Moscow and the Middle East Settlement: A Role for Soviet Guarantees.
Abstract
The author concludes that with regard to the negotiation of a general settlement, the threat of Soviet sabotage or veto appears limited by inadequate control over client behavior and by concern for global objectives of equal or greater weight than Middle Eastern stakes. If the present controversy between Egypt, Syria, and the PLO develops into a serious split, Soviet cooperation will most likely be withheld, if only because Moscow lacks the degree of influence and trust among its principal clients required for a role which could jeopardize the Soviet position in the region. With respect to the Soviet role in the implementation of a settlement, this paper argues (1) Soviet participation in a guarantee to Israel would be both incredible and dangerous; (2) A Soviet guarantee to the Arab side complementing an American guarantee to Israel would, under conditions of continued Arab-Israeli conflict, be a prescription for maintaining if not sharpening Soviet-American tensions in the Middle East; and (3) A multilateral or UN guarantee would ease the second problem only at the cost of destroying the usefulness of the guarantee.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1975
- Accession Number
- ADA026651
Entities
People
- Abraham S. Becker
Organizations
- RAND Corporation