Antagonistic Games
Abstract
This paper defines two subsets of noncooperative, finite, two-person (bimatrix) games. The first subset, called antagonistic games, consists of bimatrix games in which if one player does better, the other player necessarily must do worse (where better and worse are determined by comparing the payoffs that result from playing two alternative pairs of actions). Zero-sum games form a proper subset of antagonistic games; the distinction is that for zero-sum games, when one player does better the other must do worse by the same amount. The second subset considered, called strength-ratio games, is the subset of antagonistic games that has the additional property that if both players play pure strategies, then the payoff to one player is the inverse of the payoff to the other player.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1976
- Accession Number
- ADA030148
Entities
People
- Lowell B. Anderson
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses