


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pertinent to military topics and Soviet policies in Europe was developed.

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FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT

FURTHER METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS CONTENT ANALYSIS

Sponsored by:

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

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The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. Government.

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PREFACE

This report describes further research efforts undertaken by CACI, Inc., to develop Soviet perceptions content analysis methodology initially begun in the ARPA-sponsored project "The Application of New Methodologies to Analyze the Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Policies." The research was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Contract No. MDA903-75-C-0013, Modification P00002.

The report consists of one volume that contains an Executive Summary, a Technical Discussion, and Appendices. The Executive Summary is a non-technical review of the research accomplishments with emphasis on further methodological development and on the use of the methodology within the national security community. It briefly reviews the background of the study and summarizes the more pertinent findings. The Technical Discussion presents the results of the study in detail. The appendices contain ancillary material and data.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The final report was prepared by:

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The coding for the content analysis was accomplished by:

Andrew W. Spisak
Marina Hochstein

We would like to acknowledge the help, guidance, and suggestions received from Dr. Richard E. Hayes of CACI, Dr. Robert A. Young of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Dr. Charles Sorrels and Mr. John O'Shaughnessy of DoD(ISA), and Mr. Fritz Ermarth and Mr. Stuart Cohen of CIA(OSR). Air Force Major Robert E. Berk Jr. (AF/IN) kindly provided information on the positions of various sources in the Soviet hierarchy; however, any errors in this respect are the authors. Finally, we wish to thank Ms. Carol Franco for editing the report and Ms. Patricia L. White, Ms. Kathy Harris, Ms. Ruby White, Ms. Ann Yamat, Ms. Joyce Nalley, and Ms. Nancy Streeter for typing it.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

In the ARPA project, "The Application of New Methodologies to Analyze the Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Policies," 31 October 1975, CACI developed and demonstrated the utility of a new content analysis technique using thematic matrices as the basis for coder actions. ARPA, in response to user interest from DoD (ISA) and the CIA (OSR), sponsored the current project to provide additional methodological development of the matrix content analysis techniques.

OBJECTIVES

Methodological Objective

The primary methodological objective of this project was to make the matrix content analysis technique of maximum responsiveness to intelligence and defense analyst needs. To this end, the analysis was modified to incorporate as many dimensions as required in order to search for analyst-selected nuances in statements. In addition, matrices were structured for increased clarity, coding was expanded to include individual primary sources, and all sampling was eliminated from the coding.

Substantive Objective

The ancillary substantive objective¹ was to explore three topical areas and detect trends over time and across themes in Soviet media coverage as monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). At

¹ The achievement of this substantive objective is one measure of the success of the primary methodological objective.

CIA request, particular attention was paid to specific sources to determine the capability for observing the characteristics of and temporal changes in individual source output. The topical areas covered were:

- Soviet proclamations of goals for expanding the Soviet system into Western Europe and for strengthening European peace and security, and specifying the means to be used for that purpose. Most of the statements found dealt with strengthening European peace and security.
- Soviet force-structuring goals (by type of service and type of warfare) to attain (maintain) the military capability to carry out various objectives. (In most cases encountered, the objective was to defend against or deter attack on the Soviet bloc.)
- Soviet statements of relative U.S. and Soviet military strengths as increasing, decreasing, or stable by service and type of warfare.

For substantive purposes, it should be noted that the information obtained in this analysis reflects what the Soviet writers (speakers) communicated in the material analyzed, as abstracted by FBIS editors. This type qualification exists for all such analyses--what is actually in the minds of the Soviet leaders can only be inferred from media or other verbal source analysis and from events.

Reliability of Results

The reliability of the coders was checked continuously, producing an overall reliability using Scott's pi of .82, a highly acceptable level.²

FINDINGS

A number of detailed observations are made in the "Technical Section" and are then grouped into findings. These findings are summarized as follows:

² See "Technical Section" for further discussion. Scott's pi is developed in Scott (1955).

- With Respect to Thematic Matrix Content Analysis Procedures. Thematic matrix content analysis can be conducted at highly acceptable levels of reliability with a high level of productivity, responsiveness, discrimination, and sophistication.
- With Respect to Thematic Trends. A number of clearly differentiated thematic trends were developed. One example is that, in Soviet expressions of interest in peace and security for Europe, statements emphasizing political means to this end have risen markedly, while those expressing military or military-related means (except MBFR) have dropped significantly from 1955-1974. An example of a less obvious trend is that, among Soviet statements of relative USSR/U.S. military strength, Soviet civil defense capabilities alone increased markedly from 1965-1974.
- With Respect to Individual Sources. Many meaningful comparisons were possible with respect to individual sources. For example, among the three topical areas covered by the three matrices, prominent members of the Politburo focused on peace and security in Western Europe (both in the absolute and in comparison with less prominent Politburo members). But Suslov, Grechko, Kirilenko, and Shelest were marked exceptions to this trend. Specific observations over time were also discriminating. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Gromyko all focused increasingly on summitry in Europe from 1965-1974, but peaked at different times--Kosygin in 1971, Brezhnev in 1973, and Gromyko in 1974.
- With Respect to Media Targets. Media targets were almost entirely Soviet bloc for military themes, and all but approximately 12 percent Soviet bloc for the European theme.
- With Respect to Additional Dimensions. On some of these--particularly the qualitative versus quantitative (superiority) dimension--little significant differentiation occurred. On others, significant discrimination occurred. For example, on the deter/defend dimension, defend was the predominant theme, followed by retaliate. Deter was minor. Themes of retaliation and defeat, present in the mid-sixties, faded in the late sixties and did not reappear.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the detailed discussion and findings, the following conclusions can be made:

- The improvements in the thematic matrix content analysis procedures developed under this project have produced a highly sophisticated, responsive, analytic tool for providing information to the Soviet analyst.
- Detailed information on trends in Soviet leadership media statements was developed in a form susceptible both to simple interpretation and to more complex statistical analysis.
- Detailed information on individual Soviet sources was obtained which provided useful information on bureaucratic and leadership trends in the Soviet Union.
- Detailed information on additional dimensions to the thematic matrices was obtained which explored nuances of wording of special interest to analysts.
- The analytic capabilities provided by the thematic content analysis methodology should be applied to Soviet source documents, thus eliminating translator/editor biases, and should be used to establish a broad data base over time on Soviet policies, individuals, and bureaucratic agencies starting with the demise of Stalin.

TECHNICAL SECTION

GENERAL

This section of the report contains the following:

- Information on the methodological and substantive improvements made in the thematic matrices used for content analysis compared with the corresponding matrices in the preceding ARPA Soviet perceptions project accomplished by CACI.
- Reliability information pertaining to the content analysis.
- Summary of the data developed.
- Substantive and methodological findings.

METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENTS

The methodological and substantive improvements were directed toward making the analysis more responsive to analyst interests, more capable of detecting changes in nuances, and more accurate and informative for those interested in detailed analysis. The information obtained is subject to the same qualification that applies to all such analyses--the information reflects what the Soviet writers (speakers), as abstracted by the American (FBIS) editors, communicated in the material analyzed rather than what is actually in the minds of the Soviet leaders. The latter can only be inferred from media or other verbal source analyses and from events.

The following improvements were made in the thematic matrices used in the analysis. (These matrices are included as Appendix 1.)

1. Matrix 04----, Soviet Goals (Political)--Western European Regional Objectives. The means listed across the top of the matrix used for attaining the goals specified in the left margin of the matrix were expanded³ from 6 in the previous project to 15 in this project. This provides greatly increased specificity and responsiveness with respect to items of interest to the analyst. As a result of experience and to maintain manageability, the right-hand dimension of the matrix, "Applicability of Goals," was deleted.

2. Matrix 08----, Soviet Goals (Military)--Force Structure Requirements. There was a similar expansion of means and deletion of the "Applicability of Goals" dimension for this matrix. The 4 kinds of means previously listed were revised and expanded into 11,⁴ and grouped into those concerning arm or branch of service and those concerning type of warfare. In most cases a coding unit was coded once under arm or branch of service and once under type of warfare. This gave a much more accurate, comprehensive, structured analysis of means than the previous matrix, which lacked this differentiation, and was also much more responsive to the needs of the analysts consulted. Furthermore, four additional coding dimensions were included:⁵

- The deter/defend dimension
- The superiority/parity dimension (this had been to some degree covered in the earlier matrix)
- The attain/maintain dimension
- The qualitative/quantitative dimension.

³ In consultation with representatives of ISA (Dr. Charles Sorrels) and the CIA (Mr. Stuart Cohen) designated as recipients of the final report.

⁴ See note 3.

⁵ For a detailed description of these dimensions, see Appendix 1.

3. Matrix 34----, Other Soviet Perceptions (Military)--Relative Capabilities. The subject areas in which perceptions occurred constituted the horizontal dimension for this matrix, similar to the means used for matrix 08----. These were revised and expanded from 7 to 13⁶ and categorized as service areas (by type of service such as Army, Navy) and functional areas (such as strategic nuclear war, conventional war, civil defense). Coding normally occurred in each subject area for a coding unit, similar to the coding in matrix 08 for each type of means. The advantages of the revised matrix were similar to those for revised matrix 08----: improved accuracy, comprehensiveness, structure, and responsiveness to the analyst.

RELIABILITY INFORMATION

Checks on intercoder reliability were made throughout the coding period. Before each FBIS category was coded,⁷ 10 percent of the context units were randomly selected to form the check-coding sample. When the first coder completed the entire category, a second coder would code this 10 percent sample. The results of this check coding were then compared to the original or principal coding and an agreement percentage computed.

The formula utilized to establish a reliability measure was developed by Scott (1955). Known as Scott's pi, this formula permits rapid checks on a continuing basis and is suited to content analysis experiments involving two coders. In addition, Scott's pi, in the form

$$\text{pi} = \frac{\% \text{ observed agreement} - \% \text{ expected agreement}}{1 - \% \text{ expected agreement}}$$

corrects raw or observed agreement by accounting for agreement by chance, thus producing a more conservative measure of reliability.

⁶ See note 3.

⁷ The procedures used for coding are contained in Appendix 2.

The reliability checks for the military matrices yielded an agreement percentage of .87 and an adjusted reliability figure of .81. Across all 25 FBIS categories, the observed agreement percentage was .84, the adjusted reliability (Scott's π), .82. Of the matrices, matrix 08 produced the highest observed agreement, followed closely by matrix 04. Matrix 34 showed a somewhat lower figure. In the literature, reliability measures of .80 and above are cited as highly acceptable levels of intercoder reliability (Schutz, 1959).

The coding of the supplementary dimensions accompanying matrix 08 was also subject to checks on coder agreement. The results of these checks are given in terms of percentage of coder agreement with each dimension as it is discussed later.

SUMMARY OF DATA DEVELOPED

The manner in which data should be developed depends on the specific objective of the analyst. In this particular project, the objective is to illustrate various ways in which data can be developed using simple trend lines and tabulations. In addition, the capability to address individual sources, of which almost 250 were developed, is considered. (See Section II, Appendix 2.) The data are discussed in the following sequences:

- Data by matrix cell (that is, by specific goal and means) individually and in aggregate over time.
- Data by source by matrix cell and over time.
- Data by target.
- Data for the additional dimensions coded for matrix 08---- on military force-structuring goals.

Data by Matrix Cell--Overall

The data are disaggregated by individual matrix cell in Appendix 3, where trend plots are given on a quarterly and annual basis, with accompanying

tabulated data. Figure 1 gives the overall annual trend line and data for matrix 04---- (Western Europe), for matrices 08---- and 34---- (military matrices), and for all matrices combined. These trend lines serve as a composite base with which one can examine the individual trend lines of Appendix 3. Using such a composite base as the basis for comparison minimizes the influence of distortions in volume of material included due to FBIS-induced factors.⁸ Figure 1 provides the basis for some pertinent observations:


- Soviet expressions of interest in "peace and security" for Europe, as reflected by FBIS, have risen rather steadily, except for a dip from about mid-67 through the first quarter of 1969. Note the utility of quarterly data, as illustrated in the preceding observation in localizing time. Also note the relatively violent fluctuation of quarterly data compared to annual data in examining overall trends.
- Soviet expressions on military subjects, as reflected by FBIS, have shown a rather steady decline since 1965, with a radical drop from the third quarter of 1968 through all of 1969, and another sharp drop in 1973.

It is important to note, with respect to the preceding observations and those that follow, that they include a number of obvious facts--as they should to be valid--and a number of facts that are not obvious--as they should to be most useful.

Peace and Security in Europe. The trend lines derived from matrix 34---- concerning the means advocated by the Soviets to achieve peace and security in Europe show apparent differentiations among different types of means.

- Trend lines for general political means, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and bilateral agreements to achieve peace and security in Europe have all shown fairly steadily rising trends.

⁸ For example, changes in policy as to what will be included in FBIS summaries, or changes in effort available to produce FBIS summaries, could cause fluctuations in the items coded per unit time.




Matrix 04 (Peace and Security in Europe)

Quarter	Year									
	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74 ^a
1	7	0	15	12	9	18	17	27	24	41
2	23	17	38	12	18	<u>51</u>	23	20	35	<u>52</u>
3	4	17	6	11	22	18	17	16	<u>49</u>	26
4	<u>12</u>	19	2	3	37	24	<u>53</u>	37	26	--
Total	47	53	61	38	86	111	110	100	134	119
Quarterly Average	12	13	15	10	22	28	28	25	35	40


Tabulation of Number of Codes (Quarterly)

Matrices 05 and 34 The Military Matrices



Quarter	Year									
	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
1	137	107	157	<u>182</u>	43	81	138	27	39	83
2	103	<u>251</u>	97	102	46	130	89	37	21	59
3	<u>192</u>	78	112	52	41	43	54	83	29	22
4	106	119	<u>226</u>	73	49	65	42	91	51	--
Total	538	555	592	409	179	319	323	265	140	164
Quarterly Average	135	139	148	102	45	80	81	66	35	55

Tabulation of Number of Codes (Quarterly)



All Matrices Combined

No tabulations provided for totals, as the military matrix codes dominate, as can be seen above and in the trend plot.

Figure 1. Overall Trend Lines

^a Note no codes were obtained for fourth quarter 1974. The solid line reflects actual codes (to permit comparison with similar plots in Appendix 3). The dotted line projects the total year figure based on an average fourth quarter.

^b Number of codes = total number of cells coded during the period indicated. Underlined figures in tables are four highest values in each.

(The drop in the latter two for 1974, when compared to Figure 1, appears to be due to lack of data for the fourth quarter of 1974.) General political means peaked in 1966 and 1967.

- On the other hand, the trend lines for furthering peace and security in Europe by dissolving military alliances, establishing nuclear free zones, and general military means for achieving peace and security in Europe have fallen (as do the trend lines for the military matrices), except in 1970 when the latter two peaked.
- The multilateral agreements trend line has fallen since 1967 like the military-related lines.
- The trend line for mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) rises abruptly in 1971, roughly paralleling the majority of political trend lines cited above.

In general, the trend lines show, over the last 10 years, a marked emphasis in Soviet media output toward political means for attaining peace and security in Europe, and away from military means. This trend with respect to military means parallels the trend toward declining media output for military subjects in general, as reflected in Figure 1.

Goal to Defend Against/Deter Attack by Military Means Indicated. All trend lines for this subject (matrix 08----) follow the overall pattern for military matrices given in Figure 1--a decline in the number of codings from 1964 to 1974. There are, however, some significant differences in the trend patterns:

- The trend lines for the Army and Air Force as means to defend against/deter attack are quite similar and different from the other trend lines. They are the least mentioned of all major categories. They are mentioned most often in 1964 to mid-1968 (Army) and 1965 to 1967 (Air Force) and then not at all until late 1972 (Army) and late 1971 (Air Force). Just prior to the intervention in Czechoslovakia until the development of detente, there was no mention of these two services in the context of matrix 08----.

- The trend lines for the defensive and offensive strategic nuclear forces (PVO and SRF) and for strategic nuclear warfare are quite similar--all three decline to almost nothing by 1974. They decline somewhat more than the overall military matrix trend line of Figure 1.
- The trend lines for combinations of services and for military means to be used to defend against/deter attack are very similar and, by the numbers of codings they entail, dominate the military matrices trend line of Figure 1. The trend line for the Navy conforms most closely to these.
- The trend line for nuclear means of defense/deterrence without specifying whether they are strategic or tactical essentially phases out in 1968. Other trend lines (such as for tactical nuclear warfare) are not shown because of lack of sufficient codes. They are reflected in the tabular data.

Soviet Perceptions of Relative Soviet and U.S. Military Capabilities. The trend lines for this subject (matrix 34----) are generally similar to those for defense/deterrence (matrix 08----). There are some significant differences in trends.

- The most striking observation is the perception that Soviet civil defense capabilities are increasing. This trend line fell slightly from 1965-1971, then rose strongly in 1972-74. All other trend lines for this matrix have shown a general downward trend.
- The trend line for increasing Soviet technological and scientific capability in military matters peaks in 1965, in early 1968, and in 1972-73, and disappears in 1974.
- Tactical nuclear capabilities, of concern particularly in 1967, are no longer mentioned after mid-1971. The nuclear unspecified trend line, as for matrix 08----, essentially disappears after 1968. Thus, after 1968, the focus of nuclear comments was solely on strategic nuclear capabilities.

General Observations. The observations cited above are based on visual examinations. Statistical techniques such as correlation, regression,

and difference of means tests can be used to establish accurately differences in trend line slopes, the degree of co-variation of different trend lines, and the confidence that the characteristics of the trend lines are meaningful and not just due to chance. As demonstrated in the earlier Soviet perceptions study by CACI (1975), these techniques can be used to pursue specific items of interest, and should be used to develop broad insights that are not obvious visually.

Data by Individual Source. The data are presented in Appendix 4 in two formats:

- Data by topic (matrix cell) on which Politburo members, more prominent other sources, media commentators, and draft communiques and resolutions make coded statements.
- Data by quarter for highly prominent sources, aggregated for all topics; and broken down by pertinent themes where data density (number of codes) supports it.

Individual Source Data by Topic and Theme. The data are in three tables in Appendix 4, one for each content analysis matrix. A percentage is given for each source, under the raw data figure. This permits meaningful comparisons between individual sources, or with or between aggregated sources, in terms of emphasis given to a given topic. For example, 36 percent of Brezhnev's statements for all three matrices were coded on matrix 08----, concerning Soviet force-structuring goals. This was somewhat less than that for all Politburo members (47 percent), much less than for Shelepin (76 percent) but more than for Podgorniy (24 percent). For a few Politburo members, the number of coded statements is too low to be statistically meaningful. But this, in itself, says something about their status as spokesmen for the regime. Pertinent observations with respect to the tables for each matrix follow.

European Peace and Security (Matrix 04----). Table 1 shows the relative concentration of various groups on this topic in their statements.

TABLE 1
Aggregated Source Concentration on Matrix 04----
European Peace and Security

<u>Aggregated Sources</u>	<u>% of All Statements Coded on 04----</u>
Politburo	48
Army/Air Force	3
Navy	0
All Military	3
Media (no identified individual)	29
Communique or Draft Declaration	87
Other Sources	54
Total (weighted)	21

Note the almost complete lack of comment in this area by the military, and the heavy coverage in communiques and draft declarations. Some specific observations based on Appendix 4 are as follows:

- Among the military, Yakubovskiy (as Warsaw Pact Commander) and Grechko are the only two to comment significantly on means to attain peace and security in Western Europe. No naval officer had any comment on the subject. The prime focus of Grechko and Yakubovskiy was on CSCE and on general military means to be used.
- The most senior members of the Politburo (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorniy) made the bulk of their coded comments on this subject--over 60 percent in each case. Gromyko and Mazurov made over 80 percent of their statements on this topic. But many of the lesser Politburo members--and some more important ones like Suslov and Grechko--had little to say on the subject. In most cases, either they concentrated on it--over 60 percent of the statements--or they paid relatively little attention to it--less than 30 percent of the statements.

Soviet Force-Structuring Goals (Matrix 08----). Table 2 shows the relative concentration of various groups on this topic in their statements.

TABLE 2
Aggregated Source Concentration on Matrix 08-----
Soviet Force-Structuring Goals

<u>Aggregated Sources</u>	<u>% of All Statements Coded on 08-----</u>
Politburo	47
Army/Air Force	73
Navy	84
All Military	74
Media (no identified individual)	63
Communique or Draft Declaration	12
Other Sources	71
Total (weighted)	62

Table 2 indicates that the military and miscellaneous minor sources (mostly military) concentrated most heavily on this topic, with media coverage average as compared with total individual coverage. The following specific observations can be made based on the tables in Appendix 4.

- Soviet force-structuring goals appears to be a relatively safe topic for lesser Politburo members. The 17 (out of 26--the bottom two-thirds) Politburo members cited over this 10-year period who were coded least frequently had an average concentration on this subject of 65 percent, as compared to 50 percent for the 9 most frequently cited ones (the top third). That top third included Grechko (81 percent), Suslov (94 percent), Kirilenko (73 percent), and Shelest (67 percent). The rest were 36 percent (Brezhnev) or below.
- There were few Politburo comments on the Army and Navy and those that were made favored the Army. Almost all Politburo statements addressed the combined services and general military capabilities.
- Gromyko, as would be expected, did not dwell on this topic (11 percent as a Politburo member, 13 percent before he entered the Politburo).

- Marshall Yakubovskiy who, as Warsaw Pact Commander, had relatively much to say on European peace and security was the only military man who made less than 60 percent of his statements on this topic.
- Military personnel spoke much more on specific services and types of warfare than did others, except that the media commentators concentrated twice as much on strategic forces and strategic nuclear war as the primary military commentators.
- Relatively few (12 percent) communiques or draft declarations dealt with this subject and always in very general terms.

Soviet Statements About Soviet and U.S. Force Trends (Matrix 34----).

Table 3 shows the relative concentration of various groups on this topic in their statements.

TABLE 3

Aggregated Source Concentration on Matrix 34----
Statements About Soviet and U.S. Force Trends

<u>Aggregated Sources</u>	<u>% of All Statements Coded on 34----</u>
Politburo	5
Army/Air Force	24
Navy	16
All Military	23
Media (no identified individual)	8
Communique or Draft Declaration	1
Other Sources	23
Total (weighted)	17

The pattern for Table 3 is somewhat different than that for Table 2, although both involve military topics. The Navy heavily overparticipated in discussing force-structuring goals (135 percent of the average), but

it slightly underparticipated in discussing relative force trends (94 percent of the average). The media showed a similar trend (down from 102 percent of the average in Table 2 to only 46 percent of the average in Table 3), with the Politburo and communiques and draft declarations showing equally marked drops. In effect, the two tables indicate that the Army spokesmen ("other sources" is mainly minor army spokesmen) provide the great bulk of comments on force trends. Additional observations based on Appendix 4 are as follows:

- Three relatively minor Politburo members (Shcherbitskiy, Ustinov, and Grishin) provide approximately a quarter of the relatively low Politburo output on this subject.
- Vershinin, a Marshall in the Air Force, is the military spokesman who devotes the greatest proportion of his comments to this subject.
- Strategic forces, the Army, the Air Force, and science and technology are the specific means most often perceived as increasing relative to the United States, with specific means (as opposed to combinations of services or general military forces) receiving almost two-thirds of the codes (in contrast to matrix 08---- on force-structuring goals, where the specific means received only about one-third of the codes).

Individual Source Data - Trend Lines

These trend lines are also included in Appendix 4. Some of the more pertinent observations derived from these trend lines are:

- Brezhnev increasingly talked of summitry as a means to bring peace and security to Europe except in 1968. He has spoken less and less on major military topics, except in 1970 when he greatly increased his statements.
- Kosygin and Gromyko also discussed summitry increasingly from 1965-1974. Kosygin's statements increased markedly on the subject in 1971, two years earlier than Brezhnev. Gromyko's peaked in 1974, one year after Brezhnev.

- Considering peaks and valleys in the trend lines, Brezhnev and Kosygin appear to have similar overall trend lines, as do Krylov and Vershinin. Comparison of such trend lines could be greatly facilitated by the use of correlation techniques.
- Overall, Brezhnev, Podgorniy, and Grechko appeared to maintain relative stability in output over the 10-year period, albeit with some peak years. Kosygin, Shelest, and to some extent Shelepin, Suslov, Krylov, and Zakharov, appeared to decrease in output over the period. Krylov (in 1972), Vershinin (in 1970), and Malinovskiy (in 1968) all terminated output. Yakubovskiy was prominent primarily in 1968-1971. Kirilenko, Gromyko, and Gorshkov (discounting a peak in 1968) all appeared to increase in output over the period. The use of regression lines might be useful in assessing trends of this nature.

The output through media commentators was comparatively high in the early part of the period and low later. The output of communiques and draft resolutions was the reverse. These two time trends relate well to the information developed in the discussion of matrix cell trend lines, namely, that military topics had relatively more prominence in the early years of the period, and media commentators dwelt more heavily on military topics. The reverse of this situation was true for the later portion of the period and for communiques--political matters weighed more heavily then, and communiques and draft resolutions were oriented toward political matters.

Data by Target

The data are reflected in Table 4. Note that only with respect to European peace and security was there a significant target audience outside the Soviet bloc, and there it was just over 11 percent. Virtually all of the statements concerning the military appear to have been designed for internal consumption.

TABLE 4
Data by Target

Matrix (Topic)		Target (by %)				
		Soviet Union	Eastern Europe	United States	Other Foreign	Not Specified
(04-----)	European Peace and Security	76.5	10.5	.8	10.9	1.3
(08-----)	Force-Structuring Goals	91.2	6.5	.1	1.6	.6
(34-----)	Force Trends	86.3	13.0	0.0	0.0	.7

Data for Addition Dimensions for Matrix 08-----

Trend lines and tabular data for these dimensions are contained in Appendix 5. The dimensions themselves are set forth in detail in Appendix 1. These are discussed by dimension below:

- Deter/Defend Dimension. (84 percent coder agreement)
This dimension involved discriminating among the terms deter, defend, retaliate, defeat, and "other" in stating the objective of Soviet force-structuring building. Defend occurred most by over two out of three (1019 codes out of 1447), and retaliate accounted for 250 of the rest. The trends that varied significantly from the overall patterns of Figure 1 are:
 - Retaliate is strong in the mid-60's, fades to almost nothing from 1968 on.
 - Deter peaks in 1967, 1971, and 1973, and is never very consequential (32 codes over 10 years).
 - Defeat, after peaking strongly in 1967, fades rapidly and disappears in 1973. It involves a total of only 56 codes.

- Superiority/Parity Dimension. (95 percent coder agreement) This dimension involved discrimination among the terms superiority, parity, inferiority, and "other" in describing force-structuring objectives. Only superiority had any significant mention--and that was 54 codes (about 3 percent of the total). Almost all references to superiority were in the mid- and late-1960's.
- Attain/Maintain Dimension. (81 percent of coder agreement) This dimension discriminated among the terms attain, maintain, increase of an already possessed capability (possess-increase), and "other" in describing military capabilities. Possess-increase had just over half of the codes, and maintain just over a third. Attain had only 32 codes. Compared to Figure 1, overall military trends, maintain was lower in 1971-1972; possess-increase was the same; and attain, peaking in 1967 like defeat on the defend/deter dimension, faded out after 1968.
- Qualitative/Quantitative Dimension. (92 percent coder agreement) This dimension discriminated between qualitative and quantitative superiority in coded statements. Only 18 statements were coded qualitative and 21 quantitative; the rest were other. Both of these terms were used in 1965 and 1966, peaked in 1967, then faded away.

SUBSTANTIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL FINDINGS

With Respect to Thematic Matrix Content Analysis Procedures

There are three findings with respect to content analysis procedures using thematic matrices:

- Thematic matrix content analysis can be accomplished using complex matrices with supplementary dimensions at acceptable levels of reliability (in excess of .80 Scott's pi values).
- Thematic matrix content analysis can be highly productive (producing over 4,000 codes from 130,000 lines of text by two coders in five weeks).
- Thematic content analysis can produce highly responsive discriminating results and is capable of considerable sophistication in application.

With Respect to Thematic Trends

There are six primary findings with respect to topical trends (considering a matrix cell to represent a specific theme, a matrix as a whole to represent an overall topic).

- Soviet expressions of interest in peace and security for Europe have risen markedly over the last 10 years.
- Soviet expressions of military force-structuring goals and of perceived trends in relative USSR/U.S. military strength have declined over the last 10 years, with a noticeable drop in 1969.
- With respect to peace and security in Europe, Soviet statements involving political means to reach this objective have tended to increase, and those involving military or military-related means have tended to decrease over the last 10 years.
- With respect to Soviet force-structuring means to defend the Soviet bloc and related goals:
 - The Army and Air Force, as means toward this goal, are not mentioned from approximately 1968-1971, and seldom mentioned after that period.
 - The trend lines for mention of strategic forces and nuclear warfare means toward this goal decrease from 1965-1974 at a somewhat faster rate than the overall trend line for all means.
 - Trend lines for other means toward this goal generally decrease at the same rate as the average for all means over 1965-1974.
- With respect to Soviet perceptions of relative USSR/U.S. military strength:
 - Alone among the areas of comparison, Soviet civil defense capabilities are indicated as markedly increasing over the period 1965-1974.
 - The trend line for increasing Soviet technological and scientific capability in military matters peaks in 1965, early 1968, and 1972-1973. It disappears in 1974.

- Tactical nuclear capabilities, mentioned in the mid- and late-1960's, are no longer mentioned after mid-1971.
- The trend lines for other areas of comparison (such as Army, Navy, strategic forces) generally decline more or less slowly and irregularly from 1965-1974.
- The trend lines and data for all matrices appeared well-suited to more sophisticated statistical analysis as a means for providing significant additional information not otherwise readily deducible from the data.

With Respect to Individual Sources

There are two primary findings relating to analysis of the data obtained with respect to individual sources.

- Meaningful comparisons between individual sources and/or aggregated groups of individual sources were feasible with respect to topics for which there were sources of Soviet media statements. For example:
 - There was a marked differentiation among Politburo members as to topics they addressed. Those of less prominence addressed the military subjects proportionally more, peace and security in Europe less. Prominent members addressed peace and security in Europe more. But there were some marked exceptions to this--particularly Suslov, Grechko, Kirilenko, and Shelest.
 - By far the main source of comments on relative military strength was the military, with relatively little comment by the Politburo or general media sources. This disparity was not true in speaking of certain force-structuring goals where, for example, the media spokesman put almost twice as much emphasis on strategic forces and strategic nuclear war as the primary military spokesmen did.
- Analyses of individual source data over time were informative both as to changes in emphasis among themes over time by individuals and as to parallelism (or lack thereof) for different individuals in their media exposure and topics.

With Respect to Media Targets

Media targets were almost entirely Soviet bloc for the military themes, and were all but approximately 12 percent Soviet bloc for the peace and security in Europe themes.

With Respect to Additional Dimensions

There are four primary findings with respect to the additional dimensions to matrix 08----.

- On the deter/defend dimensions:
 - Defend was the predominant theme, followed by retaliate.
 - Themes of retaliation and defeat were present in the mid-sixties, faded in the late-sixties, and did not reappear.
 - The deter theme was of minor importance.
- On the superiority/parity dimension there was little meaningful differentiation. Superiority was mentioned on about 3 percent of the codes in the mid- and late-1960's. Otherwise, there was no discrimination on this dimension.
- On the attain/maintain dimension, there was significant discrimination in that an increase of an already possessed military capability had about half the codes, and maintenance of that capability had about a third. Attaining a military capability (which as an objective, implies a present lack of that capability) had less than 5 percent of the codes.
- There was no useful differentiation on the qualitative/quantitative dimension--only about 1 percent of the codes were related to either of these terms.

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Appendix 1

Revised Thematic Matrices:

04----, Soviet Goals (Political)
Western European Regional Objectives

08----, Soviet Goals (Military)
Force Structure Requirements (with added dimensional supplement)

34----, Other Soviet Perceptions (Military)
Relative Military Capabilities

Matrix 04 (Revised 29 September 1975)

Soviet Goals (Political)
Western European Regional Objectives

Means

It is (a) consonant with Soviet goal(s) to:	POLITICAL										MILITARY				
	ECON.	General and not otherwise specified	Summity	CSCC	Bilateral Agreements	Dissolution of Military Alliances	Establishment of nuclear free zones	Expanding the influence of non- ruling pro-Soviet parties	Multilateral Agreements	General and not otherwise specified	Nuclear arms reduction*	Conventional arms reduction*	MBFR*	War against the U.S.	War against countries other than the U.S.
a) expand the Communist system to W. Europe and/ or remove the capitalist/ imperialist system from W. Europe	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
b) expand Soviet influ- ence in W. Europe and/ or remove U.S. influ- ence from W. Europe															
c) strengthen European peace and security															

* When nuclear or conventional arms reduction is discussed in the context of MBFR, use the column MBFR only.

Soviet Goals (Military)
Force Structure Requirements

It is (a) (consonant with) Soviet goal(s) to attain/maintain the following capabilities by the means indicated:	Means (Service)**						Means (Type Warfare)**					
	Army	Navy	Air Force	PVO	SRF	Any Combinations of the above	Nuclear Warfare			Conventional Warfare	General Military (undifferentiated)	
							Strategic	Tactical	General (undifferentiated)			
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	
a) the capability to defend against or deter an attack against the USSR, East European Communist countries and Cuba												01
b) the capability to defeat or deter U.S. imperialist aggression and support of counter-revolution in the Third World												02
c) the capability for the military defeat of China												03
d) the capability for the military defeat of NATO												04
e) the capability to support Soviet foreign policy (specifically stated as such)												05
f) military capabilities for other reasons (to include inferred support of Soviet foreign policy) or for unspecified reasons												06

* This matrix includes two dimensions. Four other dimensions require coding. The manner and validation of this coding is indicated on the matrix 08 supplement attached.

** With respect to the United States, capitalists, or potential aggressors in general. Either or both type means will be coded as appropriate.

Matrix 08 Supplement

Additional Dimensions

Matrix 08 reflects two dimensions. For each cell selected from matrix 08, four additional dimensions describing the substance of the goals and means used to attain them are to be coded. These dimensions are the deter/defend, superiority/parity, attain/maintain, and qualitative/quantitative dimensions. These dimensions are constituted as follows:

- Deter/Defend Dimension

1. Deter (use of this specific term)
2. Defend (reliably protect, or equivalent)
3. Retaliate (administer a crushing rebuff, or equivalent)
4. Defeat (attain assured victory, or equivalent)
5. Other (or no) comparable terms

- Superiority/Parity Dimension

1. Superiority (that specific word or its derivations such as "become superior")
2. Parity (that specific word or its clear equivalent such as equality)
- *3. Inferiority (that specific word or its clear equivalent)
4. Any other indication, or no indication on this dimension.

- Attain/Maintain Dimension

1. Attain (acquire, seek, require further increase,--any term clearly indicating that the capabilities described are not currently possessed, but are to be sought for the future)
2. Maintain (possess, are adequate--any term clearly indicating that the capabilities described are currently possessed and are to be retained)

* This term is not expected, but is included for completeness in defining the dimension.

*3. Relinquish (any term clearly indicating an intent that the capabilities described will be permitted to deteriorate relative to the United States)

4. Any other indication, or no indication on this dimension

• Qualitative/Quantitative Dimension

1. Qualitative superiority (parity, etc.) is to be sought (maintained, etc.). This includes technological superiority when clearly specified as such.
2. Quantitative superiority (parity, etc.) is to be sought (maintained, etc.)
3. Any other indication, or no indication on this dimension

* This term is not expected, but is included for completeness in defining the dimension.

Other Soviet Perceptions (Military)
Relative Military Capabilities

It is a Soviet perception that:	Areas (Service)						Areas (Functional)									
	Army	Navy	Air Force	PVO	SRF	Any combination of the above	Nuclear Warfare			General (Undifferentiated)	Conventional Warfare	General Military (undifferentiated)	Civil Defense			Military Applications of Science & Technology
							Strategic	Tactical	General (Undifferentiated)							
a) in the areas specified, Soviet (Socialist bloc) capabilities relative to U.S. (capitalist) capabilities are:	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	01	Increasing	
														02	Stable	
															03	Decreasing
b) in the areas specified, U.S. (capitalist) capabilities relative to Soviet (Socialist bloc) capabilities														04	Increasing	
														05	Stable	
														06	Decreasing	

Appendix 2
Coding Procedures

PROJECT CODING PROCEDURES

UNITS OF ANALYSIS

The context unit coded in this project is a single Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) item carried, in most cases, in the Daily Report. The item may be, for example, a TASS transmission, a Radio Moscow broadcast, or an article from Pravda or Izvestiya. The recording unit is the theme, a single assertion of a Soviet foreign policy goal or perception which is codable to one of the three matrices (04, 08, or 34). A single theme is considered to reflect one specific goal or perception, that is, each theme is exclusive to a single matrix cell. Of course, each unit may contain numerous themes.

CODING PROCEDURES

For each theme identified, the coders followed the following procedure.

1. The year (last two digits), month, day, section, and page number of the FBIS Daily Report from which the theme was selected was recorded in the first ten columns of the coding forms. The section letter was translated to a numerical code (see Section I of the attached code list). In some cases, the theme is contained in a source other than the Daily Report for the Soviet Union. These sources are indicated in the Section I code list (e.g., JPRS=90).

Example: A theme taken from the FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union of May 12, 1972 on page 8 of section E would be coded: 7205120508)

2. The quarter of the year on which the statement was reported was coded next. Daily Report issues of January, February, and March were coded as 1, for the first annual quarter. Other three-month groups followed sequentially for each year.

3. Coders next identified the primary source of the themes, that is, the individual or group who originated the statement. The alphabetical and numerical lists are provided in Section II of the attached codes. Note that the first digit identifies the aggregate bureaucratic or functional group: 100 series, Politburo full and candidate members; 600 series, joint statements; 700 series, foreign ministry members; 800 series, other primary sources, usually less party/state officials or academicians.

4. Next, the secondary source (the reporting medium) was coded according to the list in Section III.

5. The target audience to which the secondary source was directed was recorded by the Section IV codes attached. Thus, "Radio Moscow in English to North America" would receive a secondary source code of "1" and a target audience code of "3."

6. The matrix cell which identifies the theme is represented by a six digit number which locates in sequence the matrix, column, and row of the box.

7. Following the matrix cell information, the coders entered the two digit code which identified the FBIS category from which the statement was extracted. See attached list, Section V for the codes.

8. Each context unit in each FBIS category received a sequential identification number to facilitate future referencing. This three digit number was coded after the FBIS category code was entered.

9. Finally, in those cases where a statement was coded for matrix 08, additional information was recorded for each of four supplemental dimensions. Codes for these dimensions are contained in Section VI.

CODE LIST

I. FBIS SECTION CODES

<u>CODE</u>	<u>SECTION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>SECTION</u>
01	A	27	AA
02	B	28	BB
03	C	29	CC
04	D	30	DD
05	E	31	EE
06	F	32	FF
07	G	33	GG
08	H	34	HH
09	I	35	II
10	J	36	JJ
11	K	37	KK
12	L	38	LL
13	M	39	MM
14	N	40	NN
15	O	41	OO
16	P	42	PP
17	Q	43	QQ
18	R	44	RR
19	S	45	SS
20	T	46	TT
21	U	47	UU
22	V	48	VV
23	W	49	WW
24	X	50	XX
25	Y	51	YY
26	Z	52	ZZ
		53	AAA
		54	BBB
		55	CCC

FBIS SECTION CODES (Cont'd)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>SECTION</u>
90	JPRS (Joint Publication Research Service)
91	FPIR (Foreign Press International Report)
92	FPD (Foreign Press Digest)
93	EE DR (Eastern Europe Daily Report)
94	EE DR SUP (Eastern Europe Daily Report Supplement)
95	SU DR SUP (Soviet Union Daily Report Supplement)
96	ME DR (Middle East Daily Report)
97	FE DR (Far East Daily Report)

IIa. PRIMARY SOURCE CODES (Alphabetical Order)

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Agaltsov (Marshal)	201
Alekseyev, N. (Colonel General)	503
Alekseyev, V. (Admiral)	570
Alekseyev, V. (Colonel)	504
Alekseyev, N. (Colonel) / Ivanov, O. (joint statement)	601
Altunin, A. (Colonel General)	505
Amelko (Admiral)	202
Andreyev, V. (Rear Admiral)	203
Andropov (PB CPSU)	107
Anureyev, I. I. (Major General)	568
Aristov (PB CPSU)	117
Babadzhanyan, K. (Marshal)	576
Babakov, A. (Colonel)	260
Babakov, A. (Colonel) / Rybnikovi (joint statement)	602
Bachkarev, (General)	204
Bagramyan, L.K.	289
Baibakov, N. (Chairman, State Planning Commission)	814
Baksov, A.I. (Colonel General)	586
Baranov, S. (Colonel)	506
Batitskiy, P. F. (General)	205
Batov, P. (General)	521
Baykov, (Admiral)	291
Bednyagin, A. I. (Lt. General)	522
Belonozkho, S. (Colonel General)	206
Beykenov, (Major General)	292
Bochkarev, K. (Major)	545
Bojcsuk, J. (Lt. Colonel-Hung.)	806
Bondarenko, V. (Lt. Colonel)	207
Borovykh, A. (Colonel General)	284
Brayko, (Colonel General)	523
Brezhnev, L. I. (PB CPSU)	101
Brezhnev, L. I. / Kosygin, A. N. (joint statement)	603
Brezhnev, L. I. / Kosygin, A. N. / Podgorniy, N. (joint statement)	605
Brezhnev, L. I. / Mazurov, K. T. (joint statement)	606
Brezhnev, L. I. / Podgorniy, N. / Shelest, P. (joint statement)	607
Bydenny, S. (Marshal)	577
Chapayev, A. V. (Major General)	507
Chelin, A. (Colonel)	294
Cherednichenko, M. L. (Major General)	290
Cherokov, V. (Vice Admiral)	502
Chistyakov, (Marshal)	208
Chizh, V. F. (Colonel General)	508
Chugunov, N. V. (Lt. General)	282
Chuykov, V. I. (Marshal)	209
Dankervich, P. B. (Colonel General)	210

SOURCECODE

Demichev (PB CPSU)	118
Demin, N. (Lt. General)	509
Derevyanko, (Lt. Colonel)	558
Fedorenko (Academician)	822
Fedyuninskiy, (General)	524
Fominykn (Vice Admiral)	269
Garbuzov, V. (Min. Finance)	809
Gerasimov, K. M. (Budget Planning Commission)	816
Glazov, V. (Colonel)	211
Golikov, (Marshal)	267
Goncharov, V. A. (Major General)	518
Gorchakov, P. (Lt. General)	218
Gorshkov, S. (Admiral)	213
Grachev, S. T. (Major General)	560
Grechko, A. A. (Marshal, Def. Min.)	214
Grechko, A. A. (April, 1973-on: PB CPSU)	108
Grechko, S. (Colonel General)	577
Grekov, V. (Colonel General)	560
Grigoryev, M. G. (Colonel General)	215
Grishanov, V. (Admiral)	540
Grishin, V. V. (PB CPSU)	115
Grishkov, N. (Lt. General)	298
Gritskov, F. V. (Major General)	538
Gromyko, A. (Foreign Minister)	701
Gromyko, A. (April, 1973-on: PB CPSU)	109
Grudinin, I. (Colonel)	510
Ivanov, O. (Lt. Colonel)	511
Ivanov, O. (Lt. Colonel) / Alekseyev, V. (Col.) (joint statement)	601
Ivanovsky, Y. (General)	216
Kablukov (Colonel)	293
Kadomstev, A. (Lt. General, Air Force)	217
Kalshnik, (Colonel General)	525
Kamanin (Lt. General)	582
Kapitonov (Sec'y CPSU)	830
Karpov, V. N. (Lt. General)	542
Kasatonov, V. A. (Admiral)	218
Katukov, M. Y. (Marshal)	556
Katushev, K. (Sec'y. CPSU)	831
Kazakov, K. P. (General)	219
Kazarov, A. (Engr.-Major General)	285
Khalipov, I. (Colonel General)	221
Kharich, V. (Colonel)	222
Kharlamov (Admiral)	500
Khlestov (For. Ministry - MBFR delegate)	704
Khomulo, M. G. (Colonel)	565
Kirilenko (PB CPSU)	106
Kirsanov, P. (Lt. General)	283
Kondratkov, (Lt. Colonel) / Shelyag, V. (Adm.) (joint statement)	604
Konev (Marshal)	262
Konstantinov (CC CPSU)	818
Koshevoy (General)	526
Kosygin, A. (PB CPSU)	102
Kosygin, A. N. /Brezhnev, L. I. (joint statement)	604

SOURCECODE

Kosygin, A. N. / Brezhnev, L. I. / Podgorniy, N. (joint statement)	605
Kotov, P. (Admiral)	554
Kovalev, A. (For. Ministry - Dep. Min.)	703
Kozhevnikov, Y. F. (Party/State Official)	807
Kozlov, S. (Major General)	220
Krasovskiy (Marshal)	276
Krylov, N. I. (Marshal)	223
Krypnov, S. (Colonel)	578
Krysenko, L. D.	286
Kulakov, F. D. (PB CPSU)	127
Kuleshov (Marshal)	575
Kulikov, V. (General; Army)	224
Kunayev, D. A. (Kazakh Party) (PB CPSU)	123
Kurchohikin, P. (General)	225
Kutakhov, P. S. (Marshal)	275
Larionov, V. (Colonel)	527
Lavrenov (Lt. General)	226
Leontyev (Lt. General)	265
Lifshits, M. (Colonel)	227
Lobanov, V. F. (Lt. General)	584
Labov, S. M. (Admiral)	271
Losik (Colonel General)	270
Lukonin, S. (Colonel)	537
Iyashchenko, N. G. (General; Army)	228
Maksimov, K. (Major General)	296
Malik, Ya. (For. Ministry - delegate U.N.)	702
Malinovskiy, R. Ya. (Marshal, Min. Def.)	229
Maltsev, V. (For. Ministry - delegate CSCE)	705
Maltsev, Y. (General)	564
Mamayev, Ye (Cpt.-1st rank)	572
Maryakhin, S. S. (General)	544
Masherov, P. M. (Byelorussian Party) (PB CPSU)	126
Matiryenko, V. (Major General)	513
Matrosov, V. A. (Colonel General)	566
Mayorov, A. (Colonel General)	562
Mazhayev, (Major General)	528
Mazurov, K. T. (PB CPSU)	110
Mazurov, K. T. / Brezhnev, L. I. (joint statement)	606
Melnikov, (Lt. General)	529
Miftiyev (Lt. General)	299
Mikoyan, A. (PB CPSU)	114
Millionshchikov (Academician)	823
Mishuk (General, A. F.)	279
Miyev (Colonel)	512
Mochalov, V. (Colonel)	230
Moroz (Lt. General)	273
Moskalenko, K. S. (Marshall)	268
Myhavanadyi (Georgian Party)	811
Novikov, V. (Vice Admiral)	514
"Observer"	801
Ogarkov, N. V. (General)	585
Oleynik, G. G. (Admiral)	515

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Olifirov, F. A. (Colonel General)	530
Panteleyev, (Admiral)	574
Parshikov, A. (Colonel General)	580
Pavlovskiy, I. (General)	231
Pelshe, A. (Moldavian Party) (PB CPSU)	124
Penkovskiy (General)	263
Peredelskiy, G. Y. (Marshal)	517
Petrov, (Colonel General)	567
Pika, D. (Lt. Colonel)	516
Podgorniy, N. (PB CPSU)	103
Podgorniy, N. / Brezhnev, L. I. / Kosygin, A. N. (joint statement)	605
Podgorniy, N. / Brezhnev, L. I. / Shelest, P. (joint statement)	607
Polyanskiy (PB CPSU)	113
Polyboyarov, P. P. (General)	264
Ponomarev (Colonel General)	274
Ponomarov, B. N. (PB CPSU)	104
Povaliy (Colonel General)	257
Pridvailo (Colonel)	278
Privalov, V. G. (Colonel General)	232
Rashidov (Uzbek Party) (PB CPSU)	125
Rokossovskiy, K. K. (Marshal)	233
Romanov, I. (Colonel; cand hist sci.)	543
Roshchin, A. (For Ministry-delegate disarmament conf. - Geneva)	706
Roshetnikov, V. (Colonel General)	281
Rotar, R. (Major General)	578
Rotmistrov, P. A. (Marshal)	234
Rozenko, P. A. (Chrmn., Budget Planning Commission)	817
Rudenko, I. (Marshal)	235
Rudnev, S. (Vice Admiral)	571
Rybnikoy (Colonel)	259
Rybnikov (Colonel) / Babakov, A. (Colonel) (joint statement)	602
Rykov (General)	277
Salmanov, G. I. (Colonel General)	531
Samoylenko, V. (Colonel)	236
Samsonov, V. (Lt. Colonel)	237
Sbytov, N. A. (General)	238
Semenov, N. (Colonel)	239
Sergeyev, N. (Admiral)	532
Sergeyev, P. L. (Engr.-Cpt., 1st rank)	240
Sevastyanov, D. (Rear Admiral)	563
Shablikov, N. (Admiral)	555
Shcheglov, A. F. (General)	297
Shcherbitskiy, V. V. (Ukrainian Party) (PB CPSU)	122
Shelomin (PB CPSU)	105
Shelest, P. (PB CPSU)	112
Shelest, P. / Brezhnev, L. I. / Podgorniy, N. (joint statement)	607
Shelyag, V. (Admiral) / Kondratkov (joint statement)	604
Shevstov, A. G. (Colonel General, SRF)	241
Shitikov (Chrmn.-U.S.S.R. Sup. Sov.)	829

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Shlayen, P. (Engr. Colonel)	242
Shtemenko, S. M. (Colonel General)	243
Sidelnikov, (Colonel)	244
Sidorov, M. (Lt. General)	552
Silantyev (Colonel General)	280
Simonyan, R. (Major General)	245
Skorobagatkin, K. F. (Colonel General)	
Slukhay, T. A. (Colonel)	287
Smirnov, N. (Vice Admiral)	535
Sokilov, S. (General)	579
Sokolov, S. L. (General)	246
Sokolovskiy, (Marshal)	258
Sorokin, A. I. (Vice Admiral)	520
Spiridonov, I. V. (CC CPSU) (Chmm.-Sov. of the Union, SS)	825
Spirov, K. (Colonel)	546
Stepanyuk, I. (Eng.-Lt. Gen.)	588
Stuchenko, (General)	533
Sudets, V. A. (Marshal)	519
Sulimov, (Major General)	272
Suslov, M. (PB CPSU)	111
Teplinskiy, B. L. (Major General, retired)	247
Timoshenko	534
Tolubko, V. F. (Colonel General)	248
Tretyak, I. M. (Colonel General)	552
Tsyganov, N. V. (Colonel General)	261
Tyunyayev, A. N. (Admiral)	569
Tyushkevich, S. (Colonel)	249
Ustinov (PB CPSU)	116
Uvarov, M. A. (General)	295
Vasilevskiy, A. (Marshal)	550
Vershinin (Marshal-Air Force)	266
Vinogradov (Admiral)	583
Vinogradov, I. V. (Lt. General)	587
Vishenko, V. M. (Major General)	250
Vlasyevich (Colonel)	288
Voronov, G. I. (PB CPSU)	120
Voroshilov, K. (Marshal)	547
Vovk, S. (Colonel)	539
Yakubovskiy, S. I. (Marshal)	251
Yefimov, A. N. (Colonel General)	252
Yegorov, G. M. (Vice Admiral)	573
Yegorov, N. (Colonel General)	257
Yepishev, A. (General)	254
Yeremenko, A. (Marshal)	549
Zagladin, N. (Academician)	812
Zakharov, M. N. (Admiral)	255
Zakharov, M. V. (Marshal)	256
Zamyatin, L. M. (state official)	819
Zavizion, G. (Lt. General)	559
Zavyalov, I. (Lt. General)	541
Zemskov (Major General)	501
Zhel'tov (Colonel General)	548
Zyryanov, P. (Colonel General)	551

11b. PRIMARY SOURCE CODES (Numerical Order)

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Brezhnev, L. I. (PB CPSU)	101
Kosygin, A. (PB CPSU)	102
Podgorniy, N. (PB CPSU)	103
Ponomarov, B. N. (PB CPSU)	104
Shelepin (PB CPSU)	105
Kirilenko (PB CPSU)	106
Andropov (PB CPSU)	107
Grechko, A. A. (April, 1973-on: PB CPSU)	108
Gromyko, A. (April, 1973-on: PB CPSU)	109
Mazurov, K. T. (PB CPSU)	110
Suslov, M. (PB CPSU)	111
Shelest, P. (PB CPSU)	112
Polyanskiy (PB CPSU)	113
Mikoyan, A. (PB CPSU)	114
Grishin, V. V. (PB CPSU)	115
Ustinov (PB CPSU)	116
Aristov (PB CPSU)	117
Demichev (PB CPSU)	118
Voronov, G. I. (PB CPSU)	120
Shcherbitskiy (PB CPSU) (Ukrainian Party)	122
Kunayev, D. A. (PB CPSU) (Kazakh Party)	123
Pelshe, A. (PB CPSU) (Moldavian Party)	124
Rashidov (PB CPSU) (Uzbek Party)	125
Masherov, P.M. (PB CPSU) (Byelorussian Party)	126
Kulakov, F. D. (PB CPSU)	127
Agaltsov (Marshal)	201
Amelko (Admiral)	202
Andreyev, V. (Rear Admiral)	203
Bachkarev, (General)	204
Batitskiy, P. F. (General)	205
Belonozkho, S. (Colonel General)	206
Bondarenko, V. (Lt. Colonel)	207
Chistyakov, (Marshal)	208
Chuykov, V. I. (Marshal)	209
Dankevich, P. B. (Colonel General)	210
Glazov, V. (Colonel)	211
Gorchakov, P. (Lt. General)	212
Gorshkov, S. (Admiral)	213
Grechko, A. A. (Marshal, Def. Min.)	214
Grigoryev, M. G. (Colonel General)	215
Ivanovsky, Y. (General)	216
Kadomstev, A. (Lt. General, Air Force)	217
Kasatonov, V. A. (Admiral)	218
Kazakov, K. P. (General)	219
Kozlov S. (Major General)	220
Khalipov, I. (Colonel General)	221
Kharich, V. (Colonel)	222
Krylov, N. I. (Marshal)	223
Kulikov, V. (General; Army)	224

SOURCECODE

Kurochkin, P. (General)	225
Lavrenov (Lt. General)	226
Lifshits, M. (Colonel)	227
Lyashchenko, N. G. (General; Army)	228
Malinovskiy, R. Ya. (Marshal, Min. Def.)	229
Mochalov, V. (Colonel)	230
Pavlovskiy, I. (General)	231
Privalov, V. G. (Colonel General)	232
Rokossovskiy, K. K. (Marshal)	233
Rotmistrov, P. A. (Marshal)	234
Rudenko, S. (Marshal)	235
Samoylenko, V. (Colonel)	236
Samsonov, V. (Lt. Colonel)	237
Sbytov, N. A. (General)	238
Semenov, N. (Colonel)	239
Sergeyev, P. L. (Engr.-Cpt., 1st rank)	240
Shevstov, A. G. (Colonel General, SRF)	241
Shlayen, P. (Engr. Colonel)	242
Shtemenko, S. M. (Colonel General)	243
Sidelnikov, (Colonel)	244
Simonyan, R. (Major General)	245
Sokolov, S. L. (General)	246
Teplinskiy, B. L. (Major General, retired)	247
Tolubko, V. F. (Colonel General)	248
Tyushkevich, S. (Colonel)	249
Vishenko, V. M. (Major General)	250
Yakubovskiy, S. I. (Marshal)	251
Yefimov, A. N. (Colonel General)	252
Yegorov, N. (Colonel General)	253
Yepishev, A. (General)	254
Zakharov, M. N. (Admiral)	255
Zakharov, M. V. (Marshal)	256
Povaliy (Colonel General)	257
Sokolovskiy, (Marshal)	258
Rybnikov, (Colonel)	259
Babakov, A. (Colonel)	260
Tsyganov, N. V. (Colonel General)	261
Konev (Marshal)	262
Penkovskiy (General)	263
Polyboyarov, P. P. (General)	264
Leontyev (Lt. General)	265
Vershinin (Marshal-Air Force)	266
Golikov, (Marshal)	267
Moskalenko, K. S. (Marshal)	268
Fominykn (Vice Admiral)	269
Losik (Colonel General)	270
Lobov, S. M. (Admiral)	271

SOURCECODE

Sulimov, (Major General)	272
Moroz (Lt. General)	273
Ponomarev (Colonel General)	274
Kutakhov, P. S. (Marshal)	275
Krasovskiy (Marshal)	276
Rykov, (General)	277
Pridvailo (Colonel)	278
Mishuk (General, A. F.)	279
Silant'yev (Colonel General)	280
Roshetnikov, V. (Colonel General)	281
Chugunov, N. V. (Lt. General)	282
Kirsanov, P. (Lt. General)	283
Borovykh, A. (Colonel General)	284
Kazarov, A. (Engr.-Major General)	285
Krysenko, L. D.	286
Slukhay, T. A. (Colonel)	287
Vlasyevich (Colonel)	288
Bagramyan, L. K. (Marshal)	289
Cherednichenko, M. L. (Major General)	290
Baykov, (Admiral)	291
Beykenov, (Major General)	292
Kablukov (Colonel)	293
Chelin, A. (Colonel)	294
Uvarov, M. A. (General)	295
Maksimov, K. (Major General)	296
Shcheglov, A. F. (General)	297
Grishkov, N. (Lt. General)	298
Miftiyev (Lt. General)	299
Kharlamov (Admiral)	500
Zemskov (Major General)	501
Cherokov, V. (Vice Admiral)	502
Alekseyev, N. (Colonel General)	503
Alekseyev, V. (Colonel)	504
Altunin, A. (Colonel General)	505
Baranov, S. (Colonel)	506
Chapayev, A. V. (Major General)	507
Chizh, V. F. (Colonel General)	508
Demin, N. (Lt. General)	509
Grudin, I. (Colonel)	510
Ivanov, O. (Lt. Colonel)	511
Miyev (Colonel)	512
Matiryenko, V. (Major General)	513
Novikov, V. (Vice Admiral)	514
Oleyrik, G. G. (Admiral)	515
Pika, D. (Lt. Colonel)	516
Peredel'skiy, G. Y. (Marshal)	517
Rotar, F. (Major General)	518
Sudets, V. A. (Marshal)	519

SOURCECODE

Sorokin, A. I. (Vice Admiral)	520
Batov, P. (General)	521
Bednyagin, A. I. (Lt. General)	522
Brayko, (Colonel General)	523
Fedyuninskiy, (General)	524
Kalashnik, (Colonel General)	525
Koshevoy (General)	526
Larionov, V. (Colonel)	527
Mayhayev, (Major General)	528
Melnikov, (Lt. General)	529
Olifirov, F. A. (Colonel General)	530
Salmanov, G. I. (Colonel General)	531
Sergeyev, N. (Admiral)	532
Stuchenko, (General)	533
Timoshenko	534
Smirnov, N. (Vice Admiral)	535
Skorobogatkin, K. F. (Colonel General)	536
Lukonin, S. (Colonel)	537
Gritskov, F. V. (Major General)	538
Vovk, S. (Colonel)	539
Grishanov, V. (Admiral)	540
Zavyalov, I. (Lt. General)	541
Karpov, V. N. (Lt. General)	542
Romanov, I. (Colonel; cand. hist. sci.)	543
Maryakhin, S. S. (General)	544
Bochkarev, K. (Major General)	545
Spirov, K. (Colonel)	546
Voroshilov, K. (Marshal)	547
Zheltoy, (Colonel General)	548
Yeremenko, A. (Marshal)	549
Vasilevskiy, A. (Marshal)	550
Zvryanov, P. (Colonel General)	551
Sidorov, M. (Lt. General)	552
Tretyak, I, M. (Colonel General)	553
Kotov, P. (Admiral)	554
Shablikov, N. (Admiral)	555
Katukov, M. Y. (Marshal)	556
Grechko, S. (Colonel General)	557
Derevyanko, (Lt. General)	558
Zavizion, G. (Lt. General)	559
Grekov, V. (Colonel General)	560
Grachev, S. T. (Major General)	561
Mayorov, A. (Colonel General)	562
Sevastyanov, D. (Rear Admiral)	563
Maltsev, Y. (General)	564
Khomulo, M. G. (Colonel)	565
Matrosov, V. A. (Colonel General)	566

SOURCECODE

Petrov, (Colonel General)	567
Anureyev, I. I. (Major General)	568
Tyunyayev, A. N. (Admiral)	569
Alekseyev, V. (Admiral)	570
Rudnev, I. (Vice Admiral)	571
Mamayev, Ye (Cpt.-1st rank)	572
Yegorov, G. M. (Vice Admiral)	573
Panteleyev, (Admiral)	574
Kuleshov, (Marshal)	575
Babadzhanyan, K. (Marshal)	576
Bydenny, S. (Marshal)	577
Krypnov, S. (Colonel)	578
Sokilov, S. (General)	579
Parshikov, A. (Colonel General)	580
Goncharov, V. A. (Major General)	581
Kamanin (Lt. General)	582
Vinogradov (Admiral)	583
Lobanov, V. F. (Lt. General)	584
Ogarkov, N. V. (General)	585
Baksov, A. I. (Col. Gen.)	586
Vinogradov, I. V. (Lt. Gen.)	587
Stepanyuk, I. (Eng.-Lt. Gen.)	588
Ivanov, O. (Lt. Colonel)/(joint statement)	601
Alekseyev, V. (Colonel)	
Rybnikov (Colonel)/(joint statement)	602
Babakov, A. (Colonel)	
Kosygin, A. N. /(joint statement)	603
Brezhnev, L. I.	
Shelyag, V. (Admiral)/(joint statement)	604
Kondratkov (Lt. Colonel)	
Brezhnev, L. I. /(Keep "joint statement")	605
Kosygin, A. N.	
Podgorniy, N.	
Brezhnev, L. I. /(joint statement)	606
Mazurov, K. T.	
Brezhnev, L. I. /(joint statement)	607
Podgorniy, N. /	
Shelest, P.	
Gromyko, A. (Foreign Minister)	701
Malik, Y. A. (For Ministry-delegate UN)	702
Kovalev, A. (For Ministry-Dop. Min.)	703
Khlestov (For Ministry-delegate MBFR)	704
Maltsev, V. (For Ministry-delegate CSCE)	705
Roshchin, A. (For Ministry-delegate disarmament conf., Geneva)	706
"Observer"	801
Media Commentator	802
Communiqué or Draft Declaration-Resolution	803
Bojcsuk, J. (Lt. Colonel-Hung.)	806
Kozhevnikov, Y. F. (Party/State Official)	807
Garbuzov, V. (Min. Finance)	809
Primary Source Not Specified	810
Mzhavanadze (Georgian Party) (CC CPSU)	811

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Zagladin, V. (Academician)	812
Baibakov, N. (Chairman, State Planning Commission)	814
Gerasimov, K. M. (Budget Planning Commission)	816
Rozenko, P. A. (Chairman, Budget Planning Commission)	817
Konstantinov (CC CPSU)	818
Zamyatin, L. M. (State Official)	819
Fedorenko (Academician)	822
Millionshchikov (Academician)	823
Spiridonov, I. V. (CC CPSU) (Chairman, Soviet of the Union, S.S.)	825
Shitikov (Chairman, USSR Sup. Sov.)	829
Kapitonov (Sec'y. CPSU)	830
Katushev, K. (Sec'y. CPSU)	831

III. SECONDARY SOURCE CODES

- 1 - Soviet newspaper, journal, broadcast, telegraphic agency, speech, official state/party publication.
- 2 - East European newspaper, journal, broadcast, telegraphic agency, speech, official party/state publication.
- 3 - U.S. newspaper, journal, broadcast, telegraphic agency, speech, official government publication.
- 4 - Other foreign newspaper, journal, broadcast, telegraphic agency, speech, official government publication.
- 5 - Secondary source not specified.

IV. TARGET CODES

- 1 - Soviet Union (domestic audience)
- 2 - Eastern Europe
- 3 - U.S. (North America)
- 4 - Other foreign audience
- 5 - Target area not specified.

V. FBIS CATEGORIES

<u>CODE</u>	<u>CATEGORIES</u>
01	8
02	8-077
03	8-078
04	11
05	11-026
06	11-027
07	11-028
08	11-029
09	11-030
10	11-032
11	11a
12	12
13	12-020
14	12-021
15	12-022
16	12-023
17	12-024
18	12-025
19	14f
20	15
21	19
22	26y
23	27
24	27a-075
25	17a

VI. MATRIX 08 ADDITIONAL CODING DIMENSIONS

- Deter/Defend Dimension (Column 35)

1. Deter (use of this specific term)
2. Defend (reliably protect, or equivalent)
3. Retaliate (administer a crushing rebuff, or equivalent)
4. Defeat (attain assured victory, or equivalent)
5. Other (or no) comparable terms

- Superiority/Parity Dimension (Column 36)

1. Superiority (that specific word or its derivations such as "become superior")
2. Parity (that specific word or its clear equivalent such as equality)
- *3. Inferiority (that specific word or its clear equivalent)
4. Any other indication, or no indication on this dimension.

- Attain/Maintain Dimension (Column 37)

1. Attain (acquire, seek, require further increase,--any term clearly indicating that the capabilities described are not currently possessed, but are to be sought for the future)
2. Maintain (possess, are adequate--any term clearly indicating that the capabilities described are currently possessed and are to be retained)
- *3. Relinquish (any term clearly indicating an intent that the capabilities described will be permitted to deteriorate relative to the United States)
4. Any other indication, or no indication on this dimension
5. Possess and will increase.

* This term is not expected, but is included for completeness in defining the dimension.

• Qualitative/Quantitative Dimension (Column 38)

1. Qualitative superiority (parity, etc.) is to be sought (maintained, etc.). This includes technological superiority when clearly specified as such.
2. Quantitative superiority (parity, etc.) is to be sought (maintained, etc.)
3. Any other indication, or no indication on this dimension

Appendix 3

Trend Plots and Tabulations 1965 - 1974
By Individual Matrix Cell

Trend Lines for Matrix 04-----
(Europe)

Raw Data for Matrix 04-----
(Europe)

Trend Lines for Matrix 08-----
(Military Goals)

Raw Data for Matrix 08-----
(Military Goals)

Trend Lines for Matrix 34-----
(Military Trends)

Raw Data for Matrix 34-----
(Military Trends)




Figure 1. Trend Lines--Soviet Goal to Promote Peace and Security in Europe by Means Specified (matrix 04-----)
 * For a full explanation of matrix cell codes, see matrix 04-----, Appendix 1.

RAW DATA
Soviet Goal to Promote Peace and Security
In Europe By Means Specified

Year Quarter	Quarterly												Annual (Less 4th Qtr. '64)			
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
TOTAL	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	65	66	67	68
Matrix Cell ^a (Means)																
04C103 (Economic)	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
04C203 (General Political)	83	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	12	9	3
04C303 (Security)	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
04C403 (CSEI)	406	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	18	14	14
04C503 (Bilateral Agreement)	94	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	6	7	-
04C603 (Disolving Military Alliances)	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
04C703 (Lat. Nuclear Free Zones)	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	3	-
04C803 (Expand Influence of Pro-Soviet Parties)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
04C903 (Bilateral Agreements)	92	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	13	11
04D003 (General Military)	48	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	3	4	9
04D103 (Nuclear Arms Reduction)	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
04D203 (Conventional Arms Reduction)	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

RAW DATA
Soviet Goal to Expand Communist System/Remove
Capitalist-Imperialist System in Western Europe By Means Specified

Year Quarter	Quarterly												Annual (Less 4th Qtr. '64)			
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
TOTAL	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	65	66	67	68
04C201 (General Political)	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-
04C801 (Expand Influence of Pro-Soviet Parties)	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

^a For a full explanation of the matrix cell codes, see matrix 04-1000, Appendix 1. Cells without codes are omitted.

Quarterly Trends





Figure 2a. Trend Lines - Goal to Attain/Maintain Capability to Defend Against/Deter Attack on Soviet Union, East Europe by Means Indicated (Branch of Service)

* For full explanation of matrix cell, see matrix 08-----, Appendix 1.






Figure 2b. Trend lines/Goal to Attain/Maintain Capability to Defend Against/Deter an Attack on Soviet Union, East Europe by Means Indicated (Type of Warfare)

^a For a full explanation of matrix cell codes, see matrix 04----, Appendix 1.

RAW DATA

Goal to Attain/Maintain Capabilities to Defend Against/
Deter Attack on USSR, East Europe by Means Indicated

Year	Quarterly												Annual (less 4th Qtr. '64)																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																														
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


Figure 3a. Trend Lines - Soviet Perceptions of Increasing Soviet Capabilities in the Military Area Specified (Branch of Service).
 * For a full explanation of matrix cell, see matrix 3a-----, Appendix 1.




Figure 3b. Trend Lines - Soviet Perceptions of Increasing Soviet Capabilities in the Military Area Specified (Type of Warfare)

For a full explanation of matrix cell, see matrix 24-----, Appendix 1.

RAW DATA

Soviet Perceptions of Increasing Soviet Capabilities in Military Area Specified

Year	Quarterly												Totals	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total
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Appendix 4

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 04----Soviet Goals in Western Europe

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 08----, Soviet Military Force-Structuring Goals

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 34----, Soviet Perceptions of Soviet and U.S. Force Trends

Trend Lines
Selected Primary Sources

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 04--Soviet Coals in Western Europe

Source	Source Code	Measure Given ^c	Total Codes (Matrix 04)	040103 (Economic) ^{a,b}	Political ^{a,b}						Military ^{a,b}				Other Cells ^d	Total (All Matrices)
					040203 (General)	040403 (CSCE)	040503 (Bilateral Agr.)	040603 (Dis. Mil. Alliance)	040703 (Nuc. Free Zone)	040903 (Multilateral Agr.)	041003 (General)	041103 (Nuc. Arms Red.)	041203 (Conv. Arms Red.)	041303 (MSFR)		
POLITBURO																
Brezhnev	101 ^e	#	170	2	25	64	21	6	4	20	9	4	1	10	4	285
		Z	60	1	9	22	7	2	1	7	3	1	-	4	1	100
Kosygin	102 ^e	#	103	2	20	42	11	6	1	8	7	-	1	4	1	164
		Z	63	1	12	26	7	4	1	5	4	-	1	2	1	100
Podgorniy	103 ^e	#	52	-	5	26	7	-	1	9	2	-	-	2	-	68
		Z	76	-	7	38	10	-	1	13	3	-	-	3	-	100
Ponomarev	104	#	16	-	2	9	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	30
		Z	53	-	7	30	3	3	-	3	-	-	-	7	-	100
Shelepin	105	#	6	-	-	3	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	25
		Z	24	-	-	12	4	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	100
Kirilenko	106	#	11	-	2	5	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	41
		Z	27	-	5	12	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	100
Andropov	107	#	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
		Z	100	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Grechko ^f	108	#	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48
		Z	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Gromyko ^g	109	#	31	1	6	16	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	35
		Z	89	3	17	46	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	100
Mazurov	110 ^e	#	20	1	2	7	3	-	2	1	2	-	-	2	-	24
		Z	83	4	8	29	13	-	8	4	8	-	-	8	-	100
Suslov	111	#	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
		Z	6	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Shelest	112	#	8	-	-	5	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	48
		Z	17	-	-	10	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	100
Polyanskiy	113	#	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
		Z	33	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Mikoyan	114	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Grishin	115	#	4	-	1	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	19
		Z	21	-	5	11	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	100
Ustinov	116	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Aristov	117	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Demichev	118	#	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
		Z	14	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Katushev ^h (former 119)	831	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Voronov	120	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Shcherbitskiy (formerly 804)	122	#	7	-	-	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	22
		Z	32	-	-	18	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	100
Kunayev (formerly 805)	123	#	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
		Z	5	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Peinhe	124	#	10	-	-	4	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	10
		Z	100	-	-	40	20	10	-	20	-	-	-	10	-	100
Rashidov (formerly 813)	125	#	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
		Z	8	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Masharov (formerly 815)	126	#	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
		Z	9	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Kulakov	127	#	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
		Z	100	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	100
Subtotal Politburo		#	457	6	65	197	57	14	8	45	22	-	2	27	5	939
		Z	48	1	7	21	6	1	1	5	2	-	-	1	1	100

END POLITBURO

See last page of table for footnotes

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 04--Soviet Goals in Western Europe
(Cont'd)

Source	Source Code	Measure Given ^c	Total Codes (Matrix 04)	040103 (Economic) ^{a,b}	Political ^{a,b}						Military ^{a,b}				Other Cells ^d	Total (All Matrices)
					040203 (General)	040403 (CSCE)	040503 (Bilateral Agr.)	040603 (Dis. Mil. Alliance)	040703 (Nuc. Free Zone)	040903 (Multilateral Agr.)	041003 (General)	041103 (Nuc. Arms Red.)	041203 (Conv. Arms Red.)	041303 (NSRF)		
Cromyko ^B	701	#	41	-	2	19	8	2	-	6	3	-	-	1	-	53
		Z	77	-	4	36	15	4	-	11	6	-	-	2	-	100
END FOREIGN OFFICE																
Crechko ^f (Marshall)	214	#	14	-	1	5	-	-	2	1	5	-	-	-	-	337
		Z	4	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	100
Malinovskiy (Marshall)	279	#	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	239
		Z	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Krylov (Marshall)	223	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	216
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Yakubovskiy (Marshall)	251	#	38	-	2	13	1	1	4	3	11	-	1	2	-	166
		Z	23	-	1	8	1	1	2	2	7	-	1	1	-	100
Zakharov (Marshall)	256	#	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	113
		Z	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Kazakov (General)	219	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Yepishev (General)	254	#	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	74
		Z	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	100
Batitskiy (General)	205	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Tolubko (Col. General)	248	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Vershinin (Marshall, AF)	266	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Sokolovskiy (Marshall)	258	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Rudenko (Marshall)	235	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Kulikov (General)	224	#	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	43
		Z	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	100
Chuykov (Marshall)	209	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Moskalenko (Marshall)	268	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Konev (Marshall)	262	#	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	35
		Z	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	100
Pavlovskiy	231	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Grigoryev	215	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Yegorov	253	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Kutakhov	275	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Bagramyan	289	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
		Z	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Subtotal Army/AF		#	60	-	4	18	1	1	7	4	22	-	1	2	-	1792
		Z	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	100

END ARMY/AF

See last page of table for footnotes

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 04--Soviet Goals in Western Europe
(Cont'd)

Source	Source Code	Measure Given ^c	Total Codes (Matrix 04)	040103 (Economic) ^{a,b}	Political ^{a,b}						Military ^{a,b}				Other Cells ^d	Total (All Matrices)
					040203 (General)	040403 (CSCE)	040503 (Bilateral Agr.)	040603 (Dis. Mil. Alliance)	040703 (Nuc. Free Zone)	040903 (Multilateral Agr.)	041003 (General)	041103 (Nuc. Arms Red.)	041203 (Conv. Arms Red.)	041303 (MFR)		
Gorshkov (Admiral)	213	# %	0 0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	135 100
Zakharov (Admiral)	255	# %	0 0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36 100
Sergeyev (Admiral)	532	# %	0 0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35 100
Amelko (Admiral)	202	# %	0 0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31 100
Kasatonov (Admiral)	218	# %	0 0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24 100
Subtotal, Navy		# %	0 0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	261 100
END NAVY																
Subtotal, All Military		# %	60 3	-	4 -	18 1	1 -	1 -	7 -	4 -	22 1	-	1 -	2 -	-	2053 100
END ALL MILITARY																
Media Commentator	802	# %	51 29	-	9 5	23 13	1 1	1 1	3 2	6 3	4 2	2 1	-	-	2 1	178 100
Communique or Draft Declaration	803	# %	237 87	2 1	8 3	138 5	26 10	2 1	8 3	31 11	9 3	-	2 1	9 3	2 1	273 100
Other Sources		# %	54 6	-	3 -	23 3	5 1	1 -	3 -	6 1	10 1	-	-	2 -	1 -	838 100
Total		# %	895 ^f 21	8 -	91 2	418 10	98 2	21 -	29 1	98 2	70 2	6 -	5 -	41 1	10 -	4334 ^f 100

^a For full explanation of abbreviations accompanying matrix cell numbers, see matrix 04----, Appendix 1.

^b All of these cells pertain to a goal of strengthening peace and security in Europe.

^c The first measure given is the total of coded items for each cell. The second measure given is the percent that total is of the total codes for all matrices. When this percent is compared with that for category subtotals or for all sources combined, it is possible to get an indication of which subjects are particularly emphasized by a source.

^d Other cells include:

04201, 040801 which pertain to a goal of expanding the Communist system in Western Europe by unspecified means and, in one case (by Brezhnev), by expanding the influence of non-Communist parties. This involved three codes from Brezhnev, one from Kosygin, and one by a media commentator for a total of five. 040303, three codes pertaining to summary from miscellaneous sources; 040303, a code on strengthening Western European peace and security through strengthening the influence of non-Communist parties in a communique or draft resolution; 0414, and 0415 strengthening Western European peace and security through war against US or countries other than the US had no codes.

^e In addition, data from joint statements have been added as follows:

Individual	Joint Statement Codes
Brezhnev	603, 605, 606, 607
Kosygin	603
Podgorniy	605, 607
Mazurov	606
Shelst	607

^f Code 108 in Grechko as a Politburo member. See code 214 for Grechko as a Marshal before entering the Politburo.

^g Code 109 in Gromyko as a Politburo member. See code 701 for Gromyko as a Foreign Minister before entering the Politburo.

^h Secretary CPSU inadvertently included with Politburo.

ⁱ Reflects the joint statements as credited to each participant.

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 08 --- Soviet Military Force-Structuring Goals

Source				By Branch of Service ^a						By Type of Warfare ^a						Total Codes (All Matrices)
	Source Code	Measure Codes ^b	Total Codes (Matrix 08)	080101 (Army)	080201 (Navy)	080301 (AF)	080401 (PVO)	080501 (SRF)	080601 (Comb.)	080701 (Strat Nuc)	080801 (Tac Nuc)	080901 (Gen Nuc)	081001 (Conv.)	081101 (Gen Mil)	08 (Other)	
POLITBURO																
Brezhnev	101 ^c	#	102	5	-	-	-	7	41	8	-	-	-	41	-	285
		Z	36	2				2	14	3				14		100
Kosygin	102 ^c	#	57	-	1	-	-	-	26	-	-	-	-	26	4	164
		Z	35		1				16					16	2	100
Podgorniy	103	#	16	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	8	-	68
		Z	24						12					12		100
Ponomarev	104	#	10	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	2	30
		Z	33						13					13	7	100
Shelepin	105	#	19	-	1	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	9	-	25
		Z	76		4				36					36		100
Kirilenko	106	#	30	-	1	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	15	-	41
		Z	73		2				34					37		100
Andropov	107	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
		Z	0													100
Grechko ^d	108	#	39	-	1	-	-	1	17	1	-	-	-	19	-	48
		Z	81		2			2	35	2				40		100
Gromyko ^e	109	#	4	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	35
		Z	11						6					6		100
Mazurov	100	#	4	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	24
		Z	17						8					8		100
Suslov	111	#	29	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	14	2	31
		Z	94						42					45	6	100
Shelest	112	#	36	1	-	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	18	-	48
		Z	67	2					35					38		100
Polyanskiy	113	#	6	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	9
		Z	67						33					33		100
Mikoyan	114	#	6	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	6
		Z	100	33					17					50		100
Grishin	115	#	12	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6	-	19
		Z	63						32					37		100
Ustinov	116	#	6	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	8
		Z	75						38					38		100
Aristov	117	#	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	2
		Z	100						50					50		100
Demichev	118	#	6	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	7
		Z	86						43					43		100
Katushev ^f	831	#	4	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	4
(former 119)		Z	100						50					50		100
Voronov	120	#	6	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	6
		Z	100						50					50		100
Scherbitskiy (former 805)	122	#	10	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	-	22
		Z	46						23					23		100
Kunayev (former 805)	123	#	18	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	9	-	19
		Z	95						47					47		100
Pelsha	124	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
		Z	0													100
Rashidov (former 813)	125	#	12	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6	-	13
		Z	92						46					46		100
Manukov (former 815)	126	#	10	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	-	11
		Z	91						45					45		100
Kulakov	127	#	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
		Z	0													100
Subtotal		#	444	8	4	-	-	8	200	9	-	-	-	207	8	919
Politburo		Z	47	1				1	21	1				22	1	100

END OF POLITBURO

See last page of table for footnotes

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 08 --- Soviet Military Force-Structuring Goals
(Cont.d)

Source	Source Code	Measure Codes ^b	Total Codes (Matrix 08)	By Branch of Service ^a						By Type of Warfare ^a						Total Codes (All Matrices)
				080101 (Army)	080201 (Navy)	080301 (AF)	080401 (PVO)	080501 (SRF)	080601 (COVE.)	080701 (Strat Nuc)	080801 (Tac Nuc)	080901 (Gen Nuc)	081001 (Conv.)	081101 (Gen Mil)	08 (Other)	
Grumyko ^c	701	# %	7 13	-	-	-	-	-	4 8	-	-	-	-	3 6	-	53 100
END FOREIGN OFFICE																
Grechko ^d (Marshall)	214	# %	262 78	2 1	1	-	2 1	6 2	118 35	8 2	-	-	1	122 36	2 1	337 100
Malinevskiy ^d (Marshall)	229	# %	168 70	1	-	1	5 2	6 3	70 29	9 4	-	2 1	-	64 27	10 4	230 100
Krylov (Marshall)	223	# %	170 79	-	-	-	-	44 20	39 18	46 21	-	2 1	-	35 16	4 2	216 100
Yakubovskiy ^d (Marshall)	251	# %	92 55	-	-	-	-	10 6	26 22	13 8	-	-	-	33 20	-	166 100
Zakharov (Marshall)	256	# %	89 79	-	1 1	-	3 3	7 6	36 32	6 5	1 1	-	-	35 31	-	113 100
Kazakov (Marshall)	259	# %	49 65	4 5	-	-	-	10 12	2 12	9 12	2 1	1 1	-	10 10	2 3	74 100
Yepishev (General)	254	# %	55 63	-	-	-	-	-	32 43	1 1	-	-	-	43	-	74 100
Batitskiy (General)	205	# %	47 70	-	-	-	12 18	1 1	12 18	6 9	-	1 1	-	15 22	-	67 100
Tolubko (Col. General)	248	# %	40 69	2 3	-	-	-	10 17	7 12	11 19	-	2 3	-	6 10	2 3	58 100
Vershinin (Marshall, AF)	266	# %	34 60	-	-	4 7	1 2	1 2	11 19	3 5	-	-	-	14 25	-	57 100
Sokolovskiy ^d (Marshall)	258	# %	34 61	-	-	-	1 2	-	16 29	4 7	-	5 9	-	8 14	-	56 100
Rudenko (Marshall)	235	# %	28 67	1 2	-	5 12	-	1 2	7 17	1 2	-	1 2	-	12 29	-	42 100
Kulikov (General)	224	# %	32 74	-	-	-	-	1 2	14 33	1 2	-	-	-	14 43	2 5	43 100
Chuykov (Marshall)	209	# %	29 71	-	-	-	-	4 10	11 27	5 12	-	1 2	-	6 15	2 5	41 100
Moskalenko (Marshall)	268	# %	31 89	-	1 2	-	-	2 6	13 37	3 9	-	-	-	12 34	-	35 100
Konev (Marshall)	262	# %	29 83	2 6	-	-	-	-	13 37	-	-	-	-	14 40	-	35 100
Pavlovskiy (General)	231	# %	25 81	-	-	-	2 6	1 3	10 32	2 6	-	-	-	10 32	-	31 100
Grigoryev (Col. General)	215	# %	18 67	-	-	-	-	8 30	1 3	8 30	-	-	-	1 3	-	27 100
Yegorov (Col. General)	253	# %	16 67	-	-	-	-	7 29	1 4	7 29	-	-	-	1 4	-	24 100
Kutakhov (Marshall)	275	# %	19 78	-	-	-	1 3	-	9 36	1 3	-	-	-	8 32	-	25 100
Bagramyan (Marshall)	289	# %	22 71	-	-	-	1 3	2 6	9 29	4 13	-	-	-	6 19	-	31 100
Subtotal Army/AF		# %	1299 73	12 1	3 1	10 1	28 2	121 7	474 26	148 8	3 1	15 1	1	460 26	24 1	1792 100

END ARMY/AF

See last page of table for footnotes

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 08 --- Soviet Military Force Structuring Goals
(Cont'd)

Source	Source Code	Measure Codes ^b	Total Codes (Matrix 08)	By Branch of Service ^a						By Type of Warfare ^a						Total Codes (All Matrices)
				080101 (Army)	080201 (Navy)	080301 (AF)	080401 (PVO)	080501 (SPR)	080601 (COMB.)	080701 (Strat. Nuc)	080801 (Tac Nuc)	080901 (Gen Nuc)	081001 (Conv.)	081101 (Gen Mil)	08 (Other)	
Gorshkov (Admiral)	213	# X	102 76	- -	23 17	- -	- -	3 3	23 17	10 7	- -	- -	- -	39 29	4 3	135 100
Zakharov (Admiral)	255	# X	32 69	- -	2 6	3 8	- -	1 3	11 31	- -	- -	4 11	- -	11 31	- -	36 100
Sergeyev (Admiral)	532	# X	33 94	- -	11 31	- -	- -	- -	6 17	1 3	- -	1 3	- -	12 34	2 6	35 100
Amelko (Admiral)	202	# X	29 94	- -	1 3	- -	- -	- -	13 42	1 3	- -	- -	- -	14 45	- -	31 100
Kasatonov (Admiral)	218	# X	22 92	- -	5 21	- -	- -	- -	7 29	3 13	- -	- -	- -	7 29	- -	24 100
Subtotal Navy		# X	218 84	- -	42 16	3 1	- -	4 2	60 23	15 6	- -	5 2	- -	83 32	6 2	261 100
END NAVY																
Subtotal All Military		# X	1517 74	12 1	45 2	13 1	28 1	125 6	534 26	163 8	3 -	20 1	1 -	543 26	3 1	2053 100
END ALL MILITARY																
Media Commentator	802	# X	112 63	4 2	3 2	1 1	10 6	23 13	18 10	27 15	4 2	2 1	- -	20 11	- -	178 100
Communique or draft decla- tion	803	# X	32 12	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	15 6	- -	- -	- -	- -	15 6	2 1	273 100
Other Sources		# X	592 71	7 1	15 2	6 1	19 2	50 6	199 24	64 8	1 -	4 -	1 -	217 26	9 1	938 100
Total		# X	2704 ^E 62	31 1	67 2	20 -	57 1	206 5	970 22	263 6	8 -	26 1	2 -	1005 23	49 1	4334 ^E 100

^a For full explanation of abbreviations accompanying matrix cell numbers, see matrix 08 ---, Appendix 1.

^b The first measure given is the total of coded items for each cell. The second measure given is the proportion that the first measure is of the total codes in percent. If this value is compared with that for category sub-totals or for all sources combined it is possible to get an indication of which subjects are particularly emphasized by a source.

^c In addition, data from a joint statement code (603) has been added in for both Brezhnev and Kosygin. For matrix 08---, this involves 1 item each under cells 080501 and 081101.

^d Code 108 is Grechko as a Politburo member. See code 214 for Grechko as a marshal before entering the Politburo.

^e Code 109 is Gromyko as a Politburo member. See code 701 for Gromyko as foreign minister before entering the Politburo.

^f Secretary CPSU inadvertently included with Politburo.

^E Reflects the joint statements as credited to each participant.

Matrix 14---Soviet Perceptions of Soviet and U.S. Force Trends

Source	Source Code	Measure Given ^b	Total Codes (Matrix 34)	Soviet Forces Perceived As Increasing ^a													Total Codes (All Matrices)		
				340101 (Army)	340201 (Navy)	340301 (Air Force)	340401 (PVO)	340501 (SFR)	340601 (Comb.)	340701 (Strategic Nuclear)	340801 (Tactical Nuclear)	340901 (General Nuclear)	341001 (Conv.)	341101 (General Military)	341201 (Civil Defense)	341301 (Science and Technology)			
				34--04 (U.S. Force Increasing) ^a	34--06 (U.S. Force Decreasing) ^a														
POLITBURO																			
Brezhnev	101	# %	13 5	1 -	- -	- -	2 1	- -	2 1	1 -	- -	1 -	1 -	2 1	- -	1 -	2 1	- -	285 100
Kosygin	102	# %	4 2	- -	1 1	- -	- -	- -	1 1	- -	- -	1 1	- -	1 1	- -	- -	- -	164 100	
Podgorniy	103	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	68 100	
Ponomarev	104	# %	4 13	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 3	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 3	- -	- -	2 7	30 100	
Shelepin	105	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	25 100	
Kirilenko	106	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	41 100	
Andropov	107	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 100	
Grechko ^c	108	# %	8 17	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	4 8	- -	- -	- -	- -	4 8	- -	- -	- -	48 100	
Gromyko ^d	109	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	35 100	
Mazurov	110	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	24 100	
Suslov	111	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	31 100	
Shelest	112	# %	4 8	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 4	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 4	- -	- -	- -	48 100	
Polyanskiy	113	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	9 100	
Mikoyan	114	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	6 100	
Grishin	115	# %	3 16	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 5	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 5	1 5	- -	- -	19 100	
Ustinov	116	# %	2 25	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 13	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 13	- -	- -	- -	8 100	
Aristov	117	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 100	
Demichev	118	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	7 100	
Katushev ^e (former 119)	831	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	4 100	
Voronov	120	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	6 100	
Shcherbitskiy (former 804)	122	# %	5 23	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 9	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 9	- -	1 5	- -	22 100	
Kunayev (former 805)	123	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	19 100	
Pelshe	124	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	10 100	
Rashidov (former 805)	125	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	13 100	
Muherov (former 815)	126	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	11 100	
Kulakov	127	# %	0 0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 100	
Subtotal Politburo		# %	43 5	1 -	1 -	- -	2 -	- -	14 1	1 -	- -	2 -	1 -	14 1	1 -	2 -	4 -	939 100	

END POLITBURO

See last page of table for footnotes

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 34---Soviet Perceptions of Soviet and U.S. Force Trends
(Cont'd)

Source	Source Code	Measure Given ^b	Total Codes (Matrix 34)	Soviet Forces Perceived As Increasing ^a													34--04 (U.S. Force Increasing) ^a	34--06 (U.S. Force Decreasing) ^a	Total Codes (All Matrices)
				340101 (Army)	340201 (Navy)	340301 (Air Force)	340401 (FVO)	340501 (S&F)	340601 (Comb.)	340701 (Strategic Nuclear)	340801 (Tactical Nuclear)	340901 (General Nuclear)	341001 (Conv.)	341101 (General Military)	341201 (Civil Defense)	341301 (Science and Technology)			
Gromyko ^d	701	#	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	-	53
		%	9													2	8		100
END FOREIGN OFFICE																			
Grechko ^c	214	#	61	4	1	4	2	3	17	3	1	2	1	19	-	2	2	-	337
(Marshall)		%	18	1	-	1	1	1	5	1	-	1	-	6	-	1	1	-	100
Malinovsky	229	#	69	8	-	7	4	3	11	3	4	10	6	10	-	3	-	-	239
(Marshall)		%	29	3		3	2	1	5	1	2	4	3	4		1			100
Krylov	223	#	46	-	-	-	3	11	5	10	-	2	-	6	-	7	2	-	216
(Marshall)		%	21				1	5	2	5		1		3		3	1		100
Yakubov-	251	#	36	5	1	2	2	5	6	6	-	1	2	5	1	-	-	-	166
skiy (Marshall)		%	22	3	1	1	1	3	3	3		1	1	3	1				100
Zakharov	256	#	22	4	-	-	2	-	5	-	-	2	2	5	-	2	-	-	13
(Marshall)		%	19	4			2		4			2	2	4		2			100
Kazakov	219	#	26	6	-	-	-	5	2	6	4	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	75
(General)		%	35	8				7	3	8	5	3		1					100
Yepishev	254	#	8	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	74
(General)		%	11						5					5					100
Batitskiy	205	#	20	3	-	-	5	-	1	-	1	-	-	8	-	2	-	-	67
(General)		%	30	4			7		1		1			12		3			100
Tolubko	248	#	18	-	-	-	-	8	1	8	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	58
(Col. General)		%	31					14	2	14				2					100
Vershinen	266	#	23	1	-	10	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	8	-	1	-	-	57
(Marshall, AF)		%	40	2		18				2	2	2		14		2			100
Sokovskiy	258	#	22	1	-	1	-	1	6	1	1	5	-	3	1	2	-	-	56
(Marshall)		%	39	2		2		2	11	2	2	9		5	2	4			100
Rudenko	235	#	14	-	-	4	1	-	2	-	-	1	-	6	-	-	-	-	42
(Marshall)		%	33			10	2		5			2		14					100
Kulikov	224	#	10	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	2	-	2	1	-	43
		%	23	2		2			5				2	5		5	2		100
Chuykov	209	#	12	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	6	-	1	-	41
(Marshall)		%	29				2		5					5	15		2		100
Moskalenko	268	#	4	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	35
(Marshall)		%	11		3		3							6					100
Konev	262	#	4	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
(Marshall)		%	11					3	3	3		3							100
Pavloskiy	231	#	6	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	31
(General)		%	19	3	3				3	3				6					100
Griporiyev	215	#	9	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	27
(Col. General)		%	33					7	7	7				7		4			100
Yegorov	253	#	8	-	-	-	-	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
(Col. General)		%	33					17		17									100
Kutakhov	275	#	6	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	25
(Marshall)		%	24			8								8		8			100
Bagromyan	289	#	9	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	31
(Marshall)		%	29	11							6			6		3			100
Subtotal Army/		%	433	38	4	11	21	43	68	46	14	27	12	90	8	25	6	-	1792
Air Force		%	24	2	-	2	1	2	4	3	1	1	1	5	-	1	-		100

END ARMY/AF

See last page of table for footnotes

Principal Source Tabulation
Matrix 34---Soviet Perceptions of Soviet and U.S. Force Trends
(Cont'd)

Source	Source Code	Measure Given ^b	Total Codes (Matrix 34)	Soviet Forces Perceived As Increasing ^a													34--04 (U.S. Force Increasing) ^a	34--06 (U.S. Force Decreasing) ^a	Total Codes (All Matrices)
				340101 (Army)	340201 (Navy)	340301 (Air Force)	340401 (PVO)	340501 (SRF)	340601 (Comb.)	340701 (Strategic Nuclear)	340801 (Tactical Nuclear)	340901 (General Nuclear)	341001 (Conv.)	341101 (General Military)	341201 (Civil Defense)	341301 (Science and Technology)			
Gorskov (Admiral)	213	#	33	3	7	-	-	1	2	1	1	1	1	9	-	5	2	-	135
		%	24	2	5	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	-	4	1	-	100
Zakharov (Admiral)	253	#	4	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	36
		%	11	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	100
Sergeyev (Admiral)	532	#	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	35
		%	6	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	100
Amelko (Admiral)	202	#	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	31
		%	6	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	100
Kasatonov (Admiral)	218	#	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	24
		%	8	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	100
Subtotal		#	43	3	11	-	-	1	3	1	1	2	1	13	-	5	2	-	261
Navy		%	16	1	4	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	5	-	2	1	-	100
END NAVY																			
Subtotal		#	476	41	15	31	31	44	71	47	15	29	13	103	8	30	8	-	2053
All Military		%	23	2	1	2	1	2	3	2	1	2	1	5	-	2	-	-	100
END ALL MILITARY																			
Media Commentator	802	#	15	1	-	1	1	2	3	1	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	178
		%	8	1	-	1	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	100
Communique or Draft Declaration	803	#	4	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	273
		%	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	100
Other Sources		#	192	10	8	12	9	11	24	17	2	8	6	47	13	7	14	4 ^f	838
		%	23	1	1	1	1	1	3	2	-	1	1	6	2	1	2	-	100
Total		#	735	53	24	44	33	57	114	66	17	39	20	172	22	40	30	4 ^f	4334 ^g
		%	17	1	1	1	1	1	3	2	-	1	-	4	1	1	1	-	100

^a For full explanation of abbreviations accompanying matrix cell numbers, see matrix 34---, Appendix 1.

^b The first measure given is the total of ended items for each cell. The second measure given is the percent that total is of the total codes for all matrices. When this percent is compared with that for category subtotal or for all sources combined it is possible to get an indication of which subjects are particularly emphasized by a source.

^c Code 108 is Grechko as a Politburo member. See code 214 for Grechko as a marshal before entering the Politburo.

^d Code 109 is Gromyko as a Politburo member. See code 701 for Gromyko as foreign minister before entering the Politburo.

^e Secretary CPSU inadvertently included with Politburo.

^f Includes one coding of 34--02, Soviet forces remaining stable in relative strength.

^g Reflects the joint statements as credited to each participant.




Figure 1. Trend Lines - Selected Primary Sources^a

^a For full explanation of abbreviations accompanying matrix cells, see matrices in Appendix 1.




Figure 1. Trend Lines - Selected Primary Sources (Cont'd)^a
^a For full explanation of abbreviations accompanying matrix cells, see matrices in Appendix 1.




Figure 1. Trend Lines - Selected Primary Sources (Cont'd)^a

^a For full explanation of abbreviations accompanying matrix cells, see matrices in Appendix 1.

Appendix 5

Trend Lines and Raw Data for Supplementary Dimensions




Figure 1. Trend Lines-Supplementary Dimensions




Figure 1. Trend Lines-Supplementary Dimensions (Cont'd)

RAW DATA

(79, -10 437 883) Tenny

3

MATERIAL INSPECTION AND RECEIVING REPORT		1. PROC. INSTRUMENT IDEN(CONTRACT) MDA903-75-C-0013 Modification P00002		5. ORDER NO.		6. INVOICE NO.		7. PAGE 1 OF 1			
				DATE		8. ACCEPTANCE POINT D					
2. SHIPMENT NO. CAC0002Z		3. DATE SHIPPED 11/17/75		4. B/L TCN N/A		5. DISCOUNT TERMS					
9. PRIME CONTRACTOR CACI, Inc. 1815 N. Fort Myer Drive Arlington, Virginia 22209				10. ADMINISTERED BY DCASD, Baltimore Building 22, Fort Holabird Baltimore, Maryland 21219		CODE		S2102A			
11. SHIPPED FROM (If other than 9) Same as #9				12. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY DCASR, Philadelphia P.O. Box 7730 Philadelphia, Penn.		CODE		S3901A			
13. SHIPPED TO ARPA 1400 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22209				14. MARKED FOR Technical Information Office		CODE					
15. ITEM NO.		16. STOCK/PART NO. (Indicate number of shipping containers - type of container - container number.)		17. QUANTITY SHIP/REC'D *		18. UNIT		19. UNIT PRICE		20. AMOUNT	
00 002Z		FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT Further Development of Soviet Perceptions Content Analysis		1						NSP	
21. PROCUREMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE						22. RECEIVER'S USE					
A. ORIGIN ☐ POA ☐ ACCEPTANCE of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents. B. DESTINATION ☐ POA ☐ ACCEPTANCE of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents.						Quantities shown in column 17 were received in apparent good condition except as noted.					
DATE _____ SIGNATURE OF AUTH GOVT REP _____ TYPED NAME AND OFFICE _____ DATE _____ SIGNATURE OF AUTH GOVT REP _____ TYPED NAME AND TITLE _____						DATE RECEIVED _____ SIGNATURE OF AUTH GOVT REP _____ TYPED NAME AND OFFICE _____ * If quantity received by the Government is the same as quantity shipped, indicate by () mark, if different, enter actual quantity received below quantity shipped and encircle.					
23. CONTRACTOR USE ONLY											

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Los Angeles Offices: 12011 San Vicente Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90049, Telephone (213) 476-6511
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