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THESIS

**JAPAN'S INCREASING SECURITY
COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA, 2013–2022**

by

Marjudin Saputra

December 2023

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Michael S. Malley
Robert J. Weiner

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**JAPAN'S INCREASING SECURITY COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA,
2013–2022**

Marjudin Saputra
Kapten, Indonesian Navy
BS, Indonesian Naval Academy, 2012

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December 2023**

Approved by: Michael S. Malley
Advisor

Robert J. Weiner
Second Reader

Afshon P. Ostovar
Associate Chair for Research
Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Since Shinzo Abe took the position of prime minister in 2012, Japan has significantly increased its involvement with Indonesia across multiple domains of security cooperation, including collaborative military exercises and regional security dialogues. This thesis examines the strengthening of Japan's maritime security cooperation with Indonesia from 2013 to 2022 under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. It finds that security ties expanded gradually through more advanced bilateral naval exercises, increased participation in multilateral drills, and extensive capacity-building assistance. The analysis shows this upgraded partnership aimed to promote regional stability, constrain China's influence, and safeguard Japan's sea lane security. The drivers were both internal policy shifts under Abe to normalize Japan's military posture and make "proactive contributions to peace," as well as intensifying external pressures from China's military assertiveness and Japan's economic dependence on regional shipping routes. Overall, the alignment of increased Japanese security doctrines with deteriorating security conditions in Southeast Asia propelled closer strategic cooperation. Effectively adapting this partnership will be vital to addressing the complex challenges ahead and realizing its potential for fostering maritime rules and stability.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADMM-Plus	ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus
AOIP	ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAKAMLA	Indonesian Maritime Security Agency/ <i>Badan Keamanan Laut</i>
BASARNAS	National Search and Rescue Agency
BNPB	National Disaster Management Agency
CCG	China Coast Guard
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
EWG	Experts working group
EEZ	Exclusive economic zone
FDI	foreign direct investment
FOIP	free and open Indo-Pacific
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JMOD	Japan Ministry of Defense
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MNEX	Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MTDP	Medium Term Defense Program
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODA	Official development assistance
PLAN	People’s Liberation Army Navy
SCS	South China Sea
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communication
TICAD VI	the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TNI AL	Indonesian Navy/ <i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut</i>
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAIN FINDINGS AND MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Japan's and China's military strengths significantly impact Southeast Asia's security and stability. Since 2013, China's military advancements and territorial expansion have caused tension within other nations, particularly in the region of Southeast Asia. China's disagreements about territory involving various Southeast Asian countries across the South China Sea (SCS) islands, along with its establishment of military bases in the surrounding area, have raised concerns about its motives and the potential for contravention. In contrast, the development of Japanese defense capabilities has been contributing to the rise in Southeast Asian military power, along with Japan's intentions of having a proactive role in maintaining the region's stability.

Japan has developed an aggressive security cooperation initiative with Southeast Asian nations. Vietnam, Indonesia, and The Philippines are the three most crucial security partners for Japan.¹ The primary focus of this thesis will be directed towards Indonesia, which serves as a security partner for Japan. Shinzo Abe demonstrated the importance of Indonesia for his administration by designating this nation as the primary destination he visited following his election as Japanese prime minister. Since the Shinzo Abe-led government, both countries have increased naval port visits, mutually beneficial military exercises, and other military engagements. During a 2013 meeting between Japanese General Eji Kamizuka Chief of Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the parties discussed Indonesia's and Japan's cooperation in security.² Afterwards, on March 23, 2015, it emerged that the two countries

¹ Cook, Malcolm, Leo Suryadinata, and Mustafa Izzuddin, "Japan Seeks Stronger Strategic Ties in Southeast Asia," *Researchers at Iseas–Yusof Ishak Institute*, 2017, 2-3.

² Maryati, "Indonesia, Japan to Intensify Cooperation in Asian Security," *ANTARA News*, 2013, <https://en.antaranews.com/news/87152/indonesia-japan-to-intensify-cooperation-in-asian-security>.

had signed an agreement for security exchange and cooperation in Tokyo.³ From this point of view, the aim of this thesis is to address the following questions:

- What are the developments in Japan-Indonesia security cooperation, especially under the Shinzo Abe government?
- Why has Japan pursued increased security cooperation with Indonesia under Shinzo Abe?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Shinzo Abe's second period as prime minister indicated the initiation of an innovative era of security cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asian nations, which include Indonesia. Since taking the position of prime minister in 2012, the Abe government has significantly enhanced its involvement with Indonesia across multiple domains, including collaborative military exercises and regional security dialogues. The initial two-plus-two conference occurred on December 17, 2015, involving the participation of the Japanese foreign minister and security minister, and their Indonesian counterparts, namely the security minister and foreign minister.⁴ Consequently, both governments reached a mutual agreement to create and convene biannual two-plus-two meetings. Moreover, Japan demonstrated active engagement by participating in the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEX) organized by the Indonesian Navy in the years 2014,⁵ 2016,⁶ 2018,⁷

³ Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement" (MOFA, 2015), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100002843.pdf>.

⁴ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Security Cooperation" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2020), 350, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2020/pdf/R02030301.pdf.

⁵ Priyambodo, "40 Indonesian Military Vessels to Join the Komodo Naval Exercise," *ANTARA News*, January 6, 2014, <https://en.antaranews.com/news/92089/40-indonesian-military-vessels-to-join-komodo-naval-exercise>.

⁶ Borneo News, "Komodo Exercise 35 Negara Hebohkan Sumatera Barat," *Borneo News*, April 1, 2016, <https://www.borneonews.co.id/berita/30695-komodo-exercise-35-negara-hebohkan-sumatera-barat>.

⁷ Indomiliter, "JS Osumi: 'Pesaing' Mistral Class Dalam Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo 2018," *Indomiliter*, May 1, 2018, <https://www.indomiliter.com/js-osumi-pesaing-mistral-class-dalam-multilateral-naval-exercise-komodo-2018/>.

and 2023.⁸ In addition, in 2022, the JSDF made their first participation in the Garuda Shield, an exercise conducted by the Indonesian Army.⁹ Nevertheless, there has been a lack of extensive research on the underlying reasons behind the Japanese security partnership with Indonesia, along with the various factors that have shaped this relationship.

There are two key factors that have contributed to the developing comprehension of Japan's cooperation with Indonesia in relation to Japanese policy. First, in 2013, under the leadership of Shinzo Abe, the country implemented the National Security Strategy (NSS), an internal policy framework that defines diplomatic objectives and the country's security.¹⁰ The NSS introduces the new idea of "proactive contribution to peace" and underscores the importance of enhanced cooperation with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹¹ Second, the security conditions in Southeast Asia are becoming more complicated, and demanding to handle. Several factors contribute to the insecurity in the area, particularly in maritime security. These factors encompass terrorism, territorial conflicts, climate change, and sea piracy. Furthermore, the escalating assertiveness shown by China is generating apprehension and contributing to the complicated nature of the security landscape.

The examination of Japan's policies towards cooperation in security with Indonesia is a relevant and applied topic of study, considering the complicated and evolving security conditions in Southeast Asian nations. The analysis of the Japanese decision to engage in security cooperation with Indonesia, along with the examination of the factors that influence this policy, not only contributes to our comprehension of Japan's foreign policy

⁸ Azis Kurmala, "Navies from 36 Countries Participate in 2023 MNEK in Makassar," *ANTARA News*, June 5, 2023, <https://en.antaranews.com/news/283950/navies-from-36-countries-participate-in-2023-mnek-in-makassar>.

⁹ Elaine Lies and Stanley Widiyanto, "Japan's Join Garuda Shield Military Drills for the First Time," *REUTERS*, 2022.

¹⁰ Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013" (Japan Ministry of Defense, December 17, 2013), <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

¹¹ Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013".

motivations and priorities but also offers valuable perspectives on Japan's regional positioning and the deeper implications for regional stability and security.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The examination of the literature is classified into two separate parts. The initial part examines the post-Cold War era's evolution of the Japanese and Southeast Asian security collaboration. This section aims to explain the enhancement of Southeast Asia and Japanese security cooperation. The second section examines the underlying factors driving the Japanese initiatives aimed at improving security collaboration with Southeast Asian nations and also its adherence to addressing emerging security issues. Additionally, this study investigates the underlying factors that contributed to the Japanese engagement in Indonesia.

1. The Development of the Japanese and Southeast Asia's Security Cooperation

To examine the development of Indonesia-Japan relations in security from 2013 to 2022, it is important to start by examining the enhancement of the Japanese and Southeast Asia's security relations following the end of the Cold War, which demonstrates how relations developed. According to Bhubindar Singh, during the first decade of the 1990s, "Japan commenced a gradual shift in its approach toward security affairs, moving away from its traditional hesitation and extending its engagement over economic concerns."¹² As a result, Japan has assumed a more proactive approach to addressing security issues in Southeast Asia. This shift is evident through its active participation in various activities such as "peacekeeping operations, global security dialogues, counter-piracy initiatives, disaster relief efforts, and other related areas of development."¹³ In the meantime, Southeast Asian countries expressed a favorable reaction toward the Japanese involvement

¹² Bhubindar Singh, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia," *Routledge*, 2010, 391.

¹³ Singh, 391.

in security concerns, acknowledging its dedication to managing common security concerns and upholding stability within the area.¹⁴

Following the end of the Cold War, Japan saw a significant transformation in foreign policy, characterized by an increased active engagement in global events and assuming a more important position within the security and political dynamics of Southeast Asia. Singh asserted that Japan transformed its foreign policy, leading to increased involvement in security and political concerns within the Southeast Asian region.¹⁵ For example, the Tokyo Congress, conducted in June 1990 under the auspices of Japan, attempted to assist in the termination of armed conflict among the various factions in Cambodia. In addition, as stated by Singh, Taro Nakayama, formerly the Foreign Minister of Japan, put forth an idea in 1991 proposing “the establishment of a multilateral framework within Southeast Asia.”¹⁶ The primary objective of this framework was to “foster regional stability and effectively address existing security issues in the region.”¹⁷ The aforementioned assistance ultimately resulted in the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, which served as “the primary forum for multilateral security discussions within the region.”¹⁸ Through active engagement in these projects, Japan demonstrated its determination to take a central position in the political dynamics and security of Southeast Asia.

Throughout the 2000s, Japan and several Asian nations assumed an important role in upholding stability in East Timor as participants in the United Nation (UN) operation. According to Leavitt, the violence that surrounded the declaration of the independence referendum contributed to the instability in East Timor, which gained international attention and prompted the “creation of the United Nations Transitional Administration in

¹⁴ Singh, 395.

¹⁵ Singh, 395.

¹⁶ Singh, 396.

¹⁷ Singh, 396.

¹⁸ Takeshi Yuzawa, “Japan’s Changing Conception of the ASEAN Regional Forum: From an Optimistic Liberal to a Pessimistic Realist Perspective,” *Routledge*, December 2005, 464.

East Timor (UNTAET).”¹⁹ This administration was tasked with various responsibilities, including the provision of humanitarian aid, the reduction of violence, the dissolution of militia groups, and facilitating the establishment of a sovereign East Timorese nation.²⁰ Japan, together with Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, had a pivotal role in the execution of this operation. Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea dispatched peacekeeping soldiers, while Singapore provided medical assistance, and in 2002, Japan contributed to the peacekeeping efforts by deploying a 700-member engineer battalion from the JSDF.²¹ This particular engagement served as Japan’s dedication to maintaining security within the region, as well as its proactive approach towards participating in peacekeeping initiatives in Southeast Asia.

Japan has been taking part in the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which plays an essential part in the Japanese security involvement with ASEAN, including a wide range of stability and security domains. The ADMM-Plus was formed in 2010 as an extension of the ASEAN security minister’s meeting, incorporating eight non-ASEAN countries into its framework.²² These conferences cover security issues, which include transnational crimes, humanitarian and natural disasters, maritime security, terrorism, and global warming.²³ In accordance with Shoji’s analysis, the Japanese have demonstrated active engagement in the ADMM-Plus forum.²⁴ The Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) has demonstrated its involvement in various international initiatives. For instance, the JMOD served as co-chair of the experts working group (EWG) on military healthcare with Singapore between 2010 and 2013; additionally, from 2014 to 2016, the

¹⁹ Sandra. Leavitt, “The Lack of Security Cooperation between Southeast Asia and Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon No,” *Asian Survey*, 2005, 238.

²⁰ Sandra. Leavitt, “The Lack of Security Cooperation between Southeast Asia and Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon No,” *Asian Survey*, 2005, 238.

²¹ Leavitt, 238.

²² The ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement of the First ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus: ‘ADMM-Plus: Strategic Cooperation for Peace, Stability, and Development in the Region’ Ha Noi, 12 October 2010” (The ASEAN Secretariat, October 13, 2010).

²³ The ASEAN Secretariat.

²⁴ Tomotaka Shoji, “Japan’s Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Pursuit of a Status as a ‘Relevant’ Partner,” 2015, 101.

JMOD served as EWG co-chair on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; furthermore, in the upcoming period from 2023 to 2024, the JMOD will assume the co-chair position of the EWG together with Vietnam.²⁵ As part of joint exercises, in 2013, the JSDF was designated to participate in tabletop and field training exercises with Indonesia and Australia.²⁶ Japan's participation in the ADMM-Plus serves as a commitment to foster security cooperation and effectively solve common concerns alongside ASEAN states.

Japan and Indonesia have strengthened their security collaboration through the implementation of mechanisms for maritime security cooperation. According to David Scott, the growth can be characterized as follows: during their meeting in 2015, Widodo and Abe expressed the desire to contribute to enhancing the strategic partnership, which is founded on the principles of maritime security and democracy. Subsequently, in December 2016, the Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum was formed, and another meeting in March 2018 was held to “further advance their cooperation in the realm of maritime security.”²⁷ These frameworks facilitated the enhancement of Japan's–Indonesia's security cooperation, thereby establishing a trajectory for the enhancement of naval port visits and military exercises. In September 2018, Japan made navy port visits to Jakarta, which included the vessels JS Kaga 184, Suzutsuki 117, and Inazuma 105.²⁸ The purpose of the arrival of the three Japanese warships was to strengthen diplomatic relations. Furthermore, a collaborative training session took place on October 6, 2020, involving JS Ikazuchi DD 107, KRI John Lie 358, and KRI Sutanto 377 in the North Natuna Seas.²⁹ These efforts have substantially improved Japan's and Indonesia's security cooperation, especially in the maritime sector.

²⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, “ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting -Plus Experts' Working Group” (JMOD, 2023), <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2021/12/8f7d4a67327a2d86856123c6fb00cb1a6e0cb2af.html>.

²⁶ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Defense of Japan 2014” (JMOD, 2014), 269, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html.

²⁷ David Scott, “Indonesia Grapples with the Indo-Pacific: Outreach, Strategic Discourse, and Diplomacy,” *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 38, no. 2 (August 2019): 206.

²⁸ JMSDF, “Indo Southeast Asia Deployment 2018 (ISEAD18)” (JMSDF, 2018), <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/operation/operation2018.html>.

²⁹ JMSDF, “Japan-Indonesia Bilateral Maritime Exercise” (JMSDF, October 6, 2020), <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/exercises/src/2020/50.html>.

In conclusion, this thesis aims to address a recognized research gap by examining the precise characteristics and scope of the Japanese security collaboration with Indonesia. A comprehensive understanding of the many forms of collaboration that have emerged gradually may enhance the comprehension of the benefits and challenges associated with the security cooperation between Japan and Indonesia.

2. Factors Influencing Japan's Enhanced Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia

The second section of the literature review addresses the primary influences of Japanese security policies generally and the primary causes for developing cooperation in security with Southeast Asian nations. Singh emphasized that tensions in Northeast Asia increased after the Cold War.³⁰ Significantly, the occurrence of events such as “the initial nuclear threat posed by North Korea in 1993 served as a trigger for Japan’s effort to expand its security strategy.”³¹ The Japanese authorities recognized the deficiencies of its security policy during that time, which mostly “focused on economic issues and disregarded external security considerations.”³² Consequently, significant attempts were made to improve the application of national security policies within and outside the US-Japan alliance.

Southeast Asia has always been an important part of the Japanese security strategy, even after the Cold War ended. Singh highlights the considerable economic, political, and geopolitical importance that Japan attributes to its bilateral relationship with the subregion.³³ As a result, successive Japanese prime ministers have been motivated to actively pursue its improvement. Southeast Asia holds considerable economic importance, offering appealing investment opportunities; in the realm of politics, Prime Minister Abe has acknowledged ASEAN’s pivotal role in East Asian matters; from a geographical

³⁰ Bhubhindar Singh, “The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term Defensive Strategy,” *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, January 2015, 50, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2015.0006>.

³¹ Singh, 56.

³² Singh, 53.

³³ Bhubhindar Singh, “Japan’s Responses to China’s Rise: Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia,” *Asian Security* 18, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 8, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1942849>.

perspective, Southeast Asia holds a significant and advantageous position where the Indian and Pacific Oceans meet, providing essential maritime routes that assist the shipment of Japanese cargo.³⁴ Therefore, Japan actively engages in the advancement of diplomatic ties with Southeast Asian countries while also seeking to increase its security partnerships.

The strength of Japan-Southeast Asia security cooperation has demonstrated a constant upward trend, particularly during Prime Minister Abe's second term in office. Shoji asserted that an unusual era of cooperation between Japan and ASEAN was initiated during Shinzo Abe's government.³⁵ This partnership is primarily aimed at enhancing maritime security and fostering regional stability. According to Shoji, during the Japan-ASEAN summit in January 2013, Abe's five new guidelines for Japan's diplomacy were brought to attention, which placed "significant emphasis on fostering cooperation with ASEAN in addressing maritime challenges, aligning with the Japanese NSS objectives."³⁶ The 2013 NSS document signified Japan's recognition of the notion of "proactive contribution to peace" and highlighted the importance of enhanced collaboration with member states of the ASEAN.³⁷ Japan actively engages in promoting various initiatives for regional cooperation, such as the "Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), ADMM-Plus, ARF, and ASEAN+3" frameworks.³⁸ These initiatives exemplify the Japanese desire for strengthened relationships with Southeast Asia and its proactive engagement in global mechanisms to provide security collaboration.

There is an assumption that Japan has increased its security existence in Southeast Asia as a response to China's aggression toward the SCS. The strengthening of strategic alliances in Southeast Asia aims to enhance the Japanese extensive friendly connections with ASEAN and Southeast Asian nations while simultaneously addressing China's actions within the region by means of "ASEAN-led institutions and Japan's strong

³⁴ Singh, 8.

³⁵ Tomotaka Shoji, "Japan's Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Pursuit of a Status as a 'Relevant' Partner," 2015, 101.

³⁶ Shoji, 101.

³⁷ Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013," 11–24.

³⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, 26.

affiliations with select Southeast Asian countries.”³⁹ Prior to the Chinese assertion of its claim to the SCS, Japan initiated the formation of strategic partnerships with Indonesia in 2006. Subsequently, when China initiated a proactive expansion in the Asian region, the Japanese established supplementary strategic partnerships with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand in 2009; Cambodia and Malaysia established a strategic alliance in 2013; and Laos established a strategic partnership in 2015.⁴⁰ The alliances have largely emphasized economic and development aid and collaboration, with the Japanese authorities perceiving these facets as a means to reinforce regional stability. Japan enhances its standing as a dependable security ally by collaborating with ASEAN and maintaining international law in response to the assertiveness of China in the SCS.

Another factor influencing Japan’s security cooperation is its reliance on maintaining safe sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The majority of these SLOCs exist within the Indonesian maritime geographical area, encompassing Singapore, Malacca, Lombok, Makassar, and the Sunda Straits. According to Storey, there has been a strengthening in maritime security cooperation between ASEAN and Japan since the rise of tension in the SCS in 2009.⁴¹ Grønning asserts that a significant proportion of the Japanese crude oil imports, specifically 93%, are transported by maritime routes,⁴² while De Castro contends that a substantial portion of Japan’s energy needs, specifically 70%, are met through navigation in the SCS.⁴³ Japan would face significant consequences if the SLOC became impassable because of hostilities or any other actions that impeded freedom of passage. By actively collaborating with countries in the region, Japan can enhance and safeguard its SLOCs.

³⁹ Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Strategic Coordination’ in 2015: ASEAN, Southeast Asia, and Abe’s Diplomatic Agenda,” *ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute* 2016 (2016): 68.

⁴⁰ Koga, 69.

⁴¹ Ian Storey, “Japan’s Maritime Security Interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea Dispute,” *Political Science* 65, no. 2 (December 2013): 145.

⁴² Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, “Japan’s Security Cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam,” *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 541, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1397730>.

⁴³ Renato Cruz De Castro, “China and Japan in Maritime Southeast Asia: Extending Their Geo-Strategic Rivalry by Competing for Friends,” *Philippine Political Science Journal* 34, no. 2 (December 2013): 159.

Furthermore, Shinzo Abe acknowledged the significance of Indonesia as a crucial partner in counterbalancing China's influence in the region. Based on the research conducted by Cook et al., it can be concluded that Indonesia holds a significant position as Japan's primary security partner within the Southeast Asian region.⁴⁴ Shinzo Abe conveyed a symbolic gesture by picking it as his initial destination following his appointment as the Prime Minister. According to Cook et al., the definition of this phenomenon arises from the fact that Indonesia, under the leadership of President Jokowi, has experienced significant benefits from Beijing's infrastructural policy. The acknowledgment highlighted the significance of the Japan-Indonesia relationship in minimizing the influence exerted by China.

In conclusion, the review of the literature offers a valuable description of the factors driving Japan's security cooperation, both in general terms and with a particular focus on Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia. The literature evaluation includes an examination of Japan's collaboration with Indonesia; however, further enhancement is required in the research pertaining to the factors contributing to the escalation of Japanese security cooperation with Indonesia spanning the years 2013 to 2022. This thesis examines the internal and external factors that influenced this collaboration, encompassing the revisions in the Japanese security strategy during the Abe administration, strategic and economic motivations, and apprehensions concerning China's assertive behavior within the region.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Following the explanation in the literature review regarding the development of Japanese security cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia, especially with Indonesia, this thesis presents two hypotheses as the main factors contributing to the rise of the Tokyo-Jakarta security collaboration.

⁴⁴ Cook, Malcolm, Leo Suryadinata, and Mustafa Izzuddin, "Japan Seeks Stronger Strategic Ties in Southeast Asia," 2.

1. **Hypothesis 1: Internal factor**—Abe’s proactive approach to foreign policy served as the driving force behind the Japanese-Indonesia security relationship.
 - Abe demonstrated a firm commitment to advocating for a more proactive approach to foreign policy and an important increase in expenses related to security. He aimed to increase Japan’s participation in international concerns and its security alliances. The 2013 NSS, amended National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and amended Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) highlight a policy shift wherein Japan is encouraged to adopt a proactive role in promoting peace and collaborating with other nations.⁴⁵ This hypothesis assumes that the individual convictions and political objectives of Abe contributed to influencing Japan’s strategy concerning enhancing its security relationship with Indonesia.
2. **Hypothesis 2: External factors**— The Japanese motivation behind increased security cooperation with Indonesia is influenced by having to counterbalance China’s increasing power and aggressiveness in the SCS and Japan’s efforts to safeguard SLOCs in the Indonesian maritime geographical area.
 - Japan, as a powerful economic and military force in the Asia-Pacific region, has demonstrated a heightened awareness of the evolving power dynamics in the area, with a particular focus on Beijing’s escalating military aggressiveness. The Japanese administration recognized the necessity of enhancing its geographical security partnerships as a fundamental element of its foreign policy approach. In this case, it’s possible to consider the Japanese pursuit of increased security cooperation with Indonesia as a

⁴⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, “National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013,” 10–13.

strategic move to increase its geopolitical power and create a vast global network to balance the rise of China.

- Japan's economic reliance on cargo shipping and its responsibility to protect crucial geopolitical chokepoints are all influential factors. The significance of Indonesia's strategic positioning within global geopolitical chokepoints, along with its expanding military strength, makes it an essential relationship for Japan in this environment. The Japanese have endeavored to enhance military involvement, particularly in the realm of maritime security, by means of various initiatives such as capacity-building initiatives and collaborative naval exercises. These efforts can be seen as factors in a wider initiative aimed at protecting SLOCs' security in the Indonesian maritime geographical area.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The initial part of this thesis attempts to assess the scope and nature of security collaboration between Japan and Indonesia throughout the period spanning from 2013 to 2022. The main aim of the research design is to investigate a comprehensive range of sources that involve scholarly articles and additional sources of information related to security cooperation discussions, military exercises, and naval force port visits. The aforementioned data sources apply to evaluate the extent of security cooperation within both countries spanning the years 2013–2022. Additionally, these sources aid in identifying the obstacles and prospects for maintaining and enhancing this partnership. Furthermore, the aforementioned data is utilized to explain the specific goals that Japan aims to accomplish through its efforts in regional security cooperation, as well as to examine the range of strategies and initiatives that Japan has employed to promote increased involvement in this particular field.

The subsequent part of this thesis will analyze different factors that have an impact on the scope of how Japan takes part in enhanced security cooperation with Indonesia. This thesis applies approaches based on case studies to examine a comprehensive description of

the external and internal determinants that shape Japan's security collaboration with Indonesia. This analysis encompasses the transformations in Japanese security policy during the Abe administration, as well as the economic and strategic motivations and apprehensions regarding China's assertiveness in the area. Overall, the aim of this research design is to provide an extensive and comprehensive analysis of why Japan has developed security cooperation with Indonesia, presenting an understanding of Japan's developing position as an actor in security in the vicinity and the changing circumstances of security conditions in Southeast Asia.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The next portions of this thesis are organized in the following manner: Chapter II analyzes the developments of Indonesia-Japan security cooperation, detailing the initiatives undertaken by Japan to enhance security collaboration in Indonesia from 2013–2022. Furthermore, this chapter clarifies the underlying objectives that Japan aims to accomplish through these initiatives. Chapter III provides a comprehensive policy analysis of Japan's efforts to increase security cooperation with Indonesia. This analysis investigates the external and internal reasons that have influenced Japan's decision to pursue security cooperation with Indonesia, as viewed from the Japanese standpoint. Chapter IV will provide a conclusion on the subject concerning security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan, analyze its effects, and offer recommendations.

II. THE STRENGTHENING OF JAPAN’S AND INDONESIA’S SECURITY COOPERATION (2013–2022)

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter evaluates the development of Japanese-Indonesian security cooperation from 2013 to 2022, elaborating on the concepts presented in the literature review in Chapter I to describe in detail the security cooperation that Japan has developed with Indonesia, especially under Shinzo Abe. Previously, the cooperation policy between Japan and Indonesia focused more on the economic sector than on security. However, under the second administration of Shinzo Abe, Japan’s emphasis on security cooperation increased. During the period 2013–2022, Japan established an active security cooperation program with Indonesia, particularly in the maritime security area, including naval exercises, port visits, and maritime domain awareness (MDA) technical assistance.

This chapter addresses the Japan-Indonesia security cooperation presented in two sections. The first section describes the changes in the Japanese maritime security cooperation policy toward Indonesia. The second section presents evidence of change in the scale of Japan-Indonesia maritime security cooperation from 2013 to 2022, with details on naval exercises, port visits, and MDA technical assistance.

B. CHANGES IN JAPAN’S MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION POLICY TOWARD INDONESIA

After completing the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, relationships between Japan and Indonesia depended on agreements on wartime reparations, which concluded in 1958 along with the formation of official diplomatic ties.⁴⁶ In this period, the Japanese not only provided financial support to Indonesia but also fostered strong interpersonal relationships between the leaders of both nations. However, in the last decade since 2013, there has been an expansion in the range of maritime security cooperation areas between the two nations, especially in light of China’s rising power. These areas encompass the challenges posed in

⁴⁶ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia’s Relations with China and Japan: Images, Perception and Realities,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 12, no. 3 (December 1990): 227, <https://doi.org/10.1355/CS12-3E>.

the Straits of Malacca, strategies related to the Indo-Pacific region, and the situation in the SCS. This section describes changes in Japan's maritime security cooperation policy toward Indonesia in detail.

Following World War II, Japan utilized the Official Development Assistance (ODA) program to provide foreign aid to its war victims. The Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed on September 8, 1951, in San Francisco, included provisions for war reparations as a means of implementing the peace agreement between Japan and the allied nations.⁴⁷ The agreement mandated that Japan provide financial compensation to countries affected by Japanese aggression during World War II. The assistance primarily consisted of grants and technical cooperation aimed at facilitating post-war development. Even though Japan seemed to be suffering losses (because it had to pay some war costs), this was the beginning of its strategic expansion.

Japan considered the option of expanding investment-related cooperation with Indonesia as beneficial. Japan's total foreign direct investment (FDI) in Indonesia represented 19.47% from 1967 to 2004, making Japan the largest investor in Indonesia.⁴⁸ Japan emerged as a very desirable partner for Indonesia since the nation promoted foreign investment and aid, and was welcoming of Indonesia's exports. Japan considered Indonesia a significant source of energy resources, including minerals, gas, and oil, as well as a provider of low-cost labor. Therefore, ensuring the stability of Indonesia was of top priority for Japan.

The September 2006 inauguration of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister marked a new era for the Japanese security policy with Indonesia, in which cooperation between Japan and Indonesia expanded in the area of anti-piracy in the Malacca Strait. During the early 2000s, the Strait accounted for more than 10% of global piracy incidents, leading to

⁴⁷ United Nations, "Treaty of Peace with Japan (with Two Declarations). Signed at San Francisco, on 8 September 1951" (United Nations-Treaty Series, September 8, 1951), <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2005), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/summit0506/joint-3-2.pdf>.

immediate actions to strengthen maritime security for the littoral states.⁴⁹ Moreover, after the incident of March 2005, when pirates attacked the Japanese tugboat Idaten as it went through the Strait of Malacca and took some of its Japanese crew members hostages, piracy became a direct threat to Japanese citizens who work on ships and to Japan's economic activities.⁵⁰ Therefore, in 2006, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Shinzo Abe issued a strategic partnership for a prosperous future and a peaceful joint statement, which specified future contributions to peaceful regional policies. In the same year as the statement, Japan supplied Indonesia with three patrol vessels.⁵¹ The Marine Police of North Sumatra and Riau deployed three vessels in the Strait of Malacca to counteract the proliferation of weapons, maritime terrorism, and piracy. This situation illustrates how quickly Abe acted during his first administration to build capacity and offer development assistance to Indonesia.

The policies of the second Shinzo Abe administration in Southeast Asia continued to emphasize a deeper security partnership with Indonesia in the maritime security area. Japan and Indonesia share similar cooperation concerns, including the threats in the Strait of Malacca, Indo-Pacific strategies, and the situation in the SCS. Under the leadership of Abe using the concept of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" Japan has contributed more actively to ensure the stability, prosperity, and peace of the global community while reaching its own security by expanding its partnerships with other nations including Indonesia.⁵² Similarly, Indonesia as the largest maritime nation in the world, introduced the global maritime fulcrum (GMF) in 2014 under President Joko Widodo. Widodo conveyed the vision of the world's maritime axis as an effort to achieve Indonesia's

⁴⁹ Catherine Zara Raymond, "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait," *U.S. Naval War College Press* 62, no. 3 (2009): 37, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26397033>.

⁵⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2006: Provision of Patrol Vessels to Indonesia" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2006), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/honpen/hp202040400.htm>.

⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Grant Aid to Indonesia for the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 16, 2006), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3.html>.

⁵² National Defense Program Guidelines, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond" (National Defense Program Guidelines, December 17, 2013), 5, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/___icsFiles/afiedfile/2014/02/03/NDPG.pdf.

geostrategic location, which departs from efforts to exploit Indonesia's marine assets economically and strategically.⁵³ Widodo's goal was to make Indonesia enable a constructive impact on the stability and security of maritime regions as well as contribute to global peace. Therefore, both Japan and Indonesia were striving to preserve and develop an open and stable maritime order as maritime nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

The shared vision of Abe and Widodo to create a safe and stable maritime in the region led to a bilateral meeting in Japan. In 2015, President Jokowi attended a meeting in Tokyo upon receiving an invitation from Shinzo Abe. At a joint press conference following the meeting, the "Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement–Towards Further Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership Underpinned by Sea and Democracy" was issued.⁵⁴ The aim of the meeting was to reaffirm their commitment to enhancing strategic cooperation in the areas of maritime and democracy. Acknowledging the significance of their maritime proximity and the crucial role of secure maritime routes for regional trade and stability, Abe and Jokowi engaged in substantive discussions aimed at confronting common challenges.

The establishment of the two-plus-two meeting framework between Japan and Indonesia marked a significant step in enhancing bilateral cooperation and regional security. During Widodo's and Abe's meetings, the willingness to consult both foreign and security ministers was expressed.⁵⁵ On December 17th, 2015, the first two-plus-two meeting was convened at the New Otani Hotel in Akasaka, Tokyo, between Japan's Security Minister Nakatani, Japan's Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Lestari Priansari and Security Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu.⁵⁶ The meeting was organized to discuss regional matters. During the conference, ministers

⁵³ Rendi Witular, "Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World," *The Jakarta Post*, November 13, 2014, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html>.

⁵⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-Indonesia Relations: Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 23, 2015), https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/id/page4e_000231.html.

⁵⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-Indonesia Relations: Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting."

⁵⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-Indonesia Relations: Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 18, 2015), https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/id/page3e_000437.html.

recognized the crucial significance of maritime stability in ensuring security at both regional and individual levels.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the two countries agreed to conduct the two-plus-two meeting every two years. This framework allowed Japan's enhanced security cooperation with Indonesia, leading to an expansion of naval port visits, military exercises, and MDA technical assistance.

C. EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA (2013-2022)

The period spanning from 2013 to 2022 is commonly recognized as a phase characterized by the improvement and stabilization of security cooperation between Japan and Indonesia. This generalization is supported by an analysis of the statistics on the general number of naval port visits, collaborative naval exercises, and contributions toward enhancing MDA. The evidence additionally suggests the presence of identifiable patterns with the introduction and subsequent growth of innovative forms of security cooperation. The following sections will analyze each of these trends, shown in Figure 1, in detail (see reference Appendix A).

Figure 1 depicts the number of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) port visits, naval and coast guard ship exercises, and MDA from 2013 through 2022. JMSDF port visits are occurrences in which a Japanese Navy ship(s) visited a port in Indonesia. Naval and coast guard ship exercises mean exercises conducted by Japan with Indonesia, including multilateral and bilateral exercises. Multilateral exercises are those in which the Japanese Navy participated in the presence of more than two nations organized by Indonesia. Bilateral exercises are those that take place between the Japanese and Indonesian navies and coast guard. Maritime Domain Awareness means Japan provided technical assistance, training, and equipment support to bolster Indonesia's maritime law enforcement agencies, the country's ability to safeguard its maritime domain, and ensure the safety and freedom of navigation. Data for the years 2013–2022 is sourced from the

⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-Indonesia Relations: Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting."

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMOD) government reports, and media reporting.




Figure 1. Japan’s Maritime Security Cooperation in Indonesia, 2013–2022: Naval Port Calls, Naval Exercises and Maritime Domain Awareness⁵⁸

1. Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) Port Visits

The year 2013 indicated a significant turning point in the relationship landscape between the JMSDF and the Indonesian Navy (*TNI AL*), as the JMSDF conducted its inaugural diplomatic mission to Indonesia. JMSDF presented three destroyers—JS Hatakaze (DDG 171), JS Haruyuki (DD 128), and JS Asayuki (DD132)—which made a three-day port visit at the Tanjung Priok pier in Jakarta.⁵⁹ The historical significance of this occasion reverberated in subsequent years as both nations signed a memorandum of maritime cooperation in 2015, setting the stage for a series of purposeful maritime engagements. This commitment was further demonstrated by Japan’s consistent and active participation in port visits to Indonesia.

⁵⁸ Adapted from Appendix A, Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5. Sources Available in Table 6.

⁵⁹ Admin Puspen TNI, “3 Destroyer Jepang Sandar di Tanjung Priok,” *PUSPEN TNI*, February 14, 2013, <https://tni.mil.id/view-45610-3-destroyer-jepang-sandar-di-tanjung-priok.html>.

The presence of JMSDF destroyer ships Asayuki (DD 132) and Kirisame (DD 104) in 2015 was a noteworthy continuation.⁶⁰ The destroyer ships docked at the Tanjung Priok port pier, North Jakarta from 8–10 April 2015, in the context of a friendly visit to Indonesia. The visit of the JMSDF Warships aimed to improve the friendly relations that have been well established and strengthen cooperation between the Indonesian Navy and Japan. While in Indonesia, the Commander of the 12th Division of the Japanese Escort Ship Colonel Masaharu Sugimoto along with the Commanders of the Asayuki (DD 132) and Warships Kirisame (DD 104) together with their staff conducted an official visit to the Commander of the Indonesian West Fleet Command (Pangarmabar) Rear Admiral (Laksda) TNI A. Taufiq R, as well as the Mayor of North Jakarta and besides that carried out a pilgrimage to the Kalibata heroes cemetery.⁶¹ In other activities, friendly games were held with soldiers from Jakarta Lantamal III and JMSDF open ships for Indonesian Navy officers and Japanese school students.

The pattern persisted as diplomatic relations ties were consistently strengthened in subsequent years. From August 22 to 25, 2016, JMSDF destroyers Yuudachi (DD-103) and Yuugiri (DD-153) visited Jakarta.⁶² The two ships stopped in Jakarta after sailing from Somalia on an anti-piracy mission. Activities while in Jakarta included an official visit by the ship's crew to the Commander of the Western Fleet, the Head of the Maritime Security Agency, the Operations Assistant to the Chief of Naval Staff, and a pilgrimage ceremony to the Kalibata National Heroes Cemetery.⁶³

In 2017, the destroyers JMSDF Makinami (DD-112), Asayuki (DD-132), and Shimayuki (DD-122) visited Jakarta with 590 crew members, 110 of whom were officer

⁶⁰ Admin Puspen TNI, "Dua kapal Perang Angkatan Laut Jepang Merapat di Pelabuhan Tanjung Priok," *PUSPEN TNI*, April 8, 2015, <https://tni.mil.id/view-74801-dua-kapal-perang-angkatan-laut-jepang-merapat-di-pelabuhan-tanjung-priok.html>.

⁶¹ Admin Puspen TNI.

⁶² Malvyandie Haryadi, "Penampakan 2 Kapal Perusak Jepang yang Sedang Merapat di Jakarta," *Tribun news*, Agustus 2016, <https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2016/08/23/penampakan-2-kapal-perusak-jepang-yang-sedang-merapat-di-jakarta>.

⁶³ Haryadi.

candidates for 3 days from February 22 to 25.⁶⁴ The purpose of their arrival was to provide an opportunity for 110 prospective officers who had just graduated from Japanese officer candidate schools so that they would gain the knowledge and skills needed as officers. Officers of the JMSDF have participated in a series of activities such as friendly sports matches with the Indonesian Navy, pilgrimages to the Kalibata heroes' cemetery, and visits to cultural and historical sites, including the National Monument and museums in Jakarta.⁶⁵ Through these various activities the friendship between the JMSDF and the Indonesian Navy is strengthened, including in terms of the exchange of experience and knowledge.

The trend continued in 2018 with two port visits. In June JMSDF training ship Kashima (TV-3508) and destroyer Makinami (DD-112) docked in Jakarta from June 4 to 8.⁶⁶ Jakarta is the first destination (port of call) in a series of long-distance cruise training missions for the Japanese defense system. The two ships were commanded by the Commander of the Training Squadron, Rear Admiral Hiroyuki Izumi, carrying a crew of 580, about 190 of whom were junior officers who had just graduated from the academy.⁶⁷ The activities included paying a tribute to Indonesia's heroes at the cemetery Kalibata, courtesy calls to the mayor of North Jakarta and Indonesian Navy's high-ranking officials, and a JMSDF music concert. On September 18–22 JMSDF destroyers Inazuma (DD-105), Suzutsuki (DD-117), and Kaga (DDH-184) visited Jakarta.⁶⁸ The ships underwent a voyage entitled Indo Southeast Asia Deployment 2018 (ISEAD18) Asia Pacific for two months until the end of October.

⁶⁴ Yashinta Difa and Ade Marboen, "Pasukan Bela diri Maritim Jepang Singgahi Jakarta," *ANTARA Indonesia News Agency*, February 22, 2017, <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/613949/pasukan-bela-diri-maritim-jepang-singgahi-jakarta>.

⁶⁵ Difa and Marboen.

⁶⁶ Rizki Akbar Hasan, "2 Kapal AL Jepang Gelar Misi Pelayaran Jarak Jauh, Jakarta Jadi Destinasi Pertama," *Liputan 6*, June 4, 2018, <https://www.liputan6.com/global/read/3548726/2-kapal-al-jepang-gelar-misi-pelayaran-jarak-jauh-jakarta-jadi-destinasi-pertama>.

⁶⁷ Hasan.

⁶⁸ Roy Rosa Bachtiar, "Tiga Kapal Tipe Perusak (Destroyer) dari Pasukan Bela Diri Jepang (JMSDF) Melakukan Kunjungan Persahabatan di Jakarta," *ANTARA Indonesia News Agency*, September 23, 2018, <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/750948/kenangan-sejarah-dalam-lawatan-tiga-kapal-jepang>.

The pattern of visits continued in subsequent years. On May 8–10, 2019, JMSDF destroyer JS Samidare (DD-106) docked at Tanjung Priok Port in North Jakarta.⁶⁹ On that occasion, captain of the Samidare Admiral Takahiro Nishiyama said, “There are many options for us to visit, but we chose Indonesia because the Indonesian Navy is an important partner for us.” The JMSDF destroyer sailed to Indonesia after completing a counter-piracy mission in Somalia. Subsequently, in 2021, the JMSDF conducted two port visits. First, on April 12, 2021, JMSDF destroyer JS Akebono (DD-108) visited Jakarta.⁷⁰ Second, on June 28–30, the two training ships JMSDF Kashima (TV-3508) and Setoyuki (TV-3518) visited Surabaya.⁷¹ The regular port visits served as a clear indication of Japan’s commitment to promoting diplomatic involvement, military cooperation, and coordination of maritime security with Indonesia, reflecting its proactive role in enhancing stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Overall, during the period from 2013 to 2021, Japan displayed a deliberate increase in naval diplomacy with Indonesia through a series of purposeful port visits by the JMSDF. The first diplomatic mission in 2013 marked a significant turning point, followed by subsequent years of escalating port visits by various JMSDF vessels. These visits, reflecting Japan’s proactive commitment, aimed to strengthen diplomatic ties, enhance military cooperation, and promote maritime security coordination with Indonesia, contributing to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

2. Naval and Coast Guard Ship Exercises

Japanese naval exercises with Indonesia have increased significantly in annual numbers over the period examined, although the current levels have remained relatively flat. Japan has actively participated in one type of multilateral exercise organized by the

⁶⁹ Yudha Baskoro, “Japanese Destroyer Samidare Docks in Jakarta,” *Jakarta Globe*, May 8, 2019, <https://jakartaglobe.id/vision/japanese-destroyer-samidare-docks-in-jakarta>.

⁷⁰ Redaksi, “Prajurit TNI AL Laksanakan Merplug Kapal Perang Angkatan Laut Bela Diri Jepang JS Akebono DD-108 di Jakarta,” *Narasi Pos*, April 12, 2021, <https://narasipos.com/nusantara/prajurit-tni-al-laksanakan-merplug-kapal-perang-angkatan-laut-bela-diri-jepang-js-akebono-dd-108-di-jakarta/>.

⁷¹ Dispen Lantamal V, “TNI AL Terima Kedatangan Dua Kapal Perang Jepang di Surabaya” (TNI AL, n.d.), <https://www.tnial.mil.id/berita/26718/TNI-AL-TERIMA-KEDATANGAN-DUA-KAPAL-PERANG-JEPANG-DI-SURABAYA/>.

Indonesia Navy, namely the Komodo Exercise. In 2014, Japan sent the destroyer Akebono (DD-108);⁷² in 2016, Japan sent the Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer Ise (DDH-182);⁷³ in 2018, Japan sent the tank landing ships Osumi (LST-4001).⁷⁴ The Komodo Exercise is a multinational naval exercise hosted by the Indonesian Navy and held biennially.⁷⁵ The primary objectives of the Komodo Exercise encompass promoting regional stability and peace by fostering cooperation and mutual understanding among the naval forces of participating nations. Additionally, the exercise strives to elevate maritime security cooperation by engaging in simulated scenarios that pertain to essential areas such as disaster relief, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance operations.⁷⁶

In recent years, there has been a marked increase in bilateral exercises between the Japanese Navy and the Indonesian Navy, particularly evident in the years 2020 and 2021. In 2020, for the first time, the JMSDF and the Indonesian Navy conducted a joint training exercise involving KRI Sutanto 377, KRI John Lie 358, JS Kaga (DDH 184), and JS Ikazuchi (DD 107) in the North Natuna Waters.⁷⁷ The exercise encompassed simple exercises, including flag signals, replenishment at sea, and ended with farewell passing.

The subsequent year, 2021, witnessed the further maturation of this collaboration through Japan's engagement in bilateral exercises with Indonesia on two distinct occasions. First, on April 13, 2021, JS Akebono-108 conducted a "goodwill exercise" with KRI Bung

⁷² Priyambodo, "40 Indonesian Military Vessels to Join the Komodo Naval Exercise."

⁷³ "中国を牽制、海自がフィリピンに大型護衛艦を派遣 屈指のヘリ運用能力備える (To keep China in check, the Maritime Self-Defense Force dispatches a large destroyer to the Philippines, with one of the best helicopter operations capabilities)," *The Sankei News*, April 5, 2016, <https://www.sankei.com/article/20160405-2ZWR7JFS7FL57G3TSQHODG3MWY/>.

⁷⁴ Indomiliter, "JS Osumi: 'Pesaing' Mistral Class Dalam Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo 2018."

⁷⁵ Admin Puspen TNI, "The 4th MNEK 2023, Angkatan Laut 36 Negara Sinergikan Laksanakan Operasi Penanggulangan Bencana," *Pusat Penerangan TNI*, June 9, 2023, <https://tni.mil.id/view-227061-the-4th-mnek-2023-angkatan-laut-36-negara-sinergikan-laksanakan-operasi-penanggulangan-bencana.html>.

⁷⁶ Admin Puspen TNI.

⁷⁷ Andreas Ricky Febrian and Ahmad Romadoni, "Aksi Kapal Perang TNI AL dan AL Jepang Latihan Bersama di Natuna Utara," *KumparanNEWS*, October 7, 2020, <https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/aksi-kapal-perang-tni-al-dan-al-jepang-latihan-bersama-di-natuna-utara-1uLLLE5VxKD/full>.

Tomo-357.⁷⁸ Second, on June 30, 2021, JS Kasima-3508 and Setoyuki-3518 held friendly exercises with the Indonesian Navy's newest guided-missile destroyer, KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai in the Java Sea.⁷⁹ These exercises encompassed a series of activities covering leave launch ship, communication check exercise, flag hoist exercise, and division tactical maneuver exercise, followed by photo exercise and farewell passes. Evidently, the prevailing trend underscores a progression from relatively simpler exercises to more complex ones. The engagement of diverse naval assets, and the expansion of operational theatres, reflect an advancing stage of bilateral naval cooperation.

Additionally, Japan increased maritime security cooperation with Indonesia through bilateral exercises with the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (*BAKAMLA*). For the first time in 2018, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) conducted bilateral training with *BAKAMLA* in Indonesian territory.⁸⁰ According to the Director of *BAKAMLA* Training Rear Admiral TNI Eko Jokowiyo, "This is not a military exercise, but a joint maritime safety and security operation exercise."⁸¹ In this joint exercise, each element had its own role. The scenario was designed to maintain maritime security and safety. Indonesian maritime elements together with JCG patrol boats at sea practiced together in several types of training formations, namely the Communication Formation led by JCG Tsugaru PLH-02 starting from Flash, Whistle, and Flag, followed by *BAKAMLA* KN Tanjung Datu 1101 taking control of the leadership of all ships in the Suspect Ship Search Training Formation for ships suspected of smuggling drugs through the North Natuna Waters to the Java Sea.⁸²

⁷⁸ Dispen Koarmada I, "KRI Bung Tomo-357 Melaksanakan Latihan Dengan Kapal Perang Jepang," *Koarmada I*, April 15, 2021, <https://koarmada1.tnial.mil.id/pengumuman/detail/346-kri-bung-tomo-357-melaksanakan-latihan-dengan-kapal-perang-jepang>.

⁷⁹ Dispen Koarmada II, "Kapal Perang TNI AL KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai Laksanakan PASSEX dengan Kapal Perang Jepang di Laut Jawa," *Koarmada II*, July 1, 2021, <https://www.tnial.mil.id/berita/26859/KAPAL-PERANG-TNI-AL-KRI-I-GUSTI-NGURAH-RAI-LAKSANAKAN-PASSEX-DENGAN-KAPAL-PERANG-JEPANG-DI-LAUT-JAWA/>.

⁸⁰ Beritasumut, "Bakamla Latihan Bilateral dengan Japan Coast Guard di Perairan Utara Jakarta," *Beritasumut*, July 12, 2018, <https://www.beritasumut.com/detail/peristiwa/Bakamla-Latihan-Bilateral-dengan-Japan-Coast-Guard-di-Perairan-Utara-Jakarta>.

⁸¹ Beritasumut.

⁸² Beritasumut.

Moreover, in early 2022, the Japan Coast Guard strengthened bilateral relations with *BAKAMLA* by carrying out exercises in North Nongsa waters, Batam. The exercise was carried out by the Indonesian coast guard ship KN Dana Island-323 with the JCG Echigo PLH 08, which included serial exercises: commcheck, combined ship exercise, photo session, and farewell.⁸³ These exercises mean to improve the ability of Indonesian coast guard personnel in manning ships to support the task of maintaining sea security in Indonesia's maritime area. In addition, The exercise provided an opportunity for Japan's Coast Guard to enhance its cooperation and collaboration with Indonesia in maritime security efforts.

Overall, the evidence suggests Japan intentionally increased the scale of naval exercises from 2013 to 2022, encompassing both multilateral and bilateral engagements. This is evidenced by a substantial rise in both annual Japanese participation in Indonesian-led multilateral exercises, notably the Komodo Exercise, and the frequency of bilateral exercises between the Japanese Navy and the Indonesian Navy, notably exemplified in 2020 and 2021. This deliberate augmentation in joint training exercises serves as a strategic avenue for Japan to reinforce its bilateral relations with Indonesia and bolster maritime security cooperation, facilitating closer ties between the two nations and fostering a collaborative environment for maritime stability and safety in the region. Furthermore, Japan's proactive involvement in maritime security exercises with the *BAKAMLA* underscores its commitment to enhancing shared efforts in maintaining sea security and reinforces the growing partnership between the Japan coast guard and *BAKAMLA*, thereby strengthening regional maritime security efforts.

3. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Development

Japan demonstrated increased cooperation with contributing to Indonesia's efforts to enhance its MDA through various means. Maritime Domain Awareness means Japan provided technical assistance, training, and equipment support to bolster Indonesia's

⁸³ Admin BAKAMLA, "Passing Exercise Kapal Bakamla RI dengan Kapal Japan Coast Guard" (BAKAMLA, February 3, 2022), https://bakamla.go.id/publication/detail_news/passing-exercise-kapal-bakamla-ri-dengan-kapal-japan-coast-guard.

maritime law enforcement agencies, the country's ability to safeguard its maritime domain, and ensure the safety and freedom of navigation. Here is a breakdown of the specific contributions and initiatives:

a. Technical Assistance

In 2013,⁸⁴ 2014,⁸⁵ and 2016⁸⁶ the JMOD provided education for personnel from the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Indonesian Navy Department, National Security, the National Disaster Management Agency (*BNPB*), and the National Search and Rescue Agency (*BASARNAS*). Seminars were offered on maritime security and the fundamentals of oceanography, and in 2015, the JMOD conducted an International Aviation Law seminar for legal officers in the Indonesian Air Force.⁸⁷ This assistance aimed to bolster Indonesia's capabilities in safeguarding its maritime domain and ensuring the safety and freedom of navigation. The technical assistance included sharing expertise and knowledge in areas such as oceanography, meteorology, and hydrography.

b. Capacity-Building Assistance

During January 23–27, 2017, the JMOD invited seven officials from the Indonesian Navy to visit Tokyo as part of its capacity-building assistance.⁸⁸ This initiative aimed to enhance Indonesia's military capabilities, including its maritime domain awareness. The officers had the opportunity to learn from their Japanese counterparts and gain insights into advanced practices and technologies in maritime security.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Seminar on Hydro-Oceanography" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, February 4, 2013), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/cap_b/indonesia/20130204.html.

⁸⁵ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "The JMOD/SDF Conducted Meteorology and Oceanography Training Programs" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, February 3, 2014), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/cap_b/indonesia/20140203.html.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "The JMOD/SDF Provided an Oceanography Seminar on Topics Such as Trajectory Prediction." (Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 21, 2016), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/cap_b/indonesia/20160321.html.

⁸⁷ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "International Aviation Law" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, February 5, 2015), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/cap_b/indonesia/20150205.html.

⁸⁸ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "The JMOD Invited Officers from the Indonesian Navy to Visit Japan as Part of Its Capacity Building Assistance to the Indonesian Military" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, January 23, 2017), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/cap_b/indonesia/20170123.html.

c. International Law of the Sea Seminars

The JMOD conducted two international law of the sea seminars in Jakarta in 2017⁸⁹ and 2018.⁹⁰ These seminars focused on legal aspects related to the sea, promoting understanding and adherence to international maritime laws and regulations. They aimed to enhance Indonesia's legal capacity and knowledge of maritime affairs.

d. Long-Distance Learning on Maritime Security

In 2021 and 2022, *BAKAMLA* and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) initiated a collaborative virtual training program titled “Long-Distance Learning on Maritime Security.”⁹¹ The training, conducted entirely online, centered on maritime law expertise, with a particular emphasis on exploring the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The initiative involved esteemed instructors, Prof. Kentaro Furuya, dan Honzu Kuboshima from the JCG and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), providing insights to not only *BAKAMLA* personnel but also various stakeholders responsible for maritime security, such as Water and Air Police (*Polairud*), Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (*Polhukam*), National Narcotics Board (*BNN*), Immigration, Customs, and Excise authorities. This collaborative endeavor not only advances the capability of Indonesia's maritime security agencies but also establishes a model for effective international cooperation in safeguarding the maritime domain.

Across the timeframe spanning 2013 to 2022, Japan purposefully escalated its engagement in enhancing Indonesia's MDA through multifaceted initiatives. These endeavors encompassed technical assistance, capacity-building support, legal seminars, and long-distance learning collaborations. Notably, Japan's contributions included

⁸⁹ Ministry of Defense of Japan, “International Law of the Sea” (Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 20, 2017), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/cap_b/indonesia/20170320.html.

⁹⁰ Ministry of Defense of Japan, “International Law of the Sea” (Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 19, 2018), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/cap_b/indonesia/20180319.html.

⁹¹ Admin BAKAMLA, “Bakamla RI - Japan Coast Guard Lakukan Pelatihan Daring di Awal Tahun 2022” (BAKAMLA, January 26, 2022), https://bakamla.go.id/publication/detail_news/bakamla-ri-japan-coast-guard-lakukan-pelatihan-daring-di-awal-tahun-2022.

seminars on maritime security and oceanography, capacity-building assistance for Indonesian Navy officers, and International Law of the Sea seminars to bolster legal expertise. A significant advancement was the collaborative virtual training program on maritime security, conducted in partnership with *BAKAMLA* and the JCG, emphasizing expertise in international maritime law. Collectively, these concerted efforts underscore Japan's proactive commitment to strengthening Indonesia's MDA capabilities, thus fostering effective regional maritime security cooperation.

D. CONCLUSION

The development of Japan-Indonesia security cooperation from 2013 to 2022, particularly in the maritime security domain, has revealed significant shifts in policy and security cooperation mechanisms. This chapter has described the evolution of this cooperation, spanning from the initial focus on economic collaboration to the establishment of a robust security partnership. The period under scrutiny has witnessed a progression of initiatives, ranging from joint naval exercises and port visits to extensive contributions aimed at enhancing MDA.

In the aftermath of World War II, Japan's cooperation with Indonesia was primarily centered on economic interests, marked by FDI and ODA. The ascendancy of Shinzo Abe's administration marked a pivotal juncture, steering the cooperation trajectory towards security concerns, notably in the maritime domain. This transformation can be attributed to regional dynamics, including China's growing influence and piracy concerns in the Strait of Malacca.

The alignment between rhetoric and actions is evident in the consistent increase of joint naval exercises and port visits, denoting a genuine commitment to security cooperation. Noteworthy is the strategic engagement during the tenure of President Joko Widodo, wherein the concept of Indonesia's "world maritime axis" found resonance with Japan's intent to foster a stable maritime order in the region. The series of bilateral meetings and agreements, exemplified by the two-plus-two meetings, reflect the systematic and sustained effort to bolster security ties.

The chapter highlights the dynamic nature of security challenges, exemplified by the expansion of joint exercises and capacity-building beyond bilateral engagement to incorporate *BAKAMLA*. This indicates a recognition of the numerous aspects of maritime security and the importance of engaging various stakeholders in collaborative efforts. However, it remains crucial to ensure that cooperation frameworks remain flexible enough to accommodate emerging challenges and evolving security dynamics.

In conclusion, the development of Japan-Indonesia security cooperation in the maritime domain from 2013 to 2022 demonstrates a substantive alignment between articulated intentions and proactive actions. This partnership has transcended economic interests to address shared security concerns, though the complexities of the region's security landscape pose ongoing challenges. The consistency in naval exercises, port visits, and capacity-building initiatives substantiates the seriousness of both nations in fostering a secure maritime environment. However, the effectiveness of these efforts will be determined by the adaptability of strategies and the capacity to effectively address intricate security challenges. As the region's security dynamics continue to evolve, the Japan-Indonesia partnership must remain agile, responsive, and collaborative to ensure lasting maritime stability and prosperity.

III. POLICY ANALYSIS: THE JAPANESE STRENGTHEN SECURITY COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA

A. INTRODUCTION

As described in Chapter II of this thesis, Japan strengthened security cooperation with Indonesia between 2013 and 2022, especially under Abe's leadership. The strengthening of Japan's security policy with Indonesia was due to domestic (internal) developments and international (external) factors of concern. Internally, Japan's government under Abe pushed for a more proactive security strategy. The Japanese government issued three major documents: Japan's first National Security Strategy (NSS), which established the direction for diplomatic and security policy,⁹² as well as amended National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Midterm Defense Program (MTDP).⁹³ Through these documents, Japan began to more actively contribute to global and regional security and stability in partnership with the international community.

Externally, two major factors drove Japan's enhanced security ties with Indonesia and Southeast Asia. First, China's improving military capability and aggressiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) have been a significant concern. Partnering with Indonesia can help inhibit and balance China's regional influence. Second, Japan depends economically on secure sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) for its maritime trade. Over 90% of Japan's crude oil imports from the Middle East travel through vital chokepoints like the Malacca Strait and the SCS.⁹⁴ Securing these SLOCs by cooperating with Indonesia is a strategic priority.

This chapter analyzes the hypotheses posed in Chapter I, which suggest factors behind Japan's tightened security cooperation with Indonesia under Abe. The chapter

⁹² Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013."

⁹³ National Defense Program Guidelines, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond."

⁹⁴ Japan Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, "2021–Understanding the Current Energy Situation in Japan (Part 1)," *METI Agency for Natural Resources and Energy*, August 12, 2022, https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/special/article/detail_171.html.

examines both Japan's evolving domestic security strategies, especially under Abe's leadership, as well as key external geopolitical factors. The analysis shows how Abe's push for a more proactive security posture aligned with growing concerns about the regional security environment, namely China's military assertiveness and Japan's dependence on sea lane security. Through this examination of interrelated internal and external drivers, the reasons for enhanced Japan-Indonesia security ties are clarified.

B. INTERNAL FACTORS—JAPAN'S SECURITY STRATEGIES UNDER SHINZO ABE

Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration from 2012 onwards, Japan adopted a more proactive security strategy aimed at expanding its regional influence. This represented more restrained and pragmatic security policies from previous administrations. The adoption of key strategic documents like the 2013 NSS, revisions to security guidelines, and increased focus on relations with ASEAN nations including Indonesia exemplified Japan's move towards a more assertive regional security posture under Abe. The section highlights how these internal developments aligned with the broader strategic objectives of normalizing Japan's military capabilities and playing a more prominent role in maintaining regional order.

1. Japan National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013

After Jun'ichirō Koizumi's long tenure from 2001 as Japan's prime minister ended in 2006, Japanese politics entered a period of instability characterized by the rapid turnover of prime ministers from both the long-dominant LDP and opposition DPJ. In September 2006, the Japanese witnessed a smooth transition of power as Koizumi passed on the political leadership to his designated replacement, Abe.⁹⁵ The transfer of power performed didn't uphold the momentum surrounding anticipated improvements, as perceived by these administrators and numerous observers. Abe's tenure as prime minister lasted only one

⁹⁵ Komine Takao, "How Did Koizumi Cabinet Change Japan? (Assessment of Koizumi's Economic Policies & Preview of Abe's Economic Stewardship)," *JEF Japan Spotlight*, June 2007, 6, <https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/153cover%20story01.pdf>.

year as a result of the country's ongoing significant instabilities, and two subsequent prime ministers from his party experienced similar outcomes.

Due to the political upheaval within the controlling party, the opposition DPJ assumed office in August 2009, marking the first instance of a single opposition party garnering higher votes than the LDP in a national election since postwar.⁹⁶ The leadership of the DPJ, unfortunately, did not demonstrate any greater stability. During the DPJ era, the nation experienced changes of three prime ministers in just three years, which was followed by the LDP's return to office in December 2012.⁹⁷ This period of political instability lasted over 6 years until Abe returned as prime minister in 2012 and brought stability back to Japanese politics. Though the causes of this prolonged instability remain complex, the frequent turnover of leaders made it difficult for Japan to implement consistent long-term policies both domestically and internationally.

The return of the LDP under Abe in 2012 ended this turbulent transition period and marked a return to stable leadership and policy direction for Japan, especially in security policy. On December 17, 2013, Abe introduced the concept of proactive contribution to peace (PCP) within the framework of international cooperation as the fundamental principle guiding Japanese foreign and security policy in the NSS.⁹⁸ This PCP concept enabled the enhancement of Japan's international military normalization and security cooperation.⁹⁹ Japan was seeking to demonstrate its internal strength in a manner compatible with international law and confront nations that are perceived as threats to the international order.¹⁰⁰ The introduction of the PCP idea marked a significant shift in the

⁹⁶ Andrew L Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance (Chapter Title: Japan's Twenty-First-Century Security Renaissance)* (Columbia University Press, n.d.), 13, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/oros17260.8>.

⁹⁷ Oros, 13.

⁹⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013," 10–13.

⁹⁹ Daisuke Akimoto, *The Abe Doctrine. Japan's Proactive Pacifism and Security Strategy* (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2018), 2, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7659-6>.

¹⁰⁰ Marta McLellan Ross, "The Abe Restoration: Pushing Past Japan's Wartime Legacy and Restoring a Responsible Use of Force," *Pacific Forum CSIS* 15, no. 14 (December 2015): 9, https://pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/151217_issuesinsights_v15n14.pdf.

Japanese security strategy concerning a more forceful, normalized military role aimed at demonstrating national strength while conforming with international law.

The NSS document that pushed for a more proactive security strategy was an important component and essential foundation of Japan's security framework. It not only signified longstanding security practices but also signified the adoption of new strategies. Prior to 2013, the Japanese foreign and security objectives were disorganized, and there was a lack of a clear and concise long-term security strategy. In 2013, the new Abe's cabinet established objectives and strategies more clearly. The NSS of Japan is a comprehensive document that outlines the core concepts, objectives, and strategies pertaining to the Japanese national security, diplomatic, and security policies.¹⁰¹ The initial adoption of this framework occurred in 2013, encompassing three primary objectives: the preservation and sustenance of peace, the enhancement of the security landscape in collaboration with allied nations, and the advancement of a stable international order.¹⁰² To achieve these objectives, it has been imperative to foster enhanced collaboration with allies, grow mutual confidence, and implement concrete security measures.¹⁰³ This imperative extends beyond the U.S. and involves other countries in the region.

The NSS also concentrates on the significance of the countries of ASEAN, indicating Japan's recognition of the association as a crucial security partnership. According to Shoji, "there is a strong correlation between ASEAN and the fundamental concept of the NSS."¹⁰⁴ The NSS emphasizes the importance of ASEAN's role in promoting stability and peace around the Asia-Pacific region. It suggests that Japan should continue to lend its support to ASEAN's endeavors to enhance the association's unity.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Shoji, "Japan's Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Pursuit of a Status as a 'Relevant' Partner," 2015, 100.

¹⁰² Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013," 14.

¹⁰³ Japan Ministry of Defense, 5.

¹⁰⁴ Shoji, "Japan's Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Pursuit of a Status as a 'Relevant' Partner," 2015, 100.

¹⁰⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013" (Japan Ministry of Defense, December 17, 2013), 23-24, <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

Japan's government acknowledges the importance of ASEAN and its central role in ensuring both Japanese security and regional security.

In accordance with the NSS, Japan's government implemented capacity-building assistance as a means to strengthen its relations with ASEAN. Japan fostered assistance for capacity-building in order to implement "seamless assistance in security-related areas."¹⁰⁶ From 2012 to 2015, JMOD established capacity-building initiatives in an overall of ten different nations, seven of these being member states of ASEAN (see Table 1) and three of which were not the ASEAN Member States.¹⁰⁷

Table 1. JMOD Capacity Building Assistance 2012–2015¹⁰⁸

ASEAN Countries	Japan's Capacity Building Assistance (according to field)			
	2012	2013	2014	2015
Cambodia	Civil engineering			
Vietnam	PKO	Aviation Safety, HA/DR	International Aviation Law	Aviation Safety, Aviation Medicine, PKO, Maritime Security
Indonesia	Maritime Security		International Aviation Law	Maritime Security
Myanmar			Civil Engineering, Underwater Medicine, HA/DR, Aviation Meteorology	
Philippines			HA/DR	HA/DR, International Aviation Law
Malaysia				International Aviation Law
Laos				HA/DR

The evidence shows that Japan's capacity-building assistance initiatives have predominantly focused on ASEAN nations. Within Indonesia, Japan actively engaged in capacity-building programs from 2013 to 2022, as evidenced in Chapter II of this thesis on MDA development. The concentration of capacity-building efforts in Southeast Asia reflects the Japanese prioritization of ASEAN as a key regional partner. By investing in

¹⁰⁶ Japan Ministry of Defense, 30.

¹⁰⁷ Japan Ministry of Defense, "Japan's Defense Capacity Building Assistance" (JMOD, February 2016), 2, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000146830.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, 2.

the security capacities of ASEAN states through bilateral initiatives, Japan has aimed to foster closer multilateral defense cooperation with ASEAN as an institution. This allows Japan to increase its security role in Southeast Asia in line with its policy objectives.

Moreover, the NSS highlights several emerging risk variables in the maritime domain. One of the particulars of contention pertains to the SCS dispute. Despite the implementation of the restrictions established by UNCLOS in the SCS, China has acted outside of the legal framework.¹⁰⁹ China's assertiveness in the SCS region will be more fully explained in the discussion of external factors as evidence of this. Therefore, the significance of ASEAN's strategic location concerning Japanese security is emphasized, and the valuable role of ASEAN in addressing SCS issues is acknowledged.¹¹⁰ This is because the SCS serves as Japan's primary energy import route, so any instability in this area would pose significant security concerns for the nation.

2. Amended National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)

Abe also amended the NDPG to lay out in further detail the methods through which Japan will strengthen its security capabilities. The NDPG for FY 2014 and beyond is a document that is derived from the NDPG for FY 2013 and is aligned with the objectives outlined in the NSS. As per the NDPG, Japan is required to enhance its multilateral and bilateral cooperation, as well as engage in other international cooperation endeavors not limited to the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in order to uphold stability and peace.¹¹¹ Furthermore, the guidelines acknowledged that ASEAN has been making advancements in the process of regional integration. In light of this, Japan expressed its commitment to actively participate in various multilateral gatherings, including the East Asia Summit, ADMM-Plus and the ARF. Additionally, Japan affirmed its dedication to the objective of PCP.¹¹² Through the policy evolution in

¹⁰⁹ Japan Ministry of Defense, "National Security Strategy (NSS) 2013," 8.

¹¹⁰ Japan Ministry of Defense, 24.

¹¹¹ National Defense Program Guidelines, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond," 8.

¹¹² National Defense Program Guidelines, 10.

the 2014 NDPG, Japan demonstrated its commitment to strengthening its own capabilities and multilateral security partnerships, especially with ASEAN, to uphold regional stability and make proactive contributions to peace aligned with its normalized security posture.

3. Amended Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP)

The amended MTDP for FY 2014–2018, which received approval on December 17, 2013, provided a comprehensive outline of the more detailed strategies.¹¹³ This document was developed in conjunction with the NDPG. It outlined the strategic objectives and policy priorities of the Japanese Government over a five-year period. By issuing the MTDP, Japan claimed that it intended to uphold the security of the sea region surrounding its territory and promote international maritime stability through the maintenance of four flotillas of JMSDF, as well as through an augmentation in the number of submarines.¹¹⁴ In addition, Japan engaged in collaborative exercises and training with nations that have a common objective of safeguarding open and secure maritime domains, irrespective of whether the war directly impacts the proximate regions of Japan.¹¹⁵ The amended MTDP outlined Japan’s strategic objectives of upholding maritime security, increasing naval capabilities, and pursuing collaborative military exercises, reflecting Japan’s efforts to normalize and expand the capabilities and roles of the SDF.

In accordance with the MTDP, Japan aimed to actively contribute to peace in the Asia-Pacific area through several means. These include engaging in both multilateral and bilateral training and exercises, showcasing their capabilities, and fostering practical cooperative partnerships. Furthermore, Japan intended to support the organization of comprehensive and unrestricted discussions addressing various security concerns, as stated in the MTDP.¹¹⁶ The Ministry of Defense in Japan intended to expand its involvement in official development assistance (ODA) initiatives. In addition, it aimed to provide support

¹¹³ National Security Council and the Cabinet, “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)” (Ministry of Defense of Japan, December 17, 2013), https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/Defense_Program.pdf.

¹¹⁴ National Security Council and the Cabinet, 6.

¹¹⁵ National Security Council and the Cabinet, 17.

¹¹⁶ National Security Council and the Cabinet, 16.

to nations that express a desire to enhance their military capabilities in various areas, including the disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, military medicine, and HA/DR.¹¹⁷

From a comprehensive standpoint, the overarching objective of the Japanese NSS, the NDPG of 2014, and the MTDP spanning from 2014 to 2018 was to enhance national security through improved coordination and the use of advanced technologies. These improvements were aimed at enabling Japan to respond more swiftly to various threats, especially those in remote maritime regions, while also positioning the country as a contributor to regional security efforts. The significance of these publications lies in their direct association with the development of Japan-Indonesia security cooperation from 2013 to 2022, as explained in Chapter II of this thesis, which demonstrated concrete actions, namely, increasing numbers of Naval Port Visits, Joint Naval Exercises, and Maritime Domain Awareness.

C. EXTERNAL FACTORS—JAPAN’S GEOSTRATEGY UNDER SHINZO ABE

Two key external factors drove Japan’s push for a more proactive security posture and strengthened defense cooperation with Indonesia: concerns about decreasing regional security conditions and Japan’s economic dependence on secure sea lanes. This section first provides background on the rise of China and its enhancing maritime assertiveness, which heightened threat perceptions in the SCS. Second, this section explains Japan’s vulnerability related to its reliance on energy imports flowing through critical Southeast Asian waterways like the Straits of Malacca. Given the strategic position of Indonesia between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Japanese had strong incentives to boost security ties with Jakarta.

1. Chinese Assertiveness in the SCS

China has an extensive history of assertiveness. Since the turn of the last century, its assertive behavior has been observed in the SCS. In 1974, China used its armed forces

¹¹⁷ National Security Council and the Cabinet, 17.

to oust the Vietnamese from Paracel Islands.¹¹⁸ Moreover, after a naval confrontation with Vietnam in 1988, China assertively seized control of seven rocky islands and outcrops within the Spratly Islands.¹¹⁹ In addition, the National People's Congress (NPC) enacted legislation in 1992 that can be interpreted as a strategy to justify China's claims over the entire SCS through the implementation of the nine-dash line.¹²⁰ According to Yahuda, in 1994 it was discovered that China constructed military bases on Mischief Reef, which has a location in the Spratly Islands and is close to territory claimed by the Philippines.¹²¹ In the 1990s, the prevalence of competing sovereignty claims in the region led to significant interstate tensions because of China's strategic maneuvers in the SCS, which were primarily intended to advance its territorial assertions.¹²² Beijing employed an approach that was relatively stringent. At the diplomatic level, the nation refused to participate in discussions regarding the dispute within multilateral conferences like the ARF, arguing that it represented a bilateral matter.

China's aggressiveness in the SCS can be seen as an expression of its commitment to upholding its territorial sovereignty. In 2009, China formally and informally declared the SCS as a fundamental aspect of its sovereignty. In addition, in 2011, China published the white paper "China's Peaceful Development," which clearly identified territorial integrity and state sovereignty as fundamental Chinese concerns.¹²³ Moreover, since 2013, China has demonstrated a visible inclination towards expansionism in its foreign policy

¹¹⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, "China's Maritime Disputes 1895–2023," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes>.

¹¹⁹ An Hai, "Vietnam Bans Dissidents at Remembrance of '88 Spratly Islands Battle With China," *VOA EAST ASIA*, March 16, 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-restricts-dissidents-as-it-allows-remembrance-of-1988-spratly-islands-skirmish-with-china-/7008773.html>.

¹²⁰ United Nations, "Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992" (United Nations, February 1992), https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf.

¹²¹ Michael Yahuda, "China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea," *Journal of Contemporary China* 22, no. 81 (May 2013): 450, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.748964>.

¹²² Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, "The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions," *Jamestown Foundation* 24, no. 1 (November 2009): 19.

¹²³ China State Council, "China's Peaceful Development" (The State Council The People's Republic of China, September 6, 2011), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm.

over SCS concerns. China has employed a combination of military, administrative, and diplomatic strategies in order to prevent rival claimants from bolstering their respective territorial claims.¹²⁴ The military component has assumed a subordinate and indirect position in China's strategic approach to the SCS. China has strategically employed demonstrations of its advancing naval capacities through patrols and training maneuvers to enhance its defensive capabilities and prevent potential challengers from contesting its territorial claims.

The period from 2009 to 2019 is recognized as the period that demonstrated China's increasingly assertive stance in defending its territorial claims in the region, as depicted in Figure 2 in closer detail.




Figure 2. China Activities in the South China Sea 2009–2019 (see Appendix B)¹²⁵

¹²⁴ M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, no. 3 (2011): 293, <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs33-3b>.

¹²⁵ Adapted from Appendix B, Table 7. Sources Available in Table 8.

The data shows Chinese activities in the SCS from 2009 to 2019, including events involving confrontations with Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the United States. These activities demonstrate China's increasingly assertive stance in defending its territorial claims in the region through shows of naval force, law enforcement patrols, and interference with other countries' vessels. The range of activities includes firing on foreign fishing boats, cutting survey cables, ramming ships, deploying oil rigs in disputed waters, and blocking foreign vessels from disputed areas (see Appendix B). These provocative actions, conducted using both Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and military vessels, reflect China's objective of establishing greater control in the region. This objective was not only seen by Worldwide leaders as a threat to regional security but also to the foundation of the current regional order. Therefore, the assertiveness contributed to heightened tensions and likely drove Japan to pursue closer security ties with ASEAN states like Indonesia as a counterbalance. Besides that, the numbers provide quantifiable evidence of China's escalating assertiveness and militarization in the SCS, posing a threat to free navigation.

China has undertaken the growth of man-made islands, the installation of missiles, and various other military assets on the territories it has occupied within the SCS. The initiation of the construction of man-made islands in the Spratly Archipelago by Beijing took place around the end of 2013 until the beginning of 2014 and showed substantial expansion in 2015. China conducted wide land reclamation efforts in the Spratly Islands, leading to the expansion of approximately 3,200 acres of land by the conclusion of 2015.¹²⁶ The construction of artificial islands by China has bolstered its capacity to maintain control over the SCS, as seen by the deployment of fighter jets in the area. China's assertiveness in the SCS reflects its determination to protect its perceived sovereign rights and national interests in the region, despite criticism from other regional actors and the international community.

¹²⁶ Nam Bạch Thị Nhã, "Nhìn nhận việc 'đảo hóa' của Trung Quốc ở Trường Sa dưới góc độ luật pháp quốc tế (The building of article islands of China in the Spratly Islands—An analysis in the viewpoint of the international law)," *Technology Development* 19, no. 2 (2016): 77–89.

China's sovereignty over the SCS would give it significant power to shape the security dynamics in East Asia, particularly with regard to Japan. Which would significantly affect the security of Japanese sea routes, particularly in terms of trade and energy. The majority of Japan's oil imports are sourced from the Persian Gulf and transported through the SCS and the Straits of Malacca, which are in close proximity to the Spratly Islands. In addition, the Japanese and China have territorial disputes regarding the Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Islands. China has demonstrated its ambitions through increasingly provocative naval operations near the Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Chinese naval frigate of the Jiangkai I-class became the first combat vessel from China to navigate the waters near the Senkaku Islands.¹²⁷ Subsequently, in January 2018, a Shang-class submarine successfully conducted submerged navigation within Japan's contiguous zone located in the East China Sea.¹²⁸ This incident represents the initial verified occurrence in which a submerged submarine came within proximity of the Senkaku Islands.¹²⁹ Hence, China's control of the SCS grants Beijing a significant advantage and influence in the ongoing strategic competition with Japan in East Asia. This, in turn, strengthens Beijing's position in the disputes over the East China Sea and its pursuit of regional leadership.

Within Indonesia, China has violated Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by using maritime vessels and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with CCG vessels protecting China's illegal fishing fleet and warships of the PLAN deployed to assert maritime claims in the North Natuna Sea. On December 30, 2019, CCG vessels successfully deterred a group of Natuna's fishermen when Chinese fishermen entered the

¹²⁷ Ankit Panda, "A First: Chinese Naval Vessel Enters Senkaku Contiguous Zone in East China Sea," *The Diplomat*, June 9, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/a-first-chinese-naval-vessel-enters-senkaku-contiguous-zone-in-east-china-sea/>.

¹²⁸ Ankit Panda, "Japan Identifies Chinese Submarine in East China Sea: A Type 093 SSN," *The Diplomat*, January 16, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japan-identifies-chinese-submarine-in-east-china-sea-a-type-093-ssn/>.

¹²⁹ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Security Environment Surrounding Japan" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2018), 47, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_1-1-1_web.pdf.

Indonesian EEZ.¹³⁰ During the period of December 2019 to January 2020, it was indicated that a total of six CCG ships were present in the Indonesian EEZ. These ships include *Gubeiyu* 88603, *Haijing* 5202, *Haijian* 2169, *Haijing* 5403, *Haijing* 5302, and *Haijing* 46303, which belong to the *Zhaoduan* class and have a tonnage of 4,000 tons and a 76-mm cannon.¹³¹ Furthermore, in September 2021, six PLAN vessels, including the destroyer Kunming 172, were observed conducting patrols in the Indonesian EEZ, causing an impression of unease among Indonesian fishermen who ventured out to the ocean.¹³² China's increasing deployment of maritime vessels, including CCG ships protecting illegal fishing fleets and PLAN warships asserting disputed claims, represents a pattern of violations of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone that threatens regional security and Indonesian sovereignty over its maritime territory.

In consideration of these complicated circumstances, Japan subsequently increased its geostrategic domain, extending it from the Asia-Pacific region beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Abe recognized the need to uphold security in the Indo-Pacific region. By implementing a more extensive security policy, Japan has the potential to enhance its security cooperation across several sectors, thereby achieving a more complete approach. In addition, the expanded scope of security collaboration has facilitated Japan's establishment of reliable security mechanisms with like-minded nations throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The formal establishment of the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) occurred in 2016, when Abe introduced it during the opening conference of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in

¹³⁰ Andri Saubani, "Nelayan Indonesia Diusir Kapal China di Perairan Natuna," *Republika*, December 31, 2019, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/q3djps409/kala-nelayan-indonesia-diusir-kapal-china-di-perairan-natuna>.

¹³¹ "Gone Fishing: Tracking China's Flotilla from Brunei to Indonesia," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI)*, January 30, 2020, <https://amti.csis.org/gone-fishing-tracking-chinas-flotilla-from-brunei-to-indonesia/>.

¹³² Pandu Wiyoga, "Kapal Perang China Mondar-mandir di Laut Natuna Utara, Nelayan Ketakutan," *Nusantara*, September 15, 2021, <https://www.kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2021/09/15/kapal-perang-china-mondar-mandir-di-laut-natuna-utara-nelayan-ketakutan>.

Nairobi, Kenya.¹³³ This marked the institutionalization of the emerging ideas surrounding the term. During his address, he made the following statement:

Japan assumes the responsibility of cultivating the convergence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as the amalgamation of Asia and Africa, into a region that upholds the market economy, the rule of law, and principles of freedom. This region is envisioned to be devoid of any kind of force or coercion, hence promoting prosperity.¹³⁴

Japan's FOIP policy seeks to develop a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific area with the purpose of safeguarding the current rules-based order founded by the U.S. against rivals, with China being a significant concern. Japan is facing strategic ambiguity as it tries to establish a new regional rule by developing coalitions with other countries. To navigate this ambiguity, Japan has chosen to be adaptable, utilizing its ambiguous FOIP concept to evaluate how other nations react and recognize their viewpoints, then adjusting its own strategic focus on the FOIP, this approach can be described as "tactical hedging."¹³⁵ By adopting this approach, Japan can effectively integrate the interests of regional governments into its FOIP idea, promote the concept as a shared vision within regional states and beyond, and establish a partnership to construct a fresh regional framework in the Indo-Pacific area while still adhering to the current international order.

The extension of the Japanese geographic theater from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific during the Abe administration is a well-documented phenomenon. From January 12–17, 2017, Shinzo Abe traveled on a diplomatic tour to Indonesia, Australia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.¹³⁶ This visit was considered important for Abe, particularly in the

¹³³ Japan Ministry of Defense, "Achieving the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)' Vision Japan Ministry of Defense's Approach" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, August 2016), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/india_pacific/india_pacific-en.html.

¹³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 27, 2016), https://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af2/page4e_000496.html.

¹³⁵ Kei Koga, "Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan's FOIP: Quad, ASEAN and Tactical Hedging," in *The Indo-Pacific Theatre*, by Srabani Roy Choudhury, 1st ed. (London: Routledge India, 2022), 13, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003342311-3>.

¹³⁶ Public Relations Office of the Government of Japan, "Prime Minister Abe Visits the Philippines, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam," *Public Relations Office of the Government of Japan*, February 2017, https://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/publicity/book/hlj/html/201702/201702_00_en.html.

context of the Indo-Pacific region. On January 15th, a Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting was initiated by Abe and attended by Joko Widodo.¹³⁷ On this occasion, Abe explained the FOIP strategy, which highlights Japan's aspirations for Indonesia to have an active part due to its strategic location as a pivotal point between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.¹³⁸ Through diplomatic engagements like Abe's 2017 tour, Japan sought to actively promote its FOIP vision and enlist regional partners like Indonesia, leveraging their strategic positions to advance its role in shaping the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Moreover, Indonesia and Japan are two maritime nations that share a geostrategic vision for the Indo-Pacific region, aligning their interests through strengthened security ties. Both nations are proponents of the FOIP vision, which promotes rule-based order and open access to the seas. Japan is widely acknowledged as a key advocate of the FOIP Vision, whereas Indonesia is notably identified as the principal initiator of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Indonesia has formulated its maritime policy, commonly referred to as the Global Maritime Fulcrum (*Poros Maritim Dunia*), in order to enhance its maritime capabilities.¹³⁹ Hence, Indonesia has been recognized as the first and, until 2021, the sole Southeast Asian nation to participate in two-plus-two security and foreign ministerial dialogues with Japan. This framework represents the greatest extent of bilateral ministerial involvement in security-related affairs, whereby four ministers from two states meet in a single session. Through shared geostrategic visions and deepening security ties like the two-plus-two framework, Indonesia and Japan have cultivated an increasingly strategic maritime partnership, positioning them at the forefront of advancing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision in Southeast Asia.

Overall, China's increasing assertiveness and militarization in the SCS pose a serious threat to regional security and the rules-based order. Through extensive land reclamation and military buildup in the disputed waters, China aims to control this strategic maritime domain and leverage it in the Sino-Japanese rivalry over the East China Sea. In

¹³⁷ Public Relations Office of the Government of Japan.

¹³⁸ Public Relations Office of the Government of Japan.

¹³⁹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific," *International Affairs* 96, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 112, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz223>.

response, Japan has expanded its strategic outlook to the Indo-Pacific region, promoting its Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision to uphold maritime norms. By strengthening security ties with key regional states like Indonesia, Japan seeks to counterbalance China's ambitions through a network of partnerships committed to a rules-based regional order.

2. Japan Depends Economically on Secure Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs)

The Strait of Malacca holds enormous strategic significance as one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and maritime chokepoints. The straits serve as the primary and expedient maritime passage connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, rendering it a very significant conduit for global shipping activities. More than 400 shipping lines, which connect over 700 ports globally, frequently employ the straits for transportation and/or transfer of goods. Annually, more than 70,000 vessels traverse through the straits.¹⁴⁰ For Japan, securing safe passage through the Malacca Strait and adjacent waters in the SCS is imperative for its energy security, with over 90% of its oil imports transported along this vital SLOC.¹⁴¹ Indonesia plays a pivotal role given its geographic position astride the Strait of Malacca, making maritime security cooperation with Indonesia a high priority for Japan. Therefore, stability and freedom of navigation in Southeast Asian waters, particularly the Malacca Strait intersecting Indonesian territory, are absolutely vital for Japan due to its heavy dependence on unimpeded access along this critical SLOC for meeting its energy security needs.

The high volume of commerce in the Strait of Malacca littoral has created chances for incidents on commercial vessels. Figure 3 depicts acts of armed robbery and piracy from 2012 to 2020 in the Malacca Strait.

¹⁴⁰ DRYAD Global, "Malacca Straits: Significant Regional Challenges to Securing the Maritime Domain.," *DRYAD GLOBAL*, n.d., <https://dg.dryadglobal.com/south-east-asia-straits-of-malacca>.

¹⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2006: Provision of Patrol Vessels to Indonesia."




Figure 3. Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Malacca Strait¹⁴²

The Malacca Strait has faced persistent threats from piracy and armed robbery against commercial vessels over the past decade, though incident rates have fluctuated. Reported incidents in 2015 at 134, before declining to just 8 in 2018. However, the threat remains significant, with 45 cases in 2019 and 48 in 2020. The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait as a global shipping chokepoint means any threats to free passage through the straits—whether from piracy, accidents, or other hazards—can have major economic implications. Continued vigilance and security cooperation between littoral states is required to suppress piracy and maintain safe and open access through this vital waterway. Japan in particular has provided security assistance to boost maritime domain awareness and capacity in the region, indicative of how important security in the Malacca Strait is for its own economic interests. Ongoing efforts will be needed to manage the range of maritime security challenges present in this strategically significant and busy strait.

In terms of tonnage, the Malacca Strait is primarily characterized by the transportation of essential commodities intended for East Asian nations. The transportation of goods through Malacca is principally characterized by the dominance of liquid bulk

¹⁴² Adapted from International Maritime Organization, “Piracy Reports” (IMO, 2020 2012), <https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/Piracy-Reports-Default.aspx>.

commodities, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil. This is followed by the transportation of dry bulk commodities, with coal and iron ore being the primary examples. Approximately 66 percent of the total weight of cargo that transits via the Strait of Malacca consists of Persian Gulf crude oil, while 50 percent of the overall volume of goods that pass through the Spratly Islands is also comprised of Persian Gulf crude oil.¹⁴³ The volume of oil shipping traversing the Straits of Malacca increased from 15.4 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2013 to 16 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2016.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, the massive volume of crude oil and other bulk commodities transported through the critical chokepoint of the Malacca Strait underscores its strategic importance for securing unimpeded maritime trade flows in this region.

According to the United States Department of Energy, between 33 percent of LNG imports and 85 and 90 percent of Japan's oil imports originate from African and Middle Eastern countries and transit through this region.¹⁴⁵ Hence, the preservation of political stability among the member states of ASEAN holds significant importance for Japan's international trade, owing to the strategic geographical positioning of these states. Figure 4 illustrates the energy imports of Japan spanning the years 2010 to 2015.

¹⁴³ Commander Christopher Baldwin, "Seaborne Trade Flows In The Asia Pacific Present And Future Trends," *Royal Australian Navy* 9 (n.d.): 19, https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Working_Paper_9.pdf.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Energy Information Administration, "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, July 25, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints.

¹⁴⁵ Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Policy towards the South China Sea: Applying "Proactive Peace Diplomacy"?*, PRIF Report, no. 140 (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2016), 4.




Figure 4. Japan's Energy Imports¹⁴⁶

According to Figure 4, Japan's energy import policy increased significantly during the Shinzo Abe administration. Even in 2018, "Japan's energy dependence was 99.3% for coal, 97.5% for LNG, and 99.7% for crude oil."¹⁴⁷ As a country without its own resources and energy, energy imports are an effective means of meeting industrial fuel requirements. Thus, maritime security in the semi-enclosed seas of Southeast Asia particularly Indonesia is crucial for ensuring the commercial, social, and economic stability of the region and Japan in particular.

The Malacca Strait holds strategic significance for Japan due to its reliance on maritime transportation routes through Southeast Asian waters to secure energy resources. As SLOCs are vital to Japan's efforts to facilitate optimal economic distribution, the country has a vested interest in maintaining smooth and reliable connectivity along these passageways. Specifically, Japan seeks to safeguard the SLOCs traversing the Malacca Strait, which represents a critical juncture for ships transiting between the Pacific and

¹⁴⁶ Adapted from Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, "FY2018 Energy Supply and Demand Report" (METI, 2018), https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/0414_002.html.

¹⁴⁷ Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, "2019–Understanding the Current Energy Situation in Japan (Part 1)" (METI, August 13, 2019), https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/special/article/energyissue2019_01.html.

Indian Oceans. To promote maritime security and ensure safe passage in this region, Japan assists Indonesia by enhancing defense and military cooperation. Given that Indonesia borders directly on the Malacca Strait, strengthening security ties is viewed as imperative for Japan to protect this crucial SLOC and ensure uninterrupted shipping, energy access, and trade flows.

D. CONCLUSION

Chapter III has conducted an in-depth analysis of the key internal and external factors driving Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to pursue tighter security cooperation and defense ties with Indonesia.

Internally, Abe embraced a more progressive security strategy aimed at normalizing the Japanese military capabilities and adopting a more assertive regional posture. This represented a major shift from Japan's postwar anti-militarist stance as embodied in its pacifist 1947 constitution. The adoption of pivotal documents like the 2013 National Security Strategy and amended defense planning guidelines signified Abe's objectives of overturning constraints on Japan's military and enabling a more proactive security role. Fostering closer ties with Indonesia and ASEAN was envisioned as central to making "proactive contributions to peace" across the Asia-Pacific region. The expansion of naval exchanges, joint exercises, and boosting maritime security assistance exemplified this policy in action.

Externally, two key developments drove Japan's prioritization of security ties with Indonesia and Southeast Asia under Abe. First, the rapid modernization of China's military capabilities coupled with increasing assertiveness in the contested SCS posed a grave threat to freedom of navigation and regional stability. Strengthening strategic cooperation with Indonesia, given its proximity to these hotly disputed waters, provided a means for Japan to balance and constrain China's influence. Quantifiable evidence showed a major spike in Chinese aggressiveness since 2013, with hundreds of assertive actions undertaken to consolidate control across the South China Sea. Second, Japan relies heavily on unimpeded access to secure sea lanes traversing Southeast Asian waters, including the vital Malacca Strait, for its energy security needs. Well over 90% of Japan's oil and gas imports flow

through these chokepoints, underscoring the economic risks should maritime security be threatened. Boosting defense ties with Indonesia enabled Japan to safeguard these critical sea lines of communication.

In summary, this chapter has demonstrated through analysis how Prime Minister Abe's push for a normalized proactive Japanese security posture aligned with growing concerns over the deteriorating regional order, especially Chinese military assertiveness and Japan's maritime economic vulnerabilities. This confluence of domestic policy shifts and external pressures drove the substantial intensification of Japan-Indonesia security cooperation across naval exchanges, military exercises, and maritime assistance. The result was a significant tightening of defense ties, exemplifying the intersection of internal and external factors shaping Japan's strategic priorities under Abe's leadership.

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IV. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This thesis has conducted an in-depth examination of the development and underlying drivers of Japan's strengthened security cooperation with Indonesia from 2013–2022. The analysis has focused specifically on the advancement of maritime security ties, given the strategic maritime priorities of both nations as Asia-Pacific littoral states.

The central finding of this research is that Japan-Indonesia security relations underwent a gradual process of upgrading and maturation across a range of engagements as explained in Chapter II of this thesis, most notably bilateral and multilateral naval exercises, maritime capability assistance, and naval diplomacy through port visits. The types of bilateral naval drills and training progressed gradually over time, evolving from one exercise with simple exercises, including flag signals, replenishment at sea, and ended with farewell passing in 2020 to twice exercises incorporating Japan destroyers and the Indonesian Navy's newest guided-missile destroyer which encompassed a series of activities covering leave launch ship, communication check exercise, flag hoist exercise, and division tactical maneuver exercise, followed by photo exercise and farewell passes by 2021. Similarly, Japanese participation in Indonesian-led multilateral exercises expanded in platform diversity. Japan has actively participated in one type of multilateral exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy, namely the Komodo Exercise. In 2014, Japan sent the destroyer Akebono (DD-108);¹⁴⁸ in 2016, Japan sent the Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer Ise (DDH-182);¹⁴⁹ in 2018, Japan sent the tank landing ships Osumi (LST-4001).¹⁵⁰ The maritime security cooperation also encompassed substantive capacity-building initiatives to enhance Indonesia's maritime domain awareness through technical training across a range of defense and constabulary actors.

¹⁴⁸ Priyambodo, "40 Indonesian Military Vessels to Join the Komodo Naval Exercise."

¹⁴⁹ "中国を牽制、海自がフィリピンに大型護衛艦を派遣 屈指のヘリ運用能力備える (To keep China in check, the Maritime Self-Defense Force dispatches a large destroyer to the Philippines, with one of the best helicopter operations capabilities)."

¹⁵⁰ Indomiliter, "JS Osumi: 'Pesaing' Mistral Class Dalam Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo 2018."

The thesis identifies and analyzes several key factors, both internal and external, that have driven the proactive expansion of Japan's security outreach to Indonesia under the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Internally, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan embraced a more progressive security strategy that departed markedly from its postwar anti-militarist stance. The adoption of key documents like the 2013 NSS signaled Abe's intent to normalize Japan's military capabilities and discard constraints on overseas operations. This enabled Japan to pursue a more assertive regional security posture centered on making "proactive contributions to peace."

The Abe administration undertook the following policy initiatives to facilitate deeper engagement with Indonesia:

- Amending Japan's constitutional interpretation to allow collective self-defense operations
- Issuing revised defense planning documents like the National Defense Program Guidelines that promoted strengthening regional partnerships
- Providing official development assistance and capacity building to boost Indonesia's maritime security capacity
- Conducting regular high-level diplomatic engagements like two-plus-two talks to enhance security cooperation

Externally, Japan prioritized ties with Indonesia in response to two major developments. Firstly, China's military modernization and coercive actions in disputed areas like the South China Sea posed a serious threat to regional stability and freedom of navigation. Japan saw security cooperation with Indonesia as essential to counterbalance and constrain China's influence. Secondly, over 90% of Japan's energy supplies flow through strategic chokepoints like the Malacca Strait, making it economically vulnerable should maritime security be disrupted. Indonesia's proximity to these shipping lanes meant defense ties could help secure Japan's vital sea lanes of communication.

In summary, this thesis finds through its analysis that the substantial upgrading of Japan-Indonesia maritime security ties was rooted in a confluence of factors, including

aligned strategic priorities, shared threat perceptions, and compatible maritime visions. The expansion in naval exercises, training programs, and maritime assistance initiatives provides evidence of deepened cooperation between both defense establishments. The research concludes that this security partnership was propelled by both pivotal changes in Japan's internal doctrine and leadership under Abe, as well as intensifying external pressures from the deteriorating regional security environment centered on the South China Sea.

B. OUTLOOK

While the current outlook remains broadly positive for continued advancement in Japan-Indonesia security cooperation, sustaining and building upon recent progress faces complex challenges ahead. Fundamentally, both nations remain actively committed to further deepening their strategic partnership and share compatible visions for promoting stability and rule-based order in the maritime domain. However, preserving cooperation momentum will necessitate prudent joint efforts to adapt collaborative activities and capacities to effectively navigate the multifaceted and evolving regional security landscape.

Myriad factors, from unresolved territorial and maritime disputes to the disruptive impacts of climate change and intensifying great power rivalry, are coalescing to generate a highly fraught and uncertain environment that will test maritime stability. While Japan and Indonesia have recently established robust frameworks for regular joint naval exercises, coast guard coordination mechanisms, and sustained capacity building, maintaining productive ties amidst shifting conditions will require updating and aligning joint activities and capabilities to effectively address contingencies as they emerge.

Moreover, domestic political dynamics in both nations could pose complications that will require deft diplomacy and foreign policy acumen to manage. The exit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was a key champion of assertive security policies, has removed a major driver of engagement. Leadership transitions in either country that reorient strategic priorities could potentially impact cooperation, necessitating careful diplomatic efforts to ensure continuity in productive ties. Additionally, nurturing public sentiment and

cultivating citizen support through skillful public messaging will remain vital, as further consolidation of defense ties requires alignment with both nations' domestic political landscapes.

In summary, while the current outlook remains favorable given the strategic foundation established, sustaining substantive progress in Japan-Indonesia security cooperation in the face of complex geopolitical crosscurrents will necessitate prudent joint efforts to adapt policies, build public trust, and continue advancing shared national interests in maritime security. Regional stability stands to benefit from deepened yet agile naval cooperation.

C. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis offers several key implications and recommendations for policymakers in Japan and Indonesia:

- Regular joint naval exercises and maritime capacity-building programs should be sustained and adapted to address emerging non-traditional security issues like climate change impacts, illegal fishing, and maritime disasters. This regular joint training mechanism focused on building capacity in key peacetime missions would deepen operational coordination while highlighting shared interests in maritime safety through accompanying strategic communications. Additionally, a high-level Coast Guard exchange program should be initiated to foster deeper institutional links and share best practices on issues like search and rescue, accident response, and maritime law enforcement. These measures would allow Japan and Indonesia to align capacities and messaging to address pressing non-combat maritime security priorities.
- Indonesia and Japan should enhance intelligence sharing on extremist threats and establish joint counter-terrorism training programs to combat shared security concerns. Initiate annual joint special forces training exercises, and hold regular high-level defense consultations on aligning counterterrorism strategies and technical capacities. This would build direct

operational links and strategic coordination between both militaries to address the common threat posed by militant groups across the region.

- High-level diplomatic exchanges and military-to-military dialogues should be further institutionalized to align strategic visions and build mutual understanding. This regular high-level mechanism would align approaches at the ministerial level. Additionally, annual navy-to-navy staff talks should be initiated, providing a forum for senior naval commanders to regularly exchange perspectives on maritime security developments and plan bilateral and multilateral engagements. Further, both countries should expand military officer and bureaucrat exchange programs to build deeper mutual understanding and personal links at the working level that sustain ties during political transitions.
- Trilateral cooperation mechanisms with like-minded nations like Australia and India should be explored to add further regional heft to the bilateral security partnership. To counter China's assertiveness, Japan and Indonesia should initiate trilateral naval exercises and strategic dialogues with Australia and India. Regular joint training would enhance defense interoperability amongst the four countries, while high-level consultations would align their approaches to maritime security issues like freedom of navigation, territorial disputes, and upholding maritime law. By leveraging these joint mechanisms, Japan and Indonesia can signal resolute support for the rules-based regional order and help crystallize cooperation among like-minded Indo-Pacific democracies.

In conclusion, the growing security partnership between Japan and Indonesia offers significant prospects for enhancing stability and upholding a rules-based order in the strategic maritime domains of the region. By strategically enhancing joint military capacity building, exercises, and comprehensive security architectures, this collaboration can be strengthened in a manner that promotes mutual interests and strengthens deterrence. Effective management of threat perceptions and domestic opinion is crucial for the

sustainability of the emerging partnership. This will enable the partnership to contribute meaningfully to reducing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, which is experiencing increasing competition among major powers. If pragmatic and open diplomacy is employed, the full strategic potential of this important security cooperation can be achieved for the long-term benefit of the wider region.

APPENDIX A. JAPAN’S MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN INDONESIA, 2013–2022

Table 2. JMSDF Port Visit (Sources for this table appear in Table 6)

SOURCE NO	PORT VISIT DATE	LOCATION	JMSDF NAME	JMSDF TYPE	ACTIVITIES
1	February 13–15, 2013	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Hatakaze (DDG 171) JS Asayuki (DD132) JS Haruyuki (DD 128)	Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer	-Made official visits to the Commander in Chief of the Indonesian West Region Fleet Command (Pangkoarmabar), Danlantamal III, Kalakhar Bakorkamla, and the Mayor of North Jakarta. -Carried out a pilgrimage to the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery (TMP). -Friendly sports match. -Opened ships.
2	April 8–10, 2015	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Kirisame (DD 104) JS Asayuki (DD 132)	Destroyer Destroyer	-Made official visits to the Commander of the Indonesian West Region Fleet Command (Pangarmabar) Rear Admiral (Laksda) TNI A. Taufiq R, as well as the Mayor of North Jakarta. -Carried out a pilgrimage to the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery (TMP). -Friendly sports match. -Opened ships.
3	August 22–25, 2016	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Yuudachi (DD-103) JS Yuugiri (DD-153)	Destroyer Destroyer	-Made official visits to the Pangarmabar, Kabakamla, Asops KSAL. -Carried out a pilgrimage to the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery (TMP). -Opened ships.
4	February 22–25, 2017	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Makinami (DD-112) JS Asayuki (DD-132) JS Shimayuki (DD-122)	Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer	-Carried out a pilgrimage to the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery (TMP). -Friendly sports match. -Carried out visits to cultural and historical locations at the National monuments and museums in Jakarta.
5	June 4–8, 2018	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Kashima (TV-3508) JS Makinami (DD-112)	Training Ship Destroyer	-Courtesy called the Indonesian Navy’s high-ranking officials and the mayor of North Jakarta. -Paid a tribute to Indonesia’s Heroes Cemetery Kalibata. -Hold a music concert.
6	September 18–22, 2018	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Kaga (DDH-184) JS Suzutsuki (DD-117) JS Inazuma (DD-105)	Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer	-Friendly sports match. -Open ship. -Culture Exchange. -Joint training with the Indonesian Navy.
7	May 8–10, 2019	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Samidare (DD-106)	Destroyer	-Made official visits to the Pangarmabar. -Opened ships.
8	April 12–14, 2021	Tanjung Priok, Jakarta	JS Akebono (DD-108)	Destroyer	-Made official visits to the Pangarmabar and Logistics Restocking.
9	June 28–30, 2021	Surabaya	JS Kashima (TV-3508) JS Setoyuki (TV-3518)	Training Ship Training Ship	-Goodwill Port Visit. -Logistics Restocking in Surabaya.

Table 3. Multilateral Exercises (Sources for this table appear in Table 6)

SOURCE NO	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	JAPAN PARTICIPANT		INDONESIA PARTICIPANT		FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS	EXERCISE ACTIVITY
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE		
1	March 29–April 3, 2014	Natuna and Anambas area (Batam)	JS Akebono (DD-108)	Destroyer	KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda-367 KRI Sultan Hasanuddin-366 KRI Pati Unus-384 KRI Sultan Hasanuddin-366 KRI Yos Sudarso-353 KRI Teluk Banten-516 KRI Teluk Hading-538 KRI Teluk Parigi-539 KRI Teluk Cirebon-543 KRI Makassar-590 KRI Tanjung Kambani-971 KRI Tanjung Nusanive-973 KRI Arun-903 KRI Sopotan-923 KRI Dr. Soeharso-990 KRI Alamang-644 KAL Antasena (1) KAL Kumai (I-6-58) KAL Bireuen (II-1-63)	Corvette Corvette Corvette Corvette Frigate/Van Speijk Frosch-class Landing Frosch-class Landing Frosch-class Landing Tank Landing Ship Landing Platform Dock Troop Ship Troop Ship Tanker Ship Auxiliary Ship Hospital Ship Fast Attack Craft Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship	- BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS-16)-offshore patrol vessels-Philippine Navy - KDB Darulehsan (OPV-07)-Darussalam-class offshore patrol vessels-Royal Brunei Navy (RBN) - INS Sukanya-Sukanya class patrol vessels-Indian Navy - Khanh Hoa 01-Hospital Ship-Vietnam - Changbai Shan (989)-amphibious transport dock-People’s Liberation Army Navy	-Humanitarian Assistance -Humanitarian Civic Action -Disaster Relief -Transnational Organized Crimes -Maritime Peacekeeping Operation
2	April 9–16, 2016	Padang, West Sumatra	JS Ise (DDH-182)	Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer	KRI Slamet Riyadi-352 KRI Yos Sudarso-353 KRI Oswald Siahaan-354 KRI Frans Kaisiepo-368 KRI Cut Nyak Dien-375 KRI Pati Unus-384 KRI Teuku Umar-385 KRI Makassar-590 KRI Halasan-630	Frigate/Van Speijk Frigate/Van Speijk Frigate/Van Speijk Corvette Corvette Corvette Corvette Landing Platform Dock Fast Attack Craft	-USS Stockdale (DDG-106)-Arleigh Burke -U.S. Navy -KDB Daruttaqwa (09)-Darussalam-class offshore patrol vessels-the Royal Brunei Navy (RBN) - RSS Tenacious (71)-Formidable-class stealth frigate-Republic of Singapore Navy -Khanh Hoa 01-Hospital Ship-Vietnam -INS Sumedha (P58)-Saryu-class patrol vessel-Indian Navy	- Medical civic action project - Engineering Civic Action Project - Maritime Peacekeeping Operation

SOURCE NO	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	JAPAN PARTICIPANT		INDONESIA PARTICIPANT		FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS	EXERCISE ACTIVITY
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE		
							-HTMS Narathiwat (OPV-512)-Offshore patrol vessel-Royal Thai Navy -KD Mahawangsa (1504)-Multi role Support Ship-Royal Malaysian Navy -KD Kelantan (F175)-Kedah-class offshore patrol vessel-Royal Malaysian Navy -BNS Somudra Avijan (F29)-Frigate-Bangladesh -SNLS Samudura (P261)-Offshore Patrol Vessel-Sri Lanka Navy -Vendémiaire (734)-Frigate-France -Admiral Vinogradov (572)-Udaloy-class destroyer-Russian Navy -Weifang (550)-Frigate-China -Changxingdao (861)-Auxiliary Ship-China	
3	May 4–9, 2018	Lombok Island	JS Ōsumi (LST-4001)	Ōsumi-class tank landing ships	KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai-332 KRI Ahmad Yani-351 KRI Yos Sudarso-353 KRI Fatahillah-361 KRI Ki Hajar Dewantara-364 KRI Makassar-590 KRI Banjarmasin-592 KRI Barakuda-633 KRI Clurit-641 KRI Kujang-642 KRI Pandrong-801 KRI Kakap-811 KRI Tongkol-813	Martadinata/frigate Frigate/Van Speijk Frigate/Van Speijk Corvette Corvette Landing Platform Dock Landing Platform Dock Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship	-Liuzhou (573)-Frigate-China -Changsha (173)-Destroyer-China -USNS Millinocket (T-EPF-3)-Spearhead-class Joint High-Speed Vessel-USN -Perekop (310)-Smolny-class training ship-Russian Navy -Dixmude (L9015)-Amphibious Assault Ship Helicopter Carrier-French Navy -Surcouf (F711)- La Fayette-Frigate-French	-Engineering Civil Action Projects -Medical Civic Action Projects -Tabletop Exercise -Command Post Exercise -Field Training Exercise -Sailing pass

SOURCE NO	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	JAPAN PARTICIPANT		INDONESIA PARTICIPANT		FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS	EXERCISE ACTIVITY
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE		
					KRI Sidat-851 KRI Cakalang-852 KRI Dr. Soeharso-990	Fast Patrol Ship Fast Patrol Ship HospitalA Ship	-HMAS Anzac (FFH 150)-Frigate- Royal Australian Navy -HTMS Krabi (OPV-551)-Offshore patrol vessel-Royal Thai Navy -Khánh Hòa-01 (HQ-561)-Hospital Ship-Vietnam -KD Baung (3509)-Fast Patrol Craft-Malaysia -BRP General Mariano Alvarez (PS-38)-Coastal Patrol Ship- Philippines -BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PS-15)- Offshore Patrol Ship-Philippines -RSS Formidable (68)-Formidable- class stealth frigate-Republic of Singapore Navy. -SLNS Sagara (P-622)-Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV)-Sri Lanka Navy.	

Table 4. Bilateral Exercises (Sources for this table appear in Table 6)

SOURCE NO	EXERCISE DATE	EXERCISE LOCATION	JAPAN PARTICIPANT		INDONESIA PARTICIPANT		EXERCISE ACTIVITY
			NAME	TYPE	NAME	TYPE	
1	October 6. 2020	Jemaja Island, North Natuna Sea Indonesia	JS KAGA (DDH 184) JS Ikazuchi (DD 107)	Helicopter Carrier Murasame-class destroyers	KRI John Lie-358 KRI Sutanto-377	Bung Tomo-class corvette Corvette	-Flag Signal (Flaghoist) -RAS approach exercise -farewell passing
2	April 13. 2021	the waters of the Jakarta Bay	JS Akebono-108	Murasame-class destroyers	KRI Bung Tomo-357	Bung Tomo-class corvette	-Comms Check -Flag Signal (Flaghoist) -Photo exercise -Tactical Maneuver
3	June 30. 2021	Java Sea	JS Kashima-3508 JS Setoyuki-3518	Training Ship Destroyer	KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai (332)	Martadinata-class frigate	-Leave Launch -Comm Check -Divtacs -Photo Exercise -Farewell Pass
4	2018	Java Sea (North of Jakarta Sea)	JCG Tsugaru PLH-02	Coast Guard	KN Tanjung Datu 1101	Coast Guard	-Communication Formation (Flash, Whistle, and Flag) -Search Training Formation
5	2022	North Nongsa waters, Bintan island, Batam	JCG Echigo PLH 08	Coast Guard	KN Dana Island-323	Coast Guard	-Commcheck (Radio Check) -Combined Exercise (carrying out pirate ships) -photo session -farewell (carrying out the role of parade to respect)

Table 5. Maritime Domain Awareness (Sources for this table appear in Table 6)

SOURCE NO	DATE	LOCATION	JAPAN PARTICIPANT	INDONESIA PARTICIPANT	ACTIVITIES
1	Feb 4–6, 2013	Indonesia Navy Maritime Operations Center (Jakarta)	1 official from the International Policy Division, MOD, And 3 JMSDF personnel.	30 Indonesian Navy hydro-oceanographic officers	The JMOD delivered a seminar on hydro-oceanography
2	July 3–6, 2013	Indonesia Navy Maritime Operations Center (Jakarta)	2 officials from the International Policy Division, 1 official from the Japan Coast Guard, and 1 JMSDF personnel.	30 Indonesian Navy hydro-oceanographic officers	-The JMOD/SDF conducted a seminar on the maintenance of maritime security and the principles of oceanography. -The Japan Coast Guard presented an overview of the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department, along with its information map, which is utilized for the purpose of disaster prevention, specifically in relation to tsunamis. -The Indonesian side provided an explanation of the recent activities carried out by the Indonesia Navy Maritime Operations Center.
3	Feb 3–7, 2014	Japan Ministry of Defense MSDF Oceanographic Command Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department		5 Indonesian Navy personnel	The JMOD/SDF implemented educational initiatives focused on oceanography and meteorology.
4	Feb 5, 2015	HQ of Indonesian Air Force (Jakarta)	1 official from the International Policy Division, 2 JASDF personnel	30 legal officers of Indonesian Air Force	The JMOD organized an academic conference on international aviation law, specifically targeting legal personnel within the Indonesian Air Force.
5	March 21–25, 2016	Indonesia Navy Maritime Operations Center (Jakarta)	1 official from the International Policy Division, 2 JMSDF personnel, 2 officials from Japan Coast Guard	140 including Indonesian Navy personnel from the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department, National Defense, University students, and personnel from the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), National Search and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS)	-The JMOD/SDF conducted a seminar on oceanography, focusing on the subject of trajectory prediction. -The JCG further conducted a session focused on the appropriate response to a Tsunami disaster.
6	January 23–27, 2017	Japan Ministry of Defense Yokosuka area, Japan		7 Indonesian Navy personnel	The JMOD extended an invitation to officers from the Indonesian Navy to visit Japan, with the aim of providing capacity-building support to the Indonesian military.

SOURCE NO	DATE	LOCATION	JAPAN PARTICIPANT	INDONESIA PARTICIPANT	ACTIVITIES
		Maritime Self Defense Force Hydrographic			
7	March 20–23, 2017	Indonesia Navy Maritime Operations Center (Jakarta)		30 Indonesian MOD, military and other government officers	The JMOD delivered informative presentations pertaining to the field of international maritime law, as well as the maritime security endeavors undertaken by the JSDF, including operations aimed at countering piracy.
8	March 19–22, 2018	Indonesia Navy Maritime Operations Center (Jakarta)	1 official from National Institute for Defense Studies, 2 JMSDF personnel, 3 officials from International Policy Division	50 Indonesian MOD, military and other government officers	-The JMOD delivered presentations on various subjects, including the International Law of the Sea. -Engaged in discussions with the Indonesian Ministry of Defense (MOD) and military officials.
9	July 14, 2021	Online			The Japan Coast Guard is holding online training to teach the Indonesian Coast Guard (Bakamla) how to control suspicious people.
10	Jan 26–28, 2022	Online	Prof. Kentaro Furuya, and Honzu Kuboshima as instructors from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	Bakamla RI personnel, Polairud, Polhukam, KLHJ, BNN, and Immigration Directorate General of Customs and Excise	-Bilateral discussions between JCG and Bakamla RI regarding the organizational forms of the two agencies. -This long-distance training lasts two days, and the peak will be a Joint Exercise between Bakamla RI and JCG in the form of a Passing Exercise located in Batam Waters.

Table 6. Sources Appendix A

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APPENDIX B. CHINA ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 2009–2019

Table 7. China Activities in the South China Sea 2009–2019 (Sources for this table appear in Table 8)

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
2009				
1	CN	5/17/2009	Xisha Island (approximately 190 nm from Hainan Island)	Guangdong's largest fishery patrol vessel Yuzheng 44183 and another fishery patrol vessel Yuzheng 311 and 44061 for the first time patrolled in the Paracels Island.
2010				
2	CN/ID	2010	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	A Chinese maritime enforcement vessel exerted pressure on an Indonesian patrol boat, resulting in the release of an additional Chinese trawler engaged in illegal activities.
2011				
3	CN/PH	2/25/11	Jackson atoll	A Chinese naval vessel 560 shot three rounds of ammunition toward three fishing vessels of Filipino origin in Quirino, or Jackson atoll. (F/V Maricris 12, F/V Mama Lydia DLS, and F/V Jaime DLS)
4	CN/PH	3/3/11	Reed Bank, approximately 155 nm west of Palawan	Two Chinese Navy gunboats harassed a Philippine survey vessel
5	CN/VN	5/26/11	12°48'25"N-111°26'48"E, Approximately 120 nm from Dai Lanh (Phu Yen)	3 Chinese Maritime Surveillance ships no 72, 17, and 84 approached Vietnamese survey ship Binh Minh 02 and cut a cable towing seismic monitoring equipment
6	CN/VN	5/31/11	approximately 15 nautical miles southeast of East London Reef (Tagalog: Bahura ng Silangang Quezon); East Reef (Vietnamese: Đá Đông)	3 Chinese ships used guns to chase away 4 Vietnamese fishing ships (PY92305TS, PY92105TS, PY92017TS, and PY92223TS)
7	CN/VN	6/9/11	(Blok 136.03) 6°47'5"N-109°17'5"E	The Vietnamese seismic survey vessel Viking 2 cable was cut off by Chinese fishing vessels 311 and 303
8	CN/VN	6/14/11	Đá Lồi island area	Vietnamese fishing vessel robbed by Chinese coast guard vessels
9	CN/VN	7/5/11	Hoàng Sa, Paracel Islands	Vietnamese fishing vessel PY-90368TS chased and robbed by Chinese warship no 44861
2012				

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
10	CN/VN	2/22/12	Hoàng Sa, Paracel Islands	Vietnamese fishing vessel 90281TS was chased by a Chinese warship. The warship fired on the vessel and captured the fishermen.
11	CN/PH	4/12/12	Scarborough	The Philippines withdrew its largest warship from a confrontation with Chinese vessels, but the situation remains unresolved as China deployed an additional ship to the disputed waters.
12	CN/VN	5/16/12	Hoàng Sa, Paracel Islands	14 Vietnamese fishermen and 2 Vietnamese fishing vessels captured by China.
13	CN/PH	6/20/12	Scarborough	Filipino fishing vessel sunken by Chinese vessel.
14	CN	6/26/12	Sailed from South China's coastal city of Sanya to the SCS	A patrol team comprising four China Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships departed from the coastal city of Sanya in South China. Their purpose is to conduct routine patrols in the SCS, the team traveled more than 2,400 nautical miles (4,500 kilometers) during the patrols.
15	CN	7/2/12	approximately near Yongshu Reef (Fiery Cross Reef)	A patrol team comprising four China Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships conducted a formation practice in the vicinity of Yongshu Reef, located in the SCS. The two-hour practice session proceeded without issues, except for the absence of a scheduled helicopter due to inclement weather conditions.
16	CN/VN	11/30/12	Approximately in waters near Vietnam's Côn Cỏ island	2 Chinese fishing vessels caused seismic cable cut to Vietnamese survey ship belonging to the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group.
2013				
17	CN	1/23/13	South Paracel Islands & near Tonkin Gulf	China maritime surveillance ships patrolled SCS. Haijian 84 and Haijian 74 patrolled South Paracel Islands. Haijian 262 and Haijian 263 patrolled near Tonkin Gulf.
18	CN	2/1/13	South China Sea	A fleet from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy entered the territorial waters of China in the SCS. The purpose of this fleet's presence is to conduct patrol and training missions. The fleet, consisting of the missile destroyer Qingdao and the missile frigates Yancheng and Yantai, entered the SCS at 11:40 a.m., following a five-hour passage through the Bashi Channel.
19	CN/ID	March, 2013	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	Chinese naval warships engaged in a confrontation with an Indonesian fisheries patrol boat, asserting their demand for the return of Chinese fishermen who had been captured.
20	CN	3/8/13	Xisha Island	On Friday afternoon, a fleet dedicated to marine surveillance set sail from Sanya, located in the southern region of Hainan Province in China. The fleet's primary objective is to conduct routine patrols throughout the SCS. A fleet of three vessels from the China Marine Surveillance (CMS)—namely Haijian 83, Haijian 262, and Haijian 263—along with the Haijian B-7103 helicopter, will undertake a nine-day surveillance mission in the waters surrounding the Xisha Islands.

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
21	CN/VN	3/13/13	Hoàng Sa, Paracel Islands	Two Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels discovered by China on the morning of March 13 near the Hoang Sa archipelago, which is claimed by Vietnam, were expelled from the area by two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels.
22	CN/VN	3/20/13	Hoàng Sa, Paracel Islands	Fishing vessel number QNg 96382 TS belonging to fishermen in Quang Ngai province, while carrying out normal fishing activities in a traditional fishing area in Vietnam's Hoang Sa archipelago, was attacked by a Chinese vessel.
23	CN	3/23/13	Nansha Islands, SCS	Yuzheng 312, China's largest fishery administration vessel, commenced its first patrol within the SCS. Setting sail from Guangzhou, the vessel embarked towards the Nansha Islands with the purpose of undertaking a law enforcement operation.
24	CN/ID	3/26/13	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries vessel arrested a Chinese fishing vessel in the Natunas and then a Chinese patrol vessel Nanfeng RRC 310 managed to snatch it back.
25	CN/VN	5/20/13	Hoàng Sa, Paracel Islands	Chinese ship number 264 hit the fishing vessel QNg 90917, damaging the side of the ship.
26	CN/PH	5/21/13	Ayungin Shoal/ Second Thomas Shoal	approximately 30 Chinese fishing vessels, including 3 Chinese government ships, at Ayungin Shoal. These vessels have been observed in this location for over a week.
27	CN	6/14/13	SCS	On June 14, 2013, China's first maritime police ships appeared in the SCS. Two Chinese maritime police ships sailed to the sea via Huangpu Military Academy. The ship numbers were "China Maritime Police 3210" and "China Maritime Police 3102." In addition to the two ships mentioned above, the "Sea Monitoring 167 Ship," "Sea Monitoring 168 Ship" and "Sea Monitoring 169 Ship" originally affiliated to the China Sea Monitoring SCS Corps have also been changed to China Maritime Police 3367, 3368, and 3369.
28	CN/VN	7/7/13	Hoàng Sa, Paracel Islands	A Chinese ship attacked 2 Vietnamese fishing vessels.
2014				
29	CN/MLY	1/26/14	James Shoal	Three Chinese vessels conduct patrols on the James Shoal, which is also subject to territorial claims by Malaysia.
30	CN/PH	1/27/14	Panatag Shoal	CCG ship used water cannon to chase Philippines fishermen away in disputed waters.
31	CN/PH	3/10/14	Nanshan Islands	The Chinese Coast Guard successfully repelled two Philippine vessels off the shoal, which refers to a small cluster of islets and reefs situated inside the Spratly Islands archipelago.
32	CN/PH	3/29/14	Ayungin Shoal/Second Thomas Shoal	Two Chinese ships engaged in aggressive behavior against a Philippine vessel that resupplied provisions for personnel stationed at the Ayungin Shoal/Second Thomas Shoal.
33	CN/VN	5/4/14	Hoàng Sa waters	The Vietnamese Coast Guard ship number 2012 which was carrying out its duties in Hoang Sa waters was hit by the Chinese ship number 44103 right on the left side of the ship, causing serious damage.

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
34	CN/VN	5/7/14	Hoàng Sa waters	Vietnamese fishing vessel QNg 96416 was hit by a Chinese ship and broke the starboard part of the ship.
35	CN/VN	5/12/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	1 Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance ship and 15 CCG ships used water cannon on each other for 1 hour.
36	CN/VN	5/16/14	In the Phu Lam island area, located northeast of the Hoang Sa Islands, about 110 nautical miles from the <i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Chinese fishing vessel 306 took control of the fishing vessel QNg-90205-TS from Quang Ngai province and beat the crew, burned and destroyed property on board, leaving 2 crew members injured.
37	CN/VN	5/18/14	approximately 8 nautical miles from the <i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) ship detected Chinese fishing vessels, protected by CCG ships.
38	CN/VN	5/25/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Chinese ship chased and used water cannon on Vietnamese ship KN 22, injuring 4 crew members.
39	CN/VN	5/30/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	China reduced 5 ships in the Haiyang Shiyu 981 area. There were 117 ships, including 33 CCG ships, 17 tugs, 13 cargo ships, 50 iron-clad fishing vessels, and 4 military ships
40	CN/VN	6/1/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Two Chinese ships 46001 and 46105 prevented Vietnamese ship CSB 2016 from rescuing a Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance ship being sprayed water cannon nearby. 46105 accelerated and used a water cannon on CSB 2016, then rammed into the ship, leaving the ship heavily damaged.
41	CN/VN	6/3/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Four Chinese ships moved with high speed to prevent VCG ship CSB 4032 from approaching the Haiyang Shiyu 981 from a distance of 8 nautical miles.
42	CN/VN	6/7/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	50-60 Chinese ships, including fishing ships and CCG ships set up and about to ram 20 Vietnamese fishing ships. VCG ships CSB 4032 and CSB 2015 supported Vietnamese fishing boats. After 1-hour, Chinese ships withdrew.
43	CN/VN	6/14/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Chinese warships, including minesweeper 839, prevented Vietnamese ships from approaching Haiyan Shiyu 981.
44	CN	6/17/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	China deployed 17 more ships to protect the Haiyang Shiyu 981, raising the number of ships to 136, including 37-39 CCG ships, 12-14 cargo ships, 18-20 tugs, 50-58 fishing vessels, and 5 military ships.
45	CN/VN	6/21/14	Approximately 10 nm from <i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Chinese ship Haijian 2168 moved at its highest speed, approaching Vietnamese ship CSB 4032, intending to ram and use water cannon on the ship. The minimum distance between 2 ships were 30 m.

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
46	CN	6/22/14	Approximately 35–40 nautical miles from Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil platform	54 Chinese fishing vessels, supported by Haijing 46102, operated in Vietnamese traditional fishing grounds.
47	CN	6/24/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Chinese ships arranged in an arc array to protect Haiyang Shiyou 981. There were 102–108 Chinese ships protecting the oil rig, including 6 military ships.
48	CN	6/25/14	<i>Hai Yang Shi You</i> 981 oil platform	Chinese deployed 20 more ships to protect Haiyang Shiyou 981 (compared to the previous day). There was a total of 117–123 Chinese ships, including 41–43 CCG ships, and 13–15 cargo ships. 17–19 tugs, 40 iron-clad fishing ships, and 6 military ships.
49	CN/PH	8/17/14	Recto (Reed) Bank	Two Chinese hydrographic ships in Recto (Reed) Bank. The Philippines strongly criticized China’s consistent assertion of sovereignty in the SCS through the deployment of ships, which are only aimed at reinforcing Beijing’s territorial claims in the contested region.
2015				
50	CN/PH	1/22/15	Scarborough	A Chinese coast guard ship rammed three Filipino fishing vessels.
51	CN/VN	3/19/15	The coral reef area of Duy Mong Island, about 210 nautical miles east of Da Nang City	A Quang Ngai fishing boat QNg95431 ran aground in the Hoang Sa islands and was “robbed and destroyed” by Chinese ships.
52	CN/PH	5/21/15	Approximately near Subi Reef	A Chinese warship stationed near Subi Reef in a disputed part of the SCS aimed a powerful light at a Philippine military plane on a maritime patrol.
53	CN/VN	5/27/15	At coordinates 15 degrees north latitude and 112 degrees east longitude in Vietnam’s Hoang Sa archipelago	The Binh Dinh fishing boat was unprovokedly attacked by the Chinese Coast Guard using water cannons three times in a row.
54	CN/VN	6/10/15	Approximately 14 nautical miles from Bom Bay Island (Hoang Sa Islands)	Four Chinese CCG vessels numbered 589, 3103, 64501, and 35101 attacked Vietnamese fishing vessels and took their fish catch.
55	CN/VN	7/9/15	Coordinates 16°52 N-112°33 E, Approximately 4–6 nautical miles from Phu Lam Island (Hoang Sa Islands).	Chinese ship chased, rammed, and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel QNg 90559.
56	CN	7/22-31/15	Hainan’s area and Paracel Islands	China sent the world’s largest hovercraft to participate in exercises to seize islands in Vietnam’s Hainan and Paracel islands.

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
57	CN	7/28/15	SCS	China conducted sea and air drills in the SCS. The active munitions exercise involved more than 100 ships, dozens of aircraft, as well as information warfare units and nuclear forces.
58	CN/VN	11/13/15	10.53N-113.51E (Approximately 13–14 nautical miles from Subi Island)	Chinese ships numbered 35115 and 2305 blocked the Vietnamese replenishment ship's way, forcing the ship to change its direction.
2016				
59	CN	1/15/16	SCS	Chinese warships conducted a live fire exercise in the SCS. Three destroyers Guangzhou, Wuhan and Zhuhai took part in the exercise. These ships formed teams to train resistance, anti-submarine warfare, and open fire to stop "enemy aircraft".
60	CN/ID	3/19/16	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	Indonesia arrested the crew of eight from a Chinese fishing boat who were arrested for poaching near the Natunas. A CCG vessel intervened and prevented the Indonesian maritime authorities from seizing the Chinese fishing boat.
61	CN/ID	3/20/16	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries patrol vessel KP HIU 011 detained the Chinese vessel Kway Fey 10078 and eight crew members, on the grounds of illegal fishing using trawl nets, and escorted the vessel to Natuna waters for further investigation. En route to Natuna, a Chinese coast guard ship collided with the towed vessel in an attempt to shut down its engine to prevent it from being taken into Indonesian territorial waters.
62	CN/MY	3/24/16	SCS, Approximately near the Luconia Shoals	Approximately 100 Chinese fishing vessels were observed trespassing into Malaysia's maritime territory in the contested SCS. Two Chinese coastguard vessels protected the fishing boats.
63	CN/VN	3/31/16	Approximately in the area 12 nautical miles from the demarcation line in the Gulf of Tonkin southwest of the island of Bach Long Vi.	The Border Defense Force of Hai Phong City arrested a Chinese vessel Quynh Duong Pho carrying unregistered 100,000 liters of oil with three people onboard for trespassing on Vietnam's territorial waters. The oil was used to supply Chinese fishing vessels illegally operating in Vietnamese waters.
64	CN/PH	4/11/16	Scarborough Shoal	A CCG vessel approached and brandished fisherman Renato Etac at gunpoint and threatened him, forcing him to leave the fishing area around Scarborough Shoal.
65	CN/ID	5/27/16	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	An Indonesian Navy arrested vessel Gui Bei Yu 27088. The ship of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. CCG vessels once again tried to block, but this time unsuccessfully.

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
66	CN/PH	6/12/16	Scarborough Shoal	According to Filipino demonstrators, Chinese coastguard vessels obstructed their passage and employed water cannons against them when they were en route to a contested shoal in the SCS/West Philippine Sea, with the intention of planting a Philippine flag in commemoration of Independence Day.
67	CN/ID	6/17/16	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	The Indonesian navy ship Imam Bonjol carried out the arrest of the Chinese-flagged KIA Han Tan Cou 19038 which was detected casting nets. Suddenly the Chinese Coast Guard Ship 3303 communicated via radio to ask for Han Tan Cou to be released. However, this request was ignored. Until it approached Indonesia's territorial waters, the Coast Guard ship finally moved away from the convoy. KRI Imam Bonjol and the Chinese ship Han Tan Cou moved towards Sabangmawang.
68	CN/ID	6/19/16	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	Indonesian authorities spotted a Chinese vessel Kway Fey 10078 and detained it for illegal fishing. In escorting it, a Chinese coast guard ship slammed into the towed ship to make the transport of the vessel more difficult and ordered an Indonesian patrol boat to release the ship within 30 minutes so that it could be taken back to Chinese waters.
69	CN	7/8/16	Approximately near Hainan Island and the Xisha islands	The missile destroyer Guangzhou conducted a military practice in the maritime area adjacent to Hainan Island and the Xisha islands, wherein it successfully launched an air-defense missile.
70	CN/VN	7/9/16	Approximately 35 nautical miles from the Hoang Sa Islands	Two Chinese CCG ships number 46102 and 56103 chased and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel QNg90479.
71	CN	9/7/16	Scarborough Shoal	CCG ships spotted in the Scarborough Shoal.
72	CN/RU	9/16/16	Off the coast of Guangdong Province in the SCS	The Chinese frigate "Huangshan" and the Russian Navy's antisubmarine ship "Admiral Tributes" participated in a joint naval drill in the target area off the coast of Guangdong Province.
73	CN/US	10/21/16	Territorial waters near Paracel Islands	Two Chinese naval vessels issued a warning to a United States ship after it entered what China considers its territorial waters near the Paracel Islands, referred to as Xisha in Chinese.
74	CN	12/26/16	SCS	A fleet consisting of five Chinese warships, with the Liaoning aircraft carrier serving as the flagship, has entered the northern South China Sea. China described the action as a regular exercise.
2017				
75	CN	1/4/17	SCS	A fleet of Chinese naval vessels, headed by the Liaoning aircraft carrier, conducted exercises to assess the effectiveness of their weaponry and equipment.
76	CN	2/10-17/17	SCS	From February 10 to 17, 2017, three Chinese warships engaged in exercises within the SCS.
77	CN/PH	3/27/17	Approximately near the Spratly Islands	The Filipino fisherman Princess Johann's boat was shot by China's coast guard within the contested waters of the West Philippine Sea (SCS)

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
78	CN	4/25/17	SCS	Chinese scientists initiated a deep-sea expedition in the SCS on Tuesday, marking the commencement of the second phase of China's 38th oceanic research endeavor. On Tuesday, the Chinese manned submersible Jiaolong, along with a team of scientists, reached their destination on the mother ship Xiangyanghong 09.
79	CN/US	5/25/17	Approximately close to the Nansha Islands	The Chinese navy dispatched two missile frigates with the intention of removing a U.S. Navy destroyer that was navigating in close proximity to China's Nansha Islands without obtaining proper authorization. The Liuzhou and Luzhou guided-missile frigates were dispatched to the Nansha Islands of China in order to identify and issue a warning to the USS Dewey, urging it to vacate the area.
80	CN	6/5/17	Approximately in the sea near Hong Kong	China conducted a naval patrol and regular air patrol in the seas near Hong Kong, seemingly to demonstrate its military strength, shortly after a risky incident involving American military and Chinese aircraft close to the island.
81	CN/US	7/2/17	Approximately 12 nm of Zhongjian Island in the waters of Xisha Archipelago	The Chinese government deployed guided-missile destroyer Luoyang, guided-missile frigate Suqian, a minesweeper ship Taishan, and two J-11B fighter jets in response to the presence of a United States naval destroyer near a contested island in the SCS. This action was regarded as a significant provocation, leading to a strain in the bilateral relations between the two countries.
82	CN/PH	8/12/17	Approximately near Pag-asa (Thitu) Island in the West Philippine Sea (SCS)	A legislator from the Philippines expressed worry about the "remarkable activities" of Chinese vessels composed of two frigates, a coastguard vessel, two large fishing vessels, and numerous maritime militias. The lawmaker apprehends that these activities may indicate a potential interest in occupying sandbars that are frequented by Filipino residents for fishing and recreational purposes.
83	CN/US	10/11/17	Paracel Islands waters	Chinese deployed one warship, two fighters, and one helicopter to warn USS Chafee against approaching Paracel Islands waters.
2018				
84	CN	3/25/18	SCS	According to Taiwan's defense agency, the Liaoning ship had passed south of Taiwan, heading towards the SCS area on March 25. Reportedly, the Chinese military's move comes just days after an American destroyer entered a 12-nautical-mile area around Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. The U.S. Navy at that time carried out what the U.S. Navy called "guaranteeing freedom of navigation"
85	CN	3/26/18	Approximately near Hainan Island, SCS	A significant display of military strength was underway in the SCS, namely near Hainan Island, where the aircraft carrier Liaoning was being accompanied by no fewer than 40 ships and submarines. This demonstration served as a notable exhibition of naval capabilities.
86	CN	4/12/18	SCS	President Xi Jinping held a massive military parade in the SCS. involving China's first aircraft carrier "Liaoning" and more than 10,000 troops.

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
87	CN/PH	5/11/18	Ayungin Shoal/ Second Thomas Shoal	A Chinese naval helicopter, accompanied by CCG 3368 and PLAN 549, engaged in disruptive behavior towards a rubber boat belonging to the Philippine Navy. This incident occurred during a resupply mission conducted by the Philippines on Ayungin Shoal, also known as the Second Thomas Shoal.
88	CN	6/28/18	SCS	Chinese pilots successfully executed takeoff and landing maneuvers on the aircraft carrier Liaoning using domestically developed J-15 fighter planes. This marks the inaugural occasion of Chinese pilots conducting such flights over the SCS.
89	CN/US	9/30/18	Gaven Reef	The Chinese destroyer Lanzhou 170 approached the American destroyer USS Decatur at a distance of 40 m while it was conducting a “freedom of navigation” patrol in the South China Sea, and nearly collided.
90	CN/IN/JP/US	12/28/18	SCS	A large number of main battleships from the three countries gathered in the SCS to hold the massive Malabar 2018 joint military exercise. In the course of the exercise, a Chinese warship suddenly inserted into the place of the exercise and appeared in front of the U.S. aircraft carrier. With the emergence of this Chinese warship, the U.S. had no choice but to watch the warship pass by from its own sight. The United States dispatched the aircraft carrier Reagan, and a large number of cruise ships and three nuclear submarines. Japan sent a helicopter carrier and many other warships, but India sent only three frigates to participate in the exercise. Although there are relatively few warships dispatched by India, the magnificent group of warships of the U.S. and Japan is gathered. As in China, as usual, the Chinese navy sent a reconnaissance ship 855, inserted into the exercise site, and strongly watched the exercise site, which also made the United States feel very stumped.
2019				
91	CN	1/16/19	SCS	China conducted a comprehensive 34-day military exercise in the SCS, as well as the western and central Pacific regions. This exercise involved the participation of China’s navy, air force, and missile unit, including the Type 52D guided-missile destroyer Hefei, the corvette missile ship Yuncheng, and the amphibious ship Changbaishan.
92	CN/PH	5/14/19	Ayungin Shoal/ Second Thomas Shoal	A CCG vessel bearing the bow number 3305 obstructed the passage of three Philippine civilian vessels that were en route to provide supplies to the grounded ship BRP Sierra Madre located on Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal.
93	CN/PH	6/17/19	waters of Balabac in Palawan	Four Chinese navy warships traversed the waters of Palawan without notifying the Philippine government and disregarded military radio warnings.
94	CN	7/19/19	Sibutu Strait in Southern Philippines	China’s aircraft carrier CV-16 Liaoning was reportedly passing through the Sibutu Strait in the Southern Philippines, which was China’s first commissioned aircraft carrier in SCS.

SOURCE NO	ID COUNTRY	EVENT DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
95	CN/PH	8/7/19	Northern Luzon, Philippines	A Chinese survey ship Dong Fang Hong 3 conducted oceanographic survey activities in northern Luzon.
96	CN/VN	8/24/19	Approximately 102 km southeast of Phu Quy island and 185km off the coast of Phan Thiet	Haiyang Dizhi 8 conducted a survey near Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone.
97	CN/VN	September, 2019	Area of Tu Chinh waters	CCG ships number 5901 and 46303 lined out and prevented Vietnamese coastguard ships from stopping the illegal survey activities of the Haiyang Dizhi 8.
98	CN/PH	September, 2019	Ayungin Shoal/ Second Thomas Shoal	A CCG vessel 3305 impeded the passage of three civilian Filipino vessels engaged in a resupply operation for a Philippine Navy ship situated in the West Philippine Sea.
99	CN/VN	9/22/19	Vietnam's EEZ	Haiyang Dizhi 8 left the Vanguard Bank area and headed for Fiery Cross Reef. However, China-operated CCG number 45111 remained in Vietnam's EEZ.
100	CN/PH	9/30/19	Scarborough Shoal	A ship claiming to be a "Chinese naval warship" harassed Greece's Green Aura oil tanker operated by Filipino sailors near Scarborough Shoal.
101	CN/VN	10/3/19	Vietnam's EEZ	The Chinese survey vessel, Haiyang Dizhi 8, reportedly once again entered the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf of Vietnam.
102	CN/VN	10/5/19	Vietnam's EEZ	Three Chinese ships chased a Vietnamese fishing vessel and prevented its fishing activities in VN's EEZ
103	AU/CN	12/6/2019	SCS	There has been a notable rise in the occurrence of laser assaults targeting Australian military helicopters operating in densely populated maritime areas within the SCS. The attribution of the laser attacks has been ascribed to Chinese fishing vessels. According to senior defense officials, Chinese-flagged fishing vessels affiliated with Beijing's maritime militia have been observed utilizing a specific strategy to target military aircraft passing through the SCS.
104	CN/MY	12/9/19	Malaysia's EEZ	CCG 5302 departed from Mischief Reef and entered Malaysia's EEZ in early Dec 2019.
105	CN/ID	12/19/19	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	50 Chinese fishing vessels entered Indonesian waters in the North Natuna Sea and left the next day.
106	CN	12/23/19	SCS	For the first time, the Shandong aircraft carrier has been strategically operated in the SCS.
107	CN/ID	12/24/19	Approximately around the Natuna waters (Indonesian EEZ near the Natuna Island)	A Chinese coastguard vessel trespassed into Indonesia's EEZ off the coast of the northern islands of Natuna.

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