AD-A012 832

THE MARINE CORPS HUMAN RELATIONS PROGRAM: A STUDY IN THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE. VOLUME I

James H. Shepherd, et al

American Institutes for Research

Prepared for:

Office of Naval Research

1 July 1975

AIR-20000-7/75-FTR
Volume 1 of 4 volumes

THE MARINE CORPS HUMAN RELATIONS PROGRAM: A STUDY IN THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Volume I. FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT

1 JULY 1975

Prepared by: International Research Institute of the American Institutes for Research, 3301 New Mexico Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20016

Research Sponsored by: The Organizational Effectiveness Research Program, Psychological Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research

Contract No. N00014-70-C-0267
Contract Authority Identification No. NR 177-928/2-13-70 (452)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1 REPORT NUMBER: AIR-20000-7/75-FTR

2 GOVT ACCESSION NO.

3 RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4 TITLE (and Subtitle): THE MARINE CORPS HUMAN RELATIONS PROGRAM: A STUDY IN THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

5 TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED: Final Technical Report 1 April 1970 - 30 June 1973

6 PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER: AIR-20000-7/75-FTR

7 AUTHOR(s): James H. Shepherd, Judith C. Robb, Richard H. Orth, Paul Spector, Robert L. Humphrey, Paul L. Frederick

8 CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s): N00014-70-C-0267

9 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS: International Research Institute of the American Institutes for Research, 3301 New Mexico Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016

10 PROGRAM ELEMENT PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS: NR 177-928/2-13-70 (452)

11 CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS: Organizational Effectiveness Research Program, Office of Naval Research (Code 452), Arlington, Virginia 22217

12 REPORT DATE: 1 July 1975

13 NUMBER OF PAGES: 86 + 1475 in appendixes

14 MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)

15 SECURITY CLASS. (of this report): Unclassified

15a DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

None

19 KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Cross-Cultural Relations Training
Department of Defense, Social Change Within
Human Relations Training
(listing continued)

20 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

In August 1969, in response to serious racial incidents occurring within the United States Marine Corps, the American Institutes for Research undertook a project to determine the most effective means for promoting equal opportunity and treatment in the Corps and for improving relations among Marine Corps personnel. This report describes the research conducted and the procedures followed in order to implement and institutionalize a human relations training program throughout the entire Marine Corps. An attempt was made to follow and

test a number of general social-change principles in carrying out this work:

1. That to institutionalize a viable program, members of the institution (the Marine Corps) would need to become engaged in each component of the program with a significant degree of motivation and training.

2. That a program composed of uniform cognitive training content, serving as a foundation for locally flexible experiential training, would lead to more institutional cohesiveness than loosely structured topical programs. Further, that a mass program aimed at creating common philosophical understandings among disparate groups in the Marine Corps--such as officers and enlisted personnel, Blacks and Whites--would better resolve human relations issues than more specialized training for particular groups.

3. That a program should be conducted on a mass scale, i.e., with 350,000 Marines (1970).

4. That substantial improvements in human relations could be accomplished only by means of small group training in which personnel could perceive the positive norms espoused by the majority of their colleagues. Further, that extremists (highly prejudiced Whites and Blacks) would be brought under the social influence of the great majority of moderate, constructive Marines (rather than the reverse) through the medium of public, small group discussion of a minimal, uniform set of issues. (Such training required an effective multiplier mechanism that could increase training coverage from an initial development cadre of sixteen Marines to hundreds of thousands over a span of years.)

5. That if all superiors were trained before their subordinates, opposition to program goals and methods would be minimized, and maximum support would be given to the implementation of both the cognitive and experiential training phases. Also, that leaders would be prone to participate in the discussions with their subordinates, as one means of lending such support, thereby enhancing program success by involving the chain of command.

6. That the high degree of structure and organization in the military, and particularly the Marine Corps, would help to promote innovation throughout the Corps.

7. That a single implementation model designed for the single largest or most typical component of the Marine Corps (ground divisions) could be readily adapted to other kinds of units.

8. That only limited innovations could be introduced at a given time and that, until they had been absorbed, new requirements might jeopardize the whole effort.

The report begins with a discussion of AIR's experience in the field of cross-cultural relations and a description of the general program model which was used as a basis for work within the Corps. Part II recounts the conditions and operational constraints under which the project was initiated, and describes the selection and training of the original Marine Corps cadre assembled to conduct immediate, interim training and later to train other Marine Corps teams to conduct the full program eventually developed. Details are also included on the initial project interviews conducted to elicit those salient

problems perceived by majority and minority personnel which a human relations program could address.

The general design of the training program is discussed in Part III, with a description of the development of each element of training content. Major tryouts of educational materials at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton are described, and a summary is provided of the materials currently employed in the program. Part IV describes the various components of a Corps-wide program implementation plan: the Marine Corps Human Relations Instructors School at San Diego, where Marines were trained to conduct the program at their field commands; the field programs through which each Marine was to receive twenty hours of human relations training annually; and the formal schools at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia. Discussion follows on the Corps' decision to include human relations discussion, leadership, pedagogy, and management in the goals of the schools and to effect a transition from the Human Relations Program to a Comprehensive Leadership Program, with heavy emphasis on human relations, to be conducted by unit leaders. Part V very briefly relates the status of the program within the Organized Marine Corps Reserve.

In Part VI, general problems of monitoring the training program are explored. Part VII discusses experiences related to the social-change principles with which the project was carried out.

This report is an account of more than five years of research and development in the implementation of a human relations program throughout the Marine Corps. It is written to be useful to those contemplating the initiation and institutionalization of social change on a mass scale.

Continuation of Block #19:

Race Relations Training
Social Change, Institutionalization of
United States Marine Corps, Social Change Within

AIR-20000-7/75-FTR

THE MARINE CORPS HUMAN RELATIONS PROGRAM: A STUDY IN THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Final Technical Report on Contract No. N00014-70-C-0267

1 April 1970 - 30 June 1973

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1 July 1975

THE MARINE CORPS HUMAN RELATIONS PROGRAM:

A STUDY IN THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF

SOCIAL CHANGE

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is impossible to identify all of the countless individuals who have assisted in the research, developmental, and operational tasks described in this report. Literally thousands of Marines have served as instructors, administrators, consultants, and sources of data throughout the project. Without them, the work could not have been accomplished; and to them we owe our thanks.

Most especially we acknowledge the assistance of the original cadre of Marines assigned to this project at Headquarters Marine Corps:

Lieutenant Colonel T. P. Riegert
Major H. L. Seay
Major A. E. Manning
Captain G. R. Willson
First Lieutenant L. G. Clark
Master Gunnery Sergeant H. L. Barrett
Master Sergeant R. Swoford
Gunnery Sergeant R. Mullins
Gunnery Sergeant D. Burke
Gunnery Sergeant H. R. Pritchett
Staff Sergeant A. F. Contreras
Staff Sergeant M. A. Robinson
Staff Sergeant M. K. Cummings
Staff Sergeant C. Ford
Sergeant F. Jones, Jr.
Sergeant K. A. Phillips

Their dedication and significant contributions to the program are sincerely appreciated.

Within the American Institutes for Research, the following members of the professional staff have been instrumental in the

design and implementation of a human relations program throughout the United States Marine Corps:

Johnette B. Clark
Aliton M. Fairchild
Paul L. Frederick
George M. Hampton
Daniel W. Herlong
Robert L. Humphrey
Arthur L. Korotkin
Stanley Lichtenstein
Richard H. Orth
Troy C. Parris
Judith C. Robb
James H. Shepherd
Paul Spector
Garmon West, Jr.

Part I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of the research described in this report was to determine the most effective means for promoting equal opportunity and treatment in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and for improving relations among Marine Corps personnel. To that end, a human relations training program was developed and implemented throughout the Corps. The process of institutionalizing that program provided an opportunity to follow, and in some ways to test, a number of general principles of social change, such as the following:

1. That to institutionalize a viable program, members of the institution (the Marine Corps) would need to become engaged in each component of the program with a significant degree of motivation and training.

2. That a program composed of uniform cognitive training content, serving as a foundation for locally flexible experiential training, would lead to more institutional cohesiveness than loosely structured, topical programs. Further, that a mass program aimed at creating common philosophical understandings among disparate groups in the Marine Corps -- such as officers and enlisted personnel, Blacks and Whites -- would better resolve human relations issues than more specialized training for particular groups.

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The project was undertaken by the International Research Institute of the American Institutes for Research (AIR) in April 1970, under Contract No. N00014-70-C-0267, issued by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), Washington, D.C. This report details activities through June 1973, the period of ONR sponsorship, with a discussion of the research currently continuing under a contract with the United States Marine Corps.

Background

The American Institutes for Research has conducted a variety of cross-cultural human relations programs since 1955. Designed to improve relations between overseas American military personnel and host-country nationals in a wide variety of settings, the basic training program has shown evidence of changes in attitudes and behavior on the part of

many thousands of Americans.[1] In addition, there has been evidence that where American attitudes and behavior toward members of another culture have improved, there has been a concomitant improvement in cross-racial attitudes among the Americans themselves.[2]

In August 1969, in response to the serious racial incidents occurring within the United States Marine Corps, and aware of the improvement in cross-racial attitudes fostered by its cross-cultural educational program, AIR contacted the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps regarding the possibility of adapting that program to the improvement of race relations within the Corps.[3] The Marine Corps was very eager to undertake such a project and emphasized the need for a rapid adaptation of the overseas materials in order to begin an operational program as soon as practicable. It also agreed to support concurrent research into a more comprehensive educational and experiential training program. In view of the many unanswered questions concerning the adaptation of an overseas program to domestic issues and conditions, AIR agreed to the Marine Corps suggestion to propose both tasks to the Office of Naval Research.

Accordingly, in its 3 February 1970 proposal to ONR, AIR requested funds to begin the preliminary interviewing necessary for an adaptation of the initial troop-community orientation then being employed in Korea, Thailand, and Okinawa. It was proposed to adapt and test the orientation with small panels of Marine Corps personnel, to revise it as necessary, and to introduce it operationally as interim training. In the meantime, more comprehensive surveys and additional research would be undertaken in order to explore the following concomitant and interdependent areas:

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1. P. Spector, T. C. Parris, R. L. Humphrey, J. R. Aronson, and C. F. Williams, Troop-Community Relations Research in Korea (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1969).

2. Arthur L. Korotkin, The Evaluation of Program Effectiveness: A Final Report from Okinawa (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1973).

3. While the initial ONR proposal and contract called for a "research study to determine the applicability of the general model to the 'racial problems' in the services," the project soon expanded to address the more general human relations problems of leadership, discipline, and military professionalism.

1. Methods for training a Marine cadre to develop and carry out an effective program;

2. Development of training content and methods which would be effective in improving relations within the Marine Corps;

3. Means and conditions under which a human relations training program could be developed, institutionalized, and maintained on a continuing basis within the Corps; and

4. A practical system for determining needs for further modifications and improvements as Corps-wide implementation progressed.

The Office of Naval Research agreed to fund the outlined scope of work and entered into a contract with AIR on 1 April 1970. During the initial research stages of the project, total funding was provided by ONR. When the development stage was reached in Fiscal Year 1972, supplemental funding was obtained through the Marine Corps. In July 1973, the Marine Corps began funding the work in its entirety.

Program Description

When work began in 1970 under ONR auspices, AIR had already developed and implemented a successful cross-cultural human relations program overseas. Its approach to ameliorating difficulties between diverse groups had overcome the main disadvantages of less successful approaches.

One traditional approach had been the history-, culture-, and language-study program. AIR's experience had shown that, except between groups where the misunderstandings are minor, this approach often makes the situation worse, rather than better. Members of one group strongly object to having the culture, history, and/or language of another group forced upon them. In reaction to this backlash, the members of the group being studied become even more angry.

More recent approaches, e.g., encounter groups and sensitivity training, required the guidance of highly skilled, professionally trained facilitators. This requirement made it almost impossible to implement these programs effectively on a massive scale. More importantly, when used within the military setting where order and discipline are vital to mission accomplishment, these approaches sometimes tended to undermine discipline and respect for authority.

As a more viable alternative, AIR's approach was to combine cognitive knowledge, effective communication processes, and experiential training in an educational program which includes:

1. Rapid assessment of practical problems that vex members of diverse groups.

2. Translation of those perceived practical problems into the underlying psychological and institutional factors that must be overcome in order to improve attitudes and behavior.

3. Study of the reasons for those underlying factors. Information is sought, e.g., background, customs, practices, and economic conditions, which, when translated into training content, will both factually and persuasively lead to a sympathetic understanding of why people with varying backgrounds behave as they do.

4. Micro-content development of training materials in which each element designed to overcome a psychological difficulty is rapidly and repeatedly tested on small samples of representative subjects until the information is formulated in a manner that leads to constructive discussion.

5. Guided classroom discussion of those materials during which overall perspective is maintained by considering even the smallest issue against the background of human history and human nature.

6. An experiential training component which brings trainees into contact with persons from other cultures and gradually requires more extensive and intensive constructive interaction. These action elements are carefully timed throughout the classroom phase of the training for optimal impact on various motivational and informational elements of the discussion materials.

Detailed discussion of these overseas program components is contained in the following report of research into their applicability to human relations problems within the Marine Corps.

PART II

PROJECT INITIATION

Obstacles

Of the two primary tasks proposed by AIR, the more urgent was the creation of an operational program within the Marine Corps as quickly as practicable. The recent riots at Camp Lejeune and Kaneohe Bay, and the continued threat of major violence, dictated that initial efforts be directed toward rapid implementation of a short-range, curative program based on the overseas, cross-cultural materials. Research into the elements of a long-range, preventative program could be given only minimal attention until an interim operational program had been implemented.

The problems of mounting a sound, institutionally viable program, even in the short range, were compounded by several factors:

1. Indications that the Department of Defense (DOD) would soon require a uniform, as-yet-undeveloped race relations program for all branches of the armed services;[4]

2. Resistance of Whites, in general, to race relations training;

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4. While the proposal for the Marine Corps human relations project was being reviewed by the Office of Naval Research, a Department of Defense Inter-Service Task Force on Race Relations was being formed. One year later, in February 1971, DOD approved the committee's recommendation of a mandatory educational program in race relations for all armed forces personnel and ordered its development. However, in view of the Marine Corps initiative, the considerable effort already expended, and the opinion that the Marine Corps was well ahead of the other services in addressing its race relations/human relations problems, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Corps to continue with its own more comprehensive program. This exemption of Marines from participation in DOD race relations training was reaffirmed in April 1973 by the Defense Race Relations Education Board with the approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

3. Pressure from influential members of the minority community for immediate race relations training, especially the history-and-culture approach which AIR had found to be ineffective in its overseas cross-cultural programs (See Page 4);

4. Internal Marine Corps opposition to any form of human relations training, based on:

a. personal bigotry,

b. fear of creating a permissive climate in the Corps which would lead to a breakdown of discipline,

c. dissatisfaction with the time such training would divert from mission-oriented activities, e.g., training flights, and/or

d. general conservatism about the role of the military, i.e., the Marine Corps is not a social welfare organization;

5. The lack of sufficient, trained AIR personnel; and

6. The need to train Marines in every research, development, and implementation task, so that the Marine Corps could eventually assume operational responsibility for all aspects of the program.

In the face of the severe constraints and pressures mentioned above, the project staff tended to give low priority to theoretical research tasks. This was particularly true of Marine Corps personnel and, most particularly, of minority personnel. Because they saw promise in the program of an improvement in the racial climate, and because they were compelled to deal daily with the many factors jeopardizing the program, these staff members concentrated on the practical, operational tasks necessary to institutionalize a human relations training program for 350,000 Marines each year. Paramount were the conduct of basic, practical research; development of educational materials; organization of a multiplier device, i.e., the Marine Corps Human Relations Institute (MCHRI); determination of appropriate methods for the selection and training of field discussion leaders; initiation of an implementation system for maintenance of quality control and viability;

design of experiential training assignments suited to local conditions; development of long-range institutional elements, e.g., formal schools, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in human relations, and command support; and creation of mechanisms for sustaining the enthusiasm of program proponents.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A C/S, G-1) recognized the numerical limitations of AIR staffing in accomplishing these tasks, as well as the need for developing Marine Corps proficiency in all elements of the program. Accordingly, it was agreed that the Corps would provide a cadre of selected Marines to be trained to present the proposed operational orientation and to train other Marine Corps teams as necessary to conduct, on a continuing basis, the full program developed by AIR.

Acquisition of Team Members

The American Institutes for Research cooperated with the Equal Opportunity Branch of the USMC (A C/S, G-1) in selecting an initial cadre of eight Marines who would assist with program development. The following criteria, developed by AIR, were used as the basis for screening personnel records and interviewing candidates:

1. General for all team members:
   a. high intelligence,
   b. high interest in working on the project,
   c. demonstrated leadership capacity,
   d. good public speaking or teaching capability, and
   e. high interest in remaining in the Marine Corps and minimal obligation of one year.
2. Specific:
   a. a team leader with the grade of lieutenant colonel or above and a sophisticated knowledge of Marine Corps organization, policies, traditions, and practices;
   b. a deputy with the grade of major or above, with high organizing capability;
   c. a captain, first or second lieutenant who writes well, preferably with university experience within the last two years;

(At least one, but not all three of the team members described in 2a-c should be a member of a minority group --Black, Mexican American, etc.)

d. a white or black senior NCO, grade E-8 or E-9, with high organizing capability;

e. a black NCO, grade E-5 to E-7;

f. a white NCO, grade E-5 to E-7, who was reared in a southern state;

g. a black enlisted Marine, grade E-1 to E-3; and

h. a white enlisted Marine, grade E-1 to E-3.

Although Marine Corps financial constraints restricted the personnel pool to Marines located on the East Coast, the team was selected to represent a limited cross-section of the diverse types of personnel throughout the Corps. (It should be noted here that several key members of the team did not meet the criterion of having "high interest" in this unique assignment and that AIR did not participate in the prescreening of all candidates.)

Since specific reporting dates were not included in the permanent change of station orders, the members of the Marine Corps team became available at different times. The first three members arrived in mid-June; a fourth member joined the group early in July; the fifth and sixth joined in mid-July; and the seventh member joined the team in early August. The eighth member, the lieutenant colonel who was to head the team, arrived in September. Space to house the team became available at the end of June and was minimally furnished and partitioned by the end of July 1970.

Training of Team Members

Because of the urgency with which the project was being initiated, AIR professional staff members undertook the training of Marine Corps team members as they became available. Training consisted of the following components:

1. Review of reports, lesson materials, and administrative manuals from various AIR cross-cultural training programs, and some of the literature pertaining to race relations;

2. Discussion of the concepts, principles, and methods that had previously been developed in AIR's basic cross-cultural program;

3. Preliminary practice in learning and presenting the basic overseas, cross-cultural orientation;

4. Review of the results of AIR's preliminary investigations for the Marine Corps project (See below);

5. Training in interview techniques;

6. In-house practice interviewing and critiques of the effectiveness of the practice interviewing;

7. Practice interviewing at Headquarters and field installations for the first six team members;

8. Critiques and analysis of the initial field interview results, designed to improve subsequent interviewing;

9. Participation in revision of the initial USMC interview schedule (See Page 12); and

10. Instruction in procedures for categorizing interview results and practice in coding and tabulating interview data.

Training was necessarily less efficient than would have been desirable, since it was repeated for new members as they joined the group. Training efficiency was also adversely affected by the need for certain team members to carry out administrative and logistics functions, thereby making them unavailable during significant periods of time for training and/or operations such as interviews and action projects.

Preliminary Investigations

Selection and training of the Marine Corps team involved only a portion of the AIR staff. Other staff members were simultaneously conducting preliminary investigations in three major areas, seeking information relevant to the design of a program to improve race relations:

1. For use as background and resource information in the development of educational materials, relevant racial and ethnic literature was researched. Of particular interest were the historical development of racial attitudes and the then-current attitudes of extreme radical and moderate members of various racial/ethnic groups.

2. An analysis was conducted of previous approaches to the solution of racial problems, with a view toward selecting the most effective mode of instruction. This analysis consisted primarily of library research on sensitivity and awareness training, confrontation techniques, role playing, and simulation efforts. In addition, attempts to effect racial harmony through the history-culture-and-language approach were reviewed. These various approaches were found to be as disruptive in the area of race relations as they had been in the overseas, cross-cultural programs.

3. The various local race relations training programs already being conducted in the Marine Corps were reviewed in order to determine which elements could be incorporated into an overall mass training system. Examination of the curricula revealed that these programs generally included one or more of the following:

a. improvement of leadership capabilities,

b. cross-cultural communication,

c. sensitivity and awareness training,

d. minority-group history and culture,

e. personal response, and/or

f. cognitive information on sociological and psychological aspects of attitudes and racial prejudice.

Observations of some of the local race relations training sessions and interviews with participants and personnel conducting the training led to the following general findings:

1. Emphasis was placed primarily on officers and staff non-commissioned officers (SNCO's) with little, if any, structured training presented to other Marines;

2. Some efforts, such as sensitivity and awareness training, relied completely on the availability of highly specialized trainers;

3. Courses in minority-group history and culture generated considerable hostility;

4. The "rap-session" approach, in which members of different groups discussed their grievances and attitudes, often degenerated into open hostility and, in some cases, violent confrontation;

5. No systematic monitoring of program effectiveness had been attempted; and

6. Although many commanders had assigned personnel to Equal Opportunity Sections or had formed Human Relations Councils, most of their efforts were confined to responding to equal opportunity complaints and making recommendations for correction.

Initial Interviews

Very early in the project, interviews were conducted with small samplings of Marines in order to:

1. Determine as rapidly as possible the salient problems perceived by majority and minority personnel; and

2. Test the hypothesis, based on AIR's past experience in intercultural research, that a superiority/inferiority relationship perceived by Whites and minority groups was the underlying cause leading to more specific complaints, i.e., that the basic sources of conflict between Marines were attitudinal and motivational.

Because of time limitations and the urgency with which the Marine Corps felt the black/white tensions had to be addressed, the primary consideration was to assess the attitudes of Whites and Blacks in order to adapt the overseas orientation appropriately to that racial situation. Other-minority problems were to be examined at a later, less critical date.

The experimental interview schedule developed by AIR was tested with approximately 75 subjects and revised accordingly. The instrument at Appendix A is the revised version used in the formal interviews.

Interview sites were selected on the basis of geographical location, degree of proximity to population centers, and the type of mission and organization of the command, e.g., air units vs. ground units and support units vs. combat units. By the middle of August 1970, approximately 300 Marines had been interviewed in depth at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC), Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC), Quantico, Virginia; Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Second Marine Division and Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California; Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California; and Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms, California.

Interviewees were selected at each location by the local commander. Although a truly representative sample would have been prohibitively costly in time and funds, commanders were asked to provide male and female Marines, officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel from all racial and ethnic groups and from the four major sections of the United States, i.e., North, South, East, and West. An additional requirement was that some subjects be selected who were malcontents and some who appeared to be satisfied with the Corps, as well as some who were perceived to be "militant," some "bigoted," and some "moderate."

Some interviews were conducted by interviewers belonging to the same race and age group as their subjects, while others involved racially mixed interviewer/subject pairs. The Marine Corps cadre and AIR staff members conducted the interviews privately, at an average length of 1-1½ hours, with AIR personnel checking the results for administrative errors or incompleteness. The interview responses at Appendix B were submitted to ONR in a June 1970 progress report and are indicative of the type of information gathered.

Because the sampling procedure was conducted informally, a fine statistical analysis of the interview results was not carried out. However, an examination of the individual responses indicated that Whites, Blacks, and other minority groups were concerned about several common problems:

1. Generalizing about groups, e.g., they are all prejudiced or they are all lazy,
2. Mocking one's background, e.g., accents and tastes,
3. Name-calling, and
4. Interracial dating.

Black respondents were specifically concerned about:

1. Oversupervision on the job,
2. Promotion policies,
3. Punishment policies,
4. Job assignments, and
5. Housing policies.

White respondents were specifically concerned about:

1. Intimidation,
2. Allegations of prejudice which were sometimes unwarranted,
3. Black unity acts, and
4. Preferential treatment.

Both black and white respondents expressed concern about the quality of leadership in the Marine Corps and a lack of interest in the general welfare of Marines.

Further analysis of the data indicated that members of minority groups were more concerned with institutional problems than were their white counterparts. On the other hand, white respondents were more preoccupied with difficulties in personal interaction. This is not to say that minority group members did not cite personal affronts, but rather that they viewed such affronts as secondary to the general problems of unfair treatment and unequal opportunity.

While the primary purpose of this data collection effort was to assess as rapidly as possible the practical problems that were causing conflicts between black and white Marines, the AIR project staff also:

1. Trained the Marine Corps cadre to conduct interviews and to analyze the results. As part of the continuing task to develop Marine proficiency in every aspect of the human relations program, AIR staff provided on-the-job training throughout the entire data collection effort.

2. Elicited the support of field commanders for the training effort to follow. At each of the installations visited, commanders were personally briefed on the philosophical basis of the program, as well as the proposed method of instruction and implementation. The high priority placed on the program by the Commandant was stressed, as was his expectation of similar command support in the field.

3. Studied the institutional and organizational problems that contributed to negative attitudes and behavior among Marines. Many interview responses included references to dissatisfaction with Marine Corps policy and procedure. Where this dissatisfaction impacted upon, or appeared to aggravate, the racial tensions in the Corps, interviewees were questioned extensively regarding the nature of the perceived problems, their personal reactions to those problems, and the resultant effect upon their relations with

members of other racial groups. Some of the complaints, for example, were the overly rigid interpretation of tests, i.e., if a Marine almost passes a test, an opportunity for advanced training should still be made available; allegations that success in the Marine Corps is dependent upon whom you know, not what you know; and alleged unfair treatment of both black and white Marines by the Military Police.

4. Identified areas requiring research in order to develop the educational program. In addition to specific, surface issues that were causing conflicts between black and white Marines, general, more fundamental problems were also cited in the interviews, e.g., "Whites judge all Blacks on the basis of a few examples"; "Whites discount Blacks' intelligence and ability, assuming that white Marines always know more"; and "Black Marines assume that their white superiors are 'out to get them.'" Until these various expressions of the perceived superiority/inferiority relationship were addressed, there could be little hope of substantially reducing the often violent actions that resulted from them.

5. Explored behavioral indices which could later be used to measure program effectiveness. In-depth discussions were held at various commands regarding Marine behaviors which might be affected by the racial atmosphere within the Corps. These initial discussions pointed up the complexities involved in attempting to determine command indicators of program effectiveness. For example, although it would appear that the number of racial incidents could be used as a direct measure of program effectiveness, it could also be expected that, with increased black/white association as a result of the program, the number of incidents labeled racial might very well increase because of the greater frequency of interaction.

6. Identified practical approaches for the experiential training component. Based upon information gleaned from the interview responses, AIR determined which of its previously developed experiential training activities were likely to be practical in the Marine Corps setting. These consisted of simple changes in behavior during the early phases of discussion sessions, leading to more complex behavior changes as the classroom training progressed, culminating in sustained, constructive behavior changes after the classroom work had been completed. For example, Marines might first be asked to greet everyone they met with a smile, a nod, a kind word, and/or a salute. Then they might be asked to get the personal opinion, on any subject, of someone with whom they would not ordinarily associate, e.g., someone

much older or younger, someone from a different race, or someone of a much higher or lower rank. Later, they might be asked to discuss a controversial subject across cultural lines, e.g., a white Marine discussing the Black Power Sign with a black Marine.

7. Informally solicited the human relations goals and opinions of local commanders and Headquarters personnel. Because the human relations training program was envisioned as "the commander's program," to be implemented according to the unique characteristics of each individual command (See Page 52), it was essential that the views of as many commanders as possible be considered in the program design.

The information obtained during these initial interview visits provided a broad overview of the racial issues within the Corps and indicated that a perceived superiority/inferiority relationship contributed to many of them. The next step was to develop a training program which would effectively address the tension and hostility which resulted.

PART III

DEVELOPMENT OF TRAINING CONTENT

General Design

By the end of 1970, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and other senior Marine personnel had approved the general design of a complete human relations program for the Marine Corps. Each Marine was to receive approximately 20 hours of human relations training annually, to consist of a basic orientation, guided classroom discussions, and readings on general philosophical and ideological issues and on specific intergroup and interpersonal problems. In addition, individuals were to receive experiential training in tutorial or similar activities within the Corps (in which each individual would assist one or more other Marines with a personal-development project) and in individual community-development or community-service projects outside the Corps.

Each of these program elements was to address the following factors which were judged to be the basis of human relations problems, in general, and of racial tension, in particular:

1. Confusion about relationships among human needs, values, and behavior;
2. Lack of self-awareness;
3. Inability to relate generalized concepts, such as freedom and equality, to day-to-day behavior;
4. Physical and psychological segregation;
5. Ignorance of, misinformation about, and/or naked prejudice toward members of other groups;
6. Lack of reinforcement for constructive behavior, and reinforcement of inappropriate social behavior;
7. Sense of individual futility, i.e., the feeling that an individual can do nothing to improve his behavior without risking social disapproval;
8. Lack of mission-motivation for self, national, or generally humanitarian interest; and

9. Reluctance to discuss values, behavior, philosophical issues, or racial and ethnic problems because of a lack of confidence.

The development of each program element is described in the following sections.

Initial Orientation

The first development task of the Marine Corps project was to adapt AIR's overseas orientation for use as interim training while the more comprehensive educational materials were being developed and tested. Upon completion of those materials, and the implementation of the total training program, the adapted orientation was to be presented to all trainees prior to their participation in guided classroom discussions.

The AIR overseas orientation contains a values-clarification component, designed to provide a framework for the analysis of intergroup problems, as well as cross-cultural issues analogous to many of those identified as causing friction among Marines of different backgrounds. In an attempt to determine how to combine the basic philosophical component with the highly sensitive race-relations component for maximum effectiveness, a series of tryouts was conducted.

First, the overseas, cross-cultural orientation, with emphasis on human values, was presented to five panels of Marines. In critiques prepared at the end of each session, two-thirds of the participants reported that they could see the relevance of the presentation to racial problems but felt the more pertinent domestic issues needed to be specifically addressed.

Second, information about racial issues which had been identified in the initial interviews (See Page 12) was presented to six panels of Marines without any reference to the basic human-values approach. These presentations, in general, deteriorated into confrontation episodes which heightened rather than reduced tensions. One group, in particular, which was composed of senior staff NCO's, became openly hostile, thus obviating critiques. Participants in

other groups expressed various degrees of antipathy to the race relations topic, although a few mentioned an "increased awareness and sympathetic understanding of the problem."

Meanwhile, extensive micro-content testing of information designed to overcome interracial hostility, employing many small groups of Marines, revealed that a more effective means of motivation involved placing troublesome racial issues in the context of the full range of human relations problems. Therefore, in the next series of presentations the content and the sequence of various combinations of basic philosophy and racial issues were varied. Positive and negative reactions to each variation were analyzed and became the basic determinants of the orientation format drafted in December 1970.

The orientation at Appendix C is the result of numerous tryouts, critiques, and revisions of that original draft. In addition to providing an overview of the total program, it is designed to stimulate thought for discussion and to motivate trainees to seek constructive interactions with others from different cultural, racial, or ethnic backgrounds. It is a logical, carefully structured series of ideas, with anecdotal experiences added to sustain interest and to relate abstract ideas to real-life situations. Some of the concepts are controversial, but generally not to the extent that listeners will close their minds to the totality of the motivational, informative, and thought-provoking ideas which are presented. The vocabulary is tailored so as to be understood by Marines at most intelligence levels. The order of presentation is designed to encourage trainees to begin analyzing their own attitudes and behavior with respect to others and to stimulate further, more detailed discussion of the content.

Although several revisions have been made since the orientation was first adopted in 1970, still further modifications are required to maintain currency and relevancy. For example, information concerning the problems of women Marines and of minority groups other than Blacks, as well as the interdependence of leadership and human relations, should be included in the next version. Changes in conditions or circumstances necessitate continual, periodic revisions; but the

basic approach remains unchanged.

In developing orientation visual aids (See Appendix D) for an area as sensitive as race relations, many revisions were also necessary to accommodate the subtle problems with which the research staff was confronted. For example, the chart used to summarize some of the views of Blacks and Whites was remade several times. Originally, it was printed as "black complaints over unfair promotions, unfair punishment," etc. This terminology aroused much overt hostility on the part of some white trainees, who contended that Blacks were making unsupported accusations against the Marine Corps. The version now in use, which seems to be most palatable to both Blacks and Whites, is "black concern about fair promotions, fair punishment," etc.

The Marine Corps cadre was trained to deliver the adapted overseas orientation; and in early 1971 trial presentations were given to 302 Marines at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. Each team member presented the orientation to, and led discussions with, small groups of approximately ten members each. AIR staff observed the tryouts in order to determine the orientation and discussion leading capabilities of the Marine Corps team members, the impact of the color of the orienter and the composition of the audience upon orientation response and discussion quality, and the most effective utilization of the initial orientation as interim training.

Each team member was observed and critiqued by AIR staff members and by fellow Marines. In addition to identifying individual areas which required strengthening, the tryouts confirmed that laymen could effectively present the psychological/sociological material of the orientation.

Black team members oriented black, white, and mixed audiences, as did white team members. No substantial differences in impact were observed. Rather than race, the skill, sincerity, and persuasiveness of the speakers were the critical factors.

In an attempt to determine the most effective method of presenting the orientation as interim training, several variations were attempted. First, the orientation was presented to 12 panels of Marines (N=143) from a 50-minute prepared script, using Vu-graphs to illustrate specific points. A one-hour question-and-answer session followed. Problems immediately became apparent, as the Marine orienters could not provide factual and persuasive answers to the questions generated. Interest and positive reactions of the audience could not be sustained without such discussion to promote personal insight regarding the issues raised.

Next, ten panels of Marines (N=98) were trained using a combination lecture-discussion format, with questions for discussion addressed to the audience throughout the lecture. This method increased the problems mentioned above, and responses destroyed the continuity and logic of the presentation when given by orienters with little experience.

The final group of eight panels (N=61) was given the orientation, with additional, relevant racial information. The question-and-answer periods which followed degenerated into rap sessions and produced considerable hostility. In predominantly white groups, Blacks were intimidated and did not fully participate in the discussions. In groups with a greater number of Blacks, they often took the opportunity to vent their anger, thereby placing the white participants on the defensive. As in the previous two approaches, the orienter was not able to control these situations in the absence of factual, persuasive guidelines.

Following the orientation period, each Marine was asked to submit an anonymous critique. Of the 302 trainees, 246 (81%) expressed a favorable or very favorable reaction to the presentation. However, 155 (63%) of these respondents mentioned their strong reservations that many issues had not been resolved and that more discussion should be held. Typical comments were:

"The lecture was fine, but what do we do to arrive at mutually beneficial solutions?"

"The lecture was a real awakening; but if this is all there is to the program, more harm will be done than good."

"I think before this type of thing will work, it needs more discussion."

"You just can't lecture a man about personal or social beliefs. They should be talked through. The way it's set up now, it won't work."

Despite the anxiety of the Marine Corps to field some type of human relations training program at once, AIR believed that it would be counterproductive to present the orientation with a subsequent hiatus in training while discussion materials were being developed. Cognizant Marine Corps staff agreed that the training would be far more effective if orientations were followed as soon as possible by a series of guided discussions designed to expand the ideas which had been stimulated by the orientation. Accordingly, plans for interim training were abandoned, and attention turned to accelerated completion of the discussion materials already being developed.

Guided Discussion Materials

Micro-content development, similar to that used in the design of the orientation, was employed in formulating, testing, and revising the discussion materials:

1. Surveys were conducted periodically to ascertain those issues currently troubling Marines. Some issues were rapidly assessed through pen-and-pencil questionnaires administered by Marines at local commands, while others were elicited through in-depth, face-to-face interviews conducted by AIR professional staff members.

2. Factual and persuasive information was assembled which might prove useful in ameliorating those specific troublesome issues.

3. Materials were developed by the research team to guide discussion about the more fundamental, universal, attitudinal and motivational factors.

4. These materials were presented to small groups of Marines and revised according to the responses and reactions generated by their discussion.

As with the orientation, this developmental process has been repeated several times in order to revise the educational materials to

reflect additional facts and changing conditions. The same process will be required periodically throughout the life of the program to insure that training materials remain current and relevant.

Camp Lejeune Tryout

By early 1971, it became desirable to try out various components of human relations training on a larger scale than had been attempted heretofore. Accordingly, a research plan was designed to:

1. Obtain reactions to specific elements of the training materials for guidance in the further refinement of those materials, e.g., the degree of optimism generated concerning the solution of race relations problems;

2. Determine the problems of implementing a large-scale training program, e.g., the availability of Marines for specified blocks of training; and

3. Test the efficacy of each of the following components, alone and in combination with the others, with regard to their impact on attitudes, beliefs, opinions, knowledge, preferences, and, possibly, overt behaviors:

   a. Discussions of philosophical and ethical concepts, e.g., the nature of man, life, liberty, equality, and personal and social responsibility;

   b. Discussions of intergroup issues, e.g., discrimination in promotions, assignments, and military justice; differences in cultural characteristics, such as education and career patterns; and reaction to specific behaviors, such as intimidation and the use of unity symbols; and

   c. Experiential training in the form of cross-cultural interaction and individual community-service efforts.

The tryout would thus attempt to elicit specific information for use in developing a viable human relations program for the Marine Corps, as well as to answer two general, theoretical questions:

1. Can intergroup difficulties be ameliorated most effectively by the indirect approach of philosophic training, by addressing intergroup problems directly, or by a combination of these?

2. Can intergroup difficulties be ameliorated most effectively by cognitive training, experiential

training, or combinations of cognitive and experiential training?

Tryouts of various educational contents and training methods were undertaken at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, during March and April 1971. Five treatment groups and one control group of approximately 100 each (company-size units) were utilized for five days of training as follows:

1. Philosophical training alone;
2. Intergroup issues training alone;
3. Experiential (individual action) training alone;
4. Philosophical plus intergroup issues training;
5. Philosophical, intergroup issues, and experiential training; and
6. No training.

Companies were randomly assigned to treatment groups. Each treatment group was divided into six discussion subgroups of approximately 15 members each, with officers and NCO's assigned to a separate subgroup. To control for interinstructor differences, each instructor trained one subgroup within each treatment. At the completion of each treatment, written comments were solicited from the trainees.

In addition to these training critiques, a questionnaire was developed for assessing changes in trainee attitudes or opinions. Several different response formats were utilized, such as 3-step and 5-step scales of agreement/disagreement, the semantic differential technique, and checklists for questions permitting multiple responses. The content of the items was based partly on the findings of the initial interviews, described in Part II of this report, and partly on the results of earlier tryouts.

Although most of the items were suitable for administration to all Marines, several specific questions were modified for Whites, Blacks, and members of non-black minority groups in order to maximize item equivalence. (For example, Whites were asked if they would rather have a white commanding officer than a black one, and Blacks were asked if they would rather have a black commanding officer than a white

one.) The basic questionnaire, MCQ/1 (which contains Items 1-111 for all trainees) and MCQ/1.1, the version of Items 112-150 for Whites, are included as Appendixes E-1 and E-2 of this report.

Data were collected prior to the start of the training sessions and again at the end of the training. Throughout the Camp Lejeune tryouts and the later, more formal tryouts at Camp Pendleton, the questionnaires were completed anonymously.

The first objective of the research plan, i.e., to obtain reactions to specific elements of the training material, was addressed through analysis of responses on the after-training questionnaire and on the training critiques. As is illustrated by the discussion of results from the Camp Pendleton tryout (See next section), the results of each item, and certain selected groups of items, were examined; and the information obtained was used in revising the educational materials or the training design.

The tryout also accomplished the second objective of the research plan, i.e., to determine problems of implementation of a large-scale training program. Chief among these problems was the difficulty of maintaining a uniform group of Marines for the specified blocks of training. The Camp Lejeune human affairs staff contributed to this problem in their concern that as many Marines as possible receive any amount of training that was available. In addition, officers tended to fill the quota of trainees each day with different Marines in the course of the five days, apparently in an attempt to reduce an individual's time away from regular duties.

This lack of uniformity led to a failure to achieve the third objective, i.e., to test the impact of various educational components on trainee attitudes and behavior. Because the composition of training groups varied from day to day, it could not be determined if the persons completing the questionnaire prior to training also did so after training. Thus, although the Camp Lejeune tryout generated implementation information and reactions to specific materials, and

provided an opportunity to refine questionnaire items,[5] clean impact data were not obtainable.

Camp Pendleton Tryout

Based on the experience gained at Camp Lejeune, modifications were made in both the educational content and the training methods that had been utilized in the earlier tryout. The opinion questionnaire was also slightly revised. [Appendixes F-1 through F-4 of this report are the basic questionnaire (MCQ/2) and the additional items for Whites (MCQ/2-W), Blacks (MCQ/2-B) and others (MCQ/2-O).] With these materials, a larger, more formal study was undertaken at Camp Pendleton, California, in order to:

1. Obtain further guidance in materials development from trainees' reactions to specific materials; and
2. Determine the effectiveness of the various training components, alone and in combination.

From 19 May to 30 June 1971, a sample of 1,100 Marines at Camp Pendleton were employed in eight experimental treatment groups and two control groups of approximately 100 trainees each (company- or battery-size units). These experimental treatments were:

1. Philosophical training alone;
2. Intergroup issues training alone;
3. Experiential training alone;
4. Philosophical plus intergroup issues training;
5. Intergroup issues plus experiential training;
6. Philosophical plus experiential training;

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5. Many items developed and refined as a result of the Camp Lejeune tryout have been used by the Army in the development of the Racial Perceptions Inventory. In addition, the Center for Naval Analyses utilized the basic instrument for developing an assessment of racial attitudes in the Navy. Other than the deletion of a few items, the only modification involved rephrasing to make the instrument relevant to the Navy, e.g., changing "NCO" to "petty officer." The Center's analysis showed the questionnaire to be highly useful.

7. Philosophical plus intergroup issues plus experiential training;

8. Initial draft of the Department of Defense Race Relations Education Program (which consisted primarily of information on DOD's policy on human relations, the history of minority groups and their cultural contributions to American society, and the nature of prejudice); and

9. No training.

Companies were randomly assigned to treatment groups. Each group was then divided into subgroups of approximately 20 members for training. In order to control for interinstructor differences, each instructor trained one 20-member group within all experimental treatments. Each subgroup was given training two hours a day for six to ten days. (Length of training depended upon the number of components in the treatment.)

Anonymous opinion questionnaires were administered to all trainees and to members of the control groups before the beginning of cognitive training and shortly after the conclusion of training. The following table shows the number of Marines in each training group who completed questionnaires.

Number of Questionnaires Completed at Camp Pendleton

	White		Black		Others		Totals	
	Pre-Tng.	Post-Tng.	Pre-Tng.	Post-Tng.	Pre-Tng.	Post-Tng.	Pre-Tng.	Post-Tng.
Control	156	64	15	6	14	10	185	80
Philosophy	69	54	16	16	14	11	99	81
Philosophy/ Action	87	42	17	9	14	5	118	56
Issues	81	33	16	6	25	12	122	51
Issues/ Action	54	28	14	7	17	8	85	43
Philosophy/ Issues	62	38	15	7	6	4	83	49
Philosophy/ Issues/ Action	75	57	15	12	10	5	100	74
Action	87	45	7	7	14	12	108	64
Department of Defense	126	80	40	27	34	25	200	132
TOTALS	797	441	155	97	148	92	1100	630

As the table indicates, the number of Blacks and others was very small in several groups, particulary in the post-training administration. The overall reduction in the number of responses between the two questionnaire administrations, however, was 37.7% for Blacks and others, compared with 44.7% for Whites. In the control units, there was a white attrition rate of almost 60% from the pre-training to the post-training questionnaires. While these high attrition rates indicate the inferior quality of the data obtained on changes from pre- to post-training, additional problems made accurate assessment of such changes virtually impossible.

All of the reasons for the attrition between the two administrations could not be determined. However, one important factor was the concern of Marine Corps program personnel for operational rather than research results and their consequent desire to keep civilian research participation to a minimum in order to avoid unneeded program opposition. But, when the Marine Corps staff collected the data, they did not insure that the same personnel completed both the before- and after-training questionnaires. This failure not only resulted in a great reduction in the number of people who took the post-test, but also made it impossible to determine that those who did so were the same as those who took the pre-test and actually went through training.

As at Camp Lejeune, implementation information and class observation data were obtained, but nothing more than suggestive information could be gained from the before- and after-training testing at Camp Pendleton. For this reason, the questionnaire data was never fully analyzed. However, individual questionnaire items and results of training critiques were used extensively for guidance in program development.

Analysis of the pre-training questionnaires revealed some of the dissatisfaction and cynicism within the Corps at that time. For example, in a sample of responses to questionnaire items, Blacks clearly indicated that they believed they were not receiving equal and

dignified treatment:[6]

Questionnaire Statement #26. "Non-whites get more than their share of dirty details."

Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
57%	21%	21%	1%

Questionnaire Statement #31. "An unfairly large number of non-whites are assigned infantry MOS's."

Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
67%	9%	23%	1%

Questionnaire Statement #47. "Whites do not usually have to be as good as non-whites to be promoted in the Corps."

Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
71%	12%	16%	1%

Questionnaire Statement #38. "Whites do not show proper respect for non-whites with higher rank."

Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
53%	25%	20%	1%

Questionnaire Statement #15. "White Marines are punished less severely than non-whites for the same offenses."

Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
61%	15%	22%	1%

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6. Because of rounding to the nearest whole percentage, responses throughout this section do not always total 100%.

As can be seen from the table below, white respondents had an entirely different perception of the relative status of minorities in the Corps:

Questionnaire Statement #	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
26	13%	73%	13%	1%
31	12%	60%	26%	1%
47	12%	72%	15%	1%
38	11%	73%	15%	1%
15	9%	75%	15%	1%

In addition, many white respondents indicated:

1. That they were apprehensive about black solidarity (43% agreed with Questionnaire Statement #135-C that "non-whites cluster together in groups because they mean to threaten others such as Whites");

2. That they believed accusations of prejudice were often made when prejudicial treatment, in fact, did not exist (75% agreed with Questionnaire Statement #53 that "non-whites frequently cry 'prejudice' rather than accept blame for personal faults"); and

3. That they felt too many concessions were being made for Blacks (47% agreed with Questionnaire Statement #96 that "if things continue the way they are going, the Blacks will get more than their fair share").

Against this negative, polarized background, responses were analyzed to determine:

1. The effectiveness of human relations training in ameliorating some of the tensions; and

2. The direction that the development and refinement of such training should take.

Minority representation was too small, and respondent attrition too great, to permit interpretation of changes through pre- and post-training statistical comparison; but tabulations were made on four key statements to measure effectiveness with white Marines:

1. Questionnaire Statement #11. "There is a good chance that the Marine Corps can reduce racial problems."

Control Group #1 (No Training)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Test	40%	40%	11%	8%
Post-Test	19%	57%	19%	5%

Control Group #2 (DOD Draft Materials)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	34%	34%	13%	19%
Post-Training	40%	36%	15%	9%

Experimental Group (Key Elements of USMC Program)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	39%	49%	5%	7%
Post-Training	65%	23%	5%	7%

Analysis of responses in the untreated control group indicated that human relations training was being initiated at a time when hopes for improving the racial climate within the Corps were dimming. Nevertheless, human relations training succeeded in raising expectations of improved relations, an important step preliminary to such improvement. While the increase in positive expectations from pre- to post-training was slight in the group exposed to minority history and culture, there was a significant increase in the experimental group trained with key elements of the USMC program.

2. Questionnaire Statement #111. "People can be trained to be less prejudiced."

Control Group #1 (No Training)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Test	29%	50%	12%	8%
Post-Test	25%	44%	16%	15%

Control Group #2 (DOD Draft Materials)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	32%	45%	14%	9%
Post-Training	21%	32%	23%	23%

Experimental Group (Key Elements of USMC Program)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	29%	52%	11%	8%
Post-Training	51%	26%	16%	7%

Statement #111 was used to explore the methods of convincing people that change was possible. At this early stage of program development, fostering a belief in the possibility of change was as important as designing a program to effect that change. Whereas item #11 addressed the possibility that the Corps could reduce racial problems, perhaps through official actions and policies, item #111 addressed the role of the individual in a reduction of tension.

3. Questionnaire Statement #23. "Closer association between the races will improve relations."

Control Group #1 (No Training)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Test	61%	18%	7%	14%
Post-Test	37%	32%	21%	11%

Control Group #2 (DOD Draft Materials)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	60%	18%	13%	9%
Post-Training	51%	13%	21%	11%

Experimental Group (Key Elements of USMC Program)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	47%	39%	12%	3%
Post-Training	68%	16%	12%	4%

The responses to Questionnaire Statement #23 lent support to the approach being taken to the experiential training component of the human relations program. In order to provide opportunities for sustained, constructive behavioral changes and to reinforce and habituate such changes, the experiential training phase was to be designed to encourage association across such cultural barriers as age and wealth, with particular emphasis on cross-racial or cross-ethnic association. Analysis of Statement #23 suggested that the experimental group exposed to the Marine Corps program expected improved relations as a result of such association. Thus, AIR believed it wise to

continue the thrust of the individual action program in the educational materials, with the expectation of a favorable response.

Such materials were developed cautiously, however. An excellent educational program was needed so that members of diverse groups could rationally discuss the troublesome issues likely to be encountered as a result of closer associations. If not properly countered, some issues could cause a backlash, rather than the anticipated improved relations.

4. Questionnaire Statement #109. "The Corps is doing a very good job in trying to reduce problems and tensions between groups."

Control Group #1 (No Training)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Test	20%	60%	20%	0%
Post-Test	17%	67%	17%	0%

Control Group #2 (Draft DOD Materials)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	18%	65%	11%	6%
Post-Training	21%	38%	21%	17%

Experimental Group (Key Elements of USMC Program)

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral	No Answer
Pre-Training	17%	65%	13%	4%
Post-Training	33%	37%	25%	5%

Both groups of participants exposed to human relations training were responsive to the Corps' efforts to reduce intergroup tensions. The experimental group, in particular, showed strong gains from the before- to the after-training questionnaires. On the other hand, the control group with no training became more negative over the same period. These results reinforced the belief that the Marine Corps was embarking upon a practical approach which had a reasonable chance of success.

Caution must be exercised in the application of the foregoing statements to individuals. Clearly, what is shown is that people who have participated in at least some part of the USMC program tended to have a somewhat more positive outlook than those who did not. However, this is not to say that the individuals who started with a negative attitude changed to positive or neutral.

In addition to the information gained through the formal analysis of questionnaire items such as these, as well as the written post-training critiques, a wealth of informal data were obtained through conversations with individual trainees and through classroom observations. During the development stage of the training program, AIR and Marine Corps program staff observed and critiqued literally hundreds of tryout classes with a view toward improving educational materials, discussion-leading methods, composition of classes, instructor capability, and methods for monitoring training classes in the field. These data were fed into the design and development of the Human Relations Institute (See Part IV: Program Implementation), which was to be the practical and immediate end-user of research results.

Women Marine Survey

As indicated early in the discussion of the development of guided discussion materials, small sections of the materials must continuously be tested and revised in order to insure that they remain current and relevant. However, the need for a major addition to the materials became apparent approximately one year after implementation of the program thoughout the Corps. Based upon feedback from instructors in the field, AIR believed that greater emphasis on non-black minority groups was needed in the training materials. Accordingly, preliminary interviews were held during the July - September 1972 quarter with women Marines, American Indians, and Mexican Americans.

In view of Department of Defense interest in the revision of all services' educational materials to reflect the problems of women, the Marine Corps decided to restrict follow-up, in-depth interviews to women Marines and to conduct them almost simultaneously with the major ONR-funded research task described in Part VI: Program Monitoring. During the month of October, briefings and conferences were held with the Director of Women Marines and other representatives of Headquarters Marine Corps in preparation for a pilot survey. In December 1972, fifty women Marines were interviewed by AIR staff at Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

The survey indicated that women Marines have problems that differ from those of male Marines. They run the gamut from environmental problems, such as housing, to human relations problems. In addition, it appears that there may be some intergroup problems that are unique to women in the Marine Corps. (Because other races and/or ethnic groups were not adequately represented at the commands selected for the pilot survey, the information obtained was limited to problems between Blacks and Whites.)

Based upon the successful completion of the pilot study, an expanded survey of an additional 150 women Marines began in March 1973 at eight CONUS bases: Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;

Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia; Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina; Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California; Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California; Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms, California; and Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California.

The interview schedule employed and the analysis of the data collected may be found in the Survey of Women Marine Problems, submitted to the United States Marine Corps in September 1973 (Appendix G).

Current Materials

Volumes I-III of the United States Marine Corps Human Relations Leadership Discussion Manual (Appendixes H - J of this report) comprise the training materials currently in use. They are the result of refinements made according to numerous tryouts, the two major tests being the Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton experiments described earlier in this section. While the manuals appear disjointed and unorganized when read as textbooks, empirical tryouts have shown they are sequenced appropriately for stimulating and guiding constructive discussions. In addition, they develop a willingness in people of diverse races and backgrounds to deal with each other sympathetically, that is, to take the initial actions that are advocated at the beginning of the experiential training component of the program.

AIR originally envisioned a 40-hour package of educational materials which would comprise Sections 1-6 discussed below. However, Headquarters Marine Corps determined that a 40-hour training requirement was unrealistic because of competing operational commitments. When HQMC agreed to twenty hours of training annually, Sections 1-3 were included in Volume I for use during the first year of training; and Volume II, for second year training, incorporated Sections 4-6. Volume III, which was published to the field on 1 July 1974, was designed for use during the third and subsequent years of training as a review of the basic principles and concepts of Volumes I and II.

In the development of these training materials, AIR strove to present the sometimes difficult philosophical concepts of the program in common-sense terms and at a language level that would be comprehensible and acceptable to the majority of the trainees. Reactions from the initial training sessions indicated that the effort had been successful. However, when priorities shifted from training successive classes of peer groups in descending order throughout the rank structure of the Corps to training all service members yearly (See Page 54), serious difficulties were encountered with many of the younger, less educated Marines. As a result, extensive notes (Appendixes K - M of this report) were prepared as an aid to discussion leaders in facilitating understanding of the vocabulary and philosophy of the manuals. Revisions are currently underway to adjust the language level of the manuals themselves. Discussion of the substantive content of these educational materials follows.

VOLUME I (NAVMAC 2648), which is used in the first year of training.

Section I--Introduction. This section is designed to provide a general overview of the Marine Corps Human Relations Program and an appreciation of the basic philosophy upon which the program is based. Guidelines are established for the conduct of the discussions, key words are defined as they will be used throughout the materials, and the merits of the human-values approach to human relations are described. The ideas are introduced:

1. That people need to analyze what their beliefs are, or should be; and

2. That guidelines for human relationships will be confused until values and priorities are established.

Belief in the traditional American values of life, liberty, and equality is briefly discussed, with the suggestion that failure to act upon that belief created the need for a human relations program in the Corps. Statistics and examples are presented to show that the individual is not alone, but a part of the great majority of people who want improved relations.

Section 2--Human Nature and Our Basic Values. Since a person's beliefs about many of the concepts important to this program, e.g., equal treatment and democracy, depend upon his/her view of human nature, this section begins with a discussion of various views. Is man by nature dangerous? Is he mainly social and cooperative, or is he like a blank tablet without any basic tendencies at all? The materials encourage discussion of the view that man's highest values are derived from the need of the human race to insure survival of self and the species.

Part A. Equality, Life, and Liberty. Part A encourages discussion of the idea that the political values of liberty and equality are cherished because they protect human life. Equality is defined as that natural, innate drive which causes each person to value his/her life, and the lives of his/her loved ones, just as much as every other person values his/hers.

Part B. Our Values and the Military Man. Part B is devoted to discussion of whether it is reasonable to talk of humanitarian values in relation to military personnel whose job it is to kill. Trainees are encouraged to discuss the idea that man tends to protect and sustain the lives of others as well as his own. Marines also are asked to consider the idea that it is their duty and official role to do so, that is, to be defenders of life. Further, they are asked to discuss the idea that this role includes the daily, continuous responsibility to encourage and assist others, ranging from such simple acts as acknowledging others to risking their lives for the benefit of others.

Part C. Individual Action Mission. Part C contains suggested exercises and assignments which will enable Marines to practice the encouragement and assistance referred to in Part B. Particular emphasis is placed upon activities across cultural barriers, whether they be of race, sex, age, or rank. Internal, one-on-one efforts are suggested, i.e., between Marines, as well as external efforts between individual Marines and the civilian community or between Marines and members of other services.

Section 3--Our Sameness and Differences: Cross-Ethnic Relations among Americans at Home and Abroad. The purpose of this section

can be found in its introduction: "Pride, self-confidence, and feelings of personal dignity and equality all seem to make for better fighting men, better citizens, and happier persons. How do we help each other develop these qualities in all who want them?"[7]

Having laid the foundation for constructive discussion in Sections 1 and 2 by exploring the program's basic concepts and philosophy, the materials now provide an opportunity to identify and examine specific, troublesome issues which prevent people from contributing to feelings of personal dignity and equality in others. Participants are encouraged to seek missing information in order to eliminate the myths and stereotypes that cause unjustifiable prejudice. It is suggested that the trainees consider the idea that man's physical and cultural differences may be the result of the influences of different surroundings on man's heredity and behavior, and a four-step formula is provided for learning to understand and cope with those differences:

1. Find the reason for the differences;
2. Eliminate the exaggerations and determine the facts;
3. Compare the differences to similarities in one's own culture; and
4. If Steps 1-3 are not effective, develop the courage to withstand those differences when interacting with someone from another culture.

Specifically, Section 3 includes reasons for and attitudes toward differences in skin color, wealth, age, rank, intelligence, education, language, dating customs, family matters, and sex. The section concludes with a discussion of the extent to which an individual should personally combat prejudice, in general, and in its specific manifestations, e.g., unfair promotion and punishment policies.

VOLUME II (NAVMAC 2649), which is used in the second year of training.

Section 4--Cross-Cultural Adjustment (Culture Shock). In this section, trainees are guided in the extension of the principles

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7. United States Marine Corps Human Relations Leadership Discussion Manual, Volume I, 26 June 1973, p. 119 (See Appendix H).

and concepts of Volume I from relations among Americans to relations between Americans and foreign nationals overseas. They are encouraged to do so not only because it is part of their responsibility as defenders of life, but also because their own lives might someday be saved by friendly and sympathetic foreign nationals.

The four-part formula from Section 3 is reinforced and used in detailed discussion of some of the issues that are most troublesome in establishing effective cross-cultural relations overseas: the apparent prevelance of bribes and corruption, unwelcome requests for illegal purchases from the Base Exchange, distrust of the unfamiliar bargaining system, a feeling of superiority fostered by the relative poverty of most foreign nationals, and an unwillingness or inability to deal with different approaches to religion, driving, and sanitation. The objective of this section is to enable trainees to say, "Human life (human welfare) provides the measure of good and bad, so sometimes their ways are better and sometimes ours are better. It depends on the circumstances."[8]

Section 5--The Human-Life Value, Government, and War. In this section, trainees discuss the ideas that the purpose of government is to serve and protect people and that the purpose of a just war is to defend people against oppression and aggression. In Section 5, they consider the formulation that the ideal government can be depicted as a tree whose roots symbolize all the freedom possible and all the control necessary to produce the foliage--the life value or human welfare. Various forms of existing governments are examined in the light of this tree analogy, the primary criterion for a good government being how well it protects and preserves human life. In addition to extending the concept of the defender of life from individuals to governments, this section enables an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of our own form of democracy and of the less advanced democracies a Marine may encounter while serving overseas.

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8. United States Marine Corps Human Relations Leadership Discussion Manual, Volume II, 1 April 1973, p. 126 (See Appendix I).

Section 6--Male-Female Relations (Sex) and Human Nature. Section 6 is included in the discussion materials because differences in male-female customs cause a great deal of cross-cultural misunderstanding and hostility. Marriage, the family, and sexual pleasure are discussed in terms of their protection of the human-life value. This same criterion is applied to an examination of male/female issues which may be encountered overseas and of the visiting Americans' impact upon them: various forms of marriage, e.g., polyandry and polygamy; differences in dating and courting customs; confusion of fraternity for sexuality; and the many facets of prostitution--economic need, its role in espionage, and the practice of overseas Americans "hiring" wives.

VOLUME III (NAVMAC 2650), which is used in the third and subsequent years of training.

The purposes of Volume III are to:

1. Provide a review of the ideas and issues in Volume I;

2. Provide a more interesting and challenging approach to the materials in Volume II, particularly for those Marines who believe they will never serve overseas; and

3. Provide a wide range of individual leadership action program suggestions.

The methodology of Volume III differs from Volumes I and II in that small teams of trainees utilize a case-study approach in the review of Volumes I and II.

Readings

Because of the limited number of hours available for human relations training, and the volume of discussion materials eventually prepared, it has been found that class time must be devoted to the leadership discussion manuals, to the exclusion of other reading materials. In addition, the abbreviated time frame during which most classes are held precludes the assignment and preparation of reports on outside readings. However, throughout the course, discussion leaders frequently reference published works which bear on the class-

room discussion, participants are encouraged to read appropriate materials as background for their classes, and many commands have assembled human relations libraries where such relevant materials are easily accessible. The basic list of suggested readings, both on general philosophical and ideological issues and on specific intergroup and interpersonal problems, can be found on Pages 216 and 217 of the United States Marine Corps Human Relations Leadership Discussion Manual, Volume I (See Appendix H).

Experiential Training

The orientation, guided discussions, and outside readings are preliminary to and in preparation for the basic purpose of the human relations program: to help the Marine Corps accomplish its mission through sustained, constructive behavior changes on the part of individual Marines. It is the role of the experiential training phase to provide opportunities for such behavior changes and to reinforce and habituate them.

Some specific behaviors (termed "leadership action efforts") are encouraged during the current 20 hours of classroom work, for example speaking to everyone encountered and trying to get them to return the greeting; engaging someone from another generation or from a much higher or lower rank, finding points of disagreement, and then defending the other person's position in class; and consulting someone from another ethnic background on the meanings of various emotion-packed symbols, such as the "dap" and the Confederate flag. More comprehensive, post-classroom behavior changes are also encouraged. However, because of variations at each command in the conditions of the Marines and of the community, it has not been feasible to devise a uniform, detailed post-classroom experiential training program Corps-wide. Those guidelines which have been published to all commands are, of necessity, so general that they can be interpreted with wide latitude. The result is a broad range of action efforts in the field, both in terms of types of activities and the extent to which they are pursued.

In an attempt to develop more realistic and pointed guidelines for continuing human relations training through individual leadership

action programs throughout the Corps, a worldwide data collection effort was conducted early in 1974. Interviews were conducted to determine:

1. What types of action efforts commanders would support in their commands;

2. How various action efforts would interface with activities of special staff personnel, such as education officers and chaplains;

3. The experience of Human Relations Instructors and Unit Discussion Leaders with the experiential training they had conducted thusfar; and

4. What action efforts Marines would actually be willing to undertake.

(See Appendixes N - R of this report for the interview schedules.)

A preliminary, partial analysis of the collected data was submitted to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 27 November 1974 (See Appendix S). Further analysis of those data should clarify the relationships between the following elements of individual action and should suggest the most appropriate combination for the design of a viable experiential training program:

1. Actions involving the command structure which are designed to bring about institutional change.

   EXAMPLES: Informal discussions; small unit seminars; human affairs activities; command recreational activities; establishment of culture-enriching activities; formal and informal educational activities; screening of Service Record Books for conduct, proficiency, and Essential Subjects deficiencies.

2. Actions taken by individual Marines which are designed for self-improvement in military-related areas or in personal areas.

   EXAMPLES: Improving personal appearance, MOS skills, non-MOS-related skills, and Physical Fitness scores; participating in off-duty education; seeking responsibility; increasing knowledge of current events; increasing cultural and ethnic awareness.

3. Actions taken by individual Marines which are designed to improve relations with other Marines, civilians, or other service members. These actions include one-on-one and small, team-building activities.

EXAMPLES: Saluting properly and extending greetings; assisting a Marine in a MOS-related task; associating with a Marine of a different race during off-duty time; sponsoring a junior Marine; conducting demonstrations/presentations at civilian schools; participating in community projects; visiting an orphanage or senior citizens' home; associating with a Sailor/Soldier/Airman during off-duty time; and visiting other services' museums.

As with the orientation and discussion materials, continuing research will be conducted to assess changing attitudes and conditions so that the experiential training component can be revised accordingly.

PART IV

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Original Plan

By December of 1970, the general design of a complete human relations program had been adopted by the Marine Corps (See Page 17), as well as the outline of a basic plan for its implementation in the field. A cadre of 180 Marines was to be trained over a three-month period to serve as instructors in the human relations program. The course of instruction was to be designed by AIR and carried out under the supervision of an AIR staff member who would serve as co-director of the course. Each instructor would serve in an operational command and would train Unit Discussion Leaders (UDL's) to present the orientation, conduct small group discussions, and initiate and maintain the experiential training program. Each instructor would also be responsible for obtaining current information on human relations problems, monitoring the quality of instruction and implementation, and advising the unit leaders on the program. The cadre of instructors was to be monitored at their commands and advised by the Marine team then working with the AIR project staff.

During the next nine months, several major tasks were completed in preparation for the training of these Human Relations Instructors (HRI's):

1. Detailed briefings on the educational content of the training program were presented to the Commandant, Chief of Staff, G-1, G-3, and other selected general officers at Headquarters Marine Corps. Actual training sessions were conducted for all generals and commanding officers of major units in the field.

2. The initial program team at Headquarters was doubled in order to staff the human relations instructor training course. A new group of Marines was recruited and trained for this purpose between June and August of 1971.

3. While the new team members were being trained, the educational materials were further revised on the basis of experience gained during the Camp Pendleton experiment; and detailed instructor guidelines were written. An instructor-training syllabus (Appendix T), formal lesson plans, and a 3-month training schedule were developed. The following criteria for selecting candidates were formulated and sent to the field. Candidates should:

a. be volunteers,

b. have less than one year on station,

c. have a minimum General Classification Test score and a Verbal score of 110,

d. have demonstrated leadership ability,

e. have the ability to communicate effectively with individuals and groups,

f. be of sound moral character, and

g. have an awareness of current social issues.

4. The Marine Corps decided to locate the Human Relations Instructor Training Course at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, California, and to conduct two consecutive courses of approximately 90 trainees each.

USMC Human Relations Instructor School

The USMC Human Relations Instructor School began on 20 September 1971 with 75 students from Eastern Marine Corps commands. The course included student discussions of the substantive materials which had been developed; analyses of the theory underlying the content; lectures on the functions of human relations specialists, e.g., assessing problems and impacts of the program, training discussion leaders, and supervising action projects; background readings in the social sciences and in minority affairs; instruction in discussion-leading techniques; case studies of problems in human relations training programs; and a practicum which included interviewing and analysis of protocols, individual student research on minority affairs and intergroup problems, and individual student practice-teaching under observation.

End-of-course critiques by students indicated a high regard for the course content and methodology employed in the school. However, major problems were revealed with this first class. Approximately 40% of the 75 instructor trainees did not meet the prescribed criteria for selection.

As a result, only 48 Marines (19 officers and 29 enlisted) graduated at the end of the course on 10 December 1971. The high attrition rate was due primarily to an inadequate screening process which did not detect non-volunteers, personnel with personal problems, or individuals who were intellectually unsuited to handle the program. (Based upon experience gained during the conduct of this first class, formal graduation requirements were established. They appear at Appendix U to this report.)

The second class began on 10 January 1972, with 90 students from West Coast and Western Pacific commands. Student selection continued to be a problem with this class as it had been with the first. At the completion of the course on 7 April 1972, sixty-five (21 officers and 44 enlisted) of the original 90 students graduated.

When the first two instructor courses at San Diego had been conducted, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established a secondary MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) to identify graduates of the Human Relations Instructor Course and established a Marine Corps Human Relations Institute (MCHRI) at the Recruit Depot in San Diego. Additional or replacement instructors for all commands were to be trained at MCHRI on an annual basis.

Because of a USMC requirement to extend the human relations program to the organized reserves, three reserve classes were conducted at the Institute during July and August 1972 (See Page 61). This precluded the matriculation of a third class of active Marines until 28 August. Because of increased adherence to selection criteria and a reduction in hostility to the program on the part of some commanders, 56 Human Relations Instructors were graduated on 7 November 1972 out of a starting class of 57. Twenty-three officers (second lieutenant to major), one warrant officer, and 32 enlisted personnel (lance corporal to master sergeant) constituted the class. One woman Marine captain was among the officer graduates.

The following table summarizes the classes conducted at the Marine Corps Human Relations Institute:

CLASS	DATES	TOTAL HRI'S MATRICULATED	TOTAL HRI'S GRADUATED	NO. OF OFFICERS GRADUATED	NO. OF ENLISTED GRADUATED	NO. OF WOMEN MARINES GRADUATED
1	9/20/71-12/10/71	75	48	19	29	-0-
2	1/10/72-4/ 7/72	90	65	21	44	-0-
3	8/28/72-11/ 7/72	57	56	24	32	1 (officer)
4	1/ 7/73-3/16/73	72	66	21	45	1 (officer)
5	4/ 8/73-6/22/73	67	63	18	45	1 (enlisted)
6	8/27/73-11/ 9/73	64	61	26	35	3 (1 officer, 2 enlisted)
7	1/ 7/74-3/22/74	69	62	11	51	1 (enlisted)
8	3/31/74-5/10/74	64	63	56	7	2 (officers)
9	5/19/74-6/28/74	56	56	50	6	4 (officers)
	TOTAL	614	540	246	294	13 (9 officers, 4 enlisted)

Classes 8 and 9 were abbreviated, highly intense sessions, which were conducted in an effort to graduate as many instructors as possible before the Institute was disestablished (See Page 57).

As in the development of the program's educational materials, course content and training methods at the Institute were constantly monitored. After-class student critiques and observations by AIR staff provided the feed-back necessary to modify instruction appropriately. Several curriculum revisions were made during the life of the Institute, and the last regular syllabus, dated 1 January 1974, is included at Appendix V. The syllabus for the last two six-week courses is at Appendix W.

Upon returning to their field commands, graduates of the Human Relations Institute trained Unit Discussion Leaders to conduct the actual human relations instruction in the ideal ratio of one discussion

leader for every forty personnel on board. No exact figures are available on the thousands of discussion leaders who have been trained since the inception of the program.

Refresher Training

During the April - June 1972 quarter, AIR staff members conducted interviews with a large number of Human Relations Instructors in the field in order to determine the training problems that were being encountered. Three primary concerns expressed by the instructors were:

1. The frequent semantic arguments which arose in class because of confusion between the connotative and denotative meanings of words used in the text;
2. Lack of emphasis in the materials on non-black minority groups; and
3. Omission of citations and references in the manual.

Each of these concerns was addressed in a revision to the training manual that was carried out the following quarter.

These interviews with HRI's, as well as observations of discussion groups in progress, also indicated that certain concepts in Volume I of the manual were not sufficiently well understood by many of the instructors and/or their discussion leaders. As a result, an in-depth retraining session for HRI's was conducted during the October - December 1972 quarter, with HRI's from Western commands invited to attend. Similar retraining sessions were held for Eastern Command HRI's at Camp Lejeune from 22 to 26 January 1973, and for the third HRI graduating class from 12 to 14 February 1973. From 2-6 April 1973, an intensive Volume II retraining session was held at the Institute with HRI's in attendance from all over the world.

In order to determine the efficacy of these retraining sessions, monitoring of training groups was continued during the final quarter of Fiscal Year 1973. Monitoring visits were made by an AIR/USMC team to the following commands at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina: COMCABEAST; 2nd MAW; MCAS, Cherry Point; MCB, Camp Lejeune; Force TrpsLant; and the Second

Marine Division. Observations made during the monitoring sessions were transmitted to the Human Relations Institute for revision of subsequent training courses.

In addition to providing an opportunity for the review of educational content and methodology, retraining sessions also allowed HRI's from various commands to discuss common training experiences, analyze implementation problems, and assess the impact of effective command support on their respective programs. These functions of the retraining sessions were assumed by the First Annual Leadership/Human Relations Training Symposium which was held at HQMC from 23 to 27 September 1974. Fifty-eight Marines from 48 commands met to hear presentations on race relations programs in other services, discuss new concepts in the experiential training portion of the program, receive training in the tentative version of Volume III educational materials, and participate in workshops dealing with program administration, training course improvement, the Reserve training program, and transition from the Human Relations Program to the Comprehensive Leadership Program (See Page 57). Such leadership symposia are planned hereafter on a yearly basis.

Field Activities

During the first class at the Institute, which was conducted for HRI's from East Coast commands, all USMC general officers, commanding officers, and senior staff of these commands were briefed on the school curriculum and on the command requirements for conducting an effective human relations training program. During the second class, operating commanders at Western and Pacific Marine Corps installations were briefed in preparation for establishment of the program upon the return of instructors to their commands. Appendix X, "Human Relations Procedures," was prepared by AIR for use at the Institute and contains detailed guidelines for program implementation throughout the Corps.

Each command, because of different structural and operational considerations, was to develop its own specific implementation plan. However, this seems not to have been effectively conveyed to the field. As a result of the failure to adapt the implementation model to accommodate the peculiarities of individual commands, training schedules

often conflicted with operational requirements and generated resentment in NCO's and officers. For example, one air wing commander ordered his squadron leaders to mass train their people in order to achieve acceptable training levels just as quickly as possible. The resultant, almost round-the-clock human relations training interfered with flight operations and generated such hostility that any attitudinal or behavioral changes that might have resulted from the classes were negated.

Two major factors prevented the timely solution of such implementation problems:

1. AIR staff and members of the Marine Corps cadre concentrated their efforts on classes underway at the Institute and neglected the on-site monitoring of graduates of the first two classes after they had returned to their field commands. Attempts were made to ascertain program progress through correspondence and telephone conversations, but these largely unsuccessful methods failed to prevent wide diversity in the degree and quality of implementation.

2. Actual, rather than nominal, control of a major program component, MCHRI, was transferred too early from AIR to military direction. As a result, the Institute, Headquarters, and field programs tended to be operated independently when they should have had close coordination and feedback. Military procedures and policies often impeded swift, efficient interaction among the various program elements. For example, one Marine director of the Institute would not request permission to visit operating instructors in the field until his charter had been revised to include such visits in his mission.

In addition, the composition of training classes contributed to serious problems in the field.

Initially, human relations classes were begun with the aim of training successive peer groups in descending order throughout the entire rank structure of the Corps, i.e., majors would be trained in groups using majors as discussion leaders, first sergeants would be trained by first sergeants, etc. However, this plan did not prove feasible, as little productive discussion of cross-cultural issues could be generated among participants who typically were white, male, and within a particular age group. Experimentation disclosed that discussion groups with a vertical rank mix, and

the resultant inclusion of participants from different racial, sex, and age groups, provided a far more productive climate for human relations training. Therefore, when the Department of Defense ordered immediate training of all service members yearly, as of 1 January 1972, priorities were changed to begin training the bulk of the Corps with a vertical rank mix in discussion classes.

This shift in priorities, however, meant that many mid-level personnel with direct leadership responsibility for implementing, supporting, managing, and monitoring the program did not receive adequate preparation for their leadership role in the program, in general, and in the discussion groups, in particular. Misunderstanding and apprehension concerning the intent of the program, and the application of its goals to furthering the mission of the Corps, resulted in wide variations in program support in the NCO and officer ranks. In some cases, overt opposition to the program was exhibited, e.g., derision of staff members, resistance to sending trainees to discussion sessions, refusal to attend as participants themselves, selection of insensitive or incompetent discussion leader candidates, and disregard for leadership action efforts.

Another facet of the direct leadership problem was the failure to show key Marines connected with the program:

1. That a discussion of intergroup problems is inherently conflictful; and

2. That one could not, therefore, depend on "all good Marines" to follow the Commandant's orders simply because they had been issued. This was especially true in view of the fact that all officers must continually set local priorities from among a great many general orders from Headquarters.

Efforts to alert program personnel failed for two reasons:

1. AIR was not aware of how little these Marines knew about the many ways a controversial program could break down; and

2. Some, who were being ridiculed by their contemporaries for being in what some considered to be a non-military program, were reluctant to push too hard in discharging their duties.

As a first step in addressing the direct leadership problem, AIR categorized objections to the program as stated by officers and NCO's in the field. Elements of a presentation to overcome these objections were then developed in conjunction with Headquarters Marine Corps, and a tentative briefing was delivered by an AIR/USMC team in tryouts at Quantico and at the Institute in San Diego during the October - December 1973 quarter. Revisions to the briefing were in progress when the Marine Corps Human Relations Institute was closed. When the decision was made to upgrade human relations training and incorporate it into a Comprehensive Leadership Program at Quantico (See Page 57), the direct leadership presentation was revised to demonstrate the military utility of the existing human relations program, to describe the proposed leadership training program, and to explain the interrelationship of the two.

The transition briefing was presented at several commands during May and June 1974. In addition, information was solicited from USMC field commanders to ascertain how the leadership program could be implemented with minimal conflict with operations. Informal seminars were also held with six to eight personnel from various leadership billets to:

1. Elicit their perception of the utility and practicality of human relations training for leadership; and

2. Solicit their willing support in assuming their leadership duties with respect to human relations training.

Based upon the positive responses to the briefing and the cooperative spirit engendered by the seminars, it is anticipated that these command visits will continue until the Comprehensive Leadership Program has been implemented throughout the Corps.

Formal Schools

From the outset, it was intended that the Human Relations Program should be an integral part of the curricula of the various career schools at MCDEC. However, because of a lack of time during the early implementation phase to deal with the schools' curricula as a separate development task, students at Quantico were originally required to participate

in the standard human relations training implemented throughout the Corps. Directed at trainees with a less-than-ninth-grade vocabulary and couched in persuasive rather than instructive form, e.g., no explicit objectives or topical outlines were presented, the training materials generated great opposition on the part of many schools' staff. When early exploratory conferences at Quantico revealed this opposition, work was begun on the design of special human relations programs for the formal Marine Corps schools.

AIR provided MCDEC with broad working guidelines and asked each school to attempt to adapt the basic human relations program to best fit its own curriculum. Since the schools lack the typical vertical breakdown of officers and enlisted personnel that exists in the field and differ considerably from the field with regard to the distribution of minority and women Marines, it was emphasized that implementation plans for the schools would also have to be considerably different from those in the field. It was suggested that the curricula should be based upon the human relations manuals used in the field but modified so as to best train officers and SNCO's to support the program by enhancing their role as leaders within it.

Initial curriculum designs and program adaptations were ineffective because of a lack of sophistication and sensitivity in human and race relations on the part of the schools' staff. Two types of errors were made:

1. Case studies and course materials were written from a majority point of view, assuming most of the fault in racial problems to rest with Blacks and other minorities. For example, when the proposed "points of departure" for the course at the Command and Staff College were submitted to HQMC for approval, the four minority officers from Headquarters who were designated to attend the course refused to participate. They agreed to do so only after the perspective of the questions was changed. (Two of the original questions were, "How can we eliminate group-oriented activity such as 'dapping'?" and "Do you think the Marine Corps should lower its current standards--haircuts, etc.--to achieve racial harmony?")

2. Issues were addressed at a level that was far too academic and abstract. Students completed the course wondering what the nature of prejudice had to do with the operational problems they would face in the field, e.g., Basic School

students had heard reports of strong, black, informal leaders who had wrested authority from new lieutenants like themselves.

As a result of the difficulties encountered with the initial materials formulated, AIR began working closely with Quantico staff in adapting the human relations program for implementation in each of the schools. These efforts took on new meaning when, in late November of 1973, the House Appropriations Committee issued its report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for 1974. One of the committee's recommendations was the disestablishment of all individual service race relations schools, including the Marine Corps Human Relations Institute in San Diego. When the Institute finally closed on 19 July 1974, the Marine Corps ordered a long-planned intensification of the program: revision of the goals in the formal Quantico schools to include human relations discussion, leadership, pedagogy, and management, thereby placing program responsibility directly in the hands of Marine leaders.

Comprehensive Leadership Program

With increased Marine Corps emphasis on the incorporation of human relations training into the leadership program at Quantico, the general direction and specific tasks of the project were re-evaluated during the first quarter of Calendar Year 1974. The resulting plan for the design of a Comprehensive Leadership Program, and the subsequent transition of the human relations program into the new training, was approved by the Commandant and outlined for field commands in his directive of 15 May 1974 (Appendix Y). Marine Corps Order 5390.2 (Appendix Z) details the processes of transition.

During the development and transition phase, AIR efforts are being expended in two major areas:

1. Maintenance of the current human relations program in the field and preparation for its transition into the new leadership training program; and

2. Design and implementation of an instructional program for students in the formal Quantico schools so that they will be able to assume their leadership, teaching, and management responsibilities for the program when they return to their commands.

The field program is being addressed through the following actions:

1. In accordance with the Commandant's directive, Human Relations Instructors in the field are training officers and SNCO's as Unit Discussion Leaders. If there are no trained personnel at a specific command, a mobile training team under the direction of HQMC will train the designated officers and SNCO's. This procedure should virtually eliminate the problems encountered when randomly selected, lower-ranking Marines were trained as UDL's, some of whom lacked the maturity and experience to accomplish their task successfully.

2. A USMC/AIR team is visiting major commands in order to:

   a. clarify the role of the officer- and SNCO-UDL's in the current human relations program and the new leadership training program,

   b. elicit strong command support for the new program, particularly during the difficult period of transition, and

   c. emphasize the importance of maintaining a strong, viable program in the field until that transition is accomplished.

3. HQMC (Code MPE) is being encouraged to intensify its direction and support to the field programs and is being assisted in the development of mechanisms to sustain interest and enthusiasm in the field. For example, instead of the 120-hour course formerly used to train UDL's, which generated opposition because of the amount of time required, the project staff developed an experimental 60-hour training course. After successful testing in the field, and appropriate modifications, a 68-hour UDL course has been published for use throughout the Corps. The Schedule of Training for that course can be found at Appendix AA.

The instructional program at Quantico began with the establishment of the Leadership Instruction Department (LID) as it is known in the Education Center of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. An AIR Director of Training at Quantico has been located at LID, where he is in daily contact with the LID and schools' staffs. From 5 August to 13 September 1974, he directed an intensive, elementary training program for the eleven officers (one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, five captains, one first lieutenant) and two enlisted personnel (one 1st Sergeant and one Gunnery Sergeant) recently recruited for the LID staff. They were thoroughly instructed in the basic philosophical concepts of the human relations program and in the

interrelationship of those concepts with the traditional principles of military leadership. In addition, they were taught the elements and techniques of leading group discussions and received training in various aspects of lesson planning and course design. The training syllabus is at Appendix BB.

At the conclusion of the first six weeks of instruction, the second, intermediate phase of training began with the development of course outlines and lesson plans for each of the five formal schools at Quantico:

1. Command and Staff College (C&S)--60 hours of training: The emphasis at the Command and Staff College is on providing students with the necessary expertise to supervise, monitor, inspect, and evaluate leadership training programs.

2. Amphibious Warfare School (AWS)--109 hours of training: Instruction at AWS is designed to qualify the graduate as a Leadership Instructor (LI) whose primary function will be to train officers and SNCO's as UDL's.

3. Advance Communication Officers School (ACOS)--105½ hours of training: Graduates of ACOS will also receive instruction qualifying them as LI's.

4. The Basic School (TBS)--120 hours of training: Emphasis at TBS is on training second lieutenants to be UDL's. In addition to conducting the formal 20-hour guided discussions, their training will enable them to use discussion group techniques informally to solve leadership/human relations problems.

5. Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy--50 hours of training: Training at the Academy emphasizes the unique leadership role that SNCO's have in the Marine Corps. While the training will not prepare the graduate to assume the duties of a Unit Discussion Leader, a short course is being developed for use at field commands which will complement the Academy instruction and qualify the SNCO as a UDL.

Pilot courses were conducted at all five schools during the 1974-1975 academic year. Based upon the experience gained through those courses, curriculum revisions will be made during the summer. Official leadership training will begin in the Quantico schools in September 1975. By the time graduates return to their commands, AIR should have completed and made available to them:

1. New educational materials for use during the 20-hour group discussions, which will articulate the inter-

relationship of human relations concepts and traditional leadership principles;

2. A comprehensive field manual detailing the procedures for implementing the Comprehensive Leadership Program;

3. Materials and instructions for conducting a professional seminar for officers and SNCO's at least annually on the principles of the leadership program; and

4. A handbook of case studies and critical incidents for use by commanders as a reference tool.

Transition from the Human Relations Program to the implementation of the Comprehensive Leadership Program will then be complete.

Part V

RESERVE TRAINING

In preparation for the implementation of the human relations program within the Organized Marine Corps Reserve, the first Reserve Guided Discussion Leaders Course began at the Institute on 8 July 1972. Twenty-three Marines (4 officers, 19 enlisted) and one civilian representative from the U.S. Department of Labor, who audited the course, graduated on 27 July.

The second Reserve UDL class began on 31 July 1972, with sixteen Reservists (4 officers, 12 enlisted) graduating on 11 August. (A group of 31 regular Marines -- three officers, 28 enlisted -- also matriculated on 31 July, but did not graduate until 18 August. The added week was devoted to preparing this group to present an effective orientation to discussion groups at their command.)

A pilot Reserve Human Relations Program was initiated by HQMC during the first two quarters of Fiscal Year 1973. Unit Discussion Leaders trained at the recently completed special Reserve courses were utilized in an attempt to ascertain the most feasible method for Fiscal Year 1974 implementation of the program throughout the Organized Reserve. Experimental classes were conducted for four, eight, twelve, and sixteen hours. Completion of the pilot program and analysis of the field reports from participating units took longer than anticipated. Therefore, the eventual decision to implement an eight-hour reserve program could not be carried out until Fiscal Year 1975. An appropriate directive has been issued by HQMC (Appendix CC), and units are currently undergoing their first year of training.

Part VI

PROGRAM MONITORING (AND RESEARCH INTO GENERAL FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN RELATIONS PROGRAMS)

General

Since the implementation of the operational training program in the field in 1972, when the first class of Human Relations Instructors returned to their commands, monitoring of the program, or any of its components, has largely been through observation. Staff from the American Institutes for Research and members of the Marine Corps human relations staff have continually monitored field activities, providing the feedback upon which modifications in educational materials and instructional methodology are based. Major exceptions are described in Part III: Development of Training Content, and in the following section on the 4,000-Man Survey.

The ad hoc nature of AIR's monitoring to date has been dicatated in large part by the fact that program success depends upon three factors: the degree of emphasis a commander places upon the program, the quality of the instructors presenting the educational materials, and the quality of those materials themselves. Only the third factor is constant throughout the Corps. The wide range of variation in each of the first two elements has made uniform, Corps-wide monitoring extremely difficult.

With the utilization of officers and SNCO's as Unit Discussion Leaders in the new Comprehensive Leadership Program, the quality of the instructors presenting the educational materials is expected to be more uniform and, very likely, considerably higher than before. The third factor, degree of command emphasis, should also increase and become more uniform as commanders more fully understand the interrelationship of human relations concepts and leadership principles, and more clearly recognize the military utility of the overall training program. Positive, equalizing changes in both of these factors will facilitate a more realistic development of assessment instruments and methods.

4,000 - Man Survey (MCQ/4)

From 15 September 1972 through 30 January 1973, AIR attempted to conduct a more formal research project under ONR sponsorship. Using an instrument which had been developed and refined as a result of the Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton tryouts described in Part III, approximately 4,000 Marines were to be surveyed at fifteen CONUS and overseas commands. In addition, questionnaires were to be completed by Human Relations Instructors and Unit Discussion Leaders involved in the training of the Marines surveyed, and statistical information was to be supplied by each participating command. The Commandant's 25 August 1972 letter authorizing the collection of these data is at Appendix DD.

The study was designed to provide an assessment of:

1. The impact of program variables upon the training effort;
2. The institutionalization progress within various commands;
3. Selected demographic and sociological characteristics of the surveyed groups; and
4. The behavioral and attitudinal impact of the human relations program.

The instruments and procedures employed in the study-- and their genesis -- are described in detail below.

Development of MCQ/4

The basic opinion survey, MCQ/4, was designed to provide the range of responses necessary to determine the impact of the training program upon attitudes and behavior. Items were included which would elicit opinions about:

1. The Marine Corps, in general, and its handling of racial problems, in particular;
2. The perceived quality of treatment by superiors;
3. The responsiveness of subordinates;
4. The racial atmosphere within the Corps;

5. The manifestations of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's own lot and the lot of one's "group"; and

6. The evaluation of various symbols of racist or separatist origin.

Developed and revised over an extensive period, MCQ/4 was the result of numerous prior field tests.

After the usual initial pre-testing, a trial administration (MCQ/1) had been conducted at Camp Lejeune in March of 1971. Due to the many problems that developed during this initial effort (See Page25), only a few changes to the instrument itself could be justified on the basis of the trial. However, a great deal was learned about the administration of the instrument, particularly the clarification of experimental techniques for the local command.

With new administration procedures and a slightly revised questionnaire (MCQ/2), a second tryout had been conducted at Camp Pendleton during May and June of 1971 (See Page 26). Once again, however, the research design was thwarted because of a lack of comprehension on the part of unit commanders and program personnel regarding proper investigative procedures. As discussed earlier, it was impossible to say with any confidence whether a respondent on the post-training instrument had also completed the pre-training questionnaire and actually gone through all of the training. The before- and after-training design of the instrument was therefore invalidated. Fortunately, the experimenters had also been involved in the training as discussion leaders, and the copious notes they kept allowed an examination of the entire experiment. Although the before-training measure provided the major input, from a technical standpoint, for the assessment of the individual questionnaire items, records kept on the participants permitted a minor analysis of the after-training responses. For example, it was possible to examine the distribution of responses, both from an overall perspective and according to the demographic characteristics of the individuals and the groups.

Several specific elements of MCQ/2 were important in the development of MCQ/4:

1. It was determined that most of the items would

provide sufficient distributions of responses and data of sufficient quality to permit the performance of statistical analyses.

2. The biographical information section was found to be insufficient for all the hypotheses AIR desired to test.

3. In order to insure anonymity, while permitting the pairing of an individual's pre- and post-tests, respondents were asked to choose their test identification number from a dollar bill (rather than using the last six digits of their military serial number, for example). By keeping the responses of each unit separate, the six-digit identification number was sufficient to avoid duplication, and the device proved workable. (A certain amount of attrition was anticipated wtih this method, e.g., inability to produce the same number after training because of having spent the dollar and/or having lost the note on which the number had been written. However, since respondents who felt they could be identified would tend to answer according to their perceptions of what the Corps was seeking, rather than according to their own opinions, some attrition was accepted in order to minimize false results.)

4. It was possible to relate the questionnaire items to specfic hypotheses to be investigated under the ONR contract.[9] This is not to say that all the hypotheses

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9. "In addition to continued research and development of all aspects of the Human Relations Training techniques, contractor will investigate such hypotheses as the following which were generated as an outgrowth of the work completed to date:

A. What personal characteristics make for effective discussion leaders? Contractor will observe discussion groups and analyze demographic data in an attempt to develop criteria for instructor selection.

B. What proportion of men in unit require training in order to make a positive change in the climate of unit?

C. How much training does an individual require to effect measurable and 'lasting' change in attitude?

D. Is training more effective when done in 'total immersion' or 'spaced' manner?

E. Contractor will measure relationship between training and commitment to action programs.

F. What is the nature of the diffusion process within a command with respect to commitment to a human relations training program? That is, does the maximum impetus for human relations training come from a committed commander or must all lower levels of leaders be equally committed? Contractor will study all ramifications of this.

G. What is differential impact on attitude of men in unit when commanding officer is trained vs untrained?"

(Modification No. P00003, dated 30 June 1972, to Contract No. N00014-70-C-0267.)

were to be tested via these questions, but rather that each item was related to an hypothesis.

5. The pre-test and the Camp Lejeune trial administration had resulted in a lengthy instrument for the Pendleton tryout. However, much of the length was found to be the result of asking many of the questions in two ways so that they could be validated against each other. (In the design of MCQ/4, only critical questions were asked in two ways--partly for purposes of validation but primarily to present items in a form that was meaningful to both minority Marines and white Marines. This latter approach made it possible to use only one opinion questionnaire for MCQ/4, rather than the three that had been employed in MCQ/1 and MCQ/2 for Whites, Blacks, and Others.)

The Pendleton tryout of MCQ/2 therefore produced positive methodological results in addition to the minimal substantive results discussed on Pages 29 - 36. Because of a delay in the analysis of MCQ/2, however, this methodological information was not considered in the revision which resulted in MCQ/3 (Appendix EE). In addition, field tests at various commands during the second quarter of Calendar Year 1972 revealed that the MCQ/3 questionnaire would not yield sufficient usable data to satisfy contract requirements. Accordingly, it was discarded; and MCQ/4 was developed directly from MCQ/2. The version of MCQ/4 used in the 4,000-Man Survey appears as Appendix FF to this report.

Supplementary Questionnaire (Appendix GG)[10]

The major focus of this supplement to MCQ/4 was on trainee characteristics. In addition, questions were included to elicit the trainee's perception of the training process, including an assesment of the quality of the educational materials and methodology. As will be discussed below, many of the independent variables were to be derived from this supplementary questionnaire.

It became clear during attempted analyses of the Camp Pendleton data that only a sketchy profile of the participants had been obtained. For example, the only information gathered on the participant's military career was current rank and the number of years served in the Marine Corps.

10. This questionnaire was published as a supplement because the attitudinal portion of MCQ/4 had been printed by the Marine Corps before AIR had completed development of the demographic-perceptual portion.

Consequently, questions were added to elicit information about:

1. Service in other branches of the military;
2. Size of the company;
3. Length of time out of the Infantry Training Regiment (ITR); and
4. Perception of himself/herself in relationship to combat arms versus support.

Other questions, such as geographic origin, were also added to broaden the demographic characteristics of interest to the program.

A second part of the supplementary questionnaire was geared toward obtaining information about the "mental set" with which the participant encountered the training. That is, questions were asked about the individual's view of the program's purpose, the scope expected in the discussions, and the degree of anticipation with which he/she viewed participation in the training.

Finally, the supplementary questionnaire was designed to elicit the participant's perceptions of various program variables, e.g., the quality of the Unit Discussion Leader along several dimensions -- ranging from establishing rapport with the group to being informed on the topic; the degree of command support for the program -- ranging from personal command interest to providing physical comfort in the training environment; and the development of the leadership action program -- ranging from assessment of the availability of action possibilities to the command support given to the action efforts. The full range of independent variables derived from the Supplementary Questionnaire and MCQ/4 can be found in Table I of Appendix HH.

Human Relations Instructor Questionnaire and Discussion Leader Questionnaire

It had become apparent from the Camp Pendleton research that the theoretical (or ideal) program formats would rarely, if ever, be found in the field and that the local commands would often exercise a degree of initiative far beyond the implementation latitude originally intended. This fact began to surface during the MCQ/1 research, but its pervasiveness was clarified with MCQ/2. Therefore, in order to obtain some direct measure of program variables, two additional questionnaires were developed -- one for Human Relations Instructors (Appendix II) and one for

Unit Discussion Leaders (Appendix JJ). Tables II and III in Appendix HH summarize the information solicited from the HRI's and UDL's respectively.

Questions on the HRI survey were designed to determine demographic characteristics of the instructors, as well as to obtain some assessment of program progress. The latter was investigated through questions about command support, as demonstrated by actual behavior, because AIR experience in several areas had shown that verbal support for the program did not necessarily indicate active involvement.

The second instrument, designed to yield an assessment of the quality of the Unit Discussion Leader, was to be a pivotal instrument for the assessment of program progress. Thus, in addition to eliciting the usual demographic information, numerous questions were directed toward the UDL's experience in the Marines, in the program, and in the specific class for which he/she was responding. A preliminary, unpublished analysis of the information collected from UDL's can be found in Appendix KK.

Other Data

Some of the data necessary for assessing program progress, and for answering the general research questions in the last ONR proposal, could not reasonably be obtained from the four questionnaires. Therefore, statistical data was requested from the various commands participating in the survey (See the letter from HQ, USMC at Appendix DD). The request was later modified to specify monthly statistics on such factors as UA's, serious incidents, the number of persons in the command, and the number trained in human relations. The effort here was experimental, in that direct relationships would not be measurable. However, it was hoped that some correlational indication could be obtained of the kinds of generalizations that might be attached to the program. For example, a reduction in the number of UA's could not be attributed directly to the program. However, if the rate continued to drop as more people were trained, one could begin to speculate about the possibility of a relationship. The idea that there may be a critical-mass phenomenon operating could be approached by comparing pre-test scores for units with differing proportions of their personnel having completed training.

Research Design

In the development of the analytic plan, it was judged that the behavioral impact of the human relations program might be measured by the willingness of trainees to participate in the individual action program. The remaining three assessments -- impact of program variables upon the training effort, institutionalization progress within various commands, and demographic/sociological variables of training groups -- were divided into two major topical areas: the composition of the groups and the functioning of the groups. Table IV of Appendix HH shows that all three areas of assessment are represented in both groups. For example, program variables include "class size" from the group-functioning area. "Type of facility" from the first area and "CO monitoring" from the second area reflect the progress of institutionalization. The demographic and sociological aspects are addressed by the various "mixes" from the first area and "authoritarianism of the Discussion Leader" from the second.

More specifically, the following goals were considered in the formulation of the research design:

1. The assessment of attitude changes as a result of attending human relations training;

2. The indirect assessment of behavioral consequences of participation in the human relations training;

3. The determination of the duration of any changes derived from the training; and

4. The development of a systematic approach toward future evaluation, i.e., to develop a vehicle for HQMC or local command monitoring of the human relations program.

The first two general goals dictated the use of a before- and an after-training design, with a control group, so that the amount of attitude and behavioral change could be measured while excluding the possibility that environmental changes were responsible. The third consideration required the addition of a test at varying time intervals after the completion of training. The final goal necessitated comparison with an after-training-only design in order to assess the impact of the testing on the outcome of the training.

Clearly, the appropriate design is the so-called Solomon Four-Group Design,[11] with the addition of a delayed measure for all the groups. In order to obtain varying delays between training and final testing, the beginning of training was staggered, with all groups given their final test in January following the training. The table below summarizes the testing/training schedule for both test groups (T_1 and T_2) and both control goups (C_1 and C_2).

	Pre-Training Questionnaire	Training	Post-Training Questionnaire	January Questionnaire
T_1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C_1	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
T_2	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
C_2	No	No	Yes	Yes

Instructions to the Field

Although AIR researchers believed the research design to be quite straightforward, several factors contributed to a certain amount of uneasiness as final preparations were made for the study:

1. The people who would be administering the questionnaires were not trained researchers;

2. Many problems had developed with similar questionnaires used in the earlier efforts at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton; and

3. Implementation of the research design was complicated by the fact that individual responses had to remain anonymous while being identified with very specific groups. That is,

11. Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1963), pp. 24-5.

it was important to be able to:

a. Identify the unit from which the participant came,

b. Relate each HRI with the unit (and thus the discussion leaders) with whom he/she was associated, and

c. Relate each discussion leader with the particular class that was included in the survey.

With these apprehensions in mind, AIR sent one of its senior researchers to the field to explain the instructions attendant to the research design. Each of the commands participating in the study was invited to send a representative to a research briefing, according to the following schedule:

1. Human Relations Instructors from Hq, FMFLant, 2dMAW, 2dMarDiv, and ForTrpsLant - 31 August 1972 at MCB, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

2. Human Relations Instructors from the 1st MarDiv, 3dMAW, ForTrpsPac, MCRD, San Diego, and MCSC, Barstow - 7 September 1972 at MCB, Camp Pendleton.

3. Human Relations Instructors located in Hawaii - 9 September 1972 at Hq, FMFPac.

4. Human Relations Instructors located in Okinawa - 12 September 1972 at Hq, 3dMarDiv.

5. Human Relations Instructors located in Japan - 15 September 1972 at Hq, 1st MAW.

The briefing notes used by the AIR representative are found on Pages HH-5 - HH-13 of Appendix HH.

Results

The substantive results of the research are contained in Appendix LL to this report. Some of the administrative results are presented below.

First, the data were not returned to Headquarters correctly. While some personnel were able to follow the instructions explicitly, many apparently had not understood. As a result, numerous envelopes of trainee questionnaires were received without UDL questionnaires attached to the classes they conducted. Moreover, many of the HRI questionnaires were not attached to the unit for which they were responsible. Secondly, at least one major command received priority orders to train elements which would not be available for testing due to a lack of time, thus eliminating a

portion of the sample from the outset. (Air attempted to get this group tested -- to the extent of requesting that they be tested while on board ship -- but this request was not granted.) In other words, even though the experimental design was carried out quite well at each command, the administrative intricacies aborted the research effort as it had been conceived.

The massive failure or inability to follow the prescribed instructions was difficult to explain until a member of the research team visited the field at a later date. During conversations with HRI's, it was determined that the task of administering the surveys had, in many instances, been given to people who had not attended the command briefings on the research requirements. This procedure was not followed in all cases, but it did occur more than once. In addition, all commands had not received their information and questionnaires prior to the AIR briefing.

Because a great deal of information was either not collected, not collected properly, or not submitted in a form suitable for identification, the usable sample which resulted was only 2,830 of 4,260 expected. More dire to the effort than the size of the sample, however, was the fact that it was impossible to relate most of the UDL and the HRI questionnaires to specific classes and/or units. Therefore, many of the planned analyses simply could not be performed. It was possible, however, to analyze the attitudinal and behavioral changes as a result of the training. For a detailed discussion of this analysis, see Appendix LL, "Interim Evaluation Report (MCQ/4)."

Development of a Command Evaluation Procedure

As stated in the discussion of MCQ/4, one of the goals of that study was to develop a systematic approach to future evaluation of the human relations program. Therefore, in July 1973, the AIR researcher principally responsible for MCQ/4 began planning the preparation of before- and after-class surveys, which would measure changes in the attitudes, opinions, and knowledge of trainees, and of critique sheets to be submitted by students and discussion leaders after completion of discussion sessions.

The survey instruments and critique sheets at Appendixes MM - OO are based upon experience gained through MCQ/4 and were developed with a view toward their incorporation as permanent elements of a system to improve the substance, methods, and implementation of the human relations program. However, before they could be printed for tryout on a large sample of Marines, these instruments were rendered obsolete by the program redirection which resulted from Congressional action to close the Human Relations Institute.

It is too early in the development of the Comprehensive Leadership Program to consider the design of instruments and methods for its evaluation. However, such an evaluation system will be necessary if the training is to remain effective.

Navy Personnel Research and Development Center Evaluation

Concurrent with AIR's initial work on the development of a systematic command evaluation technique for the human relations program (MCQ/4), HQMC felt it advisable to obtain an outside assessment of the program's effectiveness. Accordingly the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) was requested to conduct an evaluation.

From January through June 1973, a pilot study was conducted for the purpose of developing the methodology for the evaluation. The evaluation itself was to be conducted from August 1973 through June 1975. Classes at the Human Relations Institute were to be studied, as well as Institute graduates and operational programs at various Marine Corps commands. However, with the closing of the Institute at the end of Fiscal Year 1974, and the transition from human relations to comprehensive leadership training, NPRDC's evaluation ended prematurely. During the brief period of study, data on only two Institute classes were assembled, with no information yet obtained from the field. [See John P. Smith, "Final Report: Evaluatory Research on the U.S. Marine Corps Human Relations Program" (San Diego: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1974).]

PART VII

CONCLUSIONS

As the Marine Corps Human Relations Program begins its transition into the Comprehensive Leadership Program, three general conclusions can be drawn from the five years of effort expended thus far:

1. The educational materials used in the training have a positive impact on Marines' opinions, attitudes, and, perhaps, behavior, as indicated by action efforts throughout the Corps;

2. The greatest impact of the training has been observed when the program has been well implemented and supported within a command and when it has been integrated into the local command conditions and requirements; and

3. The program has been institutionally viable thus far and promises to become more so as the new training program produces improved discussion leaders, more knowledgeable managers, and general chain-of-command involvement.

With regard to the general social-change principles mentioned in the introduction to this report, a review of program experience from 1970 to 1975 indicates that several have been largely effective in facilitating the viable institutionalization of the human relations program; others were only partially successful; and one was largely untested. Experience concerning each of these principles is discussed below. They are discussed roughly in order of the success with which they were implemented. It is perhaps instructive to note that those principles dealing with the psychology and technology of training appear to have been most successfully implemented, whereas those dealing with the structure and function of the military institution appear to have been less successfully applied. The former were more deeply grounded on empirical experience; the latter were based to some extent on relatively simplistic misconceptions of the Marine Corps.

Principle: That substantial improvements in human relations could be accomplished only by means of small group training in which personnel could perceive the positive norms espoused by the majority of their colleagues. Further, that extremists (highly prejudiced Whites and Blacks) would be brought under the social influence of the great majority of moderate, constructive Marines (rather than the reverse) through the medium of public, small group discussion of a minimal, uniform set of issues. (Such training required an effective multiplier mechanism that could increase training coverage from an initial development cadre of sixteen Marines to hundreds of thousands over a span of years.)

Experience: It is generally recognized that race relations in the Corps have improved substantially since the inception of this program. Racial incidents have been halved. In the one major command where the program has been consistently implemented with high quality, racial incidents are virtually non-existent. Observations of discussion groups have made it clear that extremists tend to become less vocal and are often apt to modify their stated positions. Such repeatedly observed changes, coupled with the general reduction in intergroup tension, leads to the conjecture that the program has largely been effective in improving relations.

Although no formal comparison was made between small group training and other types, it appears that the attempt to train large numbers of Marines in small discussion groups has been generally successful. Further, the means for multiplying the original program seems also to have been generally successful, if unevenly so. It appears that, when field commands committed higher-ranking Marines to be Human Relations Instructors and Unit Discussion Leaders, the transmittal tended to be more effective than in commands that assigned only or mostly junior personnel to the program.

It was believed that, starting with a small number of Marines, successively larger numbers could be trained with tolerable losses in effectiveness until all Marines were receiving both effective cognitive and experiential training throughout each year. Eight Marines were trained and formed the initial staff of the project. These eight Marines were supplemented with an additional eight before the Human Relations School began. This staff was capable of training approximately

180 Marine Human Relations Instructors from the Regular Establishment (and about 150 Reserves) annually. It was estimated that each Human Relations Instructor could then train an average of 30 Unit Discussion Leaders, each of whom could conduct discussions with an average of 40 men and women (180 x 30 = 5400 x 40 = 216,000). Thus, the Institute staff was the first generation of instructors, the Human Relations Instructors the second, and the Unit Discussion Leaders the third. This meant that Marines would receive their training from instructors three times removed from direct and personal AIR experience and instruction.

With the establishment of the Leadership Instruction Department, approximately 2,000 Marines will be trained each year as discussion leaders directly responsible for conducting the 20 hours of guided discussion. Additionally, the training of almost 200 Marines as Leadership Instructors at the Amphibious Warfare School and Advanced Communications Officers School will provide the instructors necessary to train more Unit Discussion Leaders in the field, as required, until the Comprehensive Leadership Program is fully established. This new method for developing a widespread capability to conduct small group training promises even greater success than that experienced heretofore.

> Principles: That a program composed of uniform cognitive training content, serving as a foundation for locally flexible experiential training, would lead to more institutional cohesiveness than loosely structured topical programs. Further, that a mass program aimed at creating common philosophical understandings among disparate groups in the Marine Corps -- such as officers and enlisted personnel, Blacks and Whites -- would better resolve human relations issues than more specialized training for particular groups.
>
> That a program should be conducted on a mass scale, i.e., with 350,000 Marines (1970).

Experience: The major reduction in racial incidents since program implementation, the widespread knowledge of human relations program ideas throughout the Marine Corps, and the Corps' decision to emphasize the program through its leadership structure all argue that these principles have largely been successful. It should also be noted that tryouts early in the program, in which individual instructors were given considerable leeway in conducting training, made it clear that few

individuals had the ingenuity to handle discussions of many of the highly inflamed interracial issues effectively without uniform materials. However, uniformity was difficult to maintain because program personnel varied in motivation and capability. Also, the uniform language level was unsuited to people at both the upper and lower ends of the intelligence spectrum. Current revisions to the educational materials will address the language level, and it is anticipated that this will reduce the problem considerably.

Implementation of these principles is complicated by the need to have the educational materials address the various conflicting points of view that are encountered in a mass training program. The materials have to be both interesting and persuasive enough to reorient the negative behaviors of seriously conflicting groups of Marines while, at the same time, holding the attention of the mass of others. It is necessary to use materials that are interesting enough to motivate discussion from individuals who do not personally perceive the issues as problems. Even the highly uniform materials being used require able discussion leaders.

The adoption of alternative human and race relations programs by local commanders also complicated the process of institutionalization. Local personnel instituted other, generally less carefully developed and tested programs. Some programs existed before personnel trained to conduct the Marine Corps general human relations program reached the field. Other local programs were implemented on the initiative of highly motivated, and sometimes highly skilled, staff specialists who were familiar with the power of certain techniques derived from psychotherapeutic methods. These were usually applied in highly specialized circumstances, e.g., to selected officers or SNCO's, and generally without awareness of the principles under discussion here.

Although some programs appear to have been well designed and to have enjoyed considerable success, the informal methods employed to build trust and frank expressions of opinion led many Marine officers and SNCO's to attribute breakdowns in discipline to them. This belief sometimes led Marines to oppose the general human relations program either because they confused it with the local program or because they were prone to generalize from one to the other ("all that 'cloud-9' stuff"),

even though the Marine Corps program had been carefully designed to preclude such methods when early tryouts revealed the likelihood of such opposition.

Such opposition further complicated the attempt to provide uniform training, because opponents tended to assign inadequate personnel to be discussion leaders, tended to avoid the cognitive training themselves (thus, never becoming familiar with it at first hand), and often prevented program specialists from implementing effective experiential training programs for their subordinates.

> Principle: That only limited innovations could be introduced at a given time and that, until they had been absorbed, new requirements might jeopardize the whole effort.

Experience: In general, this principle appears to have been well followed, since the program has become increasingly more viable. But it is unclear whether the timing of innovations has been optimal. On balance, it appears to have been somewhat slow.

To some extent, the design of the whole program was an innovation. Many Marines clearly understood this, but others lacked confidence in the program because they had no empirical experience supporting the concepts, methods, and philosophy used. In programs of this type, many elements can only be hypothesized and extrapolated toward the future. It is almost impossible to determine clearly what many program elements should be at any given point in time. The recipients of innovation, particularly military personnel, desire specific, concrete guidance and are fearful of taking chances on unproven, untried innovations. This lack of confidence leads to a tendency to "under-deliver" in terms of funds, facilities, and personnel, resulting in a bootstrap operation. For example, the assignment of a general officer to head the program would have enhanced its chances of success. However, to have insisted that this be done would have placed a demand on the system that it was unprepared to meet.

Resistance to proposals tends to inhibit new proposals. The change-agent's confidence is diminished, and new measures that are required to correct an error or to implement further progress may be delayed, lest old accomplishments be jeopardized. Thus, for example, after initial

resistance, a needed major move into the Quantico schools was delayed for fear of imperiling the field program then being implemented through the Human Relations Institute.

> Principle: That to institutionalize a viable program, members of the institution (the Marine Corps) would need to become engaged in each component of the program with a significant degree of motivation and training.

Experience: In some instances, this principle was implemented with little difficulty. These successes were primarily the result of visible command support and involvement throughout the chain of command, the selection and training of highly qualified, experienced Marines as Unit Discussion Leaders, and the timely implementation and maintenance of the experiential component of the program.

However, there were significant problem areas. Difficulties were encountered in attempting to train headquarters Marines in program technology. The number of Marines assigned to the headquarters elements of the program at each major command was not sufficient to allow some to receive human relations training while others carried out required, operational, headquarters functions. Though these Marines usually were highly motivated, many did not receive sufficient training to enable them to provide advice and guidance to field units in all aspects of the program.

At some field commands, the implementation of any new program was viewed with suspicion. However, many dedicated Marines were especially reluctant to become identified too closely with this program, fearing that career patterns would be jeopardized and that opportunity for promotion and choice assignments would suffer. These fears kept many from actively participating as Human Relations Instructors or Unit Discussion Leaders and led them to choose other programs that were perceived to have more military respectability. In some cases, these individuals believed that active or passive opposition to the program was, in the long run, in the best interest of the individual and the institution.

In those cases in which the command indicated a lack of commitment or could not adopt the program as a leadership tool, severe problems were encountered in program implementation and institutionalization.

Selection of Unit Discussion Leaders was accomplished in a perfunctory manner with little regard for maturity, ability, experience, and rank. Thus, in many instances, discussion groups composed mostly of officers and staff non-commissioned officers were led by junior Marines whose educational backgrounds were seriously deficient. Further, personnel selected to attend the Human Relations Institute were selected in the same manner. Some that were selected for either of these two key assignments were not retained on the job long enough to gain sufficient knowledge and experience to handle the educational materials effectively.

The phenomenon of frequent personnel transfers contributed to the institutionalization problem. First, few individuals who were trained in the technology of the program remained in relevant assignments long enough to become fully proficient in its many aspects. Second, those key human relations personnel, commanders, and other leaders who fully supported the program at one unit would become frustrated when transferred to new commands where the program was not vigorously implemented. When disillusionment set in, these Marines became passive and tended to keep their prior association with the program a secret. As a result, knowledge of good implementation, selection, monitoring, and training procedures was not passed on to the very units that needed it most. Frequent transfers most particularly prevented those Marines who had the potential for becoming effective researchers and developers of educational materials from doing so. No Marines were associated with the program long enough to acquire the technical knowledge, field experience, and general social science sophistication needed to perform these vital functions.

Procedural rigidity, which required the strict adherence to formal rather than informal, flexible relationships between the program managers (Headquarters) and field commands, also contributed immeasurably to the problem of institutionalization. For example, one Director of the Human Relations Institute did not feel that he had authority to conduct informal liaison or staff visits to field commands utilizing his graduates until this vital part of his mission was formally published in a Headquarters Marine Corps directive (about a year after his first graduates started functioning). Needed assistance in program matters

thus was withheld while the lengthy staffing process at Headquarters was accomplished.

Finally, even field grade officers, knowing and understanding the limits and constraints of the Corps, tended to be conservative in thinking about and proposing necessary new developments. They were long reluctant, for example, to propose a primary MOS for Human Relations Officers and Human Relations Instructors. (Eventually a secondary MOS was adopted.)

> Principle: That the high degree of structure and organization in the military, and particularly the Marine Corps, would help to promote innovation throughout the Corps.

Experience: It is traditional for Marines to respond positively to the Command's policy or direction. To a large extent, this tradition has aided in institutionalizing the Human Relations Program, as is evidenced by the large numbers of HRI's, UDL's, and discussion participants who have been trained. However, it became clear that the hope for uniform and consistent implementation was founded on a mythical conception of the Marine Corps. Variations in local command missions and organization, coupled with wide variations in training and operational commitments, dictate great flexibility in local command implementation of programs.

For example, the number of directives from Headquarters approximates 1200. Coupled with those from intermediate commands, they result in a staggering work load for which commanders must establish local priorities. Because there are more tasks than available time and staff, the commander must continually decide which actions are to be taken this day, week, month, or year. The young, inexperienced Marines clearly do not have the perspective of the Commandant, or even of their immediate superior, and do not appreciate the conflicts in requirements and priorities. They naively believe that if the Commandant really wanted something done, it would be done. When it is not accomplished as and when they believe it should be, e.g., vigorous implementation of the Human Relations Program, cynicism often results.

Further, the directives/Marine Corps Orders that promulgate information, guidance, and direction concerning the program may be, and usually

are, translated differently as they pass through the levels of command. An example is the requirement to maintain an average of one discussion leader per 40 Marines. Viewed at the division level, this might require as many as 450 Unit Discussion Leaders for an 18,000-man division, or as few as 12 working full time.

Civilian researchers, unfamiliar with the military and particularly with Marine Corps intricacies, tend to see the Corps as completely authoritarian and uniform in structure. As a result, errors were made in program judgments and in advice given to Marines directly responsible for the implementation and conduct of the program. The experience and knowledge gained by Marines about the program's concepts, methods, and philosophy, together with their understanding of the Corps, contributed greatly to the resolution of this problem area. Advice and guidance necessarily became a mutual function.

As with most mass training efforts, it is difficult to anticipate many problems. Normally, program modifications must wait until problems have surfaced in the field and, in most cases, have already disrupted training and/or created bad feelings. Any system that is protected by regulations designed to insure uniform procedures in widely distributed locations must be slow to initiate corrective action. Misinterpretation of one of the basic philosophical concepts contained in the educational materials used during the first year of training provides an example.

The program defines the concept of "equality" in terms of the "equality of the life value," i.e., that each life is as important to oneself as another's is to himself/herself, with the implication being that all people require consideration for their survival and well-being -- concepts generally well understood in the Marine Corps and embodied in such traditional expressions as, "Marines take care of their own." However, during the class discussions, some young Marines interpreted the term to mean: "I'm as good as you are," i.e., have just as much right to give orders or should receive the same pay and privileges as higher ranking Marines. At one point, a survey revealed that many Human Relations Instructors and Unit Discussion Leaders could not correct or reconcile the misinterpretation. This problem

was ultimately resolved during refresher training of HRI's and UDL's, but the procedure required time -- time to staff the necessary documents, determine availability of funds, determine the site of the refresher training, provide sufficient notice to field commands, conduct the training, and evaluate the training when the HRI's and UDL's returned to their units.

In the meantime, some officers and staff non-commissioned officers, seeing such errors, turned against the program. Some junior Marines, misinterpreting the role of equality in the Marine Corps, became disillusioned because they felt the Corps was not practicing what it preached. Program personnel who were committed to an effective program suffered when local commanders withdrew support or resisted implementation throughout their command for fear of a breakdown in discipline and the erosion of small unit leadership.

> Principle: That a single implementation model designed for the single largest or most typical component of the Marine Corps (ground divisions) could be readily adapted to other kinds of units.

Experience: There was great variation in implementing this principle. Some units very successfully modified the model to suit local conditions. These units usually had leaders who fully supported the program and authorized the flexibility needed for adaptations. For example, in some small units, the Human Relations Instructor guided the 20-hour discussion groups, since it was the most economical and sensible way to conduct the training, even though the model indicated that Unit Discussion Leaders, trained by Human Relations Instructors, would conduct the training. Others scheduled training throughout the year in order to provide freshly trained Marines as continual reinforcement to those trained earlier. A few Marines modified the experiential component in ways that provided maximum benefits for the people involved. In these instances, the model was used "as a model" and the program was smoothly implemented.

However, in some cases, the program was not smoothly integrated into the unit's activities. Marines who were in positions of leadership and opposed to the program on ideological grounds resisted necessary

changes attempted by trained program personnel. As a result, in some commands, when the implementation model was followed most explicitly and rigidly, it proved to be disruptive and counterproductive.

Since ground infantry units were considered the largest single element in the Corps, the implementation model was designed to be most compatible with the ground unit's organizational structure and training missions. The 1 to 40 ratio for UDL's and trainees is based primarily on one platoon leader and approximately 39 members to the platoon. Therefore, the maintenance of discussion group integrity in ground units was easily accomplished since platoons usually train together -- whether it is on the rifle range, during field exercises, or in human relations classes. The experiential component of the training program stressed positive interaction at the Marine-to-Marine level because most members of ground units work and live together. In all of these areas, the implementation model required only minor adaptations in order to conduct effective training programs.

The situation in aviation units was considerably different, however, since their organization is not based on fire-teams, squads, platoons, and companies. The lines of organization are based primarily on shops, offices, and sections. The squadron, which parallels a batallion, is the lowest militarily recognized "organization" in aviation units. Normally, 40 Marines are not assigned to one shop, office, or section. Therefore, in order to receive training, Marines were gathered from various shops, offices, and sections, usually as quota fillers. Since many of these aviation Marines are pilots and technicians, productivity suffered when they were taken off the job for 20 hours of training. In some cases (a small hydraulics shop, for example), attendance at human relations training could result in the shop being closed for the entire period of training. Obviously, the implementation model required major modifications before effective programs could be conducted, while allowing pilots to fly and technicians to provide the support needed to keep aircraft and aircraft support equipment operational.

Instructions are now being given to students in the formal schools at Quantico, particularly at the Command and Staff College, to enable more adaptive program implementation. These instructions, together with

revisions of the educational materials, will permit commanders to tailor the program to type of unit, personnel, location, facilities, requirements, and conditions.

> Principle: That if all superiors were trained before their subordinates, opposition to program goals and methods would be minimized, and maximum support would be given to the implementation of both the cognitive and experiential training phases. Also, that leaders would be prone to participate in the discussions with their subordinates, as one means of lending such support, thereby enhancing program success by involving the chain of command.

Experience: Although all general officers were given at least abridged training, events overtook the implementation and testing of this principle. The Marine Corps attempted to comply with the new DOD directive that all personnel be given race relations training for a minimum of 18 hours each year. In attempting to fulfill training quotas in the allotted time, it was decided to carry out the training employing vertically mixed groups (all rank levels). This was only partially successful.

Many mid-level officers and SNCO's, often too busy to take the time, assigned their subordinates to training but failed to participate themselves. For various reasons, including the uneven quality of the training, they delayed their own participation. Some felt it demeaning to be taught how to "human relate" by a young and immature subordinate. Others heard that the training was ineffective or felt, from a cursory examination, that the training approach and materials were faulty. Still others were ideologically opposed to the training, generally on the ground that Blacks would pull the Corps down. Some Marines were opposed to any training that took time away from more military training or operations, e.g., tactics, flying, and supply. A number felt that it would be futile to try to improve the behavior of the "low-grade" Marines being recruited in the early 1970's. Still another group objected to the program because they viewed its remedial education components as social welfare efforts inappropriate to a military organization.

Although training records and informal surveys indicate that a majority of the officers and SNCO's have participated in some human relations training, it is clear that a substantial minority appears to

have avoided it even to this day. The inability to implement this principle is judged to have been one of the key obstacles to more uniform success in meeting program goals. The move to train all Marine Corps officers in the formal schools at Quantico over the next several years to enable them to lead their subordinates in human relations training will subject this principle to a practical test.

No program lasts in the military unless it is carried out by as well as within the chain of command. To that end, the chain of command must be able to perform each of the many tasks involved. At this time, the Marine Corps is the only service preparing its own officers and SNCO's to organize, administer, and evaluate its human relations program. Such action augurs well for the institutionalization of positive social change within the United States Marine Corps.

LIST OF APPENDIXES[12]

12. All appendixes are on file with the Office of Naval Research and are available for examination in their offices at 800 North Quincy Street, Arlington, Virginia 22217.