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CHINA'S DECLARATION OF A NEW ADIZ: MOTIVATIONS AND STRATEGIC GOALS

by

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**CHINA'S DECLARATION OF A NEW ADIZ: MOTIVATIONS AND
STRATEGIC GOALS**

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ABSTRACT

China's establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea (ECS) raised concerns among neighboring countries, yet the ECS ADIZ has not significantly altered the regional aerial order over a decade. This limited impact prompts questions about China's underlying objectives in its declaration.

This study examines ADIZ motives through security, normative, and domestic political lenses. Security-wise, the ADIZ aimed not just to boost air defense but also signal the use of assertive military force. Normatively, there was no intent to resolve territorial disputes through international legal channels; however, the ADIZ served as a legal tool to reinforce China's claims, akin to legal warfare. From a domestic political perspective, a shift from land to maritime and air forces aligns with potential military control strengthening under new leadership. While promoting a powerful China publicly, but the ADIZ's establishment cannot be solely explained as a tool to fuel nationalist sentiments among the Chinese population.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Area Control Center
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication
AEW&C	Airborne Early Warning and Control
CCG	China Coast Guard
CMC	Central Military Commission
ECS	East China Sea
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FIR	Flight Information Region
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
MOA	Military Operation Area
MTA	Military Training Area
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAAF	People's Liberation Army Air Force
SOA	State Oceanic Administration
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND AND MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the context of border issues among East Asian countries, land border lines are relatively stable, whereas disputes over maritime territories have been complex and contentious. Conversely, conflicts in the aerial domain had been relatively subdued, almost forgotten. However, this static situation was disrupted by China's declaration of the East China Sea (ECS) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

China's declaration of an ADIZ in the ECS in 2013 caused ripples across Asia. The ECS ADIZ directly borders the ADIZs of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, raising concerns about the potential for armed conflicts in the ECS ADIZ. Additionally, there are anticipations regarding the establishment of China's ADIZ in the South China Sea, which could threaten freedom of flight and navigation. However, the uproar reminiscent of a decade ago has abated. The establishment of China's new ADIZ has not resulted in significant changes in the air order of East Asia.

The relatively small impact of the ADIZ on the regional order spotlights the question of what China hoped to achieve in declaring it. Therefore, this thesis seeks to answer these questions: Why did China declare a new ADIZ? What advantages did China seek to gain by proclaiming a new ADIZ?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study investigates the motives behind China's ADIZ declaration and its implications for regional security. Despite being a generally stable region since the Korean War in the 1950s, East Asia remains an area with lingering potential for conflicts. In particular, recently, the competition between the United States and China has heightened concerns about the stability of this region. Understanding China's motives and actions is crucial for assessing regional stability and potential risks. This research sheds light on the dynamics and tensions among East Asian countries, allowing for an analysis of potential conflicts and cooperative measures.

Furthermore, this study expands our understanding of China's strategic goals. This research contributes to understanding China's intentions, actions, and potential strategies. By examining whether China has achieved strategic objectives through the ADIZ declaration, we can gain insights into China's national goals and the expansion of its regional influence.

Lastly, this study enables us to infer China's approach to status quo changes. China raises challenges to the existing international order, and seeks to strengthen its position by introducing new perspectives that maintain similarities with the existing order but with a distinct Chinese perspective. The declaration of the ADIZ exemplifies these characteristics because ADIZ is part of an existing international order, which was originated by the United States, and it had not been challenged before China questioned it by declaring its own ADIZ. Therefore, this research provides a useful framework for understanding China's territorial claims and its approach to expanding regional influence.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Concept of ADIZ

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is a concept established by a nation for defense purposes, and managed by its air force or military agencies. According to a CRS report, an ADIZ refers to “a designated area of airspace over land or water within which a country requires the immediate and positive identification, location, and air traffic control of aircraft in the interest of the country's national security.”¹ The report further highlights that although many countries have implemented ADIZs to protect their national security, there is no global consensus or agreement concerning the establishment, flight operations, or air traffic procedures associated with such airspace. Additionally, the report notes that ADIZs are typically situated over maritime areas adjacent to coastal nations, extending

¹ Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, *China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)*, CRS Report No. R43894 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 1–2, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R43894.pdf>.

well beyond their territorial boundaries and waters. ADIZs function as part of national early warning system.²

An ADIZ differs from sovereign airspace or a Flight Information Region (FIR) as it is not regulated by international law. An FIR serves a different purpose than an ADIZ and is regulated by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Convention on International Civil Aviation, adopted at the 1944 Chicago Conference, guaranteed freedom of aviation while recognizing exclusive rights over territorial airspace. It established the central authority for the aviation order by defining the organization and mission of the ICAO. Also, it provided universal norms for the use of airspace, but did not address buffer zones outside territorial airspace essential for necessary observation, surveillance, and tracking from a national security perspective.

ICAO establishes FIRs with the purpose of providing various information necessary for the operation of aircraft flying within those regions and coordinating search and rescue operations in the event of aviation accidents.³ It is a system designed to allocate air traffic management responsibilities for all airspace regions worldwide, including not only the national airspace of a particular country but also the airspace over international waters. The scope of an ADIZ often does not align with that of an FIR because of different purposes and governing authorities.

There is a lack of international rules or guidelines governing the implementation and operation of ADIZ, resulting in variations between countries. Charbonneau, Heelis, and Prerender said that information on an ADIZ generally can be found in an operating country's Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), but AIPs are difficult to access.⁴ Instead, they noted that Jeppesen Pilot Manual, which provides comprehensive aeronautical navigation data, is commonly used. Not all countries operate ADIZs;

² Duc L. Ho, "A South China Sea ADIZ--Vietnam's next Challenge" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 40, <https://hdl.handle.net/10945/49489>.

³ Kyeong-Ae Park, "A Legal Study on Air Defense Identification Zones" (master's thesis, Seoul, Yonsei University, 2004).

⁴ Joëlle Charbonneau, Katie Heelis, and Jinelle Piereder, "Putting Air Defense Identification Zones on the Radar," Policy Brief (Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation, June 2015), 4, <https://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu:2048/stable/resrep05189>.


according to Su's research, at least 26 countries worldwide had ADIZs in operation in 2021, and ADIZs have been established and disbanded.⁵ Su's findings indicate that nine countries (Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Libya, Peru, Poland, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uruguay) have implemented ADIZs that are confined to their respective national airspace; seventeen countries or regions, including the United States and East Asian countries, assert ADIZs that encompass areas beyond their national airspace or partially overlap with it. In addition, he mentioned that during the temporary establishment of an ADIZ for the 2014 G-20 Leaders' Summit in Australia, there was an inclusion of an offshore section.

2. ADIZ in East Asia

The first establishment of an ADIZ in East Asia was by the United States early in the Cold War, to contain the Soviet Union and China. The ADIZs of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea were designed without overlapping areas, extending from China's coastal lines to the Soviet Far East region. Later, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea took over the ADIZs, and legalized them with their domestic laws.⁶ ADIZ declarations active today, including China's, are shown in Figure 1.

⁵ Jinyuan Su, "Is the Establishment of Air Defence Identification Zones Outside National Airspace in Accordance with International Law?," *European Journal of International Law* 32, no. 4 (November 2021): 1310, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chab088>.

⁶ Yun-Hyoung Gil, "한·일·대만 방공식별구역, 미국이 그은 '냉전의 흔적'[South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zones: 'Traces of the Cold War' Drawn by the United States]," *Hankyoreh*, November 26, 2013, <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/japan/612853.html>; Subhandi Bakhtiar Handar et al., "Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in International Law Perspective," *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization* 56 (2016): 7, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3695574>.



Source: Congressional Research Service.

Figure 1. ADIZ in East Asia⁷

Dutton describes that general use of an ADIZ, which had not received much attention previously, took center stage in the security arena in the 2000s. According to his research, concerns about threats from the air have increased since 9/11 and with the rise of new military powers. For example, Dutton notes that China considered establishing ADIZs

⁷ Source: Rinehart and Elias, *China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)*, 8.

over the ECS and Taiwan in preparation for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Dutton further notes instances of ADIZ implementation with Norway and the United Kingdom scrambling aircraft in response to Russian military aircraft approaching their national airspace.⁸

In its declaration on November 23, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of China announced the enforcement of rules within its ADIZ in the ECS from 10:00 a.m. on the same day.⁹ Previously, China had considered setting an ADIZ in the ECS and the Taiwan Strait in 2007 and 2008 to prepare for potential threats to the Beijing Olympics, but deferred to Taiwan's objection that this declaration would pose a threat to the safety of the Taiwan Strait and the safety of international navigation.¹⁰ China's 2013 ADIZ rules stipulated that any aircraft operating within the ADIZ must comply with four requirements.

1. Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China.
2. Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ.
3. Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary radar transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire course.
4. Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of

⁸ Peter A. Dutton, "Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign Airspace," *The American Journal of International Law* 103 (2009): 1, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA631477.pdf>.

⁹ "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," *China Daily*, November 23, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/23/content_17126611.htm.

¹⁰ Heecheol Yang, "중국 ADIZ의 국제법적 해석과 동북아 안보에서의 함의[International Law Perspectives on the China's ADIZ and the Implications for North East Asia]," *The Korean Journal of International Law* 59, no. 4 (2014): 177.

their registration identification in accordance with related international treaties.¹¹

Also, the announcement warned that “China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in identification or refuse to follow the instruction.”¹²

China’s ADIZ requires all aircraft, regardless of whether they are transiting its territorial airspace or not, to provide flight information. In contrast, Japan does not require flight plans for aircraft that are only transiting its ADIZ.¹³ Some scholars argue that imposing requirements on aircrafts that do not enter territorial airspace threatens freedom of flight.¹⁴

China faced criticism by neighboring countries for attempting to use its ADIZ as a tool for asserting sovereignty, which is not achievable under international law. China’s ECS ADIZ overlaps with those of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, raising concerns and interpretations of sovereignty assertions. China demanded that even aircraft innocently transiting through its ADIZ without entering its sovereign airspace provide advance notice and identify themselves to Chinese authorities. Similar requirements are enforced by other countries, including the United States, but China’s specific demands and procedures were vague or unclear, leading to confusion and justified concerns.¹⁵

Ho points out three differences between China’s ADIZ and the ADIZ of other countries. Firstly, he highlights the lack of consultation with neighboring countries during the declaration process. Secondly, he refers to the arguments of Pedrozo, Lowell Bautista,

¹¹ “Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China,” *China Daily*, November 23, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/23/content_17126618.htm.

¹² Xinhua.

¹³ Dutton, “Caelum Liberam.”

¹⁴ Robert Beckman and Phan Duy Hao, “Air Defence Identification Zones: Implications for Freedom of Overflight and Maritime Disputes,” in *Building a Normative Order in the South China Sea*, ed. Truong T. Tran, John B. Welfield, and Thuy T. Le (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 156–70, <https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781786437525/9781786437525.00016.xml>; Rinehart and Elias, *China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)*, 33.

¹⁵ Charbonneau, Heelis, and Piereder, “Putting Air Defense Identification Zones on the Radar,” 4.

and Julio Amador, who argue that China's ADIZ applies not only to civil aircraft but also to state aircraft. Thirdly, he mentions the lack of differentiation between aircraft transiting through the airspace and those intending to intrude into China's territorial airspace, as both are treated as subject to the ADIZ. On the contrary, citing Michael Swain, who specializes in studying China, Hu explains that China's procedures, including the requirement for preflight plan submissions without explicit mention of the final destination, are not significantly different from Japan's requirement for flight plan submissions when passing through an ADIZ.¹⁶

3. China's Perspective on ADIZ

In announcing the ADIZ, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying explained the declaration's rationale and argued that the ADIZ does not increase regional tension.¹⁷ She emphasized that China's establishment of the ECS ADIZ was a necessary measure for self-defense and not targeted at any specific country. Therefore, she argued that, from the perspective of equal national sovereignty, China also has the right to establish its ADIZ. Also, she explained that ADIZs have already been set up by more than 20 countries around China decades before China did so, including Japan's ADIZ, which was established in 1969, to suggest that China's ADIZ should not be seen as directed towards specific countries. This statement alluded to the possibility that the ADIZ could be perceived as directed towards specific countries, such as Japan.

China claimed to establish an ADIZ as its sovereign right, but there is still controversy in domestic law. Chang criticizes that even the domestic laws China relies on cannot serve as a proper basis for their claims.¹⁸ In his research, three Chinese laws are

¹⁶ Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ)," *Chinese Leadership Monitor*, no. 43 (Spring 2014): 5, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MS_Final_022514.pdf; cited in Ho, "A South China Sea ADIZ-Vietnam's next Challenge," 11.

¹⁷ Jun Osawa, "China's ADIZ over the East China Sea: A 'Great Wall in the Sky'?", Brookings Commentary, December 17, 2013, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-adiz-over-the-east-china-sea-a-great-wall-in-the-sky/>.

¹⁸ Chang Ching, "The Legal Basis of the People's Republic of China's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations* 2, no. 1 (April 2016): 503–42.

mentioned: the Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Civil Aviation and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People's Republic of China. These laws indicate jurisdiction over China's territorial airspace and flight activities within its territory. The laws do not provide a solid basis for extending jurisdiction beyond China's territorial waters, and their objectives primarily apply to aircraft with Chinese nationality. He also examines speculations about functions of establishment of ECS ADIZ, including asserting sovereignty and expanding territory, and he concludes that the validity of these claims is controversial.

4. Debates Among Scholars Regarding the Reasons for China's ADIZ Declaration

China's motivations are not fully visible from its official announcements, but the justifications China offered can provide insight into what expectations China has for the ADIZ. Shin researched on China's motivations for establishing an ADIZ by examining Chinese literature, focusing on the discussions among Chinese scholars prior to the Beijing Olympics. He discovered, through Chinese scholars Xue and Xiong, that the installation of China's ADIZ was motivated by the following factors.¹⁹ First, ADIZ will provide protection of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime interests. Second, based on the lessons learned from the collision incident between China and United States on Hainan Island in 2001, China recognized that national security could no longer be achieved solely through interpretations of relevant international laws. Third, ADIZ may strengthen deterrent capabilities to effectively deter provocative actions by countries such as Japan or the United States in the airspace over China's administered waters. Lastly, the establishment of an ADIZ that includes Taiwan, and the Taiwan Strait could potentially serve as a means to deter attempts at Taiwanese independence. It is worth noting that all of these factors emphasize national and military security from a defensive orientation.

¹⁹ Xue Guifang and Xiong Xuyuan, "A Legal Analysis of the Establishment of Air Defense Identification Zones," *Journal of Ocean University of China Social Sciences Edition*, cited in Chang Hoon Shin, "중국의 방공식별구역(ADIZ) 선포와 역내 안보적 함의[China's Air Defense Identification Zone(ADIZ) Declaration and Its Regional Security Implications]," *Strategy 21* 17, no. 1 (2014): 148–77, <https://koreascience.kr/article/JAKO201410565090570.pdf>.

There are other contending explanations for China's declaration of a new ADIZ in the ECS. One perspective suggests that it stems from conflicts, including territorial disputes, particularly with Japan. Those presenting the first perspective often note that prior to China's declaration of the ADIZ, China and Japan were engaged in a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Rinehart views the first reason for China's designation of the ECS ADIZ as a means to strengthen China's claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.²⁰ Cohen argues that China's establishment of the ADIZ is aimed at securing strategic advantage in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.²¹

In a similar vein, Su argues that the China's ADIZ actually reflects thought about decision-making. She suggests that China's objectives behind establishing the ADIZ are twofold. Firstly, it aims to maximize the impact of its actions in response to escalations by Japan and the United States. Secondly, it serves as a deterrent to Japan by setting a clear boundary. Su explains that by pursuing the best-case scenario, China intends to draw attention, unsettle Japan, assert control over the airspace over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and enhance national security. On the other hand, preparing for the worst-case scenario involves setting a red line for the United States and other countries and seeking understanding of China's interests among other nations.²²

These explanations focusing on territorial disputes suggest a Chinese orientation that is less defensive in nature, but still all fall within the category of national security and military defense.

A second perspective highlights China's intention to challenge the U.S.-led order, including the freedom of navigation and overflight, as its power grows. More in line with the second perspective, Matthias Vanhullebusch and Wei Shen argue that China's

²⁰ Rinehart and Elias, *China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)*, 30.

²¹ David Cohen, "East China Sea Air Defense Moves: What for and Why Now?," *China Brief* 13, no. 24 (November 27, 2013), <https://jamestown.org/program/east-china-sea-air-defense-moves-what-for-and-why-now/>.

²² Xiaohui Su, "China's Bottom-Line Thinking Will Work for ADIZ," *China-US Focus*, December 2, 2013, <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinas-bottom-line-thinking-will-work-for-adiz>.

establishment of its ADIZ is a form of lawfare.²³ They state China has intentions of extending its jurisdiction over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and being ready to act in the event of an urgent threat. Chao argues that China designated the ECS ADIZ, which has strategic flexibility and initiative, as a way to show its international standing.²⁴ Rapp-Hooper defined China's declaration of ADIZ As a new format challenge, which is rule-based, aimed at United States because of its tempo and timing that was calculated to affect U.S. domestic politics.²⁵ Cheng, Osawa, Imam and Ullah analyzed the ADIZ from the perspectives of A2/AD, counter intervention operation. Cheng stated that the declaration of ECS ADIZ reflects People's Liberation Army Air Force's improvement.²⁶ On the other hand, Muralidharan said that ADIZ seems to be a political move because China's assets are still at a level where it cannot operate ADIZ effectively enough.²⁷

Daniel and Alexander argue that China's declaration of an ADIZ reflects a dynamic and competitive process that deviates from traditional geopolitical approaches. They claim that it goes beyond a one-dimensional focus on territorial control and instead forms a three-dimensional mosaic of contested jurisdiction. They interpret this behavior as a departure from Cold War-era agreements and an emphasis on the ambiguity surrounding the function and performance of ADIZs.²⁸

²³ Matthias Vanhullebusch and Wei Shen, "China's Air Defence Identification Zone: Building Security through Lawfare," *China Review* 16, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 121–50, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43709963>.

²⁴ Chao Xie, "China's ADIZ Is for More than Just Diaoyu Sovereignty," *Global Times*, December 2, 2013, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/829275.shtml>.

²⁵ Mira Rapp-Hooper, "East China Sea ADIZ: A Turning Point in US-China Relations?," *The Diplomat*, December 20, 2013, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/east-china-sea-adiz-a-turning-point-in-us-china-relations/>.

²⁶ Dean Cheng, "China's ADIZ as Area Denial," *The National Interest*, December 4, 2013, <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-adiz-area-denial-9492>; Osawa, "China's ADIZ over the East China Sea"; and Syed Muhammad Irteza Imam and Sufian Ullah, "Anti-Access Area Denial Capabilities: Implications for Strategic Stability," *Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses* 6, no. 1 (Summer 2020): 25, <https://thesvi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/JSSA-Vol-VI-no-1-17-42.pdf>.

²⁷ PI Muralidharan, "China and Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ): An Airman's Perspective," in *China and the Air DEFENCE Identification Zone (ADIZ)*, ed. Teshu Singh (New Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2014), 9–12, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09386.5..>

²⁸ Daniel Connolly and Alexander M. Hynd, "The Construction and Enforcement of East Asia's Air Defence Identification Zones: Grey Volumes in the Sky?," *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space* 41, no. 5 (August 2023): 1029–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544231169378>.

In contrast to the prior explanations, these explanations reach outside practical considerations national security and military defense, pointing to a more political motivation to assert China's capacity to reshape norms and alter the existing regional order.

Thirdly, China's ADIZ declaration can be viewed as a response to the domestic political necessity in China following the leadership transition to Xi Jinping. One analysis suggests that the motives behind China's ADIZ were to demonstrate decisiveness in the early stages of Xi Jinping's leadership, a response to pressure from hawkish elements within the military, an effort to appease nationalist sentiments, a diversion from issues such as corruption and pollution, and finally, a response to provocations from Japan.²⁹

Szu-chien Hsu and Hsiao-Chi Hsu claim that domestic politics was a crucial factor in shaping of the ECS ADIZ establishment.³⁰ They present two representative theories that highlight the strong linkage between domestic politics and international politics: mobilization theory, which emphasizes how leaders use foreign conflicts to advance their domestic political interests, and diversionary theory, which focuses on leaders seeking refuge in foreign affairs to escape domestic political crises. They conclude that declaration of ECS ADIZ was done to advance Xi Jinping's domestic political interest.

Robert Kelly suggests that China's declaration of the ADIZ is carried out to maintain domestic legitimacy.³¹ He says that China's education and propaganda emphasize a hostile perception of Japan, and the Chinese Communist Party must respond to the demands of its citizens, who view Japan as the main culprit behind a century of humiliation. Therefore, CCP needs to adopt a tough stance towards Japan to appease domestic sentiment, as failure to do so could result in domestic backlash. In his point of

²⁹ "China's ADIZ Signals More Assertive Defence Posture," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, accessed December 13, 2023, <https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB187528/Chinas-ADIZ-signals-more-assertive-defence-posture..>

³⁰ Szu-chien Hsu and Hsiao-Chi Hsu, "Domestic Motivation and the Case of the East China Sea ADIZ: Diversion or Mobilization?," *Asian Perspective* 41, no. 3 (2017): 455–80, <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2017.0021>.

³¹ Robert Kelly, "4 Quick Hypotheses on Why China Suddenly Declared This New Air Defense Zone," *The Duck of Minerva* (blog), November 29, 2013, <https://www.duckofminerva.com/2013/11/4-hypotheses-on-why-china-suddenly-declared-this-new-air-defense-zone.html>.

view, these factors indicate that China's diplomatic decisions can be understood as part of securing domestic legitimacy.

Although there are many contending explanations for China's declaration of the ECS ADIZ, there has not been a sufficiently rigorous comparison of these explanations to determine the most accurate answer. For example, Kelly proposes four hypotheses, but does not present much evidence to support any of them.³² This thesis will examine available information more comprehensively to better explain the reasons for China's ECS ADIZ declaration. To the extent it is possible to determine China's main motivations, the thesis will then be able to evaluate whether China has achieved its goals, and the implications for the region.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

In the realm of national policymaking, the motivations that guide a nation's decisions are multifaceted. Nonetheless, when it comes to military policy decisions, the most intuitive motivation that comes to mind is security. Scott D. Sagan's critique of the prevailing tendency to attribute nuclear acquisition solely to security concerns has illuminated the limitations of such a narrow approach to understanding a state's policy choices.³³ He has presented three distinct models to comprehensively grasp the motives behind nuclear proliferation: the security model; the domestic politics model, the norms model. Drawing inspiration from Sagan's models, this thesis aims to analyze the motivations behind China's declaration of the ECS ADIZ. To build on prior explanations, this thesis will comparatively evaluate the following hypotheses explaining the reasons for China's declaration of the ECS ADIZ in 2013.

- Hypothesis 1: the declaration of the ECS ADIZ was an action aimed at enhancing its military capabilities and advancing its national security

³² Kelly.

³³ Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 54–86, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273>.

interests, either defensively or offensively, considering Japan and other potential threats.

- Hypothesis 2: China's declaration of its ECS ADIZ is an effort to normatively justify China's maritime rights, and influence regional norms more broadly. China declared its ADDIZ to strengthen its sovereignty claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
- Hypothesis 3: China's declaration of its ECS ADIZ was driven by domestic political considerations. The announcement of the ADIZ aimed to strengthen nationalistic sentiments and foster a sense of pride and unity among the Chinese population, and/or reflected political forces within the PRC ruling elite.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research can be divided into two parts: first, China's objectives; and second, whether those objectives have been achieved, as well as the impact on regional security.

The verification of hypotheses will determine China's intentions and whether they have been realized. First, to determine if the actions were in response to external security threats, relevant diplomatic and security documents and statements from relative countries and China will be analyzed. Reports on U.S. military exercises and studies on military cooperation with neighboring countries can help substantiate this hypothesis. Moreover, examination of China's defense policy documents, official statements, and the trend of its military exercises will be conducted. Analyzing reports on China's naval activities and military exercise will also provide useful data.

Second, to assess if China is asserting legal justification over maritime territories, review of China's domestic laws, regulations, and related documents will be conducted. Examination of China's dispute resolution processes in international law and norms can be used as case studies.

Third, to evaluate whether domestic politics motivated the declaration of ECS ADIZ, because China is an authoritarian state, the thesis will focus on developing indirect and

circumstantial evidence that domestic political factors played a role. For example, although China strongly controls its media and publications, how ADIZ and nationalism are presented in the media can indicate how the PRC government seeks to utilize ADIZ to promote public support. The thesis can also utilize prior knowledge on the domestic role in other governmental actions to find indications of a similar role for the ADIZ declaration.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis examines the strategic goal of China's establishment of the ECS ADIZ. Research conclusions will also provide insights on the implications for regional security regarding China's declaration of ADIZ. The thesis is composed of four chapters. Chapter II will test the first, security-related hypothesis to determine the strategic goals behind China's establishment of the ECS ADIZ. Chapter III will evaluate the two non-security-related hypotheses in a similar manner. Lastly, the conclusion will synthesize the research findings from previous chapters to indicate the regional security implication of China's declaration of ADIZ and identify areas that require further investigation.

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II. SECURITY EXPLANATIONS FOR CHINA'S ADIZ DECLARATION

In line with the groundwork laid out in the preceding discussion, this chapter aims to verify the validity of the first of the three presented hypotheses regarding China's motivations for establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea (ECS). The exploration unfolds systematically, addressing key aspects related to the genesis and implications of China's actions within ECS.

Specifically, this chapter will scrutinize Hypothesis 1, positing that the declaration of the ECS ADIZ represents a strategic move by China to bolster its military capabilities. By examining military capabilities and strategies, this section seeks to provide insights into whether this hypothesis adequately captures the strategic objectives behind the ADIZ establishment.

A. HYPOTHESIS 1: SECURITY ASPECT

Was China's motivation for setting up ADIZ a way of enhancing its military capabilities and advancing its national security interests in response to the external environment? To address the question, firstly this chapter examines the history of power transition, territorial disputes, and security dilemmas in East Asia. Then follows an assessment of the military utility of the ADIZ.

1. Power Transition, Territorial Dispute, Security Dilemma of East Asia

The area between China's eastern coast, the southwestern region of Japan, and the Korean South Sea is referred to as the ECS. While the term "East China Sea" might sound like a region where China's exclusive sovereignty is recognized, that is not the case, just as not all regions in the Indian Ocean belong to India. ESC clearly signifies a domain beyond territorial waters of China. South Korea, Japan, and China all claim exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within the ECS. China's ADIZ in the ECS encompasses a broader area compared to its claimed EEZ.

When China declared the ECS ADIZ, the international community expressed concerns that his action might jeopardize regional stability and interfere with freedom of navigation. Various governments, including those of the United States, Japan and South Korea, articulated these concerns through official statements, and the media also reported on this issue.³⁴ China responded that the ECS ADIZ would be “an effective way to ease tensions, and maintain peace and stability in the East China Sea,” but skepticism and apprehensions persisted.³⁵

These concerns stem from the escalating tensions surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands conflict, which has seen a notable escalation since 2012. This was the beginning of a full-fledged escalation of the threat perception between China and Japan. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, located 300km east from mainland China, 300km west from Okinawa, Japan, and 200km northeast from Taiwan, had historically been uninhabited. The islands had held limited interest for both China and Japan, and lacked any symbolic significance for either side. By the time China declared the ADIZ, however, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands had become a very sensitive issue. The ECS ADIZ includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are at the center of territorial disputes between China and Japan, as shown in Figure 2.

³⁴ Jethro Mullen, “China Slams ‘Inappropriate’ U.S. Remarks on Territorial Dispute with Japan,” CNN, November 25, 2013, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/china-japan-disputed-islands/index.html>; Reiji Yoshida, “Tokyo Cries Foul over China’s Declaration of Air Defense Zone,” *Japan Times*, November 25, 2013, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/25/national/tokyo-cries-foul-over-chinas-declaration-of-air-defense-zone/>; and Min Cheol Kim, “국방부, 중국 방공식별구역 관련 유감 표명 [Ministry of National Defense Expresses Regret Regarding China’s Air Defense Identification Zone],” KBS News, November 26, 2013, <https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=2761420>.

³⁵ “Voice on China’s Demarcation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” *Global Times*, November 25, 2013, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201311/827620.shtml>.



Figure 2. ECS ADIZ with Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands³⁶

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands conflict has emerged only recently as a focal point in China-Japan relations. Historically, China was a strong country with a large territory, but it was also a country with strong soft power, so it was a country that had a long history of political and cultural dominance in East Asia. The threat to China was the northern people, or rather, the rebellion within China, and Japan was rarely seen as a security threat.

A paradigm shift in East Asia occurred during the period from modernization to the Cold War. This was a time when the old China-centered order collapsed, and a new order emerged. This is when China's alleged "Century of humiliation" began.³⁷ Japan succeeded in modernizing faster than China. The faster it adapted, the stronger it became.

Japan's proactive status-quo changing approach, while possibly perplexing to other actors of East Asia, underscored its quick acclimatization to the dictates of the Western-

³⁶ Source: "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," *Global Times*, November 24, 2013, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201311/827069.shtml>.

³⁷ Alison Adcock Kaufman, "The 'Century of Humiliation,' Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order," *Pacific Focus* 25, no. 1 (April 2010): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2010.01039.x>.

dominated world order. It showcased a relatively strong understanding of international law and modern interpretations of territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, nations like China and Korea were contending with domestic disarray, directing their focus away from firmly establishing territorial legitimacy.

In this historical backdrop, Japan endeavored to challenge the established order, a motive epitomized by the Sino-Japanese War. The Qing dynasty's defeat in the war resulted in a partial loss of sovereignty over their territories. After the First Sino-Japanese War, China ceded islands to Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in May 1895. One of the major points of contention surrounding the Shimonoseki Treaty is whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are included in the islands transferred. Japan's position is that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which were uninhabited before the First Sino-Japanese War, were incorporated into Japan before the war, so they are not part of the islands ceded by China according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki.³⁸ In contrast, China argues that Senkaku has been recognized as its territory since the 16th century, and Japan stole the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands during the Sino-Japanese War.

A perceptible shift occurred again through 1940s-50s in East Asia as it transitioned into the Cold War era. Because World War II concluded with the victory of the Allied Powers, Japanese initiative end; but this did not usher in an order dominated by China. The United States occupied Japan, which was defeated nation in the war. During this time, China concluded the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1949 resulting in the Communist Party taking control of mainland China. The issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was relatively small compared to the significant changes that were happening during that time.

Amid the tensions of the Cold War, a taut equilibrium brought stability to the region, even though the atmosphere was tense. There were no significant changes in this order as subsequent dramatic shifts merely altered directions while the overall balance of power remained unchanged. For instance, issues with sufficient potential for conflict did

³⁸ "Senkaku Islands," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed November 28, 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html>.

not necessarily escalate into actual disputes. The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, in its 1968 report, indicated the resource potential in the ECS. Similarly, the 1971 US-Japan Okinawa Reversion Agreement, though significant in the context of territorial disputes surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, did not lead to an outbreak of conflict.

The Senkaku issue was pushed to the background within the framework of China's new strategy of detente.³⁹ In February 1972, Nixon initiated the era of détente by visiting China. The United States, facing a downturn due to the Vietnam War, sought a breakthrough by improving relations with China. China, aiming to escape the threat of a two-front superpower confrontation with the United States and the Soviet Union, strategically chose to accept the U.S. detente proposal.⁴⁰

At the beginning of detente with the United States, the wind of improved relations between Japan and China began to blow. In negotiations to restore diplomatic relations with Japan, China has shown its willingness to settle the negotiations through its determination not to raise issues about the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, reparations, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.⁴¹

Afterwards, China shifted its focus from isolation to economic development, and the results were successful. The Chinese economy entered the 2000s demonstrating the fastest growth worldwide. China's GDP was \$396.59 billion (U.S. dollars) in 1990, but in 2000, it recorded \$1.21 trillion. In 2005, it further rose to \$2.29 trillion, and in 2010, it reached \$6.03 trillion.⁴² In 2010, China overtook Japan and became the world's second-largest economy in terms of GDP.⁴³

³⁹ Yul Shon, "U.S.-China Detente and Japan: International Politics in the China-Japan Negotiation for Diplomatic Normalization," *Ilbon Yeongu Nonchong* 38 (2013): 257–75.

⁴⁰ Dong-Ryul Lee, "Sino-U.S. Détente in 1972: Background, Strategy, and Historical Implications of China," *National Strategy* 20, no. 3 (2014): 71–106, <https://doi.org/10.35390/sejong.20.3.201408.003>.

⁴¹ Shon, "U.S.-China Detente and Japan."

⁴² "World Economic Outlook Database," International Monetary Fund, accessed October 18, 2023, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October/select-country-group>.

⁴³ Chester Dawson and Jason Dean, "Rising China Bests a Shrinking Japan," *Wall Street Journal*, February 14, 2011, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704593604576140912411499184>.

NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict became a catalyst for a fundamental review of security policies within China. Events such as the Tiananmen massacre in 1981, Gulf War in 1991, which showcased the formidable military power of the United States, collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 traumatized China.⁴⁴ The political leverage exercised by the deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–1996, and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy during the Kosovo conflict, collectively contributed to China perceiving the United States as a target of vigilance. Based on economic growth, China has significantly boosted its military spending as well. According to SIPRI military expenditure database, China exceeded Japan in military expenditures for the first time in 2006, reportedly allocating \$51 billion compared to Japan's \$41 billion.⁴⁵

As the 2000s approached, a perception of mutual threat began to surface between Japan and China. Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) serves as the document encompassing Japan's perception of the situation and security strategy, equivalent to the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS).⁴⁶ According to one analysis, in Japan's NDPG of 1995, there was no explicit mention of China; however, in the NDPG of 2004, attention was drawn to China's modernization of its military and expanding maritime activities, stating the necessity to monitor the trends.⁴⁷ It also comments the NDPG of 2010, amidst China's consecutive double-digit growth in defense spending for 21 years, concerns were expressed over regional and international apprehensions, emphasizing China's increasing defense budget; also, worries were voiced regarding China's augmentation of its maritime forces, including the development of aircraft carriers, and its expanding activities in surrounding maritime areas like the ECS.

⁴⁴ Rush Doshi, *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

⁴⁵ "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed November 28, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685>.

⁴⁶ Young Jun Park, "Implication of Japan's Defense Program Outline 2010 for South Korea's Security Policy," EAI Issue Brief (EAI, December 28, 2010).

⁴⁷ Hong Min Cho, "6 년 만에 바뀌는 일본 '신방위대강'[Japan's 'New National Defense Guidelines' Changing after 6 Years]," *Kyunghyang Daily News*, December 14, 2012, <https://m.khan.co.kr/world/japan/article/201012142201535>.

A September 2010 collision between a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese patrol boat in Senkaku waters developed into a power confrontation between the two countries. Escalating the tension in the conflict regarding Japan's detention of a Chinese fishing trawler captain, the Chinese authorities have imposed restrictions on the shipment of essential minerals, which are indispensable in the manufacturing of items such as hybrid vehicles, wind turbine components, guided missiles, to Japan.⁴⁸ At that time, the Chinese government strongly demanded the release of the captain, and Japan released the captain just two weeks after detaining him, thus concluding the incident.

In this period, China was wary of Japan's military changes. One study analyzed concerns about Japan's remilitarization through an examination of several changes in Japan's security policies.⁴⁹ First, in Japan, the concept of a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" was introduced during the process of revising the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in 2010. This concept was based on the perception that Japan's role was expanding due to a relative decrease in U.S. influence and the rapid rise of China. Second, in 2008, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Act was amended to include provisions that aimed to contribute to national security through space development. Third, in December 2011, Japan revised the "Three Principles on Arms Exports" (not exporting arms to communist countries, countries under arms export embargoes by UN resolutions, or countries involved in international conflicts or potential conflicts). Fourth, on June 20, 2012, Japan added the phrase "national security" to the Atomic Energy Basic Law during the process of enacting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Act, raising suspicions of potential nuclear armament implications. Fifth, on July 6, the National Security Council's Peace Subcommittee proposed a report advocating the exercise of collective self-defense, and the opposition party, the Liberal Democratic Party, approved

⁴⁸ Keith Bradsher, "Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan," *New York Times*, September 23, 2010, sec. Business, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>.

⁴⁹ Hwa Sub Song, Kang Kyu Kim, and Hye Jin Jang, "일본은 소위 '군사대국화'의 길로 나아가고자 하는가: 최근 일본 '재무장' 논란과 우리의 대응방향 [Is Japan Moving Towards Militarization: Recent Controversies Over Japanese 'Remilitarization' and Our Response Strategy]," KIDA Weekly Defense Analysis (Seoul: KIDA, September 10, 2012).

the “National Security Basic Law,” which included the limited right of collective self-defense.

In December 2010, around the time Japan’s NDPG were announced, Japanese defense officials argued during media interviews that Japan needed to shift its defense focus from the north, which was the orientation during the Cold War era, to the southwest. China viewed this as an attempt by Japanese politicians to rationalize their adoption of military expansion policies.⁵⁰

Tensions between China and Japan rapidly escalated on September 11, 2012, when the Japanese government purchased three islands in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from private owners. The acquisition was partly stimulated by the right-wing Tokyo Governor, Shintaro Ishihara, who criticized the Democratic Party’s moderate approach to foreign relations, which the Japanese government was concerned could strain relations with China.⁵¹ In the aftermath of the purchase announcement, widespread street demonstrations erupted through China, accompanied by vehemently expressed disapproval from the Chinese government, challenging the legitimacy of the acquisition.⁵²

In response to the nationalization of the islands, China deployed its military assets, as noted by Morris. He says that after Japan’s purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, “two Chinese ships, Haijian 46 and Haijian 49 of the China Marine Surveillance, penetrated the 12 nautical mile territorial seas of the Senkakus.”⁵³ He states that this marked the beginning of a campaign where Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels intensified their intrusions. He finds that China sent approximately 20 patrol vessels, from 1,000 to 4,000 tons, to Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands based on report of China’s State Oceanic Administration

⁵⁰ Yang Li, “Japan to Shift Defense Focus: Official,” *Global Times*, December 9, 2010, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201012/600328.shtml>.

⁵¹ Hak Bong Cha, “이시하라 도쿄지사 ‘센카쿠(중국명 댜오위다오) 구입 위한 조사船 곧(28 일) 출항’ [Tokyo Governor Ishihara: ‘Survey Ships for Purchase of Senkaku(Known as Diaoyu in China) to Depart Soon(on the 28th)’],” *Chosun Ilbo*, August 24, 2012, https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/08/24/2012082400152.html.

⁵² Lyle J. Morris, “The New ‘Normal’ in the East China Sea,” *The RAND Blog* (blog), February 27, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2017/02/the-new-normal-in-the-east-china-sea.html>.

⁵³ Morris.

(SOA). Through report of Japan Coast Guard (JCG), Morris also finds that unusual increase of the intrusion of the China Coast Guard (CCG) into Senkaku territorial waters.

China Coast Guard (CCG) ships had intruded into Senkaku territorial waters 68 times since September 11, an unprecedented spike in intrusions from previous years. The campaign continued, with 188 vessels penetrating the territorial sea in 2013, 88 in 2014, and 86 in 2015. During this multi-year period, the CCG penetrated the territorial seas of the Senkakus with an average of 7–10 vessels a month and penetrated the contiguous zones with an average of 70–90 vessels a month.⁵⁴

China also expressed its displeasure with Japan for its activities in the air. On December 13, 2012, a Y-12, which belongs to China's SOA, intruded 12 nautical-miles line of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, marking the first such incursion, and similar SOA patrol aircraft breached the territorial airspace of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on 13 separate occasions.⁵⁵

Even apart from the territorial disputes surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China harbored a sense of threat from the United States and Japan. While the United States officially maintained a stance that the issues surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands' territorial disputes should be resolved between China and Japan, it effectively sided with Japan by declaring that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.⁵⁶

In fact, the tension between the United States and China had been growing before the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Fundamentally, the relationship between China and the United States during the 1970s detente era had started with joint responses to the common threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, the U.S. government collaborated with Chinese authorities to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.

⁵⁴ Morris.

⁵⁵ Morris.

⁵⁶ Mark E. Manyin, *The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations*, CRS Report No. R42761 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 2, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42761/>.

While China initially viewed the United States as a similar anti-Soviet partner, it gradually came to perceive the United States as a major threat and adversary. Rush Doshi analyzes how this shift resulted from three traumatic events: the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the Gulf War in 1990–1991, and the Soviet Collapse in 1991.⁵⁷ He points that the watershed was the Tiananmen Square Massacre. According to his book, when Chinese authorities brutally suppressed the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square protests, the United States expressed its strong disapproval and led Western countries, including Europe, in imposing diplomatic sanctions against China. Although George H.W. Bush attempted to convey that the sanctions were due to congressional and international pressure and not a desire to harm relations with China, China came to perceive the United States as an ideological threat.⁵⁸ The swift victory in the Gulf War reminded China of the U.S. military threat. The disappearance of the common enemy, the Soviet Union, brought the U.S. geopolitical threat to the forefront.⁵⁹

Through its White Papers, it is evident that China perceives the United States and Japan as its most significant threats. Since 2010, China has been closely monitoring the United States' revised security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, known as the rebalancing strategy, and expressed concerns about U.S. military activities in the Asian region. In 2015, it specifically addressed concerns regarding U.S. naval activities, and in 2019, it mentioned worries about strategic intervention related to China's sovereignty, security, and interests. Comparisons of China's threat perceptions represented in these White Papers are provided in Table 1.

⁵⁷ Doshi, *The Long Game*.

⁵⁸ Seung Jun Park, “천안문사태 ‘미국의 두 얼굴’ [Tiananmen Square Incident: Two Faces of the U.S.],” *Chosun Ilbo*, December 20, 2007, https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/12/20/2007122000170.html.

⁵⁹ Doshi, *The Long Game*.

Table 1. Security Consideration of China⁶⁰

	2010	2013	2015	2019
United States	Rebalanced security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, expanding its military presence and its potential impact on regional stability	Rebalancing strategy, enhancing military capabilities and potential increased military intervention in the Asia-Pacific region.	U.S. military repositioning and continued naval activities, raising concerns about its military impact on China's security	U.S. strategic intervention in China's sovereignty, security, human rights, and interference in Chinese interests. reinforcement of military capabilities in maritime, air, and cyber domains
Japan	-	Japan's military expansion and strengthening of military capabilities	Changes in Japan's defense policies and military capacity enhancement, posing security threats	Japan's expansion of defense capabilities and militarization policies, potentially impacting international and regional security and stability negatively. Japan's increasing maritime activities.

⁶⁰ Adapted from Ministry of National Defense, *China's National Defense in 2010* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2011), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887922.html>; Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces* (Beijing: Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2013), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887929.html>; The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's Military Strategy* (Beijing: Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2015), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887928.html>; and Ministry of National Defense, *China's National Defense in the New Era* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2019), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/index.html>.

An interesting point to note is that, until 2010, China's defense white papers did not contain direct references to Japan as a threat. However, starting in 2013, Japan has been consistently mentioned, revealing a shift in China's perception of Japan. This change reflects China's concerns about the expansion of Japan's defense capabilities and its militarization policies, thus indicating an evolving threat perception. When considered in connection with the timing of the ADIZ declaration, it implies the possibility that the perception of Japan as a threat influenced the declaration of the ECS ADIZ.

2. The Utility of the Establishment of ADIZ

The historical background and security dilemmas surrounding the ECS grant credibility to the possibility that China declared ECS ADIZ due to security needs. Then, to examine the first hypothesis, this section explains how the background is related to the declaration of ECS ADIZ and the security factor.

It is clear from the Chinese media that the declaration of its ADIZ is directly related to the territorial dispute in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or to countering the Japanese threat. At the same time as the declaration of the ADIZ, China announced the location, purpose and rules of the ADIZ, and published the opinions of military experts in articles through its government-controlled media.⁶¹ The Chinese media focused on publicizing the legitimacy of China's ADIZ until it began reporting on the comments or responses of the relevant countries to the declaration of the ADIZ. On November 23, the very day the ADIZ was declared, an article asked five questions in the form of a question-and-response session by a Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesman, Yang Yujun, one of which does not directly refer to "Japan" but is aimed precisely at Japan.

[Question]How was the domain of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone determined? Why is the zone located as close as 130 kilometers from some countries? [Answer]... The east end of the zone is still closest to China (compared with other countries), from which combat aircraft can reach China's airspace within a short time. It is necessary for China to identify an aircraft from that point to ascertain its purpose and

⁶¹ "Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules"; "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China"; and "Defense Ministry Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Identification Zone Questions," *Global Times*, November 23, 2013, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/827113.shtml>.

attributes, so as to set aside early warning time to adopt measures to protect air defense security. Moreover, a relevant country established its air defense identification zone as early as 1969, which is also about 130 kilometers from the Chinese mainland at its closest distance.⁶²

Several years later, the Chinese media showed that apparently the ECS ADIZ was aimed at Japan. When South China Sea arose as a territorial dispute issue with Philippines, the *Global Times* said, “China established an ADIZ in the East China Sea in late 2013 at the height of tensions with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu Islands.”⁶³

Associated countries reacted with confusion to China’s uncoordinated declaration of an ADIZ, while they were busy reading between the lines rather than accepting China’s explicit explanations. Japan, South Korea, and the United States expressed their intentions that the right to free flight in the ECS ADIZ would not be infringed upon, emphasizing that flights taking place in international airspace, even within the designated ADIZ, should not be affected.

Two days after the declaration of China’s ADIZ, China reported the reactions of the associated countries in the media, but they had different tones for each nation. While the headline for South Korea is “S. Korea to discuss with China over air defense zone,” the article about Japan had the headline “China summons Japanese ambassador over air defense zone accusations.”⁶⁴

In a newspaper report that synthesized the opinions of Chinese experts, differences among Chinese scholars’ perspectives were discernible.⁶⁵ In an interview with South Korean media on November 29, Shi Yin Hong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University, stated, “China will respond differently depending on its relationships

⁶² Xinhua, “Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”

⁶³ Gang Wu, “China Has Right to Set up ADIZ in South China Sea: Official,” *Global Times*, July 13, 2016, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/994040.shtml>.

⁶⁴ “S Korea to Discuss with China over Air Defense Zone,” *China Daily*, November 25, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-11/25/content_17129539.htm; “China Summons Japanese Ambassador over Air Defense Zone Accusations,” *Global Times*, November 25, 2013, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201311/827483.shtml>.

⁶⁵ Sam Ho Shin and Seung Ho Han, “동북아 하늘다툼 중국 전문가 전망 [Experts Views on the East Asian Airspace Dispute],” *Yonhap News*, November 29, 2013, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20131129096900089>.

with countries such as South Korea, the United States, and Japan. There will be no conflict with South Korea due to this issue.”⁶⁶ However, concerning Japan, he mentioned that “Due to the tension that has been escalating since the nationalization of Diaoyu Islands in September last year, the possibility of a military conflict has increased,” acknowledging the relevance of territorial disputes and the establishment of the ADIZ.⁶⁷ Meanwhile the article introduces other statement of Zhang Junshe, Deputy Director of the Naval Research Institute. He stated, “The East China Sea air defense identification zone has no relevance to the tension regarding the Diaoyu Islands. It is a necessary measure to safeguard national sovereignty and security, following international conventions, purely for defensive purposes” in an interview with the Chinese newspaper, People’s Daily.⁶⁸

The Washington Post conveyed the Global Times assertion that Japan was the primary focus of the new zone and implied that the enforcement of the zone would be carried out with selectivity.⁶⁹ The article directly cited “What we should do at present is to firmly counter provocative actions from Japan.”⁷⁰

China’s media is heavily controlled by the government, and Chinese scholars generally provide interviews that align with the Chinese authorities’ positions. However, the discovery of these internal Chinese voices expressing inconsistencies or dissonance is better interpreted as a strategic move to leverage the relationship with the United States and South Korea, rather than arising from differences in China’s internal perceptions regarding the motivation for establishing the ADIZ.

For China, South Korea and the United States presented more room for diplomatic maneuver compared to Japan, which had a clearly anti-China stance. Tailoring different responses to each country offered China an opportunity to decouple Japan from South

⁶⁶ Shin and Han.

⁶⁷ Shin and Han.

⁶⁸ Shin and Han.

⁶⁹ Simon Dener and Chico Harlan, “China Sends Warplanes to New Air Defense Zone after U.S., Japan, S. Korea Incursions,” *Washington Post*, November 28, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japan-south-korea-military-jets-cross-through-china-air-defense-id-zone/2013/11/28/6285d350-5816-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html.

⁷⁰ Dener and Harlan.

Korea and the United States in the Sino-centric framework. China engaged in dialogue with South Korea on the issue of the ADIZ, placing it on the agenda for defense discussions. With the United States, China mentioned the need for a change in behavior but refrained from using strongly hostile rhetoric.

A few days after the announcement of a new ADIZ, Du Wenlong, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, articulated in an interview with People's Daily, China should strategically position both its "eyes and fists" within the ADIZ.⁷¹ His emphasis on a robust stance underscores the belief that China should openly demonstrate its capabilities in the realm of air defense without reservation.

The demand on People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has changed since China observed and reviewed the Gulf War. Xiaoming Zhang analyses the change of the demand on PLAAF since 1990s.⁷² In accordance with Xiaoming's research, in 1993, Jiang Zemin articulated a new strategic goal for the air force, aiming to transition it gradually from primary serving as a homeland air defense force to one with the capability to engage both defensive and offensive operations. Subsequently, in 2004, the PLAAF introduced a fresh strategic vision, highlighting "the development of a long-range strategic air force and the active involvement of integrated air and space (空天一体) operations with information and firepower systems (信息活力一体)," and China's air force capabilities are concentrated on advancements in four key domains.⁷³

- offensive capability to protect national security and national interests from the air and space
- integrated air defensive and anti-missile capability for monitoring both air and space flying objects and attacking them

⁷¹ Shin and Han, "동북아 하늘다툼 중국 전문가 전망 [Experts Views on the East Asian Airspace Dispute]."

⁷² Xiaoming Zhang, "The PLAAF's Evolving Influence within the PLA and upon National Policy," in *The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities*, ed. Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012), 71–92, <https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA572263>.

⁷³ Dai Xu, "Goodbye, Old J-6 Fighters: A Complete Examination a of the Service History of the Last Meritorious Fighter in the Chinese Air Force with Combat Victory Record," *Guoji zhanwang* [World Outlook], no.19 (2005), 21. Cited in Zhang, 91.

- superior capability over its main opponent (presumably Taiwan) and certain counter-information capability against its strategic opponent (presumably the United States)
- strategic airlift capability to conduct both airlift and airdrop operations.⁷⁴

Based on Xiaoming's research, the PLAAF evolved the smaller, but more enhanced force; and due to its emphasis on informatization, corresponding assets have been introduced.⁷⁵ For example, the adoption of Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) is notable, with both the KJ-2000 and KJ-200 aircraft, developed by China based on Russian platforms, being delivered in 2005 and 2006, respectively.

The 2013 white paper provides a more systematic explanation of the role and organization of the Air Force compared to the 2010 white paper. In the 2010 white paper, the Air Force's role was primarily focused on tactical operations, training, and it introduced PLAAF roles in scenarios like capital defense, coastal defense, and airspace security for national events.⁷⁶ In contrast, the 2013 white paper showcases a broader spectrum of activities, including safeguarding territorial air security, maintaining constant combat readiness, conducting scenario-based exercises and drills, ensuring social stability, protecting overseas interests, engaging in international disaster relief and humanitarian aid, and participating in joint exercises and training with foreign armed forces.⁷⁷ This indicates an expanded role for the Air Force within the Chinese military. Also, the 2013 white paper describes how the PLAAF is organized according to its routine air defense tasks, and it divides the organization into three categories: Reconnaissance and early warning units, Command organs, and routine air defense troops.⁷⁸ Additionally, it states that China's air defense system is composed of six sub-systems, including reconnaissance and surveillance,

⁷⁴ Shang Jinsuo, chief ed., *Kongjun jianshe xue* [Science of Air Force Construction] (Beijing: Jiefangjun Press, 2009), 557–558. Cited in Zhang, 79.

⁷⁵ Zhang, "The PLAAF's Evolving Influence."

⁷⁶ Ministry of National Defense, *China's National Defense in 2010*.

⁷⁷ Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*.

⁷⁸ Information Office of the State Council.

command and control, aerial defense, ground air defense, integrated support, and civil air defense.

With these advancements in PLAAF capabilities, it becomes crucial to explore how an ADIZ can be employed in military operations, considering its role in enhancing air defense and surveillance, especially in areas of strategic importance. The following subsections examine such applications in more detail.

a. Air Situation Awareness

Before the establishment of an ECS ADIZ, the only line at which China could require transferred flight information was the boundary of the Shanghai Flight Information Region (FIR). FIRs are allocated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to ensure that they do not overlap with each other, primarily for the purpose of enhancing navigational safety rather than security. FIR control falls under the responsibility of the Area Control Center (ACC), which is one of the state's institutions. In the process of providing air traffic control, the ACCs collaborate with the military to facilitate air traffic control. This collaboration is essential not only for preventing collisions between military and civilian aircraft in order to achieve overall aviation safety.

A wide FIR signifies the need to provide more air traffic services and assumes a broader range of rescue responsibilities, which can result in increased costs from civil aviation perspective. On the other hand, from a security perspective, a vast FIR implies an extended situational awareness and control authority over a wide area that ensures the ability to respond to security threats within a guaranteed timeframe.

The Shanghai FIR boundary is slightly west of the line that divides the ECS in half, based on the vicinity of Shanghai's coastline. Considering the typical speed of commercial aircraft at 350–400 knots, this boundary is within a distance of approximately 220 kilometers from Shanghai, which is less than 20 minutes of flight time.

There are air routes established parallel to the boundaries of the Shanghai FIR, which extend from Korea, Japan, across Taiwan, and are used by numerous aircraft heading to destinations such as Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. This area is approximately 200 km

south of China's northern coastline. However, relying solely on FIR rules, China lacks access to information about flight plans on these routes. Figure 3 shows the designation of FIR boundaries in the East China Sea.




Figure 3. FIR boundary in East Asia⁷⁹

FIRs are established by ICAO, so China cannot change them unilaterally. Instead, an ADIZ offers the advantage of being declarable under domestic law. Through its ECS ADIZ, China aspired to begin collecting and managing flight track information for aircraft entering an area near its land territory but beyond the reach of its internationally recognized FIR. Figure 4 shows the flight routes along the outside of the Shanghai FIR that are covered by China's ECS ADIZ. Of course, China actually acquiring this information depends on other countries' aircraft choosing to accept the ADIZ designation and requirements.

⁷⁹ Source: "ICAO GIS Aeronautical Data," accessed October 20, 2023, <https://gis.icao.int/portal/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=6e63373c892f47aa8d1429b8ca7cbb83>.




Figure 4. Comparison between Shanghai FIR and ECS ADIZ⁸⁰

In case of threats from the air, detecting and responding to them in advance can be critical. In the case of civilian aviation, flight plans are submitted in accordance with ICAO procedures before takeoff. The Fukuoka FIR managed by Japan and the Incheon FIR managed by South Korea are relatively positioned to the west, causing a delay in receiving track information for flights over the ECS from east to west. From China's perspective, there is a possibility of delayed identification of suspicious tracks with potential security threats. However, the declaration of the ADIZ beyond the FIR boundaries allows for quicker tracking and identification, which saves time for necessary actions. This proactive approach helps prevent aircraft-based attacks and maintain military security. In principle,

⁸⁰ Source: FIR and ADIZ boundary lines drawn by author using a map from Skyvector World Hi, <https://skyvector.com/>. The boundary lines are indicative, not precise.

ADIZ establishment allows China to prepare for emergencies and enhance their capacity for rapid responses.

China would have anticipated the possibility of other countries not following China's ADIZ rules. Other countries can indeed choose to ignore the declaration and not follow China's rules, especially when it comes to their national aircraft, both military and public such as police, custom, and national mail service. China's requirements include four elements: flight plans, transponders, radios, and logos. Flight plans are typically submitted before takeoff, often at the departure airport, and even if they are submitted in-flight, the information is relayed to other countries through air traffic control authorities. This means that the discretion for civilian aircraft to choose whether to submit a flight plan is quite limited, and the authorities with air traffic control jurisdiction have the decision-making power regarding the transmission of flight information. Transponders, in the case of civilian aircraft, are typically always turned on, and there is not much room for discretion there either. When it comes to radio communication, all aviation entities monitor the emergency frequencies (e.g., 121.4MHz/243.0MHz). In short, much civilian air traffic already complies with many of China's requirements for other reasons.

If the countries that have aircraft passing through China's ECS ADIZ choose to have civilian aircraft comply with those rules while not adhering with their national aircraft, it can still be beneficial for China's air situation awareness. Threats in the airspace are not solely imposed by national aircraft; non-state actors could pose security threats as well. Treating civilian aviation as a potential security threat justifies gathering information from a more peripheral vantage point. Moreover, rapidly distinguishing between civilian and non-civilian entities can help reduce unnecessary responses.

b. China's National Tracking Capabilities

China can obtain track information and situational awareness through its early warning systems and radars even without establishing an ADIZ. Moreover, some companies provide internet-based real time flight track information service so that enhance air situation awareness. However, by adhering to the rules set forth in China's ADIZ and having aircraft submit flight plans accordingly, a precise and improved level of situational

awareness can be achieved. If Chinese ADIZ rules were disregarded, it would offset the advantages of heightened situational awareness gained through submitted flight plans. Nevertheless, China's military can provide a clear demarcation of surveillance, establishing criteria for air defense identification assets. This can help in defining benchmarks for the proper use of early warning systems and surveillance assets in the ECS.

In 2007, China introduced and deployed the airborne early warning system, KJ-2000.⁸¹ It is stationed within the 26th Special Mission Division of the Eastern Theatre Air Force, covering the East China Sea region.⁸² The rationale for creating the ECS ADIZ dates back to similar period as the deployment of KJ-2000. Shinji Yamaguchi presents evidence that discussions about the ADIZ had taken place before 2013 from senior PLAAF officials. During the 11th National People's Congress in March 2008, Zhu Qingyi, who served as the Air Force Commander of the Lanzhou Military District and represented the People's Liberation Army (PLA), advocated for the strengthening of China's national air defense infrastructure and early warning systems. There were indications that discussions about the ADIZ were taking place around this time. Additionally, during the 60th anniversary of the PLAAF in November 2009, Xu Qiliang, who was the PLAAF Commander at the time, made references to the ADIZ. This suggests a significant link between the establishment of the ADIZ and the introduction of early warning assets.⁸³

Meanwhile, a researcher insists that there might still be limited situational awareness regarding the entire ECS ADIZ.⁸⁴ The study quoted information from the Japanese Ministry of Defense's website, indicating that "Chinese aircraft generally fly only up to the median line of the East China Sea unless they are being escorted by early-warning

⁸¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies, "East Asia and Australasia," *Military Balance* 107, no. 1 (February 2007): 331–84, <https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220601181097>.

⁸² International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 2022," *Military Balance*, 2022, <https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022>.

⁸³ Shinji Yamaguchi, "The Foreign Policy of Xi Jinping's Administration and the Establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone," *National Institute for Defense Studies News*, September 2014, https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2014/briefing_e190.pdf.

⁸⁴ Tetsuo Kotani, "Reviewing the First Year of China's ADIZ: A Japanese Perspective," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, November 25, 2014, <https://amti.csis.org/reviewing-the-first-year-of-chinas-adiz-a-japanese-perspective/>.

aircraft.”⁸⁵ The research analyzes the flight pattern was seen as a reflection of the limitations of Chinese coastal radar coverage. While China’s radar could detect high-flying Japanese aircraft such as OP-3 or YS-11EB, it might not be able to detect lower-flying Japanese aircraft like P-3C.

In September 2014, China entered into a contract to acquire the S-400 air defense missile system from Russia, consisting of two regiments. The range of the S-400 system covers almost all areas within its range, except for the eastern end of the ECS. However, in 2022, China still appeared to possess four KJ-2000, the airborne early warning aircraft, same as 2014 inventory.⁸⁶ This suggests that the level of situational awareness in the East China Sea’s airspace may not have undergone significant changes after setting the ECS ADIZ.

In the Jeppesen Airway Manual that contains procedures consulted by civilian aviation pilots, there are no provisions for specific requirements, including radio frequency communication and position reporting, when crossing the boundaries of China’s ECS ADIZ. Instead, the procedures followed are the same as those in area without an ADIZ, involving radio frequency changes and position reporting to Chinese air traffic control authorities at the FIR boundaries.⁸⁷

This evidence suggests that China may not have established the ADIZ for the purpose of improving its situational awareness. Instead, it indicates that the ADIZ may have been declared as a result of having already achieved a certain level of situational awareness. Therefore, China’s declaration of an ADIZ in the South China Sea could potentially have taken place after the ground-based air surveillance radar equipment that can cover whole South China Sea or several AEW&C assets was already introduced.

ADIZ establishment can clearly define what activities are allowed and prohibited in that area. This allows for efficient allocation of military resources and sets a standard for

⁸⁵ Kotani.

⁸⁶ International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Military Balance 2022,” 2022, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003294566>.

⁸⁷ Jeppesen, *Jeppesen Airway Manual: Eastern Europe* (Wilsonville, OR: Jeppesen, 2023).

asset deployment in air defense identification. It is challenging to determine whether the decision to introduce air defense systems prompted the establishment of the ADIZ or if the ADIZ setup led to the introduction of defense systems. However, a clear correlation was found between the demarcation lines and military capability buildup. This is a clear indication that security considerations were a primary factor in China's ADIZ declaration, in support of Hypothesis #1.

c. Training and Exercise Area

An ADIZ facilitates military occupation and dominance of public airspace within its boundaries, potentially providing an advantage over other nations. For example, South Korea's Military Operation Area (MOA), Taiwan's Military Training Area (MTA) and Japan's MTA are located in each country's ADIZ. Ensuring certain area for military training can lead to the improvement of military training and operational capabilities. Simulating and evaluating military operations through ADIZ can lead to improved military capabilities and enhanced readiness for real-life situations.

China's ECS ADIZ overlaps the declared ADIZ areas of all three countries (see Figure 1 in Chapter I). In particular, China's ADIZ overlaps Taiwan's MTA, northeast of Taiwan, and Japan's MTA, northwest of Okinawa. Figure 5 depicts these overlaps.




Figure 5. MTA of Taiwan and Japan in ECS ADIZ⁸⁸

In general, it is clear China has used its ECS ADIZ as a military exercise field, although it is not obvious whether the PLA utilizes or designates some part of its ADIZ as a military training/exercise zone like its neighbors' MOA or MTA.⁸⁹ China and Russia undertook their first Joint Sea exercise in 2012 in the Yellow Sea, located between Korea and China. Joint Sea 2014 was executed at the ECS on May 20–26; Joint Sea 2015's location was East Sea/Sea of Japan, which is between Korea and Japan.⁹⁰

d. Justification for intrusions of other countries' ADIZ

If other countries simply ignore the rule of China's ADIZ, how is the ADIZ declaration beneficial for its military? One answer is that if neighboring countries react

⁸⁸ Source: FIR and ADIZ boundary lines drawn by author using a map from Skyvector World Hi, <https://skyvector.com/>. The boundary lines are indicative, not precise.

⁸⁹ Jeong Won Sa, “기껏 넓혀 놓고 제대로 지키지도 못해? [For All That Expansion of the ADIZ, Still Unable to Guard It Properly?],” KBS News, October 16, 2014, <https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=2949430>.

⁹⁰ Ethan Meick, *China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017).

against China's ADIZ and do not comply with the rules China has claimed, China can use its ADIZ establishment as a justification for penetrating other countries' ADIZ. This can coerce information collection, preparedness assessment, and resource consumption.

The number of intrusions into neighbor countries' ADIZ by China has increased. China has been sensitive to the political and military movements of its neighboring countries by intruding neighbor countries' ADIZ. For example, China's intrusions have occurred at useful times, such as during combined exercise between Korea and the United States, U.S. aircraft carrier deployments in response to North Korea's nuclear development, visits by the U.S. president to allied countries, visit to Taiwan by U.S. politicians, and trilateral military exercises involving the South Korea, the United States and Japan. China has consistently claimed that these intrusions are routine and planned exercises, unrelated to a series of events. Recently, as a threat to Taiwan, China has made large-scale incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ.

One researcher shows how China intruded since they established its ADIZ. In accordance with Trent's study, since 2013, China has made more than 4,400 breaches into the ADIZs of neighboring countries.⁹¹ Trent adds that "often, Chinese forces violate multiple countries' ADIZs on their flights, flying routes that consecutively transgress South Korea's and Japan's ADIZs or Taiwan's and Japan's."⁹² While each of these countries has individually handled the matter by scrambling fighter jets, engaging in discussions "with China in bilateral meetings, and publicizing some information about the intrusions," it has now evolved into a regional issue that affects all three nations.⁹³

China has utilized the ADIZs of other countries as locations for joint military exercises with Russia. The Joint Sea exercises have been conducted in various maritime locations reaching into other countries' ADIZ, including Joint Sea 2014 in the ECS and

⁹¹ Mercedes Trent, *Over the Line: The Implications of China's ADIZ Intrusions in Northeast Asia* (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2020), 6, <https://fas.tghp.co.uk/publication/adiz-report/>.

⁹² Trent, 6.

⁹³ Trent, 6.

Joint Sea 2015 in the East Sea/Sea of Japan.⁹⁴ Moreover, on July 23, 2019, China and Russia conducted their inaugural joint aerial training exercise, followed by the second exercise on December 22, 2020. During the second Sino-Russian joint aerial training exercise, Russia deployed 15 aircraft, including Tu-95MS strategic bombers, A-500 AEW&C aircraft, and Su-35 fighter jets, while China contributed four H-6K strategic bombers. These joint exercises, typically held towards the end of each year, serve the purpose of evaluating military operations and addressing tactical concerns through training and education.⁹⁵

As noted earlier, territorial disputes with Japan appeared to be a triggering point for China's ECS ADIZ declaration. Japan was the de facto occupant of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and had military responses to intrusions into their airspace. From Japan's perspective, China's aerial patrols over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands represent an unavoidable provocation.

Forcing the adversary to respond has several advantages. Firstly, it allows obtaining information about Japan's response mechanisms through a kind of experiment. Secondly, it can consume Japan's resources in its responses. Lastly, it has a psychological effect on the opponent, creating a pattern of daily provocations or inducing fatigue from maintaining a state of readiness.

B. CONCLUSION

China's hostile sentiments towards Japan have been historically rooted, and China's rapid growth, both militarily and economically, signaled the need for Japan to respond. In this way, China and Japan have considered each other as potential threats. The United States and China were adversaries, having experienced conflicts during the Cold War. While there were brief periods of detente, they later regarded each other as a

⁹⁴ Richard Weitz, *Assessing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises: Past Progress and Future Trends* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021), 8, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-chinese-russian-military-exercises-past-progress-and-future-trends>.

⁹⁵ Korea Military Research Institute, “『제2차 중·러 연합공중 훈련』 실시와 함의 [Implementation and Implications of the ‘2nd China-Russia Joint Air Training’],” *World Military News* (2020 and beyond), January 4, 2021, <https://post.naver.com/viewer/postView.nhn?volumeNo=30388568&memberNo=7092534&vType=VERTICAL>.

champion and a challenger in the realm of great power competition, viewing one another as a competitor and a threat.

The ECS is of significant political interest to China as it lies adjacent to Taiwan, one of China's major political concerns. Furthermore, it houses the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are a source of territorial contention between China and Japan. Geopolitically, the ECS, along with the South China Sea, is where the influence of China and the United States intersects.

China initially pursued a diplomatic strategy with Japan and postponed addressing territorial conflicts through its open-door policy. However, starting in the 2000s, China shifted towards a more proactive approach. Particularly, the 2010 collision incident and Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012 were pivotal events in this regard.

The establishment of the ECS ADIZ in 2013 can be seen as an extension of this background with military utility as a possible motive. Firstly, it may have been set up to enhance air defense capabilities and facilitate the deployment of defensive weaponry. The actual placement of early warning systems and surface-to-air missiles by China is associated with the ECS ADIZ. Nevertheless, when comparing the timing of military deployments with the declaration of the ADIZ, it is apparent that the ADIZ was announced after the decision or establishment of a certain level of defensive military capabilities. Military exercises by China's armed forces in the ECS after the declaration of the ADIZ not only advanced China's military capabilities, but also sought to hinder or deplete the resources of the United States and Japan, who conducted training activities in the international waters. However, due to the limitations of this study, which could not access data on the extent of China's military activities in the ECS prior to the ADIZ declaration, the research has not conclusively established a direct link between China's military exercises in the ECS and the declaration of the ADIZ.

Secondly, it is plausible that the ECS ADIZ was declared with the objective of using military force in an offensive manner. In this scenario, the use of the term "air defense" may create a deceptive impression of a defensive stance. Starting in the 1990s,

China began to demand offensive capabilities from its air force, which was emphasized more in the 2013 Defense White Paper than the 2010 edition. Despite the non-compliance with China's rules regarding the ADIZ by countries such as South Korea, Japan, and the United States after the declaration, China focused not on executing defensive emergency measures in the ECS ADIZ but rather on entering the airspace of the surrounding countries.

In summary, this chapter concludes that a security motive was one of the reasons behind the establishment of the ECS ADIZ. From the perspective of military utility, it suggests that the ADIZ was established with the goal of employing offensive military force rather than for defensive purposes.

III. OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR CHINA'S ADIZ DECLARATION

This chapter aims to evaluate the two other presented hypotheses regarding China's motivations for establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea (ECS). As in the prior chapter, the exploration unfolds systematically, addressing key aspects related to the genesis and implications of China's actions within ECS.

First, the chapter examines Hypothesis 2, proposing that the declaration of the ECS ADIZ is an endeavor by China to assert normative justification over maritime rights, particularly in light of its sovereignty claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The assertion of legal rights and engagement with international legal mechanisms will be critically evaluated to assess their alignment with China's actions and intentions regarding the ADIZ.

Then, the chapter directs attention towards Hypothesis 3, suggesting that the declaration of the ECS ADIZ was driven by nationalist sentiments to garner domestic support among Chinese citizens. By examining China's domestic political landscape and the impact of nationalist sentiments, this section aims to evaluate the extent to which the announcement of the ADIZ successfully fostered a sense of national pride and unity among the Chinese population, as posited by the hypothesis.

A. HYPOTHESIS 2: NORM ASPECT

With China's international presence and the expansion of its influence, China's normative actions and legal claims have received greater attention from the international community. Since 2000s, there has been significant attention given to the question of whether China would become a status quo disruptor or a revisionist power attempting to overthrow the existing order, or if it would emerge peacefully in harmony with the world order, as they claimed.

Did China seek to be recognized as a country that acts in accordance with international norms through the declaration of the ADIZ? Were they attempting a subtle alteration of norms? It is not surprising that the question arisen about whether China's

declaration of an ADIZ in the ECS in 2013 was motivated by a desire for its norms to be recognized by the international community.

To examine their intention, this section starts by looking at how the maritime and aviation order was formed and converged. As a result, there have been international agreements, tacit agreements, domestic law and regulations, and international law. Is China's move to establish an ECS ADIZ an effort to actively use these agreements and norms as a tool? This section assesses the usefulness of China's ADIZ declaration as a legal instrument by evaluating the validity and flaws in their arguments. Also, this will be examined in the context of the concept of Legal Warfare, one of the components of the China's Three Warfare Strategy.

1. Order in the Air of East Asia

In terms of air order, there are two major norms that represent respective civil and military operations. The Chicago Convention ensures exclusive rights in territorial airspace and freedom in international airspace, while ADIZ is a customary practice that allows for the free military activities in international airspace to safeguard exclusive rights in territorial airspace.

According to the background leading to the establishment of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, since the successful flight of aircraft in 1903, aviation and aviation technology advanced significantly through the course of World War I, creating a need for international legal regulation due to the rapid development in aviation. The 1919 Paris Convention, in which 32 countries participated, acknowledged national sovereignty over their respective national airspace and established the principle of innocent passage for nonscheduled flights. It is considered a cornerstone of international aviation law. In 1944, at the initiative of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a conference was held in Chicago with the participation of Allied and neutral nations during World War II, excluding the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia due to the inclusion of neutral countries like

Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. During this conference, the Chicago Convention was adopted, leading to the birth of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).⁹⁶

Following Vanhullebusch and Wei, who research the relations between national security and the law of air, the Chicago Convention was basically the regulation about civil aviation, but grants clear criteria of the states' airspace and suggests some regulation on state aircraft.⁹⁷ Firstly, it justified the complete jurisdictional authority over each country's territorial airspace and internal waters. Even state aircraft are not an object of the Chicago Convention; state aircraft must seek permission from a nation to operate within its sovereign airspace. Secondly, there is no comparable provision for the unrestricted movement of aircraft akin to the right of innocent passage. Consequently, foreign aircraft are limited to seeking authorization for landing at specified entry airports, adhering to designated air corridors, and are required to furnish their flight details to the host nation through the submission of a flight plan.

ICAO, established through the Chicago Convention, designates Flight Information Regions (FIRs) to divide the entire world map into distinct and non-overlapping regions. This is done to ensure that safe navigation is controlled by a single set of instructions. For instance, in situations where aircraft on the same route heading toward each other are flying at the same altitude, instructing them to maintain different altitudes is crucial to prevent a collision. This can be safely coordinated by a single control authority. While ICAO grants an Area Control Center (ACC) the authority to control aircraft within an FIR, it is more about assigning responsibility for safe navigation. ICAO has not given ACCs the right to force landings or shoot down aircraft that do not comply with their control.

There is no international law that regulates or allows setting of military zone such as ADIZ. The concept of ADIZ is defined as a "special designated airspace of defined dimensions within which aircraft are required to comply with special identification and/or

⁹⁶ Maeng Sun Kim, "국제민간항공기구가 한국의 민간항공발달과정에 미친 역할[A Study on the Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization for the Development of Civil Aviation in Korea]," *The Journal of Aerospace Industry*, no. 2 (2003): 103–26, <https://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE02068931>.

⁹⁷ Vanhullebusch and Shen, "China's Air Defence Identification Zone."

reporting procedures additional to those related to the provision of air traffic services” by the Convention on International Civil Aviation.⁹⁸ But ADIZs are declared on a basis of domestic norms and policies. ADIZs set beyond the territorial airspace are often observed because of the aviation’s feature of speed. ADIZ has basically a defense purpose, so it is necessary to identify aircraft as early as its defense forces can be guaranteed execution. There is no international agreement on how large an ADIZ should be set. South Korea’s ADIZ includes part of North Korean territory, and Taiwan’s ADIZ encompasses parts of mainland China. This is not the result of negotiations with North Korea or mainland China.

While the use of the sea has a longer history compared to the use of the skies, there have been more recent international agreements governing its use. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) emerged as a result of the third United Nations conference on the law of the sea and was adopted in 1982. UNCLOS serves as a comprehensive maritime charter, encompassing various aspects of the oceans, including territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, pollution, deep seabed mining, as well as matters related to marine environment, marine scientific research, technology transfer, and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Notably, UNCLOS expanded the territorial sea width from the previous 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles and established the concept of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Specifically, it stipulates that the territorial sea extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline or low-water line along the coast. In the territorial sea, innocent passage is allowed, but the threat or use of force is not permitted. The contiguous zone, extending 24 nautical miles from the baseline, acknowledges the coastal state’s rights for the prevention of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations violations. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline and recognizes sovereign rights for the exploration, development, conservation, and management of natural resources, as well as sovereign rights for economic activities related to development and exploration. However, in the EEZ, the freedom of navigation,

⁹⁸ Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter Chicago Convention), annex 15 Dec 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15UNTS 295. Cited in Vanhullebusch and Shen.

overflight, the freedom of cables, pipelines, and the freedom of laying and servicing of cables, ship, and aircraft, and the freedom of constructing artificial islands are all ensured.⁹⁹

International law and conventions also provide allowances and limitations for maritime military use. The right of innocent passage is one of the crucial principles concerning military activities at sea. This right signifies the freedom of ships from one country to pass through the territorial waters of another without infringing upon that country's sovereignty. This passage must be for peaceful purposes, and it does not include the use of force or any threatening actions.

According to a study, the interpretations of military activities in the EEZs of the United States and China differ.¹⁰⁰ The United States defines EEZs and contiguous zones as international waters, asserting the freedom of military activities in international waters. It distinguishes military information gathering and hydrographic surveying from oceanographic research. In contrast, China criticizes oceanographic research and hydrographic surveying as attempts by major maritime powers to deliberately avoid the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction. It argues that in practice, distinguishing between the two is difficult. Since information collected in the EEZ could be used for military purposes, this is seen as conflicting with the sovereign rights or jurisdictional intentions that coastal states can exercise in their EEZs.

Contrary to their previous stance, China has used the U.S. EEZ. According to a report, the U.S. Department of Defense criticized China's double standards.¹⁰¹

The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations

⁹⁹ "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," United Nations Oceans & Law of the Sea, accessed November 28, 2023, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm.

¹⁰⁰ Min Hyo Lee, "EEZ에서의 군사활동 제한 원칙에 관한 소고 [Principles of Restricting Military Activities in EEZ: Focusing on the 'Peaceful Use of the Oceans']," *Korea Maritime Security Forum* 34 (October 31, 2018), http://komsf.or.kr/bbs/board.php?bo_table=m45&wr_id=64.

¹⁰¹ Ronald O'Rourke, *U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. R42784 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R42784>.

Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, the PLA has begun conducting the same types of military activities inside and outside the First Island Chain in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States. This activity highlights China's double standard in the application of its interpretation of international law. Examples include sending intelligence collecting ships to collect [information] on military exercises such as the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii in 2014 and 2018, [the] TALISMAN SABER [exercise] off Australia in 2017, 2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021. PRC survey ships are also extremely active in the South China Sea and they frequently operate in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.¹⁰²

The rules regarding innocent passage in the sky are stricter than those at sea. In the realm of airspace, the rules do not recognize innocent passage for both civil and state aircraft, especially within a country's territorial airspace. However, even beyond territorial airspace, such as in ADIZs, the airspace is considered international, and the freedom of overflight is acknowledged.

According to international law governing maritime and airspace, an area extending 12 nautical miles from the baseline is recognized as a country's territory, and the overlying airspace is considered its national sovereign airspace. According to UNCLOS, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands qualify as islands that can have territorial waters and airspace. The question of which country's territory the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands belong to is directly related to determining which country's airspace it is. However, even if there is not a clear answer to which country's territory the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands belong to, the current FIRs and ADIZs can exist, technically.

2. China's Domestic Legal Basis

On November 23, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of China issued a statement to announce a new ADIZ of China.

The government of the People's Republic of China announces the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in

¹⁰² Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2022*, 18 (emphasis as in original); Christopher Woody, "This New Defense Department Map Shows How China Says One Thing and Does Another with Its Military Operations at Sea," *Business Insider*, August 17, 2018, Quoted in O'Rourke, 41.

accordance with the Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense (March 14, 1997), the Law of the People's Republic of China on Civil Aviation (October 30, 1995) and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People's Republic of China (July 27, 2001). The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed by China's outer limit of the territorial sea and the following six points: 33°11'N (North Latitude) and 121°47'E (East Longitude), 33°11'N and 125°00'E, 31°00'N and 128°20'E, 25°38'N and 125°00'E, 24°45'N and 123°00'E, 26°44'N and 120°58'E.¹⁰³

The establishment of the ECS ADIZ by the China was grounded in three legal decrees. The issued statement seemed that the ECS ADIZ has proper legal basis, but Ching Chang, who is a Taiwan's researcher with military experience as a Navy officer, concluded in his research that "the construction of such a legal causation relationship between codes and the established ADIZ has failed. Furthermore, judging from the editions of these legal decrees and their jurisdictions, it is in essence full of errors to an unbelievable degree."¹⁰⁴ Through examining coverage of the three China's domestic laws, he could find that the three laws did not have any proper term that indicate or imply ADIZ.

In their 2007 paper titled "Legal Analysis of the Establishment of Air Defense Identification Zones," Guo Weiping and Shi Wen argued that China not only should establish an ADIZ in the ECS, but also in the vicinity of Taiwan. Their rationale for this proposal was based on the need to strengthen China's national defense and to draw lessons from the April 1, 2001 collision incident between U.S. and Chinese aircraft near Hainan Island. They emphasized the importance of securing effective deterrence against provocative actions by other countries in the airspace over China's relevant jurisdictional areas.¹⁰⁵

China has emphasized its sovereign rights and claimed that its actions do not undermine international law and the international order. While related countries have raised concerns about the declaration of the ADIZ itself, China dismisses criticisms of its

¹⁰³ Xinhua, "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China."

¹⁰⁴ Ching, "The Legal Basis."

¹⁰⁵ C.C. Shin, "The regional security implications for declaration of CADIZ," KIMS Strategy 21, no. 17 (May 2014): 163–166, Dong Soo Kim, Mang Seok Jung, and Sung Pyo Hong, "중국의 해양전략과 연계한 중국방공식별구역(CADIZ) 운영 분석과 우리의 대응방안 [Analysis of the Operation of China Air Defense Identification Zone(CADIZ) Corresponding to the PRC's Maritime Strategy and the ROK]," *Aerospace Engineering Review* 11, no. no.2 (2017): 35–42, <https://doi.org/10.20910/JASE.2017.11.2.35..>

rules. In other words, it does not engage in discussions about how its order differs from the international order. It presents its assertions but does not participate in debates. China also does not clarify what the term “defensive emergency measure,” which many people have been concerned about, actually entails.

While their assertion of sovereign rights is clear in tone, it lacks specific substantiation. The rules within their ADIZ may give the impression of being a reasonable means of defense to those who are not well-versed in the order in the air or sea. Defensive emergency measures that are not precisely articulated in response to exact requirements can make the recipients uneasy and lead them to comply with the demands.

3. Application of Lawfare on ADIZ establishment

The most beloved strategist among the Chinese might be Sun Tzu, who is often compared to the Prussian General Clausewitz, who is renowned for his masterpiece, on war. While Clausewitz emphasized victory through decisive battles, Sun Tzu considered the ultimate victory to be achieving success without fighting. Such a victory was well-deserved in China. Confucius mentioned about politics, “Having a bountiful harvest, having ample military provisions, and gaining the trust of the people,” and he said that if one of these had to be discarded, it would be the military.¹⁰⁶ China had been an agrarian society with intensive labor practices. As every citizen was essentially part of the reserve army, engaging in warfare would severely disrupt productivity that directly relate to survival. Thus, it was believed that preserving the foundation of citizens’ lives without engaging in war was a sign of a righteous ruler in the region. The prevention of war became an essential state function.

China’s Three Warfares Strategy represents a modern solution inspired by Sun Tzu’s principles of winning without battle. The concept of Three Warfares was officially formalized by the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2003 through the Political Work

¹⁰⁶ 公子[Confucius]. 김형찬 역[translated by Kim, Hyungchan]. 1999. 論語[Analects of Confucius]. 서울: 홍익출판사[Seoul: Hong-ik Publishing Company], quoted in Chang Hee Park, “중국의 유교적 전략문화: 공자-맹자 사상을 중심으로[China’s Confucian Strategic Culture],” *Korea Research Center of Ethnology* 63 (2015): 36–57.

Regulations.¹⁰⁷ “The ‘Three Warfares’ (*san zhong zhanfa* or *san zhan*) concept is a dynamic, nuanced strategic approach to influence operations consisting of three interrelated elements: (1) media warfare (*yulun zhan*); (2) psychological warfare (*xinli zhan*); and (3) legal warfare (*falü zhan*). The purpose of the ‘Three Warfares’ is to establish ‘discursive power’ (*huayu quan*) over an adversary – the power to control perceptions and shape narratives that serve Chinese interests, while undermining those of an opponent.”¹⁰⁸

Among these, Legal Warfare refers to proactive actions taken by China to establish domestic political legitimacy and diplomatic legitimacy externally for its current or potential military activities, utilizing various laws and norms. This enables the norms themselves to be used as a kind of weapon in situations of dispute or confrontation between parties. By providing legal grounds for the conduct of psychological warfare and public opinion warfare, it can enhance credibility both domestically and internationally.¹⁰⁹

A report points out that China uses lawfare as mean of deterrence.¹¹⁰ It cites the Science of Military Strategy, the PLA Academy of Military Science text, written in 2000, that “war is not only a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy, and law.”¹¹¹ It reports Chinese military strategists have become more focused on using international law as a means to discourage potential opponents before any military confrontation. Additionally, it highlights that China is

¹⁰⁷ Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049 *Institute*, October 14, 2013, 15, https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf, quoted in Doug Livermore, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ In Theory and Practice in the South China Sea,” *Georgetown Security Studies Review Forum* (blog), March 25, 2018, <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/03/25/chinas-three-warfares-in-theory-and-practice-in-the-south-china-sea/>.

¹⁰⁸ Edwin S. Cochran, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’: People’s Liberation Army Influence Operations,” *International Bulletin of Political Psychology* 20, no. 3 (2020): 1–24, <https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol20/iss3/1>.

¹⁰⁹ Na Ri Pyo, “중국의 회색지대 전략과 3 전의 전개: 한국에 대한 함의 China’s Gray Zone Strategy and the Deployment of Three Warfares: Implications for Korea],” *Korea Institute for National Unification*, KINU Policy Research Series, no. 10 (2022): 1–58, <https://papersearch.net/thesis/article.asp?key=4002725>.

¹¹⁰ Department of Defense, *Military Power of the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007).

¹¹¹ Department of Defense.

striving to influence global perceptions by promoting a skewed interpretation of the UNCLOS; this involves shifting scholarly views and national stances away from established norms of unhindered maritime passage towards interpretations that grant greater sovereign control over the 200 nautical mile EEZ, the airspace above it, and even outer space. Therefore, China's declaration of its ESC ADIZ could be considered an instance of Legal Warfare.

China asserts that its new ADIZ does not disturb freedom of flight because the ADIZ is not a "no-fly zone." In other words, from China's perspective, even if there is control over that space, as long as flight is possible in that space, it implies the guarantee of freedom of flight. This approach cleverly transforms the right to freely navigate into an infringement, portraying China as a law-abiding nation while characterizing any other party that does not accept ADIZ regulations as a lawbreaker.

China would have anticipated the reactions of neighboring countries, including the United States. China would have prepared for a scenario in which initially, there might have been strong opposition, but eventually there would be a change in the situation without significant backlash due to the U.S. intention to avoid confrontation. In fact, four days after the declaration of a new ADIZ, a U.S. B-52 was sent to the zone without fulfilling the new ADIZ's stipulations. Vice President Biden visited East Asia and revealed his opinion that preparations should be made to live with the Chinese ADIZ until China withdraws its demand.¹¹² The United States did not acknowledge the ECS ADIZ, nor did it demand its withdrawal. Chuck Hagel also said, "It is not that the ADIZ itself is new or unique."¹¹³ Even the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that "specifically refers to the 'Regulations Regarding Flight Plan Submission in the East China Sea ... ADIZ of People's Republic of China' and instructs U.S. carriers

¹¹² Daniel Byman, "The Foreign Policy Essay: Oriana Skylar Mastro on 'China's ADIZ – A Successful Test of U.S. Resolve?,'" *Lawfare*, December 15, 2013, <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/foreign-policy-essay-oriانا-skylar-mastro-chinas-adiz—successful-test-us-resolve>.

¹¹³ Dan Lamothe and Yochi Dreazen, "Team Obama Changes Course, Appears to Accept China Air Defense Zone," *Foreign Policy*, December 5, 2013, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/05/team-obama-changes-course-appears-to-accept-china-air-defense-zone/>.

to submit the required flight plans to the ‘Air Traffic Control Department of CAAC [Civil Aviation Administration of China].’”¹¹⁴

China gained flexibility to generate tension and escalation with neighboring countries by allowing passage through the ADIZ but proclaiming the right of executing “defensive emergency measures” they may take if the requirements are not met. As a result, the responsibility for peace shifted from China to the other countries who want to use that area, such as Japan and the United States.

China could also benefit in a different way. By reinforcing U.S. claims to freedom of military activities in or over the international waters, ironically, China gains some benefit. More specifically, even if China were to conduct overt military activities in the seas or airspace adjacent to other countries, if the place is international water, it would not be criticized for it. The Global Times argued that “we can call it dealing with the U.S. using its own methods. If the U.S. doesn’t observe the ADIZ rules it took the time to establish and pay due respect to China’s ADIZ, China’s future air presence in the globe will find more legitimate and moral standing.”¹¹⁵

When China sent an uninvited ship to the sea near the RIMPAC exercises in 2014, the U.S. reacted by saying China acted according to U.S. rules, and had to pretend it was fine. Now, China boldly uses the seas between U.S. allies, South Korea and Japan, as a combined exercise ground for China and Russia. This may unsettle South Korea and Japan, but it is an action following the same norms the U.S. does. China can project its military power anywhere in or over the international waters “to protect their interests abroad” as stated in China’s 2019 defense white paper “under the U.S. norm.”¹¹⁶

Overall, within the framework of Lawfare, China has laid the groundwork for employing a nuanced dual standard, applying different norms in different contexts to fulfill

¹¹⁴ Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “The Bull in the China Shop: Raising Tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” *International Law Studies* 90, no. 1 (2014): 77, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol90/iss1/9>.

¹¹⁵ Xie, “China’s ADIZ Is for More than Just Diaoyu Sovereignty.”

¹¹⁶ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, *China’s National Defense in the New Era* (Beijing: Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2019), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/index.html>.

its national interests. On the one hand, China's ADIZ has created a pretext to shift tension to other countries in the context of territorial disputes. On the other hand, when projecting its own military power into nearby seas, China can utilize the U.S.-supported norm of freedom of navigation.

4. Conclusion

Is China's declaration of an ADIZ aimed at becoming a nation that exerts influence in the international norms arena? Does it want to be a nation that complies with international norms, or does it seek to undermine existing norms and establish new ones by force? This section's evaluation of the second hypothesis concludes that China intended to satisfy both of these goals.

China's ADIZ is "seemingly but not (似而非)," which is a common deception tactic. It refers to a situation where something may initially appear similar to something else, but, in reality, is different or has a distinct identity.

There are still unresolved disputes in the ECS. South Korea and China initiated EEZ boundary negotiations in 1996 and experienced disagreements regarding Ieodo, a submerged reef where no territorial disputes are involved. China and Japan postponed the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue. China and Japan did not address the issue of territorial boundary during discussions related to the 1997 fisheries agreement and the 2008 joint development of gas fields in the ECS. In addition, China and Japan have not finalized the boundaries of their respective EEZs. Territorial and maritime factors do not necessarily dictate sovereignty over airspace. Contiguous zones recognize the jurisdiction of coastal states but do not inherently imply territorial control. EEZs are explicitly not territorial waters.

In this situation, China's ECS ADIZ closely resembles China's asserted EEZ boundaries. While not entirely identical, the ADIZ is set slightly wider. Even if the ECS ADIZ includes a region with territorial disputes involving Japan, its location and size do not appear to significantly deviate from international practices. This is consistent with similar cases of other countries' ADIZ locations and dimensions. Therefore, the

explanation that the establishment of the ADIZ is an exercise of China's unique authority for its national security may seem convincing. However, the rules presented for the ECS ADIZ are in line with exercising the rights in airspace over territorial and internal waters, as discussed earlier. Despite having similar flight information requirements as FIRs, the adoption of 'defensive emergency measures' is not invoked in case these requirements are not met.

States were well aware of these aspects, which is why China's declaration of an ADIZ raised suspicions. China publicly criticized these suspicions and voiced their own concerns. They even allowed military aircraft to fly in the area.

Regardless of the government's judgment on the legality of their demands regarding the ADIZ, civilian airlines have chosen to abide by their rules. From the perspective of civilian aviation, complying with it did not incur additional costs or significant inconvenience. The routes passing through the ECS ADIZ mainly involve aircraft traveling between Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Following China's required ADIZ flight procedures did not pose a significant burden on airlines. In practice, it did not change much for them.

China's norm-changing, though it may seem within the norms, seems likely to have been a motivation behind the declaration of the ADIZ. China can argue the legitimacy of its ADIZ declaration but maintain an appearance of a lawful state by not providing specific responses to criticisms of China's ADIZ. By employing a "similar but different" strategy, they are gradually challenging existing norms.

B. HYPOTHESIS 3: DOMESTIC POLITICS

In this section, I will examine two aspects of domestic politics, with a particular focus on the fact that it is the early stage of regime formation. The first is the motivation related to the elite group that decides the policy, and the second is the motivation related to Chinese nationalism.

1. Elite Group Aspect

The declaration of an ADIZ falls within the realm of national security, and enforcing it involves both military and diplomatic actions. The decision to declare an ADIZ likely involves discussions within elite groups, ultimately requiring the decisive approval of China's top leadership. Who supported the declaration of the ADIZ, and why did Xi Jinping endorse it?

The deep involvement of China's top leadership and elite groups in the ADIZ issue is inferred from the timing of the ADIZ declaration. Just a few days before the declaration of the ECS ADIZ, on November 9, 2013, the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held its 3rd plenary session. The Third Plenum is a significant and widely observed meeting that sets major directions in China's policy. The Chinese Communist Party's 3rd Plenary Session is typically regarded as the most important conference held within a five-year period that includes 6 to 7 such sessions. These 3rd Plenary Sessions traditionally occur in the autumn (October to November) of the year following the inauguration of a new term for the Communist Party regime, and they outline a new governing ideology for the upcoming term based on the policy results of the previous year.¹¹⁷

China underwent a leadership transition from 2012, and the timing of the ADIZ declaration coincided with the early stages of Xi Jinping's tenure. Until the constitutional amendment in 2018 removed term limits, the position of the state presidency was limited to two terms. In 2012, Xi Jinping assumed the role of General Secretary, highlighting the importance of having his trusted associates in key positions during the early stages of his leadership.

Despite China being governed by the Communist Party, internal political factions necessitate control to manage political rivalries. Transitioning from Hu Jintao's era to Xi Jinping's, addressing the political rifts and conflicts that emerged and solidifying Xi's

¹¹⁷ Hun Kyu Choi, "[18기 3중전회] 中 개혁의 '기수' 3중전회 어떤 회의인가 [What Kind of Meeting Is the Third Plenum?]," *Newspim*, November 5, 2013, <https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20131105000382>.

leadership at a time of power transition was of paramount importance in China's domestic politics. While China and the Chinese Communist Party are often seen as nearly synonymous, factions do exist within the Party. The major Party factions include the Princelings, Communist Youth League Clique, and the Shanghai Clique.¹¹⁸ The Princelings are a group of senior Party officials, numbering approximately 4,000, with key figures like Xi Jinping, the son of Xi Zhongxun, and others from influential revolutionary families. The Communist Youth League is the Party's youth organization, founded in August 1920 in Shanghai, and it saw its membership grow to around 8,000,000 young people aged 14 to 28 in 2012. Under Hu Jintao's leadership, this organization gained significant influence and played a crucial role within the Party.

A study indicates changes in factions after Xi Jinping came to power. Xi strengthened his position through anti-corruption campaigns, leading to shifts in power dynamics among factions as key figures in the Shanghai Faction and the Communist Youth League faced downfall. Even high-ranking military officials from the Shanghai Faction, deeply rooted in the military, experienced significant setbacks.¹¹⁹

Strengthening control over the military is also crucial. Xi Jinping emphasized the strengthening of the CCP's political control over the military.¹²⁰ The case of the Soviet Communist Party's collapse when the Party-army deviated from its political course serves as a lesson for strengthening political control over the military, and the incident in 1989 when some PLA units declined to enforce martial law underscores the ongoing need for vigilance over military forces.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Jung Ho Bae and Dong Soo Kim, “중국의 국내정치 및 대외정책과 주요 국가들의 대중국 전략 [China's Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Major Countries' Strategies toward China]” (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2012), pt. 서장 전환기의 중국과 한반도 [Preface China and Korean Peninsula in Transition Period].

¹¹⁹ Ji-Young Choi, “개혁개방 이후 중국의 집단지도체제와 파벌 연구: 시진핑 시기 변화와 함의를 중심으로 [China's Collective Leadership System after Reform and Opening Up: Focusing on the Changes and Implications in the Era of Xi Jinping],” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, March 2017, 6, 12, <https://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE07433249>.

¹²⁰ “Xi's New Model Army: Xi Jinping Reforms China's Armed Forces-to His Own Advantage,” *The Economist*, January 15, 2016.

¹²¹ Phillip Charles Saunders et al., *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019), 49.

At the same time, the change in neighboring countries' perceptions of China, shifts in China's national identity, and the variable of leadership change within China have influenced changes in China's grand strategy. This, in turn, has demanded innovation within the Chinese military. The competition within the military surrounding military innovation, coupled with Xi Jinping's efforts to consolidate domestic power, has weakened traditional army factions and led to the rise of relatively weaker factions, such as the Air Force and Navy.

The establishment of an ADIZ could have served as an appropriate reward for internal supporters within the military, ensuring strong control over the military as desired by Xi Jinping. In fact, Xi Jinping's control over the military is actively pursued through military reform and vigorous anti-corruption measures. Among the figures who actively led this process was Xu Qiliang, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). He was the first PLAAF general who took charge of Vice Chairman of the CMC.

After the 18th National Congress, which made key decisions including defense budget allocations, defense industry restructuring, downsizing the armed forces, and achieving a balance among different services and branches, the Chinese military initiated discussions on reform, leading to the establishment of the Central Military Commission's Leading Small Group for National Defense and Military Reform on March 15, 2014.¹²² Xi Jinping chaired this group, with Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang serving as vice chairs. The objectives of military reform were to strengthen the Party's control over the military, enhance joint operational capabilities, and improve combat readiness, particularly for high-intensity conflicts outside China's territory.¹²³

Xi Jinping was bestowed with the new title of "Chairman of the Military Commission," along with the utilization of a new military uniform. Some media outlets suggested that these changes signified his strong control over the military, more so than

¹²² “全會公報十大看點：明確全面深化改革總目標[Top 10 Highlights of the Plenary Session Communique: Clarification of the Overall Goal for Deepening Reforms],” *Xinhua*, Nov 13, 2013, quoted in Dong Won Yoo, “중국 군사체제 개혁과 한국의 대응 [Chinese Military Reform and South Korea's Response],” *Journal of Korean Ethnic Culture* 61 (November 2016): 533–69.

¹²³ Department of Defense, *Military Power of the People's Republic of China*.

previous leaders, serving as a signal that he was prepared to employ military force to address issues such as ethnic unrest and various internal challenges.¹²⁴

If Xu Qiliang could assist Xi Jinping in consolidating control over the military, Xi Jinping could provide policies for the PLAAF. Xu Qiliang had already expressed a favorable stance on the establishment of the ADIZ during his tenure as the head of the PLAAF.¹²⁵ However, Hu Jintao did not allow China to declare an ADIZ.¹²⁶

Furthermore, there are many things to achieve for a modernized PLAAF. A notable example is the Chinese version of the national air command system. Since the ADIZ demands enhanced air situation awareness capabilities, and assets to address it, it could serve as the initial gateway for constructing a national air command system. An article from the Liberation Army Daily in January 2014 highlighted the PLAAF's "plans in the future to use early warning aircraft to command directly an air combat group of fighters, bombers, and tankers to manage the ECS ADIZ efficiently."¹²⁷ Notably, up to 2012, the period Xiaoming examined, there was no single national air command system, and China's Lieutenant General Liu had suggested creating one.¹²⁸

Overall, in the field of foreign policy and national security, policies tend to be determined by political elites. The factors that shape the preferences of political leaders are often rooted in their domestic political base of support. It is worth noting that leaders in authoritarian regimes, as opposed to leaders in democratic systems, have relatively fewer constraints when it comes to using unfavorable means, as they rely on a narrower base of support. In the CCP system, the maintenance of power is contingent upon the consent of the elite group. Consequently, the regime must provide public and private goods to the elite

¹²⁴ Andrew Nathan, "Xi Jinping's New Military Position: A China File Conversation," *South China Morning Post*, May 1, 2016.

¹²⁵ Osawa, "China's ADIZ over the East China Sea."

¹²⁶ Rush Doshi, "Hu's to Blame for China's Foreign Assertiveness?," in *Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World*, ed. Tarun Chhabra et al. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 25–32, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/9780815739166_ch1.pdf. 29.

¹²⁷ Rinehart and Elias, *China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)*.

¹²⁸ Zhang, "The PLAAF's Evolving Influence."

group. If a dictator violates internal norms and seeks to govern arbitrarily, the elite group has the potential to resist and undermine the regime.

Therefore, examining the relationship between the elites who can influence policy decisions and the groups that support them can be one way to approach the reasons for the establishment of an ADIZ. In this case, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest Xi Jinping may have favored an ADIZ declaration, after his predecessor did not, due to the increased prominence of the PLAAF in the base of his elite support.

2. Nationalism Aspect

This section explores the influence of nationalism regarding the ECS ADIZ. It is necessary to examine the ADIZ in the context of the ongoing tensions between China and Japan stemming from the Senkaku territorial dispute. This section seeks to investigate the extent to which the Chinese government considered nationalism as a crucial factor when declaring the ECS ADIZ.

The genesis and amplification of modern nationalism in China originated from external invasions. Modern nationalism in China first manifested itself during the mid-19th century, experiencing incursions from Western powers, notably the United Kingdom. Subsequently, with Japan's aggression, nationalism intensified further.

Since the 1990s, the resurgence of nationalism in China has been characterized by a state-led, state-centric approach, emphasizing patriotism.¹²⁹ Despite China's economic success resulting from the reforms and opening-up policies initiated in 1978, China faced ideological contradictions as a communist state. Straying from the central tenets of socialism, China aimed to maintain national coherence in its departure from socialist ideals, and nationalism served as an effective tool to achieve this. Nationalism evoked Chinese collective memories of Western imperialism, unequal treaties, and invasions, providing the

¹²⁹ Suisheng Zhao, "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X\(98\)00009-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(98)00009-9).

Communist Party with a means to regain legitimacy by eradicating the century of humiliation and disgrace.¹³⁰

The correlation between nationalism and China's foreign policy has been an intriguing subject. One scholar argues that nationalism is fundamentally internal and possesses a defensive nature.¹³¹ On the contrary, there are researchers who contend that nationalism can drive expansive and aggressive foreign policies. One scholar asserts that Chinese nationalism has played a crucial role in explaining the “suboptimal, unstrategic, or counterproductive aspects of China's behavior on its maritime littoral.”¹³²

In China, territorial disputes serve as a catalyst for nationalism. China shares borders with 14 countries on land. Additionally, there are maritime neighbors such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia, in the vicinity of China. China faces territorial conflicts both on land and at sea, with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands serving as a prominent location for territorial disputes between China and Japan. The ECS ADIZ was established in 2013, encompassing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While the ADIZ apparently does not align with territorial airspace, the notion of a region managed by the state could influence the Chinese people's perceptions of sovereignty and nationalism.

In fact, nationalism played a significant role in the conflict surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This is closely tied to the historical context of the disputed area. After the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, China perceived the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as having been seized by Japan. Initially, when China lacked the strength to resist Japan, a more subdued stance was taken to suppress public discourse, adopting an approach of “keeping a low profile (道光陽會).” However, as China grew into a major power, the perception of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands shifted to a territory that China must inevitably

¹³⁰ Zhao.

¹³¹ Zhao.

¹³² Andrew Chubb, *Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”: Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy*, China Maritime Study No. 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2021), <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/16/>.

reclaim. Particularly in 2010, when China's GDP surpassed Japan's, people of China developed a stronger and wealthier image of their nation that enhanced support for territorial claims.

The conflicts between China and Japan in 2010 and 2012 exemplify both state-led responses and the nationalist reactions of the Chinese people. In September 2010, tensions between China and Japan escalated after a Chinese vessel collided with a Japanese ship, leading to the arrest of Chinese crew members. This coincided with the September 18th commemoration of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, sparking nationwide protests in China with slogans like "Never forget September 18th" and "Expel the Japanese from Diaoyudao."¹³³ China actively responded to the ship collision incident, including the suspension of Japanese tourism of public servants, a blank summit meeting with Prime Minister Naoto Kan, the arrest of four Japanese citizens on espionage charges, and the halt of rare earth exports to Japan.¹³⁴ This was considered a successful response for China, as the Chinese captain was released without a trial.

While the 2010 issue was temporarily resolved when Japan released the detained Chinese captain, it became a catalyst for the 2012 purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by Japan, leading to entanglement in Japanese domestic politics. The process of Japan's nationalization was not a sudden announcement, but unfolded over several months, starting with the statements of the Tokyo governor. A study examines the movements of China's people related to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from August to September 2012.¹³⁵ On August 15, 2012, a Chinese activist group landed on Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, raised the Chinese national flag, and sang the Chinese national anthem, and they were arrested by the Okinawa Coast Guard. This arrest sparked considerable discussion on Sina Weibo, with

¹³³ Oana Burcu, "Chinese Nationalism through the Prism of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands," *Asian Studies Review* 47, no. 1 (2023): 152–72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2022.2040429>.

¹³⁴ Tai Young Kwon and Pu Reaum Kim, "중국의 3전과 한국의 대응 방향 [China's Tree Warfares and the ROK's Countermeasures]," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 1 (March 2019): 288, <https://doi.org/10.46226/jss.2019.03.26.1.261>.

¹³⁵ J. Ashley Roach, "China's Straight Baseline Claim: Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands," *ASIL Insight* 17, no. 7 (February 13, 2013), <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/7/china%E2%80%99s-straight-baseline-claim-senkaku-diaoyu-islands>.

over 9.1 million posts. A few days later, on August 19, 2012, ten Japanese activists landed on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, further igniting anti-Japanese protests. In response, on September 10, 2012, China declared the straight baselines, the coordinates of which enclose Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

However, Japan nationalized the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands the following day, September 11, 2012, provoking strong reactions in China. Upon Japan's announcement of the island's purchase, anti-Japanese protests erupted nationwide in China. Japanese cars and stores were vandalized, flags were burned, and products were boycotted. The protests in 2012 were among the largest in decades in China.¹³⁶ On September 18, a day commemorating Japan's invasion, protests reached their peak. In Beijing, around 60,000 people gathered at the Japanese embassy, resulting in broken embassy windows due to thrown objects. This nationalistic response from the Chinese public, however, did not succeed in reversing Japan's nationalization of Senkaku.

China allowed the outpouring of nationalist sentiments, but sought to control the intensity. The Chinese government did not prohibit citizen protests against Japan, tacitly accepting the venting of anti-Japanese nationalism.¹³⁷ However, there were concerns about the protests becoming too violent, leading to societal turmoil, so participants who engaged in violent acts were arrested.¹³⁸ On September 19, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that they would take responsibility for damages caused by the protests.¹³⁹ By the end of September, protests across China had subsided.

China subsequently amplified the Senkaku Island issue. On April 26, 2013, China declared the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a core national interest. The declaration of the East

¹³⁶ Burcu, "Chinese Nationalism through the Prism."

¹³⁷ "중정부, 반일시위 피해 배상 시사 [The Chinese Government Indicates Compensation for Damages from Anti-Japan Protest]," *Yonhap News*, September 19, 2012, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20120919179500083>.

¹³⁸ "长沙警方依法刑拘9月15日打砸抢犯罪嫌疑人 [The Changsa Police, in Accordance with the Law, Detained a Suspect on September 15 on Charges of Assault, Battery, and Robbery]," *Huasheng*, accessed November 28, 2023, https://web.archive.org/web/20120921191152/http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201209/18/t20120918_23689614.shtml.

¹³⁹ *Yonhap News*, "중정부, 반일시위 피해 배상 시사 [The Chinese Government Indicates Compensation for Damages from Anti-Japan Protest]."

China Sea ADIZ at the end of 2013 served to highlight that China was deliberately drawing attention to the issue. The benefits that China could hope to gain by stirring up nationalism can help explain the timing of the declaration.

China is a prime example of a country where the media is tightly controlled.¹⁴⁰ Chinese media is rigorously regulated and censored by the CCP's Central Propaganda Department. Some scholars found that China utilizes the media to promote nationalism.¹⁴¹ According to Kim's research, after Japan's decision to purchase the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2012, the frequency of coverage on this issue by Xinhua News Agency significantly increased.¹⁴² She found that Xinhua News Agency employed methods to stoke anti-Japanese nationalist sentiments regarding events in 2012. They increased the quantity of related coverage, included it in the top 10 news events of 2012 to garner attention, and extensively used nationalist rhetoric. Kim mentioned that China frequently published articles concerning the legitimacy of China's claims and cited the white paper "Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China," which was published in September 2012, 182 times.¹⁴³ Kim also found that the attempt to stir up anti-Japanese nationalist sentiments based on the Senkaku issue is substantiated by marked differences in reporting compared to other disputes. The research exemplifies that, contrary to the extensive coverage of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, only a single report was dedicated by Xinhua to the civil demonstrations of Vietnam and the Philippines. Also, in the coverage of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a unique approach was observed, mixing historical animosities, which was not observed in the reporting of other territorial disputes. The reports for both NSI and SIB disputes conspicuously avoided merging historical events, which was notable characteristic of the nationalist rhetoric in the Senkaku dispute.

¹⁴⁰ "China," Freedom in the World 2022, 2022, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2022>.

¹⁴¹ William A. Callahan, "History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China," *Critical Asian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2006): 179–208, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672710600671087>; Yinan He, "History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino–Japanese Conflict," *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 50 (February 2007): 1–24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560601026710>.

¹⁴² Chrystopher S. Kim, "Nationalism: The Media, State, and Public in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA620768>.

¹⁴³ Kim.

In terms of media reports on the ADIZ, the direction was towards Japan, but the intensity was not strong. The Global Times began reporting on the military's announcements and the claims of military experts in China on November 23, when the ECS ADIZ was declared. The first two reports were released almost simultaneously with the announcement from the Ministry of National Defense. They simply conveyed the Ministry of National Defense's establishment of the ECS ADIZ, essentially providing the full text of the announcement. The subsequent reports elaborated on the scope of the ECS ADIZ and the rules within the ECS ADIZ. Following this, there is a report featuring Yang Yujun, the spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, responding to questions regarding the establishment of the ADIZ. It contains five questions and answers.¹⁴⁴

1. Why did the Chinese government set up the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone? Was it related to the current regional situation?
2. On what grounds did China establish the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone?
3. How was the domain of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone determined? Why is the zone located as close as 130 kilometers from some countries?
4. After foreign aircraft enter the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, what measures will China adopt?
5. Will China establish other air defense identification zones?¹⁴⁵

Most of the answers to the questions focused on how the ADIZ was established following international and universally recognized rules. However, the following sentence added to the response to the third question revealed an ADIZ intention directed towards Japan: "Moreover, a relevant country established its air defense identification zone as early as 1969, which is also about 130 kilometers from the Chinese mainland at its closest distance."¹⁴⁶

Chinese media began covering foreign responses two days after the announcement of the ADIZ, starting on November 25th. However, they did not provide comprehensive

¹⁴⁴ "Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Zone Questions," *China Daily*, November 23, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/23/content_17126969.htm.

¹⁴⁵ Xinhua.

¹⁴⁶ Xinhua.

articles on foreign reactions. Instead, they addressed the responses from different countries individually, focusing on Japan, South Korea, the United States, Australia, and Taiwan. The tone of articles covering the countries appears distinctly different. Notably, the most resolute stance from a foreign government was portrayed to be from Japan, as Table 2 illustrates.

Table 2. Articles Regarding International Reaction on Global Times¹⁴⁷

Related Country	Title of Article (date)
Japan	China summons Japanese ambassador over air defense zone accusations (Nov 25)
	Japanese PM concerned over China's air defense zone in East China Sea (Nov 25)
	Japan's remarks on China's air defense identification zone 'groundless': FM spokesman (Nov 25)
	Japan's remarks on China's air defense identification zone 'unacceptable': DM spokesman (Nov 25)
United States	FM spokesman: U.S. should 'correct its mistakes' over China's setup of air defense identification zone (Nov 25)
	US: U.S. B-52 bombers flying into Chian Air Zone is a planned flight exercise (Nov27)
	China monitors U.S. bombers in defense zone (Nov 27)
Korea	S. Korea to discuss with China over air defense zone (Nov 25)
	Air defense zone issue worsens Northeast Asian situation: S. Korea (Nov27)
Taiwan	Air defense zone in line with cross-Straits interests: Spokeswoman (Nov27)
Australia	China refutes Australia's remarks over air defense identification zone (Nov27)

¹⁴⁷ Adapted from “China Summons Japanese Ambassador over Air Defense Zone Accusations”; “Japanese PM Concerned over China’s Air Defense Zone in East China Sea,” *Global Times*, November 25, 2013, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/827440.shtml>; “Japan’s Remarks on China’s Air Defense Identification Zone ‘Groundless’: FM Spokesman,” *Global Times*, 25 2013; “Japan’s Remarks on China’s Air Defense Identification Zone ‘Unacceptable’: DM Spokesman,” *People’s Daily*, November 25, 2013, <http://en.people.cn/90786/8464693.html>; “FM Spokesman: U.S. Should ‘correct Its Mistakes’ over China’s Setup of Air Defense Identification Zone,” *People’s Daily*, 2013–11–25 edition, accessed November 30, 2023, <http://en.people.cn/90883/8465111.html>; “US: U.S. B-52 Bombers Flying into China Air Zone Is a Planned Flight Exercise,” *Global Times*, November 27, 2013, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/828071.shtml>; “China Monitors U.S. Bombers in Defense Zone,” *Global Times*, November 27, 2013, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/828070.shtml>; “S Korea to Discuss with China over Air Defense Zone”; “China’s Air Defense Zone Worsens Situation: S Korea,” *China Daily*, November 27, 2013, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/world/2013-11/27/content_17135771.htm; “Air Defense Zone in Line with Cross-Straits Interests,” *China Daily*, November 27, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/27/content_17135104.htm; and “China Refutes Australia’s Remarks over Air Defense Identification,” *China Daily*, accessed November 30, 2023, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2013-11/27/content_17135733.htm.

Compared to the media landscape in 2012, the coverage did not dominate the media, and the use of nationalistic investigations was primarily confined to explaining the legitimacy of the establishment of the ADIZ. However, in the top 10 news stories of 2013, the declaration of the ADIZ was included.

To gauge how influential the ADIZ was as a topic among the public, data on search terms provided by Baidu, a widely used search engine in China, can be examined (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Baidu Search Index of Japan, the United States and East China Sea in Fall 2013¹⁴⁸

The search terms for ‘东海[East China Sea],’ ‘日本[Japan],’ and ‘美国[United States]’ on November 23, 2013, the day the ADIZ was announced, were higher than the November average. However, there was no significant increase or decrease in these search terms comparing the periods before and after the declaration of the ADIZ. Similarly, search terms for “East China Sea” and “United States” did not show any particular interest (Figure 7).

¹⁴⁸ Source: Baidu, “百度指数 [Baidu Index],” Baidu Search Index, accessed November 29, 2023, <https://index.baidu.com/v2/main/index.html#/trend/%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC?words=%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC,%E7%BE%8E%E5%9B%BD,%E4%B8%9C%E6%B5%B7,%E7%B6%B2%E9%9A%9B%E7%B6%B2%E8%B7%AF>.




Figure 7. Baidu Search Index of Japan, the United States and East China Sea in 2012¹⁴⁹

When comparing the data with 2012, it is even clearer that the 2013 ADIZ declaration did not generate explosive interest among the Chinese. After the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012, searches for the keyword ‘Japan’ surged, reflecting anti-Japanese sentiments within China. This demonstrates a clear difference between 2012 and 2013. However, these search trends have limitations in confirming whether China successfully evoked nationalistic sentiments in the process of establishing the ADIZ or if there were motives, but the information does suggest that emotions were not effectively stirred by the ADIZ declaration.

From the other view, the Chinese government announced the ADIZ not during height of the Senkaku dispute in 2012, but in the latter half of 2013. Microscopically viewed, this does not naturally fit into the sequential flow of events. Examining whether the anticipated possibilities commonly associated with emphasizing nationalism could have been realized during this period will help determine whether nationalism was the motive behind the declaration of the ADIZ.

First, there is the possibility that China sought to leverage its domestic political situation in diplomatic negotiations with Japan or the United States. The timing of the declaration of the ADIZ coincided with the upcoming visit of the U.S. Vice President Biden to East Asia. In 2012, China experienced a significant surge of anti-Japanese nationalism,

¹⁴⁹ Source: Baidu.

manifested in a notably violent manner. Bringing up issues that could trigger nationalism during this period might have been intended to prevent the United States from taking the diplomatic initiative. Vice President Biden's East Asia tour was scheduled, and his travel bag included the concept of "pivot to Asia." Unexpectedly, in responding to the establishment of the ADIZ, he had to spend a considerable amount of time on the issue during his visits to Japan, China, and Korea. The United States sparked dissatisfaction among the Japanese people by not fully endorsing Japan's demand for China to withdraw the ECS ADIZ. The nationalistic theme is a sensitive subject that the Chinese authorities find challenging to concede. Revealing the ADIZ declaration ahead of significant diplomatic events may have been utilized to rally nationalist sentiments to assert China's firm stance.

Secondly, there is the possibility that the new government sought to articulate a nationalistic direction in its foreign policy. What strengthens this possibility is China's declaration of ECS ADIZ included the contentious Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a prominent area in China's maritime territorial disputes. Although it is not proved by data such as Baidu Search Index, this move could have a positive impact on the pride of the Chinese people. Rather than getting embroiled in legal debates about the ADIZ's implications for territorial sovereignty, the public is more likely to react to the intuitive expression of China's presence. Ni, professor of Shanghai Politics and Law School, assessed the establishment of the ADIZ as a departure from China's previous passive responses, showcasing an assertive diplomatic approach in the era of Xi Jinping. Chinese novelist Yu Hua, writing in the *New York Times*, argued that the ADIZ is primarily for domestic purposes. He conveyed that there were critical voices toward Chinese government during anti-Japanese protest in 2012 due to its inconsistent handling on Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.¹⁵⁰ Contrary to the rare instances of heightened tensions

¹⁵⁰ Dae Woon Cha, "중국 소설가 위화 '방공식별구역 설정은 국내용' [Chinese Novelist Yu Hua, 'Establishment of an ADIZ if for domestic purpose']," *Yonhap News*, December 3, 2013, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20131203083000009>.

with Japan in September 2010 and September 2012, the declaration of the ECS ADIZ did not trigger any nationalistic or violent anti-Japan protests.¹⁵¹

Third, there is the possibility that China sought to boost economic support for its domestic businesses and stimulate domestic consumption through the intensification of nationalism. The anti-Japanese nationalism in 2012 also led to a boycott of Japanese products. According to one article, the sales of Japanese cars in China decreased by 40% in September 2012 compared to the same period the previous year; and in October, the decline was even more significant, ranging from 50% to 70%.¹⁵² The article highlights that Toyota, in particular, experienced a sales plummet of over 70% in October compared to the same month the previous year, leading to measures such as partial suspension of production at its Tianjin plant. Also, the article discusses the phenomenon where local Chinese brands absorbed the market share of traditional Japanese cars during this period. However, no such activities, such as boycotts, emerged in relation to the declaration of ECS ADIZ.

Fourth, there is the possibility that China intended to externalize domestic political unrest. In 2013, there was a severe level of air pollution, events such as the Bo Xilai case, and crackdowns on online dissent that were influential news for the Chinese people.¹⁵³ “With its skies regularly shrouded by a filthy film of gray smog, bringing chaos to the transportation network and forcing millions to seek refuge behind surgical masks, Beijing has been forced to take more extreme action.”¹⁵⁴ These events could spark dissatisfaction and controversy domestically. As a Chinese novelist said, the Chinese government might

¹⁵¹ Rinehart and Elias, *China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)*, 43.

¹⁵² Song Hyun Kim, “센카쿠 분쟁 때 일본 기업, 어떻게 대처했나 [Japan's Businesses Response during the Senkaku Dispute],” *Opinion News*, April 11, 2017, <https://www.opinionnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=5794>.

¹⁵³ “China's Top 10 Domestic Events of 2013,” *China Daily*, December 30, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-12/30/content_17204801.htm; “Yearender: Xinhua Top 10 World News Events in 2013,” *People's Daily*, December 30, 2013, <http://en.people.cn/90777/8499831.html>.

¹⁵⁴ Paul Armstrong and Feng Ke, “Beijing Announces Emergency Measures amid Fog of Pollution,” CNN, October 23, 2013, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/23/world/asia/china-beijing-smog-emergency-measures/index.html>.

have intended to divert attention by turning these issues into external matters.¹⁵⁵ However, verifying such a possibility is challenging due to China's strong control over the expression of discontent in society since China tightly regulates any public expression of dissatisfaction. Also, there are limitations in quantifying public sentiment through measurable indicators such as voting or surveys.

Overall, based on the keyword trends attempted in this study, it can be inferred that the establishment of the ADIZ failed to generate the same level of attentions or emotions as the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012. China would have been aware that including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the ADIZ area that evoke nationalism. However, China's restrained tone indicates an intention not to escalate this into intense nationalism. Among the advantages China could gain through nationalism, the diplomatic initiative through domestic situations, and the cultivation of a strong image of China as a vocal actor suggest that nationalism can influence not only domestic politics but also foreign policy. Analyzing the economic benefits gained through nationalism and redirecting domestic attention to foreign policy, the research findings suggest that these aspects do not fully explain the establishment of the ADIZ.

3. Conclusion

Domestic politics became a consequential factor in the declaration of the ADIZ. Aligned with the change in the dominant elite group amid a regime change, a policy window opened for the declaration of the ADIZ, with nationalism exerting influence during the declaration period.

Considering that security policies are mainly decided by the leading elite groups, it is plausible that elites in each military branch had preferred policy alternatives. Even though the ADIZ policy was not explicitly designed to exclude the Army, it was evidently not centered around the Army but rather originated as an idea led by the Air Force. The nomenclature 'East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone' suggests a focus on the two domains of 'Sea' and 'Air', corresponding to the Navy and Air Force.

¹⁵⁵ Cha, "중국 소설가 위화 '방공식별구역 설정은 국내용' [Chinese Novelist Yu Hua, 'Establishment of an ADIZ if for domestic purpose']."

Efforts to diminish the dominant role of the Army within the Chinese military were observed from various perspectives. The Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, traditionally held by the Army, was first occupied by an Air Force official during Xi Jinping's inauguration. Xi Jinping emphasized Party-led military governance and military reform from the early days of his leadership, dedicating efforts to establish a foundation for enhanced Party control and undertaking Military Reform. The restructuring of the previous seven military regions into five theater commands resulted in a reduction in the number of Army generals, redirecting focus towards joint capacity and maritime strength.¹⁵⁶

From the standpoint of popular nationalism, historical conflicts with Japan form the basis of public sentiment rooted in hostility. While external adversaries can serve as a means to unite internal forces, the direction of animosity towards the regime poses inherent risks. The declaration of the ADIZ not only allows China to confront Japan, which denies historical facts, but also presents an image of China confidently facing the United States, the world's foremost power. Consequently, it serves as material to evoke national pride among the populace. Therefore, in the early days of Xi Jinping's leadership, it not only forms nationalistic support but also educates the public on the direction of the regime. This aspect contributes positively to the declaration of the ADIZ.

However, nationalism could also be a delaying factor in the declaration of the ADIZ. The discussion on the ADIZ had been ongoing since 2008, and it could have been adopted during critical conflict periods in 2010 or 2012. The implication is that government leadership considerations play a role in policy decisions. As China strongly controls its media, internal political situations are rarely conveyed externally, yet understanding the direction of public sentiment is beneficial for national security.

To explain why we consistently see the same face of the moon, it is necessary to understand both the phenomenon of revolution, which is the relationship between the Earth and the moon, and rotation, which is the moon's own spinning motion. Analogously, if revolution symbolizes the relationship between a country and the international community,

¹⁵⁶ Saunders et al., *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA*, 4, 6.

rotation represents domestic politics. While the moon's rotation does not directly cause its revolution, it plays a role in presenting a consistent face to Earth and shaping the tides of Earth's seas. Similarly, in the declaration of ECS ADIZ, even if domestic politics is not the central force, understanding domestic politics' role still give some hint why China declared a new ADIZ in that specific timing and on that specific region.

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IV. CONCLUSION

This thesis tested three hypotheses regarding China's declaration of the East China Sea (ECS) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The research findings indicate that security and normative factors were the main motivations for the declaration of the ADIZ, and domestic politics might have affected the declaration.

A. FINDINGS

First, the investigation confirmed that China's historical tensions with Japan, coupled with its rapid military and economic growth, contributed to a security-driven motive behind the establishment of the ECS ADIZ. The geopolitical significance of the ECS, especially concerning Taiwan and the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, further underlined the military utility of the ADIZ. It was established with the intention of enhancing air defense capabilities.

Furthermore, it is evident that China intended to establish an ADIZ with the potential for employing offensive military force. Following the ADIZ declaration, despite non-compliance with China's stipulations by countries like South Korea, Japan, and the United States, China's focus shifted away from implementing defensive emergency measures in the ECS ADIZ. Instead, the emphasis was placed on entering the airspace of the surrounding countries.

Second, this study determined that China's ADIZ, while seemingly conforming to international norms, was a strategic move to subtly challenge existing norms. The strategy adopted by China, characterized as 'similar, but different,' involves appearing to adhere to norms while having the intention to modify them. While the international community expresses concerns about China's ADIZ rules, civil aviation companies do not resist significantly following certain aspects of China's ADIZ rules, as abiding does not incur substantial additional costs.

China has not opted for the avenue of bringing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan to the International Court of Justice for resolution. Moreover, the establishment of the ADIZ was based on domestic law, and the likelihood of asserting legal reasoning

through the ADIZ is slim. These facts indicate that China did not declare the ADIZ with the intention of resolving territorial disputes through legal means.

From the perspective of lawfare, China's declaration of an ADIZ appears to employ a strategy combining legal justifications with domestic logic to shape the perception of its citizens, leading them to recognize the ECS as part of China's area. Additionally, externally, this strategy can enhance awareness of China's sovereignty claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and make consideration of China's ADIZ a factor when passing through the area.

Third, this research examined whether China's domestic politics played a significant role in the declaration of the ECS ADIZ. In terms of domestic politics, elites groups in China effectively formulate and implement security policies, possessing the power to either support or oppose a regime. Changes in the elite groups, the diminishing influence of the Army, and the emphasis on nationalism during Xi Jinping's leadership were observed. This circumstantial evidence can support that domestic politics affected the decision of declaration of an ADIZ.

Another factor is the nationalism sentiment of the public. The ADIZ declaration not only served as a means to confront historical adversaries like Japan but also contributed to shaping a positive image of China as a confident player in global affairs. However, generating excessively strong nationalism sentiments such as anti-Japanese can be burdensome for the government. Balancing these opposing forces may have been a factor in the timing of the declaration of the ADIZ.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The case of China's declaration of an ADIZ highlights China's subtle and sophisticated attempts at strategic changes. The approach to dealing with China's attempts at change should start at the awareness stage. Particularly, considering the possibility that China may make security-related decisions in conjunction with domestic political issues or leadership changes, it is crucial to detect and prepare for such shifts in advance.

Understanding China's intricate and deceptive strategy for changing the status quo requires international cooperation. Information sharing and collaboration among nations are vital, and increasing transparency regarding China's actions can lay the foundation for joint responses by affected countries. Additionally, as there is a possibility that China may emphasize security decisions during domestic political changes or leadership transitions, and so the international community should prioritize predicting and preparing for such developments through continuous information exchange and dialogue.

The response to China's attempts at change should occur on an international scale. Considering that China faces difficulties in the "China versus the majority" scenario, in which its neighbors cooperate to resist its initiatives, a strategy that involves "China versus each country," in which China can deal with each smaller state separately, seems more effective. This aligns with the ongoing trend where countries, including the United States, are strengthening their relationships with allied nations and enhancing cooperation through mechanisms like the QUAD to bolster collaboration with countries around China.

However, coordinated responses to China's awareness of the aerial situation and the establishment of ADIZ appear lacking. China may have aimed the details of its ADIZ declaration to create divisions among opposing countries, such as Japan's dissatisfaction when the United States did not fully endorse Japan's demand for China to withdraw the ECS ADIZ. Especially with China and Russia attempting to obstruct coordinated responses from South Korea and Japan, addressing this challenge requires strengthened international cooperation and unity. In circumstances where alliances among nations may weaken, it is necessary to establish effective responses based on shared principles and norms.

Finally, it is crucial to anticipate the possibility of China establishing ADIZs in other regions, such as the South China Sea, and to prepare coordinated responses in advance. Vigilance is required against China's use of grey-zone strategies, where boundaries between civilian and national activities are blurred, allowing for military-like actions. Given the potential for various forms of such strategies, a proactive approach is essential.

In summary, an effective response to China's attempts at change necessitates international cooperation, information sharing, and predictive measures regarding security decisions, all aimed at countering the strategy of 'China versus each country.' To adapt to China's intricate and flexible strategy, global unity is required to establish a transparent and effective response foundation.

C. LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Despite the comprehensive analysis, this study acknowledges certain limitations. The inability to access data on China's military activities in the ECS before and after the ADIZ declaration hinders a complete understanding of the relationship between military capability and the ADIZ. Additionally, the study does not delve into the intricacies of China's internal political landscape, including inter-service arguments on establishment of ADIZ, as limited information is available due to strict media controls in China.

To overcome these limitations, future research could focus on obtaining more nuanced insights into China's military activities and explore the intricacies of its internal political dynamics. Furthermore, an in-depth examination of how China's normative influence manifests in different fields could provide valuable insights.

Lastly, this study did not delve into discussion of the development of advanced military technologies such as drones, artificial intelligence, cyber, and space, in relation to the establishment of an ADIZ. The focus was primarily on the airspace where aircraft operate, and the study did not explore the interaction between the ADIZ and domains beyond the stratosphere, including high-altitude airspace, space, maritime, subsea, and cyber domains. These topics present valuable avenues for in-depth exploration in future research.

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