Social Choice and Coherent Structures
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show the relevance of reliability theory to the problem of aggregating individual preferences to social preferences over a set of alternatives. First, the Arrow impossibility theorem is proved using coherent structure arguments. Second, coherent systems as decision structures are examined and their properties studied. It is shown that only the self-dual systems are never inconsistent or blocked. It is further found that for any given coherent decision structure any set of alternatives is split into four subsets that have certain interesting properties. Finally, the introduction of probabilities indicates how a cardinal ordering of preferences on the component level can be aggregated to a cardinal ordering on the system level.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1975
- Accession Number
- ADA017237
Entities
People
- Pantelis M. Pechlivanides
Organizations
- University of California, Berkeley