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FORWARD DEFENSE ON THE BATTLEFIELD

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FOREWORD

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The research and writing for this study were performed by Colonel William E. Hutchison, United States Marine Corps, who is assigned to the National War College as a Senior Research Fellow.

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ABSTRACT

NATO's concepts for the defense of Europe are seen differently by its members. Public interpretations of NATO's strategy in ministerial proceedings have varied over time and the record is ambiguous in any account. US views of the meaning of forward defense have become progressively more qualified. Europeans think mainly of deterrence and have difficulty contemplating implications of its collapse. There is no agreement within the Alliance on territorial objectives under the forward strategy, and little thought has been given on either side of the Atlantic to defining war outcomes which would consummate a successful defense. The role of nuclear weapons remains at issue. Comprehension of the nature of military decisions which could confront NATO as it prosecutes or seeks to end a war in Central Europe is limited. The likelihood of dispute is high, and this could weaken the war-making effectiveness of the Alliance.

Since the European allies do not feel threatened now and are not disposed to reopen a timeworn and inconclusive debate, the US must provide the needed leadership if it expects to create a firm basis for the long haul security of the Alliance. Essential conditions for progress include recognition in the US of the potential consequences in war of failure to agree in peace on the purposes of NATO's strategy of forward defense, and a desire to eliminate the sources of this disagreement.

If the US accepts the challenge, opportunity for compromise exists and programs can be found which together could remove much of the uncertainty which now afflicts NATO's military strategies. Principal among these are a firm US commitment to maintain or restore the frontier of West Germany if the Pact attacks, and a decision by the Alliance to structure its forces for the non-nuclear counteroffensive capability which would be needed to make that commitment credible. To find common ground with the US, the European allies would need to moderate their rigid views and adjust to the reality that the US does not position the nuclear threshold along NATO's eastern frontier.

SUMMARY

This paper examines forward defense and flexible response as strategic concepts for the defense of Central Europe. The purpose is to determine whether or not announced national and Alliance interpretations of these security policies represent a dependable framework for decisions affecting the use of NATO's forces in battle.

NATO's defensive concepts are seen differently by its members. Descriptions of NATO's strategy in ministerial communiques have varied over time and the record is ambiguous in any account. US views of the meaning of forward defense have become progressively more qualified. Common objectives cannot be found whose satisfaction would be seen by all the NATO participants as a successful defense in the aftermath of a Pact attack. The nations can agree on no better definition of the forward strategy than "to defend as far forward as possible"--a territorial objective which can be interpreted in at least two ways. First, the mission of defending forces may be construed in geographical terms; that is, to maintain resistance by whatever means in the region of the eastern frontier. An alternative explanation is that the defense should be mounted only as close to the border as NATO's forces are judged capable of sustaining against the expected threat. Both interpretations are held within the Alliance. The geographical view meets political needs of nations most exposed to Pact aggression; the FRG in particular. The second version accommodates inclinations of other nations who doubt NATO's ability to contain and repulse an attack near the boundary. Since about 1970, the US has become an increasingly conspicuous member of this latter group.

The flexible response concept has failed to bridge the gap between US and allied definitions of objectives under the forward strategy. First, the US purpose to "defend without major loss of territory" implies a willingness to concede some undefined area of West Germany--presumably in the interests of providing time for reinforcements to offset early Pact conventional advantage. Second, the US does not believe that NATO's forces can be sized to expel the Pact from incursions it might succeed in making, at least in the early period. Third, US policies do not in any sense bond a nuclear response to preservation of political boundaries as the European allies, especially the FRG, would have it. Finally, despite US reservations, the European allies continue to threaten early use of nuclear weapons; both to compensate for NATO's perceived conventional deficiencies if war occurs, and as part of their attempts to reinforce the deterrent value of the strategy.

Objectives and Decisions

Without common understanding of strategic purpose in peace, severe difficulties could confront the Alliance in sorting out its territorial objectives after the war began. A particular problem is that strategic conceptions of the European allies cannot rationally be converted to the battlefield. This is true for two reasons. First, the initial velocity of a large Pact attack would drive NATO's forces back from the frontier, and, in the absence of some miracle on which it could not plan, the Alliance would not possess the capability to reduce the salient--whatever its size. Second, despite NATO's inability by most estimates to defend the frontier, the US unambiguously excludes the certainty of a nuclear response to achieve that objective. For these reasons, the missions which the European allies now imagine for NATO's forces--especially its nuclear forces--would be revealed by a determined Pact attack to have been departures from military and political reality. Any expectation on their part that the US would, in fact, begin a climb up the nuclear ladder to reinforce a failing conventional defense at the border would be promptly extinguished.

This failure in logic is the upshot of any attempt to adapt European views of the forward strategy to the battlefield. The point of fracture is not hard to find. The European allies are not prepared to fight a war; they prepare, instead, not to fight a war. They have entrusted their destiny completely to deterrence, since their announced beliefs about how the defense should be conducted would lead to a different force--qualitatively, quantitatively, or both--than exists today or is projected either in Europe or the US.

The evidence is not limited to these facts about force capabilities and US nuclear policies. The European allies return with stupefying regularity to their theme of nuclear attacks triggered inevitably by penetrations of political boundaries with which conventional forces might not immediately be able to cope. By implicitly basing their defense policies on the questionable assumption that nuclear strikes can compensate for insufficient conventional capability, they attempt to achieve security on the cheap; or, what is the same thing, depend mainly on the US nuclear commitment, however qualified. The price of that commitment--and it is small relative to the potential danger they face--is just enough capability to sustain the cherished US desire for a credible conventional defense and some balance-of-payment remuneration. The last measure of irony is that the allies do not believe that conventional capability adequate for effective defense is attainable in the first place.

In European perspectives, the forward strategy and flexible response have in this way been decoupled from any need to supply capabilities sufficient for a confident conventional defense. It can be concluded that the Alliance is effectively without an agreed concept for fighting a war. In the absence of common strategic purpose, disputes about where, on the ground, and when the war should be ended can be expected to confound the Alliance.

Even in the best of circumstances, where the strategic objective is clear and uniformly accepted, arriving at these decisions would test the most stable political structures. Where this condition does not exist, as is the case in NATO, uncertainty regarding territorial objectives can be expected to weaken the war-making effectiveness of the Alliance.

Combat Operations Under the Strategy

The pernicious effects of an ambiguous strategy with great political but little military usefulness may not be limited only to confusion about war-ending objectives. Strategic uncertainty would be likely also to afflict NATO's tactical decision processes. Two general concepts for conducting the defense based on the differing interpretations of defending "as far forward as possible" given earlier can be postulated to illustrate why this might occur. The first, or geographical, version would result in combat operations designed to prosecute the war essentially on or near NATO's eastern frontier using nuclear weapons if needed for this purpose. The second concept would subordinate the importance of political boundaries to other objectives, especially to limiting incentives for nuclear defense. Under this concept, the defending forces would maintain resistance in the initial period only as far to the east as NATO's conventional capabilities permit. These views can be attributed respectively to the European allies and the US, and would obviously lead to different judgments regarding the preferred employment of NATO's forces in combat.

There are no important considerations affecting the actual conduct of a forward defense on which advocates of the two different concepts would uniformly agree. Decisions regarding defense locations, use of reserves, tactical air missions, maneuver and force posture (for conventional or nuclear combat) could force this disagreement to the surface in the first few days or weeks of the campaign. The probability of differences on preferred tactics would be highest in marginal situations on the battlefield--especially in decisions as to whether or not continued defense or reinforcement of this locale or that might be advisable. Different judgments of acceptable risk could obstruct attempts to reach tactical decisions since, particularly in the early period, the possibility of catastrophic error would be high. If the announcements of the Europeans are to be believed, they would be inclined to accept these risks, including nuclear risks, if they thought the likely results on the battlefield would convince the Pact of their determination to resist at all costs. The US, on the other hand, would be less disposed to court destruction of its forces near the frontier or to gamble on Soviet nuclear forbearance.

Credible missions for the forces in battle cannot be derived from European versions of the forward strategy and flexible response for the same reasons which prevent agreement on a territorial criterion for the defense. These defense concepts remain burdened not only by uncertainty

regarding ultimate objectives on the ground in Europe, but are encumbered as well by the likelihood of differences in judgment which could impair NATO's tactical decision-making from the onset of the war.

Tolerating Strategic Uncertainty

The political and military disconnects embedded in NATO's defense concepts and forces of the sort described are evidently believed impervious to solution, and inducements to resolve these arguments have been found less than compelling. Instead, and in the absence of alternatives, an arrangement has developed in the Alliance over the years which permits military and political cooperation to go forward despite profound differences in nuclear and conventional defense concepts. In effect, an accommodation has been reached which evades severe contradictions between the capability needed to contain and repulse an attack and the forces available, and submerges the potential consequences of conflicting perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons. Currently, this understanding is exhibited primarily in the flexible response concept--a war-fighting policy which enables the European allies to find courage in nuclear alarms while maintaining smaller conventional forces than they are plainly capable of supporting and, at the same time, permits the US to press for improved conventional capabilities to reduce the likelihood that its nuclear commitment need ever be made good. The Alliance has in this fashion demonstrated a large and enduring capacity to abide strategic uncertainty.

The European allies find these questions of strategic purpose only vaguely unsettling--believing themselves in no immediate danger, and also finding it hard to think about the actual execution of a forward defense anyway. The US, however, should not consign its own future security to the conditions of plausible disaster which accompany these European attitudes. For its own purposes, the US should come to grips with the potential wartime consequences of an indeterminate strategy--out of concern for its own force and contingency planning, if for no other reasons. But the US should also be able to view the strategy formulation problem in broader perspective. The interests of the Alliance and its member nations are not served by a collective if unspoken agreement to avoid the hard military questions which continue to contaminate NATO's concepts for the defense of Europe. As is so often the case in NATO, it is up to the US to disinter and reexamine the strategic objective and nuclear doctrine problems of forward defense and flexible response before these concepts atrophy from neglect.

A Framework for Decisions

There are some reasons why reinvigorated debate on NATO's strategy might bring payoffs. Several factors at work in the Alliance environment could make new study worthwhile. From the military point of view, although

there are pressures for force reduction, these probably exist on both sides, and, in any case, the quality of NATO's conventional forces has improved relatively more than the Pact's in recent years. The urging of recent US Secretaries of Defense has achieved good results in Europe in the way of improved anti-tank capabilities, aircraft sheltering, command arrangements and cooperative logistics. The French seem to be adjusting to more accommodating policies for military cooperation. In terms of conventional force capabilities relative to the Pact's, the trend for NATO is up, whatever the sources of the various stimuli which have produced this important progress.

These improved and improving capabilities for non-nuclear defense have produced another condition needed for progress on the issue of strategy. This is the "rough" conventional balance which the US seems now to believe exists between the two sides. If such a balance has been achieved, then the gap between capabilities and the demands the European allies place on the strategy has been narrowed significantly. The attainment of conventional parity represents opportunity, not present before, for positive leadership by the US to generate a parallel advance toward agreement on how NATO's improved forces should be employed in the defense of Europe--both nuclear and non-nuclear. The US objective should be to construct a policy framework for decisions affecting the forces which can be seen by all the nations to be consistent with their own vital security interests in peace or war.

First, in the presence of conventional equilibrium, the US should now consider a stronger commitment to forward defense, and its current practice of temporizing about ending the war at the frontier one way or another stopped. Next, to find common ground with the US, the Europeans should moderate their rigid views. The likelihood of some early Pact success must be accepted as a military reality for the conventional defense. All delusions they now seem to harbor about the certainty of nuclear strikes to shore up defenses along the frontier need to be shed. These expectations should, instead, be circumscribed by a willingness to contemplate some initial loss of territory in the belief that the US commitment to assist in repelling the invasion can be depended upon.

Thus, in trade for some European flexibility regarding the relationship of territory and the decision to use nuclear weapons, the US should assure the FRG that it has no intention of limiting its commitment only to a containing the Pact attack "without major loss of territory." A US guarantee that its ultimate objective is without question a restored frontier would remove any latent Soviet belief that a limited objective attack would be tolerated by the Alliance--as the FRG, with considerable justification, now seems to fear. Without such compromise, there is no chance whatever that the Alliance can make progress on any issue of strategy design.

It is likely that political difficulties would make progress slow if efforts were limited only to attempts at compromise. More concrete and visible actions affecting NATO's strategies and forces could be important means of accelerating the process of accommodation. For example, some rethinking of the missions assigned NATO's forces seems in order. Presently, these missions are cast entirely in terms of defense at the strategic level. This limited interpretation of strategic purpose is entirely inconsistent with the situation NATO is most likely to face on the battlefield. As argued earlier, and setting aside defeat which is of no interest, the initial phase of a successful defense would probably conclude with some NATO territory still occupied by the Pact. If the Alliance can comprehend the possibility of containing the attack anywhere in the FRG, it should surely be able to foresee that, sooner or later, a counteroffensive would be the only conceivable course of military action on which agreement could be reached. For this reason, the inherent tendency of NATO to conduct its military affairs only in the context of a strategic defense has the effect of obscuring the vital importance of planning also for the offensive operation which would be required to eject the Pact from NATO territory it might choose to defend.

It need scarcely be said that NATO does not today possess a realistic capability for counteroffensive operations. This is true not so much because of the size of the forces, which, we believe are now in general balance with the Pact's, but because of their defensive characteristics. That NATO's ground force structure is inherently defensive can be shown easily enough. First, the Pact can muster nearly three times as many tanks in the Central Region as NATO and at least this advantage persists for the length of the period of initial reinforcement. Second, the conventional balance can be claimed only if NATO's ground and helicopter anti-tank weapons are included in the calculation to offset this Pact superiority (tactical aircraft might compensate somewhat, depending on weather and reinforcement decisions on both sides, but their tank-killing contribution is likely to be modest in the early period.) Third, major anti-tank weapon programs designed to provide the bulk of this offset are infantry missile systems, mostly ground-mounted, hand-held, or perched atop lightly armored vehicles. In most of these systems, either the crew, the missile, or both, are exposed and vulnerable to small arms and fragmenting munitions of all types. The US TOW and Dragon anti-tank missile systems are prominent members of this family. While these weapons may provide superb capabilities to defend against an armored offensive (assuming they can be sheltered in some fashion from the intense artillery and rocket fires which can be expected to accompany that assault), they are virtually incapable of taking ground against the kind of well-supported and protected defense the Soviets can mount.

A partiality for defensive weaponry in NATO is no accident. The first-order problem facing the Alliance has been to devise ways to resist an attack, never mind any thought of a subsequent offensive. Since NATO seems now to have achieved this capability, however, it is appropriate to think

less about containing the attack--a problem which, if not solved, is near solution--and more about developing a potential for follow-on offensive operations. Such a capability possesses attributes which place it at the heart of the argument that a realistic and agreed conception of the forward strategy is achievable. First, and above all, it accounts for the most probable situation on the battlefield if NATO succeeds in holding. Second, it reduces the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be needed to achieve the most demanding objective of the forward strategy--a restored frontier. For both of these reasons, an option for a non-nuclear counteroffensive is the one ingredient which, if incorporated in the concept of flexible response, could make believable a US commitment to reestablish the territorial integrity of the FRG.

The policy changes needed for a plan designed to achieve an agreed conception of the forward strategy for fighting a war can be summarized as follows:

- First, compromise is imperative: A firm US commitment to forward defense and European acceptance of US policies which do not link nuclear strikes to the frontier.

- Second, an objective to include a non-nuclear counteroffensive option in NATO's array of responses to aggression should be adopted: To make the US commitment credible by aligning the flexible response concept with the predictable and inescapable situation on the battlefield; and to supply, thereby, the survival guarantee required by the European allies.

If NATO were able to agree on the necessity for adopting such a plan, a supporting program would also be required to restructure NATO's forces; that is, to begin the process, however gradual, of removing the bias now present in NATO's force structure and programs, and, in this way to generate a capability for strategic non-nuclear offensive as well as defensive operations. It should be understood that higher force levels form no part of the program. First, a "rough" conventional balance suggests that NATO already possesses the combat resources needed to contain the expected threat. Further, NATO currently has more men under arms and, depending on the period of mobilization, can outman the Pact in the Central Region. It is the quality of NATO's force structure, not its size, which must be changed to create a legitimate capability to attack, as well as defend against, large armored formations. The source of funds needed to begin this qualitative change lies in those current actions now underway which are designed to release resources in various ways to improve NATO's combat potential; including increased use of civilian logistic capacity, reduced support forces and more reliance on more effective reserves. An example is the US plan to add three active Army divisions to its land forces without increasing manpower in that category.

The point is, NATO is already improving and restructuring its forces, and on a large scale.

For this reason, NATO has an opportunity to begin elimination of the defensive polarization of its present force. Central to this process would be a test to be met by all proposed structure changes or improvements affecting forces in or destined for Europe. Each such change in programs would be required to demonstrate a positive and measurable contribution to NATO's capabilities for offensive operations, in addition to any other criteria for adoption.

This test exhibits some useful characteristics. First, it is simple and easily comprehended by concerned interests--military, political and industrial. Second, it can be readily applied to new weapon systems or force structure change proposals. Finally, it is a low-risk specification because a force possessing realistic capabilities for armored offensive warfare would also be more effective in conventional defense and nuclear operations.

A decision to impose an offensive capability filter for new programs would need to be preceded by an assessment of its cost implications. As has been pointed out, however, only those funds now being switched to improve combat capability are needed to begin. The planned increase in US Army divisions and expected improvements in the Bundeswehr suggest that these shifts are not small. It is not clear, moreover, that true costs would rise and, in fact, they might fall. By "true costs" is meant the cost of fielding a survivable and effective tank-killing force in Central Europe. For example, if a major new anti-tank weapon system cannot endure or avoid small arms, artillery or anti-aircraft fire when in action to destroy tanks--whether in the defense or offense--it is not "cost-effective." The productivity of these vulnerable systems, as measured by tanks killed per weapon in the Central Region, is more likely to be small, particularly if the suppression effects of artillery and rockets or air defenses are included in the calculation.

If each weapon system development of the future were required, on the other hand, to meet the design parameter of realistic contribution to large-scale non-nuclear offensive operations in the Central Region, it would not be long before industry, and thereby the technology of the West, would be increasing the survivability of each new system for any kind of combat in Europe. Increased peacetime costs, if any, of units equipped with these systems should be offset by lowered personnel requirements made possible by raising the expected level of tank-kills per man in combat.

The technological superiority of the West should be harnessed in this way, as it is not now, to begin development of a conventional force structure which is insensitive to the types of missions which it might be called on

to perform. The objective of this technological effort should be to reduce total manpower requirements while insuring that men retained and their weapons are better protected, more mobile and, therefore, more likely to remain effective in the intense combat environment--defensive or offensive--which can be anticipated in Central Europe. A decision by the Alliance to mobilize and systematically apply the one great advantage it retains over the Pact against a low-risk force improvement criterion is the remaining policy change needed for a plan and a program designed to produce a force integrated with a strategy for war.

New defense concepts, new strategies are not needed. Forward defense is the right strategy; it is the only strategy which can insure that the FRG remains a Western power. Flexible response is identically the right concept for implementing the forward strategy, so long as nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the two sides. It is only that the concept must be understood to be flexible in missions equally as in weaponry, and that these missions include the counteroffensive operations which would be needed to regain the frontier.

The compromises, force mission and structure changes and programs sketched out here satisfy minimum conditions for a credible framework for decisions affecting the forces in peace or war: Before the war, political and military agreement on the way the defense of Europe is to be conducted and a force development program to underwrite that compromise. After the war begins, an objective and a capability first to absorb and then to repulse the Pact attack, and by non-nuclear means.

There seem to be but two alternatives to new US study of NATO strategy. One is to continue the current practice; that is, to observe, as if from another planet, the European allies in their protracted gamble on threats of nuclear responses to aggression which they are unable and the US would be unwilling to deliver. The other is to follow, not lead, these allies in steadfast reliance on a decaying nuclear deterrence; trusting in detente to substitute tranquillity for the conventional capability otherwise needed to compensate for that weakening curb on Soviet ambitions. Before either of these alternatives is chosen, the matter of NATO's strategic purpose in war seems worthy of more attention than it is receiving in the US today.

I

INTRODUCTION

> My purpose has been to begin . . .construction of a satisfactory basis for maintaining an overall NATO security posture for the long haul, including balanced forces with rational missions credible to our adversaries and ourselves.
>
> --James R. Schlesinger
> Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975

There are a number of reasons today why it is timely, if not urgent, for the US and its European allies to reappraise the strategies and forces which have been chosen for defense of NATO. Such an examination of these military interests of the Alliance would be consistent with the political processes now in motion to redefine or reaffirm the purposes and future course of NATO. Moreover, the forward strategy--foundation for all NATO's defensive concepts--was adopted nearly a quarter of a century ago in reaction to the communist attack on South Korea. Flexibility in response was formally accepted by the Alliance in 1967, although the policy actually dates from 1961 when the US abandoned massive retaliation in anticipation of Soviet-US strategic nuclear parity. Since these decisions, political, military and economic relationships in Europe and the world have changed, and the architects of those strategic concepts and their governments have long passed into history.

The pyramiding effects of these adjustments in international conditions are readily observable in Europe and NATO. Serious political difficulties have arisen to frustrate the Alliance as it has attempted to accommodate the new realities. Questions of consultation, US commitment, force reduction and the implications of detente for US-European relations remain to be settled. Some members, notably the UK and the Netherlands, are forecasting force reductions. Others may follow, as the various nations attempt to accommodate recent shifts in national and international economic affairs. These and other problems now facing the Alliance do not require additional recounting or amplification here, since it seems clear that the situation within NATO has reached a point where, as Secretary Kissinger said in London in December 1973, "A comprehensive reexamination of all aspects of our relationship--economic, political and military--is imperative."

At least two reasons justify inclusion of NATO's strategic concepts for the defense of Europe in the military part of the work responding to the Secretary's initiative. First, though these concepts have guided security planning in the Alliance for some years, it is important to determine whether or not current interpretations of NATO's defensive doctrine represent a dependable framework for decisions affecting the use of the forces in battle. Second, some assurance is needed that national perceptions of military strategy are consistent with new political and economic policies which may be adopted as the Alliance reconciles its future with the changing international climate. This paper pertains to the first of these, concerning itself with the way NATO has devised its strategies and the workability of the concepts which have emerged.

In Part II, collective and individual views of the member nations regarding the purposes of NATO's defense concepts are examined as to their source and characteristics over time. Parts III and IV present some judgments about potential consequences in war of prevailing interpretations of the forward strategy. Part V then explains how the Alliance functions in the presence of uncertainty concerning its strategic purpose. Finally, PART VI describes a course of action requiring US leadership which could contribute to strengthening the strategic foundation of NATO's policy of common defense.

The issue is limited here, by intent, to aspects of the strategy having to do with fighting the war. The matter of deterrence--the other vital purpose which the strategy should serve--is not included in the examination; first, because an objective to avoid war can hardly be in dispute, and, second, because the deterrent value of a strategy can only be estimated in light of other factors which also contribute to the absence of war. Further, the likelihood of a Pact attack is not evaluated; only implications of the strategy which bear on its execution if the attack occurs are considered. The discussion is confined to the Central Region, although the logic could be extended easily to the flanks of NATO.

II

THE FORWARD STRATEGY IN TRANSLATION

Despite long debate, numerous uncertainties remain about objectives other than deterrence the forward strategy should be designed to serve. A set of agreed military objectives and outcomes cannot be found whose satisfaction could reasonably be construed in the aftermath as a successful forward defense against a Pact attack. Further, although NATO's declaratory strategy for repelling an attack is reaffirmed publicly with great frequency, its purpose other than prevention of war must surely be at least as obscure to the Soviets as it is in the West.

There is today wide variance among interpretations of the territorial objectives of the strategy; that is, where, on the ground, should the attack be stopped? As is known well enough, there are many explanations, political and military, why this question cannot be satisfactorily answered, and, indeed, may never be. Not least of these is that it is very hard to predict the kinds of outcomes which could conceivably be enforced by NATO in a war with the Pact. For this reason, doubt as to NATO's capability to achieve its military objectives, however defined, can be expected to continue. Despite these uncertainties, judgments have been made as to the strategic intent of the Alliance if war occurs. An examination of interpretations in NATO and by the US and the European allies over the years is useful as an aid to illustrating and understanding the nature and origin of obstacles to agreement on the strategic aims of the Alliance.

According to NATO

The North Atlantic Charter created NATO in 1949. Article 5 of the Charter states the military obligations and objectives undertaken by the nations in a reasonably direct way by providing, in part, that:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree (to take) such action as (deemed) necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.[1]

The signers evidently had in mind that, following an attack, the allies would seek at least to regain pre-war boundaries and some measure of postwar military security. Clearly, nations could not have agreed on any military purpose for the Alliance which would stop short of insuring the reestablishment of frontiers.

In 1950, the ministers adopted a new military strategy to implement the provisions of Article 5:

> . . .there was complete agreement, that a forward strategy should be adopted in Europe, i.e., that any aggression should be resisted as far to the East as possible in order to ensure the defense of all NATO European countries.[2]

The purpose given the forward strategy when it was first agreed seems to temper the military objectives implied by Article 5. In particular, the territorial criterion for the defense is qualified by the words "as far to the East as possible." It can be presumed that the reasons for ambiguity probably had to do with rationalization of military capabilities attainable under prevailing or anticipated outlays for defense with declaratory strategies which were politically acceptable. The fact is that the new forward strategy was totally inconsistent with the capabilities of NATO's forces then existing. The ministers recognized this problem at the time and the nations set about increasing their forces and arranging for incorporation of the FRG within the Alliance. Nevertheless, a deliberate strategic decision was made in conscious departure from prevailing military realities. Thus was the divergence between forces and strategies born in 1950, and the need to compromise military and political purposes of NATO's concept of forward defense has persisted since.

The advent in 1967 of flexibility in response did not further clarify objectives of the forward strategy. In fact, NATO's interpretations of the concept have varied over time. The foreign ministers first described flexible response in December 1967 in the following way:

> This concept, which adapts NATO's strategy to current political, military, and technological developments, is based upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. These responses, subject to appropriate political control, are designed, first to deter aggression and thus preserve peace; but, should aggression unhappily occur, to maintain the security and integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty area within the concept of forward defense.[3]

An objective of maintaining security should deterrence fail is included as part of the new concept, but in the context of forward defense. The purpose of forward defense, however, is to defend as far to the east "as possible" --a territorial objective which can be interpreted in at least two ways. First, the mission of the defending forces could be construed in geographical terms, that is, to resist at the eastern limits of NATO's boundaries. An alternative, and equally plausible interpretation, is that the defense should be mounted

only as close to the border as NATO's forces were believed capable of sustaining against the expected threat. The probability is that both interpretations were held within the Alliance. The geographical view would meet the political needs of nations bordering the Pact, and the second version would accommodate the inclinations of other nations who perhaps doubted NATO's ability to defeat an attack at or near the border, and were not disposed to develop the forces needed for such a high-confidence defense.

The 1968 Czech crisis did not inspire additional firmness in NATO's declarations regarding its military purposes in war. Following the Soviet invasion, the ministers limited their substantive reaction to a pledge that:

> The quality, effectiveness and deployment of NATO's forces will be improved. . .in order to provide a better capability for defense as far forward as possible. 4

We are left to speculate on what additional capability the force improvements were expected to provide--was it to defend further forward than before, or to defend more effectively at whatever point was believed defensible?

In 1970, the ministers, in their December communique, reaffirmed NATO's defense concepts in this way:

> Ministers confirmed the continued validity of the NATO strategy of flexibility in response, which includes forward defense, reinforcement of the flanks and capabilities for rapid mobilization, and calls for the maintenance of military capabilities which are able to provide an appropriate counter to any aggression.[5]

This statement is at once an expansion, a contraction and contradiction of the 1967 declaration on flexible response. It is an expansion because it specifies some elements (mobilization, reinforcement) of the concept and a contraction because, unaccountably, the purpose "to maintain the security and integrity" of NATO contained in the earlier version is absent. Finally, the declaration changes the association of forward defense and flexible response by defining the second in terms of the first, an inversion of the 1967 statement. The equivocality of one defense concept was thereby implanted firmly in the ambiguity of another, and the ministers have not chosen more recently to enlighten us further.

Since 1970, communiques of the North Atlantic Council have been preoccupied with the onset of negotiations regarding security relationships and mutual force reductions, and rationalizing these activities with continuing efforts to improve NATO's defense capabilities. Other than occasional references to the need to maintain forces adequate for deterrence

at all levels, little additional public attention has been given by the ministers to NATO's military strategy in the last three or four years. For example, defense ministers, in their communique of 7 December 1973, were content to state that:

> They reaffirmed that the fundamental purpose of NATO is to deter aggression and to preserve all members of the Alliance from attack or threat from outside. They stressed that fulfillment of this purpose depends on maintaining a capability of conventional as well as nuclear forces balanced with the Warsaw Pact.[6]

There is a new element in this statement, however, and it is the appearance, for perhaps the first time, of an agreed objective to work toward a "balance" of forces. The inclusion of this objective is undoubtedly a result of US initiatives. The US, as discussed in more detail later, has experienced difficulty with the forward strategy as a basis for sizing its forces. The notion of "balance" substitutes a peacetime purpose for the Alliance which can be generally understood by laymen and at the same time is probably a convenient means for circumventing the emotional problem of agreeing on interpretations of the forward strategy for the benefit of the body politic--East or West. In terms of what can be thrashed out at the ministerial level for public consumption at least, forward defense and flexibility in response are concepts which remain poorly defined in agreed statements as to their meaning in the way of missions for NATO's military forces should war occur.

When one takes into consideration the difficulties of drafting statements on which 15 different nations can agree, it is perhaps understandable that these pronouncements are not always consistent. It must be said, nevertheless, that it is not possible to derive a coherent understanding of NATO's strategic purpose in war from the public account of proceedings within the Alliance. The reasons for this uneven record become more apparent when US views and those of the European allies are examined and compared.

According to the US

There has been a drift away from precision in US statements regarding NATO's defense concepts since Secretary McNamara stated in 1968:

> . . .neither the United States nor its allies have ever contemplated a war in which falling back upon French soil through the battlefield of Germany was an acceptable strategy for the Alliance. . . our military strategy is and remains the forward defense of Western Europe, which means, in Central Europe, a defense at the frontier of Western Germany. Our

> commitment, our deployments, our strategy and our forces are oriented as far as possible to that forward strategy, and to the use of whatever force and weapons may be necessary to achieve this forward defense.[7]

The Secretary's interpretation of the purpose of NATO's forces and strategy in the event of a Pact attack could hardly be more exacting in terms of its intended territorial outcome. There is no doubt that, at that time, Mr. McNamara believed the eastern border to be the proper geographical objective for calibrating the success or failure of a forward defense.

Subsequent statements by later Secretaries of Defense were different in tone and dramatically less specific, as US views of the forward strategy became progressively more qualified. By 1972, US support for NATO's defensive concepts began to be conditioned by an interpretation called "initial defense." The state of US decision-level planning for forward defense at that time is illustrated by the following two interchanges in Defense Department testimony before Congress:

> Question. Is it true that the present forward defense posture of NATO, that is, to defend NATO territory as far forward as possible, is based more on political considerations for maintaining the integrity of German territory than it is on military feasibility or desirability?
>
> Answer. We believe that war is effectively deterred by having a credible military posture so that any would-be aggressor knows his attack will be met with an immediate and effective response to preclude his attainment of military objectives. To convey this message, it is imperative that our forces be as far forward as feasible, so that should he choose to attack we can then make real the message, which he failed to correctly perceive. Both the NATO Military Authorities and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a forward defense is feasible and desirable.
>
> Of course, the ultimate objective is to stop a major attack and stabilize the military situation without major loss of NATO territory, German or otherwise.[8]

Later, in the same period of testimony, another question was posed to the Defense Department:

> Question. . . .Precisely, Mr. Secretary, what do you mean by the term "initial defense"?. . .
>
> Answer. . . .Initial defense means stopping a major attack and stabilizing the military situation. . .[9]

In these statements there is no residue of Secretary McNamara's belief that a territorial objective of the strategy should be a restored Pact/NATO border. To defend "without major loss of territory" and to "stabilize the situation" became the new objectives in the US interpretation.

Testimony by the Defense Department under Secretary Richardson and Secretary Schlesinger shows that these conceptual problems of NATO's strategic purpose were taken up only inferentially. For example, Secretary Richardson did not attempt to identify the war-fighting objectives of the strategy at all. He instead limited his 1973 posture statement to an interpretation of the deterrent nature of the strategy:

> Current NATO strategy, in an era of relative strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, calls for a range of capabilities--strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional--to pose a credible deterrent to aggression at any level.[10]

In his annual report of March 1974, Secretary Schlesinger also makes no mention of the territorial implications of forward defense:

> . . .the United States forces in Europe. . .are sized to help maintain a stalwart conventional defense against an attack by the Pact after little warning, and I believe that mission continues to be essential despite the steps we have taken toward detente.[11]

More recently, in the report to Congress of February 1975, Secretary Schlesinger has put the matter of US objectives in Europe somewhat differently, but their territorial significance remains open to interpretation:

> The view of this Department is that, within the framework of the strategic concept, we have two fundamental needs: the capacity for a successful strong initial forward defense based primarily on our active forces; and a long-war hedge that depends primarily on our guard and reserve forces and our production base.
>
> Surely, if we wish to preserve our essential interests and maintain the nuclear threshold at a high level, we should keep sufficient active and ready conventional forces, along with selected, high-priority reserves, to have a high probability of repelling an initial attack in such crucial theaters as Central Europe and Northeast Asia.[12]

The series of quotations above illustrates the evolution which has occurred over time in US thinking regarding its own commitment to the defense of NATO territory. When Secretary McNamara made his rigorous interpretation of forward defense--that is, to end the war at NATO's eastern border, the force level implications of the concept were probably not fully understood. Later study and reflection revealed a conflict between the US objective of fighting the war at non-nuclear levels and those political interpretations of the strategy which would require recapturing any NATO territory lost to the Pact or immediate use of nuclear weapons to prevent such a loss. Most assessments of the relative capabilities of the two sides made by the US in the intervening years showed that the Pact could probably make some significant incursions in the early period. This meant that an objective of reproducing the frontier would require forces sized and structured fundamentally for defense to shift to offensive operations at some point. Forces needed for such a capability relative to the expected threat seemed beyond conceivable NATO military budgets. That the US has no plans to make up for this deficiency with nuclear weapons was made plain by Secretary Schlesinger:

> I must stress that our tactical nuclear systems do not now and are most unlikely in the future to constitute a serious substitute for a stalwart non-nuclear defense. In fact, we must recognize in our planning that the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons--however small, clean, and precisely used they might be--would be the most agonizing that could face any national leader. Accordingly, we and our allies must keep strong conventional forces at hand.[13]

The US has found that, if the nations most affected will not absorb a larger burden, it cannot fill the conventional gap alone, and, since it has foreclosed the substitution of nuclear weapons for this purpose, must plan its own non-nuclear forces on a less demanding objective than strict defense of the frontier would permit.

According to the Europeans

Earlier, it was shown that NATO declarations regarding the forward strategy and flexibility in response have been less than specific in defining related war-fighting objectives and also seem to change over time. The source of this irresolution can be found in the views of the European allies contrasted with those of the US.

The debate which led finally to adoption of flexibility in response in NATO illustrates that the concept was not seen in the same way on both sides of the Atlantic. The European allies, particularly the FRG, were overwhelmingly more interested in deterrence, and failing that, determination not to give up any territory at all in the event of war. American interests in improving conventional capabilities at the time alarmed the

Germans, since, as they perceived it, prompt use of nuclear weapons would be needed to resist the kinds of attacks they foresaw. The German concern with emphasis on the conventional end of the flexible response spectrum, and the related potential for lowering the deterrent value of the forward strategy, is evident in the views of Defense Minister Von Hassel who wrote in 1965 that:

> (The US concept) must not be interpreted to mean that the so-called atomic threshold can be raised unduly high, without reference to political considerations. Apart from the fact that this would lead the potential aggressor to think that he could calculate his risk, it would create a situation in which he could seize pawns for future negotiations.[14]

The FRG believed it inconceivable that a high-confidence conventional defense was achievable, and suspected that the US disposition for nuclear warfare would vary inversely with the NATO/Pact conventional force balance. Thus, increases in NATO's conventional capability relative to the Pact were seen as inherently diminishing the deterrent value of nuclear weapons as the certainty they would be used receded.

The British also stress their reliance on deterrence, and the importance of nuclear weapons for that purpose. Their concept of the capabilities and significance of conventional forces is also decidedly different than that of the US, as this 1970 statement by Defense Minister Healy in Parliamentary debate illustrates:

> Conventional forces are probably available in sufficient numbers to deter the sort of local military action that might lead to an armed confrontation. If they did not deter it, if a military clash began somewhere by accident, then the non-nuclear forces would still deal with it so long as it remained localized. If, however, the local clash led to a general attack, then the enemy would know that tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably be used if that attack were persisted in.[15]

Thus, the belief that an effective conventional capability is unattainable has produced a relentless devotion on the part of the European allies to planning (or at least threatening) early use of nuclear strikes to defeat a large Pact attack. Only after a change in government did the FRG begin to accept the fact that a conventional "option" was one of the prices which must be paid to assure continued strong US commitment.[16] A compromise was struck in 1967, but the disposition of the European allies to emphasize nuclear responses to aggression has not changed.

Differences between the US and its allies are not limited to questions of nuclear weapons and deterrence. The matter of the importance of national

boundaries is also at issue. The Germans place great emphasis on defense at the frontier, and couple the use of nuclear weapons to this objective. This rigid interpretation of the territorial implications of the forward strategy is made necessary, in German eyes at least, by the geopolitical situation in Central Europe. Since a uniform 50-mile penetration of the nation's eastern border would sacrifice about one-third of its territory, it is not hard to find some sympathy for this view. Complete grasp of the characteristic lack of depth for defense in the FRG is reflected in the missions assigned the Bundeswehr and the Army which are to "preserve or restore the integrity of federal territory" and "Forward Defense. . .along the country's border. . ." respectively.[17]

There is a certain significance for the US in this propensity of the FRG to sanctify its frontier, since German officers seem able to widen that dedication to include NATO command policies. General Jurgen Bennecke, then Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Central Europe, illustrated such an infiltration of German perspective when he wrote, in 1972:

> This concept (flexible response) comprises a sophisticated combination of defense and deterrence on several levels and includes the possibility of a positive period of conventional warfare before recourse to tactical nuclear and ultimately strategic nuclear weapons. In the Central Region the key word is "Forward Defense." We do not intend to allow large parts of our territory to be overrun or to trade space for time.[18]

Flexible Response and the Gap

A realistic assessment of US views over the last three or four years regarding objectives and policies for the defense of Europe might not encourage the European allies, especially the FRG. They could find, in fact, that they are attributing characteristics to NATO's defense concepts which do not exist and which, incidentally, the Soviets must also know do not exist. First, US policies do not in any sense bond a nuclear response irrevocably to preservation of political boundaries, as the Germans would have it. They should also discover that the US would be willing to concede some undefined amount of territory to the Pact in the interests of providing time for US reinforcement which would, in turn, reduce the need for nuclear defense. Finally, beginning about 1971, annual reports of the Department of Defense would show that the US does not believe that NATO's forces can be sized to expel the Pact from territory it might succeed in capturing. Reflection on these facts should lead these allies to the conclusion that something is amiss in their practice of invoking always the nuclear menace without careful attention to the way a war might actually unfold.

Flexibility in response has for these reasons failed to bridge the gap between US and allied interpretations of the forward strategy. One has the uneasy impression, in fact, that conventional force improvement programs recently adopted in NATO were viewed in Europe more as an increased insurance premium for continued US commitment than any determination to achieve a realistic conventional capability against a full-scale Pact attack. There remains in European perspectives a strong attachment to threats of early use of nuclear weapons despite US reservations, and it is that end of the range of responses on which they lean most heavily in NATO councils. The result is that when NATO issues public declarations regarding defense strategy, emphasis is mainly on the one objective on which all can agree--its intent to deter the Pact. There is, for these reasons, no firm common ground on which NATO could base an agreed policy statement pinning down either objectives or missions for the forces in war.

III

OBJECTIVES AND DECISIONS

The foregoing discussion serves as background to describe a situation already well known within the Alliance. Europeans in the main exert themselves to perserve the deterrent content of the strategy, virtually to the exclusion of any attempt to rationalize its purpose in war. The US, on the other hand, struggles with the wartime consequences of the strategy, particularly the decisions which would be needed if conventional defenses proved inadequate to prevent a significant Pact encroachment. Perhaps less well understood are the potential difficulties which could confront the Alliance in sorting out its objectives if, for whatever reason, deterrence collapses and the Pact chooses to launch a major attack.

Some comprehension of the nature of the decisions which might face NATO in these circumstances is possible if the problem is examined in the context of a forward defense on the battlefield. Because converting the strategy to objectives on the ground has been the most troublesome conceptual difficulty in peacetime, it is used also to examine wartime implications of strategic uncertainty.

The Territorial Criterion

Short of some catastrophic event such as the nuclear devastation of Europe, it is unlikely that nations with some fraction of their territory occupied by the Pact would be disposed to negotiate a settlement which ratified such an outcome, particularly those possessing significant residual military capability, conventional or nuclear. In contrast, other nations, without territory at stake and under identical conditions, might be more willing to end the war, both to limit further damage to themselves and to avoid nuclear disaster. It can scarcely be argued that this situation might not arise despite any pre-war agreement regarding territorial objectives of the strategy after the war started. What can be argued, however, is that nations in danger of losing territory under negotiated settlement would have a firm political basis under the forward strategy strictly related to Article 5 for prolonging and, especially, escalating the war.

In fact, it is very hard to postulate a scenario for ending a war in Central Europe. Consider, for example, the type of large Pact attack many seem to believe possible--a main thrust crossing the North German Plain to cut the north-south line of communications and seize the North Sea ports. Such an attack could either have limited objectives, or, depending on the degree of success, constitute the first phase of a more ambitious campaign. Moreover, it could be delivered in a manner to avoid, or at least minimize,

contact with US ground forces, if desired, thereby dampening US enthusiasm for nuclear strikes. Further, if successful, the operation would drastically weaken NATO, because the Soviets would then control the major Central European lifeline.

Broadly, there are three possible outcomes: NATO holds at the border, NATO loses (with major loss of territory), or NATO contains the attack (without major loss of territory). As to the first, it strains credibility too much to believe that the Pact could not achieve some kind of sizable salient in the North in the early period--even if NATO defends with nuclear weapons and the Soviets are thereby intimidated as devoutly hoped. This is because, and there seems to be agreement within the Alliance on this question, nuclear strikes would follow a period of conventional operations. During this interval (a week?) NATO would simply not be capable of keeping the various convexities and concavities of the border precisely intact against the Pact onslaught.

Force ratios can be used to make the point. If the Pact can generate a 2:1 or 3:1 attacker/defender ratio, however measured, it is likely that it could--all other factors being equal between the two sides--seize some ground early in the war by exploiting traditional advantages of surprise, concentration and so forth. Complete success would not be guaranteed, however, because a 1:2 or 1:3 ratio also gives the defense a reasonable chance to survive. Since a D-Day defender/attacker force ratio in the region of 1:2 is probably achievable today in Central Europe, there is a certain equilibrium present. Stability could not be expected immediately, however. With a 2:1 advantage in the Central Region, the Pact could develop much higher ratios in sectors of main attack, while holding in or ignoring others. NATO would require time to redeploy to meet these attacks and during that period it is a virtual certainty that the Pact would be able to capture some territory. And this result is probable whether or not nuclear weapons are included in the calculation because of the initial physical momentum of the Pact offensive. Consequently, it can be said with reasonable assurance that NATO could not hold the initial Pact attack exactly at the frontier.

Since a NATO "loss" is not a matter for examination here, what about the third outcome wherein NATO absorbs the attack, but with some territory still left in Pact hands? Because this result might be enforceable by NATO, it is worth considering the types of decisions which would then be needed.

Suppose the attack were stopped at the Weser River--the first truly defensible line west of the FRG/GDR border. What decisions could be expected from Brussels? Nuclear strikes seem an improbable choice because of an associated high risk of Pact retaliation. Would NATO accept a stalemate? Perhaps, but, so long as the Alliance remained united, such a conditon

would be very unstable. Even if an attempt were then made to reach a settlement, it is hard to imagine grounds for agreement. NATO would clearly seek a Pact withdrawal, but it seems unlikely that the Alliance could achieve by negotiation an outcome it could not force on the battlefield. In contrast, the Soviets could be quite content to avoid further losses among their own forces, settle for access to the North Sea and contemplate the future benefits of a severely weakened NATO.

These conditions could not persist for long. NATO would be forced to choose, soon or late. Would the European allies capitulate? Such a damage-limiting alternative would undoubtedly be considered, but there is not much in the military history of these nations to suggest that they would make that choice. Certainly, their conceptions of the forward strategy suggest otherwise. If thoughts of inducing the Pact to retire by nuclear intimidation are set aside as they should be, the strategic mission would have to change. Such a shift in strategy would not be in the context of local counterattacks to peck away at Pact salients, but a fundamental change to counteroffensive operations with the purpose of forcing a Pact withdrawal behind the border.

The US would be presented in turn with some very unsavory alternatives. If it failed to support the allies, the loss of Western Europe would be a certainty. On the other hand, the US might join such an operation if it seemed anything less than suicidal under conditions existing on the battlefield. Unfortunately, neither the US nor the European allies plan for this contingency, a fact exhibited by the characteristics of the forces chosen on both sides of the Atlantic for the defense of Europe. Further, there are no plans to provide the incremental forces or effectiveness needed to achieve a counteroffensive capability. The defensive design of NATO's forces also acts as an additional constraint on capabilities to drive Pact Forces from terrain they might hold. It can therefore be concluded that an immediate shift to offensive operations would be foolhardy.

And this is where the logic of the forward strategy vaporizes. The condition wherein NATO has developed a force which might be able to absorb an attack but not thereafter dislodge the Pact from ground which it had decided to defend--a likely if not the most likely result of a successful forward defense, conventional or nuclear--precisely contradicts the previous reasoning that a decision to shift to offensive operations would be forced by such a circumstance. It makes no difference what scenario is conjured up, including instant nuclear warfare. The initial velocity of a large attack would drive NATO's defenses back from the frontier and, in the absence of some miracle on which it could not plan, the Alliance would not possess the capability to remove the incursion, whatever its size--small or large. The same types of dismaying decision situations as those hypothesized above can be derived for any scenario short of a Pact victory.

Deterrence Alone

This failure in logic is the upshot of any attempt to adapt European views of the forward strategy to the battlefield. The point of fracture is not hard to find. The European allies are not prepared to fight a war; they prepare, instead, not to fight a war. They have entrusted their destiny completely to deterrence, since their announced judgments about how the defense should be conducted would lead to a different force, qualitatively, quantitatively, or both, than exists today or is projected either in Europe or the US. It is therefore clear that the strategic orthodoxy of the major European allies is rooted in fantasy. Conventional forces are insufficient to defend the frontier, and the message from the US--which, if their public declarations are to be believed, these nations have so far failed to read correctly--unambiguously excludes the certainty of a nuclear response to achieve that perfect objective. The missions which these allies now imagine for both conventional and nuclear forces would be revealed abruptly by a determined Pact attack to have been departures from military and political reality. In particular, any expectation on their part that the US would, in fact, promptly begin a climb up the nuclear ladder to reinforce a failing defense at the border would be quickly extinguished.

And the evidence is not limited to these facts about force capabilities and US nuclear policies. The European allies return with stupefying regularity to their theme of nuclear attacks triggered inevitably by penetrations of political boundaries with which conventional forces might not immediately be able to cope. By relying on the erroneous assumption that nuclear forces substitute for conventional capability, they have grown accustomed to security on the cheap; or, what is the same thing, depending mainly on US nuclear support, however qualified. The price of that commitment--and it is small relative to the potential danger they face--is just enough capability to sustain the cherished US desire for a credible conventional defense and some balance-of-payment offsets. The last measure of irony is that the allies do not believe that conventional capability adequate for effective defense is attainable in the first place.

In European perspectives, the forward strategy and flexible response have in this way been decoupled from any need to supply capabilities sufficient for confident conventional defense. It can be concluded that the Alliance is effectively without an agreed concept for fighting a war. In the absence of common strategic purpose, disputes about where, on the ground, and when the war should be ended can be expected to confound the Alliance. Attempts to agree on a territorial criterion for ending the war could test the unity of NATO as no other problem. Even in the best of circumstances, where the strategic objective is clear and uniformly accepted, arriving at these decisions would test the most stable political structures. Where this condition does not exist, as is the case in NATO, it cannot be ruled out that one nation or another might act according to its own perceived

best interests--an event made possible by the geographical arrangements for defense, with the various corps sectors in the Central Region distributed by nationality in the wake of occupation.

Thus, the probability must be judged high that internal conflict could result in unilateral actions by one or another of the allies which would eviscerate the Alliance--including initiatives for a separate peace, or resort to the use of strategic nuclear weapons, a capability resident in the armed forces of both the UK and, especially, France. European adherence to the idea of a defense which would begin, continue and end at the frontier is therefore an illusion of the worst kind which serves no useful military purpose and even less the future security of the exposed nations.

IV

COMBAT OPERATIONS UNDER THE STRATEGY

The problem of objectives dominates military thought because from objectives can be derived missions for the forces in war; that is to say, they define the military task. As has been shown, the military objectives of NATO's defensive strategy must be inferred, since they are not explicit. From the process of inference, different objectives have emerged. While it may be that a Pact attack would generate a sense of common strategic aim within the Alliance, if it did not, an early divergence in judgments as to how the war should be fought to an outcome of any description could be the untimely result. The pernicious effects of an ambiguous strategy with great political but little military usefulness may not be limited only to confusion about war-ending objectives. For this reason, some speculation about NATO's decision processes operating in an environment of uncertain purpose from the beginning of the war might also be informative.

Meeting the Initial Attack

Comprehensive, detailed plans for the disposition and early defensive employment of forces have been made in NATO. Sectors of responsibility have been assigned, commanders understand their missions and units have been rehearsed to the last detail. On warning, the forces would be quickly readied for combat, defensive positions occupied and developed, barrier systems emplaced and reinforcement plans executed.

After these initial deployments have been made, presumably to begin the defense at the frontier, requirements of the forward strategy are passive, and NATO would await the attack if it had not occurred earlier. On these initial operational missions, there should be no important disagreement, political or military, and it seems safe to assume that any differences regarding tactics for meeting the initial attack have been resolved in the process of developing the plans. Can the same unity of purpose be anticipated once the attack comes? One way to respond to the question is to examine the various conceptions of forward defense as they might influence tactical decisions affecting the course of the battle. Since, as expected by many, the war could be short and intense, little time might be available to deliberate on the best tactics to achieve the aims of the forward strategy. Each decision could appear only momentarily separated in time from the final outcome. Tactical decisions to defend here or attack there would therefore be made under great pressure.

Locating the Main Line of Resistance

If the war ended somewhere generally along the present Pact/NATO common border, NATO's defense would be judged successful. Complete failure of the defense could be defined as the loss of Western Europe. Between these extremes are an infinity of possible combat situations on the ground, and perceptions of the degree to which any of these converted to outcomes would satisfy the territorial objectives of NATO's strategy would quite obviously vary among the participants. Moreover, as the war progressed, the line of resistance could move westward, eastward or, in some periods, it might not be possible to define a "line" at all, as the armies attack and counterattack. Although there are many nuances in tactical thought regarding the way NATO should defend against a large attack in Central Europe, it is possible to describe two general concepts with which the various proponents should be able to associate themselves--either one, or the other.

The first concept might be termed "unqualified" forward defense, having as its foundation a literal interpretation of the geographical meaning of "defending as far to the east as possible." Under this concept, the only acceptable line of resistance is on or close to the present eastern border of NATO. At the tactical level, conventional resistance would be maximized immediately and forces committed with this in mind to maintain the frontier. Sacrifice of territory for tactical advantage or to gain time for reinforcement would be minimized and every kilometer defended bitterly. Each penetration would be counterattacked immediately, and highly mobile anti-armor formations held in reserve would be expended as needed for this purpose. Intensity of resistance would be stimulated by the belief that ground given up might not be recoverable. If the conventional defense of the border region ruptured, or were in imminent danger of failing, tactical nuclear strikes would be delivered early, while the bulk of the attacking Pact forces remained on their own territory and before significant attrition of NATO's delivery capability occurred. The hope would be that this action would convince the Pact of NATO's determination to resist and thereby induce a withdrawal, leaving the Pact/NATO border as before--the foremost objective of this conception of a forward defense. The FRG might find this description of a successful forward defense to be reasonably consistent with its national views.

The other concept could be defined as a "qualified" forward defense, taking as its source a different and more circumspect interpretation of the forward strategy. Under this concept, territorial defense requirements are conditioned to a greater degree by relative military capability estimates as the war progresses. More flexibility in the use of terrain is ascribed to the forward strategy in this view, in both tactical and strategic terms. On the ground this would mean that the suitability of terrain for defense would take on greater importance when locations for various lines or points of resistance were chosen. Criteria for successful execution of

the qualified strategy would not necessarily include a status quo ante since it implies more territorial elasticity relative to the unqualified version. The intent would be to gain time for mobilization and US reinforcement, and, especially, to exercise nuclear restraint. The strategic objective would be to prevent Pact domination of Western Europe, as well as its nuclear devastation, rather than the narrower and more demanding mission of maintaining pre-war national boundaries. This formulation should fit prevailing US views to the effect that a capability to defend the frontier at non-nuclear levels is an objective which generates force requirements beyond those the Alliance is willing to support.

The essential difference between the two concepts is that one places preservation of continued strong conventional capability before territorial considerations, while the other precisely reverses these priorities and adds the possibility of early use of nuclear weapons in what has come to be known as a "demonstration of resolve."

Conduct of the Defense

This difference in priorities could produce variance in tactical behavior on the battlefield in a number of ways. Adherents of an unqualified forward defense would be motivated to accept higher risks to NATO's forces in the early period. They would probably be willing to endure more personnel and equipment casualties to prevent a Pact penetration, and perhaps argue for earlier commitment of reserves for this purpose than would advocates of a more qualified interpretation of the strategy.

The unqualified concept could result in the need very early in the campaign to disperse the forces for nuclear combat if the main line of resistance were penetrated or badly weakened. Such a re-disposition would be enormously difficult, and would generate a posture entirely unsuited to continuing the war conventionally, as would be desired under the qualified forward strategy. Further, the prospect of engaging at the conventional level at all becomes a matter of questionable judgment from the outset under these circumstances, since attempts to deploy for nuclear operations would be a clear signal to the Soviets, who would then be in a position to determine which side should reap the "benefits" of a first strike.

The reluctance to give up terrain which characterizes proponents of unqualified forward defense could cause the loss to Pact maneuver of formations which under less rigid concepts would have been moved or withdrawn sooner, for example. During the conventional phase of the war, these same strategists would be willing to expend ammunition and replacement weapons at very high rates in the early period. Since the Allies stock far less of these resources than the US, the prospect of early exhaustion of conventional combat resources in their sectors would be an important factor in assessing the desirability of this concept.

Use of tactical air resources could be affected. Allocation of attack sorties under an unqualified strategy could be biased in favor of support of the engaged ground forces and limiting penetrations when, under other concepts, relatively more counter-air missions would be preferred in the interests of preventing enemy domination of the air. As for ground forces, high attrition might be accepted for tactical air forces, with consequent reduction in capabilities to deliver nuclear strikes if needed later in the war.

All of these effects--high attrition, high expenditure rates of limited conventional combat resources and deteriorating capabilities to mount tactical nuclear strikes--could interact with determination not to give ground to develop powerful incentives for a shift to nuclear defense of the battlefield. In fact, it is conceivable that early exhaustion of conventional capability would leave no alternative for further effective resistance other than tactical nuclear weapons in the areas defended by the European allies.

The qualified forward defense concept would produce different beliefs regarding the best means to conduct the defense. Forces would be employed in more traditional ways. Relatively more concern would be given to their preservation and the husbanding of resources to prolong the capacity of NATO to defend conventionally. Given identical defensive situations, the qualified forward defense would result in fewer casualties per engagement, less risk of being outmaneuvered and lower consumption rates of combat materiel resources. The probability of nuclear war initiated by NATO would be much lower, hence the problem of posturing for nuclear combat would be less likely to arise. In exchange for enhancing the survivability of the conventional force, raising the nuclear threshold and gaining time for mobilization and reinforcement to offset early Pact advantage, a qualified forward strategy would trade space on the battlefield if required.

Thus, there are no important considerations affecting the actual conduct of a forward defense on which advocates of the two different concepts would agree. Decisions regarding defense locations, use of reserves, tactical air missions, rates of expenditure, maneuver, force posture and the need for nuclear strikes could force this disagreement to the surface in the first days or weeks of the campaign.

In terms of nations adhering to the alternative hypothetical interpretations of the strategy given earlier, it seems clear enough that, as claimed, the US and the FRG would prefer the qualified and unqualified concepts respectively. Other nations might be harder to place. Remaining continental powers, forced to choose, would probably follow the Germans for their own purposes, betting on deterrence or a defense conducted in locations which would hopefully reduce the likelihood of combat, especially nuclear combat, reaching their own soil. The UK might find itself somewhere

between the two concepts--questioning the desirability of rigid defense of the frontier, but also inclined to use nuclear weapons earlier than would the US in identical situations.

In the actual event, it might be unlikely that either of these two different concepts for forward defense would be advocated in any pure sense. The problem could instead arise mainly in the marginal situations, where the possibility for disagreement on the preferred tactics would be highest--especially in decisions as to whether or not continued defense or reinforcement of this locale or that might be advisable. Different judgments of acceptable risk could obstruct attempts to reach tactical decisions since, particularly in the early period, the possibility of catastrophic error would be high. If the announcements of the Europeans are to be believed, they would be inclined to accept these risks, including nuclear risks, if they thought the likely results on the battlefield would convince the Pact of their determination to resist at all costs. For its part, the US would be less disposed to court disaster at the frontier or to gamble on Soviet nuclear forbearance.

Credible missions for the forces in battle cannot be derived from European versions of forward defense and flexible response for the same reasons which prevent agreement on a territorial criterion for terminating the war. First, NATO's conventional forces are unequal to the task of maintaining a defense along the frontier to a point of favorable decision, and this deficiency is insensitive to conceivable assumptions of warning or relative mobilization capabilities of the two sides. Second, and beyond the force capability inconsistencies which separate these European views from military reality, is their failure to accommodate US policies which do not position the nuclear threshold along political boundaries. If the choice is limited, as it seems to be, to the two conceptions just described, only the less rigid US purpose of limiting damage to the Alliance as a whole by containing the aggression at non-nuclear levels is in any way a rational framework for tactical decisions in the early period.

For these reasons, forward defense and flexible response are concepts afflicted not only by uncertainty regarding ultimate territorial objectives, but are encumbered as well by the near certainty of differences in judgment which could impair NATO's tactical decision-making from the onset of the war.

V

TOLERATING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY

The differences in strategic conceptions among the nations presented earlier and issues bearing on the conduct of the war and its territorial outcome just described are probably seen by some as interesting but mostly intractable matters. Other difficulties confronting NATO seem more amenable to solution. Many of these are program decisions believed only faintly related to rarified deliberations on wartime strategy. There is some merit in that argument. Secretaries Laird and Schlesinger have been very successful, for example, in inducing the allies to take on force improvement programs which will greatly enhance NATO's conventional defense capabilities, irrespective of results of any debate about the purposes of NATO's strategy.

The Modus Vivendi

Moreover, there exists a rationale which finds these apparent uncertainties in strategic policy less worrisome. This argument, presented now in the cause of impartiality, unfolds as follows: The purpose of NATO's defensive concepts is not to serve a useful purpose in war or to ease the lot of military men seeking a peg point for their cooperative planning against a contingency no one expects anyhow. Instead, these concepts are designed, declared and interpreted entirely to diminish the already small danger of Soviet aggression in Europe. Advocates of this reasoning counsel against tampering with or investigating strategic persuasions at all within the Alliance, no matter they are different, because they have succeeded. That is to say, these policies have 'worked"--war has not broken out and is judged unlikely for the future. If it were correct to attribute peace in Europe completely to NATO's forces as now maintained or its strategy as now interpreted, there would be no need for debate.

Unfortunately for this rationale, forward defense and flexibility in response cannot be credited as the sole, or even the most important, reasons for the Soviet choice not to attack. The best that can be said is that political, social, economic and military incentives in the opposing alliances have interacted at less than those critical levels where the vital interests of either would be at stake. It is, for this reason, not possible to measure the relative contribution of NATO's military strategy or forces to the absence of a European war. Other combinations or levels of these variables obviously might have created situations exceeding Soviet (or NATO's) tolerance. Armed uprisings in the GDR or civil war in Yugoslavia come to mind as incidents which would have put the war-preventing effectiveness of the strategy to far more severe test than has actually been the case. We cannot know, therefore, whether the deterrent value of the collected works

of the nations and the Alliance on strategy is low or high; it is, instead, anybody's guess. The better explanation for continued peace is probably that the Soviets have achieved the bulk of their territorial objectives, including authentic division of Europe, without the need for measures other than political intimidation and an occasional military suppression of deviant behavior in the satellites.

If this is all true, one may inquire, if even the deterrent worth of the strategy is suspect, how is it that NATO perseveres? The short answer is that there is no alternative. What has happened is that, in the interests of survival, an arrangement has developed in the Alliance over the years which permits military and political cooperation to go forward despite profound differences in nuclear and conventional defense concepts. In effect, an accommodation has been reached which evades severe contradictions between the capability needed to contain and repulse an attack and the forces available, and submerges the potential consequences of conflicting perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons. Currently, this understanding is exhibited primarily in the flexible response concept--a war-fighting policy which enables the European allies to find courage in nuclear alarms while maintaining smaller conventional forces than they are plainly capable of supporting and, at the same time, permits the US to press for improved conventional capabilities to reduce the likelihood that its nuclear commitment need ever be made good. The Alliance has in this fashion demonstrated a large and enduring capacity to abide strategic uncertainty.

End of the Debate

It must be acknowledged that these issues cannot be found at the center of NATO's present-day concerns. After years of active discussion, especially in the 1960's, the debate on strategy design has either foundered in the exhaustion of the participants or been diminished by the "euphoria" of detente. The political and military disconnects embedded in NATO's defense concepts and forces are evidently believed impervious to solution and inducements to reopen these timeworn arguments are apparently less than compelling. Further, any suggestion that perceptions of forward defense are divided in the way described here, or in any way at all, for that matter, might be disputed in some military circles. Twenty-three years of multinational command, it could be argued, have been enough to iron out differences, and clarity of strategic purpose may indeed exist there.

Regrettably, as events of the last year or so have shown, a strong sense of unity cannot be attributed to the political structure of the Alliance, where nations have exhibited a disconcerting and generally uniform tendency to act exactly in their own interests. Perhaps this should not be surprising; but recent experience can hardly reassure us that nations will subordinate their own incentives in war to those of other nations--about which there

is no mystery and which are known to be different. If NATO is unable to resolve or effectively moderate its political differences in peacetime, conditions would seem present for more serious disputes in war which could further sap its already feeble decision-making ability. An important source contributing to that disarray can be predicted with confidence to be flexible response and forward defense if these concepts are allowed to persist in their current infirm state of irresolution and indecision.

US Leadership

Prospects that national perceptions of NATO's strategic purpose can be accommodated in a consistent political-military foundation for the future security of the Alliance are therefore not promising. Solidarity on the issue of military strategy seems limited to a universal desire to deter war. Otherwise, areas of basic agreement are few. The conduct of the war and the nature of NATO's related political and military objectives are viewed differently in the US and in Europe. The US and its allies differ also on estimates of the conventional balance and are equally at odds on the place of nuclear weapons in NATO's defensive concepts. Moreover, the European allies seem quite content with the situation as it is, although they are well aware of conceptual difficulties with the strategy and often discuss them in open forums. In the presence of detente, and in the absence of shocks from the other side, they do not and will not feel threatened. As long as the US retains large forces in the FRG and thereby inextricably links its strategic nuclear deterrent to the defense of NATO, the allies can be expected to continue their current if unstated policy of making the minimum effort needed to induce the US to remain in Europe. At present, the Europeans would therefore probably be apathetic toward, if not totally disinterested in, any new effort to reconcile the forward strategy and flexibility in response with the policies of the various nations.

But the fact that the European allies apparently find these questions of strategic purpose only vaguely unsettling--believing themselves in no immediate danger, and also finding it hard to think about the actual execution of a forward defense anyway--is insufficient reason for the US itself to submerge the predicament. It is not enough for the US to consign its own future security once more to the conditions of plausible disaster which accompany these European attitudes. For its own purposes, the US should come to grips with the potential wartime consequences of an indeterminate strategy--out of concern for its own force planning, if for no other reason. Planning US forces for Europe would be a formidable task even if there were agreement on the job they are expected to accomplish in war. The problem of force structure is accompanied by far more uncertainty in the absence of agreed objectives; what is worse, the US may be configuring its forces for a type of war no other nation, East or West, expects to fight.

The US should also, however, be able to view the strategy formulation problem in broader perspective. Governments, personalities, and strategies may come and go, but the defense of Western Europe will remain the most important national security interest of the US, short of its own survival. Just as perfection is not a goal to which NATO can respond, neither is despair warranted, given the stakes. The interests of the Alliance and its member nations are not served by a collective if unspoken agreement to avoid the hard military questions which continue to burden NATO's concepts for the defense of Europe.

As is so often the case in NATO, then, it is up to the US, in its own interests initially, to disinter and reexamine the strategic objective and nuclear doctrine problems of forward defense and flexible response before these concepts atrophy from neglect.

VI

A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS

The description of differences in perception which contaminate NATO's defense concepts given here has been to contribute to the development of recognition which must be present in the US before progress can be made toward their resolution. By recognition is meant acknowledgement first that the problem exists and, second, that it should be solved. The bulk of the argument has until now been for these two purposes: To certify that contradiction and ambiguity are characteristic of NATO's strategy of forward defense; and then to show that, if prolonged, these uncertainties in strategic purpose could, and almost surely would, disrupt the decision processes of the Alliance in war.

There are, moreover, some reasons why reinvigorated debate on NATO's strategy might bring payoffs. Several factors at work in the Alliance environment could make new study worthwhile. From the military point of view, although there are pressures for force reduction, these probably exist on both sides, and, in any case, the quality of NATO's conventional forces has improved relatively more than the Pact's in recent years. The urging of the recent succession of US Secretaries of Defense has achieved good results in Europe in the way of improved anti-tank capabilities, aircraft sheltering, command arrangements and cooperative logistics. The French and NATO seem to be adjusting mutually to more accommodating policies for military cooperation. In terms of conventional force capabilities relative to the Pact's, the trend for NATO is up, whatever the sources of the various stimuli which have produced this important progress.

These improved and improving capabilities for non-nuclear defense have produced another condition needed for progress on the issue of strategy. This is the "rough" conventional balance which the US seems now to believe exists between the two sides.[19] If such a balance has been achieved, then the gap between capabilities and the demands the European allies place on the strategy has been narrowed significantly. The attainment of conventional parity represents opportunity, not present before, for positive leadership by the US to generate a parallel advance toward agreement on how NATO's improved forces should be employed in the defense of Europe--both nuclear and non-nuclear.

The necessary conditions for a renewed effort to create a workable interpretation of the forward strategy for fighting a war in Europe seem therefore to be present. The problem exists, it is serious, and a timely opportunity is available for the US to lead the Alliance toward its solution.

Search for Alternative Policies and Programs

Any enterprise having as its purpose development of an agreed concept for the execution of a forward defense in Europe will obviously be confronted by formidable obstacles of all sorts, political, military and economic. If the US chose to accept the challenge, it would need first to make its own assessment to determine whether or not a basis for agreement is likely to be found. There may be several promising solutions or none; it cannot be known before an attempt is made, as it has not been, in the context of conditions prevailing within and outside the Alliance. The remainder of this paper is committed to such a venture. The objective is to construct a policy framework for decisions affecting the forces which can be seen by all the nations to be consistent with their own vital security interests in peace or war.

The problem can be partitioned to reduce its complexity and to assist in the search for elements which either obstruct or can be exploited to obtain agreement. First, since NATO's defensive concepts must continue to function under the same conditions which have so far acted to prevent agreement on strategic issues, these can be identified and treated separately:

- The European allies, especially the FRG, have a legitimate claim on the strategy for some insurance of survival as nations in their present geopolitical form.

- The US will not embark on nuclear adventures to provide that insurance if its own survival is thereby placed in the balance with the momentary loss of land along the eastern frontier.

- Real outlays for defense will not rise and may fall, but not drastically (assuming no economic calamity in the West--in which case even the modest improvements now planned in NATO's forces would perish).

Implications of the strategy for survival on both sides of the Atlantic and defense budgets thus stand to inhibit development of a new approach to NATO's defense concepts. These constraints are, in fact, initial assumptions for the assessment which are explored later to discover whether or not some relaxation may be possible where it is most needed; that is, in the fundamentally conflicting views on how the strategy and the forces can best contribute to national survival.

Next, there are also present some variables, mainly military, which are controlled entirely either by NATO or its member nations and are therefore potentially available for manipulation in the search for agreement. These are:

- The missions which can be chosen for the forces in war.

- The composition of the forces, within certain limits, which include the fact that the US cannot structure all its forces solely for combat in Central Europe.

- The allocation of defense budgets among operating force levels, combat and support forces, reserves, force modernization, research and so forth.

Finally, inspection of these constraints and variables reveals certain properties of the strategic problem which can be used to advantage. First, the two categories are not watertight. For example, the missions (variable) selected for NATO's forces, especially its nuclear forces, can influence the degree to which the various nations perceive their vital security interests to be served by the strategy (constraints). Second, the constraints and variables are internally interdependent. The existence of a conventional balance might, for example, permit nations on both sides of the Atlantic to think of alternatives to nuclear defense against conventional attack as means for insuring survival in case of war, thereby lowering a major barrier which separates conceptions of the forward strategy. Interdependence in variables is more apparent. If it were decided, for example, that the missions should be changed, it is likely that both the structure of the forces and the allocation of defense budgets would also need to change to produce the capabilities required for the new missions.

For reasons which should become clear, it is convenient to take up the constraints and variables as they have been listed and to treat interrelationships as they appear.

Compromise First

As has been explained, circumspection on the part of the US regarding an objective to end the war at the eastern border of NATO has been caused mainly by the belief that containing the attack somewhere in the FRG and thereafter planning to expel the aggression would generate unsupportable demands for increases in force levels. This view is a product of studies which depend on analytic techniques using numbers of units, weapons and so forth represented by various measures of effectiveness to estimate the additional forces needed for such a capability--and these have been shown to be large in some cases. The trouble with these measures of effectiveness as well as more elaborate computerized wargames and simulators used also to calculate such "requirements" is that these procedures do not account for what may be the most important factors affecting the outcome of a war. The Israeli-Arab wars are classic examples of deficiencies in these techniques. No model, however sophisticated, would have predicted the Israeli wins, since no model can account for the Israeli superiority

in combat skill, leadership, communications and unity of command which were so important to the outcomes. Instead, these models would have shown, before the fact, that far larger forces would have been required by the Israelis to contain the Arab assault and, especially, to drive their forces out of the Sinai.

Another factor which these US requirements analyses do not accommodate is the uncertain value of the forces the satellites contribute to the Pact. Identical Soviet and East European formations are typically given a one-for-one correspondence in combat effectiveness. In terms of Poles and Czechs facing West Germans, such a correlation might be about right. But what about Poles vs. Belgians, British or Dutch? East Germans against West Germans? Or Poles, Czechs and Hungarians opposite the US? There are, in fact, a number of reasons for believing that the Soviets would need to divert a significant fraction of their own forces to keep the the satellites motivated--a prospect reinforced by the historically undistingusihed military performance of these East European nations. (Germans excepted, of course--but this could mean that the Soviets would need to watch the GDR even more closely.)

If the US believes a general conventional equilibrium now exists, it should also take into account these weaknesses of its own analyses and consider a stronger commitment to forward defense. Specifically, the US should not remain paralyzed by the force requirement implications of the territorial objective which is, as the years have proven, central to FRG security policy in the most absolute sense and for entirely understandable reasons. The current US practice of temporizing about ending the war at the frontier one way or another should be stopped.

In order to find common ground with the US, the Europeans would need to moderate their rigid views. The likelihood of some early Pact success would have to be accepted as a military reality for the conventional defense. All delusions they now seem to harbor about US readiness to use nuclear weapons to shore up defenses at the frontier would need to be shed. These expectations would, instead, have to be circumscribed by a willingness to contemplate the possibility of significant loss of territory initially, in the belief that the US commitment to assist in reducing the invasion can be depended upon. Certainly, there is nothing in history to suggest the US would not meet such an obligation once it was accepted.

To assist the allies in reaching these essential conclusions, the US should, while making clear its readiness to use nuclear weapons, remove all doubt about the "inevitability" of nuclear strikes to defend against a large conventional attack. The US should also be able to describe the likely consequences in war if the allies fail to grasp this fundamental point. Such knowledge does not exist in the US, or if it does, it is so diffuse as to be useless as a basis for stimulating internal reflection by the allies on the

dangers of disagreement; reflection which may be necessary to make them an attentive audience for US arguments concerning the need for revitalizing NATO's strategic concepts.

An attitude of realistic compromise would be the critical feature of the negotiation. In trade for some European flexibility regarding the relationship of territory and the decision to use nuclear weapons, the US should assure the FRG that it has no intention of limiting its commitment only to absorption of a Pact attack, and that its ultimate objective is without question a restored frontier. Such a guarantee would remove any latent Soviet belief that a limited objective attack would be tolerated by the Alliance--as the FRG, with considerable justification, now seems to fear. Without compromise, there is no chance whatever that the Alliance can make progress on any issue of strategy design. Agreement on other issues may be possible, but these achievements will hardly matter if unity later dissolves in the withering of nuclear deterrence or in the wake of early losses along the frontier.

Willingness to compromise is not all that would be needed. Other actions would also be required, mainly to make the US commitment a credible one--that is, so that it could be made good on the battlefield--a problem taken up in due course.

Planned Reallocation

Defense budgets of the nations represent the most severe restraint which prevents movement within the Alliance on the matter of forces and strategy. If there were fewer limits on resources for defense, NATO could match its military capabilities to any strategy it chose. The opposite is true, however, and there seems to be no chance whatever that military spending in real terms will rise, and, indeed, a trend of reduction is evident in varying degree throughout NATO. Opportunities to generate flexibility in this constraint must therefore be judged nonexistent. Instead, more must be done with less.

Providentially for our efforts to find ways to rationalize the forces and the strategy, there is considerable ferment already within the Alliance to exploit the variable, that is, reallocation possibilities within the military sector. Old barriers between civilian and military resources are being broken down, and the various Service and Branch fiefdoms are being challenged to generate more combat potential at no increase in cost or to face reduction so that additional resources can be switched to more efficient producers. An excellent example is the new US plan to increase Army divisions from 13 to 16 without increasing its land force manpower. More effective use of reserves is also planned, both in the US and elsewhere in NATO. Greater reliance on commercial capacity for logistic support shows promise as a means for releasing funds to create additional combat capability.

The net effect of these and similar programs under development is likely to be that NATO's defense potential can rise despite fixed or slightly declining budgets.

For this reason, the budget constraint, which appeared critical at first glance, actually has an important variable component which is turned to use later.

The Counteroffensive Option

Serious political difficulties could make progress slow if attempts were limited only to efforts to loosen the constraints by compromise. More concrete and visible actions in terms of changes in the variable elements of the strategic problem could be important means of accelerating the process of accommodation.

One variable, always available to the Alliance, is the assignment of missions to the forces. Presently, these missions are cast entirely in terms of defense at the strategic level, and NATO has done its best to make this fact clear to the Soviets. This limited interpretation of strategic purpose is entirely inconsistent with the situation NATO is most likely to face on the battlefield. As argued at length in an earlier part of this paper, and setting aside defeat which is of no interest, the initial phase of a successful defense would probably conclude with some NATO territory still occupied by the Pact. If the Alliance can comprehend the possibility of containing the Pact anywhere in the FRG, it should surely be able to foresee that a counteroffensive would be the only conceivable course of action on which agreement could be reached. For this reason, the inherent tendency of NATO to conduct its military affairs only in the context of a strategic defense has the effect of obscuring the vital importance of planning also for the counteroffensive operation which would be required to reduce the Pact salient.

Both the US and the Soviets demonstrate a capacity to suffer indignity without recourse to nuclear weapons, and there is no reason to believe that they would not continue to do so in a major war. If the war remained non-nuclear, and without decisive outcome in the early period, it is likely that both sides would continue to build up by diverting production to the task. Since the West could outstrip the East in such a competition, sooner or later, capabilities as well as incentives would rise to "restore the integrity" of the Alliance.

It is worth noting, in this regard, that Secretary Schlesinger has not excluded this possibility in the event of a war in Europe:

> Surely it is far better that we should establish a forward defense in this sensitive area and deter hostile action there rather than risk the failure of deterrence because of insufficient force and then undergo the agonizing and costly effort to recover lost and devastated territory.[20]

The need for a counteroffensive capability is insensitive to any scenario which includes a successful non-nuclear defense anywhere in the FRG. Such a capability possesses attributes which place it at the heart of the argument that a realistic and agreed conception of the forward strategy is achievable. First, and above all, it accounts for the most probable situation on the battlefield if NATO contains the attack. Second, it reduces the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be needed to achieve the most demanding objective of the forward strategy--a restored eastern frontier. Third, it removes any possibility that the Soviets could calculate their risks before an attack or choose limited territorial objectives. For these reasons, an option for strategic non-nuclear offense is the one ingredient which, if incorporated in the concept of flexible response, could make credible a US commitment to reestablish the territorial integrity of the FRG. Forward defense and flexible response do not exclude, a priori, the possibility of offensive operations on a strategic scale. NATO has chosen, nevertheless, to rely on inflexible response to aggression by foreclosing in advance the offensive mission which would almost certainly be forced on it following a successful defense.

This reasoning suggests the fundamental change in strategic perspectives of the Alliance required to bring about unity of purpose in war. New strategies are not needed. What is required of the nations is a transformation in policies and programs so that NATO's present defense concepts can be judged by all to be in proximate conformity with their need for some assurance of survival. The first, and essential, change in strategic policy is to expand the scope of flexibility in NATO's sequence of responses to aggression to include a non-nuclear counteroffensive option.

The Force Structure Bias

It need scarcely be said that NATO does not today possess a realistic capability for counteroffensive operations. This is true not so much because of the size of the forces, which, we believe are now balanced with the Pact's, but because of their defensive characteristics. That NATO's ground force structure is inherently defensive now and becoming more so can be shown easily enough. First, the Pact can deploy about three times as many tanks in the Central Region as NATO and at least this advantage persists for the length of the period of initial reinforcement. The relationship between the two sides in this respect is described in Military Balance, 1973-1974:

"This numerical weakness in tanks (and other armoured fighting vehicles) reflects NATO's essentially defensive role . . ."[21] Second, the conventional balance can only be claimed if NATO's ground and helicopter anti-tank weapons are included in the calculation to offset this Pact superiority (tactical aircraft may be able to compensate somewhat, depending on weather as well as deployment decisions on both sides, but their contribution in the way of tank kills is likely to be modest in the early period). Third, major anti-tank weapon programs designed to provide the bulk of this offset are infantry missile systems, mostly ground-mounted, hand-held, or perched atop lightly armored vehicles. In most of these systems, either the crews, the missile, or both, are exposed and vulnerable to small arms and fragmenting munitions of all types. The US TOW and Dragon anti-tank missile systems are conspicuous members of this family. While these weapons may provide superb capabilities to defend terrain against an armored offensive (assuming they can be protected in some fashion from the intense artillery fires which can be expected to accompany that assault), they are virtually incapable of taking ground against the kind of well-supported and protected defense the Soviets can mount. Helicopters armed with anti-tank missiles are, if anything, less useful for offensive operations. In a defensive situation, the Soviets would place their armored air defense systems well forward, to create an environment in which helicopters simply could not operate effectively.

Further, for reasons which are obscure, the US MICV (Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle) planned to replace the M-113 armored personnel carrier is not expected to mount anti-tank weapons in any configuration. This vehicle could provide an excellent platform for anti-tank weapons to enhance the mobile anti-armor capability NATO needs for any kind of operation--offensive or defensive. The US might look closely at the Soviet solution to this problem--the BMP-76 which is a dual-purpose armored personnel carrier and anti-tank system mounting a 76mm gun turret as well as a Sagger missile launcher. Both of these weapons can be served from within the vehicle.

It is necessary, in fact, to be more clear about the nature of the military capability relationship between the two sides in Central Europe. NATO's forces are internally "unbalanced" as has been shown. Pact forces, on the other hand, are "balanced" even though, as is often pointed out in the West, they appear structured mainly for offensive operations. This is because, in general, forces rich in armored systems designed for offensive operations possess, without exception, excellent capabilities for defensive employment. Further, these same weapons would be more survivable in nuclear operations, in stark contrast to the increasingly vulnerable characteristics of many of NATO's infantry anti-tank missile systems which are even less resistant to the effects of nuclear detonations than the weapons they are replacing. Of the four missions, conventional and nuclear, offense and defense, then, NATO is "balanced" against the Pact in only one dimension--a conventional defense against a conventional attack.

A partiality for defensive weaponry in NATO is no accident, of course. The first-order problem facing the Alliance has been to devise ways to resist an attack, never mind any thought of a subsequent counteroffensive. Since NATO seems now to have achieved this capability, however, it is correctly positioned to begin to think less about containing the attack--a problem which, if not solved, is near solution--and more about developing a potential for follow-on offensive operations.

NATO must grasp the nettle. Decisions affecting the force structure should no longer be made in a context only of enhancing capacity for conventional defense. Each such decision will further skew the forces away from any hope of attaining a capability which is politically and militarily imperative: First, to enhance confidence of the FRG in the US commitment; second, to reduce the need for nuclear defense; and third, to remove any possibility that the Soviets could expect NATO to accede to successes they might achieve in a limited objective attack.

Once the requirement for a counteroffensive option is accepted, the policy issue is solved. Prospects for compromise should improve shortly, because the Alliance would then have agreed on an objective which could be perceived in Europe to be consistent with the US commitment to maintain or regain NATO's eastern frontier. The Alliance could then turn to the problem of finding the wherewithal in its programs to infuse that objective with credibility.

Some Objections to the Counteroffensive Option

It is one thing to be persuasive about the need for including a nonnuclear counteroffensive option in NATO's flexible range of responses and another to show that it is a feasible goal for the Alliance. Objections could be expected on military, economic and political grounds. Some of these can be foreseen. First are the programs required to transform NATO's force structure. An initial reaction might be that large additional expenditures would be needed to achieve a believable counteroffensive capability against the expected threat. Next, some might claim that adopting a policy to work toward such a capability could be politically destabilizing in Central Europe where the Soviets have no fear of significant NATO reaction to their repressions in the satellites. Finally, the suggestion would probably be made that the idea of armies once more overrunning Europe in any direction is a prospect the allies are unwilling to contemplate in the first place.

The last objection is taken up first because it is emotional and without substantive content. If the Pact embarked on a major offensive, westward movement of the line of contact could not be prevented in the early period. If NATO were able to hold somewhere in the FRG, the allies would be confronted by three alternatives. The first is submission to the Pact gains,

and if that is the choice they are willing to make before the fact, the Alliance has no purpose and the US should draw the appropriate conclusions for its own commitment. The second alternative would be to begin a nuclear defense, but such a decision could "produce much higher military and civilian casualties . . . than its non-nuclear counterpart."[22] The third choice is to attempt, at one time or another, to retake any territory lost to the Pact--in which event the armies would indeed have marched about in Central Europe. The first choice to cede territory is remote because it would be political suicide for any government which made it. The second is irrational because it would produce more devastation than the third, and, in any event, unless loss of the FRG were otherwise a certainty, the US would probably not permit a nuclear defense. It can be concluded that the European allies must contemplate the likelihood of extensive damage to their territory caused by non-nuclear defensive and offensive operations of their own as well as those of the Pact.

A NATO decision to begin structuring its conventional forces with the additional capability needed for counteroffensive operations, if not declared, would certainly be detected quickly by the Soviets in other ways--and a reaction is likely. The question is, what form would this reaction take? The Soviets already contend that NATO is up to no good in Europe and, for their own purposes, begin most of their military exercises with a scenario in which NATO attacks first. Renewed denunciations of NATO's aggressive purpose would sound familiar to both sides. Would they choose a preemptive attack before NATO could make the shifts in structure needed? If NATO's strategy and forces have any deterrent effect at all, the probability of such a reaction seems negligible.

There may be other less dangerous responses available to the Soviets. Trouble-making in Berlin is one, but a NATO decision to develop a force capable of eastward as well as westward operations should lower, not raise, the likelihood of that kind of provocation. Finally, would detente suffer? It is difficult to see how; the Soviets respect strength, not weakness, and detente has not brought with it any lessening in their own force improvement programs. Likely Soviet reactions appear insufficient to discourage NATO from adopting a policy which could be indispensable for its survival.

The first objection, that additional outlays would be required to generate a realistic capability for counteroffensive operations is obviously the most difficult to counter. But such a capability is not as distant as first impressions might suggest, and for several reasons. First, the existence of conventional parity, which, though limited, nevertheless implies that NATO possesses the combat resources needed to contain the expected threat. Further, NATO currently has more men under arms and, depending on the period of mobilization, can outman the Pact in the Central Region.[23] Next, as explained earlier, if the quality of the forces of the satellites is considered, quantitative measures of the threat decline sharply. It is

mainly the ubiquitous Pact tank which NATO must be capable of neutralizing--in offensive as well as defensive operations. Hence, it is the quality of NATO's force structure, not its size, which must be changed to create a legitimate capability to attack, as well as defend against, large armored formations. The source of funds needed to begin this qualitative change lies in those current actions described earlier which are designed to release resources in various ways to improve NATO's combat potential. As will be explained shortly, these reallocated funds can be put to more productive use than may otherwise result under present force development criteria.

A Plan and A Program

The assessment is now at an appropriate point for recapitulation. What has thus far been uncovered in the search for practical and advantageous alternative national and Alliance policies? The answer is that all the policy changes needed to clear the way for a plan and a program designed to achieve an agreed conception of the strategy for fighting a war have been identified.

The plan requires accommodating adjustments in security policies on both sides of the Atlantic and by the Alliance.

- First, compromise is imperative: A firm US commitment to forward defense and European acceptance of US policies which do not link nuclear strikes to the frontier are the minimum absolute prerequisites.

- Second, an objective to include a non-nuclear counter-offensive option in NATO's array of responses to aggression should be adopted: To make the US commitment credible by aligning the flexible response concept with the predictable and inescapable situation on the battlefield; and to supply, thereby, the survival guarantee demanded by the European allies.

If NATO were able to agree on the necessity for such a plan, a supporting program would obviously be required; that is, to begin a process, however gradual, of removing the bias now present in its force structure and programs, and, in this way, to generate a capability for offensive as well as defensive operations.

Some may be tempted, unjustifiably as will be shown, to translate "restructure" as"increase." It should be understood from the outset that higher force levels form no part of the plan or the program. There are several US studies which have shown, in various ways, how large increases in capability can be achieved by changes in force structure, and at no

appreciation in cost. Further, as explained earlier, the Alliance is translating some of these studies into action by transferring funds and manpower from selected programs to increase combat potential in others. The point is, NATO is already improving and restructuring its forces, and on a large scale. It is the nature of these changes which is at issue here, together with the conviction that there is no clear idea of the range of missions the resulting force should either be capable of or called upon to perform. As has been shown in a number of ways and places in this paper, these modifications cannot be taking place in the context of a universally accepted concept for the defense of Europe on the battlefield because there is none. In the absence of agreed strategy, there can be no common objectives and consequently no agreed missions. The US, in particular, is either flying blind in its reallocation programs, or developing its ground forces mainly for defensive operations in Europe. We have gone through what is wrong about this force structuring policy.

These force improvement programs are, however, the key to elimination of the defensive polarization of NATO's forces. Because many decisions as to how these programs will be implemented lie in the future, NATO has an opportunity to begin an incremental process of creating a "scenario-proof" force. Central to this process would be a test to be met by all proposed structure changes or improvements affecting forces in or destined for Europe: Each such change in programs would be required to demonstrate a positive and measurable contribution to NATO's capabilities for offensive operations, in addition to any other criteria for adoption.

This test exhibits some very useful characteristics. First, it is simple, and easily comprehended by concerned interests--military, political and industrial. Second, it can be readily applied to new weapon systems or force structure change proposals. Third, it is a low-risk specification because resulting programs would also enhance conventional defense and nuclear capabilities. Finally, the force improvement programs which survive this test would, slowly to be sure, eventually generate a force "balanced" in all dimensions with the Pact's.

A decision to adopt such a force development criterion would result in changes in some US programs. Consider, for example, the procurement objectives for selected weapons included in the US land force modernization and improvement program presented in the Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975.

	Number of Vehicles/Weapons	Armored	Anti-Tank Capability
MICV (Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle)	1186	Yes	No
ARSV (Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle)	1147	Yes	No
TOW Anti-Tank Missile Launchers	2280 a/	No b/	Yes
Dragon Anti-Tank Missile Launchers	1200 a/	No	Yes

a/ Through FY 1975

b/ A TOW mounted on an M-113 APC is not "armored" because the weapon is always exposed and the crew also when firing.

No argument for "combined arms" or "balance" between armor and infantry could possibly justify this acquisition program. An objective of procuring 2300 modern, expensive armored fighting vehicles, not one capable of defeating a tank, while acquiring 3500 modern, expensive anti-tank missile systems, each one easily put out of action by a single bullet, cannot rationally be related primarily to the probable requirements of combat in the Central Region.

The Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 indicates a considerable change in these elements of the "close combat (tank/anti-tank)" program. Only 43 MICV are approved for initial production. The ARSV has been deferred for review of its suitability in light of experience in the Middle East war (perhaps to reflect on the value in Central Europe of such a vehicle without an anti-tank capability). Large additional numbers of TOW launchers and Dragon trackers--about 2900 and 2500, respectively--and associated missiles continue to be programmed, however.

The FY 1976 report also claims that, because the MICV can embark an infantry squad armed with the Dragon, it is the US counterpart of the Soviet BMP. In fact, it is clearly not, as a duel between the two systems under realistic combat conditions would establish in short order. This is for the obvious reason that, just as is the case for the TOW/M113 combination, the Dragon crew must disembark or otherwise expose itself and the weapon to hostile fire in order to aim and launch the missile. As has been explained, the crew of the Soviet BMP need not forsake the comfort of armor protection to operate the vehicle's anti-tank weapons.

Even when planned tank modernization and additional tank procurement is considered, the close combat (tank/anti-tank) program remains poorly conceived as a means of improving US land force defensive, especially nuclear defensive, capability in the Central Region--let alone adding in any important way to its potential for offensive operations against armored forces. It would, for this reason, fail the test proposed for programs affecting forces in or deploying to Europe. The program would need to be reconfigured so that a net increase in armored anti-tank systems more survivable in all conditions of warfare would result before it could be approved.

Costs, Technology and Manpower

Clearly, a decision to impose an offensive capability filter for new programs would need to be preceded by an assessment of its cost implications. As has been pointed out, however, only those funds now being switched to improve combat capability are needed to begin. The planned increase in US Army divisions from 13 to 16 suggests that these shifts are not small. It is not clear, moreover, that costs would rise, and, in fact, they might fall. Consider the US Army "close combat (tank/anti-tank)" modernization program just described. No technological breakthrough is needed to contrive ways in which anti-tank missile or gun systems might be mounted on some of the ARSV or MICV. The costs of a TOW-MICV marriage, for example, could probably be defrayed by reduction in crew size which now includes an assistant gunner and, in some cases, an ammo bearer as well. The Army is now examining the possibility of a "TOW-Under-Armor" system--somewhat tardily, one might observe, since development of the weapon began about 13 years ago.

Changes in programs of this type are only the most obvious actions which could increase survivability of weapons and crews. The solution to creation of a "scenario-proof" force in NATO is more fundamental and lies in two interrelated areas: technology and personnel. The technological superiority of the West should be harnessed, as it is not now, to begin development of a conventional force structure which is insensitive to the kinds of missions which might be required of it. The objective of this technological effort should be to reduce total manpower requirements while insuring that men retained and their weapons are better protected, more mobile and, therefore, more likely to remain effective in the intense combat environment which can be expected in Central Europe; tactical aircraft specifically included. There are available experiments in the Israeli-Arab wars which should be adequate to establish this need if logic cannot.

It is, in fact, a simple matter of productivity, which is, after all, the domain of technology. If a major new anti-tank weapon system cannot survive or avoid small arms, artillery or anti-aircraft fire when in action to destroy tanks--whether in the defense or offense--it is not "cost-effective." The productivity of these vulnerable systems as measured by tanks killed per weapon in Central Region is more likely to be small,

particularly if the suppression effects of artillery and rockets or air defenses are included in the calculation. If each weapon system development of the future were required to meet the design parameter of realistic contribution to large-scale non-nuclear offensive operations in the Central Region, it would not be long before industry, and thereby the technology of the West, would be increasing the expected productivity of each new system for any kind of combat in Europe. Competition should insure such an effect. Increased peacetime costs, if any, of units equipped with these systems would be offset by lowered personnel requirements which would be made possible by raising the expected tank-kill potential per man in combat. Each system proposed by industry should be required to demonstrate this result for both offensive and defensive operations.

There are, without doubt, a number of other capabilities which have been neglected by the Alliance from a technological viewpoint which could improve the productivity of NATO's systems in combat--offensive or defensive. For example, NATO is spending large sums on sophisticated systems, especially tactical air systems, whose contribution would be small in the conditions of poor visibility likely to accompany a Pact offensive, or to descend on the battlefield during a NATO counteroffensive. If the Vietnam War proved nothing else, it demonstrated the poor capabilities of the US to locate and destroy point targets dispersed on the battlefield; fair weather or foul. It is possible that the best return for the next technological dollar spent on defense, conventional or nuclear in Europe, would result from its investment in improving target acquisition capabilities.

It is not necessary here to mention other challenges for technology; each year the Services of all the nations put up innumerable problems which can only be solved by technological investment. These proposals should, however, be rigorously screened to insure that they will contribute significantly to NATO's capabilitiy to attack as well as defend.

A decision by the Alliance to mobilize and systematically apply the one great advantage it retains over the Pact against a low-risk force improvement criterion is the remaining policy change needed for a plan and a program designed to produce a force integrated with a strategy for war.

A Credible Contract

The parts of a framework for decisions affecting the forces in peace or war have been constructed and are now in place. Each is hinged to another; the absence of one part collapses the structure. Before the war, political and military agreement on the way the defense of Europe is to be conducted and a force development program to underwrite that compromise. After the war begins, an objective and a capability first to absorb and then to repulse the Pact attack, and by non-nuclear means. New defense concepts, new strategies are not needed. Forward defense is the right

strategy; it is the only strategy which can insure that the FRG remains a Western power. Flexible response is identically the right concept for implementing the forward strategy, so long as nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the two sides. It is only that the concept must be understood to be flexible, not inflexible, in missions equally as in weaponry, and that these missions include the counteroffensive needed to restore the frontier.

The endeavor has been to discover whether or not a basis for agreement on a legitimate conception of NATO strategy for war in Europe can be found. The compromises, force mission and structure changes and programs sketched out in the course of the search satisfy the minimum conditions for consensus: A credible contract for mutual survival and a force with some chance of meeting the terms of that contract on the battlefield.

It seems clear that such an agreement would pay off for other reasons which should now increasingly concern the European allies. With the passage of time, and in the presence of nuclear parity, it has become more and more apparent that both the US and the Soviets recognize that neither is likely to risk, deliberately, its own survival by being first to use nuclear weapons in Central Europe--or anywhere else for that matter. Mutual nuclear restraint by the superpowers is now a fact of international life. Development of a force capable of undertaking any mission--offensive or defensive--conventional or nuclear--is a means whereby NATO could compensate in an orderly way for the diminishing plausibility of nuclear threats.

If the "comprehensive reexamination" of Alliance relationships urged by Secretary Kissinger is to be accomplished in a realistic way, NATO's defense concepts must surely be included at one time or another. There seem to be but two alternatives to new US study of NATO strategy. One is to continue the current practice; that is, to observe, as if from another planet, the European allies in their protracted gamble on threats of nuclear responses to aggression which they are unable and the US would be unwilling to deliver. The other is to follow, not lead, these allies in steadfast reliance on a decaying nuclear deterrence; trusting in detente to substitute tranquillity for the conventional capability otherwise needed to compensate for that weakening curb on Soviet ambitions.

Before either of these alternatives is chosen, the matter of NATO's strategic purpose in war seems worthy of more attention than it is receiving in the US today.

NOTES

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3. Quoted in NATO Final Communiques 1949-1970, NATO Information Service, Brussels, p. 189.

4. Ibid., p. 206.

5. Ibid., p. 240.

6. Final Communique of the Defense Planning Committee, quoted in NATO Review, No. 6, 1973, NATO Information Service, Brussels, p. 29.

7. Robert S. McNamara in testimony before Congress, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, Second Session, Part 1, Committee Print, p. 288.

8. Department of Defense response to a prepared question by Senator Smith, Fiscal Year 1973 Authorizations, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, Second Session, Part 2, p. 530.

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10. Elliot L. Richardson in testimony before Congress, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1974, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, First Session, Part 1, Committee Print, p. 46.

11. James R. Schlesinger, Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, March 4, 1974, p. 88.

12. James R. Schlesinger, Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs, February 5, 1975, pp. III-12 and III-13.

13. James R. Schlesinger, 1974, op. cit., p. 82.

14. Quoted in "National Strategies Within The Alliance: West Germany," by Carl H. Amme, Jr., NATO's Fifteen Nations, August-September 1972, p.82.

15. Quoted in "National Strategies Within The Alliance: Great Britain," by Carl H. Amme, Jr., NATO's Fifteen Nations, October-November, 1972, p. 21.

16. Difficulties among the Allies in the mid-1960s regarding the purposes of forward defense and its implications for nuclear and conventional strategic objectives are discussed in James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 63-87.

17. The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of Federal Armed Forces, White Paper 1971/1972, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, pp. 24-27.

18. General Jurgen Bennecke, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, "Allied Land Forces in NATO's European Central Region," NATO's Fifteen Nations, June-July 1972, p. 52.

19. James R. Schlesinger, 1974, op. cit., p. 88. See also James R. Schlesinger, 1975, op. cit., p. I-19, which refers to the "current, somewhat precarious, equilibrium" between the two sides.

20. James R. Schlesinger, 1974, op. cit., p. III-8.

21. The Military Balance, 1973-1974, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1973, p. 90.

22. James R. Schlesinger, 1974, op. cit., p. 82.

23. The Military Balance, 1973-1974, pp. 89-90.