

AD/A-006 453

CARS '75: PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS  
FOR THE COMBAT ARMS REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

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31 October 1974

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM	
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER <b>AD/A006453</b>	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) CARS '75: Permanent Headquarters for the Combat Arms Regimental System?		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Student Essay	
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
7. AUTHOR(s) COL Walter L. McMahon		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE 31 Oct 74	
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>18 27</b>	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) U	
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)  Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)  Reproduced by <b>NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE</b> US Department of Commerce Springfield, VA. 22151			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
<b>PRICES SUBJECT TO CHANGE</b>			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The basic question addressed is whether headquarters for the 170 regiments in the US Army's Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) should be established to assume their traditional responsibilities as heads of the regimental families. Since CARS's implementation in 1957, these headquarters have been at zero strength under DA control--essentially they do not exist. The circumstances and events which have kept this aspect of the system dormant are reviewed and a solution that utilizes retired personnel and non-appropriated funds to circumvent long-standing fiscal and manpower barriers			

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(Essay)

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DATE: 31 October 1974  
PAGES: 18

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## CARS '75: PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS FOR THE COMBAT ARMS REGIMENTAL SYSTEM?

The Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) has been in operation within the United States Army for 17 years. It was introduced in the Service's "Pentomic" era, accommodated the change to the "ROAD" concept, supplied the numerical designation scheme for additional combat forces during the Vietnam buildup, and provided guidelines for selection of Armor, Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry units inactivated as the Army was gradually withdrawn from Southeast Asia. By insuring continuity in the existence of the Army's historic combat regiments, CARS appears to have successfully resolved one of the perennial problems concerning expansion and contraction of the Service's combat forces that has arisen during and after each of the nation's major wars. This turbulence plus changes in the weapons and techniques of warfare has badly tangled the genealogy of most of the Army's older combat units, and at times even resulted in the inactivation of some of the most historic organizations on its rolls.<sup>1</sup>

But if CARS has proven to be an effective solution to the Army's long-standing problem of maintaining historical continuity among its combat units, the system has done little to sustain the position of the regiments as the principal repositories of Army history and tradition. The concept of the parent regiment as the head of a family of member battalions, the tradition of a "home outfit" for the line soldier, the esprit engendered through a sense of "belonging" to the regimental family, have all been missing from CARS as it has thusfar been implemented within the Army.

The plan establishing the Combat Arms Regimental System was approved by Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker on 24 January 1957, after more than two years of study.<sup>2</sup> Part of the rationale for the development of

such a system was the basic premise that esprit de corps is an essential characteristic of an effective military force. While acknowledging that vigorous, capable leadership can, of itself, produce a fighting unit with high esprit, the US Army has found through experience that tradition and the past achievements of a unit are valuable aids in this process. Prior to 1957, however, the Army had developed no satisfactory means of maintaining the continuity of its historic units, and whenever it entered a period of retrenchment, combat units were broken up, combined, redesignated or simply disbanded. Under the pressures of a subsequent mobilization new units were formed, often without any historical precedents.<sup>3</sup>

CARS was designed to provide a flexible regimental structure that would facilitate the perpetuation of unit history and tradition in a modern tactical configuration without restricting future organizational trends. Conceived as a long-term operation, the major actions required to put the plan into operation were grouped into five phases. In the first three, combat arms units of the Active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard were reorganized and, as necessary, redesignated as members of the organizations selected by the Department of the Army to be parent regiments.<sup>4</sup> Selection of these regiments was based on separate criteria for the Regular Army and the National Guard, but the overall objective was to retain units whose combat history or traditional significance was worthy of perpetuation for future generations of combat soldiers. By mid-1960, redesignation of Active Army and Army Reserve combat units as members of the 168 Regular Army regiments retained under CARS had been accomplished, and reorganization of the combat elements of the Army National Guard into 225 CARS regiments was all but completed.<sup>5</sup>

Phase IV of CARS addressed mobilization planning, but it soon became

apparent that much of this work depended upon policies and procedures to be established in Phase V. Therefore, except for establishing criteria for the sequential activation of units within a regiment during mobilization, little action was (or has) been taken on this aspect of the system.

Phase V of CARS called for the assignment of parent regimental headquarters to permanent CONUS locations and the performance of various support functions by them. Among the tasks visualized for these headquarters in the original CARS concept were maintaining the regimental history and traditions, maintaining records of members of the regiment, performing personnel services for members, conducting regimental recruiting, supervising reserve personnel and units, and operating regimental training units. Supervision of the activities of the regimental headquarters in the Regular Army was to be exercised by the then active Continental Army Command (CONARC), while the National Guard Bureau was to monitor National Guard regiments.<sup>6</sup>

When the Department of the Army staff began planning for the implementation of Phase V, however, it discovered serious problems. For the conditions under which such headquarters would be established were dependent, in large measure, upon the extent to which personnel stabilization through membership in a "home" regiment--part of the CARS concept--could realistically be applied to the US Army. A 1959 restudy of this facet of the system determined that the stabilization visualized in the original CARS plan was not possible unless membership in a parent regiment was established as the overriding consideration in all personnel actions. Because of the inflexibility, duplication of effort and malutilization of personnel and facilities that would result from such a restriction, this aspect of CARS was judged to be neither feasible nor desirable.<sup>7</sup>

While it ruled out the CARS "home" regiment concept as a viable personnel management tool, the DA study stressed that leaving the regimental headquarters at zero strength under DA control and the regimental colors and trophies in the custody of the lowest numbered or lettered member unit of each parent regiment was an equally unsatisfactory arrangement. Such a situation, it said, left CARS "dangling," failed to utilize the headquarters (as the most symbolic element of traditional regiments) to promote troop morale and public relations, and showed favoritism toward the units which have custody of the regimental colors and trophies.<sup>8</sup>

Acknowledging that the purpose for which the headquarters were to be established would not justify the manpower, facilities and funds required to staff and operate them as separate and distinct activities, the study recommended that the regimental headquarters be established outside the tactical structure of the Army and assigned enmass to their respective Branch and School Centers. The regimental colors and trophies could be displayed in an appropriate setting, such as a "Hall of Flags," and the activities connected with these headquarters would center around this display. A minimal number of permanent civilian historians would be authorized to prepare historical literature, provide continuity, and facilitate the growth of this type activity. Such action, the study said, would provide a uniform program for establishing all regimental headquarters and take advantage of the atmosphere and facilities found at Branch and School Centers, in particular, branch customs and traditions, museums, printing plants and publishing facilities.<sup>9</sup>

The DA staff concurred in the study findings, but unfortunately for the Army, Headquarters, CONARC recommended that the plan not be implemented. Citing a general reluctance on the part of school commandants to support

this type of activity, a lack of appropriate on-post facilities, insufficient personnel and inadequate funds to properly establish and maintain the regimental headquarters, CONARC held that without the full support of field commanders--especially the school commandants--it would be most difficult to implement the proposed plan.<sup>10</sup> Faced with this negative response, the DA Staff decided to delay the project to a later date when it could be implemented under what the Staff termed "more favorable conditions."<sup>11</sup>

During the next 10 years, the Department of the Army continued to receive intermittent requests to activate the headquarters of one CARS regiment or another, or to activate all of them. But no major DA level action to reopen the question was initiated until the spring of 1971, when LTG George I. Forsythe, the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for the Modern Volunteer Army, hired former Army Times staff writer Monte Bourjaily to evaluate CARS's potential for enhancing the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) concept. Mr. Bourjaily developed an eight point program that embodied many of the elements of the rejected "home" regiment concept which he felt could now become a productive element of the MVA program and recommended further study of the idea.<sup>12</sup> In October, 1971, the Chief of Staff directed that CARS be reexamined to determine the feasibility of implementing Phase V, but the study only reaffirmed the drawbacks of the "home" regiment concept and once again recommended that "Phase V not be implemented at this time."<sup>13</sup>

So while this much debated stage of CARS has remained unimplemented, it has never been discarded because the concept of permanent headquarters for the regiments is sound; only the means of putting it into operation are at issue. The system has proven to be a flexible organization capable of expansion or contraction without loss of historical continuity, but with no

headquarters the CARS regiments are inanimate bodies, vaguely organized and adrift, like a family without parents. Without a father or mother, each member of the family goes his separate way. The most symbolic element of the family, the patriarch, is not being used to promote true family spirit or act as the adhesive that binds the parts into an inseparable traditional group.

But this important component of the system has been stymied by more than objections to the disruptive impact of the "home" regiment concept on Army personnel management, or the benefits to be derived from active regimental headquarters vis-a-vis the projected high cost--in funds and manpower---of operating them. There has also been opposition to CARS from those who believe that the division rather than the regiment should be the focal point for unit esprit and the vehicle by which the public relates to the Army. It is true that during World War II the regimental organization which had been the traditional "home outfit" for the Army's line soldiers was, with few exceptions, abandoned in all branches except the Infantry. Even the Infantry regiments were replaced in most armored divisions which used separate infantry battalions to achieve greater organizational flexibility. Following World War II, the Army's combat divisions continued to receive greater attention than the regiments which had previously been the repositories of Army history.

From an historical point of view, however, the division is a relative newcomer to the Army, and it did not become a fixed organization with specific strengths and equipment until 1917. Before that date it did not exist as a tactical organization except in wartime, and as a consequence, there is no historical or lineal connection between the divisions of 1917 and those commands existing prior to that date.<sup>14</sup> Divisions are also subject

to activation and inactivation as the Army's strength fluctuates, and therefore, cannot provide the long term continuity of the CARS regiments. In addition, their large size impedes the intense loyalty and family-like closeness that has characterized regimental organizations through the years. More importantly, a large proportion of the Army's combat units are non-divisional and, therefore, have no firm or continuous identification with a specific division.

Finally, despite the increased prominence of the division organization within the Service during the past 25-30 years, recruiters for the All Volunteer Army are finding that except for the airborne divisions and perhaps the 1st Cavalry or the "Big Red One," there is little familiarity outside the Service with its other combat divisions. Because of these limitations it appears wiser to fully implement CARS, which embraces both divisional and non-divisional elements and is specifically designed to perpetuate historic combat regiments, rather than to enhance the limited visibility of a few divisions which are vulnerable to the uncertainties of the Army's manpower fluctuations.

To vitalize the dormant portion of the system, form, substance and cohesion must be given to the familial aspects of CARS. This has to be done without generating the prohibitively costly manpower, facilities and fund requirements that heretofore have barred the establishment of permanent headquarters for the parent CARS regiments. This support has always been considered essential in earlier plans to establish regimental headquarters as independent activities within the Army's tactical organization and to implement any "home" or parent regiment concept; therefore, the proposals which follow eschew both. It is felt that the form and functions visualized herein for the headquarters of the CARS regiments can

produce the vitality and vigor now lacking in the system without this prohibitive type of support.

The first step in establishing regimental headquarters for CARS is to give them a permanent location, and the 1959 DA staff proposal to assign such headquarters to their respective Branch/School Centers is still the best solution. CONARC commander General Herbert B. Powell's 1962 designation of each Branch School as a repository for the traditions, history, trophies, awards and "other recognitions" of the Branch provides supportive rationale for this concept.<sup>15</sup> (One of CONARC's successors, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has recently taken action to reaffirm this role for Branch Schools by designating the Signal School at Fort Gordon as the "Home of the Signal Branch." The responsibility will be spelled out for all Branch Schools in the next revision of TRADOC Regulation 10-41.)<sup>16</sup>

The regimental colors would be exhibited in a "Hall of Flags" in the museums of the Centers which are among the best in the entire US Army Museum System. Under this plan, the colors of the 30 Armor and Cavalry units in CARS plus those of four Cavalry regiments currently formed as Infantry would be displayed at Fort Knox, Kentucky. There the Patton Museum is currently adding the second of four incremental wings to the new museum building opened in 1972. The Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, would receive the colors of 59 CARS field artillery regiments which would be housed in one of the top museums in the Army Museum System. The colors of the 23 CARS Air Defense Artillery regiments would be prominently displayed in a new ADA Museum which will be opening early next year at Fort Bliss, Texas.<sup>17</sup>

Pending construction of the new multi-million dollar Infantry Museum

at Fort Benning, Georgia, the colors of the 43 CARS Infantry regiments can easily be accommodated in the spacious foyers of the huge Infantry Hall where they will be seen by thousands of Infantrymen who attend classes there each year. However, the colors of the 11 active airborne Infantry regiments in the CARS system would be displayed in the 82d Airborne Division Museum or in the headquarters of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 1st Special Forces colors would also be located at Fort Bragg in the Special Warfare Museum. Finally, the colors of the 75th Infantry, the parent regiment for the US Army's Rangers, would be located at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the home of the first Ranger battalion in the Army since World War II.

This plan provides for uniformity of establishment and long-range stability of the regimental headquarters at the traditional institutions where branch esprit, customs and traditions are fostered. It also facilitates location of these headquarters with a minimum amount of turbulence and expense at posts which have the facilities, capability and interest in this responsibility and in contributing to the enhancement of the units of their branch. There is also no conflict between the proposed locations for the colors of the CARS regiments and the stations suggested under the DA Regimental/Brigade Post Plan. Although pending approval for more than two years, that plan is still intended to provide a repository for the colors of any CARS regiment without active member units (there are now four) and for the colors of any inactivated brigades which served in Vietnam (there are also four). None of the posts tentatively selected in this plan are among those proposed herein as locations for the colors of the CARS regiments.<sup>18</sup>

Prior to the formal installation of regimental colors at the Branch/

School Centers, action should be taken at Department of the Army (DA) level to select a commander for each regiment. As head of the regimental family, he would take the lead in developing the sense of kinship and unity now lacking in the loose and distant relationships that exist between most of each regiment's member battalions. The position of commander, or Colonel of the Regiment, would be strictly an honorary one and its only function would be ceremonial. The occupant should be a volunteer selected from among retired officers, colonel (O-6) or higher, who have served on active duty with a unit of the regiment.

Personnel chosen would normally serve for five years at the pleasure of the Chief of Staff of the Army, but this tenure could be extended or shortened as appropriate by DA, or at the request of the regiment's members. While they would receive no pay, the colonels of the regiments would be afforded certain special privileges and have access to other resources to be discussed later. Selections from among qualified retired officers responding to the publicized call for volunteers would be made by the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). The Chief of Army Reserve will control the selection process for Reserve CARS regiments with active units.

As the regiment develops a viable alumni membership in addition to its active duty members, the Colonel would also preside over the latter as chairman instead of commander. He would retain his honorary role and should not become involved in the operational aspects of any regimental association.

Working with the honorary Colonel would be the Sergeant Major (SGM) of the Regiment. He would have a particularly important role in developing identity and engendering esprit, especially among the enlisted men of the regiment's member units. Like the commander, this is an honorary position

to be filled by volunteer retired senior non-commissioned officers (E-8 or E-9) who have served with a unit of the regiment during their active careers. Again, selections would be made by MILPERCEN. The SGM would augment and compliment the Colonel in his ceremonial functions, aid in maintaining continuity in the leadership of the regimental family, share the correspondence load and other administrative requirements with the commander, and handle some of the liaison and travel requirements placed upon the leader of the regiment.

Although neither the Colonel or the Sergeant Major of the Regiment would be paid, they would have certain privileges (to be spelled out in a new Army regulation governing this phase of the CARS system). In establishing these positions, DA should give serious consideration to structuring them in a manner which would provide the basis for tax deductions as an added incentive for those performing such duties. They would be authorized one duty status flight annually on military or military charter aircraft to visit each member element of the regiment. Each would also have the same priority as active duty personnel with mission orders on military space available flights for regimental business. Both would be authorized use of a military vehicle when visiting posts at which units of the regiment are stationed and free use of visiting officer, NCO or guest house quarters during such visits. These visits, of course, would be made at the pleasure of the commander of the member unit.

Wear of the uniform would be authorized for any ceremonial activities such as unit visits. The regiment's Colonel and SGM would also be entitled to wear, in addition to their own decorations, the symbols of all honors accruing to the regiment when it came under CARS. It may also be appropriate for the US Army Institute of Heraldry to develop a special insignia for

these honorary officials to be worn on the blouse lapels or on the left shoulder. Combined with the distinctive insignia already authorized for each CARS regiment, it would readily identify individuals functioning in such positions to members of their own or other regiments.

The Colonel and the SGM will also participate in Unit Day ceremonies, a special annual holiday selected by the regiment to commemorate a noteworthy event in its history, and when feasible, attend other important activities involving regimental units. If at all possible, they should be in office and present at the formal installation of the regiment's colors in the "Hall of Flags" at the Branch Center, referred to earlier.

Historical support for honorary leaders of each regiment would be provided by the US Army Center of Military History (CMH). Upon their selection, CMH would provide each Colonel and SGM with original copies of their regiment's lineage and honors certificate plus any distinctive designation, unit day or memorial award certificates authorized. The Center would also supply them with any fact sheets, bibliographies or other historical material contained in its files on the regiment and with all published volumes in the Army Lineage Series.

Requests for other historical assistance would be given the same priority as official requests from the active Army, and honorary commanders would be routinely informed of any staff actions or decisions on lineage, honors or other historical aspects of their regiments. Finally, as a long-term project, CMH could be tasked to produce a standard regimental history pamphlet for each CARS regiment, beginning with those about which no privately written history has been published.<sup>19</sup>

The principal barrier to past implementation of this phase of CARS has been the cost--in terms of manpower, facilities and funds--of supporting

the regimental headquarters visualized for the system. Therefore, this proposal requires no active duty personnel to administratively support the honorary Colonel and SGM of each regiment and provides no office space for them. Because these are honorary positions without formal organizational functions, they would be essentially parttime and the Colonel and the SGM could operate from their own homes or other appropriate locations provided by the incumbents themselves. In this aspect of their work, they would differ little from many other volunteers who function part or even full time as officials in a variety of fraternal, service and community organizations. The Colonel and the SGM would be authorized to make collect calls to the member units of their regiments and other military agencies concerning regimental business and use franked envelopes for regimental correspondence.

Despite the above special arrangements, it is inevitable that the Colonel and the Regimental SGM will need some funds if they are to properly conduct their operations without personal expenses. Ruling out the use of appropriated funds, this leaves only Army non-appropriated funds or monies from some form of regimental fund which may be generated by contributions, gifts, bequests, etc. from personnel of the regiment. Such funds would not exist in the early stages of establishing regimental headquarters; so they are not considered a viable source of operational monies in this proposal. **These** funds, however, should be a long range goal for each regiment.

The US Army currently generates about \$60 million annually in non-appropriated funds. This money is distributed by DA to major Army commands on a per capita basis; for example, the current rate in CONUS is \$2.00 per man per month. A certain percentage of the overall total each month is retained by the DA non-appropriated fund managers for specialized distribution. In turn, the major commands allocate their funds to support various

authorized activities. Again as an example, FORSCOM and TRADOC currently disburse 25¢ per man per month to all unit funds within the two commands.<sup>20</sup>

AR 230-1, entitled "Nonappropriated funds and related activities," authorizes use of the various non-appropriated fund monies to supplement appropriated funds to provide goods and services and for official mission activities directly related to morale, welfare, and recreation. The AR also authorizes purchase of distinctive insignia, unit histories and related materials.<sup>21</sup> But, as currently written, AR 230-1 would not authorize the use of non-appropriated funds to support the operation of regimental headquarters for CARS.

DA, however, has wide latitude in the spending of these funds, and if the concept of providing limited financial support for operation of the CARS regimental headquarters were accented, DA could revise the regulations governing non-appropriated funds to authorize such expenditures.<sup>22</sup> If approved, a per capita system based upon the authorized TOE strength of each active CARS combat element could be used to allocate a specified amount of non-appropriated funds each month for disbursement to the parent regimental headquarters of these units. For example, if 10¢ per month per soldier authorized for the Army's combat units were to be provided from non-appropriated funds, the following amounts would accrue:

Air Defense Bn	- \$52.00 per month; \$624.00 per year
Armor Bn	- \$54.00 per month; \$648.00 per year
Cavalry Bn	- \$87.00 per month; \$1,044.00 per year
Field Artillery Bn	- \$52.00 per month; \$624.00 per year
Infantry Bn	- \$77.50 per month; \$936.00 per year <sup>23</sup>

With 170 Active Army CARS regiments and 316 combat arms elements currently active, the average regiment with two active battalions could expect about twice the yearly amount indicated above. Total non-appropriated fund monies allocated for use by CARS parent regiments each month

would be \$19,728 or \$236,736 annually, less than four tenths of one percent of the \$60 million available to the Army each year. Funds for each regimental headquarters would be, in most cases, less than \$1,500 annually and could be maintained in a separate fund by a designated custodian in the lowest numbered active duty battalion of the regiment. The regimental Colonel and SGM would draw against the fund for expenditures authorized by the governing AR. This money would purchase normal administrative supplies, part-time typing and other administrative help and cover miscellaneous expenses incurred by the Colonel or the SGM in the execution of their duties. Without such minimal fiscal support, the viability of the entire austere concept proposed herein would be extremely tenuous.

The need to give form, substance and meaning to the CARS regiments, the unfinished status of the system without the headquarters, and the proposal for an honorary colonel and SGM for each regiment are not new themes. All have been examined in one form or another by other authors as well as studied by the DA staff. Yet no proposal has avoided the requirement for appropriated funds, military personnel and facilities to bring CARS to fruition. This paper, however, places no such demands on the Army's legislated resources. It does require commitment of a relatively small portion of internally generated funds now dedicated to activities considered necessary or beneficial but which are inadequately or not at all funded from appropriated monies. The latter are unlikely to be used to fully implement the CARS concept so the use of non-appropriated funds to support operations of regimental headquarters appears to be fully within the spirit and purpose for which they are intended.

Arguments to the contrary ignore the basic fact that the Army's final purpose is to fight and that enhancement of the morale and esprit of its combat forces contributes to that purpose. They also overlook the often

stated goal of the Service's top leaders: the readiness of the combat forces. Full implementation of CARS would aid in achieving that end and the use of the Army's internally generated resources to accomplish that task is, for that reason, a justifiable and productive course of action. The relative merits of this proposal vis-a-vis cutbacks in currently funded projects cannot be evaluated in this paper because the specific activities affected by any diversion of funds to the support of CARS cannot be identified without detailed study of the entire concept by DA fund managers.<sup>24</sup>

If, however, the proposals discussed thusfar were implemented there are a number of other actions that should be taken to help reestablish the traditional role of the regiment in the Army. One of the first ways to do it is to stress the historic past of the Army's regiments to new enlistees. An example of this would be to solicit enlistments in one of the "famous" combat regiments of the Army, essentially just a modification of the current division enlistment option. Consideration should also be given to developing a half-and-half option for a three year tour. Under it an enlistee would serve one half his tour in CONUS with a member unit of the regiment he selects, and one half overseas with another element of the same regiment.

In conjunction with such an option, current DA proposals to increase guaranteed tour lengths from 16 to 21 months as a means of lowering personnel turbulence in combat units can also aid in forming regimental ties. The nature of the 6-12 month unaccompanied European tours now under DA study could be particularly conducive to development of regimental loyalties since the soldier's "outfit" rather than his family will be his principal frame of reference overseas, both socially and professionally.

The use of a Standard Name Line (SNL) designation to indicate what

regiment a first term enlistee belongs to is also a useful possibility. It would be an indicator only for personnel managers to consider along with all other factors in determining individual assignments. There would be no change in current personnel management procedures and only if a tour with a unit of the indicated parent regiment met the primary assignment criteria would the regimental designation be considered. The SNL would also be useful in insuring that the Army keeps any bargain made on first assignments after completion of basic training, and could serve as an automatic trigger for sending an automated printout (for info only) to the Colonel or SGM of the Regiment. Such information could generate an official letter of welcome from the Colonel of the Regiment to a new member of the family together with a set of distinctive unit insignia. These automatic communications from personnel management offices would also provide a most useful means of developing a roster of present and former members of the regiment.

The topics discussed briefly above are but a few of many ideas for improving CARS, and they are intended to enhance this paper's basic proposal for breathing life into the long dormant concept of active regimental headquarters for the system. Whatever their individual merit, they are all keyed to the ultimate objective of developing CARS to its full potential and of returning the regiment to its traditional place at the head of the Army's family of combat arms.

In summary then, CARS has limped along for 17 years performing only half its intended functions. While providing the Army's combat units with historical continuity and flexibility of organization, it has failed to generate the esprit and cohesiveness that bind the elements of each regiment together in a close family relationship. To develop this missing

aspect of the system, the colors of the 170 currently active CARS regiments should be located at their respective Branch/School Centers; a senior retired career officer and NCO should be designated as honorary Colonel and Sergeant Major to head each CARS regiment; these volunteer leaders of the regiment should be afforded the prerogatives, privileges and a modest sum of non-appropriated funds annually to function as the titular heads of the regimental families.

Enlistment options and recruiting themes should be modified to enhance the stature of the CARS regiments and the impact of the CARS system on today's Army. The short term, unaccompanied European tour scheme being considered by DA can be used to strengthen the relationship between CONUS and overseas-based elements of a regiment; consideration should be given to a half CONUS-half overseas tour option with assignment to an element of the same parent regiment in each location; use of a parent unit designation on personnel records as an additional factor in determining personnel assignments and in triggering automatic reports on such personnel to parent regiments should be examined.

These and other innovative ideas can revitalize the little utilized but potentially valuable esprit and morale generating capabilities of CARS. But without them the system will remain little more than the "bean counting" scheme it is now producing the correct numbers for the next combat unit to be activated or inactivated. What was conceived as a vehicle for preserving continuity, tradition and history will become the instrument that eventually separates and decentralizes the elements of a regiment to the point at which they lose their common identity. Then the "humpty dumpty" that opponents predicted CARS would become will never be put back together again.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 220-1, p. 4.
2. LTC K.R. Lamison and J.W. Wike, "Combat Arms Regimental System," Army Information Digest, September 1964, p. 17.
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