Lessons of Strategic Surprise: Pearl Harbor, Cuba and the 1973 Middle East Crisis (REV)
Abstract
Strategic surprise succeeded for the aggressor at Pearl Harbor, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in the 1973 Middle East Crisis, not because American military and diplomatic policymakers were uncertain about what the enemy was planning but because they were all "too certain." Researchers in the areas of belief systems and decisionmaking have long held that analysts seldom review incoming information objectively. Instead, such information is usually unconsciously fitted into preexisting intelligence positions and preconceived behavior patterns or else simply disregarded as irrelevant or erroneous. This study attempts to validate and expand conclusions, to examine reasons for the successes and failures of diplomacy, and to identify relevant trends and commonalities in these three crises upon which to base useful recommendations for improved strategy formulation. In each case, it was found that the actors responded (1) on the basis of their own national interest, (2) within the constraints of a short timeframe, and (3) with a rather limited choice of alternatives. Each crisis was preceded by numerous indicators which were incorrectly analyzed by US officials because of preconceived notions, stereotypes, and personal biases. Enemy analysts also misperceived US national and popular will to resist their strategic challenge.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 15, 1974
- Accession Number
- ADA004262
Entities
People
- Kenneth E. Roberts
Organizations
- United States Army War College