learn from its protracted struggle with BH, acknowledging that while national pride is a virtue, the continuous loss of lives can be mitigated by soliciting direct external assistance from capable third-party states. Beyond the BH insurgency, Nigeria grapples with a myriad of security challenges that demand the active engagement of its armed forces. These multiple deployments stretch limited resources, ultimately diminishing their effectiveness. The continuous reluctance of Nigeria to seek direct external aid only prolongs and, in some cases, worsens its security issues, depriving Nigeria of the significant advantages of enlisting foreign military assistance. Recognizing the importance of soliciting external support, Nigeria must leverage its strategic partnerships, particularly with nations like the United States, to optimize its counterinsurgency efforts. This collaboration should be characterized by transparency, professionalism, and a shared commitment to addressing Nigeria's specific security needs. Such a proactive approach is not a sign of weakness but a strategic choice aimed at maximizing the nation's security and stability while minimizing further loss of life.

Secondly, Nigeria must prioritize the development and implementation of an effective border management strategy. While the Nigeria Immigration Service has outlined strategies for border security within the NSS, these measures have proven largely ineffective due to the significant physical threats that persist in the border areas. To proactively address this issue, Nigeria should consider the implementation of border fencing, a strategy designed to reduce human contact while providing an efficient means of curtailing illegal trans-border movements. It is essential to acknowledge that covering the entirety of Nigeria's vast land border with fencing may be unrealistic, given the nation's

limited resources. Therefore, a more targeted approach should be taken to identify critical and vulnerable points for fencing, particularly in the northeast region. To further enhance the effectiveness of this border fencing, deploying technology to detect and alert authorities to possible breaches should be a complementary measure. Furthermore, a highly mobile task force with air assets should be strategically stationed to respond rapidly to any breaches. This strategy will enhance Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts, preventing the continuous recruitment of foreign fighters, which also fuels the BH insurgency. It also becomes even more critical in light of the growing presence of the Islamic State in the Sahel and the potential for this threat to extend into Nigeria.

Thirdly, Nigeria must seek to formalize the activities of the civilian joint task force (CJTF) as part of the state's security apparatus. Members of the CJTF can play a pivotal role in establishing a community policing framework in Borno State to monitor emerging security issues at their inception. Restructuring Nigeria's community policing system is imperative, given the advantages the CJTF offers to Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts, particularly in gathering intelligence on potential security issues. This strategy necessitates granting Nigerian states autonomy to establish their own policing systems, with police presence in every community within their jurisdictions. However, the federal government must allocate dedicated funding for this initiative, recognizing that some states may lack the necessary resources for the initial setup. This community policing framework needs to be integrated into a more extensive security system that facilitates the transmission of actionable intelligence from local law enforcement agencies to lead agencies capable of addressing security threats promptly. This integration will significantly enhance Nigeria's ability to respond to security challenges and improve overall counterinsurgency efforts proactively.

Finally, Nigeria needs to improve coordination between its military and non-military components in counterinsurgency. Achieving this coordination necessitates the integration of military and non-military responses under a unified oversight mechanism. The key stakeholders in this integration process, including the National Emergency Management Agency, the North-East Development Commission (NEDC), and the military's joint task force, should establish a collaborative forum. In this regard, the

recently established National Counterterrorism Center emerges as a potential nexus for the convergence of these entities. It can serve as a central hub where representatives from the military and the NEDC jointly assess the evolving conflict landscape and collectively strategize on the most effective measures to implement. Such synchronization and synergy are imperative to facilitate a more efficient and comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency in Nigeria.

C. CONCLUSION

In both cases analyzed in this study, the early counterinsurgency strategies were largely ineffective at their early stages due to a failure to appreciate the severity of the insurgent threat at its early stages. While Pakistan did not react to the influx of Taliban into the FATA, Nigeria saw only a law enforcement problem that was then mishandled, leading to the insurgency. When both states eventually decided to confront the insurgencies, their efforts were marred by indiscriminate military actions, primarily due to the absence of well-suited military forces for counterinsurgency operations and a lack of understanding of local dynamics. These shared challenges underscore the importance of early recognition and appropriate response to insurgent threats. Moreover, they highlight the need for tailored military strategies and a comprehensive understanding of local contexts in effective counterinsurgency efforts.

The challenges weak states face in providing effective governance across their territories create opportunities for insurgent groups to contest these areas. While it is not impossible for such fragile states to combat insurgencies independently, assistance from a more powerful third party can significantly expedite and enhance their responses. In this regard, Pakistan stands in contrast to Nigeria, as it received substantial external aid from the United States, considerably bolstering the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency operations. Though national interest is a significant factor driving third-party intervention in another country's internal conflicts, insurgent movements like BH, which employs terrorism as a tactic, have far-reaching international implications. Thus, there is a compelling case for a comprehensive approach to addressing such situations. Nigeria has made significant strides since the BH insurgency began in 2009. However, it remains

evident that the country has struggled to defeat BH terrorists decisively, partly due to ineffective strategies and the absence of robust external support directly enhancing its counterinsurgency efforts.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Adamo, Antonino. "The Terrorist and the Mercenary: Private Warriors against Nigeria's Boko Haram." *African Studies* 79, no. 3 (July 2, 2020): 339–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2020.1788920>.
- Afridi, Shahid Ahmad. "Pakistan's Counterinsurgency: Military and Civilian Approach." *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* 36, no. 3 (2016): 21–37.
- Agbibo, Daniel E. "Borders That Continue to Bother Us: The Politics of Cross-Border Security Cooperation in Africa's Lake Chad Basin." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 55, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 403–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2017.1312730>.
- Aghedo, Iro, and Oarhe Osumah. "The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?" *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (June 2012): 853–69. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.674701>.
- Ahmed, Naeem. "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: A Critical Overview." *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 55, no. 2 (2016): 1–16.
- Ahmed, Raja Qaiser, Mohammad Ishaq, and Muhammad Shoaib. "The Changing Political Trends in Erstwhile FATA: A Study of the Last Three Elections." *International Area Studies Review* 24, no. 4 (December 2021): 335–48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659211013652>.
- Akhlaq, Sayed Hassan. "Taliban and Salafism: A Historical and Theological Exploration." *Open Democracy*. December 1, 2013. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/1462675728?parentSessionId=nbrd4tZVJqK0I%2BMU80GlevvLNAK6ebZeBbBYMM7dgTk%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=12702>.
- Akhtar, Shahzad. "Decline of Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA." *Asian Survey* 59, no. 4 (August 1, 2019): 693–716. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2019.59.4.693>.
- . *The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA*. Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics 34. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2023.
- Ali, Yousaf, Asadullah Khan, Ghani Khan, Amin Ullah Khan, and Zeeshan Ahmad. "Evaluation of Effectiveness of Fence on a Country's Border: A Case Study of Pak-Afghan Border Fence." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 22, no. 2 (June 2021): 769–90. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00774-1>.

- Amao, Olumuyiwa Babatunde. "A Decade of Terror: Revisiting Nigeria's Interminable Boko Haram Insurgency." *Security Journal* 33, no. 3 (September 2020): 357–75. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00232-8>.
- Aniche, Ernest T., Chris C. Nshimbi, and Inocent Moyo. "Borderlands in West Africa Are Ungoverned: Why This Is Bad for Security." *The Conversation*. July 1, 2021. <https://theconversation.com/borderlands-in-west-africa-are-ungoverned-why-this-is-bad-for-security-161453>.
- Arise News. "South African Mercenary Speaks on War against Boko Haram." Video, 36:00, YouTube, December 14, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=qKf371K_QHU.
- Asghar Khan, Mohammad. *Mainstreaming the Tribal Areas (Ex-FATA) of Pakistan Bordering Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022.
- Ashfaq, Mohammad. "Uplift Plan for Tribal Districts in Jeopardy over Funds Shortage." *Dawn*. October 5, 2020. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1583248/uplift-plan-for-tribal-districts-in-jeopardy-over-funds-shortage>.
- Avdan, Nazli, and Christopher F. Gelpi. "Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence." *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2017): 14–27.
- Ayuba, Caleb. "Mainstreaming Intelligence as a Strategy in the Counter-Insurgency Operations of Boko Haram Insurgency." *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* 2, no. 1 (2021): 5–22.
- Babatunde, Abosede Omowumi, Mahfouz A. Adedimeji, Shittu Raji, Jacinta Mwende Maweu, and John Mwangi Githigaro. *Managing Violent Religious Extremism in Fragile States: Building Institutional Capacity in Nigeria and Kenya*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2022.
- Babb, Carla. "US-Constructed Air Base in Niger Begins Operations." *Voice of America*. November 1, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_us-constructed-air-base-niger-begins-operations/6178666.html.
- Bamidele, Seun. "The Civilian Joint Task Force and the Struggle against Insurgency in Borno State, Nigeria." *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 7, no. 2 (2017): 85–98. <https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.7.2.04>.
- Bappah, Habibu Yaya. "Nigeria's Military Failure Against the Boko Haram Insurgency." *African Security Review* 25, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 146–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2016.1151799>.

- Basit, Abdul. "Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Fence, a Step in the Right Direction." Al Jazeera. February 25, 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/2/25/the-pak-afghan-border-fence-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction>.
- BBC News. "Musharraf Admits Border Problems." February 2, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6323339.stm.
- Beehner, Lionel. "Fragile States and the Territory Conundrum to Countering Violent Nonstate Actors." *Democracy and Security* 14, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 101–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2017.1408009>.
- Bell, Marissa, and Katja Starc Card. *Maiduguri: City Scoping Study*. Manchester, UK: African Cities Research Consortium. June 2021. <https://www.african-cities.org/maiduguri/>.
- Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan." *Council on Foreign Relations* 90, no. 4 (2011): 12–18.
- Berlingozzi, Laura, and Ed Stoddard. "Assessing Misaligned Counterinsurgency Practice in Niger and Nigeria." *The International Spectator* 55, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 37–53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833472>.
- Bhattacharya, Sanchita. "Afghanistan: A Child's Nightmare." *South Asia Intelligence Review* 19, no. 47 (2021). <https://www.satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-19-No-47>
- Bohon, Dave. "Boko Haram Declares Islamic 'Caliphate' in Nigerian Town." *The New American*. August 31, 2014. <https://thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/boko-haram-declares-islamic-caliphate-in-nigerian-town/>.
- British Broadcasting Corporation. "Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis: Maiduguri Rocket Attack Kills 10." February 24, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56184033>.
- Burchard, Stephanie, and Stephen Burgess. "U.S. Training of African Forces and Military Assistance, 1997–2017: Security versus Human Rights in Principal–Agent Relations." *African Security* 11, no. 4 (October 2, 2018): 339–69. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560969>.
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Washington, DC: Department of State, March 11, 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136092.htm>.

- Cachelin, Shala. "The U.S. Drone Programme, Imperial Air Power and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 15, no. 2 (April 3, 2022): 441–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.2013025>.
- Campbell, John. "Recent Boko Haram Attacks Along Nigeria-Niger Border." *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog), November 30, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/recent-boko-haram-attacks-along-nigeria-niger-border>.
- Castelli, Christopher J. "Pentagon Aids Pakistan's Frontier Corps in Bid to Secure Border." *Inside the Pentagon* 24, no. 33 (August 14, 2008): 1, 16–17.
- Clunan, Anne L., and Harold A. Trinkunas. "Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces: Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority, and Softened Sovereignty." In *Ungoverned Spaces? Alternative to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty*, edited by Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, 17. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Comolli, Virginia. "The Regional Problem of Boko Haram." *Survival* 57, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 109–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1068560>.
- Crenshaw, Martha. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (December 1987): 13–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398708437313>.
- De Montclos, Marc Antoine Pérouse. "The Nigerian Military Response to Boko Haram: A Critical Analysis." *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 10, no. 2 (2020): 65–82. <https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.10.2.04>.
- De Simone, Sara, and Alessio Iocchi. "The End of the Security–Development Nexus? Reflections from Counterinsurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria." *Third World Quarterly* 43, no. 12 (December 2, 2022): 2757–74. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2104705>.
- Duruji, Moses M., Sunday Idowu, Okachukwu Dibia, and Favour U. Duruji-Moses. "Military Budget, War Against Boko Haram Insurgency, and Its Impact on Nigerian Politics and Economy." In *Handbook of Research on Military Expenditure on Economic and Political Resources*, edited by Ramesh Chandra Das, 427–47. Advances in Public Policy and Administration. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-4778-5>.
- Ejeh, E. U., A. I. Bappah, and Yusuf Dankofa. "Nature of Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Laws in Nigeria." *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence* 10, no. 2 (2019): 186–92.

- Eji, Eugene. "Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy." *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs* 18, no. 3 (September 2016): 198–220. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2016.1242278>.
- Ekhomu, Ona. *Boko Haram: Security Considerations and the Rise of an Insurgency*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2020.
- Epstein, Susan B., and Alan K. Kronstadt. "Pakistan: United States Foreign Assistance." *Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East* 3, no. 2 (2012): 241–92.
- Ette, Mercy. "Nigeria as a Country of Interest in Terrorism: Newspaper Framing of Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Underwear Bomber." *Journal of African Media Studies* 4, no. 1 (2012): 45–59.
- Fantom, Neil James, and Umar Serajuddin. *The World Bank's Classification of Countries by Income*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7528. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, January 4, 2016. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2741183>.
- Fatima, Noor, and Zahid Ali Khan. "Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy as Counter-Terrorism Measure in Contemporary International Politics." *Global Social Sciences Review* III, no. II (June 30, 2018): 1–20. [https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2018\(III-II\).01](https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2018(III-II).01).
- Federal Republic of Nigeria. *National Security Strategy*. Abuja, Nigeria: Office of the National Security Adviser, December 2019.
- . "Presidential Committee on North-East Initiative." 2016. <https://statehouse.gov.ng/policy/councils-committees/presidential-committee-on-north-east-initiative/>.
- Galgano, Francis A. "Ungoverned Space and Effective Sovereignty in the Global War on Terror." In *Modern Military Geography*, edited by Francis A. Galgano and Eugene J. Palka, 1st ed., 442. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.
- Gana, Modu L., Ku Hasnita Samsu, and Mohd M. Ismail. "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Changing the Pattern of Counterinsurgency." *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science* II, no. VIII (2018): 127–30.
- Gana, Modu Lawan. "Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: The Conduit for Ending Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria's North." *European Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 1, no. 4 (July 1, 2018): 7–13. <https://doi.org/10.33422/EJBS.2018.07.61>.

- Gul, Imtiaz. “Explaining the Resurgence of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan.” East Asia Forum. March 29, 2023. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/29/explaining-the-resurgence-of-terrorist-violence-in-pakistan/>.
- Hanson, Michael D. “Enforcement of Counterterrorism Treaties within the Framework of Terrorism (Prevention) Act in Nigeria.” *African Journal on Terrorism* 9, no. 2 (2020): 71–86.
- Institute for Economics and Peace. “Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.” ReliefWeb. 2015. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2015-measuring-and-understanding-impact-terrorism>.
- Iwuoha, Victor Chidubem. “United States’ Security Governance in Nigeria: Implications on Counterterrorism Strategies Against Boko Haram.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 54, no. 8 (December 2019): 1175–94. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909619862846>.
- Janes. “Pakistan – Air Force Summary.” April 27, 2023. https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_1009/air-force.
- Javaid, Umbreen. “Zarb-e-Azb and the State of Security in Pakistan.” *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 53, no. 1 (2016): 159–70.
- Johnston, Patrick B., and Anoop K. Sarbahi. “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan.” *The International Studies Association* 60, no. 2 (2016): 203–19.
- Khyber Pakhtun Revenue Authority. “Sales Tax Exemption for FATA and PATA.” March 15, 2019. <https://kpra.gov.pk/notification/sales-tax-exemption-for-fata-and-pata/>.
- Kieghe, David. “Nigeria Unveils North East Development Commission.” *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog). February 6, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-unveils-north-east-development-commission>
- Lalwani, Sameer. “Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency Strategy.” In *Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders between Terror, Politics, and Religion*, edited by Peter Bergen, 202–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Lenshie, Nsemba Edward, Chikodiri Nwangwu, Christian Ezeibe, Louie Marie A. Ifem, and Godwin O. Okafor. “Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria.” *Armed Forces & Society*, September 13, 2022, 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221121656>.
- Levy, Adrian, and Cathy Scott-Clark. *The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2017.

- Mahmood, Sara. “Decapitating the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: An Effective Counter-Terrorism Strategy?” *International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research* 7, no. 6 (2015): 24–29.
- Mickler, David, Muhammad Dan Suleiman, and Benjamin Maiangwa. “‘Weak State’, Regional Power, Global Player: Nigeria and the Response to Boko Haram.” *African Security* 12, no. 3–4 (October 2, 2019): 272–99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2019.1667052>.
- Mir, Asfandiyar. “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan.” *International Security* 43, no. 2 (2018): 45–83.
- Mir, Asfandiyar, Tamanna Salikuddin, and Andrew Watkins. “Is Pakistan Poised to Take on the TTP?” United States Institute of Peace. February 14, 2023. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/pakistan-poised-take-ttp>.
- Mullick, Haider Ali Hussein. “Recalibrating U.S.–Pakistan Relations.” *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (August 2012): 93–107. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706521>.
- Multinational Joint Task Force. “MNJTF Mandate.” Accessed September 26, 2023. <https://mnjtfmm.org/mandates/>.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Boko Haram Incident Summary.” Global Terrorism Database. 2020. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=202011280009>.
- . “Incident Summary.” Global Terrorism Database. 2020. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=202008260024>.
- . “Nigeria – Terrorism Deaths.” Global Terrorism Database. 2021. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=fatalities&search=nigeria>
- . “Pakistan – Terrorism Deaths.” Global Terrorism Database, 2021. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=fatalities&search=pakistan>.
- National Counter Terrorism Authority. “National Action Plan.” 2014. <https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/>.
- Nawaz, Shuja. *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009.

- Njadvara, Musa. “Boko Haram Attacks Stifling Reconstruction, Development Process in Borno – NEDC.” *The Guardian*. April 21, 2021. <https://guardian.ng/news/boko-haram-attacks-stifling-reconstruction-development-process-in-borno-nedc/>.
- Njoku, Emeka T. “‘Laws for Sale:’ The Domestication of Counterterrorism Policies and Its Impact in Nigeria.” In *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*, edited by Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Francis Grice, Daniela Irrera, and Stewart Tristan Webb, 1003–20. Palgrave Handbooks. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Nyadera, Israel Nyaburi, Michael Otieno Kisaka, and Billy Agwanda. “Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria: A Nexus of Just War and Fragile State.” *The Round Table* 109, no. 3 (May 3, 2020): 298–315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2020.1760494>.
- Odomovo, Afeno S. “Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria.” *The Age of Human Rights*, no. 3 (2014): 46–62.
- Ogundiya, Ilufeye Sarafa. “Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and Some Explanations.” *The Anthropologist* 11, no. 4 (October 2009): 281–92. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09720073.2009.11891117>.
- Okolie-Osemene, James, and Benjamin A. Aluko. “Border Porosity and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria.” In *African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration*, edited by Inocent Moyo and Chris C. Nshimbi, 1st ed., 63–88. Border Regions Series. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019.
- Olu-Adeyemi, Lanre and Makanjuola T. Shaibu. “Is There Borderline in Nigeria’s Northeast? Multi-National Joint Task Force and Counterinsurgency Operation in Perspective.” *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (May 31, 2020): 33–45. <https://doi.org/10.5897/AJPSIR2019.1198>.
- Omeni, Akali. *Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria: The Military and Operations against Boko Haram, 2011–2017*. Studies in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and National Security. London: Routledge, 2018.
- Omenma, J. T., and C. M. Hendricks. “Counterterrorism in Africa: An Analysis of the Civilian Joint Task Force and Military Partnership in Nigeria.” *Security Journal* 31, no. 3 (July 2018): 764–94. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-018-0131-8>.
- Omolaye-Ajileye, Alaba. “Legal Framework for the Prevention of Terrorism in Nigeria.” *National Judicial Institute Law Journal* 11 (2015): 19–43.
- Onapajo, Hakeem, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike. “Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the State, and the International System.” *African Security Review* 21, no. 3 (September 2012): 24–39. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2012.687693>.

- Onuoha, Freedom C. “The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend.” *Security Journal* 25, no. 2 (April 2012): 134–51. <https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2011.15>.
- Onuoha, Freedom C., Chikodiri Nwangwu, and Michael I. Ugwueze. “Counterinsurgency Operations of the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram Insurgency: Expounding the Viscid Manacle.” *Security Journal* 33, no. 3 (September 2020): 401–26. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6>.
- Owojori, Abimbola Joseph, Omolara Akinyemi, and Muhammad Danial Azman. “Counterterrorism Cooperation: A Critical Appraisal of Nigeria-United States Counterterrorism Cooperation.” *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* 3, no. 2 (2022): 105–21. <https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.31920/2732-5008/2022/v3n2a5>.
- Oyewole, Samuel. “Making the Sky Relevant to Battle Strategy: Counterinsurgency and the Prospects of Air Power in Nigeria.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 3 (March 4, 2017): 211–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533>.
- Oztig, Lacin Idil. “Pakistan’s Border Policies and Security Dynamics along the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border.” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 35, no. 2 (March 14, 2020): 211–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2018.1545598>.
- Parvez, Tariq, and Mehwish Rani. *An Appraisal of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act*. USIP Special Report 377. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR377-An-Appraisal-of-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Anti-Terrorism-Act.pdf>.
- Peralta, Eyder. “Muhammadu Buhari Becomes Nigeria’s President.” NPR. May 29, 2015. <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/29/410493750/muhammadu-buhari-becomes-nigerias-president>.
- Pham, J. Peter. “Boko Haram: The Strategic Evolution of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province.” *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2016.1152571>.
- Planning and Development Department. *Tribal Decade Strategy 2020–2030*. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, May 2019. <https://pndkp.gov.pk/2020/11/30/tribal-decade-strategy-2020-2030/>.
- Popovski, Vesselin, and Benjamin Maiangwa. “Boko Haram’s Attacks and the People’s Response: A ‘Fourth Pillar’ of the Responsibility to Protect?” *African Security Review* 25, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 159–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2016.1152987>.

- Qazi, Shehzad H. “Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 574–602. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.601865>.
- Rashid, Ahmed. *Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan*. New York: Viking, 2012.
- Rehman, Faiz Ur, Mohammad Nasir, and Mohammad Shahbaz. “What Have We Learned? Assessing the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Strategies in Pakistan.” *Economic Modelling* 64 (2017): 487–95.
- Riedel, Bruce O. *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
- Rivett-Carnac, Mark. “The U.S. Is Sending 300 Military Personnel to Cameroon to Help Fight Boko Haram.” *TIME*. October 15, 2015. <https://time.com/4074393/cameroon-boko-haram-us-troops/>.
- Rosenau, William G. *Irksome and Unpopular Duties: Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, Local Security Forces and Counterinsurgency*. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 2012. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562440.pdf>.
- Sampson, Isaac Terwase. “The Dilemmas of Counter-Bokoharamism: Debating State Responses to Boko Haram Terrorism in Northern Nigeria.” *Security Journal* 29, no. 2 (April 2016): 122–46. <https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2013.2>.
- Shabana, Fayyaz. “Responding to Terrorism: Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Laws.” *Terrorism Research Initiative* 2, no. 6 (2008): 18.
- Solomon, Hussein. “Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram.” *The RUSI Journal* 157, no. 4 (August 2012): 6–11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.714183>.
- South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Datasheet – Pakistan: Yearly Fatalities.” 2023. <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan>.
- . “Datasheet – FATA: Number of Terrorism Related Incidents Year Wise.” 2023. <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/incidents-data/pakistan-fata>.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.” Accessed September 30, 2023. <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>.
- Thomas-Greenfield, Linda. “Boko Haram and Its Regional Impact.” U.S. Department of State. February 9, 2016. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2016/252357.htm>.

- Tochukwu Omenma, J., Ifeanyichukwu M. Abada, and Z. Onyinyechi Omenma. “Boko Haram Insurgency: A Decade of Dynamic Evolution and Struggle for a Caliphate.” *Security Journal* 33, no. 3 (September 2020): 376–400. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00233-7>.
- U.S. Department of State. “The United States and Nigeria: Strategic Partners.” November 18, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-nigeria-strategic-partners-2/>.
- . “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country: Pakistan.” ForeignAssistance.gov. 2023. <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/pakistan/2010/disbursements/0>.
- Varin, Caroline. “Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security Companies on Nigeria’s Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.” *African Security Review* 27, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 144–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1489863>.
- Walker, Andrew. *What Is Boko Haram?* USIP Special Report 308. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2012. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf>.
- Warraich, Saqib K., Muhammad M.A. Khan, and Imran Alam. “Terrorism, Military Operations and Counterterrorism Strategies for Pakistan.” *Journal of Politics and International Studies* 7, no. 1 (2021): 44–45.
- Watts, Stephen. *Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014.
- Wazir, Asmatullah Khan. “FATA Reforms: Journey So Far and the Way Forward.” *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*, (July 5, 2013): 45–59. <http://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/270.pdf>.
- Weinbaum, Marvin G. “Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier.” *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): 73–88.
- . “Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 34–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1266130>.
- Wilson, Chris, and Shahzad Akhtar. “Repression, Co-Optation and Insurgency: Pakistan’s FATA, Southern Thailand and Papua, Indonesia.” *Third World Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (April 3, 2019): 710–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1557012>.

Wolf, Siegfried O. *Playing the Hard Power Card. Pakistan's Fencing of Its Afghan Border*. SADF Research Report 3. Brussels, Belgium: South Asia Democratic Forum, 2020.

Zenn, Jacob, and Zacharias Pieri. "Boko Haram." In *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, edited by Andrew Silke, 278–91. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

WWW.NPS.EDU

WHERE SCIENCE MEETS THE ART OF WARFARE