Algorithms for Determining Equilibrium Points in N Stage Voting Games. Part I. Secret Ballot Schemes. Part II. Open Ballot Voting Schemes.
Abstract
In Part one, voting schemes are expressed as N person, single or multistage games in extensive form with ordinal preferences. Some of the voters can be indifferent to certain outcomes. The voters are not allowed to consult one another before arriving at the result. A majority rule with tie breaking is used. The voting schemes are labelled as binary or nonbinary depending on whether the number of alternatives in every ballot is two or not. In this section the authors consider only secret ballot. Part two is a continuation of Part one. The authors consider multistage open (sequential) ballot voting schemes as in U.S. Senate. The important result is that, as long as all the players have strong preferences, there is a pure admissible strategy for each voter leading to the unique Nash equilibrium point of the game.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1974
- Accession Number
- ADA006218
Entities
People
- R. L. Kashyap
- R. Mukundan
Organizations
- Harvard University