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**MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION, PHASE I  
(1977-1982) STUDY**

**MARSAS WAR GAMES. VOLUME II. INDIVIDUAL GAME REPORTS**

**MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND**

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ANNEX A  
Report of War Game IARSAS I  
(MAU in the Night Defense)

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## Report of War Game MARSAS I

### 1. Political and Military Background

a. Political. Saxet and Ocixem are adjoining nations which, like the United States, border on the Gulf of Mexico. Saxet, which has a communist government, is an ally of the USSR, whereas Ocixem, which has a democratic government, is an ally of the US. For some time the propaganda policy of Saxet has been that the Ocixem government does not represent its "oppressed" people and that Saxet stands ready to assist in their "liberation". The United States in turn has publicly stated its resolve to fulfill its mutual defense treaty obligations by dispatching forces to the aid of Ocixem in the event of a Saxet military incursion.

b. Military. Both Saxet and Ocixem have large, well-trained, well-led armed forces, equipped with the latest type material and aircraft by USSR and US, respectively. Both countries have been bolstering their frontier forces and, as a result, there have been numerous border clashes.

### 2. General Situation - Blue

a. Inasmuch as the numbers and intensities of border incidents had been increasing rapidly in the last month the US estimated that Saxet was on the eve of an inevitable invasion of Ocixem and took steps to discourage it, if possible, and to be prepared for immediate response, if not possible. The Caribbean Amphibious Ready Group (CARG) began on 1 August, conducting a show of force operation just outside the territorial waters of Saxet, being careful not reveal the probable landing site of a potential amphibious assault.

b. Concurrently with the amphibious demonstration of CARG, the 9th MAB (less the 122d MAU with CARG) was embarked at New Orleans on the amphibious shipping of ATG 2.1. Assuming the employment of the 122d MAU on an undetermined D-day, the 9th MAB could arrive in the AOA on D+1. The II MAF (less the 9th MAB and elements of the II MAF) was embarked at East coast ports on the amphibious shipping of ATF 2 and had arrived on the west coast of Florida to conduct a widely publicized training exercise. Assuming the employment of the 9th MAB on D+1, the II MAF could arrive in the AOA on D+3.

c. The presence of CARG and the threat of the other US preparations described above did not deter Saxet from its rendezvous with destiny. On 7 August it invaded Ocixem in force at a point 300km west of its Gulf of Mexico coast. Within hours the US JCS directed the landing of the 122d MAU in Saxet and a build-up earliest by the 9th MAB and II MAF. This plan envisaged that an attack on the Saxet flank/rear would disturb the tempo and impetus of the aggression in Ocixem and hence would be more productive than a mere reinforcement of the Ocixem defense force.

### 3. General Situation - Red

a. Saxet had no intention of waiting for the people of Ocixem to call on its armed forces for assistance in a war of liberation. As a matter of fact, Saxet knew that there would never be a legitimate request. Planning went on to conduct an assault in early August, building up a case for it in the court of world opinion by staging border actions which would make Ocixem look the aggressor.

b. While this rationale was being developed, Saxet was well aware of the division-size amphibious training exercise being staged off Florida and of the embarkation of a brigade-size force at New Orleans. Around the first of August a small amphibious force appeared just outside the territorial waters of Saxet and commenced making a show of force up and down the coast. These US machinations didn't impress Saxet as it optimistically estimated that the US could not risk its detente with the USSR and possible nuclear war by attacking a USSR ally. Therefore, Saxet took the irrevocable step of an invasion of Ocixem with the bulk of its armed forces on 7 August. This operation was initiated 300km west of the Gulf of Mexico coast.

### 4. Special Situation - Blue

a. US aerial surveillance of Saxet had been going on for sometime. The AOA selected owed its selection in part to being free of Red tactical units. The threat to a force landed in this area is posed by a mechanized infantry division 200km to the west. This division is apparently in strategic reserve. In compliance with JCS orders, CARG (now designated ATU 2.1.1) landed the 122d MAU at 0500, 9 August (H-hour, D-day) with the mission of organizing a high-ground, defensive position to block any Red counterattack which would interfere with the landing of the 9th MAB, now enroute, at 0500, D+1. The assault echelons of the 122d were airlanded in the vicinity of GS1070 (sheet 6446IV, Series V782, Edition 5-TPC, US Army Topo Comd, 1:50,000), with remainder of the MAU being landed across the beach 15km to the southeast.

b. The air and surface landings were made without opposition. Aircraft from ATG 2.1 achieved local air superiority throughout D-day. Link-up between air-landed and surface-landed elements of the 122d MAU was made at 0700, with all unloading completed and all units in position before dark. During the day 1/2 prepared a defensive position extending from 090700 to 120730, deployed sensors and surveillance and target acquisition radars, conducted patrolling, and kept the enemy threat under aerial observation.

c. During the morning of D-day, aerial reconnaissance detected an unusual amount of activity in the assembly area of the Red mechanized infantry division (MID), which seemingly indicated that preparations were underway to react to the Blue landing. Shortly after noon over fifty vehicles were reported moving east from the division area on

Highway I-84. It was subsequently reported that at least a hundred and fifty vehicles had left the division area and were one-half hour behind the initial group. It was estimated that a mechanized infantry regiment (MIR) with a battalion-size advance guard was moving toward the AOA. The Red columns were attacked at various times, but there were an insufficient number of attack aircraft available to delay or halt the columns. At 2130, D-day two MTI aircraft reported attacking the head of an armored column, moving at an estimated 25kph on Highway I-84, 12km west of South Purmela (977820).

d. A Saxet mechanized infantry regiment is known to be triangular, with the infantry mounted in BTRs (10 per company). It is Saxet doctrine for the infantry to fight from their vehicles, dismounting for close combat only when forced to do so. Each regiment has a tank battalion (30-T62) which is normally task organized to provide each mechanized infantry battalion (MIB) with a tank company. Additional to 120mm mortar battery in each MIB, there is one 122mm howitzer battery in the MIR. All batteries have six tubes. Additional to the antitank platoon (two ground-mount AT-3 and two 73mm recoilless guns) in each MIB, there is an ATGM battery in the MIR with nine BRDMs, each BRDM having six AT-3 (Sagger) launchers. Additional to a SA-7 (Grail) in each infantry company and probably in other type units, the air defense for a MIR is provided by a battery of six 14.5mm AAMG and one of four 23mm AAG (SP). Aerial reconnaissance indicates that the MIR approaching the AOA has a slice of the MID combat support - 152mm howitzers, 122mm rocket launchers, and SA-6 missile launchers having been identified. There is no known surveillance and target acquisition (STA) equipment in the MIR, but it is presumed that there are radar receivers that can detect Blue radar emissions. While most of the Saxet air force appears to be committed to the invasion of Ocixem, uncommitted SU-7s, MIG-21s, IL-28s, and helicopters have been spotted in revetments on inactive airfields in eastern Saxet.

##### 5. Special Situation - Red

a. The small amphibious force which had been threatening the Saxet coast since the first of the month landed an estimated reinforced infantry battalion by air and surface means at dawn on 9 August. Initial police reports indicate that air-landed infantry is preparing a defensive position on the high ground in the vicinity of GS1090 (Sheet 6446IV, Series V782, Edition 5-TPW, US Army Topo Comd, 1:50,000). The intentions of the US for the employment of the amphibious forces now at New Orleans and Florida are unknown. Also there remains the capability for the US to make a major vertical assault on Saxet. However, as it is intolerable that a foreign power should violate Saxet sovereignty, the 1st MID was directed to destroy the landing force with the minimum force required. This would leave the division capable of counterattacking an airborne landing or reacting to follow-on amphibious assaults. The MID commander decided to employ the 1st MIR (rein), including a slice of the aircraft assets earmarked for the division. As the division had been on high alert since the invasion of Ocixem, it was possible to dispatch the counterattack force at noon

on 9 August with instructions to attack and destroy the enemy ASAP.

b. Police intelligence received during that morning indicated that the surface-landed units had linked up with the air-landed troops. Ten artillery pieces, five tanks, and ten APCs were counted in the link-up. Aircraft were seen dropping mines and sensors in areas north and northwest of the enemy battalion position. Foreign intelligence reported that the brigade-size force had sailed west from New Orleans. This all served to highlight the need to attack as soon as possible before further development of the position could be effected and before the invader could be reinforced (which it was estimated could occur on 10 August).

c. The 1st MIR (rein), with the 4th MIB (rein) as advance guard one-half hour ahead of the main body, used Highway I-84 as its axis of advance to the assault area. The extended march column was under surveillance and occasional attack by enemy aircraft, but these attacks did not delay the movement nor reduce its 24kph rate of advance. At 2200 on 9 August the point of the advance guard was at 960820.

#### 6. Instructions to the Blue Team Commander

a. Submit separate operation orders for your position defense, using MARSAS Model I organization and equipment for one and MARSAS Model III for the other. These orders should be in standard format and be effective as of H-hour, D-day (0500, 9 August).

b. Essential information to be contained in the orders should include the concept of operations and plans for employment of unattended ground sensors (UGS), surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices, patrols, communications, and barriers. Also to be provided are an SOP for reaction to electronic intelligence, an air schedule for 2200, D-day to 0500, D+1, and preplanned and on-call artillery and naval gunfire missions for 2200, D-day to 0500, D+1.

c. Troop lists are attached as Appendix 1, as are lists of major combat items.

d. Environmental data are attached as Appendix 3.

e. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) will not be played.

#### 7. Instructions to Red Controller

a. Prepare an operation order for attack of the Blue position at 2200, 9 August. This order will be unchanged for the two separate war games conducted under MARSAS I. As a minimum the order should contain the concept of operations, reconnaissance plan, air schedule for 2200, 9 August to 0500, 10 August, and preplanned/on-call artillery missions for the same period.

b. Troop list, summary of major weapons and tactical vehicles, and pertinent T/OEs are attached as Appendix 2.

c. Environment data are attached as Appendix 3.

d. ECM will not be played.

Appendix 1 to Annex A  
Troop Lists - Blue

1. <u>Model 1</u>	<u>Off,</u> <u>incl USN</u>	<u>En,</u> <u>incl USN</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
a. <u>122d Marine Amphibious Unit</u>	177 <sup>(1)</sup>	2202 <sup>(1)</sup>	2379 <sup>(1)</sup>	48
<u>Command Element</u>	20	109	129	
MAU Hq	(14)	(61)	(75)	
Radio Relay Sec,				
HqCo, 2d MAR	(4)	(4)	(8)	
Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF	(2)	(44)	(46)	
<u>Ground Combat Element</u>	49	1209	1258	
1st Bn, 2d MAR	(48)	(1183)	(1231)	
1st Plt (rein), Co A,				
2d Tk Bn, FMF	(1)	(26)	(27)	
<u>Aviation Combat Element</u>	84 <sup>(1)</sup>	342 <sup>(1)</sup>	426 <sup>(1)</sup>	48
122d Composite HMM Sqdn	(75)	(298)	(373)	12-CH46 (2) 4-CH53D (2) 6-AHLJ (2) 4-UH1N (2) 4-AV8A (2) 6-A4M (3) 4-A6A (3) 4-F4J (3) 2-RF4B (3) 2-EA6A (3)
Det, VMA (V) Sqdn	(9)	(44)	(53)	
Det, VMA Sqdn	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
Det, VMA (AW) Sqdn	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
Det, VMFA Sqdn	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
Det, VMCJ Sqdn	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
<u>Combat Support Element</u>	16	295	311	
Btry A (rein), 1st Bn,				
10th MAR	(11)	(136)	(147)	
1st Plt, Btry K, 4th Bn,				
10th MAR	(1)	(24)	(25)	
1st Plt (rein), Co A,				
2d Rcn Bn	(1)	(26)	(27)	
Det, 2d Force Rcn Co,				
FMF	(1)	(7)	(8)	
Det, SCAMP, FMF	(0)	(11)	(11)	
1st Plt (rein), Co A,				
2d Engr Bn	(1)	(50)	(51)	
1st Plt, Co A, 2d				
AMTRAC Bn	(1)	(41)	(42)	
<u>Combat Service Support Element</u>	8	248	256	
Det, Coll Plt, C&C Co,				
2d Med Bn	(0)	(7)	(7)	
122d Log Spt Unit	(8)	(24)	(249)	

- Footnotes: (1) Does not include 2d MAW personnel from ATG 2.1.  
(2) Embarked on LHA with 122d MAU.  
(3) Embarked on CVA-1 with ATG 2.1.

b. Naval Gunfire Support

<u>Ship Type &amp; Side No.</u>	<u>Armament</u>
CLG-4(1)	1-6"/47 twin mount
	1-5"/38 twin mount
DD-931A	3-5"/54 RF Single
DD-931B	3-5"/54 RF Single

Footnote: (1) Withdrawn from fleet reserve for this mission.

2. Model II. The troop list is identical with Model I, above, except that the strength of the 1st Bn, 2d MAR, including USN, is 42 officers and 1038 enlisted men, for a total of 1080. This makes the strength of the 122d MAU 171 officers and 2057 enlisted, for a total of 2228; and the strength of the ground combat element 43 officers and 1064 enlisted for a total of 1107.

3. Personnel Comparison of Model I and Model III Infantry Battalions. Tab A.

4. Table of Candidate Equipment (major combat end items), Model I Infantry Battalion. Tab B.

5. Table of Candidate Equipment (major combat end items), Model III Infantry Battalion. Tab C.

6. Equipment Comparisons of Model I and Model III

a. Weapons: Tab D

b. Surveillance and Target Acquisition: Tab E

c. Position Location and Reporting System: Tab F

Personnel Comparison (incl USN)

<u>Battalion Elements</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model III</u>
<b>H&amp;S Company</b>	<b>24-379</b>	<b>22-378</b>
Bn Hq	13(1)-22	11(1)-22
Comm Plat	1-60	1-52
Service Plat	2-53	2-53
Medical Plat	2-65	2-65
Chaplain Sec	1-1	1-1
Company Hq	2-16	2-7
Mortar Plat	2-94	2-104
106mm RR/AT/Assault Plat	1-39	1-33
STA Plat	0(1)-29	0(1)-41
<b>Rifle Company(4)</b>	<b>6-201</b>	<b>5-165</b>
Co Hq	2-7	2-11
Weapons Plat	1-65	None
Plt Hq	(1-2)	(None)
MG Sec	(0-28)	(None)
60mm Mortars	(0-13)	(None)
Assault Sec	(0-22)	0-10
Rifle Plat(3)	1-43	1-48
Plat Hq	(1-4)	(1-3)
Rifle Squad(3)	(0-13)	(0-13)
Fire Tm(3)	(0-4)	(0-4)
STA Squad	(None)	(0-6)
<b>Total</b>	<b>48-1183</b>	<b>42-1038</b>

Footnote: (1) Bn S-2 has additional duty as STA Plt cmdr.





MODEL III  
TABLE OF CANDIDATE EQUIPMENT  
(MAJOR COMBAT END ITEMS)  
MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION STUDY

UNIT												
RIFLE, M16A1												208
GRENADE LAUNCHER, M203												
M191, MPFW												
PISTOL, AUTO												191
106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE												4
DRAGON, MISSILE W/LAUNCHER												12
HEAR/SAW												108
81MM MORTAR (ADVANCED)												12
MTI, LONG RANGE RADAR												4
MULTIPURPOSE LASER												4
E-O ANGLE MEAS. DEVICE												4
MTI, Med, RANGE RADAR												12
E-O SURV DEVICE, LONG RANGE												4
E-O SURV DEVICE, MED RANGE												12
POSITION, LOCATION AND REPORTING SYS (USER SET)												8
WPN, NIGHT VISION SIGHT, AN/PVS-4												
POCKETSCOPE												
TRUCK, CARGO, 1/4T M151												
TRUCK, PLATFORM, 1/4T M274												
TRUCK, CARGO, 1-1/4T M561												
TRUCK, AMBULANCE												
MRC-83												
MRC-87												
MRC-109												
MRC-123												
H&S COMPANY												
BN HQ												
COMM PLT												
SVC PLT												
COMPANY HQ												
STA PLT												
LIGHT WEIGHT MORTAR PLT												
ANTI-TANK ASSAULT PLT												
(4) RIFLE COMPANIES												
COMPANY HQ												
ASSAULT SECTION												
(3) RIFLE PLTS												
STA SQUAD												
TOTALS												

Tab C  
Appendix 1 to  
Annex A



**Weapons Comparison  
(Individual Weapons Not Shown)**

Battalion Elements

H&S Company

Company Hq  
Mortar Plat  
Wpns Plat

Rifle Company (4)

Wpns Plat

MG Sec  
60mm Mortars  
Assault Sec

Rifle Plat (3)

Plat Hq  
Rifle Squad (3)  
Fire Tm (3)

Model I

4 3.5 Rocket Launchers  
8 81mm Mortars (M29A1)  
8 106mm RR

6 M-60  
5 M-19  
3 MPFW, 12 LAW

13 M-16  
4 M-16

Model III

12 81mm Mortars (Advanced)  
4 106mm RR, 12 DRAGON Tracker  
24 Missiles

None  
None  
3 MPFW, LAW as issued

3 SAW, 10 M-16 (or follow-on)  
1 SAW, 3 M-16 (or follow-on)

**Surveillance and Target Acquisition Equipment Comparison**

Battalion STA Elements

STA Platoon,

H&S Company

Model I

8 AN/PPS-15 Radar

4 AN/TVS-4 Night Observation  
Device (NOD)

Model III

4 Long Range MTI Radar  
4 Long Range E-O Surv. Devices  
4 Multipurpose Lasers  
4 E-O Angle Measurement Devices

STA Squad, Platoon,  
Rifle Platoon,  
Rifle Company

1 Medium Range MTI Radar  
1 Medium Range E-O Surveillance  
Device  
1 Multipurpose Laser  
1 E-O Angle Measurement Device

Rifle Squad,  
Rifle Platoon  
Rifle Company

1 Rifle Night Vision Sight  
1 Pocketscope (or follow-on)

**Position Location and Reporting System Comparison**

Battalion Elements

Model I

Model III

Map & Compass Retained  
PLRS Added

H&S Company

Mortar Plat  
Bn Hq  
STA Plt

Map & Compass  
Map & Compass  
None

2 PLRS User Sets (2)  
2 PLRS User Sets (2)  
4 PLRS User Sets (4)

Rifle Company(4)

Co Hq  
Wpns Plat  
MG Sec  
60mm Mortars

Map & Compass

1 PLRS User Set (4)

None  
None

Rifle Plat(3)

Plat Hq  
Rifle Squad(3)  
Fire Tm(3)  
STA Squad

Map & Compass

1 PLRS User Set (12)

None

(Uses Platoon PLRS)

Total PLRS 24


Appendix 2 to Annex A  
Troop List - Rad

1. . . . .	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Acft</u>
<u>1st Mechanized Infantry Regt</u> <u>(MIR) (rein)</u>	191 (1)	2226(1)	2419(1)	28
<u>Command Element</u>	27	115	142	
1st Hq Co	(20)	(35)	(55)	
2d Comm Co	(5)	(50)	(55)	
3d MP Plt	(2)	(30)	(32)	
<u>Ground Combat Element</u>	100	1435	1535	
4th Mech Inf Bn (MIB)	(27)	(433)	(460)	
5th MIB	(27)	(433)	(460)	
6th MIB	(27)	(433)	(460)	
7th Tk Bn	(19)	(136)	(155)	
<u>Aviation Combat Element</u>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	28
8th Ftr/Bomber Flt	"	"	"	4-SU7B
9th Intcpter Flt	"	"	"	4-MIB21J
10th Intcpter Flt	"	"	"	4-MIG21J
11th Lt Bomber Flt	"	"	"	4-IL28
12th Lt Helo Flt	"	"	"	8-HOPLIGHT
13th Med Helo Flt	"	"	"	4-HIP
<u>Combat Support Element</u>	49	487	536	
<u>14th Prov Arty Bn</u>	(24)	(258)	(282)	
14th Hq Plt <sup>(2)</sup>	(5)	(22)	(27)	
15th Arty Btry	(5)	(60)	(65)	
Btry A, 1st Bn,				
16th Arty Regt <sup>(2)</sup>	(5)	(60)	(65)	
Btry G, 3d Bn, 16th				
Arty Regt <sup>(2)</sup>	(5)	(60)	(65)	
Btry A, 17th RL				
Bn <sup>(2)</sup>	(4)	(56)	(60)	
18th ATGM Btry	(4)	(16)	(20)	
19th AAG Btry	(3)	(18)	(21)	
20th AAMG Btry	(3)	(30)	(33)	
Btry A, 21st SAM Bn <sup>(2)</sup>	(5)	(45)	(50)	
22d Rcn Co	(4)	(45)	(49)	
23d Engr Co	(5)	(55)	(60)	
24th Chem Plt	(1)	(20)	(21)	
<u>Combat Service Support</u>				
<u>Element</u>	15	191	206	
25th MT Co	(4)	(70)	(74)	
26th Maint Co	(3)	(45)	(48)	
27th Supply Co	(3)	(51)	(54)	
28th Med Co	(5)	(25)	(30)	

Footnotes: (1) Does not include Aviation Combat Element.  
(2) Attached from 1st MID.

2. The above troop list will be the same for the Model I and Model III games.
3. Tables of Organization and Equipment. Tabs A through Q.

# MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)



## WEAPONS

2173 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM  
 84 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK  
 183 - 9mm PISTOL, PM  
 6 - 14.5mm AAMG (TOWED), ZPU-4  
 4 - 23mm AAG (SP), ZSU-23-4  
 6 - 73mm RG, SPG-9  
 97 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7  
 18 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)  
 12 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30  
 240 - 122mm RL  
 6 - 152mm HOW (TOWED), D-1  
 30 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7  
 6 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT  
 54 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, VEH MOUNT  
 2 - 13.2" SAM, SA-6


## TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

3 - AMPHIB TANK, PT-76  
 31 - MED TANK, T-62  
 9 - ATGM LNCHR VEH, BRDM  
 6 - RKT LNCHR VEH, BM-21  
 5 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM  
 9 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM-2  
 92 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P  
 4 - ARMD COMD VEH, BTR-60P  
 3 - MOTORCYCLE, M-72  
 4 - MINELAYER, SP ARMD  
 3 - TRUCK, DECON, ARS-14  
 1 - TRUCK, DECON, DDA-53

## MISC.

9 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET  
 8 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS  
 6 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A  
 8 - RADARS  
 346 - RADIOS

# HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



## WEAPONS

- 115 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 27 - 9 mm PISTOL, PM
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7 (HQ CO)


## TACTICAL VEHICLES

- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM (HQ CO)
- 4 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM-2 (MP PLT)
- 2 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P (HQ CO)

## MISC.

- 4 - RADIOS (HQ CO)
- 17 - RADIOS (COMM CO)
- 6 - RADIOS (MP PLT)

# MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



A-7-C-1

## WEAPONS

- 423 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 27 - 7.62 mm LMG, RPK
- 26 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 2 - 73 mm RG, SPG-9
- 27 - 85 mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 6 - 120 mm MORTAR (TOWED)
- 4 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT


## TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM
- 30 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P

## MISC.

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, D:
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2
- 62 - RADIOS

# HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY, MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



A-2-D-1

## WEAPONS

32 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM

4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM

2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9

1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7

2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT

## TACTICAL VEHICLES

1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM


## MISC.

12 - RADIOS

Tab D

Appendix 2 to Annex A

**MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 117 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 9 - 7.62 mm LMG, RPK
- 6 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 9 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

- 10 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P

**MISC.**

- 15 - RADIOS

**MORTAR BATTERY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 40- 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)


**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**

NONE

**MISC.**

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 5 - RADIOS

# TANK BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT




A-2-G-1

WEAPONS	TACTICAL VEHICLES	MISC.
136-7.62mm RIFLE, AKM	31 - MED TANK, T-62	9 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET
19-9mm PISTOL, PM	1 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM-2	48 - RADIOS
	1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BTR-60P	

Tab G  
Appendix 2 to Annex A

**TANK COMPANY,  
TANK BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

39 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM  
5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

10 - MED TANK, T-62

**MISC.**

3 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET  
14 - RADIOS

# PROVISIONAL ARTILLERY BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)



### WEAPONS

- 258 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 24 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 12 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30
- 6 - 152mm HOW (TOWED), D-1
- 240 - 122mm RL
- 4 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


### TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BTR-60P
- 6 - RKT LNCHR VEH, BM-21

### MISC.

- 4 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS
- 3 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2
- 25 - RADIOS

**HOWITZER BATTERY,  
PROVISIONAL ARTILLERY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)**



**WEAPONS**

- 60 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30,OR
- 6 - 152mm HOW (TOWED), D-1
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**

NONE

**MISC.**

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 5 - RADIOS

**MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER BATTERY,  
PROVISIONAL ARTILLERY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)**



**WEAPONS**

- 56 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 240 - 122 mm RL
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

- 6 - RKT LNCHR VEH, BM-21

**MISC.**

- 5 - RADIOS

# PROVISIONAL AIR DEFENSE BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)



A-2-L-1

## WEAPONS

93 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM

11 - 9mm PISTOL, PM

6 - 14.5mm AAMG (TOWED), ZPU-4

4 - 23mm AAG(SP), ZSU-23-4

2 - 13.2" SAM, SA-6

3 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7 (1 PER BTRY)

## TACTICAL VEHICLES

NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

1 - ARMD CMD VEH, BRDM (SAM BTRY)

## MISC

8 - RADARS (SAM BTRY)


10 - RADIOS (SAM BTRY)

6 - RADIOS (AAG BTRY)

4 - RADIOS (AAMG BTRY)

**NOTE: THERE IS NO HQ BTRY, AS EACH FIRING BATTERY OPERATES INDEPENDENTLY.**

# ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILE BATTERY, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



## WEAPONS

- 16 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 9 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 54 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, VEH MOUNTED


## TACTICAL VEHICLES

- 9 - ATGM LNCHR VEH (BRDM)

## MISC.

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS
- 14 - RADIOS

# RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



## WEAPONS

- 45 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 3 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK\*\*
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 4 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7\*

## TACTICAL VEHICLES


- 3 - AMPHIB TANK, PT-76\*\*
- 4 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM-2\*
- 3 - MOTORCYCLE, M-72\*\*\*

## MISC.

- 10 - RADIOS (1 PER VEH)

FOOTNOTES: \* 1 PER HQ SEC AND RCN PLT  
 \*\* 1 PER RCN PLT  
 \*\*\* SCOUT SEC

# ENGINEER COMPANY, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



### WEAPONS

- 55 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 3 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7


### TACTICAL VEHICLES

- 4 - MINELAYER, SP ARMD

### MISC.

- 8 - RADIOS (4 ON VEH)

**CHEMICAL PLATOON,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

20 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM

1 - 9mm PISTOL, PM

**TACTICAL VEHICLES**


3 - TRUCK, DECON, ARS-14

1 - TRUCK, DECON, DDA-53

**MISC.**

1 - RADIO

# REAR SERVICE BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



**WEAPONS**

166 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM  
10 - 9 mm PISTOL, PM

**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

NONE

**MISC.**

7 - RADIOS (2 PER CO, EXCEPT  
1 PER MED CO)

**NOTE: THERE IS NO HQ CO, AS EACH COMPANY OPERATES INDEPENDENTLY.**

Appendix 3 to Annex A  
Environmental Data

1. Terrain

a. The terrain in the Amphibious Operation Area (AOA) is exactly as depicted on Sheet 6446IV, Series V782, Edition 5-TPC, US Army Topographic Command map 1:50,000. Digitized terrain profiles will be made from this map. It is assumed that Table Rock Creek, Cowhouse Creek, Wolf Creek, and Henson Creek to the Leon River (Sheets 6446III, II, and I) represent the Gulf of Mexico coastline, 14-20km from the Blue defensive position.

b. Game play will be conducted on the Geological Survey map, 1:24,000. Overlays will be made at this scale.

c. Other map coverage of the AOA, such as Orthopictomap 1:25,000, Experimental Ground Tactical Data 1:25,000, Vehicle Movement 1:50,000, foot movement 1:50,000, Concealment 1:50,000, and Foxhole Construction and Existing Cover 1:50,000, is available for use in developing planning information.

2. Astronomic. Daylight, twilight, and moonlight in the AOA are as follows:

<u>Day</u>	<u>EMNT</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>Moon Rise</u>	<u>Moon Set</u>	<u>Moon Phase</u>
9 August	0406	0512	1855	2001	1657	0632	
10 August	0407	0513	1853	2001	1800	0704	Full
11 August	0409	0514	1852	1957	1859	0732	

3. Weather. The three-day weather forecast issued 2400, 8 August is for clear skies, with scattered clouds giving a maximum of 5% cover. Visibility will be 10-15 miles. Temperatures will range from 70° in the early morning hours to 95° in the afternoon. Relative humidity will be 40-60%. Winds will be light 5-10 knots, generally westerly.

Appendix 4 to Annex A  
Description of Model I Game Play

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3. Concept of Operations - Red . . . . .	A-4-1
4. 2200-2300, D-day . . . . .	A-4-3
5. 2301-2400, D-day . . . . .	A-4-3
6. 0001-0100, D+1 . . . . .	A-4-6
7. 0101-0200, D+1 . . . . .	A-4-6
8. 0201-0300 (end-game), D+1 . . . . .	A-4-9
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Tabs

- A. Task Organization - Blue
- B. Task Organization - Red

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I-I-4	Blue and Red Unit Dispositions, 2400, D-day	A-4-7
I-I-5	Blue and Red Unit Deployments, and Blue PPS-15 Deployments, 0100, D+1	A-4-8
I-I-6	Blue and Red Unit Deployments, and Blue PPS-15 Deployments, 0200, D+1	A-4-10
I-I-7	Blue and Red Unit Deployments, 0300, D+1	A-4-11

## 1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of War Game MARSAS I, with the current Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model I surveillance and target acquisition (STA) capability. The game portrays a night defense by a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red mechanized infantry regiment. Game play commenced 1 May 1974 and was completed 10 May 1974.

b. The Blue assault was made without opposition at 0500, D-day. The Red attack was initiated at 2200 that day, giving Blue 17 hours to develop a prepared defensive position. Assessment intervals were of one hour duration, with game play terminating at 0300, D+1. A summary of each of these five intervals appears below.

## 2. Concept of Operations - Blue

a. Commencing at H-hour, D-day the 122d MAU will prepare and defend a position on the ridge line extending from GS0772 to 1169, in order to support the landing of the 9th MAB on D+1.

b. Unit deployments of the 122d MAU are shown on Figure I-I-1. Also depicted are the deployment of STA devices/sensors and the barrier plan.

c. Blue task organization is provided in Tab A to this appendix.

## 3. Concept of Operations - Red

a. Commencing at 2200, 9 August (H+17, D-day) from positions along Highway I-84 the 1st MIR will attack to the southeast to destroy the enemy force occupying a defensive position on the high ground in the vicinity of GS1070.

(1) 4th MIB (rein) (-) to turn southeast to an assembly area just northwest of the enemy position, from which to launch its attack in coordination with that of the 5th MIB. Co A, reinforced with A/7 Tk and the 3d Plt, 22d Rcn Co, will move via Cowhouse Creek, on the right flank of the battalion, to an assembly area just west of the enemy position, from which to launch an enveloping attack for the 4th MIB.

(2) 5th MIB (rein) will continue east on Highway I-84, turning south to an assembly area just north of the enemy position, from which to launch its attack in coordination with that of the 4th MIB.

(3) 6th MIB designated regimental reserve.

(4) A/1/16 Arty is in direct support of the 4th MIB, with

**MARSAS I  
BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL I)**




FIGURE 2.1

reinforcing fires provided by A/17 RL. 15th Arty is in direct support of the 5th MIB. G/3/16 is in general support. All artillery units to be prepared to fire by 2300.

b. The scheme of maneuver of the Red attack is depicted in Figure I-I-2.

c. The Red task organization is provided in Tab B to this appendix.

#### 4. 2200-2300, D-day

a. During the first hour of game play all detections made of the Red 1st MIR approach march were made by a MTI aircraft, as all Red units were beyond ground radar range and none passed by an unattended ground-sensor (UGS).

b. During this hour the Red 15th Arty Btry arrived at its planned position and was prepared to fire at 2300. The Red 5th MIB hit a Blue minefield on Highway 84 (See Figure I-I-1), but, in accordance with plans for such a contingency, turned 400m to the south and was able to bypass other mines so as not to delay its movement. On the Blue side, a PPS 15 was down for maintenance at 2230, with the expectation of being back in action at 2330.

c. In the Red force there were 80 platoon-size units, a platoon being the smallest unit tracked in game play. At end-interval there were 29 such targets 9-12kms from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 22 that were at range 12-15kms, and 29 beyond 15kms.

d. Location of major Red units vis-a-vis the center of mass of the Blue defense position at end-interval are shown on Figure I-I-3.


#### 5. 2301-2400, D-day

a. The MTI aircraft which had been observing the Red columns was shot down by a SA-6. The relieving A-6 continued the mission, attacking with his available ordnance and calling for an A-4 flight to illuminate, attack, and track. PPS 15 number 1 which had gone down during the last interval was up again at 2330.

b. 4thMIB (rein) (-) arrived at its assembly area (Figure I-I-2) at 2340 and was deployed for the attack by end-interval. En-route, one UGS was activated. The approach to this assembly area and the assembly area itself were generally masked from radar detection by high ground. However, at end-interval PPS 15 number 2 detected 20 tracked vehicles moving on the left flank of the 4th MIB. At end-interval A/1/4 (rein) was still moving down the Cowhouse Creek bed.

c. At 2350 the 5th MIB arrived at its assembly area (Figure I-I-2), and encountered a Blue nuisance minefield (Figure I-I-1). The first vehicle to arrive exploded a mine, the blast being heard by a Blue patrol. Lanes were being rapidly cleared at end-interval.

MARSASI  
RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL I)




○ ASSEMBLY AREA  
○ OBJECTIVE



SCALE 4 KM

8 JUNE 55-2-2

MARSAS I  
RED APPROACH MARCH (MODEL I)  
2300, D-DAY



BLUE OFFENSIVE  
OPERATIONS

SCALE IN KMS  
0 1 2 3

FIGURE I-1-3

d. Inasmuch as the concern was only with two reinforced Red battalions attacking the Blue MAU, the number of Red platoon-sized targets to be tracked was reduced to 53 by eliminating those no longer appearing in game play (such as the 6th MIB). No new targets were detected during the interval and none were being tracked at end-interval due to the fact that most were not moving. At midnight there were 26 Red targets 3-6km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 16 in the 6-9km, 7 that were 9-12km, none in the 12-15km zones, and 4 that were over 15km.

e. Disposition of Red and Blue maneuver and fire support units as of 2400, D-day is shown on Figure I-I-4.

6. 0001-0100, D+1

a. There was minimal ground activity during this period as Red made last minute preparations for his coordinated attack. A/4 Inf (rein) arrived at its departure area at 0015. There was air illumination and one air attack on the 5th MIB late in the hour. Early in the hour another A-6 was lost to a SA-6.

b. Red fired H & I missions randomly on high ground spots likely for radar emplacement. This proved to be a wise decision, as it cost Blue PPS15 number 3 at 0045. During the hour PPS15 numbers 1 and 2, in threatened positions, were moved by helicopter to closer-in alternate positions.

c. Red launched his attack on his initial objectives (Figure I-I-2) at 0050. The zonal locations of the 53 platoon-size targets in play were the same as during the previous hour (paragraph 5d, above).

d. Disposition of Red and Blue units and Blue ground radar (PPS15) coverage are shown on Figure I-I-5.

7. 0101-0200, D+1

a. During this interval the ground radar (PPS15) came into its own. Red, attacking mounted, was detected four times by PPS15 number 1, once by PPS15 number 2, twice by PPS15 number 4 (supplemented by NOD number 1), and once by PPS15 number 8. Additionally, combat patrols of B/1/2 and A/1/2 reported hearing tracked vehicles, as did A/1/2. At 0115 the A-6 engaged 20 vehicles attacking due south, calling for illumination and additional attack capability.

b. At mid-period 1/2 was receiving artillery and rocket fire. Between 0111 and 0115 the 2d Plt of B/1/2 saw and engaged three Red tanks, destroyed them with 106mm RR, and lost one of the AT weapons.

c. As the interval ended, the Red attackers were within 1km of the Blue position, with close combat imminent. The location of the

MARSAS I  
 BLUE AND RED UNIT DISPOSITIONS (MODEL I)  
 2400, D-DAY





FIGURE I-I-4

**MARSAS I**  
**BLUE AND RED UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)**  
**BLUE PPS 15 DEPLOYMENTS**  
**O100, D+1**



□ PPS 15 SEARCH FAN

0 1 2 3  
 SCALE IN KMS

FIGURE I-1-9

Red platoon-size targets in relation to the Blue center of mass at 0200 was as follows: 0-3km - 17, 3-6km - 26, 6-9km - 1, 9-12km - 7, over 15km - 2.

d. Red and Blue unit dispositions, with Blue active ground radar fans (PPS15 number 2 was moving to an alternate position) are shown on Figure I-I-6.

8. 0201-0300 (end game), D+1

a. At the beginning of the interval PPS15 number 1 detected 22 vehicles. From that point on all detections were ground visual (there were none by A-6 aircraft), as a result of B/1/2 illuminating the battlefield with mortars. These visual detections resulted in four tank-antitank engagements in the first five minutes. In the first, A/1/2 engaged three tanks of the 4th MIB with two 106mm RR. All tanks were destroyed without Blue loss. In the second, B/1/2 engaged four tanks of the 5th MIB with its two 106mm RR and heavy tank section. All four tanks were killed, but Blue lost two of his three tanks in so doing. In the third, B/1/2 destroyed an APC and tank with the two 106mm RR and remaining tank. In the fourth, A/1/2 destroyed three APCs and two tanks with his 106mm RR and light tank section, but lost his two tanks.


b. These antimechanized actions forced the Red force, in accordance with his SOP, to dismount to fight on foot at a range of 500m from the Blue position. The remainder of the hour was consumed by ground combat, during which Red fired a number of artillery and rocket missions and Blue fired artillery and naval gun missions. There were two separate battles. In one, Blue A/1/2 (rein) defended successfully against the frontal attack by Red 4th MIB (-) and the envelopment by Red A/1/4 (rein), even though Red had a force ratio of 3.4. In the other, Red 5th MIB (rein) with a force ratio of 3.5, was successful in pushing B/1/2 (rein) 800m back into the position.

c. The zonal location of Red platoon-size targets with relation to Blue center of mass at end-game was as follows:

0-3km	37
3-6km	6
6-9km	1
9-12km	7
12-15km	0
over 15km	<u>2</u>
	53

d. End-game dispositions of Red and Blue units are shown on Figure I-I-7.

**MARSAS I  
 BLUE AND RED UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)  
 BLUE PPS I5 DEPLOYMENTS  
 0200, D+1**




PPS I5 SEARCH FAN

SCALE IN KMS  
 0 1 2 3

FIGURE I-1-6

**MARSAS I  
BLUE AND RED UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)  
0300, D+1**



SCALE IN KMS  
0 1 2 3

FIGURE I-I-7

9. Summary of Mission and Combat Effectiveness

a. Had the game continued, the Red 4th MIB would probably have destroyed Blue A/1/2 (rein). However Blue 1/2 (-) would probably have held both Red battalions, or at least would have delayed them sufficiently, to permit the 9th MAB to land unopposed by ground units at 0500, D+1. There might have been some air opposition as Red had committed none of his aviation in the night attack.

b. The combat effectiveness factors for Blue and Red combat and combat support units at start-game (2200, D-day), start-close combat (0200, D+1), and end-game (0300, D+1) are as follows:

Unit	(1) <u>Blue</u>		0200, D+1		0300, D+2	
	2200, D-day		% T/O or E	Cbt Eff	% T/O or E	Cbt Eff
1/2 Inf	100	1.00	97	1.00	93	.97
1/A/2 Tk	100	1.00	100	1.00	0	Destroyed
A/1/10 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
1/K/4/10 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
1/A2AM	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00

(2) <u>Red</u>						
Unit	% T/O or E	Cbt Eff	% T/O or E	Cbt Eff	% T/O or E	Cbt Eff
4th MIB	100	1.00	96	1.00	80	.83
5th MIB	100	1.00	99	1.00	93	.96
A/7 Tk	100	1.00	90	.90	60	.60
B/7 Tk	100	1.00	40	.40	0	Destroyed
15 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
A/1/16 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
G/3/16 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
18th ATGM	100	1.00	89	.89	89	.89
19th AAG	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
20th AAMG	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
A/21 SAM	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
22d Rcn	100	1.00	86	.86	71	.71

Footnote: (1) Percentage of T/O personnel for infantry, artillery, and air defense; percentage of tactical vehicles for all other units.  
 (2) Fractional combat effectiveness based upon % T/O or E, posture of unit and type of unit.

Tab A to Appendix 4 to Annex A

Task Organization - Blue

122d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)

122d MAU Headquarters

Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR

Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Rcn Bn

Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF

Det, SCAMP, FMF

1st Bn, 2d MAR (-)(rein)

H&S Co, 1/2 (-)

Co A (rein)

A/1/2

1st Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co B (rein)

B/1/2

2d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

1st Sec (lt), 1st Plt, Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

Co C (rein)

C/1/2

3d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

3d Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

2d Sec (Hvy), 1st Plt, Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt (-)(rein), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt (-), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

Det, H&S Co, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn

1st Plt, Co A, 2d Engr Bn

Det, Support Co, 2d Engr Bn

Det, Coll Plt, C&C Co, 2d Med Bn

MAU Reserve

Co D (rein), 1st Bn, 2d MAR

D/1/2

4th Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn, FMF

MAU Artillery

Btry A (rein), 1st Bn, 10th MAR

A/1/10

Survey Team, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 10th MAR

Shore Fire Control Party, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 10th MAR

Cook Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 10th MAR

1st Plt, Btry K, 4th Bn, 10th MAR

MAU Aviation

122d Composite HMM Sqdn

Det, VMA (V) Sqdn

Det, VMA Sqdn

Det, VMA (AW) Sqdn

Det, VMFA Sqdn

Det, VMCJ Sqdn

122d Logistic Support Unit

Tab B to Appendix 4 to Annex A

**Task Organization - Red**

1st Mechanized Infantry Regiment (MIR)

1st Hq Co  
2d Commo Co  
3d MP Plt  
7th Tk Bn (-)  
22d Rcn Co (-)  
23d Engr Co (-)  
24th Chem Plt  
4th Mech Inf Bn (rein)  
4th MIB  
Co A, 7th Tk Bn  
1st Plt, 18th ATGM Btry  
1st Plt, 19th AAG Btry  
1st Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
1st Plt, 22d Rcn Co  
3d Plt, 22d Rcn Co  
1st Plt, 23d Engr Co

5th Mech Inf Bn (rein)

5th MIB  
Co B, 7th Tk Bn  
2d Plt, 18th ATGM Btry  
2d Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
2d Plt, 22d Rcn Co  
2d Plt, 23d Engr Co

Regimental Reserve

6th MIB  
Co C, 7th Tk Bn  
3d Plt (Minelayer), 23d Engr Co

Regimental Artillery

14th Prov Arty Bn  
14th Hq Plt  
15th Arty Btry  
Btry A, 1st Bn, 16th Arty Regt  
Btry G, 3d Bn, 16th Arty Regt  
Btry A, 17th RL Bn  
18th ATGM Btry (-)  
19th AAG Btry (-)  
20th AAMG Btry (-)  
Btry A, 21st SAM Bn

Regimental Logistic Support

25th MT co  
26th Maint Co  
27th Supply Co  
28th Med co

Appendix 5 to Annex A  
Description of Model III Game Play

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- A. Task Organization - Blue
- B. Task Organization - Red

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## 1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of MARSAS I, with the Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model III surveillance and target acquisition (STA) and advanced weapons systems. The game portrays a night defense by a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red reinforced mechanized infantry regiment, the identical threat employed against the Blue reinforced Model I battalion. Game play commenced 15 May 1974 and was completed 23 May 1974.

b. As in the Model I game (Appendix 4), the Blue assault was made without opposition at 0500, D-day. The Red attack was initiated at 2200 that day, giving Blue 17 hours to develop a prepared defensive position. Assessment intervals were of one hour duration, with game play terminating at 0300, D+1. A summary of each of these five intervals appears below.

## 2. Concept of Operations - Blue

a. Commencing at H-hour, D-day the 122d MAU will prepare and defend a position on the ridge line extending from GS0772 to 1169, in order to support the landing of the 9th MAB on D+1.

b. Unit deployments of the 122d MAU, the location of sensor strings, and the barrier plan are depicted on Figure I-III-1A. Figure I-III-1B shows the deployment of the ground radars. In view of the overlap of medium range radars, the total coverage of eight are grouped for clarity.

c. Blue task organization is provided in Tab A to this appendix.

## 3. Concept of Operations - Red


a. The concept used against Model III is identical with that used against Model I.

b. Commencing at 2200, 9 August (H+17, D-day) from positions along Highway I-84 the 1st MIR will attack to the southeast to destroy the enemy force occupying a defensive position on the high ground in the vicinity of GS1070.

(1) 4th MIB (rein)(-) to turn southeast to an assembly area just northwest of the enemy position, from which to launch its attack in coordination with that of the 5th MIB. Co A, reinforced with 1/A/7 Tk and the 3d Plt, 22d Rcn Co, will move via Cowhouse Creek, on the right flank of the battalion, to an assembly area just west of the enemy position, from which to launch an enveloping attack for the 4th MIB.

(2) 5th MIB (rein) will continue east on Highway I-84, turning south to an assembly area just north of the enemy position, from which

**MARSAS I  
BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL III)**



**MARSAS I  
BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL III)  
RADAR DEPLOYMENTS**




FIGURE 1-22-10

to launch its attack in coordination with that of the 4th MIB.

(3) 6th MIB designated regimental reserve.

(4) A/1/16 Arty is in direct support of the 4th MIB, with reinforcing fires provided by A/17 RL. 15th Arty is in direct support of the 5th MIB. G/3/16 is in general support. All artillery units to be prepared to fire by 2300.

c. The scheme of maneuver of the Red attack is depicted on Figure I-III-2.

d. The Red task organization is provided in Tab B to this appendix.

#### 4. 2200-2300, D-day

a. During the first hour of game play all detections made of the Red MIR approach march were made by the MTI aircraft on station and by Force Recon Team Number 2 (Figure I-III-1A), which had moved up to the road parallel on the north to Highway I-84. The aircraft expended its ordnance, causing some casualties, but no delay. Four Red SAMs were fired without effect, so the aircraft was able to watch the targets all of the hour. Long range surveillance radars made no detections nor were any unattended ground sensors (UGS) activated.

b. By the end of the period Red 15th Arty battery was in its planned position and was prepared to fire.

c. In the Red force there were 80 platoon-size units, a platoon being the smallest unit tracked in game play. At 2300 there were 5 such targets 9-12kms from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 28 that were at range 12-15kms, and 47 beyond 15kms.


d. Location of major Red units vis-a-vis the center of mass of the Blue defense position at end-interval are shown on Figure I-III-3.

#### 5. 2301-2400, D-day

a. The MTI aircraft on station during the first hour continued to track targets, making two such detections, until relieved by a second MTI aircraft at 2324. The new aircraft made three detections, expended his ordnance, and requested relief. Additionally, an AV8A illuminated the area and a second AV8A and two A4s attacked the columns. Although 30 rounds of NG were fired at a key road junction, all Red material lost was caused by aircraft - one tank, one truck, one rocket launcher, and six BTRs.

b. At 2301 the 2d Force Rcn Team reported the target he detected in the last interval (15th Arty) had disappeared to the east. At 2350 the 4th MIB (-) activated a sensor string and eight minutes later A/1/4 (rein) activated a string in Cowhouse Creek bed.

**MARSASI  
RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL III)**



0 1 2 3  
SCALE IN KMS

FIGURE I-II-2

ASSEMBLY AREA  
OBJECTIVE

c. At 2351 the ground radars made their first detection of the game. Long range radars numbers 2 and 3 picked up two vehicles of the Red 5th MIB, which the E-0 devices identified as an amphibious tank and BRDM. Five minutes later they picked up eight following vehicles, which the E-0 device identified as seven BTRs. At 2357 E-0 devices numbers 2 and 3 reported that the target had entered the upper minefield just north of the Blue position, had exploded a mine, and had halted.

d. Inasmuch as the concern was only with two reinforced Red battalions attacking the Blue MAU, the number of Red platoon-sized targets to be tracked was reduced to 53 by eliminating those no longer appearing in game play (such as the 6th MIB). At midnight there were no Red targets in the zones 0-3 and 3-6km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 15 in the 6-9km zone, 34 that were 9-12kms, 2 that were 12-15kms, and 2 over 15kms.

e. Disposition of Red maneuver and fire support units and center of mass of the Blue position as of 2400, D-day are shown on Figure I-III-4.

6. 0001-0100, D+1

a. Blue aircraft were very active during this period, making five detections of moving Red columns both by MTI and illumination. Eight attacks between 0009 and 0049 cost Red two tanks, two trucks, eight BTRs, two tubes, and 53 casualties. Red got his revenge by shooting down the A6 at 0026 with a SAM. As the interval ended, all available aircraft had been employed to the utmost.

b. At 0017 1/A/2 Rcn picked up Red A/4 aurally in Cowhouse Creek and then saw the unit moving northeast from the creek. The target was illuminated and attacked by Blue A4s and AV8As, causing it to halt. At 0059 the reconnaissance team reported it again on the move.

c. Due to overlap problems (Figure I-III-1B) medium range radars numbers 3, 7, and 9 were shut down, to become operable if other radars lost targets. Due to the closeness of the enemy threat, long range radar number 1 at 0011 was moved back to battalion headquarters. It reached there at 0047 but was not placed in operation.

d. At 0002 long range radars numbers 2 and 3, their E-0 devices, and medium range radar number 2 detected the lead vehicles of the 5th MIB in the approach march to its assembly area. As time went on, with a total of two detections each by LRR Nos. 2 and 3, four each by LREO Nos. 2 and 3, and three by MRR No. 2, the vehicles sighted had grown from 8-16 to 35-70.

e. At 0014 Red 4th MIB (-) arrived at its assembly area, detected en route only by aircraft. By 0030 the battalion was deployed mounted in attack formation and combat patrols sent forward. At 0038 a battalion preparatory mission was fired by Red A/1/16 on the high ground to the battalion front, Blue A/1/2 reporting the shelling to the northwest of its position. The Red commander decided to move out the 4th when the

MARSASI (MODEL III)  
RED APPROACH MARCH  
2300, D-DAY




FIGURE I-III-3

patrols had gone out 2 kms. He anticipated the 5th MIB would be able to move out from its assembly area by the time the 4th took Objective B (Figure I-II-2), thus, placing the battalions abreast.

f. At 0005 Blue fired a mission with the CLG, 155s, and A/1/10 at the 5th MIB, but it did no damage as the enemy was not there. No other supporting arms were used during the hour.

g. At 0100, D+1 there were no Red units within 0-3km of the Blue center of mass, there were 12 targets at 3-6km, 32 at 6-9km, 5 at 9-12km, 2 at 12-15km, and 2 over 15km.

h. Dispositions of Red and Blue units at 0100, D+1 are shown on Figure I-III-5.

#### 7. 0101-0200, D+1

a. As the Red battalions approached the Blue positions, there was a plethora of targets reported - 33 by radar/electro-optic, two by reconnaissance team, one by air, and toward the end of the interval six by two of the three forward infantry companies. Actually, Long Range Radar Number 2 and its associated E-O device made 10 detections, Long Range Radar Number 3 and its associated E-O device made 10, Medium Range Radar Number 2 made 4, MRR Number 4 made 5, MRR Number 5 made 4. When Red was in visual detection range of the infantry, at 0159, radar/EO surveillance was discontinued.

b. Early in the interval the A6 covering the Red approach was shot down by a SAM-6. The aerial detection made during the interval was by an AHLJ. Red did not fly aircraft at any time in game play.


c. The Red 5th MIB was able to launch its attack, after extricating itself from the minefield in its assembly area at 0140. As the interval ended the two Red battalions were abreast, 1100 meters from the Blue FEBA.

d. Supporting arms played a greater role in this interval than previously. At 0136 Red fired 40 rocket rounds in support of the 4th MIB and 160 in support of the 5th. Due to its prepared position, these only cost Blue 13 casualties. Blue kept the battlefield illuminated with his direct support battery, also firing 960 rounds of naval gun, 50 rounds of 155mm, and 234 rounds of 105mm. The effect of these findings on Red was the loss of one BTR and eight casualties to A/4 by artillery and one truck and six casualties to the 5th MIB by naval gunfire.

e. At end-interval there were 17 Red platoon-size units within 3km of the Blue center of mass; 25 at 3-6km; 2 at 6-9km; 5 at 9-12km; 2 at 12-15km; and 2 over 15km.

f. Dispositions of Red and Blue units at 0200, D+1 are shown on Figure I-III-6.

**MARSAS I**  
**BLUE AND RED UNIT DISPOSITIONS (MODEL III)**  
**2400, D-DAY**




A-5-9

SCALE IN MILES  
0 1 2 3

FIGURE I-III 4

**MARSA I  
BLUE AND RED UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
0100, D+1**



8. 0201-0300 (end game), D+1

a. All detections made during this interval were ground visual by A/1/2 and B/1/2, three targets by each.

b. In the first few minutes of the interval the highlight was four antimechanized engagements.

(1) B/1/2 engaged two tanks of B/7 Tk with his 106mm RR and three Dragons, losing nothing while killing the two Red tanks.

(2) Four minutes later, having been joined by the heavy tank section of 1/A/2 Tk, B/1/2 engaged four tanks of B/7 Tk, now joined with three BRDM (Sagger) of the 18th ATGM. This battle cost Blue one tank, but the four Red tanks and three Sagger vehicles were destroyed.

(3) A/1/2 engaged three tanks of A/7 Tk with his 106mm RR and three Dragons, losing the RR and one Dragon while killing the three Red tanks.

(4) Two minutes later, having been joined by the light tank section of 1/A/2 Tk, A/1/2 engaged three tanks of A/7 Tk, now joined by three BRDM (Sagger) of the 18th ATGM. This battle cost Blue two tanks, but the three Red tanks and three Sagger vehicles were destroyed.

c. As a result of these losses and the continued AM threat posed by Blue, Red dismounted at 0215 to continue his attack on foot. At 0230 he was 500 meters from the Blue position and for the remainder of the period the two forces were locked in close combat. With a force ratio of but 1.1, Red was able to advance 300 meters, taking 11 casualties against Blue's 28.

d. Supporting arms again played a major role. When Red dismounted Blue dumped 240 rounds of NGF and artillery on him, inflicting but 22 casualties. Red fired 180 rounds of artillery and 200 rocket rounds, inflicting 28 casualties on Blue.


e. During this last interval of the game there were 33 Red platoon-size targets within 3km of the Blue center of mass: 9 at 3-6km; 2 at 6-9km; 5 at 9-12km; 2 at 12-15km; and 2 over 15km.

f. End-game deployments of Red and Blue units are shown on Figure I-III-7.

9. Summary of Mission and Combat Effectiveness

a. Had Red entered close combat with a higher force ratio, which would have increased his advance rate, he would have forced Blue back somewhat on his position. However, Blue would have continued to occupy prepared positions, even though alternate. Had the game continued,

MARSAS I  
 BLUE AND RED UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
 0200, D+1



**MARSAS I  
BLUE AND RED UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
0300, D+1**




FIGURE I-III-7

Blue might well have held Red to no further advance, forcing him to commit his reserve battalion. Even if Red were to do this, the 9th MAB would probably have arrived in time to save situation and secure the beachhead.

b. The combat effectiveness factors for Blue and Red combat and combat support units at start-game (2200, D-day), start-close combat (0230, D+1), and end-game (0300, D+1) are as follows:

(1) Blue

<u>Unit</u>	<u>2200, D-day</u>		<u>0230, D+1</u>		<u>0300, D+1</u>	
	<u>% T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>% T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>% T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>
1/2 Inf	100	1.00	95	1.00	92	0.97
1/A/2 Tk	100	1.00	40	0.40	40	0.40
A/1/10 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
1/K/4/10 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
1/A/2AM	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00

(2) Red

4th MIB	100	1.00	92	0.96	90	0.96
5th MIB	100	1.00	86	0.90	84	0.83
4/7 Tk	100	1.00	40	0.40	40	0.40
B/7 Tk	100	1.00	10	Destroyed	10	Destroyed
15 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
A/1/16 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
G/3/16 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
18th ATGM	100	1.00	33	0.33	33	0.33
19th AAG	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
20th AAMG	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
A/21 SAM	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
22d Rcn	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00

Footnote: (1) Percentage of personnel for infantry, artillery, and air defense; percentage of tactical vehicles for all other units.  
 (2) Fractional combat effectiveness based upon % T/O or E, posture of unit and type of unit.

Tab A to Appendix 5 to Annex A

Task Organization - Blue

122d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)

122d MAU Headquarters

Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR

Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Rcn Bn

Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF

Det, SCAMP, FMF

1st Bn, 2d MAR (-) (rein)

H&S Co, 1/2 (-)

Co A (rein)

A/1/2

1st AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

1st Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co B (rein)

B/1/2

2d AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

2d Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

2d Sec (Hvy), 1st Plt, Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

Co C (rein)

C/1/2

3d AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

3d Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

3d Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

1st Sec (Lt), 1st Plt, Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt (-) (rein), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt (-), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

Det, H&S Co, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn

1st Plt, Co A, 2d Engr Bn

Det, Support Co, 2d Engr Bn

Det Coll Plt, C&C Co, 2d Med Bn

MAU Reserve

Co D (rein), 1st Bn, 2d MAR

D/1/2

4th AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

4th Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

MAU Artillery

Btry A (rein), 1st Bn, 10th MAR

A/1/10

Survey Team, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 10th MAR

Shore Fire Control Party, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 10th MAR

Cook Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 10th MAR

1st Plt, Btry K, 4th Bn, 10th MAR

MAU Aviation

122d Composite HMM Sqn

Det, VMA (V) Sqn

Det, VMA Sqn

Det, VMA (AW) Sqn

Det, VMFA Sqn

Det, VMCJ Sqn

122d Logistic Support Unit

Tab B to Appendix 5 to Annex A

Task Organization - Red

1st Mechanized Infantry Regiment (MIR)

1st Hq Co  
2d Commo Co  
3d MP Plt  
7th Tk Bn (-)  
22d Rcn Co (-)  
23d Engr Co (-)  
24th Chem Plt  
4th Mech Inf Bn (rein)

4th MIB  
Co A, 7th Tk Bn  
1st Plt, 18th ATGM Btry  
1st Plt, 19th AAG Btry  
1st Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
1st Plt, 22d Rcn Co  
3d Plt, 22d Rcn Co  
1st Plt, 23d Engr Co

5th Mech Inf Bn (rein)

5th MIB  
Co B, 7th Tk Bn  
2d Plt, 18th ATGM Btry  
2d Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
2d Plt, 22d Rcn Co  
2d Plt, 23d Engr Co

Regimental Reserve

6th MIB  
Co C, 7th Tk Bn  
3d Plt (Minelayer), 23d Engr Co

Regimental Artillery

14th Prov Fld Arty Bn  
14th Hq Plt  
15th Arty Btry  
Btry A, 1st Bn, 16th Arty Regt  
Btry G, 3d Bn, 16th Arty Regt  
Btry A, 17th RL Bn  
18th ATGM Btry (-)  
19th AAG Btry (-)  
20th AAMG Btry (-)  
Btry A, 21st SAM Bn

Regimental Logistic Support

25th MT Co  
26th Maint Co  
27th Supply Co  
28th Med Co

Annex B  
Report of War Game MARSAS II  
(Battalion in the Night Attack)

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Appendices

1. Troop Lists - Blue
2. Troop List - Red
3. Environmental Data
4. Description of Model I Game Play
5. Description of Model III Game Play

## Report of War Game MARSAS II

1. Political and Military Background. Saxet, a nation in the Soviet orbit, is a major Caribbean power which has been for years a thorn in the underbelly of the United States. "Yankee imperialism" and "dollar diplomacy" are typical of terms revived by the GOS for propaganda use on the masses in order to foster hatred for the US and all its works and thus, to foster continued support for the Saxet communist regime and all of its works. For many years the Saxet armed forces have been equipped and trained by the Soviets and are, today, leadership-dependent on USSR personnel.

### 2. General Situation - Blue

a. US-USSR detente became a dismal, but not so admitted, failure when the Soviets refused to continue the SALT negotiations. About the same time, US intelligence discovered that the Soviets were sending offensive missile parts to and constructing two launching site complexes in Saxet, much as they did in Cuba a decade earlier. This became public knowledge when the US asked the UN Security Council to take remedial action. Knowing any UN action would be blocked by Soviet veto, the US concurrently and secretly secured OAS agreement to support passively any US unilateral action which might follow UN inaction. Also, concurrently, the US staged the II MAF at various East Coast and Gulf of Mexico ports for an announced amphibious training exercise on the west coast of Florida.

b. When UN action was formally stymied by a Soviet veto, the US issued an ultimatum to Saxet to commence dismantling of the offensive missile systems within one week or the US would employ military force to do the dismantling for them. Saxet was unmoved by the threat, or didn't believe it, but the day after the ultimatum expired (7 August) the US proved it was not an idle threat by making a division-size airborne assault on the launching site complex in the interior and by landing the 9th MAB of the II MAF (the MAB having earlier departed its staging area at New Orleans) to inaugurate a beachhead in the vicinity of the other launching site complex, which is much nearer to the coast. The MAB will be followed in two days by the MAF, now enroute, to expand the beachhead from which follow-on US Army forces will launch the final assault.

c. The landing site selected by Blue because of the proximity of the offensive missile complex has excellent beach and sea conditions and is not heavily defended. Intelligence reports only a reinforced mechanized infantry regiment in the area. This regiment, apparently having no prepared beach defenses, offered only token opposition to the 9th MAB when it landed at 0600 on 7 August (D-day).

### 3. General Situation - Red

a. SALT negotiations between USSR and the USA have broken down. During

this period of dwindling detente the USSR demanded its "pound of flesh" from Saxet for the years of support by insisting on the installation of Soviet offensive missiles in two launching site complexes - one in the deep interior and one much nearer to the Saxeten coast. The Russian logic was that the US would then make concessions in order to avert nuclear warfare, which would ultimately result in the triumph of world communism. Before these sites could become operational, the entire project was uncovered by US intelligence and taken by the US to the UN Security Council with a request that immediate action be taken to remove the missiles and destroy the launchers.

b. When the USSR vetoed action by the UN Security Council, the US, apparently acting unilaterally, issued an ultimatum to Saxet to remove the missiles and destroy the sites in one week or the US would do it itself by armed intervention. Neither USSR nor Saxet felt that US would really risk world condemnation by an invasion, so the ultimatum was ignored and preparations for the nuclear missile threat to the US continued apace.

c. Saxet was well aware of the US capability to conduct an aerial, airborne, and/or amphibious assault, if it should so desire. It was also aware that an amphibious brigade had been staged at New Orleans and an amphibious division staged east from there, ostensibly to conduct exercises off Florida. What it had not foreseen was that the US really meant its ultimatum and that these amphibious forces were en route to Saxet. At the fatal week's end, 7 August, an estimated airborne division dropped near the deep interior launcher complex and that at 0600 on the same day an estimated US Marine regiment landed across the beach near the other launcher complex, in the sector of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Regiment (rein). It had been economically infeasible for Saxet to prepare beach defenses along its extensive Gulf of Mexico coastline, so it was possible for the 1st MIR to offer only token resistance to the landing.

#### 4. Special Situation - Blue

a. The 9th MAB landed by surface means only and is at present occupying a position along the ridge extending GS2782 to 3278 (Sheet 6446I, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topo Comd, 1:50,000). The MAB mission is to seize a beachhead for the II MAF, which is due in the AOA on D+2. The MAB had had local air superiority throughout D-day.

b. While the Red regiment is obviously withdrawing, it is not making a rapid withdrawal, but rather is conducting retire/delay operations. The axis of the enemy movement is south to Highway 36 and thence east. The rear guard actually conducting the retire/delay appears to be a reinforced mechanized infantry battalion. It has been moving mounted from delay position to delay position, making no attempt to defend or hold any of the positions.

c. The 1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR has been given the mission of maintaining

pressure on the withdrawing Red force and has been so doing, dismounted. 1/2 had been instructed to seize Objective 121 (285715 to 305705) ASAP, prepared to continue the attack to seize Objective 122 (RJ on Highway 36 at 285661). At 1945, D-day 1/2 was at Objective 121. At 2000, D-day Red commenced breaking contact and withdrawing due south. Having been in the attack all day, Blue was in no position to follow the Red movement (albeit it would still be foot against vehicle), but he estimated that, given the unbelievable esprit and training of his command, he would be able to reorganize/consolidate, take a breather, and push on at 2100.

d. Intelligence generated during D-day has provided the Blue commander with the following data:

(1) The rear guard MIB is reinforced with a tank company (10-T62), an artillery platoon (3-122mm how), and an ATGM platoon (3-BRDM with 6 sagger launchers on each).

(2) The MIR minus its rear guard has halted, apparently for the night, in the vicinity of The Grove (GS4060).

(3) The MIR has the capability of reinforcing its rear guard not only with its own units (two more MIBs, a tank battalion (-), a 122 how battery (-), an ATGM battery (-), an AAMG battery, and an AAG battery), but with other units which apparently represent its slice of division assets - 122mm MRL, 152mm How, and SA-6 missiles. The SAMs, of course, will automatically support the rear guard from The Grove.

(4) There are uncommitted Red tactical aircraft - SU7, MIG21, IL28, and helicopters.

(5) No ground radars have been seen, nor is Red known to have any surveillance and target acquisition equipment.

(6) Red apparently has casualties on the order of 5%, but no major items such as tanks, tracks, or tubes have been discerned destroyed.

##### 5. Special Situation - Red

a. The mission of the 1st MIR is to conduct retire/delay operations in its sector, sacrificing space for time for the 1st MID to react. The hostile regiment initially seized the high ground, GS2782 to 3278 (Sheet 6446I, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topo Comd, 1:50,000), behind the landing beach, sending an estimated reinforced battalion, dismounted, to keep contact with the 1st MIR. Actually, the contact was with the regimental rear guard, the 6th MIB (rein), as the regiment had made a rapid move to the vicinity of The Grove. The 6th MIB was executing the retire/delay mission by moving mounted between defensive positions and making no attempt to hold these positions.

b. At 1945, 7 August the Blue battalion (reinforced with a few tanks and Amtracs) was on the high ground extending from GS287515 to 305705, which has been the 6th MIB's latest delay position. By 2000 the enemy had made no attempt to advance farther and it was logically concluded by the Red commander that after a day of fire and movement that Blue battalion would dig in for the night. Therefore he broke contact in order to move as fast as possible to the vicinity of GS265675 to 295663 along Highway 36, where he planned to prepare a hasty defensive position that he might hold, at least for the night.

c. During the day's fighting the 6th MIB had sustained about 5% casualties, but had lost no major items of material.

#### 6. Instructions to the Blue Team Commander

a. Submit separate operations orders for your attack, using MARSAS Model III organization and equipment for one and MARSAS Model I for the other. These orders should be in standard format and be effective as of 2000, D-day.

b. Essential information to be contained on the orders should include the concept of operations and plans for employment of unattended ground sensors (UGS), surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices, patrols, communications, and barriers. Also to be provided are an air schedule and preplanned and on-call artillery and naval gunfire missions for the period 2000, D-day to 0500 D+1.

c. Troop lists and lists of major combat items are attached as Appendix 1. Although only 1/2 (rein) will be gamed, you are authorized the indicated slice of 9th MAB aircraft and the naval gunfire support of the CLG and one DD.

d. Environmental data are attached as Appendix 3.

e. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) will not be played.

#### 7. Instructions to the Red Controller

a. Prepare an operations plan as of 2000, D-day for the 6th MIB (rein) withdrawal to and defense of the defensive position prescribed in para 5b above. Fire missions and air schedule should cover the period from which contact was broken (2000, 7 August) to 0500, 8 August.

b. Troop list, summary of major weapons, and pertinent T/OEs are attached as Appendix 2.

c. Environmental data are provided in Appendix 3.

d. ECM will not be played.

Appendix 1  
Troop Lists - Blue

1. 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (skeleton organization)

a. Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Regiment  
Co A, 2d Tank Bn, FMF

b. Aviation Combat Element (1st MAW)

VMA Squadron (20-A4M, 6 available to 1/2)  
VMA-V Squadron (20-AV8A, 4 available to 1/2)  
VMFA Squadron (15-F4J, 4 available to 1/2)  
VMA(AW) Squadron (10-A6A, 4 available to 1/2)  
Det, VM CJ (4-RF4B and 4-FA6A, 2 each available to 1/2)  
HMA Squadron (24-AH1J, 6 available to 1/2)  
HML Squadron (24-UH1N, 4 available to 1/2)  
HMM Squadron (20-CH46E, 12 available to 1/2)  
HMH Squadron (20-CH53D, 4 available to 1/2)  
ASRT No. 1

c. Combat Support Element

1st Bn, 10th Marine Regiment  
Btry K, 4th Bn, 10th Marine Regiment  
2d 8" Battery, 2d FAG, FMF  
Co A, 2d Amphibious Tractor Battalion  
Co A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion  
1st Plt, 2d Force Reconnaissance Company

d. Naval Gunfire Element

<u>Ship Side No.</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Comment</u>
CLG-4(1)	1-6"/47 twin	DD963A
	1-5"/38 twin	Available to 1/2
DD931A	3-5"/54 RF single	
DD931B	3-5"/54 RF single	
DD931C	3-5"/54 RF single	
DD963A	2-5"/54 single	
DD063B	2-5"/54 single	

Footnote: (1) withdrawn from fleet reserve for this operation.

2. 1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR

	<u>Off, incl USN</u>		<u>FM, incl USN</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>
<u>Ground Combat Element</u>						
1st Bn, 2d MAR	48	42	1183	1038	1231	1080
1st Plt (rein), Co A						
2d Tk Bn, FMF	1	1	26	26	27	27
<u>Combat Support Element</u>						
Radio Relay Sec,						
HQ Co, 2d MAR	4	4	4	4	8	8

2. 1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR (cont)

	<u>Off, incl USN</u>		<u>EM, incl USN</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>
Det., 2d Radio Bn, FMF	2	2	44	44	46	46
Btry A (rein), 1st Bn, 10th MAR	11	11	136	136	147	147
1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Recon Bn	1	1	26	26	27	27
Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF	1	1	7	7	8	8
Det, SCAMP, Fire 1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn	0	0	11	11	11	11
1st Plt, Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn	1	1	50	50	51	51
1st Plt, Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn	1	1	41	41	42	42
<u>Combat Service Support Element</u>						
1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d MT Bn	1	1	34	34	35	35
Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn	1	1	17	17	18	18
Totals	72	66	1579	1434	1651	1500

3. Personnel Comparison of Model I and Model III Infantry Battalions:  
Tab A.

4. Table of Candidate Equipment (major combat end items), Infantry  
Battalion: Model I, Tab B; Model III, Tab C.

5. Equipment Comparisons of Model I and Model III

- a. Weapons: Tab D
- b. Surveillance and Target Acquisition: Tab E
- c. Position Reporting and Location System: Tab F

Personnel Comparison (incl USN)

<u>Battalion Elements</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model III</u>
H&S Company	24-379	22-378
Bn Hq	13(1)-22	11(1)-22
Comm Plat	1-60	1-52
Service Plat	2-53	2-53
Medical Plat	2-65	2-65
Chaplain Sec	1-1	1-1
Company Hq	2-16	2-7
Mortar Plat	2-94	2-104
106mm RR/AT/Assault Plat	1-39	1-33
STA Plat	0(1)-29	0(1)-41
Rifle Company(4)	- 6-201	5-165
Co Hq	2-7	2-11
Wpns Plat	1-65	None
Plt Hq	(1-2)	(None)
MG Sec	(0-28)	(None)
60mm Mortars	(0-13)	(None)
Assault Sec	(0-22)	0-10
Rifle Plat(3)	1-43	1-48
Plat Hq	(1-4)	(1-3)
Rifle Squad(3)	(0-13)	(0-13)
Fire Tm(3)	(0-4)	(0-4)
STA Squad	(None)	(0-6)
<b>Total</b>	<b>48-1183</b>	<b>42-1038</b>

Footnote: (1) Bn S-2 has additional duty as STA Plt cmdr.

MODEL I  
TABLE OF CANDIDATE EQUIPMENT  
(MAJOR COMBAT END ITEMS)  
MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION STUDY

ITEM OF EQUIPMENT		UNIT		TOTALS	
RIFLE, M16A1	223				
GRENADE LAUNCHER, M203					108
60MM MORTAR					12 (12)
3.5 RKT LAUNCHER				4	4
PISTOL, M1911A1	180				160
M-191 MPFW					12 (12)
MG, M60					24 (24) (12)
106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE	8	8			(8)
81MM MORTAR	8				(8)
AN/TVS-4 NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICE					4
AN/PPS-15, MTI SURV RADAR					8
TRUCK, CARGO 1/4T, M151				20	20
TRUCK, PLATFORM, 1/4T, M274				30	30
TRUCK, AMBULANCE, M718				1	1
MRC-83				2	2
MRC-87				1	1
MRC-109				2	2
MRC-123				2	2
MRC-124				1	1
MRC-134				2	2
H&S COMPANY					
BN HQ					
COMB PLT					
SVC PLT					
COMPANY HQ					
81MM MORTAR PLT					
106MM RR PLT					
STA PLT					
(4) RIFLE COMPANY					
COMPANY HQ					
(1) WEAPONS PLT					
(3) RIFLE PLT					
TOTALS					

\*Includes 108 Automatic Rifles, M16A1

Tab B  
Appendix 1 to  
Annex B



**MODEL III  
TABLE OF CANDIDATE EQUIPMENT  
(MAJOR COMBAT END ITEMS)  
MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION STUDY**

RIFLE, M16A1														208
GRENADE LAUNCHER, M203														
M191, MPFW														
PISTOL, AUTO														191
106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE														4
DRAGON, MISSILE W/LAUNCHER														12
HEAR/SAW														
81MM MORTAR (ADVANCED)														12
MTI, LONG RANGE RADAR														4
MULTIPURPOSE LASER														4
E-O ANGLE MEAS. DEVICE														4
MTI, Med, RANGE RADAR														
E-O SURV DEVICE, LONG RANGE														4
E-O SURV DEVICE, MED RANGE														
POSITION, LOCATION AND REPORTING SYS (USER SET)														8
WPV, NIGHT VISION SIGHT, W/PVS-4														(2)
POCKETSCOPE														
TRUCK, CARGO, 1/4T M151														
TRUCK, PLATFORM, 1/4T M274														20
TRUCK, CARGO, 1-1/4T M561														7
TRUCK, AMBULANCE														1
MRC-83														
MRC-87														2
MRC-109														1
MRC-123														2
UNIT														
H&S COMPANY														
BN HQ														(2)
COMM PLT														
SVC PLT														
COMPANY HQ														
STA PLT														(4)
LIGHT WEIGHT MORTAR PLT														(2)
ANTITANK ASSAULT PLT														
(4) RIFLE COMPANIES														
COMPANY HQ														
ASSAULT SECTION														
(3) RIFLE PLTS														
STA SQUAD														
TOTALS														

Tab C  
Appendix 1 to  
Annex B



**Weapons Comparison  
(Individual Weapons Not Shown)**

Battalion Elements

H&S Company

Company Hq  
Mortar Plat  
Wpns Plat

Model I

4 3.5 Rocket Launchers  
8 81mm Mortars (M29A1)  
8 106mm RR

Model III

12 81mm Mortars (Advanced)  
4 106mm RR, 12 DRAGON Trasker  
24 Missiles

Rifle Company (4)

Wpns Plat

MG Sec  
60mm Mortars  
Assault Sec

6 M-60  
3 M-19  
3 MPFW, 12 LAW

None  
None  
3 MPFW, LAW as issued

Rifle Plat (3)

Plat Hq  
Rifle Squad (3)  
Fire Tm (3)

13 M-16  
4 M-16

3 SAW, 10 M-16 (or follow-on)  
1 SAW, 3 M-16 (or follow-on)

**Surveillance and Target Acquisition Equipment Comparison**

Battalion STA Elements

Model I

Model III

STA Platoon,

H&S Company

STA Squad,

Rifle Platoon,  
Rifle Company

Rifle Squad,

Rifle Platoon  
Rifle Company

8 AN/PPS-15 Radar

4 AN/TVS-4 Night Observation  
Device (MOD)

4 Long Range MTI Radar

4 Long Range E-O Surv. Devices

4 Multipurpose Lasers

4 E-O Angle Measurement Devices

1 Medium Range MTI Radar

1 Medium Range E-O Surveillance  
Device

1 Multipurpose Laser

1 E-O Angle Measurement Device

1 Rifle Night Vision Sight

1 Pocketscope (or follow-on)

**Position Location and Reporting System Comparison**

<u>Battalion Elements</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model III</u>
H&S Company	Map & Compass Oriented	Map & Compass Retained PLRS Added
Mortar Plat Bn Hq STA Plt	Map & Compass Map & Compass None	2 PLRS User Sets (2) 2 PLRS User Sets (2) 4 PLRS User Sets (4)
Rifle Company (4)	Map & Compass	1 PLRS User Set (4)
Co Hq Wpns Plat MG Sec 60mm Mortars		None None
Rifle Plat (3)	Map & Compass	1 PLRS User Set (12)
Plat Hq Rifle Squad (3) Fire Tm (3) STA Squad	None	(Uses Platoon PLRS)
		<b>Total PLRS 24</b>

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B  
Troop List - Red

1. 1st Mechanized Infantry Regiment (skeleton organization)

a. Ground Combat Element

4th Mech Inf Bn  
5th MIB  
6th MIB  
7th Tk Bn

b. Aviation Combat Element

8th Ftr/Bomber Flt (4-SU7)  
9th Intcptr Flt (4-MIG21)  
10th Intcptr Flt (4-MIG21)  
11th Lt Bomber Flt (4-IL28)  
12th Lt Helo Flt (8-HOTLIGHT)  
13th Med Helo Flt (4-HIP)

c. Combat Support Element

15th Arty Btry (122 How)  
A/1/16 Arty (122 How)  
G/3/16 Arty (152 How)  
A/17 RL (122MRL)  
18th ATGM Btry (BRDM w/AT-3)  
19th AAG Btry (23 SPAAG)  
20th AAMG Btry (14.5 AAMG)  
A/21 SAM (SA-6)  
22d Rcn Co  
23d Engr Co

2. 6th Bn (rein), 1st Mech Inf Regt

a. Gnd Cbt Element

6th MIB  
Co C, 7th Tk Bn

b. Cbt Spt Element


3d Plt, (rein), 15th Arty  
3d Plt, 18th ATGM Btry  
Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co  
Minelayer Plt, 23d Engr Co

Authorized			Total Str 2100, 7 Aug
Off	Em	Total	
27	433	460	435
5	39	44	40
1	28	29	25
1	5	6	5
0	6	6	5
1	17	18	14
TOTAL	35	528	563
			524

3. The above troop list will be the same for the Model I and Model III games.

4. Tables of Organization and Equipment. Tabs A through J.

# MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION (REINFORCED)



## WEAPONS

- 518 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 27 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK
- 34 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9
- 31 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)
- 3 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30
- 5 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT
- 10 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, VEH MOUNT

## TACTICAL VEHICLES


### NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

- 10 - MED TANK, T-62
- 3 - ATGM LNCHR VEH, BRDM
- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM
- 30 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P
- 3 - MOTORCYCLE, M-72
- 4 - MINELAYER, SP ARMD

## MISC.

- 3 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET
- 2 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1
- 2 - PERIS AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 89 - RADIOS

# MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



4-1-5-1

## WEAPONS

- 423 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 27 - 7.62 mm LMG, RPK
- 26 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 2 - 73 mm RG, SPG-9
- 27 - 85 mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)
- 4 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT


## TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

- 1 - ARM'D CO:MD VEH, ERDM
- 30 - ARM'D PERS CARR, BTR-50P

## MISC.

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2.
- 62 - RADIOS

**HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



R-2-C-1

**WEAPONS**

32 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM

4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM

2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9

1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7

2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT

**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

1 - ARMED COMD VEH, BRDM


**MISC.**

12 - RADIOS

Tab C

Appendix 3 to Annex B

**MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 117 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 9 - 7.62 mm LMG, RPK
- 6 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 9 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

- 10 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P

**MISC.**

- 15 - RADIOS

**TANK COMPANY,  
TANK BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

39 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM  
5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

10 - MED TANK, T-62

**MISC.**

3 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET  
14 - RADIOS

**MORTAR BATTERY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 40- 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)


**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**

NONE

**MISC.**

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 5 - RADIOS

**HOWITZER PLATOON (REINFORCED),  
 HOWITZER BATTERY  
 MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



B-2-G-1

**WEAPONS**

- 28 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 1 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 3 - 122 mm HOW (TOWED), D-30
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
 NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**

NONE

**MISC.**


- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-3A
- 2 - RADIOS

**ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILE PLATOON,  
 ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILE BATTERY,  
 MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



WEAPONS	TACTICAL VEHICLES	MISC.
5 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM	3 - ATGM LNCHR VEH (BRDM)	4 - RADIOS
1 - 9mm PISTOL, PM		
3 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7		
18 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, VEH MOUNT		

**SCOUT SECTION,  
RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



<b>WEAPONS</b>	<b>TACTICAL VEHICLES</b>	<b>MISC.</b>
<b>6-7.62mm RIFLE, AKM</b>	<b>3 - MOTORCYCLE, M-72</b>	<b>3- RADIOS</b>

**MINELAYER PLATOON,  
ENGINEER COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



<b>WEAPONS</b>	<b>TACTICAL VEHICLES</b>	<b>MISC.</b>
17 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM	4 - MINELAYER, SP ARMD	4 - RADIOS
1 - 9mm PISTOL, PM		
1 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7		

Appendix 3  
Environmental Data

1. Terrain

a. The terrain of the AOA is exactly as depicted on Sheet 64461, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topographic Command map, 1:50,000. Digitized terrain profiles will be made from this map. For game purposes it is assumed that Coryell Creek/Clear Branch is the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, Highway 84 is a coastal highway, and the Leon River is fordable.

b. Game play will be conducted on the Geological Survey map, 1:24,000. Overlays, therefore, should be at this scale.

c. Other map coverage of the AOA, such as Orthopictomap 1:25,000, Experimental Ground Tactical Data 1:25,000, Vehicle Movement 1:50,000, Foot Movement 1:50,000, Concealment 1:50,000, and Foxhole Construction and Existing Cover 1:50,000 is available for use in developing planning information.

2. Astronomic

<u>Date</u>	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>Moon Rise</u>	<u>Moon Set</u>	<u>Moon Phase</u>
7 Aug (D-day)	0417	0521	1841	1946	0045	1038	Last qtr.
8 Aug (D+1)	0418	0522	1839	1943	0145	1121	

3. Weather. The 24-hour weather forecast issued at 1200, D-day is for clear skies, with a few scattered clouds giving a maximum of 5% cloud cover. Visibility will be 10-15 miles. Temperatures will range from 75° to 100° and relative humidity from 30% to 40%. Winds will be light, 4-6 knots, and generally southerly.

Appendix 4 to Annex B  
Description of Model I Game Play

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8. 0001-0100, D+1 . . . . .	B-4-11
9. 0101-0200, D+1 . . . . .	B-4-11
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Tabs

A. Task Organization - Blue

B. Task Organization - Red

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II-I-1C	Blue Radar Deployments . . . . .	B-4-5
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## 1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of MARSAS II, with the current Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model I surveillance and target acquisition (STA) capability. The game portrays a night attack by a reinforced battalion at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red reinforced mechanized infantry battalion conducting retire/delay operations as a regimental rear guard. Game play commenced 5 June 1974 and was completed on 14 June 1974.

b. Game play began at 2000, D-day (7 August) as Red broke contact and commenced his withdrawal to his next defensive position. Assessment intervals were of one hour duration, with game play terminating at 0300, D+1. A summary of each of these seven intervals appears below.

## 2. Concept of Operations - Blue

a. Upon seizing Objective 121, the 1st Bn, 2d MAR will reorganize to continue the attack, initially at least non-illuminated, to seize Objective 122 ASAP. The attack, dismounted, will be conducted with three companies abreast. (Figure II-I-1A).

(1) B/1/2 (rein), in the center, will seize, occupy, and defend Objective A.

(2) C/1/2 (rein), on the right, will seize, occupy, and defend Objective 122 and, on order, will revert to battalion reserve.

(3) D/1/2 (rein), on the left, will seize, occupy, and defend Objective B.

(4) A/1/2 (rein) is designated as battalion reserve, prepared, on order, to establish a blocking position at the Highway 36 road junction just south of division reconnaissance team no. 3.

(5) Priority of Fires:

(a) 81mm mortar platoon to B/1/2 and C/1/2.


(b) A/1/10 to D/1/2

b. The scheme of maneuver and pre-assault reconnaissance team deployments are shown on Figure II-I-1A. Locations of serially-emplanted sensors and serially-sowed mines to detect and impede reinforcement of the Red rear guard battalion by its parent regiment in the vicinity of The Grove, are shown on Figure II-I-1B.

c. Figure II-I-1C shows the location of the two operating PPS 15 radars at start game and the planned deployment for two PPS 15 (in dotted lines) as the game progresses. PPS 15 Nos. 1 and 3 are the two initially operating; night observation device (NOD) No. 1 operating with the former and NOD No. 2 with the latter. PPS 15 No. 2 is back-up for PPS 15 No. 1 and PPS 15 No. 4 for PPS 15 No. 3. These radars and NODs will cease operation and be prepared for deployment in the objective area once PPS 15 No. 5, PPS 15 No. 7, and NOD No. 3 and 4 have been established.

1000000 25

## BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL I)



LOD - LINE OF DEPARTURE  
 PLB - PROBABLE LINE OF BATTLE  
 PLD - PHASE LINE  
 LOA - LIMIT OF ADVANCE  
 PLB - PHASE LINE BLUE

1A 2 FRC

SCALE 1:50,000

As in the initial situation, PPS 15 Nos. 6 and 8 will be back-up for PPS 15 Nos. 5 and 7. Upon seizing the objectives, four PPS 15 and associated NODs will be placed to provide 360° coverage, each radar with the visual 90° search fan and each with a PPS 15 backup.

d. Task organization is shown on Tab A to this appendix.

### 3. Concept of Operations - Red

a. The 6th MIB (rein) has been conducting retire/delay operations as the rear guard of the 1st MIR (rein). If the enemy succeeds in taking the delaying position on the high ground extending from 287515 to 305705, the 6th MIB will again break contact and withdraw mounted to Highway 36, prepare a hasty defensive position in the vicinity of 265675-295663, and hold the position for the night. The companies will be deployed abreast on this position, with each positioning a platoon reinforced with a tank platoon on the COPL. These combat outposts will withdraw as the situation dictates and will not accept excessive casualties in delaying any Blue attack. One platoon of I/6 is designated as battalion reserve.

b. The engineer minelaying will lay nuisance minefields on the road leading into the H/5 sector. The direct support howitzer battery will dedicate one tube in support of each rifle company.

c. The withdrawal routes and defense plan of Red is depicted on Figure II-I-2.

d. Task organization is shown on Tab B to this appendix.

### 4. 2000-2100, D-day

a. This interval was characterized by each side initiating operations. Red 6/1 commenced breaking contact at 2000 and moving mounted to the planned defensive position. The COPL was manned at 2010 and the battalion was closed in the new delay position at 2030. Blue 1/2, after setting up his two radars, spent the hour reorganizing for the attack, which he would be ready to launch, dismounted, at 2102. If not delayed, he expected to arrive at his objectives about 0100, D+1, which he expected would not be seized without opposition.


b. Early in the interval PPS 15 No. 1 and NOD No. 1 detected the withdrawal of Red G/6 and PPS 15 No. 3 and NOD No. 2 the withdrawal of I/6. Both of these targets were lost by 2015, although division reconnaissance team No. 2 picked up I/6, halted, at 2030. The withdrawal of H/6 was undetected, but of course Blue knew contact was broken all along the line.

c. The A-6 MTI aircraft on station at start-game attacked G/6 and destroyed a BTR and also a tank in the attached I/C/7Tk. The A-6 was shot down by a SA-6 shortly thereafter.


# MARSAS II BLUE MINEFIELD AND SENSOR PLAN (MODEL I)

OBJ A

OBJ B




MAKSAS II  
BLUE RADAR DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)



B-4-5

FIGURE I-I-1C

MARSAS II  
 RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL i)



- AXIS WITHDRAWAL
- - - COP WITHDRAWAL ROUTE
- ⋯ Scout ROUTE
- ☒ MINEFIELD



FIGURE 2 . . .

d. Late in the interval Blue A/1/10 fired 60 rounds and naval guns another 60, causing 3 casualties in Red I/6 (whose location had been reported by a recon team). In the first half of the hour, the Red 122mm platoon fired 60 rounds (aurally detected by division reconnaissance team No. 3), inflicting 5 casualties each on B/1/2 and C/1/2.

e. In this game there were 25 platoon-size Red targets. At end-interval four were 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 20 were at 3-6 km, and one was at 6-9 km.

f. Red and Blue unit deployments at 2100, D-day are shown on Figure II-I-3.

#### 5. 2101-2200, D-day

a. At 2101 the three Blue assault companies moved out in the approach march to the attack positions (Figure II-I-1A), with the battalion reserve (A/1/2) being left on Objective 121. During the hour C/1/2, B/1/2, and D/1/2 moved without incident approximately 1.3 km, 2-400m short of their attack positions. Near the end of this assessment period they were aurally detected by the Red COPs, illumination was called for and began at end-interval, as did small arms fire by the outposts of G/6 and H/6 on C/1/2 and B/1/2 respectively.

b. The radar detections made in the prior hour terminated when the Red movement ceased at the COPL. Blue, suspecting that this might be the reason for the loss of these targets (which were really the Red flank companies, G/6 and I/6), carried NOD Nos. 3 and 4 with C/1/2 and B/1/2. This distribution was premised on the fact that there was no detected target in front of Co B, whereas the target in front of Co D was under reconnaissance team observation. At 2145 NOD No. 3 discovered the G/6 outpost and called for supporting arms. There were no radar detections in this interval.

c. At mid-interval three A4s illuminated Red I/6, whose location had previously been reported by recon team, attacked, and destroyed one BTR and eight infantrymen. The fourth A-4 was shot down by a SA-6 en-route to the target. At interval's end Blue had two helicopter gunships on station with the mission of watching for firing by Red artillery so that, hopefully, they might silence it.


d. During the interval the Red 122mm platoon did dump 120 rounds on the Blue start-game position, which cost HS/1/2 11 casualties. Blue in turn fired 60 rounds each with his 105mm battery, CLG, and DD, giving B/6 but 3 casualties.

e. At end-interval there were five Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2. 19 were at 3-6 km, and one was at 6-9 km.

# MARSAS II

## BLUE & RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)

2100, D-DAY



SCALE IN KMS  
FIGURE II - I - 3

f. Red unit deployments at 2200, D-day were unchanged and Blue are essentially the same as shown on Figure II-I-3, except that the Blue assault companies were 1.3 km south of the positions shown.

6. 2201-2300, D-day

a. Inasmuch as the Blue commander was sure the small arms fire came from combat outposts, he continued his advance, reaching the planned attack positions at mid-period. At this time Red ceased illuminating the battlefield because his COP withdrew to avoid close combat and there was no one left to observe Blue. Blue, of course, continued to move south of the attack positions, advancing 1.1 km during the hour. The battalion CP and battalion reserve remained in their start game positions.

b. While the center Red H/6 COP platoon was detected only by inference of the small arms fire from the south on B/1/2, NOD No. 3 which was observing the G/6 COP actually saw it withdraw at 2231. Further, division reconnaissance team No. 2 reported the withdrawal of the I/6 COP, which was also detected by the A6 aircraft on station. There was no ground radar detections during the period.

c. Blue had a number of air missions up. The A6 just mentioned did not make an attack because he detected four vehicles and his SOP to attack required a target of five or more vehicles. Two helicopter gunships searched fruitlessly for the artillery battery division reconnaissance team No. 3 had reported hearing firing to its west. Two A4s also were unable to locate the SA-6 launchers which had been causing Blue aircraft losses. At end-interval they requested dump instructions. Also at end-interval four AV8s came on station, requesting targets.

d. Blue fired no artillery or naval guns during the interval as he had no suitable targets. Red, during the period he illuminated and could observe from the COPL, fired 60 rounds, inflicting 16 casualties each on C/1/2 and B/1/2.

e. At end-interval there were seven Red platoon-size targets 0-3km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2 and 18 that were at 3-6 kms.

f. Red and Blue deployments at 2300, D-day are shown on Figure II-I-4.

7. 2301-2400, D-day

a. The Blue assault companies moved 1.1 km without opposition and the reserve displaced forward slightly to get out of the target area known to Red. Not being under illumination or observation, Red did not fire on the advancing companies nor did Blue fire any artillery or naval guns on Red, as he, in turn, had no located targets.

b. At start-interval PPS 15 Nos. 5 and 7 (with PPS 15 Nos. 6 and 8 as backup) were set up as shown on Figure II-I-1C. They made no detections as nothing Red was moving.

**MARSAS II**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)**  
**2300, D-DAY**





FIGURE II-1-4

c. Except for the advance of the Blue companies, the only activity during the period was Blue aircraft searching for targets. Two F4s attacked I/6, detected earlier by a recon team, inflicting two casualties. The two gunships were still looking unsuccessfully for the Red artillery battery, the fact that it wasn't firing being a major factor. An A6 destroyed a tank and two A4s and 4 AV8s finding no targets dumped on Objective 122, causing 11 casualties in H/6 and the attached engineers.

d. At end-interval there were 20 Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass (B/1/2) of Blue 1/2 and five that were at 3-6 km.

e. Red and Blue deployments at 2400, 7-day are shown on Figure II-I-5.

#### 8. 0001-0100, D+1

a. The Blue assault companies continued to move toward their respective objectives during the hour. At mid-period, C/1/2 entered the Red minefield (Figure II-I-2) at the Leon River taking three casualties and moving off the road to escape the probability of more mines. The explosions having given Red an indication where the Blue force was, he illuminated and fired 90 rounds in that river crossing area. C/1/2 took 13 casualties because of this. The illumination helped Blue by allowing him to increase his advance rate, moving 1.4 km during the interval. At 0035 all three companies were across the Leon River at Phase Line Blue and at 0100 they were but 100m north of the PLD (Figure II-I-1A).

b. There were no PPS 15 or NOD detections during the hour.

c. The two helicopters which were searching for the Red artillery battery were still not successful. In fact, aviation did not play any role in the interval. Red shot down the one A6 that was up with a SA-6 missile.

d. During the last half of the interval A/1/10, the CLG, and a destroyer fired 60 rounds each of preparatory fire on the three Blue objectives (Figure II-I-1A). Damage was minimal, Red H/6 sustaining two casualties and HS/6 one.


e. At 0100 there were 22 Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of the Blue attack, with the other three at 3-6 km.

f. Red and Blue deployments at 0100, D+1 are shown on Figure II-I-6.


#### 9. 0101-0200, D+1

a. At 0110 the Blue assault companies crossed the planned line of departure (Figure II-I-1A), deployed, and advanced 500 meters before engaging in ground combat at 1330. Ground combat was in essence an attack by two companies (C/1/2 and B/1/2) supported by the battalion

**MARSAS II**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)**  
**BLUE RADAR REDEPLOYMENTS**  
**2400, D-DAY**



**MANSAS I**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)**  
**0100, D+1**



SCALE IN KMS  
 FIGURE II-1-6

81mm mortar platoon against an entire Red battalion, except for two infantry platoons too distant on each Red flank to be involved. Blue had a force ratio of only 0.33, so it is not surprising that he was unable to advance. He took 11 casualties to the Red's four. The third assault company (D/1/2) had no opposition and, over difficult terrain, moved another 300m, being just short of Objective B (Figure II-I-1A) at end-interval.

b. At 0130 the engineer platoon moved down to the Leon River and by 0200 had cleared the minefield that C/1/2 entered the last hour. The battalion reserve (A/1/2) remained in its original position, but, being mounted in LVTs and having the tank platoon with it, was capable of being committed in the ground battle in a quarter hour.

c. There were no radar-associated equipment detections during the hour, but at 0130 the two gunships finally detected the Red howitzer battery firing and called for fire support and aviation attack. Of course, the companies in contact had a number of targets by ground visual means.

d. Air support did not arrive during the interval for the battery attack. Blue was further hampered by having one of the two F4s (carrying only flares) on station shot down by a SA-6 at 0115.

e. During the hour Blue fired 150 rounds of 105mm and 360 rounds from naval guns, inflicting one casualty on the Red antitank platoon, two on H/6, and 15 on the light artillery battery. While one prime mover was destroyed in the latter, all tubes were still intact. However, the battery became ineffective due to the personnel losses. Before this happened, Red had fired 120 rounds of 122m against the attackers, giving C/1/2 and B/1/2 nine casualties each.

f. At 0200 there were 23 Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of the Blue attack, with the other two at 3-6 km.

g. Red and Blue deployments at 0200, D+1 are shown on Figure II-I-7.

#### 10. 0201-0300 (end-game), D+1

a. At the beginning of this interval both Blue and Red commanders made tactical decisions based on the past half-hour of combat. Blue committed his reserve (A/1/2 rein) on an envelopment of the Red west flank and ordered D/1/2, which had not been engaged, to make an envelopment of the Red east flank. Red ordered the two infantry platoons on each of his flanks to join, in a mounted move, their parent companies now engaged in battle. Unit moves to implement these decisions were completed at 0230.

b. Close combat between 0201-0230 still saw the two attacking Blue companies with a force ratio of but 0.33. They gained no ground, took

**MARSAS II  
BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)  
0200, D+1**




FIGURE II-1-7

nine casualties, and inflicted three. In the battle from 0230 to 0300 Blue 1/2 had a force ratio of 0.56 in his double envelopment attack against the entire Red 6th MIB, advanced 100m, and took another nine casualties. The Red battalion gave no ground and lost but another three casualties.

c. All detections during the interval were ground visual by the engaged companies. The two Blue PPS radars in operation (para 7b, above) did not detect the movement of the Red flank platoons during the first half hour as line of sight to them did not exist.

d. At 0201 Blue commenced lighting the battlefield like day with 250 rounds of 105mm artillery and naval guns, all supporting arms being dedicated exclusively to this mission. Red, of course, fired no artillery because his 122m battery had become ineffective during the prior hour (para 9e, above). Red did request additional fire support from 1st MIR, but did not get it before the interval's end.

e. During the hour Blue intensified his aircraft activity, using most of the planes available to him. At 0220 two AV8s again attacked the Red artillery battery (3/A/15), not knowing it was already ineffective, destroying two tubes, a prime mover, and ten more gunners. In the closing minutes of the game, two A-4s attacked Objective A and one AV8 (one having been lost to a SA-6 en route to the target) attacked Objective 122, causing four casualties in H6 and five in I/6.

f. At 0300 there were still 23 Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2 and two at 3-6 km.

g. Red and Blue deployments at 0300, D+1 are shown on Figure II-I-8.

11. Summary of Combat Effectiveness. The unit effectiveness factors for Blue and Red combat and combat support units at start-game (2000, D-day), start-close combat (0130, D+1), and end-game (0300, D+1) are as follows:

Blue	2000, D-day		0130, D+1		0300, D+1	
	% T/O or E	CE	% T/O or E	CE	% T/O or E	CE
1/2 Inf	100	1.00	94	0.96	90	0.96
1A/2 Tk	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
A/1/10 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
1/A/2 AM	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
<u>Red</u>						
6th MIB	95	1.00	87	0.96	83	0.94
C/7 Tk	100	1.00	80	0.80	80	0.80
3/15 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	0	0
3/18 ATGM	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00

**Footnotes:**

- (1) Personnel for infantry and artillery, tactical vehicles for others.
- (2) Combat effectiveness based upon % T/O or E, posture and unit type.

MARSAS II  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)  
 0300, D+1




FIGURE 2-1-0

Tab A to Appendix 4 to Annex B

Task Organization - Blue

1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR

H&S Co (-), 1/2

Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR

Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Rcn Bn

Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF

Det, SCAMP, FMF

Co B (rein), 1/2

B/1/2

2d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co C (rein), 1/2

C/1/2

3d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co D (rein), 1/2

D/1/2

4th Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Reserve

A/1/2 (rein), 1/2

A/1/2

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt, Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn

1st Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Fire Support

A/1/10 (rein)

Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Combat Service Support

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d MT Bn

Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn

Tab B to Appendix 4 to Annex B  
Task Organization - Red

6th Bn (rein), 1st MIR (rein)

H&S Co (-), 6th MIB

Co C (-), 7th Tk Bn

Co G (rein), 6th MIB

G/6/1

1/C/7 Tk

1st Tm, Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Co H (rein), 6th MIB

H/6/1

2/C/7 Tk

2d Tm, Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Minelayer Plt, 23d Engr Co

Co I (rein)(-), 6th MIB

I/6/1 (-)

3/C/7 Tk

3d Tm, Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Battalion Reserve

1/I/6/1

Battalion Fire Support

Mort Btry, 6th MIB

3d Plt, 15 Arty Btry

AT Plt, H&S Co, 6th MIB

3d Plt, 18th ATGM Co

Appendix 5 to Annex B  
Description of Model III Game Play

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8. 0001-0100, D+1 . . . . .	B-5-11
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- B. Task Organization - Red

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## 1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of War Game MARSAS II, with the Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model III surveillance and target acquisition (STA) and advanced weapons systems. The game portrays a night attack by a reinforced battalion at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red reinforced mechanized infantry battalion acting as a regimental rear guard, the identical threat employed against the Blue reinforced Model I battalion. Game play commenced 28 May 1974 and was completed on 4 June 1974.

b. As in the Model I game (Appendix 4), game play began at 2000, D-day (7 August) as Red broke contact and commenced his withdrawal to his next defensive position. Assessment intervals were of one-hour duration, with game play terminating at 0200, D+1. A summary of each of these six intervals appears below.

## 2. Concept of Operations - Blue

a. Upon seizing Objective 121, the 1st Bn, 2d MAR will reorganize to continue the attack, initially at least non-illuminated, to seize Objective 122 ASAP. The attack, dismounted, will be conducted with three companies abreast (Figure II-III-1A).

(1) B/1/2 (rein), in the center, will seize, occupy, and defend Objective A.

(2) C/1/2 (rein), on the right, will seize, occupy, and defend Objective 122 and, on order, revert to battalion reserve.

(3) D/1/2 (rein), on the left, will seize, occupy, and defend Objective B.

(4) A/1/2 (rein), is designated as battalion reserve, prepared to assume mission of any assault company, and, on order, to establish a blocking position to the south in the vicinity of a road junction on Highway 36 which is collocated with the highway symbol on Figure II-III-1A.

(5) Priority of fires:


(a) 81mm Mort Plt to B/1/2 and C/1/2.

(b) A/1/10 to D/1/2.

b. The scheme of maneuver and pre-assault reconnaissance team deployments are shown on Figure II-III-1A. Locations of aeri-ally-emplanted sensors and aeri-ally-sowed mines, to detect and impede reinforcement of the Red rear guard battalion by its parent regiment in the vicinity of The Grove, are shown on Figure II-III-1B. Location of long range and medium range radars and their fans for observation of Red withdrawal, redeployment, and possible reinforcement are shown on Figure II-III-1C.

c. Task organization is shown on Tab A to this appendix.

# MARSAS I BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL III)



LOD - LINE OF DEPARTURE  
 PLD - PROBABLE LINE OF DEPLOYMENT  
 LOA - LIMIT OF ADVANCE

0 1 2 3  
 SCALE IN KMS


FIGURE I-III-1A

1 2 FRC

**MARSAS II  
BLUE MINEFIELD AND SENSOR PLAN (MODEL III)**

OBJ  
A

OBJ  
B



SCALE IN KMS

PROJ. 1: 100,000

SENSOR STRING

MINEFIELD

**MARSAS II  
BLUE RADAR DEPLOYMENT (MODEL III)**




FIGURE II 2-10

### 3. Concept of Operations - Red

a. The 6th MIB (rein) has been conducting retire/delay operations as the rear guard of the 1st MIR (rein). If the enemy succeeds in taking the delaying position on the high ground extending from 287515 to 305705, the 6th MIB will again break contact and withdraw mounted to Highway 36, prepare a hasty defensive position in the vicinity of 265675-295663, and hold the position for the night. The companies will be deployed abreast on this position, with each positioning a platoon, reinforced with a tank platoon, on the COPL. These combat outposts will withdraw as the situation dictates and will not accept excess casualties. One platoon of 1/6 is designated as battalion reserve.

b. The engineer minelayer platoon, moving back with H/6 will lay nuisance minefields. The direct support howitzer battery will dedicate one tube in support of each rifle company.

c. The withdrawal routes and defense plan of Red is depicted as Figure II-III-2.

d. Task organization is shown on Tab B to this appendix.


### 4. 2000-2100, D-day

a. This interval was characterized by each side initiating operations. Red 6/1 commenced breaking contact at 2000 and moving mounted to the planned defensive position. The COPL was manned at 2010 and the battalion was closed in the new delay position at 2030. Blue 1/2, after setting up his radars, spent the hour reorganizing for the attack, which he will be ready to launch, dismounted, at 2101. If not delayed, he expected to arrive at this objective about 0100, D+1, which he also expected would not be seized without opposition.

b. Between 2006 and 2015 Blue radars and associated electro-optical devices reported tracking ten targets. Of course, these reports were multiple detections of the Red withdrawal. Medium range radar (MRR) No. 6, MRR No. 7, medium range electro-optical device (MREO) No. 7, long range radar (LRR) No. 1, and long range electro-optical device (LREO) No. 1 all reported the same target at 2006, as did MRR No. 7 and LREO No. 1 ten minutes later. At 2015 MRR No. 7 picked up a new target, LRR No. 1 and LREO No. 1 reporting the same target at 2006, as did MRR No. 7 and LREO No. 1 ten minutes later. At 2015 MRR No. 7 picked up a new target, LRR No. 1 and LREO No. 1 reporting the same target. At 2025 all radars reported negative targets, which of course, was due to the completion of Red movements.

c. The A-6 aircraft on station detected a target (Red 1G/6 Inf) at 2015 and dropped half of his ordnance, destroying a BTR and inflicting 4 casualties. Five minutes later the MTI aircraft detected and attacked a new target, but caused no damage.

**MARSAS II  
RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (MODEL III)**



d. At 2030 force reconnaissance team No. 2 (Figure II-III-1A) reported an enemy infantry company deploying to the south. The force and division reconnaissance teams had been inserted prior to the start of game play.

e. Supporting arms were employed during the interval, Blue firing 180 rounds of artillery and 120 rounds of naval gun at the combat outpost line, inflicting 9 casualties. Red 3/15 arty fired 60 rounds on the Blue position, inflicting 36 casualties on HS/1/2 and C/1/2.

f. In this game there were 25 platoon-size Red targets. At end-interval, four were 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 20 were at 3-6 km, and one was at 6-9 km.

g. Red and Blue unit deployments at 2100, D-day are shown on Figure II-III-3.

#### 5. 2101-2200, D-day

a. At 2101 the three Blue assault companies moved out in the approach march to the attack positions (Figure II-III-1A), with the battalion reserve following - A/1/2 (rein) in trace of B/1/2 and 1/A/2 Tk echeloned to the right, more or less in trace of C/1/2. Red spent the hour improving his defensive positions (Figure II-III-2).

b. The assault companies carried their MREOs with them, but made no sightings. No radars were moved and the only detections made during the hour were MRR No. 11 seeing a motorcycle scout on one Red flank and MRR Nos. 4 and 8 seeing a motorcycle on the other.




c. Early in the interval a SA-6 shot down the A-6 aircraft on station. Two AV-8s attacked the tanks with 2/G/6 on the COPL, but did no damage. A few minutes later four A-4s illuminated and attacked Red I/6, succeeding in destroying three BTRs and killing seven people.

d. Between 2101 and 2134 Blue artillery and naval guns illuminated the battlefield forward of the troops with 66 rounds and naval gunfire laid 60 rounds on Red I/6, but caused only three casualties. Between 2110 and 2159 Red fired 150 rounds of 122mm How on the three Blue companies advancing abreast, which had been illuminated by Red with mortars and observed from the COPL, causing five casualties in C/1/2 and 11 each in B/1/2 and D/1/2.

e. At end-interval there were five Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 19 at 3-6 km, and one at 6-9 km.

f. Red unit deployments were unchanged and Blue at 2200, D-day were essentially the same as shown on Figure II-III-3, except that the Blue assault companies were 1.1 km south of the positions shown.

**MARSAS II  
RED & BLUE DEPLOYMENT (MODEL III)  
2100, D-DAY**



SCALE IN KMS  
F 3-RE 8-2-3

X INF PLT (REIN)

6. 2201-2300, D-day

a. During this hour Blue continued to move toward his attack positions, but his movement was slowed (making only 300m) by calling for air strikes, artillery, and naval gunfire on the detected COPL positions. At the end of the hour the assault companies were still about 1 km from their attack positions (Figure II-III-1A).

b. The only radar or radar associated gear making a detection during the interval was MREO No. 10 with B/1/2, which reported the five tanks and five BTRs of Red 1/H/6 on the COPL. No radars were moved during the hour.

c. Blue aircraft had a bad hour, two A-6 and one A-4 being shot down by SA-6s. However, the Red COPL units were attacked under illumination by two AV8As and two A4s, the former accounting for a tank, a BTR, and six casualties at the 1/H/6 position, and the latter killing a BTR and two people at the 2/G/6 position.

d. Blue A/1/10 fired 120 rounds at 1/H/6 and 2/G/6, causing only two casualties, and naval guns fired 240 rounds at these two combat outposts, causing four casualties. Red, in turn, fired 120 rounds from its direct support platoon, at the advancing Blue troops (which could be seen in the illuminated battlefield from the COPL), inflicting eight casualties on B/1/2 and seven on C/1/2.

e. At end-interval there were seven platoon-size Red targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2, with the remaining 18 at 3-6 km.

f. The Red and Blue unit deployments at 2300, D-day were essentially the same as shown on Figure II-III-3, except that the Blue letter companies were 1400m south of the positions shown.

7. 2301-2400, D-day

a. At 2354 C/1/2, B/1/2, and D/1/2 moved through their attack positions (Figure II-III-1A) and crossed the LOD, which was an easily discernable railroad track. In view of the detections made earlier in the interval of Red 2/G/6 west of Blue Objective 122, Blue had modified his scheme of maneuver (para 2a, above) as follows (Figure II-III-4):

(1) C/1/2 to change direction slightly to the right to seize new Objective C (the newly detected Red company).

(2) A/1/2 to assume the original mission of C/1/2 to seize Objective 122. When C/1/2 and B/1/2 reach the Leon River (1.5 km to south of the end-period positions) it would become a new LOD on which these two companies will await the arrival of A/1/2 (rein), mounted. Upon arrival of A/1/2, the attack would resume with all three companies dismounted and abreast.

**MARSAS II**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)**  
**2400, D-DAY**




FIGURE II III-4

(3) The mission of B/1/2 to seize Objective A remained unchanged.

(4) D/1/2 (there being no threat discovered at Objective B) reverted to battalion reserve in a position 1 km to the south of its end-period position.

b. At 2314 the withdrawal of the Red COP was detected by MRR Nos. 6, 7, and 4; LRR No. 1 (on the Red right flank); MREO Nos. 6 and 7; and LREO No. 1. Subsequent to this, all radars and associated devices were moved. LRR No. 3 took over the LRR No. 1 site (Figure II-III-1C) and LRR No. 4 took over from LRR No. 2. LRR No. 1 accompanied C/1/2 and LRR No. 2 went with D/1/2. All the MRRs moved with the companies - Nos. 1, 2, and 3 with A/1/2, Nos. 4, 5, and 6 with B/1/2, Nos. 7, 8, and 9 with C/1/2, and Nos. 10, 11, and 12 with D/1/2. No detections were made by these deploying radars and electro-optical devices.

c. Air activity during the interval was light. An A-4 and an AV8A attacking Red H/6 caused three casualties in the company and one in the attached minelayer platoon. The AV8A was lost to a SA-6 at 2355. Two AH1J, which were performing reconnaissance under illumination after 2315, made four reports on Red G/6.

d. Division reconnaissance team No. 2 reported the withdrawal of the 1/6 COP at 2327.

e. During the interval NGF provided battlefield illumination with 30 rounds. Also 120 rounds were fired on detected targets by the CLG and a destroyer, causing six casualties in 6th MIB headquarters, H/6, and G/6. Red fired 120 rounds with his direct support platoon, causing 8 casualties in B/1/2 and 7 to C/1/2.

f. At end-interval there were 20 Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 1/2 and five at 3-6 km.

g. Red and Blue maneuver unit deployments at 2400, D-day are shown on Figure II-III-4. There were no changes in the location of reconnaissance teams from those shown on Figures II-III-1A and 1B.

8. 0001-0100, D+1

a. At 0045 C/1/2 and B/1/2 crossed the fordable Leon River, halted to set up radars and await the mounted arrival of A/1/2 (rein). A/1/2 arrived promptly, dismounted on the north side of the river, and crossed at 0051 accompanied by the tank platoon. The lead tank immediately entered a Red minefield on the road, losing a tank, and forcing 1/A/2 Tk to deploy and to move cross-country. At end-interval the Blue assault companies were deployed at the high ground (the PLD on Figure II-III-1A), 600m from the Red defensive position.

b. There were no radar and associated devices detections during the interval, but there were two detections by AH1J and one by division recon team No. 2.

c. At mid-period an A-4 and AV8A conducted a strike that cost Hq/7 Tk its tank and the 18th ATGM a truck. This was more costly to Blue as an SA-6 down the AV8A on its leaving the target area.

d. During the interval Blue artillery fired 120 rounds inflicting 3 casualties on G/6 and H/6 and naval guns fired 240 rounds inflicting 4 casualties on G-6 and the engineer platoon with H/6. In turn Red fired 180 rounds of 122mm on B/1/2, causing 10 casualties.

e. At end-interval there were 25 Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center mass of Blue 1/2.

f. Red and Blue maneuver unit deployments at 0100, D+1 are shown on Figure II-III-5. There has been no change in location of reconnaissance or fire support units throughout the game.

9. 0101-0200 (end-game), D+1

a. During this hour the major happening was, of course, ground combat. Blue 1/2 (minus Co D, in reserve) attacked the hasty defensive position of Red 6th MIB (minus Co I on the east flank) with a force ratio of very slightly over 1. Both forces were dismounted and were supported by the fire of tanks and APCs. Blue was successful in advancing 200 meters, but the advance was not sufficient to cause the 6th MIB to give any ground. Blue took eight casualties and Red seven.

b. There were no radar, or associated devices, detections during the hour, all were ground visual by the troops in contact.

c. The only air activity was a strike by the A-6 which was up over the battlefield, which destroyed two BTRs of H/6.

d. During the interval Blue artillery and naval guns fired 180 and 360 rounds, respectively. The former caused one casualty in G/6 and the latter caused nine in G/6, MORT/6, and AT/6. The Red medium artillery platoon fired 270 rounds, resulting in 13 casualties in each Blue assault company.

e. At end-interval all 25 Red platoon-size targets were within the zone of 0-3 km from the center of mass of the Blue battalion.

f. Red and Blue unit deployments at 0200, D+1 (end-game) are shown on Figure II-III-6. Blue reconnaissance team locations did not change during the game.

MARSAS II  
BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
0100, D+1





FIGURE II-III-5

**MARSAS II**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)**  
**0200, D+1 (END-GAME)**



10.

for Blue and Red combat and combat support at start-game (2000, D-day), start-close combat (0100, D+1), and end-game (0200, D+1) are as follows:

	<u>2000, D-day</u>		<u>0100, D+1</u>		<u>0200, D+1</u>	
	<u>% T/O or E<sup>(1)</sup></u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>% T/O or E<sup>(1)</sup></u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>% T/O or E<sup>(1)</sup></u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>
<u>Blue</u>						
1/2 Inf	100	1.00	92	0.90	88	0.90
1/A/2 Tk	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
A/1/10 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
<u>Red</u>						
6th MIB	100	1.00	83	0.91	78	0.91
C/7 Tk	100	1.00	80	0.80	80	0.80
3/15 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
3/18 ATGM	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00

- Footnotes: (1) Personnel for infantry and artillery, tactical vehicles for others  
 (2) Combat effectiveness based upon % T/O or E, posture and unit type.

Tab A, Appendix 5, Annex B  
Task Organization - Blue

1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR

H&S Co (-), 1/2

Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR

Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Rcn Bn

Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF

Det, SCAMP, FMF

Co B (rein), 1/2

B/1/2

2d AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

2d Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co C (rein), 1/2

C/1/2

3d AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

3d Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co D (rein), 1/2

D/1/2

4th AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

4th Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Reserve

A/1/2 (rein)

A/1/2

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

1st Plt, Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn

1st AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

1st Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Fire Support

A/1/10 (rein)

Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Combat Service Support

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d MT Bn

Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn

Tab B, Appendix 5, Annex B  
Task Organization - Red

---

6th Bn (rein), 1st MIR

H&S Co (-), 6th MIB

Co C (-), 7th Tk Bn

Co G (rein), 6th MIB

G/6/1

1/C/7 Tk

1st Tm, Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Co H (rein), 6th MIB

H/6/1

2/C/7 Tk

2d Tm, Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Minelayer Plt, 23d Engr Co

Co I (rein)(-), 6th MIB

I/6/1(-)

3/C/7 Tk

3d Tm, Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Battalion Reserve

1/I/6/1

Battalion Fire Support

Mort Btry, 6th MIB

AT Plat, H&S Co, 6th MIB

3d Plt, 15th Arty

3d Plt, 18th ATGM Co

**Annex C**  
**Report of War Game MARSAS III**  
**(Battalion in the Day Attack)**

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2. General Situation - Blue. . . . .	C-1
3. General Situation - Red . . . . .	C-2
4. Special Situation - Blue. . . . .	C-2
5. Special Situation - Red . . . . .	C-3
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7. Instructions to Red Controller. . . . .	C-4

**Appendices**

1. Troop Lists - Blue
2. Troop List - Red
3. Environmental Data
4. Description of Model I Game Play
5. Description of Model III Game Play

## Report of War Game MARSAS III

1. Political and Military Background. Saxet, a nation in the Soviet orbit, is a major Caribbean power which has been for years a thorn in the underbelly of the United States. "Yankee imperialism" and "dollar diplomacy" are typical of terms revived by the GOS for propaganda use on the masses. in order to foster hatred for the US and all its works and, thus, to foster continued support for the Saxet communist regime and all its works. For many years the Saxet armed forces have been equipped and trained by the Soviets and are, in fact, today leadership-dependent on USSR personnel.

### 2. General Situation - Blue

a. US-USSR detente became a dismal, but not admitted, failure when the Soviets refused to continue the SALT negotiations. About the same time, US intelligence discovered that the Soviets were sending offensive missile parts to and constructing two launching site complexes in Saxet, much as they did in Cuba in the early sixties. This became public knowledge when the US asked the UN Security Council to take remedial action. Knowing any UN action would be blocked by Soviet veto, the US concurrently and secretly secured OAS agreement to support passively any US unilateral action which might follow UN inaction. Also, concurrently, the US staged the II MAF at various east coast and Gulf of Mexico ports for an announced amphibious training exercise on the west coast of Florida.

b. When UN action was formally stymied by a Soviet veto, the US issued an ultimatum to Saxet to commence dismantling the offensive missile systems within one week or the US would employ military force to do the dismantling for them. Saxet was unmoved by the threat, or did not believe it, but the day after the ultimatum expired (7 August) the US proved it was not an idle threat by making a division-size airborne assault on the launching site complex in the interior and by landing the 9th MAB of the II MAF (the MAB having earlier departed its staging area at New Orleans) to inaugurate a beachhead in the vicinity of the other launching site complex, which is near to the coast. The MAB will be followed in two days by the MAF, now enroute, to expand the beachhead from which follow-on US army forces will launch the final assault, if necessary.

c. The landing site was selected by Blue because of the proximity to the missile complex, the excellent beach and sea conditions, and being not heavily defended. Intelligence reported only a mechanized infantry regiment (MRR) in the area. The assault by the 9th MAB commenced at 0500, 7 August (D-day), with the 1st and 2d battalions of the 2d Marines landing abreast by surface means. The Red regiment, with three battalions deployed abreast, was occupying a beach frontage of approximately 20 kms. After several hours of attempting to defeat the landing with two battalions (the west flank battalion being outside the action), the entire regiment began a retrograde movement to the northeast. Heavy Red casualties apparently had been received, principally from naval shore bombardment

and aerial attack.

### 3. General Situation - Red

a. US-USSR detente became a dismal, but not admitted, failure when the Soviet refused to continue SALT negotiations. During this period the USSR demanded its "pound of flesh" from Saxet for the years of support by insisting on the installation of Soviet offensive missiles in two launching site complexes - one in the deep interior and one much nearer to the Saxeten coast. The Russian logic was that the US would then make concessions to avert nuclear war, which course of events could ultimately lead to the triumph of world communism. Before these sites could become operational, the entire project was uncovered by US intelligence and taken to the UN Security Council with a request that immediate action be taken to remove the missiles and destroy the launchers.

b. When the USSR vetoed action by the Security Council, the US, apparently acting unilaterally, issued an ultimatum to Saxet to remove the missiles and destroy the sites in one week or the US would do it by armed intervention. Neither USSR nor Saxet felt the US would really risk world condemnation by an invasion, so the ultimatum was ignored and preparations for the nuclear missile threat to the US continued apace.

c. Saxet was well aware of the US capability to conduct an aerial, airborne, and/or amphibious assault, if it should so desire. It was also aware that an amphibious brigade had been staged at New Orleans and an amphibious division staged east from there, ostensibly to conduct exercises off Florida. What it had not foreseen was that the US really meant its ultimatum and that the amphibious forces would be enroute to Saxet. At the fatal week's end, 7 August, an estimated airborne division dropped near the deep interior launcher complex and at 0500 on the same day as estimated US Marine regiment landed in the sector of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Regiment (MRR), near the other launcher complex.

### 4. Special Situation - Blue

a. The 3d battalion (reinforced), 2d Marines had initially been held afloat as MAB reserve. When it was determined that the enemy was disengaging and apparently withdrawing to the northeast, the decision was taken to commit the reserve on the left flank of the assault force to cut off the uncommitted west flank Red battalion, which appeared to be on a withdrawal route across the 9th MAB front. 3/2 (rein) was landed by air and surface means at 0830 and by 1000, D-day was closed in an attack position on the high ground extending from GS2668 to GS2966, Sheet 6446I, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topo Comd, 1:50,000.

b. Aerial reconnaissance as of 1000 indicated that the Red west flank battalion (MIB) is moving unopposed, but slowly and cautiously due to aircraft attacks, northeast on West Range Road toward North Fort Hood, with the lead element at 180643 (Sheet 6446IV). The center battalion had moved due north, with its lead element now at 330773

moving east on Highway 84. The withdrawal of this battalion is covered by an estimated company in a hasty defensive position in the vicinity of GS2970 to GS3070. The east flank battalion is moving north on Highway 236, with its lead element at 414644.

c. In accordance with its assigned mission 3/2 (rein) plans to attack at 1100, D-day, the soonest he can get organized to seize the high ground extending from 295745 to 307737 as this seems to be the most suitable blocking position. It will probably require destruction of the Red rear guard company, as it is deployed in the avenue of approach to the objective.

d. While the Red company is the only immediate threat to the accomplishment of the Blue mission, it appears that combat with a Red reinforced battalion will be imminent. An enemy mechanized infantry battalion has three rifle companies which fight from their APCs until forced to dismount and fight on foot. Additionally, the battalion has a battery of six 120mm mortars and an anti-tank platoon which has two ground-mount Sagers and two 73mm recoilless guns, and each rifle company has a Grail launcher. An infantry battalion is conventionally reinforced with a company (10-T62) from the regimental tank battalion and often, when acting independently, has a slice of other regimental combat support—such as a 122mm howitzer platoon and an ATGM platoon (three BRDMs carrying six Sagers each). It can also be presumed that there will be other SAM (probably GAINFUL) and combat aviation (MIG 21, SU 7, IL 28) threats. In addition to these weapons systems, a Red MIB is known to have a surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon roughly equivalent that of Blue Model I.

##### 5. Special Situation - Red

a. The mission of the 1st MIR is to defend the beach as long as it is feasible and then to withdraw northeast as rapidly as possible to the 1st MID assembly area. The Blue surface landing of approximately two battalions was made against the eastern half of the 20 km regimental sector, involving only the 4th and 5th battalions (MIB). After taking heavy infantry casualties (on the order of 20%) by 0900, 7 August and noting that a third enemy battalion was being air-landed at 0830 in the vicinity of Henson Creek (275670), the regiment started breaking contact and withdrawing. At 1000 the lead element of the 6th MIB (rein), on the west flank, was at 180643 (Sheet 6446IV), moving northeast on West Range Road toward north Fort Hood. The 6th was moving slowly and cautiously because it was under intermittent aerial attack. Also at 1000 the lead element of the 1st MIR (rein) (-), on the east flank, was at 414644, moving north on Highway 236. Finally, at 1000 the 5th MIB (rein), in the center, after withdrawing due north had its lead element at 330773, moving east on Highway 84. The withdrawal of the 5th was covered by a rear guard company which was occupying a hasty defensive position in the vicinity of 295705-302700.

b. At 1000, the 1st MIR commander modified his withdrawal plan. In

order not to give the enemy air-landed battalion the opportunity for cutting off the retrograde movement of the 6th MIB, he ordered that battalion to turn north when it reached Highway 36 and go as rapidly as possible to the vicinity of Gatesville, there to await further orders. At the same time he stopped the withdrawal of the 5th MIB and ordered it back to establish a defensive position on the high ground in the vicinity of 307737-312730. Finally, he planned to halt the withdrawal of the 4th MIB and other regimental elements when they reached Highway 84.

c. The 5th MIB commander estimated that he should be closed in his new position by 1030 and be deployed on the position, constructing hasty defenses, by 1100. He instructed the rear guard to conduct retire/delay operations, as necessary, to this position.

d. The enemy battalion which threatens the 5th MIB, has four rifle companies, normally supported by a tank platoon (5-M60), an LVT platoon, and a light artillery battery. There is known to be a surveillance and target acquisition capability in all enemy battalions.

#### 6. Instructions to the Blue Team Commander

a. Submit separate operation orders for your attack, using MARSAS Model III organization and equipment for one and Model I for the other. These orders should be in standard format and be effective 1000, D-day.

b. Essential information to be contained in the orders should include the concept of operations and plans for employment of unattended ground sensors (UGS), surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices, reconnaissance teams, patrols, communications, and barriers. Also to be provided are an air schedule and preplanned and on-call artillery and NGF missions for the period 1000 to 1800, D-day.

c. Troop lists and lists of major combat items are attached as Appendix 1. Although only 3/2 (rein) will be gamed, you are authorized the indicated slice of 9th MAB aircraft and the naval gunfire support.

d. Environmental data are attached as Appendix 3.

e. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) will not be played.

#### 7. Instructions to the Red Commander

a. Prepare an operation order for the position defense as of 1100, 7 August. This order will be unchanged for the two separate war games conducted under MARSAS III. Essential information contained in the order should include the concept of operations and plans for the employment of surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices, patrols, reconnaissance teams, communications and barriers. Air schedule and fire missions should cover the period 1000-1800, 7 August.

b. Troop list, summary of major weapons and tactical vehicles, and pertinent T/OEs are attached as Appendix 2. Only 5th MIB (rein) and A/21 SAM (listed in the skeleton structure of the 1st MIR) will be gamed.

c. Environmental data are provided in Appendix 3.

d. STA equipment will be played, but not ECM.

Appendix 1 to Annex C  
Troop Lists - Blue

1. 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (skeleton organization)

a. Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Regiment  
Co A, 2d Tank Bn, FMF

b. Aviation Combat Element (1st MAW)

VMA Squadron (20-A4M, 6 available to 3/2)  
VMA-V Squadron (20-AV8A, 4 available to 3/2)  
VMFA Squadron (15-F4J, 4 available to 3/2)  
VMA(AW) Squadron (10-A6A, 4 available to 3/2)  
Det, VMCJ (4-RF4B and 4-EA6A, 2 each available to 3/2)  
HMA Squadron (24-AH1J, 6 available to 3/2)  
HML Squadron (24-UH1N, 4 available to 3/2)  
HMM Squadron (20-CH46E, 12 available to 3/2)  
HMH Squadron (20-CH53D, 4 available to 3/2)  
ASRT No. 1

c. Combat Support Element

1st Bn, 10th Marine Regiment  
Btry K, 4th Bn, 10th Marine Regiment  
2d 8" Battery, 2d FAG, FMF  
Co A, 2d Amphibious Tractor Battalion  
Co A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion  
1st Plt, 2d Force Reconnaissance Company

d. Naval Gunfire Element

<u>Ship Side No.</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Comment</u>
CLG-4(1)	1-6"/47 twin	Available to 3/2
	1-5"/38 twin	
DD931A	3-5"/54 RF single	Available to 3/2
DD931B	3-5"/54 RF single	
DD931C	3-5"/54 RF single	
DD963A	2-5"/54 single	
DD963B	2-5"/54 single	

Footnote: (1) Withdrawn from fleet reserve for this operation.

2. 3d Bn (rein), 2d MAR

	<u>Off, incl USN</u>		<u>EM, incl USN</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>
<u>Ground Combat Element</u>						
3d Bn, 2d MAR	48	42	1183	1038	1231	1080
3d Plt (rein), Co A,						
2d Tk Bn, FMF	1	1	26	26	27	27

2. 3d Bn (rein), 2d MAR (cont)

	<u>Off, incl USN</u>		<u>EM, incl USN</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>
<u>Combat Support Element</u>						
Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR	4	4	4	4	8	8
Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF	2	2	44	44	46	46
Btry C (rein), 1st Bn, 10th MAR	11	11	136	136	147	147
3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Recon Bn	1	1	26	26	27	27
Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF	1	1	7	7	8	8
Det, SCAMP, FMF	0	0	11	11	11	11
3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn	1	1	50	50	51	51
3d Plt, Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn	1	1	41	41	42	42
<u>Combat Service Support Element</u>						
Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn	1	1	17	17	18	18
3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d MT Bn	1	1	34	34	35	35
Totals	72	66	1579	1434	1651	1500

3. Personnel Comparison of Model I and Model III Infantry Battalions:  
Tab A.

4. Table of Candidate Equipment (major combat end items), Infantry  
Battalion: Model I, Tab B; Model III, Tab C.

5. Equipment Comparisons of Model I and Model III

- a. Weapons: Tab D
- b. Surveillance and Target Acquisition: Tab E
- c. Position Locating and Reporting System: Tab F

Personnel Comparison (incl USN)

<u>Battalion Elements</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model III</u>
H&S Company	24-379	22-378
Bn Hq	13(1)-22	11(1)-22
Comm Plat	1-60	1-52
Service Plat	2-53	2-53
Medical Plat	2-65	2-65
Chaplain Sec	1-1	1-1
Company Hq	2-16	2-7
Mortar Plat	2-94	2-104
106mm RR/AT/Assault Plat	1-39	1-33
STA Plat	0(1)-29	0(1)-41
Rifle Company(4)	-6-201	5-165
Co Hq	2-7	2-11
Wpns Plat	1-65	Ncne
Plt Hq	(1-2)	(None)
MG Sec	(0-28)	(None)
60mm Mortars	(0-13)	(None)
Assault Sec	(0-22)	0-10
Rifle Plat(3)	1-43	1-48
Plat Hq	(1-4)	(1-3)
Rifle Squad(3)	(0-13)	(0-13)
Fire Tm(3)	(0-4)	(0-4)
STA Squad	(None)	(0-6)
<b>Total</b>	<b>48-1183</b>	<b>42-1038</b>

Footnote: (1) Bn S-2 has additional duty as SIA Plt cmdr.



**MODEL I  
TABLE OF CANDIDATE EQUIPMENT  
(MAJOR COMBAT END ITEMS)  
MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION STUDY**

ITEM OF EQUIPMENT																		
PRC-25				75														75
PRC-41				3														3
PRC-47				5														5
PRC-75				3														3
PRC-77				19														19
GRC-125				7														7
GRC-160				7														7
TRC-166				2														2
			COMM PLT															
																		TOTALS

MODEL III  
 TABLE OF CANDIDATE EQUIPMENT  
 (MAJOR COMBAT END ITEMS)  
 MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION STUDY

UNIT	RIFLE, M16A1	GRENADE LAUNCHER, M203	M191, MPFW	PISTOL, AUTO	106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE	DRAGON, MISSILE W/LAUNCHER	HEAR/SAW	81MM MORTAR (ADVANCED)	MTI, LONG RANGE RADAR	MULTIPURPOSE LASER	E-O ANGLE MEAS. DEVICE	MTI, Med, RANGE RADAR	E-O SURV DEVICE, LONG RANGE	E-O SURV DEVICE, MED RANGE	POSITION, LOCATION AND REPORTING SYS (USER SET)	WPN, NIGHT VISION SIGHT, AN/PVS-4	POCKETSCOPE	TRUCK, CARGO, 1/4T M151	TRUCK, PLATFORM, 1/4T M274	TRUCK, CARGO, 1-1/4T M561	TRUCK, AMBULANCE	MRC-83	MRC-87	MRC-109	MRC-123	TOTALS					
H&S COMPANY	208			191	4	12		12	4	4	4	4	4	4	8																
BN HQ															(2)																
COMN PLT																						2	2	1	2	2	2				
SVC PLT																				1	7	1									
COMPANY HQ																															
STA PLT									(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)															
LIGHT WEIGHT MORTAR PLT							(12)																								
ANTITANK ASSAULT PLT																															
(4) RIFLE COMPANIES				236			108					12	12	12		36	36														
COMPANY HQ															(4)																
ASSAULT SECTION																															
(3) RIFLE PLTS																															
STA SQUAD														(108)																	
TOTALS				427	4	12	108	12	4	16	16	12	4	12	24	36	20	30	7	1	2	1	2	2	2	652					

Tab C  
 Appendix 1 to  
 Annex C



**Weapons Comparison  
(Individual Weapons Not Shown)**

Battalion Elements

H&S Company

Company Hq  
Mortar Plt  
Wpns Plt

Rifle Company (4)

Wpns Plt  
MG Sec  
60mm Mortars  
Assault Sec

Rifle Plt (3)

Plt Hq  
Rifle Squad (3)  
Fire Tm (3)

Model I

4 3.5 Rocket Launchers  
8 81mm Mortars (M29A1)  
8 106mm RR

6 M-60  
3 M-19  
3 MPFW, 12 LAW

13 M-16  
4 M-16

Model III

12 81mm Mortars (Advanced)  
4 106mm RR 12 DRAGON Tracker  
24 Missiles

None  
None  
3 MPFW, LAW as issued

3 SAW, 10-16 (or follow-on)  
1 SAW, 3 M-16 (or follow-on)

**Surveillance and Target Acquisition Equipment Comparison**

Battalion STA Elements

Model I

Model III

STA Platoon, H&S Company	8 AN/PPS-15 Radar 4 AN/TVS-4 Night Observation Device (NOD)	4 Long Range MTI Radar 4 Long Range E-O Surv. Devices 4 Multipurpose Lasers 4 E-O Angle Measurement Devices
STA Squad, Rifle Platoon, Rifle Company		1 Medium Range MTI Radar 1 Medium Range E-O Surveillance Device 1 Multipurpose Laser 1 E-O Angle Measurement Device
Rifle Squad, Rifle Platoon Rifle Company		1 Rifle Night Vision Sight 1 Pocketscope (or follow-on)

**Position Location and Reporting System Comparison**

Battalion Elements

Model I

Model III

Map & Compass Oriented  
 PLRS Added

H&S Company

Mortar Plat  
 Bn Hq  
 STA Plt

Map & Compass  
 Map & Compass  
 None

2 PLRS User Sets (2)  
 2 PLRS User Sets (2)  
 4 PLRS User Sets (4)

Rifle Company (4)

Co Hq  
 Wpns Plat  
 MG Sec  
 60mm Mortars

Map & Compass

1 PLRS User Set (4)

None  
 None

Rifle Plat (3)

Plat Hq  
 Rifle Squad (3)  
 Fire Tm (3)  
 STA Squad

Map & Compass

1 PLRS User Set (12)

(Uses Platoon PLRS)

Total PLRS 24

Appendix 2 to Annex C  
Red Troop List

1. 1st Mechanized Infantry Regiment (skeleton organization)

- a. Ground Combat Element
  - 4th Mech Inf Bn
  - 5th MIB
  - 6th MIB
  - 7th Tk Bn
  
- b. Aviation Combat Element
  - 8th Ftr/Bomber Flt (4-SU7)
  - 9th Intcptr Flt (4-MIG21)
  - 10th Intcptr Flt (4-MIG21)
  - 11th Lt Comber Flt (4-IL28)
  - 12th Lt Helo Flt (8-HOPLIGHT)
  - 13th Med Helo Flt (4-HIP)
  
- c. Combat Support Element
  - 15th Arty Btry (122 How)
  - A/1/16 Arty (122 How)
  - G/3/16 Arty (152 How)
  - A/17 RL (122 MRL)
  - 18th ATGM Btry (BRDM w/AT-3)
  - 19th AAG Btry (23 SPAAG)
  - 20th AAMG Btry (14.5 AAMG)
  - A/21 SAM (SA-6)
  - 22d Rcn Co
  - 23d Engr Co


2. 5th Bn (rein), 1st Mech Inf Regt

- a. Ground Combat Element
  - 5th MIB
  - Co B, 7th Tk Bn
- B. Combat Support Element
  - 2d Plt, 15th Arty Btry
  - 2d Plt, 18th ATGM Btry
  - Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co
  - Minelayer Plt, 23d Engr Co

	Authorized			Total Str 2100, 7 Aug
	Off	EM	Total	
	28	462	490	410
	5	39	44	40
	1	28	29	25
	1	5	6	6
	0	6	6	4
	1	17	18	12
Totals	36	557	593	497

- 3. The above troop list will be the same for the Model I and Model III games.
- 4. Tables of Organization and Equipment. Tabs A through J.

# MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION (REINFORCED) MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



### WEAPONS

- 547 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 27 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK
- 35 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9
- 31 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)
- 3 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30
- 5 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT
- 18 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, VEH MOUNT

### TACTICAL VEHICLES


NOT INCL. PRIME MOVER

- 10 - MED TANK, T-62
- 3 - ATGM LNCHR VEH, BRDM
- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM
- 30 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P
- 3 - MOTORCYCLE, M-72
- 4 - MINELAYER, SP ARMD

### MISC.

- 3 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET
- 2 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1
- 2 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 94 - RADIOS
- 8 - MED RANGE MTI RADAR
- 4 - NIGHT OBSERV DEVICE

# MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION, MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



C-2-B-1

## WEAPONS

- 452 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 27 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK
- 27 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)
- 4 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT


## TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVER

- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM
- 30 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P

## MISC.

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 67 - RADIOS
- 8 - MED RANGE MTI RADAR
- 4 - NIGHT OBSERV DEVICE

**HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 61- 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BRDM

**MISC.**

- 17- RADIOS
- 8 - MED RANGE MTI RADAR
- 4 - NIGHT OBSERV DEVICE

**MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 117 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 9 - 7.62 mm LMG, RPK
- 6 - 9 mm PISTOL, PM
- 9 - 85 mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

- 10 - ARMD PERS CARR, BTR-50P

**MISC.**

- 15 - RADIOS

**MORTAR BATTERY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 40- 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)


**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**

NONE

**MISC.**


- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 5 - RADIOS

**TANK COMPANY,  
TANK BATTALION,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



- |                         |                          |                            |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>WEAPONS</b>          | <b>TACTICAL VEHICLES</b> | <b>MISC.</b>               |
| 39 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM | 10 - MED TANK, T-62      | 3 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET |
| 5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM      |                          | 14 - RADIOS                |

# HOWITZER PLATOON (REINFORCED), HOWITZER BATTERY MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



C-2-G-1

**WEAPONS**

- 28 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 1 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 3 - 122 mm HOW (TOWED), D-30
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7

**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**


NONE

**MISC.**

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-3A
- 2 - RADIOS


Tab G

**ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILE PLATOON,  
ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILE BATTERY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**




<b>WEAPONS</b>	<b>TACTICAL VEHICLES</b>	<b>MISC.</b>
5 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM	3 - ATGM LNCHR VEH (BRDM)	4 - RADIOS
1 - 9 mm PISTOL, PM		
3 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7		
18 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, VEH MOUNT		

**SCOUT SECTION,  
RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



<b>WEAPONS</b>	<b>TACTICAL VEHICLES</b>	<b>MISC.</b>
<b>6--7.62mm RIFLE, AKM</b>	<b>3--MOTORCYCLE, M-72</b>	<b>3-- RADIOS</b>

**MINELAYER PLATOON,  
ENGINEER COMPANY,  
MECHANIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



<b>WEAPONS</b>	<b>TACTICAL VEHICLES</b>	<b>MISC.</b>
17 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM	4 - MINELAYER, SP ARMD	4 - RADIOS
1 - 9mm PISTOL, PM		
1 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7		

Appendix 3 to Annex C  
Environmental Data

1. Terrain

a. The terrain of the AOA is exactly as depicted on Sheet 6446I, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topographic Command map 1:50,000. Digitized terrain profiles will be made from this map. For game purposes it is assumed that Owl Creek (8 km south of the 3/2 (rein) assembly area) is the Gulf of Mexico coastline and that the Leon River is fordable.

b. Game play will be conducted on the geological survey map 1:24,000. Overlays, therefore, should be at this scale.

c. Other map coverage of the AOA, such as orthophotomap 1:25,000, Experimental Ground Tactical Data 1:25,000, Vehicle Movement 1:50,000, Foot Movement (:50,000, is available for use in developing planning information.

2. Astronomic Data for 7 August

a. Daylight: Sunrise 0521, sunset 1841.

b. Twilight: BMNT 0417, EENT 1946.

3. Weather. The 24-hour weather forecast issued at 0001, D-day is for heavy cloud cover (80-85%), with ceiling at 4000' in the morning, lowering to 2000' in the afternoon. Thunderstorm activity likely in the afternoon, with 2/3" rainfall. Visibility all day will be restricted to 1 km due to haze along the stream beds, but will rise to 10 km at elevations of 800' and above, except during thunderstorms. Temperatures will range from 75° in early morning hours to 95° in the afternoon, falling to 85° after rainstorms. Relative humidity will range from 80-90%. Winds will be light, generally 5 knots southerly, except in periods of thundershowers when they will be gusty up to 20 knots, and shifting in direction.

Appendix 4 to Annex C  
Description of Model I Game Play

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- A. Task Organization - Blue
- B. Task Organization - Red

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III-I-2A	Red Deployments, 1000, D-day	C-4-5
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## 1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of War Game MARSAS III, with the current Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model I surveillance and target acquisition (STA) capability. The game portrays a day attack by a reinforced battalion at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red reinforced mechanized infantry battalion with a STA capability, occupying a hasty defensive position during a regimental retrograde movement. Game play commenced 27 June 1974 and was completed on 8 July 1974.

b. The game began at 1000, D-day (7 August) as the Red battalion was withdrawing from beach defense and as the Blue battalion completed assembly in its planned attack position. Assessment intervals were of one-hour duration, with the play terminating at 1600, D-day. A summary of each of these six intervals appears below.

## 2. Concept of Operations - Blue

a. At start of game play (1000, D-day) all elements of 3/2 (rein) had just completed closing in on the battalion attack position. Allowing one hour for organization, the attack is to be launched at 1100 with two companies abreast, dismounted, and one company mounted in LVTs, reinforced with the tank platoon, attacking on and around the right flank (Figure III-I-1A). The line of departure (LD) is the present attack position. Objective 1 is the position known to be occupied by the Red rear guard company. Objective A is the high ground which 3/2 has been directed to seize and defend (para 4, scenario). The attack will be coordinated by phase lines. Phase Line (PL) Blue is the opposite bank of the Leon River, PL Red is for the final assault on Objective 1, and PL Green is just beyond Objective 1, and PL Yellow is for control of the assault, if necessary, on Objective A.

(1) I/3/2 (rein), attacking dismounted, will seize the left (west) portion of Objective 1, prepared to continue the attack to seize Objective A.


(2) K/3/2 (rein), attacking dismounted, will seize the right (east) portion of Objective 1, prepared to continue the attack to seize Objective A.

(3) L/3/2 (rein) will, on order, conduct a mechanized envelopment of Objective 1, prepared to continue the attack to seize Objective A.

(4) M/3/2 (rein) is designated as the battalion reserve, prepared to assume the mission of any assault company.

(5) The STA plt will establish two squads on the LD. Only PPS 15 Nos. 1 and 3 will be in operation, with PPS 15 Nos. 2 and 4 as backup. When the

# MARSAS III (MODEL I) BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS



0 1 2 3  
SCALE IN KMS

FIGURE III-I-1A

assault companies reach PL Blue, PPS 15 Nos. 5 and 7 will be sited, with PPS 15 Nos. 6 and 8 as backup. At this time PPS 15 Nos. 1 through 4 will be prepared to displace forward on order.

(6) All supporting arms will be in direct support of the battalion.

b. The scheme of maneuver, including initial radar employments, is shown on Figure III-I-1A. Locations of aeri-ally-inserted reconnaissance teams, aeri-ally-emplanted sensors, and aeri-ally-sowed minefields are shown on Figure III-I-1B.

c. Task organization is provided on Tab A to this appendix.

### 3. Concept of Operations - Red

a. At 1000, 7 August the 5th MIB was withdrawing from the beach area, after opposing the surface landing of the 9th MAB, along with the other elements of the 1st MIR (Figure III-I-2A). The withdrawal of the 5th MIB was being covered by a rear guard company. At this time, the 1st MIR ordered the 5th MIB to discontinue its withdrawal and return to defend the high ground (which happens to correspond approximately with Blue Objective A).

b. The 5th MIB expects to be able to occupy the position by 1100. Two companies will be initially deployed abreast. The third company will conduct retire/delay operations from its present rear guard position, moving to the right flank of the battalion defensive position (Figure III-I-2B).

(1) E/5 defend in assigned sector.

(2) F/5 (rein) defend in assigned sector.

(3) D/5 (rein) conduct retire/delay operations from 1000 positions, if necessary. Withdraw to the battalion position when occupied and defend in assigned sector. 3/D/5 becomes battalion reserve at this time.

(4) Allocation of supporting arms:

(a) Initially, priority of fires of 2/15 Arty to D/5.


(b) 1/5 Mort initially attached to D/5.

(c) Upon withdrawal of D/5 to battalion position, 1/5 Mort will support D/5 and E/5; 2/5 Mort and 2/15 Arty will support F/5.


(5) Minelayer platoon will lay minefields as shown on Figure III-I-2B, except that the two minefields on D/5 withdrawal route will be laid as the company withdraws.

(6) All attachments to D/5 will revert to battalion control on order when the company has completed its withdrawal.

MARSAS III (MODEL I)  
 BLUE MINEFIELD AND SENSOR PLAN  
 RECONNAISSANCE TEAM DEPLOYMENTS



**MARSAS III  
RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)  
1000, D-DAY**



C-4-5

SCALE IN KM 0 1 2 3  
FIGURE III-1 2A

MARSAS III (MODEL I)  
 RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS




FIGURE III - I - 20

MEDIUM RANGE RADAR FAN

c. The begin-game disposition of the 5th MIB and 1st MIR are shown of Figure III-I-2A. The concept for the defense of the battalion position, emplacement of PPS15-equivalent radars, withdrawal route of the rear guard, and barrier plan are shown on Figure III-I-2B.

d. Task organization is provided on Tab B to this appendix.

#### 4. 1000-1100, D-day

a. This interval was devoted by Blue to organizing on the LD for his attack toward the Red rear guard and, ultimately, the high ground which he is to defend. Red, of course, was executing his order to turn around to occupy and defend approximately the same high ground. He began to deploy on this position at 1030.

b. There were no radar detections made by either side, nor was artillery employed by either side.

c. The A6 aircraft on station detected the Red 5th MIB return to occupy the defensive position and attacked the column twice. E/5/1 lost a BTR, F/5/1 two BTRs, and Hq/5/1 one truck.

d. In this game there were 37 Red platoon-size targets. At 1100 there were none within 3 kms of the center of mass of Blue 3/2, 12 were at 3-6 km, 23 at 6-9 km, one at 9-12 km, and one at 12-15 km.

e. Red and Blue deployments at 1100, D-day are shown on Figure III-I-3.

#### 5. 1101-1200, D-day


a. The Blue attack commenced as planned, with I/3/2 and K/3/2 crossing the LD at 1101. L/3/2 (rein) was held at the LD until the situation was developed further by the dismounted troops. The battalion reserve (M/3/2) moved out at the same time as the two assault companies, following their trace at 500m. At 1115 I/3/2 and K/3/2 were detected by Red PPS15 - equivalent radar No. 1 (Figure III-I-2B). As a result of this detection the Red mortars fired 60 rds and the howitzers 120 rounds, inflicting twenty casualties each on the two companies. However, this did not slow the Blue advance. Phase Line Blue (Figure III-I-1A) was crossed at 1130 and at the end of the hour the assault elements had advanced 2.2 km to just south of Phase Line Red.

b. Inasmuch as the 5th MIB (rein) (-) completed occupation of its defense position at 1100, D/5/1 (rein) was ordered to withdraw to the position at once. This move was immediately detected by the MTI aircraft on station and attacked, not only by the A6, but by two A4s and two F4s that were on station. These attacks cost D/5/1 two BTRs and ten casualties and 1/B/7 Tk two tanks and crews. However, this rear guard made it back to the battalion by 1130.

c. At the end of the interval the Red radar sites were unchanged.



**MARSAS III**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)**  
**1100, D-DAY**



SCALE IN KMS

FIGURE III-I-3

However the No. 1 radar, which had just detected M/3/2, would soon be forced to withdraw. When Blue reached PL Blue he set up PPS15 Nos. 5 and 7 (with Nos. 6 and 8 as back-up), but made no detections. I/3/2 and K/3/2 at end-interval reported being able to see Objective 1 and could not detect any sign of the enemy. They also reported bypassing a minefield on the road just south of their present position.

d. Blue fired no supporting arms during the period as he had no suitable targets.

e. At 1200 there were four platoon-size Red targets within 3 km of the Blue 3/2 center of mass, 20 were at 3-6 km, 12 were at 6-9 km, and one was at 9-12 km.

f. Red and Blue deployments at 1200, D-day are shown on Figure III-I-4.

#### 6. 1201-1300, D-day

a. The Blue attack continued without incident or opposition. I/3/2 and K/3/2 advanced 1.67 km to reach Objective No. 1 at 1243, with M/3/2 trailing at 500 m, and spent the remainder of the hour reorganizing to continue the advance. At this time L/3/2 (rein), designated as TF ZULU, was on the right flank, just north of PL Red, and H&S/3/2 had started to move north. At 1230 the engineer platoon was brought forward to mark, not clear, the minefields encountered.

b. Red Radar No. 1, which had been observing the Blue advance, called for preplanned artillery concentrations, just before deciding it was time to withdraw. 2/A/15 Arty fired 60 rounds of VT, inflicting 7 casualties each on I/3/2 and K/3/2. At 1230 Red Radars Nos. 1 and 2 commenced their foot withdrawal toward the battalion position. There were no Blue radar detections during the interval, either ground or aerial.

c. Early in the hour Red aviation attacked with two IL28s and two SU7s, escorted by two MIG21s. Navy CAP destroyed four planes en route to the target area, but the two IL28 light bombers got through and back to base. Due to the cloud cover they were unable to see the target and dumped their loads. The bombs dropped to the west of 3/2, causing no damage.

d. At 1300 there were eight platoon-size Red targets within 3 km of the Blue 3/2 center of mass, 26 where at 3-6 km, two at 6-9 km, and one at 9-12 km.

e. Red and Blue deployments at 1300, D-day are shown on Figure III-I-5.

#### 7. 1301-1400, D-day

a. Blue's reorganization on Objective No. 1 consumed more time than planned, but the attack did resume at 1330. I/3/2 and K/3/2 crossed PL Green (Figure III-I-IA) at 1345, with M/3/2 still in trace at 500 m, and at the end of the hour had advanced 1.1 km without opposition. L/3/2

**MARSAS III  
BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)  
1200, D-DAY**





FIGURE II-1-4

# MARSAS III (MODEL I) BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS 1300, D-DAY



SCALE IN KMS  
FIGURE III-I-5

(rein) remained at Objective No. 1 awaiting its order to move so as to cross PL Yellow at the same time as the main attack.

b. There were no radar detections by either side during the hour. Blue did not displace his radar forward on PL Green as the terrain made it obvious that he had line-of sight problems. However, early in the interval two helicopters located Red E/5/1 and F/5/1. Blue fired 120 rounds of artillery and 360 of naval guns, causing 6 casualties each to these two companies. After these firings the targets were attacked by 3 F4s and 3AV8s, destroying 5 BTRs and 13 men. The two helicopters survived several GRAIL firings and returned to base at 1330.

c. At end-interval it was confirmed to Blue that a severe thunderstorm was imminent.

d. At 1400 there were 18 platoon-size Red targets within 3 km of the Blue 3/2 center of mass, 17 at 3-6 km, and two at 6-9 km.

e. Red and Blue deployments at 1400, D-day are shown on Figure III-I-6.

#### 8. 1401-1500, D-day

a. At the beginning of this interval the heavy thunderstorm hit the battlefield. As it brought near zero visibility, including a zero ceiling, in dropping 2/3" rain before it passed at the end of the hour, there were no radar or visual detections by either side, air operations were suspended, and the unopposed Blue attack was slowed 50%.

b. During the hour Blue fired 60 rounds of artillery and 120 of naval gun on the previously detected Red positions, inflicting 4 casualties each on E/5/1 and F/5/1. Red, having no observation, did not fire.

c. As the interval ended, the storm passed and I/3/2 and K/3/2 had advanced 1.1 km, with M/3/2 still in trace at 500 m. T.F. ZULU was still holding near Objective 1, prepared to move out to cross PL Yellow with the assault companies. Except for this movement by three companies, all Red and Blue deployments at 1500 are as shown on Figure III-I-6.

d. Also at 1500, D-day there were 31 platoon-size Red targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 3/2, four at 3-6 km, and two at 6-9 km.

#### 9. 1501-1600 (end-game), D-day

a. At the start of this interval the Red ATCM platoon took the four 106mm RR attached to I/3/2 and K/3/2 under fire, destroying them without loss to Red. The Red platoon then withdrew to the north into the battalion position. Despite this unexpected attack, the Blue assault companies pressed on, advancing one km by mid-period, when, at range of 500m from Red, close combat was entered. Just prior to the start of the close

MARSAS III (MODEL I)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 1400, D-DAY





FIGURE III-I-6

combat, the Blue tank platoon attached to L/3/2 (which was enveloping the Red east flank) opened fire on the Red ATGM platoon destroying all three Sagger-mounted BRDMs before they could launch a missile.

b. Ground combat began with 3/2 having a force ratio of but 0.54, with a probability of advancing of 30%. No advance was made. Blue casualties were heavy - 3/2 taking 34 to Red's 4.

c. No Red aircraft were flown during the interval and Blue air activity was light. The A-6 MTI aircraft on station was shot down by a SA-6 missile at 1530. At the end of the game, four A-4 aircraft struck the Red battalion position, destroying two BTRs, two tanks, and eleven men.

d. Supporting arms were very busy during the hour, Red fired 270 rounds of mortar and artillery and Blue fired 150 rounds of artillery and 360 rounds of naval gun. The Red firings cost Blue 65 casualties and the Blue firings cost Red 16 casualties. The disparity of these figures is due to the fact that Blue was attacking in the open on foot and that Red was in hasty defensive positions.

e. There were no radar detections by either side during the interval. All detections were ground visual.

f. At end-game there were 35 platoon-sized Red targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of Blue 3/2, one at 3-6 km, and one at 6-9 km.


g. Red and Blue deployments at end-game (1600) are shown on Figure III-I-7.

10. 1601-1700, D-day. While game play ended at 1600, the ground combat assessment only was made for this additional hour. 3/2 had a force ratio of 0.51, with the same probability (30%) of success. Again, Blue was unsuccessful and was unable to advance. And, again Blue casualties were heavy, 3/2 taking 31 and the 5th MIB 12.

11. Summary of Combat Effectiveness. The unit effectiveness factors for Red and Blue combat and combat support units at start-game (1000, D-day), start-close combat (1530, D-day), and end-game (1700-D-day), are as follows:

	<u>1000, D-day</u>		<u>1530, D-day</u>		<u>1700 D-day</u>	
	<u>%T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff (2)</u>	<u>%T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff (2)</u>	<u>%T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff (2)</u>
Blue						
3/2 Inf	100	1.00	91	0.96	85	0.90
3/A/2 Tk	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
C/1/10 Artv	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00

**MARSAS III  
 BLUE AND RED END-GAME DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL I)  
 1600, D-DAY**



Red	<u>1000, D-day</u>		<u>1530, n-day</u>		<u>1700, D-day</u>	
	<u>T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>
5th MIB	82	0.94	69	0.85	62	0.82
8;7 Tk	100	1.00	80	0.80	80	0.80
2/15 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
2/18 ATGM	100	1.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

Footnotes: (1) Personnel for infantry and artillery, tactical vehicles for others.  
(2) Combat effectiveness based upon T/O or E, posture and unit type.

Tab A to Appendix 4 to Annex C  
Task Organization - Blue

3d Bn (rein), 2d MAR

H&S Co(-), 3/2

Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR

Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Rcn Bn

Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF

Det, SCAMP, FMF

Co I (rein), 3/2

I/3/2

1st Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Co K (rein), 3/2

K/3/2

2d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Co L (rein), 3/2

L/3/2

3d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

3d Plt, Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn

Battalion Reserve

Co M (rein), 3/2

M/3/2

4th Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Battalion Fire Support

C/1/10 (rein)

Mort Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Battalion Combat Service Support

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d MT Bn

Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn

Tab B to Appendix 4 to Annex C

Task Organization - Red

5th Bn (rein), 1st MIR (rein)

H&S Co (-), 5th MIB

Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Minelayer Plt (-), 23d Engr Co

Co D (rein), 5th MIB

D/5/1

1st Plt, Co B, 7th Tk Bn

AT Plt, H&S Co, 5th MIB

1st Sqd, Minelayer Plt, 23d Engr Co

1st Plt, Mort Btry, 5th MIB

Co E, 5th MIB

Co F, 5th MIB

F/5/1

3d Plt, Co B, 7th Tk Bn

2d Plt, 18th ATGM

Battalion Reserve

Co B(-), 7th Tk Bn

Battalion Fire Support

Mort Btry (-), 5th MIB

2d Plt, 15th Arty

Appendix 5 to Annex C  
Description of Model III Game Play

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## 1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of War Game MARSAS III, with the Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model III surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices and advanced weapons systems. The game portrays a day attack by a reinforced battalion at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red reinforced mechanized infantry battalion, with a STA capability, occupying a hasty defensive position during a regimental retrograde movement. Game play commenced 17 June 1974 and was completed on 26 June 1974.

b. The game began at 1000, D-day (7 August) as Red was withdrawing from defending the beach area. Assessment intervals were of one-hour duration, with the play terminating at 1600, D-day. A summary of each of these six intervals appears below.

## 2. Concept of Operations - Blue

a. At start of game play (1000, D-day) all elements of 3/2 (rein) had just completed closing in on the battalion attack position. Allowing one hour for organization, the attack is to be launched at 1100 with two companies abreast, dismounted, and one company mounted in LVTs, reinforced with the tank platoon, attacking on and around the right flank (Figure III-III-1A). The line of departure (LD) is the present attack position. Objective 1 is the position known to be occupied by the Red rear guard company. Objective A is the high ground which 3/2 has been directed to seize and defend (para 4, scenario). The attack will be coordinated by phase lines. Phase Line (PL) Blue is the opposite bank of the Leon River, RL Red is for the final assault on Objective 1, and PL Green is just beyond Objective 1, and PL Yellow is for control of the assault, if necessary, on Objective A.

(1) I/3/2 (rein) attacking dismounted, will seize the left (west) portion of Objective 1, prepared to continue the attack to seize Objective A.

(2) K/3/2 (rein), attacking dismounted, will seize the right (east) portion of Objective 1, prepared to continue the attack to seize Objective A.

(3) L/3/2 (rein) will on order, conduct a mechanized envelopment of Objective 1, prepared to continue the attack to seize Objective A.


(4) M/3/2 (rein) is designated as the battalion reserve, prepared to assume the mission of any assault company.

(5) The STA plt will establish two squads on the LD. Only long range radars Nos. 1 and 3 will be in operation, with LRR Nos. 2 and 4 as backup. Similarly, each assault company will set up one medium range radar - with the remaining ones kept as backup.

(6) All supporting arms will be in direct support of the battalion.

b. The scheme of maneuver, including initial radar deployments, is shown on Figure III-III-1A. Locations of aeri-ally-inserted reconnaissance

# MARSAS III (MODEL III) BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS



teams, aeriaily-emplanted sensors, and aeriaily-sowed minefields are shown on Figure III-III-1B.

c. Task organization is provided on Tab A to this appendix.

### 3. Concept of Operations - Red

a. At 1100, 7 August the 5th MIB was withdrawing from the beach area, after opposing the surface landing of the 9th MAB, along with the other elements of the 1st MIR (Figure III-III-2A). The withdrawal of the 5th MIB was being covered by a rear guard company. At this time, the 1st MIR ordered the 5th MIB to discontinue its withdrawal and return to defend the high ground (which happens to correspond approximately with Blue Objective A).

b. The 5th MIB expects to be able to occupy the position by 1100. Two companies will be initially deployed abreast. The third company will conduct retire/delay operations from its present rear guard position, moving to the right flank of the battalion defensive position (Figure III-III-2B).

(1) E/5 defend in assigned sector.

(2) F/5 (rein) defend in assigned sector.

(3) D/5 (rein) conduct retire/delay operations from 1000 position, if necessary. Withdraw to the battalion position when occupied and defend in assigned sector. 3/D/5 becomes battalion reserve at this time.

(4) Allocation of supporting arms:

(a) Initially, priority of fires of 2/15 Arty to D/5.

(b) 1/5 Mort initially attached to D/5.

(c) Upon withdrawal of D/5 to battalion position, 1/5 Mort will support D/5 and E/5; 2/5 Mort and 2/15 Arty will support F/5.

(5) Minelayer platoon will lay minefields as shown on Figure III-III-2B, except that the two minefields on D/5 withdrawal route will be laid as the company withdraws.

(6) All attachments to D/5 will revert to battalion control on order when the company has completed its withdrawal.

c. The begin-game dispositions of the 5th MIB and 1st MIR are shown on Figure III-III-2A. The concept for the defense of the battalion position, emplacement of FPS15 - equivalent radars, withdrawal route of the rear guard, and barrier plan are shown on Figure III-III-2B.

d. Task organization is provided on Tab B to this appendix.

### 4. 1000-1100, E-day

a. This interval was devoted by Blue to organizing on the LD for his attack toward the Red rear guard and, ultimately, the high ground which he is to defend. Red, of course, was executing his order to turn around to occupy and defend approximately the same high ground. He began

to deploy on this position at 1030.

b. There were no ground radar detections by either side during this interval. However, Blue had pre-game intelligence on the whereabouts of a Red rear guard company, searched this area with Long Range Electro-Optical Device (LREO) No. 3, and detected the tanks and BTRs with the company. Inasmuch as this was a hard target, with the infantry undoubtedly dug in, the battalion commander called for an air strike (which could not be done until 1100) and alerted his artillery and naval support ships to fire in that area on order, which order would be given if the enemy unit started to move before the arrival of Blue aircraft.

c. An A-6 MTI aircraft was on station at the beginning of the interval because heavy cloud cover almost precluded aerial visual detections. This plane detected the movement of the Red 5th MIB back to the defensive position and made two strikes, destroying a BTR in each E/5/1 and F/5/1. He made no detections after 1030 because Red had completed moving. Unfortunately for Blue, this A-6 was lost to a SA-6 missile late in the hour. Red aircraft did not operate in the period.

d. Supporting arms, other than noted above, were not employed by either side during this interval.

e. In this game there are 37 Red platoon-size targets. At 1100 there were none within 3 kms of the center of mass of Blue 3/2, 12 were at 3-6 km, 23 at 6-9 km, one at 9-12 km, and one at 12-15 km.


f. Red and Blue deployments at 1100, D-day are shown on Figure III-III-3.

##### 5. 1101-1200, D-day


a. The Blue attack commenced as planned, with I/3/2 and K/3/2 crossing the LD at 1101. L/3/2 (rein) was held at the LD until the situation was developed further by the dismounted troops. The two companies advanced without interference until detected fifteen minutes later by Red PPS15-equivalent radar No. 1 (Figure III-III-2B). As a result of this detection the 5th MIB mortars and the attached 122mm howitzer platoon fired 60 rounds each, inflicting 10 casualties on each of the two assault companies. However, this did not slow the advance and PL Blue (Figure III-III-1A) was crossed at 1145, with an advance of 2.2 km being made during the hour.

b. At the start of the interval LREO No. 3 observed the Red rear guard company preparing to withdraw. All available fire support was applied. C/1/10 fired 60 rounds, and naval guns 200 rounds - causing 8 casualties in Red D/5/1. Two AV8s destroyed a BTR with 8 aboard; two A4s destroyed a BTR, truck, and five men; and two F4s destroyed a tank and crew in 1/B/7 Tk and caused 4 casualties in D/5/1. The A6 on station detected the retrograde movement on the MTI and attacked, but caused no damage. LREO No. 3 couldn't follow Red D/5/1 (rein) after 8 minutes, so Blue interference with the Red withdrawal ceased. D/5 (rein) arrived in its sector of the

**MARSAS III (MODEL III)  
 BLUE MINEFIELD AND SENSOR PLAN  
 RECONNAISSANCE TEAM DEPLOYMENTS**




**MARSAS III  
RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
1000, D-DAY**



C-5-6

FIGURE III-2A

MARSAS II (MODEL III)  
RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS



MEDIUM RANGE RADAR FAN

MINEFIELD

SCALE 100 METERS

FIGURE III-E-28

battalion defensive position at 1130. Also at 1130 Blue changed the route reconnaissance pattern for the A6, but this brought no new detections.

c. At 1200, D-day there were three Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of the Blue attack, 18 at 3-6 km, 15 at 6-9 km, and one at 9-12 km.

d. Red and Blue deployments at 1200, D-day are shown on Figure III-III-4.

6. 1201-1300, D-day

a. At 1230 I/3/2 and K/3/2 reached PL Red (Figure III-III-1A), with L/3/2 (rein) moving up on the right flank. By the end of the interval, after an advance of 1 2/3 km, Objective 1 had been seized without opposition.

b. During the period no Blue radar and associated devices made any detections, nor did the MTI aircraft on station. However, Red PPS15 - equivalent No. 1 (Figure III-III-2B) did watch the approaching Blue companies. As a result Red 2/A/15 Arty was able to fire 90 rounds with VT fuze, giving I/3/2 and K/3/2 seven casualties each. At 1230 this Red radar team was forced to leave its position and move back on foot toward the Red defensive positions.

c. At 1300 there were eight Red platoon-size targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of the Blue attack, 26 at 3-6 km, two at 6-9 km, and one at 9-12 km.

d. Red and Blue deployments at 1300, D-day are shown on Figure III-III-5.

7. 1301-1400, D-day


a. The two Blue assault companies spent 15 minutes assuring that there was no enemy on Objective 1 and then pressed on. The battalion CP reserve started moving in trace, but L/3/2 (rein), now called Task Force ZULU, stayed in position on the east of Objective 1. TF ZULU, formerly TF X-Ray, which wasn't required on the first objective, would move out on an envelopment of Objective A at such a time so that it could cross PL Yellow simultaneously with I/3/2 and K/3/2. At interval's end these two companies were just north of PL Green.

b. There were no radar detections by either side during the hour. Blue LRR Nos. 1 and 2 were brought forward to the left flank of PL Green, where LRR No. 1 began operating at end-interval.

c. There was aircraft activity by both sides during this hour. Red launched two SU7s and two IL28s, escorted by two MIG21s, to attack the Blue dismounted infantry. Navy CAP Engaged the escort and shot them down and shot down two bombers as they left the target area. I/3/2 and K/3/2 each lost seven casualties to the bombing.





# MARSAS III BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III) 1100, D-DAY



SCALE IN KILOMETERS  
FIGURE III-III-3

C-5-9


**MARSAS III**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)**  
**1200, D-DAY**



SCALE IN KMS

FIGURE III III 4

**MARSAS III  
BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
1300, D-DAY**



SCALE IN FMS  
FIGURE III III 4

d. On the Blue side, the A6 aircraft on station was destroyed by a SA-6 missile at 1330. Blue also had a flight of two UH1s and another of two AH1s which were using pop-down tactics from the clouds (the ceiling being at 2000') to look for enemy in the Objective A area. The former sighted the BTRs of E/5/1 and the latter the BTRs and tanks with F/5/1, but both planes were damaged by small arms fire at mid-period and had to return to base.

e. In response to the helicopter detections, Blue fired 200 rounds of NGF and 90 rounds from C/1/10, causing six casualties each to E/5/1 and F/5/1. Red fired no artillery during the interval.

f. At end-interval it was confirmed to Blue that a severe thunderstorm was imminent.

g. At 1400, D-day there were 19 platoon-size Red targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of the Blue attackers, 16 at 3-6 km, and two at 6-9 km.

h. Red and Blue deployments at 1400, D-day are shown on Figure III-III-6.

#### 8. 1401-1500, D-day

a. The heavy thunderstorm which hit the battle area at approximately 1415 had a major effect on the battlefield. As it brought near zero visibility, including a ceiling near zero, and as it dropped 2/3" rain before it passed from the battle area at 1500, radar and visual detections were nil, air activity was nil, and the unopposed Blue attack was slowed 50%. After the end of the storm, a low ceiling and heavy cloud cover persisted.

b. Before the storm struck Blue aircraft were brought in on the targets identified by helicopter observers the preceding period. Two A4s attacked Red E/5/1 causing three casualties and two F4s attacked F/5/1 causing four. Also, during the following half hour naval guns fired 234 rounds at these targets, but inflicted only three casualties to each company due to their postures.


c. As the interval ended, I/3/2 and K/3/2 had advanced 1.1 km and were approximately 900 m. south of PL Yellow. At 1455 TF ZULU started moving forward from Objective A, figuring to cross PL Yellow at the same time as the foot troops. Except for these three locations changes, Red and Blue deployments at 1500 are as shown on Figure III-III-6.

d. Also at 1500, D-day there were 31 platoon-size Red targets 0-3 km from the center of mass of the Blue 3/2, five at 3-6 km, and one at 6-9 km.

#### 9. 1501-1600, (end-game), D-day

a. The interval began with the Red ATGM platoon taking the 106mm RR

**MARSAS III  
BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
1400, D-DAY**



attached to each I/3/2 and K/3/2 under fire at 1100 m and destroying both without loss to Red. Only one of the three BRDM/Sagger vehicles fired, but after the engagement the entire platoon withdrew. Fifteen minutes later two DRAGONS in each I/3/2 and K/3/2 detected the three tanks and nine BTRs with F/5/1, engaging the tanks. One tank was destroyed, but the BTR machine guns killed three of the DRAGONS. At 1530 the Red ATGM platoon and the Blue tank platoon with T.F. ZULU were in a meeting engagement. All five tanks were destroyed, as were two BRDM/Sagger. The third BRDM received a mobility kill.

b. The activity during the first half hour slowed the I/3/2 and K/3/2 advance enough so that the reserve, M/3/2, could come on line with them. The tank-antitank action on the right flank forced L/3/2 to dismount. At 1530 the entire battalion was in close combat with the entire Red battalion. Blue had a force ratio of 1.22 with a 55% probability of success, but was unsuccessful and was unable to move. Casualties were light, five for Blue and two for Red. The attack was continuing at end-game.

c. In the first half-hour there was Blue aircraft activity, but none for Red. The A6 on station attacked F/5/1, causing four casualties. Two A4s attacked E/5/1 and F/5/1, causing six casualties in each. A flight of two AV8s attacked the ATGM platoon, destroying the BRDM which had received a mobility kill in the TAT combat.


d. Supporting arms were active on both sides throughout the hour. Blue fired 500 VT rounds of naval gun and artillery, inflicting 20 casualties. Red fired 360 VT rounds of 120 mm mortar and 122 mm artillery, causing 81 casualties to the Blue assault companies.

e. There were no radar or radar-associated devices detections during the hour by either side. All detections were ground visual by assault or defending units.

f. At 1600, D-day there were 35 platoon-size Red targets 0-3 km from the Blue center of mass, one at 3-6 km, and one at 6-9 km.

g. Red and Blue deployments at end-game (1600) are shown on Figure III-III-7.

**MARSAS III  
 BLUE AND RED END GAME DEPLOYMENTS (MODEL III)  
 1600, D-DAY**



0 1  
 1/2 IN KM.

FIGURE 2 III

10. 1601-1700, D-day. While the game play ended at 1600, the ground combat assessment only was made for this additional hour. 3/2 had a force ratio of 1.21, with the same probability (55%) of success. This time Blue was successful and advanced 500 m. - the same distance from Red at which ground combat began at 1530. 3/2 received ten casualties and the 5th MIB seven.

11. Summary of Combat Effectiveness. The unit effectiveness factors and Blue combat and combat support units at start-game (1000, D-day), start-close combat (1530, D-day), and end-game (1700, D-day) are as follows:

Blue	<u>1000, D-day</u>		<u>1530, D-day</u>		<u>1700, D-day</u>	
	<u>ΣT/O or E</u> <sup>(1)</sup>	<u>Cbt Eff</u> <sup>(2)</sup>	<u>ΣT/O or E</u> <sup>(1)</sup>	<u>Cbt Eff</u> <sup>(2)</sup>	<u>ΣT/O or E</u> <sup>(1)</sup>	<u>Cbt Eff</u> <sup>(2)</sup>
3/2 Inf	100	1.00	88	0.90	86	0.90
3/A/2 Tk	100	1.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
C/1/10 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
Red						
5th MIB	82	0.94	64	0.82	61	0.82
B/7 Tk	100	1.00	80	0.80	80	0.80
2/15 Arty	100	1.00	100	1.00	100	1.00
2/18 ATGM	100	1.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

Footnotes: (1) Personnel for infantry and artillery, tactical vehicles for others.  
 (2) To attack for Blue; to defend for Red.

Tab A to Appendix 5 to Annex C  
Task Organization - Blue

3d Bn (rein), 2d MAR

H&S Co (-), 3/2

Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR

Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Rcn Bn

Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF

Det, SCAMP, FMF

Co I (rein), 3/2

I/3/2

1st AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

1st Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Co K (rein), 3/2

K/3/2

2d AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

2d Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Co L (rein), 3/2

L/3/2

3d AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

3d Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Tk Bn, FMF

3d Plt, Co A, 2d AMTRAC Bn

Battalion Reserve

Co M (rein), 3/2

M/3/2

4th AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

4th Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Battalion Fire Support

C/1/10 (rein)

Mort Plt, H&S Co, 3/2

Battalion Combat Service Support

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn

3d Plt (rein), Co A, 2d MT Bn

Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn

Tab B to Appendix 5 to Annex C

Task Organization - Red

---

5th Bn (rein), 1st MIR (rein)

H&S Co (-), 5th MIB

Scout Sec, 22d Rcn Co

Minelayer Plt (-), 23d Engr Co

Co D (rein), 5th MIB

D/5/1

1st Plt, Co B, 7th Tk Bn

AT Plt, H&S Co, 5th MIB

1st Sqd, Minelayer Plt, 23d Engr Co

1st Plt, Mort Btry, 5th MIB

Co E, 5th MIB

Co F, 5th MIB

F/5/1

3d Plt, Co B, 7th Tk Bn

2d Plt, 18th ATGM

Battalion Reserve

Co B (-), 7th Tk Bn

Battalion Fire Support

Mort Btry (-), 5th MIB

2d Plt, 15th Arty

Annex D  
Report of War Game MARSAS IV  
(Battalion in the Day Defense)

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4. Special Situation - Blue . . . . .	D-2
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2. Troop List - Red
3. Environmental Data
4. Description of Model I Game Play
5. Description of Model III Game Play

NARSAS IV  
(Battalion in the Day Defense)

1. Political and Military Background. Saxet, a nation in the Soviet orbit, is a major Caribbean power which has been for years a thorn in the underbelly of the United States. "Yankee Imperialism" and "dollar diplomacy" are typical of terms revived by the GOS for propaganda use on the masses, in order to foster hatred for the US and all its works and, thus, to foster continued support for the Saxet communist regime and all its works. For many years the Saxet armed forces have been equipped and trained by the Soviets and are, in fact, today leadership - dependent on USSR personnel.

2. General Situation - Blue

a. US-USSR detente became a dismal, but not admitted, failure when the Soviets refused to continue the SALT negotiations. About the same time, US intelligence discovered that the Soviets were sending offensive missile parts to and constructing two launching site complexes in Saxet, much as they did in Cuba in the early sixties. This became public knowledge when the US asked the UN Security Council to take remedial action. Knowing any UN action would be blocked by Soviet veto, the US concurrently and secretly secured OAS agreement to support passively any US unilateral action which might follow UN inaction. Also, concurrently, the US staged the II MAF at various east coast and Gulf of Mexico ports for an announced amphibious training exercise on the east coast of Florida.

b. When UN action was formally stymied by a Soviet veto, the US issued an ultimatum to Saxet to commence dismantling the offensive missile systems within one week or the US would employ military force to do the dismantling for them. Saxet was unmoved by the threat, or did not believe it, but the day after the ultimatum expired (7 August) the US proved it was not an idle threat by making a division-size airborne assault of the launching site complex in the interior and by landing the 9th MAB of the II MAF (the MAB having earlier departed its staging area at New Orleans) to inaugurate a beachhead in the vicinity of the other launching site complex, which is near to the coast. The MAB will be followed in two days by the MAF, not enroute, to expand the beachhead from which follow-on US Army forces will launch the final assault, if necessary.

c. The landing site selected by Blue because of the proximity to the missile complex has excellent beach and sea conditions and is not heavily defended. Intelligence reported only a motorized infantry regiment in the area. This regiment, located south of The Grove (GS4060, Sheet 6446I, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topo Comd, 1:50,000), offered no resistance to the 9th MAB when it landed at 0500 on 7 August as it had no early warning of where a landing might be made as TG 2.1 didn't "drop anchor" until 0400, 7 August.

3. General Situation - Red

a. The SALT negotiations between USSR and US broke down. During

this period of dwindling detente, the USSR demanded its "pound of flesh" from Saxet for the years of support by insisting on the installation of Soviet offensive missiles in two launching site complexes - one in the deep interior and one much nearer to the Saxeten coast. The Russian logic was that the US would then make concessions in order to avert nuclear warfare, which course of events would ultimately lead to the triumph of world communism. Before these sites could become operational, the entire project was uncovered by US intelligence and taken by the US to the UN Security Council with a request that immediate action be taken to remove the missiles and destroy the launchers.

b. When the USSR vetoed action by the Security Council, the US, apparently acting unilaterally, issued an ultimatum to Saxet to remove the missiles and destroy the sites in one week or the US would do it by armed intervention. Neither USSR nor Saxet felt the US would really risk world condemnation by an invasion, so the ultimatum was ignored and preparations for the nuclear missile threat to the US continued apace.

c. Saxet was well aware of the US capability to conduct an aerial, airborne, and/or amphibious assault, if it should so desire. It was also aware that an amphibious brigade had been staged at New Orleans and an amphibious division staged east from there, ostensibly to conduct exercises off Florida. What it had not foreseen was that the US really meant its ultimatum and that the amphibious forces were enroute to Saxet. At the fatal week's end, 7 August, an estimated airborne division dropped near the deep interior complex and at 0500 on the same day an estimated US Marine regiment landed in the sector of the 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment (rein), near the other launcher complex. It has been economically infeasible for Saxet to prepare beach defenses along its extensive Gulf of Mexico coastline and the 1st MIR located in the vicinity of The Grove (GS4060, Sheet 6446I, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topo Comd, 1:50,000) was too distant from the beaches used to oppose the landing, especially because the enemy force began landing an hour after its arrival.

#### 4. Special Situation - Blue

a. The 9th MAB, minus 1/2 (rein), made a surface landing at 0500, 7 August and is presently occupying a position along the ridge extending from GS2782 to 3278. 1/2 (rein) was helicopter-landed, also at 0500, on the high ground extending from GS3074 to 3173. The mission of 9th MAB is to seize a beachhead for the II MAF, which is due in the AOA on D+2. The mission of 1/2 is to protect the MAB flank from the threat of the Red regiment which is known to be in the vicinity of The Grove. The MAB has local air superiority. It will be the afternoon of D-day before it will be possible to support 1/2 with (tanks) medium artillery or Amtracs.

b. The Red regiment, which apparently was on high alert, reacted quickly to the landing. Aerial observers reported that on 0600, D-day the regiment started moving in trucks northwest on Highway 36 from The Grove. Indications are that an attack on the 1/2 position is imminent.

c. A Red motorized infantry regiment is known to be triangular, with an adequate amount of transport to move it without shuttling. However, it has no APCs and the infantry always, of necessity, fights on foot. However, the MIR does have a tank battalion (approximately 30-T54), a mortar battery (6-120mm) in each battalion, howitzer battery (6-122mm), and an AT battery (6-85mm gun). Air defense weapons consist of a MG battery (6-14.5mm), a gun battery (4-23mm), and at least one SA-7 per infantry company. Aerial observers have also identified 152mm howitzers, 122mm MRL, and SA-6 missile launchers, so it is presumed the MIR has its slice of division support. A MIR is not known to have surveillance and target acquisition equipment, but it is believed to have an ECM capability.

#### 5. Special Situation - Red

a. At 0200, 6 August a Red aircraft patrol reported a naval task force 150 nautical miles east of Saxet steaming west at an estimated speed of 20 knots. Upon receipt of this intelligence the 1st MIR commander issued a warning order placing the regiment on high alert, prepared to implement without delay one of several counterattack plans in the event a landing should be made in the 1st MIR sector.

b. The regimental-size landing in the sector of the 1st MIR by surface craft and helicopters commenced at 0500, 7 August. Police reported at 0545 that the bulk of the force was landing behind the ridge extending from GS2782 to 3278 and that a battalion-size force is landing by helicopters and is starting to prepare a defensive position on the high ground extending from GS3074 to 3173, apparently to provide flank security for the landing force.

c. Acting on this intelligence, at 0530, 7 August the 1st MIR commander ordered immediate implementation of Plan X, an attack on the landing beach used by Blue. This plan included securing the high ground being occupied by the Blue air-landed battalion. It was estimated that the reduction of this battalion, interposed between the 1st MIR and the enemy main body, was first priority because it gave the best possibility of success if executed before the invader could get established, and, if successful, would leave the remainder of the enemy force very vulnerable.

d. At 0600, the battalion-size guard of the regiment left The Grove, moving motorized northwest on Highway 36 toward the previously selected attack position, which was reached at 0630, with the regiment following closely. This attack position is generally the open area north of Highway 36, east of Henson Creek, and south of the Leon River. There the infantry will be dismounted from the trucks and will launch the attack ASAP on a general axis of the road leading north from Highway 36 through Mound (GS2969).

6. Instructions to the Blue Team Commander

a. Submit your operation orders for Model I position defense and for Model III. These orders should be effective 0500, D-day and include plans for employment of surveillance and target acquisition devices, sensors, barriers, reconnaissance teams, and patrols. Air schedules and artillery and naval gunfire missions should be limited to the daylight hours of D-day.

b. Blue troop lists and infantry battalion T/Es are attached as Appendix 1. Although only 1/2 (rein) will be gamed, you are authorized a slice of aircraft, not to exceed one-third, of the 9th MAB skeleton structure shown.

c. Environmental data are attached as Appendix 3.

d. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) will be played by Red.

7. Instructions to the Red Controller

a. Prepare an operation plan as of 0530, 7 August for the attack by the 1st MIR of the air-landed Blue battalion defensive position described in para 5a, above.

b. The Red troop list and major items of equipment are attached as Appendix 2.

c. Environmental data are provided in Appendix 3.

d. ECM will be played by Red.

Appendix 1 to Annex D  
Troop Lists - Blue

1. 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (skeleton organization)

a. Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Regiment  
Co A, 2d Tank Bn, FMF

b. Aviation Combat Element (1st MAW)

VMA Squadron (20-A4M, 6 available to 1/2)  
VMA-V Squadron (20-AV8A, 4 available to 1/2)  
VMFA Squadron (15-F4J, 4 available to 1/2)  
VMA(AW) Squadron (10-A6A, 4 available to 1/2)  
Det, VM CJ (4-RF4B and 4-EA6A, 2 each available to 1/2)  
HMA Squadron (24-AH1J, 6 available to 1/2)  
HML Squadron (24-UH1N, 4 available to 1/2)  
HMM Squadron (20-CH46E, 12 available to 1/2)  
HMH Squadron (20-CH53D, 4 available to 1/2)  
ASRT No. 1

c. Combat Support Element

1st Bn, 10th Marine Regiment  
Btry K, 4th Bn, 10th Marine Regiment  
2d 8" Battery, 2d FAG, FMF  
Co A, 2d Amphibious Tractor Battalion  
Co A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion  
1st Plt, 2d Force Reconnaissance Company

d. Naval Gunfire Element

<u>Ship Side No.</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Comment</u>
CLG-4(1)	1-6"/47 twin	Available to 1/2
	1-5"/38 twin	
DD931A	3-5"/54 RF single	Available to 1/2
DD931B	3-5"/54 RF single	
DD931C	3-5"/54 RF single	
DD963A	2-5"/54 single	
DD963B	2-5"/54 single	

Footnote: (1) Withdrawn from fleet reserve for this operation.

2. 1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR

	<u>Off, incl USN</u>		<u>EM, incl USN</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>
<u>Ground Combat Element</u>						
1st Bn, 2d MAR	48	42	1183	1038	1231	1080
<u>Combat Support Element</u>						
Radio Relay Sec, HQ Co, 2d MAR	4	4	4	4	8	8

2. 1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR (cont)

	<u>Off, incl USM</u>		<u>EM, incl USM</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>III</u>
Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF	2	2	44	44	46	46
Btry A (rein), 1st Bn, 10th MAR	11	11	136	136	147	147
1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Recon Bn	1	1	26	26	27	27
Det, 2d Force Rcn Co, FMF	1	1	7	7	8	8
Det, SCAMP, FMF	0	0	11	11	11	11
<u>Combat Service Support Element</u>						
1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn	1	1	50	50	51	51
Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn	1	1	17	17	18	18
Totals	69	63	1478	1333	1547	1396

3. Personnel Comparison of Model I and Model III Infantry Battalions:  
Tab A.

4. Table of Candidate Equipment (major combat end items), Infantry  
Battalion: Model I, Tab B; Model III, Tab C.

5. Equipment Comparisons of Model I and Model III.

- a. Weapons: Tab D
- b. Surveillance and Target Acquisition: Tab E
- c. Position Reporting and Location System: Tab F

Personnel Comparison (incl USN)

<u>Battalion Elements</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model III</u>
H&S Company	24-379	22-378
Bn Hq	13(1)-22	11(1)-22
Comm Plat	1-60	1-52
Service Plat	2-53	2-53
Medical Plat	2-65	2-65
Chaplain Sec	1-1	1-1
Company Hq	2-16	2-7
Mortar Plat	2-94	2-104
106mm RR/AT/Assault Plat	1-39	1-33
STA Plat	0(1)-29	0(1)-41
 Rifle Company(4)	 6-201	 5-165
Co Hq	2-7	2-11
Wpns Plat	1-65	None
Plt Hq	(1-2)	(None)
MG Sec	(0-28)	(None)
60mm Mortars	(0-13)	(None)
Assault Sec	(0-22)	0-10
Rifle Plat(3)	1-43	1-48
Plat Hq	(1-4)	(1-3)
Rifle Squad(3)	(0-13)	(0-13)
Fire Tm(3)	(0-4)	(0-4)
S/A Squad	(None)	(0-6)
 Total	 48-1183	 42-1038

Footnote: (1) Bn S-2 has additional duty as STA Plt cmdr.

MODEL I  
TABLE OF CANDIDATE EQUIPMENT  
(MAJOR COMBAT END ITEMS)  
MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION STUDY

ITEM OF EQUIPMENT		UNIT																
RIFLE, M16A1	223																	
GRENADE LAUNCHER, M203																	108	108
60MM MORTAR																	(12)	12
3.5 RKT LAUNCHER											4							4
PISTOL, M1911A1	180																	180
M-191 MPFW																		12
MG, M60																	(24)	24
106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE	8												(8)					8
81MM MORTAR	8											(8)						8
AN/TVS-4 NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICE														4				4
AN/PPS-15, MTI SURV RADAR														8				8
TRUCK, CARGO 1/4T, M151									20									20
TRUCK, PLATFORM, 1/4T, M274									30									30
TRUCK, AMBULANCE, M718									1									1
MRC-83																		2
MRC-87																		1
MRC-109																		2
MRC-123																		2
MRC-124																		1
MRC-134																		2
TOTALS																		

\*Includes 108 Automatic Rifles, M16A1

Tab B  
Appendix 1 to  
Annex D



MODEL III  
TABLE OF CANDIDATE EQUIPMENT  
(MAJOR COMBAT END ITEMS)  
MARINE SEARCH AND ATTACK BATTALION STUDY

	RIFLE, M16A1							208												
	GRENADE LAUNCHER, M203																			12
	M191, MPFW																			12
	PISTOL, AUTO								191											
	106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE								4											4
	DRAGON, MISSILE W/LAUNCHER								12											12
	HEAR/SAW																			108
	81MM MORTAR (ADVANCED)								12											12
	MTI, LONG RANGE RADAR								4											4
	MULTIPURPOSE LASER								4											4
	E-O ANGLE MEAS. DEVICE								4											4
	MTI, Med, RANGE RADAR																			12
	E-O SURV DEVICE, LONG RANGE								4											4
	E-O SURV DEVICE, MED RANGE																			12
	POSITION, LOCATION AND REPORTING SYS (USER SET)		8	(2)																
	WPN, NIGHT VISION SIGHT, AN/PVS-4																			36
	POCKETSCOPE																			36
	TRUCK, CARGO, 1/4T M151																			20
	TRUCK, PLATFORM, 1/4T M274																			30
	TRUCK, CARGO, 1-1/4T M561																			7
	TRUCK, AMBULANCE					1														1
	MRC-83																			2
	MRC-87																			1
	MRC-109																			2
	MRC-123																			2
	TOTALS																			1208

Tab C  
Appendix 1 to  
Annex D



**Weapons Comparison  
(Individual Weapons Not Shown)**

Battalion Elements

H&S Company

Company Hq  
Mortar Plat  
Wpns Plat

Model I

4 3.5 Rocket Launchers  
8 81mm Mortars (M29A1)  
8 106mm RR

Model III

12 81mm Mortars (Advanced)  
4 106mm RR, 12 DRAGON Tracker  
24 Missiles

Rifle Company (4)

Wpns Plat

MC Sec  
60mm Mortars  
Assault Sec

6 M-60  
3 M-19  
3 MPFW, 12 LAW

None  
None  
3 MPFW, LAW as issued

Rifle Plat (3)

Plat Hq  
Rifle Squad (3)  
Fire Tm (3)

13 M-16  
4 M-16

3 SAW, 10 M-16 (or follow-on)  
1 SAW, 3 M-16 (or follow-on)

**Surveillance and Target Acquisition Equipment Comparison**

**Battalion STA Elements**

**Model III**

STA Platoon,  
H&S Company

8 AN/PPS-15 Radar  
4 AN/TVS-4 Night Observation  
Device (NOD)

STA Squad,  
Rifle Platoon,  
Rifle Company

4 Long Range MTI Radar  
4 Long Range E-O Surv. Devices  
4 Multi Purpose Lasers  
4 E-O Angle Measurement Devices

Rifle Squad,  
Rifle Platoon  
Rifle Company

1 Medium Range MTI Radar  
1 Medium Range E-O Surveillance  
Device  
1 Multi Purpose Laser  
1 E-O Angle Measurement Device  
  
1 Rifle Night Vision Sight  
1 Periscope (or follow-on)

**Position Location and Reporting System Comparison**

<u>Rattalion Elements</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model III</u>
	Map & Compass Oriented	Map & Compass Retained PLRS Added
H&S Company		
Mortar Plat	Map & Compass	2 PLRS User Sets (2)
Bn Hq	Map & Compass	2 PLRS User Sets (2)
STA Plt	None	4 PLRS User Sets (4)
Rifle Company(4)		
Co Hq	Map & Compass	1 PLRS User Set (4)
Wpns Plat		None
MG Sec		None
60mm Mortars		
Rifle Plat(3)		
Plat Hq	Map & Compass	1 PLRS User Set (12)
Rifle Squad(3)		
Fire Tm(3)		
STA Squad	None	(Uses Platoon PLRS)
		<b>Total PLRS 24</b>


Appendix 2 to Annex D  
Troop List - Red

	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Acft</u>
1. <u>1st Motorized Infantry Regiment</u>				
<u>(MIR)</u>	197(1)	2322(1)	2519 (1)	28
<u>Command Element</u>	33	209	242	
1st Hq Co	(20)	(35)	(55)	
2d Comm Co	(5)	(50)	(55)	
29th Spec. Sign. Co.	(6)	(94)	(100)	
3d MP Plt	(2)	(30)	(32)	
<u>Ground Combat Element</u>	100	1435	1535	
4th Motor Inf Bn (MIB)	(27)	(433)	(460)	
5th MIB	(27)	(433)	(460)	
6th MIB	(27)	(433)	(460)	
7th Tk Bn	(19)	(136)	(155)	
<u>Aviation Combat Element</u>	unk	unk	unk	28
8th Ftr/Bomber Flt	unk	unk	unk	4-SU7B
9th Intcpter Flt	unk	unk	unk	4-MIG21J
10th Intcpter Flt	unk	unk	unk	4-MIG21J
11th Lt Bomber Flt	unk	unk	unk	4-IL28
12th Lt Helo Flt	unk	unk	unk	8-HOPLIGHT
13th Med Helo Flt	unk	unk	unk	4-HIP
<u>Combat Support Element</u>	49	487	536	
14th Prov Arty Bn	(24)	(258)	(282)	
14th hq Plt (2)	(5)	(22)	(27)	
15th Arty Btry	(5)	(60)	(65)	
Btry A, 1st Bn				
16th Arty Regt (2)	(5)	(60)	(65)	
Btry G, 3d Bn, 16th				
Arty Regt (2)	(5)	(60)	(65)	
Btry A, 17th RL Bn (2)	(4)	(56)	(60)	
18th ATG Btry	(4)	(16)	(20)	
19th AAG Btry	(3)	(18)	(21)	
20th AAMG Btry	(3)	(30)	(33)	
Btry A, 21st SAM Bn (2)	(5)	(45)	(50)	
22d Rcn Co	(4)	(45)	(49)	
23d Engr Co	(5)	(55)	(60)	
24th Chem Plt	(1)	(20)	(21)	
<u>Combat Service Support</u>				
<u>Element</u>	15	191	206	
25th MT Co	(4)	(70)	(74)	
26th Maint Co	(3)	(45)	(48)	
27th Supply Co	(3)	(51)	(54)	
28th Med Co	(5)	(25)	(30)	

Footnotes: (1) Does not include Aviation Combat Element.  
(2) Attached from 1st MID.

2. The above troop list will be the same for the Model I and Model III games.
3. Tables of Organization and equipment: Tab A through R.

# MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)



## WEAPONS

- 2267 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 84 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK
- 189 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 14.5mm AAMG, ZPU-4
- 4 - 23mm AAG(SP), ZSU-23-4
- 6 - 73mm RG, SPG-9
- 94 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 6 - 85mm ATG(TOWED), SD-44
- 18 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)
- 12 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30
- 240 - 122mm RL
- 6 - 152mm HOW (TOWED), D-1
- 32 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 6 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT
- 2 - 13.2" SAM, SA-6

Tab A

Appendix 2 to Annex D


## TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS OR TROOP CARRYING TRUCKS

- 3 - AMPHIB TANK, PT-76
- 31 - MED TANK, T-54
- 6 - RKT LNCHR VEH, BM-21
- 9 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM
- 3 - ARMD COMD VEH, BTR-60P
- 3 - MOTORCYCLE, M-72
- 3 - TRUCK, DECON, ARS-14
- 1 - TRUCK, DECON, DDA-53

## MISC.

- 9 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET
- 4 - MINELAYER (TOWED), PMR-6C
- 8 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1
- 6 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-3A
- 8 - RADARS
- 360 - RADIOS
- 3 - RADAR JAMMER
- 9 - RADIO JAMMER
- 10 - RADIO INTERCEPT SET
- 1 - DF NET

# HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



## WEAPONS

- 209 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 33 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7 (HQ CO)


## TACTICAL VEHICLES

- 4 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM (MP PLT)
- 2 - ARMD COMD VEH, BTR-60P (HQ CO)

## MISC

- 4 - RADIOS (HQ CO)
- 17 - RADIOS (COMM CO)
- 6 - RADIOS (MP PLT)
- 23 - RADIOS (SPEC SIG CO)
- 3 - RADAR JAMMER/DF
- 9 - RADIO JAMMER
- 10 - RADIO INTERCEPT SE
- 1 - DF NET\*

**SPECIAL SIGNAL COMPANY,  
HEADQUARTERS BATTALION,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)**



**WEAPONS**

94-7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM  
6 - 9mm PISTOL, PM

**TACTICAL VEHICLES**


NONE

**MISC.**

- 23 - RADIOS
- 2 - JAMMER VHF/UHF, 1KW
- 3 - JAMMER VHF/UHF, 100W
- 4 - JAMMER VHF/UHF, 10W
- 10 - RADIO INTERCEPT SET
- 1 - DF NET VHF/UHF\*
- 3 - DF/JAMMER, RADAR

\*See Annex J.

# MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION, MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



## WEAPONS

423 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM

27 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK

26 - 9mm PISTOL, PM

2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9

27 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7

6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)

5 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7

2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT

## TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS OR TROOP-CARRYING TRUCKS

NONE


## MISC.

1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-1

1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A

62 - RADIOS

**HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



D-2-E-1

Tab E  
Appendix 2 to Annex D

**WEAPONS**

- 32 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 2 - 73mm RG, SPG-9
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7
- 2 - 4.75" ATGM, AT-3, GND MOUNT


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

NONE

**MISC.**

12 - RADIOS

**MOTORIZED INFANTRY COMPANY,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 117 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 9 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK
- 6 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 9 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES, NOT INCL.  
TROOP-CARRYING TRUCKS**

**NONE**

**MISC.**

**15 - RADIOS**

**MORTAR BATTERY,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



D-2-G-1

Tab G  
Appendix 2 to Annex D

**WEAPONS**

- 40 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 120mm MORTAR (TOWED)
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**

NONE

**MISC.**

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 5 - RADIOS

# TANK BATTALION, MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



## WEAPONS

- 136 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 19 - 9mm PISTOL, PM


## TACTICAL VEHICLES

- 31 - MED TANK, T-54
- 1 - ARMD COMD VEH, BTR-60P
- 1 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM

## MISC.

- 9 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SE
- 48 - RADIOS

**TANK COMPANY,  
TANK BATTALION,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 39 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

- 10 - MED TANK, T-54

**MISC.**

- 3 - MINE CLEARING PLOW SET
- 14 - RADIOS

# PROVISIONAL ARTILLERY BATTALION MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)



### WEAPONS

- 258 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 24 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 12 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30
- 6 - 152mm HOW (TOWED), D-1
- 240 - 122mm RL
- 4 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


### TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

- 6 - RKT LNCHR VEH, BM-21

### MISC.

- 4 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS
- 3 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 25 - RADIOS

**HOWITZER BATTERY,  
PROVISIONAL ARTILLERY BATTALION,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)**



**WEAPONS**

- 60 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 122mm HOW (TOWED), D-30, OR
- 6 - 152mm HOW (TOWED), D-1
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7

**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**


NONE

**MISC.**

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-
- 1 - PERI AIM CIRCLE, PAB-2A
- 5 - RADIOS

D-2-K-1

**ROCKET LAUNCHER BATTERY,  
PROVISIONAL ARTILLERY BATTALION,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)**



D-2-L-1

Tab L  
Appendix 2 to Annex D

**WEAPONS**

- 56 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 240 - 122mm RL
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES**

- 6 - RKT LNCHR VEH, BM-21

**MISC.**

- 5 - RADIOS

# PROVISIONAL AIR DEFENSE BATTALION, MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT (REINFORCED)



### WEAPONS

93 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM

11 - 9mm PISTOL, PM

6 - 14.5 mm AAMG (TOWED), ZPU-4

4 - 23mm AAG (SP), ZSU-23-4

2 - 13.2" SAM, SA-6

7 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7 (1 PER PLT)

### TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME VEHICLES

NONE

### MISC.

8 - RADARS (SAM BTRY)

10 - RADIOS (SAM BTRY)

6 - RADIOS (AAG BTRY)

4 - RADIOS (AAMG BTRY)


D-2-M-1

Tab M

Appendix 2 To Annex D

NOTE: THERE IS NO HQ BTRY, AS EACH FIRING BATTERY OPERATES INDEPENDENTLY.

**ANTITANK GUN BATTERY,  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



**WEAPONS**

- 16 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 6 - 85mm ATG (TOWED), SD-44
- 6 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7
- 1 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7


**TACTICAL VEHICLES  
NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS**

NONE

**MISC.**

- 1 - STEREO RANGE FINDER, DS-
- 5 - RADIOS

# RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY, MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



## WEAPONS

- 45 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM
- 3 - 7.62mm LMG, RPK \*\*
- 4 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 4 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7\*

## TACTICAL VEHICLES

- 3 - AMPHIB TANK, PT-76 \*\*
- 4 - ARMD SCOUT CAR, BRDM\*
- 3 - MOTORCYCLE, M-72 \*\*\*

## MISC.

- 10 - RADIOS (1 PER VEH)


D-2-0-1

FOOTNOTES: \* 1 PER HQ SEC AND RCN PLT

\*\* 1 PER RCN PLT

\*\*\* SCOUT SEC

# ENGINEER COMPANY, MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



### WEAPONS

- 55 - 7.62 mm RIFLE, AKM
- 5 - 9mm PISTOL, PM
- 3 - 85mm ATGL, RPG-7

### TACTICAL VEHICLES NOT INCL. PRIME MOVERS

NONE

### MISC.


- 4 - MINELAYER (TOWED), PMR-6
- 8 - RADIOS (4 ON PRIME MOVER)

**CHEMICAL PLATOON  
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT**



<b>WEAPONS</b>	<b>TACTICAL VEHICLES</b>	<b>MISC.</b>
20 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM	3 - TRUCK, DECON, ARS-14	1 - RADIO
1 - 9mm PISTOL, PM	1 - TRUCK, DECON, DDA-53	

# REAR SERVICE BATTALION, MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT



**WEAPONS**  
 166 - 7.62mm RIFLE, AKM  
 10 - 9mm PISTOL, PM  
 4 - 2.75" SAM, SA-7 (1PER CO)

**TACTICAL VEHICLES**  
 NONE

**MISC.**  
 7 - RADIOS (2 PER CO, EXCEPT 1 PER MED CO)

**NOTE: THERE IS NO HQ CO, AS EACH COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT COMPANY OPERATES INDEPENDENTLY.**

Appendix 3  
Environmental Data

1. Terrain

a. The terrain of the AOA is exactly as depicted on Sheet 6446I, Series V782, Edition 4-TPC, US Army Topographic Command map, 1:50,000. Digitized terrain profiles will be made from this map. For game purposes it is assumed that Coryell Creek/Clear Branch is the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, Highway 84 is a coastal highway, and the Leon River is fordable.

b. Game play will be conducted on the Geological Survey map, 1:24,000. Overlays, therefore, should be at this scale.

c. Other map coverage of the AOA, such as Orthopictomap 1:25,000, Experimental Ground Tactical Data 1:25,000, Vehicle Movement 1:50,000, Foot Movement 1:50,000, Concealment 1:50,000, and Foxhole Construction and Existing Cover 1:50,000, is available for use in developing planning information.

2. Astronomic Data for 7 August

a. Daylight: Sunrise 0521, Sunset 1841.

b. Twilight: BMNT 0417, EENT 1946.

c. Moonlight: not applicable.

3. Weather. The 24-hour weather forecast issued at 0001, 7 August is for clear skies initially, with cloud cover moving in during the afternoon, becoming 80% by night and with a ceiling lowering to 2500'. Visibility will be unlimited, but there will be ground fog in the valleys during the morning, which will burn off by 1000. No rain foreseen. Temperatures will range from 75-95° and humidity from 50-75%. Winds will be offshore at 5-10 knots.

Appendix 4 to Annex D  
Description of Model I Game Play

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2. Concept of Operations - Blue . . . . .	D-4-1
3. Concept of Operations - Red . . . . .	D-4-1
4. 0500-0600, D-day . . . . .	D-4-3
5. 0601-0700, D-day . . . . .	D-4-6
6. 0701-0800, D-day . . . . .	D-4-6
7. 0801-0900, D-day . . . . .	D-4-9
8. 0901-1000, D-day . . . . .	D-4-11
9. 1001-1100 (End-Game) D-day . . . . .	D-4-14
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Tabs

- A. Task Organization - Blue
- B. Task Organization - Red

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IV-I-1B	Blue Minefield and Sensor Plan, and Reconnaissance Team Deployments	D-4-4
IV-I-2	Red Concept of Operations	D-4-5
IV-I-3	Blue and Red Deployments, 0700, D-day	D-4-7
IV-I-4	Blue and Red Deployments, 0800, D-day	D-4-10
IV-I-5	Blue and Red Deployments, 0900, D-day	D-4-12
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## 1. (U) Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of War Game MARSAS IV, with the current Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model I surveillance and target acquisition (STA) capability. The game portrays a day defense by a reinforced infantry battalion at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red reinforced motorized infantry regiment (MIR) with electronic countermeasures capability. Game play commenced 10 July 1974 and was completed 19 July 1974.

b. The game began at 0500, D-day as the Blue battalion was air-landed on high ground on the flank of the 9th MAB assault of Saxet which was exposed to the threat of the Red MIR. Assessment intervals were of one-hour duration, with the game terminating at 1100, D-day with the two forces locked in close combat. A summary of each of these six intervals appears below.

## 2. (U) Concept of Operations - Blue

a. L-hour is 0500, D-day (7 August). The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines will be landed on the high ground extending from GS3074 to 3173 and will be closed in earliest by use of all of the helicopters available to the 9th MAB. A strong defensive position will be developed at the landing site.

b. The mission of 1/2 is to protect the left (south) flank of the 9th MAB landing against the threat posed by the Red 1st MIR at The Grove.

(1) A/1/2 (rein), B/1/2 (rein), and C/1/2 (rein) will defend assigned areas and will conduct patrolling forward of their positions. See Figure IV-1-1A.

(2) D/1/2 is designated as battalion reserve, prepared to reinforce any company or to counterattack.

(3) PPS '5 radars will be employed at each company position to effect 360° coverage. Two radars will be advanced to forward sites by one patrol each from A/1/2 and B/1/2.

(4) All supporting arms will be in direct support of the battalion.


c. The defensive plan, with initial radar deployments and patrol routes, is shown on Figure IV-1-A. The plan for hand emplaced sensors and barriers subsequent to the landing is shown on Figure IV-1-B.

d. Task organization is provided in Tab A to this appendix.

## 3. (U) Concept of Operations - Red

a. The 1st MIR will attack as soon as possible to reduce to enemy defensive position on the high ground extending from GS3074 to 3173. An approach march will be made motorized from the present assembly area at The Grove to an attack position generally in the open area east of Henson Creek and south of the Leon River. The attack will be made

**MARSAS IV (MODEL I)  
BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**



dismounted by two battalions abreast.

(1) 5th MIB (rein) will depart present assembly area at 0600 and proceed northwest on Highway 36 to the regimental attack position, deploy on the right flank, prepared to attack to the north at H-hour (tentatively, 0800) in coordination with the 4th MIB.

(2) 4th MIB (rein) will depart present assembly area at 0630 and proceed northwest on Highway 36 to the regimental attack position, deploy on the left flank, prepared to attack to the north at H-hour (tentatively, 0800) in coordination with the 5th MIB.

(3) 6th MIB (rein) will depart present assembly area at 0700 and proceed northwest on Highway 36 to a position behind the regimental attack position as regimental reserve, prepared to assume the mission of either assault battalion, to conduct a heliborne attack on the left flank, or to make a motorized attack on the highway north toward Mound.

(4) 7th Tk Bn will move A/7 and B/7 with the 4th MIB to a position east of the regimental attack position, prepared to make a flanking attack in support of the infantry assault. C/7 will move with the 6th MIB.

(5) Combat support units will be deployed forward to be in general support of the regimental attack, except that the 15th Arty will be in direct support of the 4th MIB and A/1/16 Arty will be in direct support of the 5th MIB. All artillery units will be prepared to fire at 0630.

(6) Radar DF and Jamming platoon will be in assigned positions by helicopter lift at 0600. Communication Jamming platoon will operate from vicinity of The Grove.

b. The Red concept of operations is shown on Figure IV-I-2.

c. Task organization is provided in Tab B to this appendix.

4. (U) 0500-0600, D-day


a. At L-hour (0500), D-day the assault landing of Blue 1/2 commenced. At the end of this hour, by employing all available 9th MAB helicopters, the entire battalion and its attached units were closed in and deployed on the defensive position, reconnaissance teams had been inserted, and ground radars had been emplaced (Figure IV-I-1A and 1B). However, none of the barrier plan had been implemented.

b. During this hour the Red 1st MIR was preparing for its attack, but had not departed from its assembly area in The Grove.


c. The only combat activity during the interval was the destruction of the sole Blue plane on station, an A-6 MTI aircraft, by a Red SA-6 at 0550. This A-6 had, of course, made no detections.

d. There were no detections by Blue ground radars as not only were no moving targets within their search fans, but they weren't operating until end-period. There are 92 platoon-size targets in the Red threat, all of which were over 15 kms from 1/2 (rein).

**MARSAS IV (MODEL I)  
 BLUE MINEFIELD AND SENSOR PLAN  
 RECONNAISSANCE TEAM DEPLOYMENTS**



# MARSAS IV (MODEL I) RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS



SCALE IN METERS  
FIGURE 22-17

5. (U) 0601-0700, D-day

a. The Red 1st MIR reacted to Blue 1/2 deploying on the high ground, not only by implementation of Plan X, as described in para 5 of the scenario, but by firing artillery concentrations from The Grove on the Blue position. A/17 RL delivered 240 rounds, causing 64 casualties in HS/1/2 and destroying two mortars. G/3/16 (152mm How) fired 60 rounds, causing eight casualties in D/1/2.

b. At 0601 three Red radar and radio jammers were helicopter-lifted to positions shown on Figure IV-I-2. At 0630 the Red advance guard (5th MIB), which had departed The Grove at 0601, reached the attack position and by the end of the interval was deployed, waiting the arrival of the 4th MIB before launching the attack.

c. At the beginning of the hour Blue aircraft lifted four demolition teams, each protected by an infantry squad, to prepare bridge demolitions (Figure IV-I-1B). Three were prepared, but at 0630 the fourth was aborted due to the arrival in the area of the 5th MIB (Figure IV-I-3). Also, at 0601, 1/2 began hand-emplanting sensor strings and mines. By the end of the hour the minefields were in, but they were able to implement only partially the sensor plan (Figures IV-I-1B and IV-I-3). All company patrols were out by end-interval.

d. The A-6 MTI aircraft on station detected the 4th MIB moving on Highway 36 and attacked. This cost D/5/1 two trucks and ten casualties, E/5/1 three trucks and 11 casualties, 2/A/18 an AT gun, and 2/A/19 an AA gun. At 0700 the Red 1st MIR (less the 4th and 5th MIBs) was still at The Grove.

e. Due to limited range, the Blue ground radars again made no detections. On the Red side, also due to range, none of these radars, which were not operating continuously, was located by direction finders and, hence, not jammed. Nor were any Blue communication nets jammed by Red. Actually, Blue on landing laid wire to the companies, mortars, and direct support battery. Thus the only communications really susceptible to jamming were the air request and naval gunfire nets.


f. At 0700, D-day, of the 92 platoon-size Red targets being examined for radar detections, none was within 3 kms of the Blue 1/2 center of mass, one was between 3 and 6 kms, 27 were 6-9 kms, 29 were 9-12 kms, and the remaining 35 were over 15 kms.



g. Blue and Red deployments at 0700, D-day and that part of the Blue sensor plan implemented are shown on Figure IV-I-3.

6. (U) 0701-0800, D-day

a. The principal activity of this assessment period was the completing of the Red regimental redeployment to its attack position. The 4th MIB

MARSAS IV (MODEL I)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 0700, D-DAY



 RED RADAR POSITIONS  
 UNATTENDED GROUND SENSORS


  
 SCALE IN KMS

FIGURE IV-1.3

reached its position at 0730 and by the interval's end was deployed for the dismounted attack ordered to go at 0801. The 6th MIB, 1st MIR reserve, reached its assembly area at 0800.

b. All of this Red activity was beyond the range of the Blue PPS 15 radars and, hence, all detections during the interval were ground visual (2) and air visual (5). Early in the interval the Force Recon Team No. 2 reported the road movement of the 4th MIB and the deployment to its north and northeast of the 5th MIB on its attack position. Also, early in the interval, two reconnaissance helicopters (one UH1N and one AH1J) reported the 5th MIB deployment position and were then shot down by Red LADS. Minutes later a similarly-composed helicopter flight reported the departure of the 6th MIB from The Grove and 10 minutes later reported the attack deployments of the two Red battalions. Two F4s also picked up the movement of the Red reserve from The Grove and attacked, as did two A4s and two AV8s. The 6th MIB did not slow up and 15 minutes later was detected on the highway by the A6 on station. This plane also attacked. All told these attacks cost the 6th MIB six vehicles and 26 casualties and the accompanying C/7 Tk lost three tanks and crews.

c. Red aircraft were also active during this period. At 0705, four SU7s, escorted by four MIGs, struck the 1/2 defensive position with good effect. A radio jeep and six casualties were lost in HS/1/2; two trucks, one tube, and seven casualties were lost in A/1/10; C/1/2 took eight casualties and D/1/2 seven. The escorts were engaged by the Blue CAP, with Red losing two MIGs, and Blue losing two Navy F4s. The other six Red aircraft returned safely to base. This air strike caused A/1/10 to move to another position at 0715, where it was prepared to fire at 0733.

d. During the hour Red expended a total of 180 artillery rounds which cost A/1/2, C/1/2, and D/1/2 ten casualties each. Blue, in turn, fired 200 rounds from the destroyer which gave the 4th and 5th MIB each 16 casualties. A/1/10 fired 100 rounds at C/4, giving that company nine casualties.

e. Red had a small amount of ECM activity. The radios of the two helicopters were jammed intermittently. At the end of the interval the Blue transmitter on the air observation net was located by direction finding.

f. One patrol from Blue A/1/2 and B/1/2, each carrying a PPS 15 radar not previously employed, established two forward radar sites early in this period.

g. At 0800 none of the 92 platoon-size Red targets was within 3 kms of the center of mass of Blue 1/2, one was between 3 and 6 kms, 85 were 6-9 kms, three were 9-12 kms, and three were beyond 15 kms.

h. Red and Blue deployments, including Blue forward radar sites, at 0800, D-day are shown on Figure IV-I-4.

7. (U) 0801-0900, D-day

a. At 0801 the Red 4th and 5th MIBs started their attack, crossing PL VODKA at 0845, and advancing 2.2 km during the hour. The initiation of the assault had been reported by a flight of A4 aircraft noting that the two battalions previously reported in the attack position were no longer there. Ground fog in the Leon River valley precluded the planes locating these units, but Blue fired 140 rounds of artillery and 300 of naval guns at the start of the period at estimated locations, inflicting 31 casualties each on the 4th and 5th MIB.

b. Between 0805 and 0838 PPS No. 8 (Figure IV-I-4) made 5 detections of the 4th MIB attack, primarily of the mortars. A/1/2 responded to these detections with 90 rounds, inflicting 6 casualties on Red B/4/1. Late in the period the patrol from B/1/2 which had PPS No. 8 with it, made a visual detection of C/4/1, the left flank assault company. PPS 1 through 7 made no detections during the hour because no Red targets were within their fans. At the end of the hour Red had DFed PPS 8 and, earlier, had jammed the patrol's radio, delaying reports of its initial detections.

c. During the interval the 1/2 commander asked 9th MAB for A/2 Tk which he knew to be ashore now. In view of other threats to the landing, 9th MAB was unable to accede, but did attach the 1st platoon. Arrival of the tanks in the 1/2 area was estimated to be approximately 0915.

d. The flight of four A4 aircraft mentioned in subpara a, above, also detected the 6th MIB and C/7Tk, which were being held in the reserve assembly areas. On attacking, two tanks and crews were lost by C/7Tk and one truck and four casualties by the 6th MIB. About the same time a flight of two AV8s detected A/7 Tk, attacked, and destroyed one tank and crew and a flight of two F4s detected B/7 Tk and also killed a tank and crew. Blue lost the A-6 on station at 0810 to a SAM.


e. Red aircraft were again active. Late in the period four IL28s, escorted by four MIGs, were launched to attack the Blue defensive position. Navy CAP shot down all escorts, but the bombers got through and returned to base. As a result of this attack HS/1/2 lost a mortar, radio jeep, and 10 men and A/1/2 lost 3 MULES and 8 men.

f. Red artillery fired 60 rounds of 122mm and 240 rockets during the hour. The rockets were particularly devastating to HS/1/2, inflicting 52 casualties and destroying another radio jeep. A/1/2 also lost eight men to the rockets and D/1/2 two to artillery.

g. At 0900 none of the 92 platoon-size Red targets was within 3 kms of the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 38 were between 3 and 6 kms, 49 were 6-9 kms, 2 were 9-12 kms, and 3 were beyond 15 kms.

h. Red and Blue deployments at 0900, D-day are shown on Figure IV-I-5.

MARSAS IV (MODEL I)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 0800, D-DAY



8. (U) 0901-1000, D-day

a. The Red attack advanced 2 km during the hour and was approximately on PL BODA at the end. A/2/7 Tk and B/2/7 Tk, supporting these two battalions, were ordered up to join in the final assault of the Blue position. It was anticipated they would arrive about 1015.

b. At the beginning of the hour a patrol from B/1/2 saw the assault companies of the Red 4th MIB, called for artillery, and withdrew. Actually, the patrol had seen the attackers toward the end of the last hour, but could not report as the radio was being jammed by Red. Blue fired 90 rounds of artillery and 300 rounds from naval guns, all unobserved fire, inflicting 22 casualties in the 4th MIB.

c. About mid-period a flight of two helicopters detected the assault companies of both Red battalions and called for supporting arms, Blue fired 105 rounds of artillery on the 4th MIB and 140 mortar rounds on the 5th MIB, all observed and adjusted fire, causing an additional 17 casualties in the 4th and 28 in the 5th. The flight took AA fire, but received no damage. Naval gunfire could not be used in this supporting arms attack as the radio net had been jammed at 0929 and was still being jammed at the end of the interval.

d. There were no ground radar detections by Blue during the hour and there were no radars or radios located by Red direction finding. Blue lost his only airborne radar when the A6 on station was shot down by a SAM at 0915 and no relief was available. The only other electronic intelligence which occurred was the 5th MIB activating the sensor string just east of the minefields (Figure IV-I-1B) at mid-period. This did not tell Blue anything he didn't know already.

e. During the first hour Red fired 180 rounds of artillery and 150 of mortar on the Blue defense position, inflicting 29 casualties on 1/2. Blue was taking fewer artillery casualties now, as according to LFWG rules the digging in of its hasty defensive position was completed at 0900.


f. The only other activity of the hour was the arrival of Blue 1/A/2 Tk as planned, and its deployment by 0940.

g. The fog which had been in the valleys all day was burned away by the end of this hour. This had no significance in subsequent game play as close combat was at an altitude which was never fogged in.

h. At 1000, 25 platoon-size Red targets were within 3 km of the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 13 were between 3 and 6 km, 49 were 6-9 km, 2 were 9-12 km, and 3 were beyond 15 km.

i. Red and Blue deployments at 1000, D-day are shown on Figure IV-I-6.

**MARSAS IV (MODEL I)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 0900, D-DAY**



SCALE 1:1000  
 FIGURE 10

MARSAS IV (MODEL I)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 1000, D-DAY




FIGURE IX-1-6

9. (U) 1001-1100, D-day (End-Game)

a. As the interval began, the Red battalions were approximately 1 1/4 km from the Blue position. Fifteen minutes later, at a range of 700 meters, close combat began. On the Red side the attackers consisted of the 4th and 5th MIBs and their attached direct-fire weapons, each having a tank company, two air defense platoons, and an antitank platoon. On the blue side the defense consisted of the 1/2 battalion and a tank platoon. Red had a force ratio of 1.94, with a probability of success of .65, was successful and advanced 300 meters across Type A terrain in the first 20 minutes and 200 meters across Type C terrain during the remainder of the hour. Blue did not start withdrawing to alternate positions within his general position, so the game ended with 200 meters separating the two forces. Blue suffered twice as many casualties as Red - 17 to 8.

b. PPS No. 6 made two detections this hour. At 1005 Red D/5/1 was picked up and at 1017 Red A/7 Tk and B/7 Tk were picked up moving to the northwest in the attack. At the same time 1/2 actually saw the same targets. The tanks also had been detected by the helicopter flight moving from their rear positions toward the attacking battalions.

c. Red cut off his jammers during this assessment period as he didn't want to cause himself any communications problems at a critical time when he was closing with the enemy. Also, Red was unable to DF any Blue radio or radar.

d. Red fired 360 rounds of artillery and 480 rounds of rockets during the hour. The artillery caused 20 casualties in HS/1/2, 4 in A/1/2, and 7 in D/1/2. The rockets inflicted an additional 21 casualties in A/1/2. Blue, in turn, fired 120 rounds of artillery and 360 rounds from naval guns. The 4th MIB took 10 casualties from the artillery and 32 from the naval guns.

e. When the game ended at 1100 D-day, 43 platoon-size Red targets were within 3 km of the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 3 were between 3 and 6 km, 41 were 6-9 km, 2 were 9-12 km, and 3 were beyond 15 km.


f. Blue and Red deployments at 1100, D-day (end-game) are shown on Figure IV-I-7.

10. (U) Summary of Combat Effectiveness. The unit effectiveness factors for Blue and Red combat and combat support units at start-game (0500, D-day), start-close combat (1015, D-day), and end-game (1100, D-day) are as follows:

	<u>0500, D-day</u>		<u>1015, D-day</u>		<u>1100, D-day</u>	
	<u>%T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>%T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>	<u>%T/O or E</u>	<u>Cbt Eff</u>
<u>Blue</u>						
1/2 Inf	100	1.0	83	.94	77	.91
A/1/10 Arty	100	1.0	94	1.0	94	1.0
1/A/2 Tk	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
<u>Red</u>						
4th MIB	100	1.0	78	.76	75	.76
5th MIB	100	1.0	79	.76	71	.68
6th MIB	100	1.0	93	.96	93	.96
15th Arty	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
A/1/16 Arty	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
G/3/16 Arty	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
A/17 RL	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
18th ATG	100	1.0	88	1.0	88	1.0
A/7 Tk	100	1.0	90	.90	90	.90
B/7 Tk	100	1.0	90	.90	90	.90
C/7 Tk	100	1.0	50	.50	50	.50

Footnotes: (1) Personnel for infantry and artillery, tanks for tank units  
 (2) Combat effectiveness is based upon % T/O or E, posture and type unit.

MARSAS IX (MODEL I)  
 BLUE AND RED END GAME DEPLOYMENTS  
 1100, D-DAY



SCALE IN KMS  
 FIGURE IX-77

Tab A to Appendix 4 to Annex D

Task Organization - Blue

---

1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR

H&S Co (-), 1/2

Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR

Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Recon Bn

Det, 2d Force Recon Bn, FMF

Det, SCAMP, FMF

Co A (rein), 1/2

A/1/2

1st Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co B (rein), 1/2

B/1/2

2d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co C (rein), 1/2

C/1/2

3d Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Reserve

Co D (rein), 1/2

D/1/2

4th Sec, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Fire Support

A/1/10 (rein)

Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Combat Service Support

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn

Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn

Tab B to Appendix 4 to Annex D  
Task Organization - Red

1st Motorized Infantry Regiment (MIR)

1st Hq Co  
2d Comm Co  
29th Spec Sig Co  
3d MP Plt  
7th Tk Bn  
22d Recon Co (-)  
23d Engr Co (-)  
24th Chem Plt

4th Motorized Infantry Battalion (MIB) (rein)

4th MIB  
1st Plt, 18th ATG Btry  
1st Plt, 19th AAG Btry  
1st Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
1st Plt, 22d Recon Co  
1st Plt, 23d Engr Co

5th Motorized Infantry Battalion (rein)

5th MIB  
2d Plt, 18th ATG Btry  
2d Plt, 19th AAG Btry  
2d Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
2d Plt, 22d Recon Co  
2d Plt, 23d Engr Co

Regimental Reserve

6th Motorized Infantry Battalion (rein)

6th MIB  
3d Plt, 18th ATG Btry  
3d Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
3d Plt, 22d Rcn Co

Regimental Artillery

14th Prov Arty Bn  
18th ATG Btry (-)  
19th AAG Btry (-)  
20th AAMG Btry (-)  
Btry A, 21st SAM Bn

Regimental Logistic Support

25th MT Co  
26th Maint Co  
27th Sup Co  
28th Med Co

Appendix 5 to Annex D

Description of Model III Game Play

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3. Concept of Operations - Red . . . . .	D-5-5
4. 0500-0600, D-day . . . . .	D-5-5
5. 0601-0700, D-day . . . . .	D-5-8
6. 0701-0800, D-day . . . . .	D-5-9
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Appendix 5 to Annex D  
Description of MARSAS IV (Model III) Game Plan

1. (U) Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to furnish a description of the dynamic play of War Game MARSAS IV, with the Marine infantry battalion equipped with Model III surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices and advanced weapons systems. The game portrays a day defense by a reinforced infantry battalion at Fort Hood, Texas against the mid-intensity threat of a Red reinforced motorized infantry regiment (MIR) with electronic countermeasures capability. Game play commenced 22 July 1974 and was completed 30 July 1974.

b. The game began at 0500, D-day as the Blue battalion was air-landed on high ground on the flank of the 9th MAB assault of Saxet which was exposed to the threat of the Red MIR. Assessment intervals were of one-hour duration, with the game terminating at 1200, D-day (one hour later than in Model I play) with the two forces locked in close combat. A summary of each of these seven intervals appears below.

2. (U) Concept of Operations - Blue

a. L-hour is 0500, D-day (7 August). The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines will be landed on the high ground from GS 3074 to 3173 and will be closed in earliest by use of all of the helicopters available to the 9th MAB. A strong defensive position will be developed at the landing site.

b. The mission of 1/2 is to protect the left (south) flank of the 9th MAB landing against the threat posed by the Red 1st MIR at The Grove.

(1) A/1/2 (rein), B/1/2 (rein), and C/1/2 (rein) will defend assigned areas and will conduct patrolling forward of their positions.


(2) D/1/2 is designated as battalion reserve, prepared to reinforce any company or to counterattack.

(3) Medium-range radars will be employed at each company position to effect 360° coverage. Two radars will be advanced to forward sites by one patrol each from A/1/2 and B/1/2. Long-range radars will be employed for quadrant search, each to give 360° coverage.

(4) All supporting arms will be in direct support of the battalion.


c. The defensive plan, with long-range radar deployments and patrol routes, is shown on Figure IV-I-1A. Medium-range radar employments are shown on Figure IV-III-1B. The plan for hand emplaced sensors and barriers subsequent to the landing is shown on Figure IV-I-1C.

**MARSAS IX (MODEL III)**  
**BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS,**  
**LONG-RANGE RADAR DEPLOYMENTS AND PATROL ROUTES**



# MARSAS IV (MODEL III)

## BLUE MEDIUM RANGE RADAR DEPLOYMENTS




L
 MEDIUM RANGE RADAR FAN



1000  
 METERS  
 FIGURE 18

**MARSAS IV (MODEL III)  
 BLUE MINEFIELD AND SENSOR PLAN  
 RECONNAISSANCE TEAM DEPLOYMENTS**



d. Task organization is provided in Tab A to this appendix.

3. (U) Concept of Operations - Red

a. The 1st MIR will attack as soon as possible to reduce the enemy defensive position on the high ground extending from GS3074 to 3173. An approach march will be made motorized from the present assembly area at The Grove to an attack position generally in the open area east of Henson Creek and south of the Leon River. The attack will be made dismounted by two battalions abreast.

(1) 5th MIB (rein) will depart present assembly area at 0600 and proceed northwest on Highway 36 to the regimental attack position, deploy on the right flank, prepared to attack to the north at H-hour (tentatively, 0800) in coordination with the 4th MIB.

(2) 4th MIB (rein) will depart present assembly area at 0630 and proceed northwest on Highway 36 to the regimental attack position, deploy on the left flank, prepared to attack to the north at H-hour (tentatively, 0800) in coordination with the 5th MIB.

(3) 6th MIB (rein) will depart present assembly area at 0700 and proceed northwest on Highway 36 to a position behind the regimental attack position as regimental reserve, prepared to assume the mission of either assault battalion, to conduct a heliborne attack on the left flank, or to make a motorized attack on the highway north toward Mound.

(4) 7th Tk Bn will move A/7 and B/7 with the 4th MIB to a position east of the regimental attack position, prepared to make a flanking attack in support of the infantry assault. C/7 will move with the 6th MIB.

(5) Combat support units will be deployed forward to be in general support of the regimental attack, except that the 15th Arty will be in direct support of the 4th MIB and A/1/16 Arty will be in direct support of the 5th MIB. All artillery units will be prepared to fire at 0630.

(6) Radar DF and Jamming platoon will be in assigned positions by helicopter lift at 0600. Communication Jamming platoon will operate from vicinity of The Grove.


b. The Red concept of operations is shown on Figure IV-I-2.

c. Task organization is provided in Tab B to this appendix.

4. (U) 0500-0600, D-day


a. At L-hour (0500), D-day the assault landing of Blue 1/2 commenced. At the end of this hour, by employing all available 9th MAJ helicopters, the entire battalion and its attached units were closed in and deployed on the defensive position, reconnaissance teams had been inserted, and ground radars had been emplaced (Figures IV-III-1A, 1B, 1C.) However, no part of the barrier plan had been implemented.



# MARSAS III (MODEL III) RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS




0 1 2 3  
SCALE IN KMS  
FIGURE III-III-2

**MARSAS IV (MODEL III)**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS**  
**0700, D-DAY**



 RED MAIN POSITIONS  
 UNATTENDED GROUND SENSORS

  
 SCALE IN KMS  
 FIGURE IV-III-3

b. During this hour the Red 1st MIR was preparing for its attack, but had not departed from its assembly area in The Grove. As a result, the A-6 MTI aircraft on station made no detections nor did Blue ground radars make any detections as not only were there no moving targets within their search fans, but they weren't operating until end-period. There are 92 platoon-size targets in the Red threat, all of which were over 15 km from 1/2 (rein).

5. (U) 0601-0700, D-day

a. The Red 1st MIR reacted to Blue 1/2 deploying on the high ground, not only by implementation of Plan X, as described in para 5 of the scenario, but by firing artillery concentrations from The Grove on the Blue position. A/17 RL delivered 240 rounds, causing 63 casualties in HS/1/2. G/3/16 (152mm) fired 60 rounds, killing 8 marines in D/1/2.

b. At 0601 three Red radar and radio jammers were helicopter-lifted to positions shown on Figure IV-III-2. At 0630 the advance guard (5th MIB), which had departed The Grove at 0601, reached the attack position and by the end of the interval was deployed, awaiting the arrival of the 4th MIB before launching the attack.

c. At the beginning of the hour Blue aircraft lifted four demolition teams, each protected by an infantry squad, to prepare bridge demolitions (Figure IV-III-1C). Three were prepared, but at 0630 the fourth was aborted due to the arrival in the area of the 5th MIB (Figure IV-III-3). Also at 0601, 1/2 began hand-emplanting of sensor strings and mines. By the end of the hour the minefields were in, but they were able to implement only partially the sensor plan (Figure IV-III-1C and IV-III-3). All company patrols were out by end-interval.

d. At the beginning of the hour the 2d Force Reconnaissance team reported the insertion of the Red jammer squad to the northwest of its position. Subsequently during the interval this team made three reports of the 5th MIB moving northwest on Highway 36. At mid-period the A-6 MTI aircraft on station also reported on the 5th MIB entering the attack position, at which time the plane was shot down by an SA-6 before it could deliver its ordnance. The AHLJ escorting the bridge demolition team in this area also saw the 5th MIB deploying. As a result, the demolition operation was aborted. The other demolition missions were successfully completed during this assessment period.

e. At 0645 Long Range Radars Numbers 1 and 4 detected the AAMG platoon moving with the 5th MIB and at the end of the hour they both detected the 5th MIB mortar battery. These two radars had their azimuth picked up by Red, but were not located by Red direction finders. Nor was there any Red jamming of either radars or radios. Actually, Blue on landing laid wire to the companies, mortars, and direct support battery, so the only communications susceptible to jamming were the air request and naval gunfire nets.

f. Blue aircraft reported ground fog 500m on either side of the Leon River.

g. At 0700, D-day, of the 92 platoon-size Red targets being examined for radar detections, none was within 3 kms of the Blue 1/2 center of mass, one was between 3 and 6 kms, 27 were 6-9 kms, 29 were 9-12 kms, and the remaining 35 were over 15 kms.

h. Blue and Red deployments at 0700, D-day and that part of the Blue sensor plan implemented are shown in Figure IV-III-3.

6. (U) 0701 - 0800, D-day

a. At 0730 the Red 4th MIB reached its attack position and by the end of the interval was deployed for the dismounted attack which is to be launched by the 4th and 5th MIBs at 0801. At 0800 the 6th MIB, regimental reserve, reached its assembly area.

b. These Red movements and deployments were not made without Blue detection and opposition by Blue supporting arms. At the beginning of the interval a Blue reconnaissance helicopter reported the deployment of the 5th MIB. As a result, Blue fired 360 rounds of artillery and 200 of naval guns, inflicting 43 casualties. At mid-period, this aircraft reported the arrival of the 4th MIB in its attack position. Blue responded with another 560 rounds, causing 43 casualties in that battalion.

c. The 6th MIB (rein) also had problems in its movement from The Grove to its assembly position. At approximately 0725 the column was detected and attacked by the A6 MTI aircraft on station, a flight of two A4's, and a flight of two AV8s. These attacks destroyed two tanks and crews in C/7TK, three wheeled vehicles and 14 casualties in the 6th MIB, and a tube, prime mover, and 2 casualties in 3/A/18AT. The A6 was shot down by an SA-6 at 0750.

d. Additionally, there were Blue radar detections during the hour. At 0710 LRR Numbers 1 and 4 detected the attached AT and AAG platoons of the 4th MIB moving on the road and at 0720 they both detected the mortar battery of the 4th MIB moving up. At 0730 LRR Number 1 detected A/7Tk moving toward its attack position. Ten minutes later the reconnaissance helicopter reported these tanks halted in an assembly area. These two radars were located by Red direction finders.

e. Red aircraft were active at the start of the interval. 4-SU7s escorted, by 4-M1G21s attacked the Blue defensive position. Blue CAP engaged the escorts flying to the target, destroying one and losing one F4. The SU7s were able to make their attack, which cost HS/1/2 two radio jeeps and 11 casualties and A/1/10 one tube, two wheeled vehicles, and 10 casualties. On the return flight, Blue CAP destroyed one SU7, without loss to itself.

f. Throughout the hour Red also attacked the Blue position with 180 rounds of artillery. This caused 34 casualties in A/1/2, C/1/2, and D/1/2.

g. One patrol from Blue A/1/2 and B/1/2, each carrying two medium range radars not previously employed, established four forward radar sites early in this period.

h. Blue radio communications were jammed three times for ten minutes each during the hour.

i. At 0800 none of the 92 platoon-size Red targets was within 3 kms of the center of mass of Blue 1/2, one was between 3 and 6 kms, 85 were 6-9 kms, three were 9-12 kms, and three were beyond 15 kms.

j. Red and Blue deployments, including Blue forward radar sites, at 0800, D-day are shown on Figure IV-III-4.

7. (U) 0801-0900, D-day


a. At 0801 Red launched his attack with the 4th and 5th MIBs abreast, each with two companies up, one following in reserve. Attached units moved with the battalions except for the tank companies, which moved up to the attack position on the right flank where they will await further orders. Simultaneously the Blue helicopter reconnaissance flight reported the departure of the battalions with towed weapons and the fact that the attackers would soon enter the fog surrounding the Leon River. Blue responded to this detection with 300 rounds of artillery, 360 of mortar, and 200 of naval gunfire. This fire was very costly to Red; A/4/1 suffering 22 artillery casualties, D/5/1 and E/5/1 79 mortar casualties, and F/5/1 (5th MIB reserve) 18 naval gunfire casualties.

b. Shortly after the aircraft detection medium range radar No 12 (Figure IV-III-4) with a B/1/2 patrol picked up the mortar battery and AT and AA platoons moving with the 5th MIB and at mid-interval this radar detected the mortar battery moving with the 4th MIB. At the end of the hour, this target was still being tracked, with troops being picked up with it. Actually, much earlier the patrol carrying MRR No 12 had ground visual contact with A/4/1 and by the end of the period had also seen B/4/1 one km to the south.

c. Blue had two flights of two A4s each and two of two F4s each up during the interval which, at mid-interval, detected and attacked A/7 Tk and B/7 Tk. A/7 lost 2 tanks and crews to the A4s and B/7 one tank and crew to the F4s.

d. Again, Red aircraft were busy. Four IL28s, escorted by four MIG-21s attacked the Blue defensive position early in the hour. Blue CAP destroyed all escorts without loss, but the light bombers got through to the target, destroying 2 mortars and killing 24 people in HS/1/2 and inflicting 7 casualties in A/1/2.

MARSAS IV (MODEL III)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 0800, D-DAY



 MEDIUM RANGE RADAR FAN

  
 STAFF  
 FIGURE 12

e. There was additional employment of supporting arms to that discussed in a. above. Toward the end of the hour Blue shot 200 rounds from naval guns which caused 15 casualties in F/5/1. These firings would have occurred earlier had not Red been jamming the NGF net. Red fired 120 rounds of artillery and 240 rockets throughout the hour. B/1/2 took 3 casualties to the former and A/1/2 took 20 and HS/1/2 28 casualties and lost a mortar to the rockets.

g. At 0900 none of the 92 platoon-size Red targets was within 3 kms of the center of mass of Blue 1/2, 38 were between 3 & 6 kms, 49 were 6-9 kms, 2 were 9-12 kms, and 3 were beyond 15 kms.

h. Red and Blue deployments at 0900, D-day are shown on Figure IV-III-5.

8. (U) 0901 - 1000, D-day

a. The Red attack advanced but 800 meters during the hour because the regimental commander realized that the 5th MIB had taken so many casualties that it was near its break point. The 6th MIB (rein) was ordered to make a motor move to the right flank of the 5th, so that it could relieve that battalion in the final assault on the high ground objective. The reserve moved out at mid-interval and arrived at its attack position at 0945. This move was reported by the observation helicopters on station and by MRR No. 11, the latter reporting losing the target at 0945. A flight of two AV8s responded to these detections late in the interval by destroying a tank a crew in C/7Tk and two trucks with eight casualties in the 6th MIB.

b. At the very beginning of the interval MRR No 12 reported that it was following the advancing infantry companies, but that they were forcing an immediate shutdown and withdrawal. At the end of the interval, with no communications nets being jammed by Red, LRR Numbers 1 and 4 reported that the radars had been jammed all hour.


c. Throughout the hour Blue attacked Red with 210 rounds of artillery, 90 of mortars, and 300 of naval guns, the fire being observed by the helicopters. This caused 25 casualties in the 4th MIB and 18 in the 5th. Red also bombarded the Blue position with 360 rounds of artillery throughout the hour which caused a total of 18 casualties in the rifle companies, and with 240 rockets early in the hour, which killed a mortar, two MULES, and 47 Marines.

d. Blue was reinforced during the interval by a tank platoon from 9th MAB. This platoon was in position at 0917. About this time the A6 aircraft on station was shot down by a SA-6.

e. The ground fog in the Leon River Valley lifted at 1000, but this had no effect on the game as the Red attackers were beyond it.

f. At 1000 none of the 92 platoon-size Red targets was within 3 km

MARSAS IV (MODEL III)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 0900, D-DAY



of the Blue 1/2 center of mass, 62 were between 3 and 6 kms, 24 were 6-9 kms, 3 were 9-12 kms, and 3 were beyond 15 kms.

g. Red and Blue deployments at 1000, D-day are shown on Figure IV-III-6.

9. (U) 1001-1100, D-day

a. The Red attack did not resume immediately due to the time delay in the 6th MIB relieving the 5th MIB. At 1015 the 4th MIB and 6th MIB, with the mortar battery of the 5th MIB attacked, moved out, leaving the 5th MIB in place. By 1100 they had advanced 1500 meters to PL BODA (Figure IV-III-2). At this time it was realized that ground combat was imminent, A/7Tk and B/7Tk were ordered forward, and PL BODA became, in essence, the line of deployment.

b. There were no radar detections during this interval, the only reports being air visual. At 1020 the A6 MTI aircraft on station reported the renewed Red attack, including the halted battalion, and expended its ordnance on it, destroying a tank and crew in C/7Tk and inflicting 6 casualties on the 6th MIB. This plane was shot down by a SA-6 at 1050. At the end of the interval an observation helicopter reported the positions of the three Red battalions, noting that the one on the east had three tanks with it (which was all that were left in C/7Tk which had moved up with the 6th MIB).

c. The Blue artillery battery was out of ammunition and could not fire during the hour. It was resupplied with a day of ammunition (DOA) and was again prepared to fire (PTF) at 1100. But Blue was able to deliver 800 rounds of naval gunfire (NGF) which caused 15 casualties in the 4th MIB and 23 in the 6th MIB. Red fired 360 rounds of artillery and 180 of mortar during the hour, inflicting 35 casualties on Blue 1/2.


d. At 1100 35 of the 92 platoon-size Red targets were within 3 kms of the Blue 1/2 center of a mass, 27 were between 3 and 6 kms, 24 were 6-9 kms, 3 were 9-12 kms, and 3 were over 15 kms.

e. Red and Blue deployments at 1100, D-day are shown on Figure IV-III-7).


10. (U) 1101-1200, (End-Game), D-day

a. During the first 15 minutes the 4th and 6th MIBS advanced 600 meters to the PLD (Figure IV-III-2). At this point, at a range of 600 meters the two Red reinforced battalions engaged in close combat with the Blue reinforced battalion holding the high ground which Red desperately wanted. Red had a force ratio of 1.38 and was successful in advancing 400 meters (300 over Terrain Type A the first half hour and 100 over Terrain Type C the last quarter hour). Each Red battalion took 6 casualties and the Blue defender took 16. At game's end, Red was 200 meters from the Blue position, but Blue had not yet been forced

**MARSAS IX (MODEL III)  
 BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS  
 1000, D-DAY**



**MARSAS IV (MODEL III)**  
**BLUE AND RED DEPLOYMENTS**  
**1100, D-DAY**



0 1 2 3 4  
 SCALE IN KM  
 FIGURE 2-1-

to move back to alternate positions.

b. All radars were turned off when ground combat began. Actually, the only detection prior to that was by an observation helicopter reporting at 1108 that 17 Red Tanks (see para 9a, above) were moving northwest and closing in on the two attacking battalions.

c. There was no air activity other than by the above mentioned plane during the interval, nor were any Blue planes available. However, other supporting arms were, as usual, active. Blue fired 90 rounds of mortar prior to ground combat and 200 artillery rounds and 500 naval gun during this final hour. These resulted in 15 casualties to the 4th MIB and 27 to the 6th MIB. Red, in turn, delivered 360 rounds of artillery, 180 of mortar, and 240 rockets during the hour, resulting in 54 casualties in Blue 1/2. Actually, the rockets caused 25 of these in D/1/2.

d. At 1200 (end-game) 47 of the 92 platoon-size Red targets were within 3 kms of the Blue 1/2 center of mass, 23 were between 3 and 6 kms, 16 were 6-9 kms, 3 were 9-12 kms, and 3 were over 15 kms.


e. Red and Blue deployments at 1200, D-day are shown on Figure IV-III-8.

11. (U) Summary of Combat Effectiveness. The unit effectiveness factors for Blue and Red combat and combat support units at start-game (0500, D-day), start-close combat (1115, D-day), and end-game (1200, D-day) are listed on the following page.

	<u>0500, D-day</u>		<u>1115, D-day</u>		<u>1200, D-day</u>	
	<u>%T/OorE</u>	<u>CbtEff</u>	<u>%T/OorE</u>	<u>CbtEff</u>	<u>%T/OorE</u>	<u>CbtEff</u>
<u>BLUE</u>						
1/2 Inf	100	1.0	72	.88	66	.85
A/1/10 Arty	100	1.0	93	1.0	93	1.0
1/A/2Tk	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
<u>RED</u>						
4th MIB	100	1.0	76	.76	72	.68
5th MIB	100	1.0	62	.25	62	.25
6th MIB	100	1.0	85	.90	78	.76
15th Arty	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
A/1/16 Arty	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
G/3/16 Arty	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
A/17 RL	100	1.0	100	1.0	100	1.0
18th ATG	100	1.0	88	1.0	88	1.0
A/7 Tk	100	1.0	80	.80	80	.80
B/7 Tk	100	1.0	90	.90	90	.90
C/7 Tk	100	1.0	30	.30	30	.30

Footnotes: (1) Personnel for infantry and artillery, tanks for tank unit  
(2) Combat effectiveness is based upon % T/O or E, posture and type unit.

MARSAS IV (MODEL III)  
 BLUE AND RED END GAME DEPLOYMENTS  
 1200, D-DAY



Tab A to Appendix 5 to Annex D  
Task Organization - Blue

1st Bn (rein), 2d MAR

H & S Co (-) 1/2  
Radio Relay Sec, Hq Co, 2d MAR  
Det, 2d Radio Bn, FMF  
1st Plt (rein), Co/A, 2d Recon/Bn  
Det, 2d Force Recon Bn, FMF  
Det, SCAMP, FMF

Co/A (rein), 1/2

A/1/2  
1st AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2  
1st Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co/B (rein), 1/2

B/1/2  
2d Sec, H&S Co, 1/2  
2nd AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2  
2nd Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Co/C (rein), 1/2

C 1/2  
3rd AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2  
3rd Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Reserve

Co D (rein), 1/2

D/1/2  
4th AT Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2  
4th Aslt Sqd, AT/A Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Fire Support

A/1/10 (rein)  
Mort Plt, H&S Co, 1/2

Battalion Combat Service Support

1st Plt (rein), Co A, 2d Engr Bn  
Det, C-C Co, 2d Med Bn

Tab B to Appendix 5 to Annex D  
Task Organization - Red

1st Motorized Infantry Regiment (MIR)

1st Hq/Co  
2d Comm Co  
29th Spec. Sig Co  
3d MP Plt  
7th Tk Bn  
22d Recon Co (-)  
23d Engr Co (-)  
24th Chem Plt

4th Motorized Infantry Battalion (MIB)

4th MIB  
1st Plt, 18th ATG Btry  
1st Plt, 19th AAG Btry  
1st Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
1st Plt, 22d Recon Co  
1st Plt, 23d Engr Co

5th Motorized Infantry Battalion

5th MIB  
2d PLT 18th ATG Btry  
2d Plt, 19th AAG Btry  
2d Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
2d Plt, 22d Recon Co  
2d Plt, 23d Engr Co

Regimental Reserve

6th Motorized Infantry Battalion

6th MIB  
3d Plt, 18th ATG Btry  
3d Plt, 20th AAMG Btry  
3d Plt, 22d Recon Co

Regimental Artillery

14th Prov Arty Bn  
18th ATG Btry (-)  
19th AAG Btry (-)  
20th AAMG Btry (-)  
Btry A, 21st SAM Bn

Regimental Logistic Support

25th MT Co  
26th Maint Co  
27th Sup Co  
28th Med Co

**END**