Vietnam: Mao Versus Clausewitz

Abstract

The basic question explored by this research paper is as follows: Did the application of the Clausewitzian military strategy by the United States during the Vietnam War to combat a Maoist guerrilla war contribute to the American defeat. The nature of guerrilla warfare is examined using four historical examples. The evolution of modern guerrilla warfare by Mao and Giap is described. The Clausewitzian philosophy of war is examined and its impact on US Army doctrine is developed. Counterinsurgent theory and doctrine is explored and finally the Vietnam War strategy is examined from the perspective of both General's Giap and Westmoreland. The conclusion is that Clausewitzian doctrine did not contribute to the American defeat but that the misapplication of it did. The concluding observation is that Americans, particularly military men, must study the war to determine its lessons and must not turn their backs on the war or consider it an aberration.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 07, 1976
Accession Number
ADA028265

Entities

People

  • William O. Staudenmaier

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil War
  • Combat Areas
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Doctrine
  • Geography
  • Guerrilla Warfare
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • Military Strategy
  • National Politics
  • Second World War
  • Students
  • United States
  • Vietnam War
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies