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**AN EXAMINATION OF USSR-Cuban Military Ties and Their
Strategic Significance as a Key Assumption Underlying
Current United States Foreign Policy Toward Cuba**

Michael Edward Jallo

**Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.**

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AS A KEY ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING CURRENT UNITED
STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CUBA

✓ MARCH 15, 1975

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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CUBA AND AN EXAMINATION OF ITS BASES

Since 1962, United States policy toward Cuba has been one of attempting to isolate Cuba from hemispheric affairs and influence. It has imposed economic and political embargoes on Cuba. The Organization of American States suspended participation of Cuba in the OAS, so long as it maintained its Communist ties, in 1962 and many members of the OAS have imposed embargoes. Since 1962 there have been few exceptions to the non-intercourse policy between the United States and Cuba. In 1973, the United States and Cuba, through the offices of a Czechoslovakian negotiator and the Swiss embassy, signed a memorandum concerning aircraft hijacking. Recently, a few newsmen and Congressmen have been allowed to travel to Cuba. Despite these moves, the U.S. policy today remains basically the same as in 1962. This is evidenced by President Nixon's and Secretary Kissinger's statements.

In a report to the Congress concerning foreign affairs, President Nixon stated, "We will consider a change in policy toward Cuba when Cuba changes its policy

toward the other countries of the hemisphere". (1)
Secretary Kissinger, in reply to a question about the possibility of opening talks concerning the reestablishment of relations with Cuba, said, "I certainly have no plan to go to Havana on any trip I am now planning. And the major obstacle to rapprochement with Cuba has been the hostility of the Cuban government . . ." (2)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the bases of the United States policy of isolation toward Cuba in order to determine if these bases remain valid for the continuation of said policy.

The U.S. policy toward Cuba is not without domestic critics. Only a few months after its implementation, a co-authored work appeared that severely criticized our policy. Maurice Zeitlin, a university professor, and Robert Scheer, a free-lance writer, wrote Cuba, Tragedy in Our Hemisphere. Their main criticism of our policy centered upon the policy determinants. The authors claimed that the determinations of our policy were on the basis of illusion rather than reality. Specifically, the

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1. Nixon, Richard M.; U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace; U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1973. Page 121.
 2. Department of State Bulletin; January 21, 1974. Page 53.

authors contend that Cuba's revolution was misunderstood as a result of misrepresentation in our media. And, they claim that the Cuban revolution was a revolution of the people for freedom, similar to our revolution in 1776, and not a Communist revolution or takeover.

"The Cuban crisis epitomizes the failure and dangers of much of our foreign policy. The determination of policy on the basis of illusion rather than reality was the immediate reason for the failure of the invasion of Cuba, armed, financed, and directed by the United States, in April 1961. And it is for this same reason that our policy led us to the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs in the first place. Had our policy not been premised in the twenty-seven months preceding the invasion on false assumptions, self-righteous moralizing, and considerable arrogance toward the Cuban Revolutionary Government, we would not have had to endure the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs or the later agony and horror of the week of October 22-28, 1962. Had we sought to understand the social revolution occurring in Cuba, to sympathize with the aspirations of the Cuban people which Fidel Castro articulated so fiercely - with their demands for economic, political, and social changes, changes that challenged our long dominance in Cuban affairs - we might have succeeded in cementing cordial relations with the new Cuban Government." (3)

In 1967, Raymond Aron and Alfred Grosser, two well known European scholars, expressed views critical of the United States, its actions and its policy toward Cuba.

"Up to now the United States government seems not to have arrived at what many people consider to be the logical consequence of its refusal to resort

3. Zeitlin, Maurice and Scheer, Robert; Cuba, Tragedy in Our Hemisphere; Grove Press; New York, New York; 1963. Pages 9-10.

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to military force - to wit, since Castroism exists, the best course is to accept it. President Kennedy chose a course that seemed to Europeans fairly typical of American policy: a double refusal-denial of diplomatic recognition to Cuba and at the same time abstention from armed intervention. What remains uncertain to the observer is the purpose of the double refusal and the possibilities of achieving that purpose, whatever it may be." (4)

Later in the same essay, the authors state,

"What in our view condemns the present American policy is that it is obviously being weakened, and will be further weakened, by the noncompliance of the allies of the United States." (5)

James Bradshaw, a journalist, writing in 1968, criticizes the U.S. policy because he believes the bases for its policy are now untenable. He cites six specific reasons to suggest rapprochement is now possible: the popularity of Castro within Cuba, the failure of our economic and diplomatic embargo, the reduction in Soviet aid (from \$400 million in 1967 to \$150 million in 1968), existing tension between Cuba and Russia, the failure of the export of revolution, and the growing detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. (6) Richard O'Mara, a newspaper reporter familiar with the Latin American situation,

4. Aron, Raymond and Grosser, Alfred; "A European Perspective", Cuba and the United States; John Plank (ed); The Brookings Institution; Washington, D.C.; 1967. Page 152.

5. Ibid., page 154.

6. Bradshaw, James S.; "A Policy Change Toward Cuba?", The Christian Century; August 28, 1968. Pages 1075-77.

in rebutting a defense of U.S. policy by Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, claimed the Organization of American States is ready to change and the export of revolution by Cuba is no longer in force. (7)

A long time Cuba-watcher and professional journalist, George Volsky, criticizes our policy in a manner similar to O'Mara and Bradshaw. Volsky cites three primary criticisms. First, there are unmistakable signs that many Caribbean and South American nations, all of whom are members of the Organization of American States, favor a change of United States policy toward Cuba. Second, the export of revolution has lost impetus. Third, and last, Cuba's strategic importance to the Soviet Union has lessened due to the advent of ballistic missiles. (8) Edward Gonzalez, a university professor specializing in Latin American affairs, notes that our policy is based on origins of the past which no longer serve to advance the national interests of the United States. (9)

7. O'Mara, Richard; "Cuba: Policy of Malign Neglect", The Nation; November 22, 1971. Pages 524-26.

8. Volsky, George; "Cuba", The United States and the Caribbean; Tad Szulc (ed); Prentice-Hall, Inc.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; 1971. Pages 121-25.

9. Gonzalez, Edward; "The United States and Castro: Breaking the Deadlock", Foreign Affairs; July, 1972. Page 723.

Ernest B. Furguson, syndicated Washington columnist, wrote an article entitled "Normal Relations with Cuba?". His central theme, other than a recital of a speech by Senator Bentsen, is that our allies are making their own initiatives toward Havana and ignoring the wishes of Washington. Thus, who is being isolated now? (10) A recent editorial in the Atlanta Constitution said, "For 13 years the United States has had no diplomatic or trade ties with Cuba. It is time now for that to change." (11) Another syndicated columnist from Washington, William Safire, wrote an article concerning policy changes toward Cuba.

"U.S. policy was - and still nominally is - to isolate the police state in the Caribbean in a political and economic quarantine. Everybody knows that the policy, like a bawling baby, is waiting to be changed.

One reason why: The quarantine is becoming ludicrous, since six members of the Organization of American States have opened embassies in Havana and more are to follow soon. The old fear that Castro would export his Communist revolution has diminished, because dictatorship of the left is not as efficient as dictatorship of the right.

Another reason, which will provide the figleaf for the American turnaround, is that Premier Castro has been looking for the moment to drop his overt hostility, and the best moment is the succession of

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- 10. Furguson, Ernest B.; "Normal Relations with Cuba?", Atlanta Constitution; December 19, 1973. Page 5-A.
 - 11. _____; "Dealing with Cuba", Atlanta Constitution; September 10, 1974. Page 4-A.

a new U.S. president. The half-billion dollar-a-year Soviet subsidy does not satisfy him, because he thinks he can do better in normal relations with the Western Hemisphere neighbors, he has been sending signals of amity."

Safire also notes that Sol Linowitz, a former Assistant Secretary of State and the ex-U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States, is urging the reestablishment of United States-Cuban relations. (12)

Congress is also not without critics. In July of 1971, Senator Fulbright and Senator Church submitted Senate Joint Resolution 146 calling for the repeal of the Cuban Resolution of 1962. In a speech delivered on the Senate floor, Senator Byrd expressed criticism of our Cuban policy.

"The advocates of a new U.S. policy toward Cuba feel that the Nixon administration is excluding Cuba from the politics of detente. They feel that if talks can begin with China, a nation which we fought not too long ago on the battlefields of Korea, and Russia, our traditional rival and foe, then we can begin to talk to the Cubans, close neighbors with whom mutual enmity developed over a relatively short span of years." (13)

Besides the Congress, a Harris Poll published in 1973 shows that the "average" American, by a 51 to 33 percent margin,

12. Safire, William; "Changes Toward Cuba", Atlanta Constitution; September 2, 1974. Page 17-A.

13. Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report; March 17, 1973. Page 597.

favors the reestablishment of relations with Cuba. This marks a turnaround in public opinion, according to pollster Harris. (14)

CHRONOLOGY OF US-CUBAN EVENTS

Prior to discussing the bases of United States policy toward Cuba, a brief chronology of events following Castro's rise to power and the development of the United States policy of attempting to isolate Cuba will be helpful.

On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro assumed control of the island through the successful revolutionary overthrow of the Batista regime. In February, Castro became Prime Minister and within a month his government began intervention and expropriation of U.S. owned firms.

While the U.S. government conceded the right of Cuba to expropriate private property, it was dissatisfied with the terms of compensation offered by the Cuban Government to the expropriated property owners and therefore formally protested the matter. Thereupon Castro charged the United States with interfering in Cuban affairs. The United States was also upset about the reports that Castro was increasingly moving in a Communist direction or becoming

14. Christian Science Monitor; March 26, 1973. Page 1.

controlled by Communist elements in Cuba. Relations thereafter rapidly deteriorated. Beginning in July, 1960, the U.S. reduced aid and cut the sugar quotas, whereupon Castro sought aid from the Soviets and received it. During the summer of 1960, the United States began to secretly organize Cuban emigres for the possible invasion and liberation of Cuba. Counterrevolutionary activities increased in Cuba and Castro charged the United States with complicity.

On January 2, 1961, Prime Minister Castro demanded that the United States Embassy in Havana be reduced to 11 officials, and gave a time deadline of 48 hours in which to comply. President Eisenhower, citing Castro's demand and the limitation it will have on our ability to conduct normal diplomatic and consular relations, terminated relations on January 3. He further reduced our sugar quota to zero for the quarter January-March 1961. When President Kennedy assumed office, he imposed a trade embargo aimed at Cuba, effective March 31, 1961. In April, the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban emigres took place and failed. Ten days later, Castro proclaimed his revolution as a Socialist revolution. In December, Castro announced that he was a Marxist-Leninist and aligned himself with the Communist bloc. In early 1962, the Organization of

American States, and at the urging of the United States, suspended Cuba from membership.

The Soviets increased arms shipments to Cuba throughout 1962. In October, 1962, President Kennedy publicly announced that missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were in Cuba. This resulted in what is now commonly referred to as the "Cuban Missile Crisis" in which the U.S. imposed a temporary blockade of all shipping into Cuba until the Soviets promised to withdraw their offensive missiles and long-range bombers. After the apparent removal of the equipment, the U.S. blockade was lifted but the embargo on American trade with Cuba remained.

The United States embargo on Cuba was made hemispheric in 1964 when, again at the urging of the United States, the Organization of American States passed resolutions urging its members to sever relations and terminate trade relations with Cuba. This policy of attempted isolation has remained officially in force to this day, breached only by Mexico and a few Latin American countries.

BASES OF US POLICY TOWARD CUBA

The U.S. Government cites three bases for our Cuban policy. The first is the U.S. obligations as a member of the Organization of American States to support the resolutions of that body pertaining to the diplomatic and

economic isolation of Cuba. Second is the U.S. opposition to the Cuban export of revolution. The third and final basis of U.S. policy concerns opposition to the military ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the implication of those ties threatening U.S. security.

The government's advocacy of a policy of isolation began in February, 1962. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, delivered a speech before the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers for Foreign Affairs for the American States at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in which he called on the Organization of American States to oust Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system, impose trade embargoes on Cuba, and isolate Cuba so as not to allow her to disrupt hemispheric affairs. In arguing these sanctions on Cuba, Secretary Rusk provided the following reasons for such action:

" . . . we must recognize that the alignment of the Government of Cuba with the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and its commitment to extend Communist power in this Hemisphere, are incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Inter-American system and that its current activities are an ever present and common danger to the peace and security of the continent.

. . . The acts of political aggression which the Castro regime is committing have an immediate and direct impact in the general Caribbean area near the focus of infection. Yet with one exception there is not a Foreign Minister present whose country has not felt the impact of the interventionist activities which constitute essential elements of the

international Communist design." (15)

The basis of our policy was further clarified in a statement by President Kennedy and was further reinforced in a Congressional Joint Resolution called the Cuban Resolution of 1962. While discussing the entire Cuban situation in early September, 1962, the President made this statement:

"But let me make this clear once again: If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies." (16)

Following President Kennedy's strong speech, the Congress expressed its will concerning Cuba and its support of the President in his policies.

"Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers 'to expand their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety'; and

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15. Rusk, Dean; "The Tragedy of Cuba", Vital Speeches of the Day; February 15, 1962. Page 261.
 16. Department of State Bulletin; October 1, 1962. Page 62.

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that 'an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent rights of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations'; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: 'The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union'; and

Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the United States is determined (a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere; (b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and (c) to work with the Organization of American States and with the freedom loving Cubans to support the aspirations of Cuban people for self-determination." (17)

17. Public Law 87-733. 76 Stat. 697. Approved October 3, 1962.

These same bases for our policy were reiterated some nine years later by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Robert A. Hurwitch. While appearing before a Senate Committee he stated that the bases of U.S. policy were threefold. First, U.S. obligations as a member of the Organization of American States. The second basis concerns the export of revolution. And, the third base concerns the military ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union. He further noted, "Therefore, the Cuban Resolution of 1962 still reflects United States policy toward Cuba." (18) Then again in March of 1973, Deputy Assistant Secretary Hurwitch upheld the U.S. policy.

"We are also mindful of Cuba's hostile attitude toward us. Since the early 1960's, Cuba has unremittingly vilified this country, its policies, and its Presidents. It has publicly consigned the Organization of American States to the 'garbage heap'. Only last week at the United Nations Security Council meeting in Panama, the Cuban foreign minister continued Cuba's scurrilous attack upon us and the Organization of American States.

Nor has Cuba abandoned its goals of subverting other governments in the hemisphere. It has simply become more cautious, more selective, and more sophisticated in its 'export of revolution', and has directed its resources to those areas where it estimates the opportunity for interference greatest. While

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18. United States Policy Toward Cuba. United States Congress; Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing on Senate Joint Resolution 146, 148 and Senate Resolution 160. September 16, 1971. 92nd Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1971. Page 4.

failures have forced the Cuban leaders to be less dogmatic in their insistence on the Cuban model as the only way to mount a revolution, they still openly advocate armed revolt in propitious situations. These long-held views of Premier Castro and his closest associates are not likely to be lightly discarded even though Cuban deeds may not always succeed in matching the belligerence of the rhetoric. To accomplish its objective, Cuba's apparatus for support to subversion is functioning and remains a unique phenomenon in Latin America - which should give pause to any nation prepared to believe that Cuba is now just another state among many. In short, we are convinced that regrettably the time has not yet arrived when the hemisphere can safely regard Cuba as no longer a threat to its peace and security or when we can take Cuba's leaders at less than their word.

With respect to Cuba's close military ties to the Soviet Union - ties that are tighter than ever - what we especially mean is Cuba's demonstrated willingness to lend its territory for Soviet military purposes. We obviously do not question Cuba's right to maintain an army, or equip it or to receive training. Every nation has such a right. What concerns us is Cuba's disposition to cooperate in the strategic goals of an extra-hemispheric 'super-power'. This was illustrated by the emplacement of offensive missiles in October 1962, and more recently by Cuba's cooperation in 1970 in Soviet efforts to establish a nuclear submarine facility at Cienfuegos which, had it succeeded, could have caused a major disturbance in this hemisphere. Any disturbance, even a slight one, of the balance of military power with the Soviet Union must remain of concern to us even as our efforts to develop peaceful contacts with the country continue.

The bases for continuing an 'arms-length' relationship with Cuba, which I would stress are Cuba's external activities and not its internal political, economic, and social arrangements, would seem, therefore, to be clear." (19)

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19. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. United States Congress; Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. March 26 and April 18, 1973. 93rd Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1974. Pages 3-4.

EXAMINATION OF OAS BASIS

The first basis of U.S. policy refers to the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS has suspended Cuba from membership. It has also imposed economic and political sanctions against Cuba which are respected by most Latin American countries to this day. The U.S., as a member of the OAS, adheres to the OAS dictates and therefore so has the economic and political embargo.

The United States, it will be recalled, first urged the ousting of Cuba from membership in the organization in early 1962. Rusk asked the OAS to adopt a policy similar to that of the U.S. concerning Cuba.

" . . . we must now make the policy decision to exclude the Castro regime from participation in the organs and bodies of the Inter-American system; and to direct the Council of the Organization to determine how best to give rapid implementation to this decision. Within our own competence, since the Inter-American Defense Board was created by a meeting of consultation, we can and should now exclude the Government of Cuba from membership in the Inter-American Defense Board. This step would correct at once the most obvious incongruity arising from the participation of a regime aligned with the Sino-Soviet bloc in a body planning the defense of the Hemisphere against the aggressive designs of international Communism.

. . . we must interrupt the limited but significant flow of trade between Cuba and the rest of the Hemisphere, especially the traffic in arms.

. . . we must set in motion a series of individual and communal acts of defense against the various forms of political and indirect aggression mounted against the Hemisphere. . . . We must find adequate means to strengthen our capacity to anticipate and overcome this constant gnawing at the security

of our peoples. In particular, we should direct the Inter-American Defense Board to establish a special security committee to recommend individual and collective measures to the Governments of the American States for their greater protection against any acts or threats of aggression, direct or indirect, resulting from the continual intervention of Sino-Soviet powers or others associated with them." (20)

Following his address, and at the urging of the United States, the OAS did suspend Cuba from membership so long as it maintains its Communist ties. The OAS unanimously declared that Castro and Cuba were a clear and present danger to the unity and freedom of the American Republics. The suspension of Cuba from membership, however, was not enough for the U.S.

Two weeks after the vote, Dean Rusk continued to urge stronger restrictions on Cuba. He asked again for a prohibition against trade and arms traffic to Cuba as well as the other restrictions. (21) But no further sanctions were adopted by the OAS at that time.

Two years later, he addressed the Latin American Foreign Ministers at the Pan American Union, on July 21, 1964, and again urged further sanctions on Cuba, and cited Castro's export of revolution as a danger to our hemisphere.

"As I stated at the outset, I regard our task as being to determine what measures should now be taken to impress on the Castro regime that the hemisphere will no longer permit its subversive acts

20. See footnote 15.

21. Rusk, Dean; "The Inter-American Foreign Ministers Conference: Report to the Nation", Vital Speeches of the Day; March 1, 1962. Page 292.

against the American Republics. In my opinion, there are three types of measures which we can take to drive this point home.

One should represent the American community's reaction to Castro's efforts to destroy democracy in Venezuela. Certainly this intervention should not be allowed to go without imposition of sanctions.

(paragraph deleted)

The second type of measure would carry the community's clear warning to the Castro regime that if it persists in acts of subversion in the other American Republics, the full weight of the regional security system will be applied. This should serve as a deterrent and I trust the Castro regime will heed such a message.

(2 paragraphs deleted)

A third type of measure should urge our own governments and those of other free-world countries to take appropriate steps in the field of trade with Cuba. This is appropriate because the Communist threat to this hemisphere is a threat also to other parts of the free world." (22)

Again under U.S. initiative, the OAS this time did adopt further sanctions against Cuba. Citing the military ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the export of the Cuban Revolution, the OAS on July 26, 1964, called upon all its members to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and impose trade embargoes.

While Cuba is still suspended from membership in the OAS and sanctions are still part of the official OAS policy,

22. Rusk, Dean; "The Task of the OAS", Vital Speeches of the Day; August 15, 1964. Page 666.

some member-nations are ignoring the sanctions as have Canada and many non-Latin American nations. Some Latin American nations are seeking to restore Cuba to membership. Already seven member-nations have established economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba. On November 12, 1974, a resolution which called for an end to the sanctions imposed on Cuba was narrowly defeated. (23) It is now apparent that the OAS is split over the issue of Cuba, yet the official policy of the organization remains the same today as in 1964 - diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba enforced by trade embargoes.

The U.S. Government continues to cite its obligations as a member of the OAS as a basis for its present policy toward Cuba. However, it appears to be more an extension of its policy, rather than a basis for it. Note that throughout the three year span covering 1962 until the end of 1964, it was the U.S. urging the OAS to take action against Cuba. The U.S. Government can cite OAS policy as a part of its policy toward Cuba but cannot logically cite OAS policy as a basis of U.S. policy.

23. Atlanta Constitution; November 13, 1974. Page 18-A. The vote was 12 in favor, 3 against, 6 abstentions. The resolution failed because 14 affirmative votes were required for passage. The U.S. abstention, although implying a less rigid support of sanctions, for all practical purposes served to continue the present OAS policy because since affirmative votes were necessary for passage, abstentions were in reality no different than a "no" vote.

So, while the State Department continues to cite three bases for U.S. policy, as noted on page 10 of this paper, there are in fact only two bases. Our data indicates that the OAS basis is not a sound legitimate foundation of the current U.S. policy toward Cuba. Therefore, the opposition to Cuba's export of revolution and the Cuban-Soviet military ties and the threat to our security that comes from it are the real bases of U.S. policy.

EXAMINATION OF THE EXPORT OF REVOLUTION BASIS

The Government of the United States and others in this hemisphere have noted the threat of subversion that exists. Fidel Castro once proudly proclaimed that only one solution to the problems in Latin America exists - guerrilla warfare. (24)

The export of revolution began in 1962 with the attempted subversion of the Venezuelan Government. It progressed slowly and carried on throughout 1963, and spread to other countries by 1964. Much of the effort centered within the Latin American Continental Students Organization (OCLAE). This group consisted of subversive students in Latin America that were trained and sponsored

24. Gonzalez, Edward; Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma; Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston, Mass.; 1974. Page 108.

by Cuba. Many were educated at the Revolutionary Education School located at San Francisco de Paula, Cuba. (25) On November 28, 1963, the Venezuelan Government announced it had discovered an arms cache containing Cuban weapons. (26) This setback was soon followed by defeats for the Cuban-backed rebels in Venezuela, Panama, Brazil, and Chile. (27) Yet, the export continued. In 1967, a report to the OAS was filed by the Ministers of Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, and Dominican Republic and the U.S. Secretary of State. The report cited Cuban interventionist activities, including training of guerrillas, the clandestine supply of arms, a continual campaign of anti-government propaganda, espionage, and clandestine transportation of men and arms to support guerrilla activities. (28)

The Cuban program for the export of revolution peaked during the period 1962-1964. Since then it has been in trouble. Beginning in 1965, the Soviets and other Latin

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25. Bethel, Paul D.; "Can Castro Start a New Vietnam", National Review; February 7, 1967. Page 130.
 26. Department of State Bulletin; December 16, 1963. Pages 913-14.
 27. Szulc, Tad; "Exporting the Cuban Revolution", Cuba and the United States; John Plank (ed); The Brookings Institution; Washington, D.C.; 1967. Page 71.
 28. Americas; September, 1967. Page 45.

American Communist parties began to dissociate themselves from guerrillas and other disruptive forces in order to work with established governments in Latin America. The Soviet Union decided that rather than fight, they would attempt to be-friend the existing governments, thereby increasing their own influence in Latin American politics. In order to achieve this peaceful approach, the Cuban export of revolution had to be reduced. (29) But Castro was adamant and sought to continue subversive action, in defiance of Moscow. Guevara was sent to Bolivia. Regis Debray's Revolution in the Revolution, published in early 1967, added doctrinal support to the revolution. Castro also supplied a guerrilla band in Venezuela led by Douglas Bravo, who attacked not only the government, but the local Communist party as well. (30) When accused of directly aiding revolutionaries, Castro said,

"We are accused of helping the revolutionary movement and it is true, we are helping and will help, whenever we are asked to do so, all the revolutionary movements that fight imperialism anywhere in the world." (31)

Castro's zenith of independence came at the first conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization

29. Gonzalez; loc. cit. Page 137.

30. Gonzalez; loc. cit. Page 138.

31. Granma; May 18, 1967. Page 8.

(OLAS), held in Havana in August of 1967. He questioned Moscow's professed commitment to the revolution and urged an independent commitment to promote revolutions in Latin America. The OLAS affirmed Castro's view and established an executive committee to promote and coordinate revolutionary movements, independent of Moscow and Latin American Communists. (32)

Castro's efforts to revitalize guerrilla revolution, however, ended with the death of Che Guevara in October of 1967. The Bolivian movement headed by Che crumbled. The final blow came when Cuba needed to negotiate a trade agreement with Moscow for the year 1968. Moscow demanded a reduction in the export of revolution in return for the trade agreement. Castro was without a bargaining position. (33) Castro turned from his penchant for foreign export of revolution toward an internal mobilization aimed at Cuba's economy. (34)

The official government position in the United States has continued to cite Cuba's support of subversion as a basis for its policy. In 1971, the State Department

32. Gonzalez; loc. cit. Page 139.

33. Gonzalez; loc. cit. Page 139.

34. Gonzalez; loc. cit. Pages 140-42.

claimed the Cuban export of revolution was a viable basis for our present policy. Robert Hurwitch, again appeared before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

"Cuba continues to interfere in the internal affairs of other hemispheric nations by providing training in Cuba for urban and rural terrorists, by providing monetary and other material support to subversive groups and occasional direct participation by Cubans in insurgencies. On July 26 (1971) Prime Minister Castro openly took sides in the pending Uruguayan elections and drew a stiff rejoinder from the Uruguayan Government that Cubans in 1967 and again in 1970 had blatantly interfered in the internal affairs of Bolivia, a nation that had experienced one of the most fundamental socio-economic revolutions in the hemisphere in 1952, 7 years before Prime Minister Castro came to power. Last month, on August 27 (1971), Prime Minister Castro vigorously reaffirmed that he would not abandon his support for violent change in other nations of the hemisphere, and spoke of Cuba's intention to give material support to Bolivian guerrillas." (35)

In addition to Hurwitch, Charles A. Meyer, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, spoke out on the subject of the export of revolution. When discussing United States policy toward Cuba before the same committee as Hurwitch, Meyer made the following comments:

35. United States Policy Toward Cuba. United States Congress; Senate. 92nd Congress, 1st Session. Page 6.

". . . but I can see very little reason for us to seek to change our Cuban policy, particularly as Fidel clearly knows that all he has to do to wipe the slate clean is say, 'I will no longer export revolution'; on the 15 of April (1971) he said, 'I will ship every Cuban to Chile if I have to.' Stalemate." (36)

Then, two years later in 1973, Hurwitch again supported the policy basis concerning the export of revolution.

"In our view this threat results from Cuba's support of subversion in other countries . . . nor has Cuba abandoned its goals of subverting other governments in this hemisphere. It has simply become more cautious, more selective, and more sophisticated in its 'export of revolution' . . ." (37)

In President Nixon's report to the Congress, 1973 (see page 1 of this paper), he stated,

"Havana's rhetoric in support of violent revolution has diminished somewhat, and it is selecting its targets for subversion with greater care. But extremists and revolutionaries from many Latin American countries are still being trained in Cuba today in the techniques of guerrilla war, in sabotage, and subversion. Those trained agents

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36. Aircraft Hijacking Convention. United States Congress; Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft, Signed at the Hague, December 16, 1970. Senate hearings held on June 7 and July 20, 1971. 92nd Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1971. Page 69.
37. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. United States Congress; Senate. 93rd Congress, 1st Session. Page 3.

and saboteurs are then returned to their home countries, or to neighboring countries, to carry out violence against established governments. Money and arms flow from Cuba to underground groups in some countries. This activity continues to threaten the stability of our hemisphere." (38)

In 1974, during a press conference, Secretary Kissinger answered a question about the possibility of the United States lifting its embargo on Cuba.

"Our position is that our objection to Cuban policy has concerned its attempts to export revolution to subvert existing governments in the Western Hemisphere. Our attitude would be subject to change if Cuba pursued a more restrained international course." (39)

There are many who dispute the U.S. Government's view. The critics have long claimed that the export of revolution is a dead issue. Tad Szulc, ex-Latin American Correspondent for the New York Times and now a free-lance journalist, in 1967, claimed Castro had failed in his efforts to successfully export his revolution and would continue to fail. (40) James Bradshaw, previously noted, notes the failure of Castro to export his revolution. (41) Gonzalez cites a Castro speech broadcast by Havana Radio on

38. Nixon; loc. cit. Page 121.

39. Department of State Bulletin; February 4, 1974. Page 122.

40. Szulc; loc. cit. Page 71.

41. Bradshaw; loc. cit. Pages 1075-77.

August 4, 1970, acknowledging the legitimacy of the nonviolent path. This, according to Gonzalez, begins to ease the tension between Castro and Moscow which ultimately ended in excellent Cuban-Russian relations and no export of revolution by armed guerrillas. (42) George Volsky believes the issue is also now dead. He cites the death of Guevara as the beginning of the end. The real end comes with the failure and the disappearance of the OLAS executive committee for revolutionary promotion, in 1970. (43)

Richard O'Mara, as previously noted, claims the export of revolution is no longer in force.

"There is reliable evidence that the Castro government at one time or another financed expeditions or indigenous movements in countries as distant as Panama, Bolivia, and Venezuela. But in recent years Cuba has turned inward, having learned that to foment revolution abroad - and to fail at it - costs too much in both money and prestige. To a great extent, the revolutionary internationalism of Cuba's early years has gone aglimmering." (44)

So, the critics claim that the export of revolution is no longer being utilized and therefore is not a valid basis for the present policy of the U.S. Yet, the government claims the export is still in operation, only to a lesser

42. Gonzalez; loc. cit. Page 142.

43. Volsky; loc. cit. Pages 121-22.

44. O'Mara; loc. cit. Page 524.

extent than before. It is obvious that controversy surrounds the issue. Neither side is willing to budge from their point of view.

EXAMINATION OF MILITARY TIES BASIS

The second real basis of U.S. policy rests upon objections to the Soviet-Cuban military ties. The ties, in themselves, it will be recalled, are not the real objection. (45) It is the belief that these ties create the possibility of an increased Soviet threat to U.S. security as well as to the security of the Western Hemisphere that is objected to by the U.S. Government.

It may be recalled that just prior to the Missile Crisis, President Kennedy warned the Soviets against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. He noted the U.S. would not tolerate an action that produced a threat to national security and the U.S. would take those measures necessary to protect its security. (46)

Shortly thereafter, the strategic threat was realized, when the Soviets did introduce Intermediate Range Ballistic

45. See Hurwitch quote, page 14 of this paper.

46. See footnote 16; or Kennedy quote, page 12 of this paper.

Missiles (IRBM's) into Cuba. As President Kennedy noted in his televised speech to the nation concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis, this introduction of "offensive" missiles was a threat.

"Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 A.M., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles - capable of traveling more than twice as far - and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base - by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of

sudden mass destruction - constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolutions of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation." (47)

The Chief Executive's concern over the implied threat brought about by close military ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba are continued by succeeding administrations. In 1972, President Nixon said, ". . . Cuba has increased, not diminished, its military ties with the USSR . . ." (48) Then, a year later, the President again voiced concern over the Cuban military ties.

" . . . Cuba became the first member of the American family to welcome into the hemisphere the armed power of a non-American state. This action created, among other things, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. And there is no evidence that Havana's military ties with Moscow have markedly changed." (49)

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47. Kennedy, John F.; "Cuban Missile Crisis Speech, October 22, 1962", The United States, Cuba, and the Cold War; Lester D. Langley (ed); D.C. Heath and Company; Lexington, Mass.; 1970. Pages 46-47.
48. Nixon, Richard M.; U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace; U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1972. Page 97.
49. Nixon, Richard M.; U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace; U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1973. Page 121.

The concern of the U.S. Government over the implied threat brought about by military ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba is also criticized by some people. Volsky notes the decline of the threat in his article, "Cuba".

"After 1962, Cuba became of marginal importance strategically to the Soviet Union in view of technological advances in ballistic weaponry. In October 1962 Moscow acquiesced, over Castro's vigorous objections, to the American aerial surveillance of Cuba. Castro accepted the American overflights as a consequence of the failed missile gamble." (50)

Hanson W. Baldwin, the military editor of the New York Times, writing in 1966, notes the conditions under which Cuba may lose its strategic importance to the Soviet Union.

"All these advantages might be nullified, in a strict military sense, in some future time, by technological developments. When Russia has acquired a large fleet of nuclear-propelled, missile-firing submarines and has constructed many heavily protected easily concealed launching sites for solid-fueled ICBM's on her own soil, the cost-effectiveness equation (particularly the difficulties of logistics) might dictate the permanent abandonment of Cuba as a potential Soviet missile site." (51)

In fact, the Soviet Union does now have solid-fueled ICBM's and a large fleet of nuclear propelled, missile-firing submarines. As Baldwin's conditions are now met,

50. Volsky; loc. cit. Page 124.

51. Baldwin, Hanson W.; "A Military Perspective", Cuba and the United States; John Plank (ed); The Brookings Institution; Washington, D.C.; 1967. Page 214.

it may be assumed that today he could contend that the threat is either greatly diminished or nonexistent.

Senator Fulbright also believes the threat issue is unfounded. When chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1973, and considering the question of the reestablishment of relations with Cuba, he said,

"We are the big country and ought to take the responsibility. As the Chairman (Senator McGee, chairman of the subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs) suggested, the initiative should come from the United States. We are not in any great danger or peril, . . . (from Castro)." (52)

If as the critics suggest, that our policy toward Cuba is unfounded and has been for some time, why is it being continued? It may very well be that the continuing U.S. Government's Cuban policy is the result of the phenomenon known as bureaucratic conservatism. Scholars note this phenomenon in the arena of public policy, foreign policy, and business. Basically, bureaucratic conservatism concerns a policy that is continued long after the bases for that policy have become invalid. This is a result of bureaucratic momentum and the difficulty for a "routinized" bureaucracy to reopen policy reevaluation.

52. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. United States Congress; Senate. 93rd Congress, 1st Session. Page 15.

The phenomenon of bureaucratic conservatism, in general, is described quite adequately by William T.R. Fox, Warner R. Schilling and I. M. Destler. Fox prepared a paper concerning the power of the military in the United States. Therein he stated,

"Still another attitude which may endanger national security is the slothful attitude of letting crises make policy instead of using policies to avert or meet crises. This attitude we may call the 'gyroscope' attitude of spinning along the same old policy line until . . . jolts the country and the government onto a course of action which the expert should long before have seen as obvious and his civilian superior have understood and advocated." (53)

Schilling supports the views of Fox and even cites the work of Fox in his writings. Specifically, Schilling approaches the subject via consensus-building.

"Policies once set in motion tend to go on and on, without much regard, at times, for changes in the circumstances that first occasioned them. In part this is related to the need for agreement; the best way to maintain a consensus is not to disturb it. It also reflects the fact that the time and energy of the policy elites are limited. Most policy problems are very difficult; so, too, is the process of reaching an agreement on what to do about them. The combination of the two difficulties can easily lead the policy elites, once they have thought and fought their way through an operational consensus, to adopt an attitude of leaving well enough alone. And so they do, until some drastic change occurs in their environment which sharply and dramatically challenges the wisdom and feasibility of the previous

53. Fox, William T. R.; "American Military Power", World Politics; April, 1955. Page 415.

course of action. The policy consequence is outmoded policy, and the stylistic consequence is crisis oriented diplomacy." (54)

Destler discusses the politics of the bureaucracy and states that there is a bias against change. He further notes that, similar to the "gyroscopic" effect described by Fox and reinforced by Schilling, policies once adopted become self-perpetuating. If changes are proposed, he noted, everything is upset and the trial of consensus-building is involved as well as establishing new channels of communication, working procedures, assignments, etc. (55)

Bureaucratic conservatism specifically applied to foreign policy is described by Schilling and Henry Kissinger. In his chapter in Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, Schilling states,

"Other symptoms mark the style of the policy process itself. It is 'slow'. Competition and consensus-building cannot take place overnight, and the delay between recognition of the problem and the development of a policy for it sometimes take longer than the exigencies of the situation seem to warrant, or, in fact, permit." (56)

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54. Schilling, Warner R.; "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950", Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets; Schilling, Hammond and Snyder (eds); Columbia University Press; New York, New York; 1962. Page 26.
55. Destler, I. M.; Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy; Princeton University Press; Princeton, New Jersey; 1974. Pages 75-77.
56. Schilling; loc. cit. Page 25.

Kissinger describes the pain of decision-making and the even more painful act of changing policy.

"But once the decision-making apparatus has disgorged a policy, it becomes very difficult to change it. The alternative to the status quo is the prospect of repeating the whole anguishing process of arriving at a decision. This explains to some extent the curious phenomenon that decisions taken with enormous doubt and perhaps with a close division become practically sacrosanct once adopted. The whole administrative machinery swings behind their implementation as if activity could still all doubts." (57)

The prospect of change has other implications, also.

Perhaps a bureaucrat disagrees with prospective changes or is afraid of the consequences (loss of responsibility, job, etc.). In this case, "research often becomes a means to buy time and to assuage consciences. Studying a problem can turn into an escape from coming to grips with it." (58)

SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER

The original purpose of this paper was to analyze the bases of United States policy toward Cuba (1962-1974). It was determined that there were three official bases: (a) OAS obligations, (b) concern with export of revolution, and (c) concern with military ties. Our data does not

57. Kissinger, Henry A.; "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", Daedalus; Spring, 1966. Pages 508-09.

58. Ibid., pages 509-10.

support basis (a), and basis (b) has been shown to be under dispute, as indicated on pages 20 and 28. Therefore, it appears that the most logical basis for the continuance of the United States policy toward Cuba is (c), the military ties issue. Accordingly, the specific purpose of this paper is to analyze the validity of the Cuban-Soviet military ties as a valid basis for the continued U.S. policy of isolation toward Cuba.

This paper will test the following hypothesis: that the strategic threat posed by the Cuban-Soviet military ties is not a valid basis for the continuance of the U.S. policy of isolation toward Cuba, and has not been since the end of 1962. In order to test this hypothesis, there are two questions that need be answered.

- (a) Are the Cuban military forces a strategic threat to the United States and other nations of the Caribbean region?
- (b) Is Russia utilizing Cuba as a base in order to build Soviet military strength in the Caribbean, thus presenting a strategic threat to the nations of the area?

To answer question (a), the Cuban armed forces will be described in detail. This description will show the buildup, sequentially, of the armed forces to the present time. Once the military forces of Cuba are described,

a conclusion will be reached as to whether or not the forces on the island of Cuba pose, or have posed, a strategic threat to the security of the United States and the surrounding Caribbean nations.

To answer question (b), the plan is to describe the general Soviet threat, the addition to its threat position, if any, and the potentialities of future increases in its threat position through its military ties with Cuba. In order to accomplish the above, a determination will be made as to if and when a legitimate threat to U.S. security existed and at what time that alleged threat ceased to exist.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT THROUGH THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY TIES BASIS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Prior to answering question (a), two definitions are needed so as to provide a common footing. The term "strategic threat" applies to a design wherein the military forces of one nation are perceived to be designed for, and/or trained to, strike at the sources of other nations' political, economic, or military power. In a sense, also, it implies the capability to destroy industrial centers, communication networks and rear bases/depots belonging to the other nations. Specifically applied to Cuba, in order for her to achieve a credible strategic threat, Cuba must be able to strike the United States or the surrounding nations in the Caribbean region. This strike has to be in a manner such as to seriously deplete, or destroy, the military power of the United States and/or other Caribbean nations. It should also have the capability to use its force to disrupt the economic and political situation of the United States and/or other Caribbean nations. Therefore, a strategic threat implies an "offensive" capability, which brings me to my second definition - offensive. Admittedly, just about any weapon or force can be used

offensively at time. The firing of a rifle, throwing of a grenade, or a bayonet charge can be construed as offensive action. However, the term "offensive" as used in this paper signifies the ability of the military forces of one nation to strike other nations in their own territory. This implies long-range missiles or bombers that can invade the territorial boundaries of the other nations. It also can signify an invasion followed by prolonged military action in the territory of the other nations.

QUESTION (a) - CUBAN THREAT

Having conceptualized the two basic terms that have an impact on this chapter, question (a) can now be taken up - are Cuban military forces a strategic threat to the United States and other nations of the Caribbean region?

The necessity of examining the Cuban armed forces as posing a strategic threat is due to the fact that through the Soviet-Cuban ties Cuba has become highly dependent, both economically and militarily, upon the Soviet Union. Cuba is troubled with a lack of needed raw materials and manufactured goods, and her principle export, sugar, has not covered the cost of needed imports resulting in an unfavorable balance of trade and a balance of payments

problem. (1) The Soviet Union has stepped in to cover the trade deficits and through 1971 had supplied the Cubans with over six billion dollars in aid which gives the Soviets very high Soviet influence in Cuba. (2) As Time magazine suggests, Cuba is a mortgaged island and the Soviet Union holds the deed. (3)

The Cuban military obtains virtually all of its equipment from the Soviet Union and, a sizeable contingent of Soviet military advisors are present in Cuba to train the Cubans in the use of the equipment as well as in other military operations. Additionally, over one-half of the cabinet posts in the Cuban Government are held by Soviet trained personnel. (4)

It would appear then that these various ties and dependencies provide the Soviets with the leverage and instruments through which control over the Cuban military could be exerted and, should they be so inclined, to use them for offensive purposes. Because of this, it is

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1. Lamberg, Robert F.; "The Cuban Economy and the Soviet Bloc, 1963-1968: A Commentary", The Soviet Union and Latin America; J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover (eds); Praeger Publisher; New York, New York; 1970. Page 124.
 2. U.S. News and World Report; November 6, 1972. Page 43.
 3. Time; February 8, 1971. Page 38.
 4. U.S. News and World Report; August 23, 1971. Page 34.

necessary to investigate the Cuban armed forces and their offensive capabilities.

The armed forces of Cuba are the largest and best equipped of all the Latin American nations. The growth of the Cuban armed forces will be traced from Castro's rise to power up to the present time.

There was, to speak of, no legitimate armed force on Cuba immediately after January 1, 1959. While many soldiers were present, no unity existed. An armed force, in the sense of a unified army, did not exist. The military establishment was split into many factions, the most prominent of which were three. One was loyal to Batista and his followers, a second faction was claiming loyalty to the Revolution of Fidel Castro. The third faction was on middle ground, attempting to remain neutral and see what transpired. The factionalism, however, ended soon after Castro's assumption of power.

Within a week after assuming control, Castro proclaimed himself Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces and began the process of building a unified military force loyal to himself. All the officers in key positions were personally selected by Castro and an intensive indoctrination program was initiated to instruct the members of the armed forces on "correct" thought. Castro utilized

the image of the "Yankee Imperialist" to assist in uniting the armed force with one common bond. The uniting factor was to be the protection of the island against United States invasion.

The armed forces were equipped with outmoded equipment at best. Thus, Castro's first task was to modernize the armed forces. He sought the assistance of the Soviet Union, and received it. The February 4, 1960, visit by, the then First Deputy Premier, Mikoyan signalled the beginning of the Soviet assistance to Cuba. In May of 1961, U.S. News and World Report noted the first arrival of new military equipment - 54 Soviet tanks. (5) Then, in the space of one year the Cuban armed forces had enlarged their Soviet-built equipment to the following: 150-250 tanks, 50-100 assault guns, 500-1,000 artillery pieces, 500-1,000 antiaircraft guns, some SAM missiles, a few transport planes, a small number of torpedo patrol boats, and 50-75 MiG jet aircraft. (6)

During the month of September, 1962, Time and U.S. News and World Report printed articles on the rapidly

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5. U.S. News and World Report; May 29, 1961. Page 76.
 6. Figures represent a compilation from: Department of State Bulletin; April 16, 1962. Pages 644-46. AND U.S. News and World Report; February 12, 1962. Pages 47-48.

growing Cuban armed forces. While their figures do vary slightly in places, both point out the tremendous increase that had taken place since the April, 1962, figures cited in the preceding paragraph. Time noted the following: 2,000 antiaircraft guns, 24 MiG helicopters, 8 Ilyushin bombers (capable of carrying nuclear bombs), 25 MiG 15's, 45 MiG 17's, and 20 MiG 19's. (7) U.S. News and World Report quoted these figures: 200-250 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, 1,000 antiaircraft guns, and 75-200 MiG jet aircraft. (8)

By the end of February, 1963, almost everything again increased. There were now 350 tanks, 3,000 antiaircraft guns, 500 SAM-2's, 70 MiG helicopters, 60 surface-to-surface missiles and 34 submarine chasers. However, the MiG totals remained relatively constant at 150. The only change of significance in this area involved the introduction of 42 MiG 21's. (9)

In addition to estimates and approximations being printed in our news sources, there also appeared one

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7. Time; September 14, 1962. Pages 42-43.
 8. U.S. News and World Report; September 17, 1962. Pages 37-40.
 9. U.S. News and World Report; January 14, 1963. Page 4.
January 21, 1963. Pages 49-50.
February 11, 1963. Pages 42-45.

report that is termed an "Underground Intelligence Report". Unnamed sources from an unnamed underground in Cuba sent the following report in February, 1963: 44 remaining IRBM's, 184 MiG's, 37 transport planes, 83 helicopters, 12-15 submarines, 260 tanks, 32 patrol boats, 1,900 artillery pieces, and 2,200 antiaircraft guns. (10) Based on reliable estimates of the State Department, Defense Department and others cited earlier, the only figures suspect in the "Underground" report are the 44 IRBM's and the submarines. No other publication in that period, or since, showing each nation's military capacity lists "offensive" missiles or submarines in Cuba. Administrative spokesmen have been denying and still deny any reports that IRBM's are in Cuba. Among recent denials, I have chosen one as a representative of the many. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, G. Warren Nutter, appeared before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs on July 13, 1970. In his opening remarks, he made this statement:

"Contrary to numerous recent news reports, we have discovered no evidence that strategic missiles have been reintroduced into Cuba or that Cuba has missiles that could be fired from Cuba and hit our mainland. Cuba has long had defensive missiles,

10. U.S. News and World Report; February 11, 1963.
Pages 42-45.

and the Soviets have recently replaced some of them. These defensive missiles include surface-to-air, air-to-air, and short-range surface-to-surface types." (11)

The seven year period from the end of 1963 to 1970 saw a steady gradual rise in the numbers of equipment as well as the modernization of that equipment. Tanks had increased to 300. Armored personnel carriers numbered 200. 374 aircraft were present, including 100 combat aircraft. (12) By the end of 1972, tanks had increased to 560 and aircraft had increased to 451. This figure includes an increase of 30 combat aircraft. (13)

The Military Balance: 1974-1975 pamphlet contains the most detailed and current list of strengths and equipment of the Cuban armed forces. (14) The figures cited in the following paragraphs are current. The Glossary

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11. Cuba and the Caribbean. United States Congress; House. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Hearings held July 8, 9, 10, 13, 20, 27, 31, and August 3, 1970. 91st Congress, 2nd Session. U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1970. Page 103.
 12. Dupuy, Trevor N.; The Almanac of World Military Power; Stackpole Books; Harrisburg, Pa.; 1970; First Edition. Page 27.
 13. Dupuy, Trevor N. and Blanchard, Wendall; The Almanac of World Military Power; T. N. Dupuy Associates; Dunn Loring, Va.; 1972. Second Edition. Page 25.
 14. The Military Balance: 1974-1975; International Institute for Strategic Studies; London, England; 1974. Page 65.

of this paper will give descriptions and definitions of the technical terms used in the following paragraphs.

Today, the Cuban Army is comprised of 90,000 men and women that are divided into 3 army elements - the East Army, Central Army and West Army. While there are a total of 15 infantry divisions (up 6 since 1972), the actual size of each division is much closer to brigade strength. In the event of a crisis, there exists 85,000 trained reservists that can be called to active duty within three days. This added strength would then put the 15 infantry divisions at full strength. Artillery support is included in the divisional strengths whereas the scout and small unit maneuver capability is provided by 2 motorized brigades. The Army's principle equipment includes over 600 heavy and medium tanks (JS-2, T-34, T-54, T-55) and 200 armored personnel carriers (BTR-40, BTR-60, BTR-152). There are also 100 assault guns (Su-100). The artillery relies on such weapons as the 152mm, 122mm, 85mm and 76mm. In addition, they possess some 57mm anti-aircraft guns and 30 short-range surface-to-surface FROG missiles.

The next major element of the Cuban armed forces is the Air Force. The 20,000 personnel (down from 25,000 in 1970) form 12 squadrons. There is 1 fighter-bomber squadron,

5 interceptor squadrons utilizing MiG 21's, 2 interceptor squadrons utilizing MiG 19's, and 4 interceptor squadrons utilizing MiG 17's. There are a total of 419 aircraft. 205 of these aircraft are considered combat aircraft and are comprised as follows: 80 MiG 21 interceptors, 40 MiG 19 interceptors, 70 MiG 17 fighter-bombers, and 15 MiG 15 fighter-bombers. The remaining 209 aircraft are used for scouting, transporting and training. They consist of 70 transports, 54 MiG 1 and 4 helicopters, and 85 trainer/support aircraft. In addition to the fighter-bomber squadrons, the Air Force does have a missile capability. A total of 600 V750VK SAM's (SA-2/"Guideline") makeup 24 SAM battalions. A total of 144 launchers exist that can launch the 600 missiles.

The final contingent of the Cuban armed forces is the Navy. There are 6,500 personnel serving in the Navy, an increase of 500 since 1970. The ships include 3 escorts (PFO), 2 patrol escorts (PCE) and 18 submarine chasers (SO-1 class, SC). They also have 18 guided missile boats (Komar class, PTFG), and 2 guided missile boats of the OSA class. There are also 24 motor torpedo boats (P-4 and P-6 class, PT) and 23 patrol boats (YP). The "Samlet" surface-to-surface missile provides coastal defense. (For specific details of the military buildup, see Appendix A)

Advising the Cuban armed forces is a contingent of Soviet military advisors which have been estimated from a high of 17,000 in 1963 to the present level of 3,000. No figures are given as to how the advisors are broken down between the Army, Air Force or Navy.

The Cuban armed forces are not an offensive threat. They have neither missiles nor artillery capable of effective use outside of Cuba. The missiles and artillery it does possess are only capable of shooting down attacking aircraft or destroying invading landing craft and vehicles.

The Cuban Air Force lacks aircraft capable of launching any significant attack on the United States or on other surrounding Caribbean nations. The characteristics of the MiG aircraft in Cuba are such that they are defensive aircraft. The payload of the fighter-bomber is extremely small (two 550 pound bombs), and the combat aircraft is considered short-range. With the exception of the MiG 19 (850 miles with wingtanks), their aircraft have an effective combat radius of only 375 miles or less compared to U.S. attack fighters' radius of 1,500 miles and B-52 bomber radius of 6,250 miles. The principle effectiveness of these MiG aircraft are against tanks, armored personnel carriers and intercepting incoming aircraft. It will be recalled that on September 14, 1962, Time magazine reported

the presence of 8 Ilyushin bombers in Cuba. It is not known whether or not these aircraft were actually under the control of the Cuban Air Force. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962, resulted in the removal of all Ilyushin bombers and subsequent reports to this day show no such bombers to be present. The subject of the Ilyushin bomber is brought up because this plane is "offensive" in design. Even if it is conceded that the Cubans did have a slight offensive capability in late 1962, this capability ceased to exist by the beginning of 1963 and has not been present since.

The posture of the Cuban Army is also defensive in nature. The tanks, armored personnel carriers and other equipment is landlocked. The threat potential of this equipment can be realized only if the capability exists to move it into a foreign country. The Cuban Navy lacks large transport ships and landing craft. The Cuban Air Force lacks sufficient transport aircraft to move the Army. Thus, the Army is confined to the island of Cuba and therefore presents no strategic threat to the nations of the Caribbean.

The final contingent of the Cuban armed forces is the Navy. The United States is concerned with the possible presence of a hostile naval force in the Caribbean. Its

concern has two foundations. First there is a strategic consideration as the presence of a hostile naval force in the Caribbean area would pose a potential threat to the southern and eastern seaboard of the United States.

The second consideration entails economic overtones. In the event of a flare-up or a war, a hostile naval force present in the Caribbean area would pose a threat to the exits of the U.S. eastern inland waterways, especially the Missouri-Ohio-Mississippi River complex. In addition to the inland water routes, the sea lane between Cuba and Haiti, known as the Windward Passage, which is used by two-thirds of all shipping from the North Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal (15), would be effected.

Escorts, patrol craft and submarine chasers are not offensive craft. Even the missiles mounted on the ships are of limited range (15 miles) and are considered defensive. The relatively small size of the Cuban Navy may be able to achieve a limited tactical threat, but it does not possess the capability for protracted naval warfare or interdiction, especially when one considers the United States ability to counter with a considerable air and naval force.

15. Los Angeles Times; July 26, 1970. Page 7-Part I.

On the assumption that an "offensively-oriented" military force would require high budget expenditures, another indication of the possible lack of offensive orientation of the Cuban armed forces is the fact that only 11 percent of the total budget (only 5 percent of the Gross National Product) is spent on military items. (16)

This assessment of the Cuban armed forces as not posing a strategic threat has also been supported by selected administrative spokesmen. George Ball, Undersecretary of State, noted in 1964 that because Cuba does not possess the capability of air and sealift, she does not present a military threat to the United States or Latin America. He wrote a pamphlet entitled U.S. Policy Toward Cuba and the following quotation is from that work.

"First, what is the nature of the threat imposed by the existence of a Communist regime in Cuba? It is not, in our judgment, a military threat to the United States. We shall never permit it to menace our own strategic power, as our actions in October 1962 demonstrated. We are taking constant and effective measures to insure that such a threat does not occur again - and we shall continue to take those measures. Nor do we regard Cuba as a direct military threat to Latin America. The Cuban armed forces are large and equipped with modern weaponry. They are by all odds the most powerful military establishment in Latin America. But Cuba does not possess air and sealift sufficient to permit it to take offensive

16. Dupuy; loc. cit. Page 25.

action against its neighbors, and, in any event, we maintain overwhelming military forces in the area to prevent Cuba from attacking other American Republics." (17)

Undersecretary Ball's analysis of the Cuban armed forces is still valid today. The air and sealift capacity is still missing.

Furthermore in 1970, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic - Admiral Holmes, conclude that the limited strike capability of MiG aircraft in Cuba is of a defensive posture rather than offensive. The missile capability, likewise, is defensive in nature. (18)

The answer to question (a) - are the Cuban military forces a strategic threat to the United States and other nations of the Caribbean region? - is no. The military forces of Cuba lack offensive capabilities and would not, by themselves, serve as a strategic threat to the other nations in the regions which could be exploited by the Soviets. As noted above, this conclusion has also been acknowledged by at least some administrative and military spokesmen during the past decade.

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17. Ball, George; U.S. Policy Toward Cuba; Department of State Publication 7690, Inter-American Series 88, Released May 1964. U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1964. Pages 2-3.
 18. Cuba and the Caribbean. United States Congress; House. 91st Congress, 2nd Session. Page 125.

QUESTION (b) - THE DIRECT SOVIET THREAT THROUGH CUBA

Unquestionably, the military makeup of the Soviet Union per se, poses a strategic threat to the United States, and for that matter, any region of the world. The Soviets have 70 submarines capable of firing nuclear weapons. The missile total on these submarines exceeds 700. In addition to these "sea-going" platforms, the Soviets have over 1,500 ICBM's; and, an assortment of IRBM's/MRBM's. There also exist long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The strategic threat capacity of the Soviet Union is, indeed, awesome. (19)

The question, however, is not whether the Soviet Union itself is a threat, but whether the Soviet Union has been able to increase its threat through its military ties with Cuba. The answer lies partly in seeing to discover how the Cuban-Soviet ties could be used to increase the Soviet threat. Then, this paper must address itself to the question of whether or not the Soviet Union has, in fact, increased its threat through Cuba. Finally, the question arises as to whether or not the United States can detect and thwart any movement in Cuba that would allow the Soviets to increase their threat.

19. The Military Balance: 1974-1975; loc. cit. Page 8.

There are three principle ways in which the Soviet Union could increase its threat to the United States and the Caribbean region through Cuba. The most obvious increase in threat could be brought about by the emplacement of land based missiles and/or nuclear bomb carrying aircraft in Cuba. Because the Soviet Union's delivery systems are capable of striking the United States and the Caribbean region from Soviet soil, it necessarily follows that the location of a delivery system or systems in Cuba would also be capable of striking the region.

The principle benefit to be derived by the emplacement of a delivery system or systems in Cuba is the time in which a weapon is launched until it explodes on the target. (20) Certainly, Cuba is closer to the Caribbean region than the Soviet Union. This would result in less warning time for the United States to counter, when one compares the time involved for delivery of a nuclear weapon from Soviet soil.

20. While accuracy and an increase in the number of missiles might come to mind, these are ruled out for purposes of this paper. According to Quester, ("Missiles in Cuba, 1970", Foreign Affairs; April, 1971. Pages 493-506) it is highly questionable that missiles fired from Cuba would be more accurate than missiles fired from the Soviet Union. Secondly, the 1972 SALT Interim Agreement sets a limit on the number of missiles a country can possess, and the Soviet Union is now at that limit. The U.S. assumes it is not above that limit.

There are disadvantages however, to the emplacement of delivery systems in Cuba. The possibility of loss of control is real. Imagine what would happen if a group of Cubans in Cuba were to take control and fire a Soviet missile at the U.S. A second and more practical disadvantage is the cost. The logistical support necessary for the protection and maintenance of weapons in Cuba would be greatly increased compared to the cost already being burdened by the Soviets for safeguarding and maintaining weapons in their own country.

A second possible increase in threat centers upon the introduction of massive numbers of Soviet combat troops into Cuba with a maneuver capability throughout the Caribbean. An introduction of a few divisions onto Cuban soil together with air and sea transportation, would pose the threat of possible invasion to neighboring Caribbean nations and perhaps the United States. The principle disadvantage to this possibility involves economics. The cost of moving and maintaining these forces in Cuba, with a 20,000 mile round-trip logistical supply route, would be a burden.

The final possible increase in threat concerns an increased presence in the Caribbean of the Soviet Navy. It will be recalled from an earlier discussion in this

chapter, our concern with the Windward Passage and the outlets to our inland waterways. The Soviet Navy, unlike the Cuban Navy, does include a significant number of "offensive" warships. These include missile launching cruisers and destroyers. Most importantly, the Soviet Navy has nuclear weapon carrying submarines. Due to a lack of maintenance facilities in the Caribbean region, Soviet naval vessels are not now present in great numbers. Should such a facility be completed and become operational, the Soviet Navy could easily operate in great numbers in the Caribbean region and serve as a threat to our eastern and southern seaboard as well as the principle trade routes in the Caribbean.

Whether or not the Soviets have increased their threat to the Caribbean region through Cuba can be addressed by discussing the two attempts the Soviets have made to increase their threat: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Cienfuegos incident of 1970. (21)

On October 15, 1962, at 8:45 A.M., President Kennedy was informed by McGeorge Bundy that offensive missiles were in Cuba. Bundy had learned of the missiles the

21. The Soviet military advisors, numbering 3,000, are only advisors, normally high ranking officers, and are not combat troops. As such, they do not constitute an offensive force.

evening before at 8:30 P.M. when U-2 photographs had been interpreted and handed to him. The delay in informing the President was caused by the necessity of gathering further photographs and "supporting interpretations" so as to be sure of the accuracy of the report. (22)

Increased U-2 overflights and low-level photographic flights were ordered immediately. The President formed an Executive Committee (ExCom) to study the alternatives and recommend courses of action. On October 22, 1962, the President publicly announced the presence of Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM's) in Cuba, as well as a number of Ilyushin bombers. All in all, 42 missiles (24 MRBM's and 18 IRBM's) and 36 Ilyushin bombers were introduced into Cuba. The IRBM carries a thermo-nuclear warhead and has a range of 1,500 to 3,000 miles. The MRBM also carries a thermo-nuclear warhead and has a range of 600 to 1,500 miles. The bomber is capable of carrying nuclear bombs and has a range of 1,500 miles.

The President's appeals to halt construction of sites and introduction of offensive weapons made to

22. Schlesinger, Arthur M.; "Kennedy and the Cuban Problem", The United States, Cuba, and the Cold War; Lester D. Langley (ed); D.C. Heath and Company; Lexington, Mass.; 1970. Page 81.

Chairman Khrushchev were initially answered couched in negotiations terms - let's have a summit, let's take it to the United Nations. President Kennedy's reaction was to impose a blockade on all shipping into Cuba. The blockade by the U.S. Navy took effect at 2:00 P.M.

Greenwich Time, on October 24. He further ordered our Ambassador to the United Nations, Stevenson, to show the Security Council the photographic evidence. This action, taken on October 25, was taken to allay any suspicions by other countries that we had "made up" the incident in an effort to justify an attempt to oust Castro from Cuba.

On October 27, Chairman Khrushchev sent two letters to Kennedy concerning removal of these weapons. In one, he agreed to their removal if the United States would agree to the removal of similar offensive weapons in Turkey. These terms were unacceptable to the President who had declared that the United States would accept only: a) the halting of construction and dismantling of all weapons sites, b) removal of all weapons, c) international verification of weapons removal, at U.N. supervision, and d) an agreement that no offensive weapons would again be introduced to Cuba at any time. Once these terms were agreed to, the President would lift the blockade.

In the other letter, Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy's terms if the U.S. promised it would not invade Cuba. President Kennedy accepted this proposal.

On November 1, 1962, Castro stated he did not agree to U.N. verification. President Kennedy thereupon dropped the demand concerning U.N. verification, but stated the U.S. would pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba via aerial overflights. The blockade was terminated on November 20 and by the first of the year, 1963, all offensive weapons that were in Cuba had been removed. To this date, none of the weapons, as per the terms of the agreement in 1962, have been reintroduced insofar as can be determined by the author.

The other attempt by the Soviets to increase their threat through Cuba came in late 1970 and is commonly referred to as the "Cienfuegos" incident. (23) In September, 1970, U-2 photographs of the Cienfuegos, Cuba, area showed new communication towers, barracks, and anti-aircraft sites being built. The harbor was also shown to have a Soviet submarine tender and two barges that store radioactive wastes from nuclear submarines. This harbor,

23. This summary of the incident is an abbreviated form of the description in Kissinger, by Marvin and Bernard Kalb; Little, Brown and Company; Boston, Mass.; 1974. Pages 209-212.

on the south coast of Cuba, the U.S. concluded, was being turned into a nuclear submarine base.

A Soviet submarine base in Cuba would increase the Soviet threat. Presently, Soviet submarines are consistently off our coast line, just outside U.S. territorial waters. Any missile fired from 12+ miles off the U.S. coast does not give much time for the U.S. to react. The presence of Soviet submarines is currently at 30 to 40 percent of their fleet. The reason it is relatively small is because the Soviet Union has no advance bases, thus a submarine's on-station-time is limited because it must travel to Murmansk, Russia for maintenance. (24) An advance base in Cuba would allow a higher on-station percentage and short turn-around-time for Soviet submarines. The U.S. concern with the building of the submarine base at Cienfuegos was founded on these considerations, and President Nixon and National Security Advisor Kissinger brought up the matter with the Soviets.

Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the White House in mid September, and informed Dobrynin that the Soviets were violating the terms of the 1962 agreement concerning the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba.

24. Quester: loc. cit. Page 496.

A week later, Dobrynin answered that the Soviets were not violating the agreement, yet photographs showed continued construction. On October 5, Kissinger again confronted Dobrynin with the evidence. On October 22, the President was informed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that no offensive base was being built. By the end of October, U.S. surveillance indicated construction had halted and the incident thereupon ended.

The conclusion, based upon the evidence presented in this section of Chapter II, is that despite the opportunities that exist, the Soviet Union has not been able to use its ties with Cuba to permanently enhance its strategic threat toward the United States and the other nations in the Caribbean region. Nor is it likely that the Soviets will ever be able to increase their strategic threat posture through Cuba unless the United States chooses to accede to their plans. The U.S. intelligence network, surveillance capabilities, and sophisticated "spy-in-the-sky" satellites enable the easy detection of any moves on the part of the Soviet Union to introduce offensive weapons, build military bases, or send large numbers of combat troops into Cuba. In the two incidents when such offensively oriented moves by the Soviets were detected, the United States was able, by forceful and persistent pressure, to force the Soviets to abandon their designs.

It is not contended here that the Soviets cannot attempt to increase their strategic threat through Cuba. It is contended, however, that any such effort on the part of the Soviet Union will be discovered by the United States, and the United States would have the option to try to halt the attempt and return the situation to the previous status quo.

Hopefully, the confrontation that occurred in October, 1962, will not need to be repeated. The 1970 Cienfuegos incident never reached the intensity of the Missile Crisis because the U.S. began privately protesting early, before the base was finished, and the Soviets abandoned the project rather quickly, before the U.S. protest rose to a confrontation level. The developing detente atmosphere appears to preclude a confrontation as neither side is desirous of having open hostility.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to analyze the bases of United States policy toward Cuba in order to determine if any were valid as bases for the policy. The specific hypothesis was that the strategic threat posed by the Cuban-Soviet military ties is not a valid basis for the continuance of the U.S. policy of isolation toward Cuba, and has not been since the end of 1962. Our data confirms the hypothesis.

Our data supports the following conclusions:

- (a) the Cuban armed forces have not presented a threat since the end of 1962, if then,
- (b) the Soviets have not significantly increased their threat through Cuba since the end of 1962,

therefore we conclude that our hypothesis, that the strategic threat posed by Cuban-Soviet military ties has not been a valid basis for the continuance of the U.S. policy of isolation toward Cuba since the end of 1962, is confirmed.

What then can account for the continued use of a basis for a policy long after the basis has become invalid? The answer perhaps lies in the phenomenon known as bureaucratic conservatism. Destler notes that policy once adopted becomes self-perpetuating. Kissinger discusses policy as being all but sacrosanct once adopted and how difficult it is to reject the status quo and begin anew.

Since becoming Secretary of State on September 22, 1973, Kissinger has not cited the military ties as a basis for our Cuban policy. Perhaps, this is founded in his personal belief that the Cuban Missile Crisis was not the threat it has been made out to be. While still a Harvard professor, Kissinger noted in late 1962, during the Missile Crisis:

"The original misjudgment was compounded by many others. As we have seen, the bases were of only marginal military use in a defensive war. In an offensive war their effectiveness was reduced by the enormous difficulty - if not impossibility - of co-ordinating a first strike from the Soviet Union and Cuba." (25)

One other explanation can also be entertained as to why the policy has continued to exist. Students and scholars of public opinion might note that, according to pollster Harris (page 7 of this paper), the public turn around concerning Cuba came in early 1973. Therefore, is it possible that the administration had not acted because it felt constrained by public opinion? For example, in 1968, a Gallup Poll showed public opinion as hostile toward Cuba. The poll showed only 6 percent of the American people had a favorable attitude toward Cuba, implying the remaining 94 percent were either hostile or noncommittal. (26)

Investigation of the actual cause of the continuance of the use of the strategic threat basis for the U.S. policy of isolation toward Cuba is one for further analysis.

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25. Kissinger, Henry A.; "Reflections on Cuba", The Reporter; November 22, 1962. Page 23.
 26. Gallup, George H.; The Gallup Poll, 1935-1971; Random House; New York, New York; 1972; Volume III. Page 2105.

APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGICAL BUILDUP OF THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES

<u>ARMY</u>	1961*	1962*	1963*	1970*	1972*	1974*
Personnel				90,000	90,000	90,000
Divisions				9	9	15
Reserves				85,000	85,000	85,000
Arty Bde				1		
Motor Bde				2	2	2
FROG			60	30	30	30
Tanks	54	150-250	350	300	560	600+
APC's				200	200	200
Air-Gd Rkt		*				*
Assault Gun		50-100				100
Arty Pieces		500-1,000		*	*	*
Antiair Gun		500-2,000	3,000	*	*	*

APPENDIX A
(continued)

<u>Air Force</u>	1961	1962	1963	1970	1972	1974
<u>Personnel</u>				25,000	12,000	20,000
F-B Sqdns				12	12	12
SAM Bn's					24	24
SAM-2			500	600	600	600
Total Combat Aircraft		50-200	150	180	210	205
MiG 21			(42)	(60)	(55)	(80)
MiG 19		(20)		(20)	(65)	(40)
MiG 17		(45)		(40)	(70)	(70)
MiG 15		(25)		(60)	(20)	(15)
Ilyushin		(8)				
Total Noncombat Aircraft				194	194	209
MiG 1 & 4		24	70	(24)	(24)	(54)
Transport		*		(70)	(70)	(70)
Trainer				(100)	(100)	(85)

APPENDIX A
(continued)

<u>Navy</u>	1961	1962	1963	1970	1972	1974
<u>Personnel</u>				6,000	7,500	6,500
Escort				4	2	3
Pat Escort				2	2	2
Sub Chaser			34	12	18	18
Komar				18	18	18
Torp Bt		*		24	24	24
Pat Bt				27	16	23

<u>Soviet</u>						
<u>Advisors</u>		up to 8,000	up to 17,000	3,000	3,000	3,000

APPENDIX A
(continued)

Figures cited in the appendix are from the sources noted below.

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- 1962 - Time; September 14, 1962. Pages 42-43.
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- 1963 - U.S. News and World Report; January 7, 1963. Pages 36-37.
 January 14, 1963. Page 4.
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 February 11, 1963. Pages 42-45.
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- 1970 - Almanac of World Military Power; First Edition
- 1972 - Almanac of World Military Power; Second Edition
- 1974 - The Military Balance: 1974-1975

* - used in the chart signifies the weapon was mentioned but no figures were given.

GLOSSARY

Note: This glossary is based on definitions found in The Almanac of World Military Power and Infantry Reference Data, Volume I.

- BATTALION - A unit of from 500 to 1,000 men of one arm, which combined with like units form a brigade. U.S. size, approximately 820 men.
- BRIGADE - A formation of from 3,000 to 6,000 men, usually of several battalions of the same arm. U.S. size, approximately 2,650 men.
- BTR-40 - Soviet Union, 4 wheeled armored personnel carrier. Weight 5.8 tons. Crew of 10. 175 mile range.
- BTR-60 - Soviet Union, 8 wheeled amphibious armored personal carrier. May mount 12.7mm machine gun.
- BTR-152 - Soviet Union, 6 wheeled armored personnel carrier. Weight 6.5 tons. Crew of 14. Maximum speed of 34 miles per hour.
- DIVISION - A formation of combined arms, that is infantry, armor, artillery, etc. Usually from 10,000 to 20,000 men. U.S. size, approximately 8,650 men.
- FROG - (Free Rocket Over Ground) Soviet Union, unguided tactical surface-to-surface rocket, nuclear or conventional warhead. Range from 15 to 30 miles depending upon the model of the rocket.
- GUIDELINE - (U.S. designation is SA-2) Soviet Union, V750VK surface-to-air guided missile. Solid propellant booster, liquid propellant sustainer. 35 feet long. Weight 4,875 pounds. High explosive warhead weight 288 pounds. Automatic radio command guidance. Speed Mach 3.5. Ceiling 60,000 feet.
- ICBM - Intercontinental ballistic missile. 4,000 to 8,000 mile range. Thermo-nuclear warhead. Accuracy 1 to 5 miles.

- JS-2 - Soviet Union, heavy tank. 122mm gun. Weight 57 tons. Crew of 4. Maximum speed 23 miles per hour.
- KOMAR - Soviet Union, class of guided missile fast patrol boat (PTFG). 82 feet long. Maximum speed of 40 knots. Mounts twin 25mm antiaircraft cannon and two STYX missiles.
- MiG 1 - Soviet Union, utility helicopter. 3 passengers. Range of 200 miles. Maximum speed 125 miles per hour.
- MiG 4 - Soviet Union, utility helicopter. 8 to 11 passengers. Maximum payload 3,800 pounds. Maximum speed 130 miles per hour. Ceiling 18,000 feet. Range 150-250 miles.
- MiG 15 - Soviet Union, sweptwing jet fighter. Two 23mm cannon and one 37mm cannon, two 550 pound bombs. Maximum speed Mach .89. Ceiling 48,000 feet. Range 600 miles.
- MiG 17 - Soviet Union, sweptwing jet fighter. Three 23mm cannon. Ceiling 55,000 feet. Range 350 miles.
- MiG 19 - Soviet Union, "A" model is day fighter, "B" model is all-weather interceptor. Three 23mm cannon and air-to-air missiles. Maximum speed Mach 1.3. Ceiling 58,000 feet. Range with wingtanks 850 miles.
- MiG 21 - Soviet Union, short-range delta wing supersonic fighter. Maximum speed Mach 2. Combat radius of 375 miles.
- OSA - Soviet Union, class of guided missile patrol boat PTFG. 131 feet long. Maximum speed 35 knots. Mounts two twin 25mm antiaircraft guns and 4 STYX missiles.
- PCE - U.S. designation for a new class of escort ships. 180 feet long. One 3-inch gun and anti-submarine warfare equipment.
- PF - U.S. designation for a class of patrol escorts over 200 feet long. Same armament as PCE.

- PT - U.S. designation for motor torpedo boats, 60 to 120 feet long. Speed over 40 knots and armed with two to four torpedos.
- PTFG - Guided missile patrol craft mounting missiles with a 10 to 30 mile range.
- SAMLET - Soviet Union, air-to-surface antishipping guided missile. Also used as a surface-to-surface missile launched by a booster rocket.
- SO-1 - Soviet Union, class of submarine chasers. 138 feet long. Maximum speed 28 knots. Two twin 25mm guns and anti-submarine warfare capacity.
- STYX - Soviet Union, solid propellant, rocket booster, rocket sustainer, radar homing guidance. 20 feet long. Wingspan of 9 feet. Range 15+ miles.
- Su-100 - Soviet Union, assault gun. 100 mm gun hull mounted on T-34 chassis. Weight 32 tons. Maximum speed 32 miles per hour.
- T-34 - Soviet Union, medium tank. 85mm gun. Weight 33.5 tons. Crew of 5. Maximum speed 33 miles per hour.
- T-54 - Soviet Union, medium tank. 100mm gun. Maximum speed 35 miles per hour. Weight 37 tons. Crew of 4.
- T-55 - Soviet Union, medium tank. 100mm gun. Weight 35 tons. Crew of 4. Maximum speed 35 miles per hour.
- V750VK - Soviet Union designation for a SA-2/Guideline.
- YP - U.S. designation for a local patrol craft. Under 100 feet. Armed with machine guns. Short endurance and low seakeeping ability. Generally, any craft with these characteristics.

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