Formal Models of Dilemmas in Social Decision-Making
Abstract
Social dilemmas occur whenever each individual is better off choosing an anti-social course of action than a pro-social one, yet all individuals would be better off if all were to choose the pro-social course than if all were to choose the anti-social course. Interest in social dilemmas has increased because problems such as overpopulation, pollution, and selfish use of energy appear to be the result of such dilemmas. A simple game has been developed according to the principle that benefit for anti-social behavior accrues directly to the individual whereas loss is spread out among all the players. Such a game results in a true social dilemma -- one which becomes worse the more players there are. The present paper discusses the dilemma.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1974
- Accession Number
- ADA006188
Entities
People
- Robyn M. Dawes
Organizations
- Oregon Research Institute