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Operation New Life: Camp Orote -- A Study in Refugee Control and Administration, Doctrine and Practice

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
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As a result of the fall of the Government of South Vietnam, more than 100,000 refugees fled that country. The majority of all refugees under United States control were processed through Camp Orote, an interim refugee center on Guam. This study addresses the problems experienced by Army personnel who were given the mission of operating Camp Orote as a part of Operation New Life. This camp reached a peak population of 39,331 and processed more than 90,000 refugees between 23 April 1975 and 24 June 1975.


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Based on the results achieved, the study supports the hypothesis that current U.S. Army doctrine and training are inadequate insofar as they pertain to refugee administration and operation. Specific recommendations to improve doctrine and training are that Department of the Army:

- Reassess its civil affairs capability, because it appears that more than one active duty civil affairs battalion is needed in the force structure.
- Exchange liaison and training visits between selected civilian agencies and selected military civil affairs personnel.
- Increase training in ethnic and cultural characteristics for all of its personnel.
- Allocate research and development resources to the design of prepackaged material and equipment to be used to support that aspect of civilian emergencies which deals with refugees.
- Conduct research to determine the effect of the presence of armed and unarmed military police vis-à-vis the use of personnel less specialized in security procedures for a crisis that involves civilians.
- Develop specific policies that permit the hiring of civilian refugees.
- Identify and deploy medical personnel in consonance with the demands imposed by emergencies that involve civilians.

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OPERATION NEW LIFE: CAMP OROTE -- A STUDY IN REFUGEE  
CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION, DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

As a result of the fall of the Government of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975, more than 100,000 refugees fled that country. The majority of all refugees under United States control were processed through Camp Orote, an interim refugee center on Guam. This study addresses the problems experienced by Army personnel who were given the mission of operating Camp Orote as a part of Operation New Life. This camp reached a peak population of 39,331 and processed more than 90,000 refugees between 23 April 1975 and 24 June 1975.

The methodology consisted of the historical method of research in combination with the author's eyewitness account and personal notes. In describing the organization, structure, and functions of the military and civilian agencies that were involved in the operation, primary emphasis was on the Army's capabilities and efforts.

Based on the results achieved, the study supports the hypothesis that current U.S. Army doctrine and training are inadequate insofar as they pertain to refugee administration and operation. Recommendations are suggested to improve the doctrine available to commanders and to emphasize training requirements to civil affairs as well as other military personnel. Some of the specific recommendations are that  
Department of the Army:

- Reassess its civil affairs capability, because there appears to be a requirement for more than one active duty civil affairs battalion in the force structure.

- Exchange liaison and training visits between selected civilian agencies and selected military civil affairs personnel.

- Increase training in ethnic and cultural characteristics for all of its personnel, thereby enhancing the soldier's sensitivity to and understanding of foreign cultures and his ability for intercultural communication.

- Allocate research and development resources to the design of prepackaged material and equipment to be used to support that aspect of civilian emergencies which deals with refugees.

- Conduct research to determine the effect of the presence of armed and unarmed military police vis-à-vis the use of personnel less specialized in security procedures for a crisis that involves civilians.

- Develop specific policies that permit the hiring of civilian refugees who result from man-made or natural disasters.

- Identify and deploy medical personnel in consonance with the demands imposed by emergencies that involve civilians.

All of the preceding recommendations have implications for policy makers and suggest areas for further research.

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The photographs were taken at various times by the Fleet Air Photographic Laboratory, Agana, Guam, and by the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii. The Army Field Printing Plant, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, reproduced the photographs, a map of Camp Orote, and the messages in Appendix B.

I am especially indebted to Mrs. Evelyn F. Randolph for her professional ability as a technical adviser and typist. Lastly, I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of my wife, Kim, and our four children, who encouraged all of my efforts to complete this study.

G. G., Jr.

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## CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

As a result of the fall of the Government of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975, more than 100,000 refugees fled that country. Some escaped with official United States assistance while others used their own means and later sought American aid. Over a period of months, ships and aircraft brought this massive wave of refugees, people from every walk of life, to interim refugee centers in the Philippines, Guam, and later Wake Island. From these centers the refugees were processed to resettlement sites in the Continental United States. Guam was selected as the primary location for the interim refugee centers. Twelve separate camps were established on Guam, which eventually accommodated the largest influx of refugees.

The most important interim refugee center, Camp Orote, also referred to as "Tent City," was constructed at an abandoned airstrip on the United States naval base at Guam. The camp, located on the southwestern tip of the island, became the largest to be constructed. The overall refugee effort was called Operation New Life, the title of the United States sponsored "humanitarian effort . . . to receive and process refugees . . . as they [made] the transition from war zone to

safe havens."<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this study is to examine and compare U.S. Army doctrine concerning refugee operations with the Army's actual role and mission at Camp Orote.

#### Refugee Operations and U.S. Army Doctrine

Before proceeding to the hypothesis and the issues raised by this study it is appropriate to discuss current U.S. Army doctrine that pertains to refugee operations and to discuss the single active duty unit which possesses at least a partial capability to support these operations. The primary source documents for Army doctrine and guidance available to the commander and staff officer who work in a refugee or civil affairs operation are Army Regulation 350-25, Field Manual 41-10, and Field Manual 101-5.<sup>2</sup> Guidelines in FM 41-10 are:

(1) . . . Civil affairs cover the entire spectrum of civil-military relationships ranging from advice, assistance, and civic action performed in a friendly country through military government operations in an occupied territory. They involve the relationship between the military commander and his forces, and the civil authorities and populace of a country. In effect, civil affairs constitute the bridge between the military function of defeating enemy forces striving to establish control over people and territory and the civil function of providing police protection for the populace while preserving or developing the political, economic, and social structure and desired psychological orientation of the country. The dividing line is indeterminate and can shift with changing circumstances.

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<sup>1</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Training, AR 350-25 (June 1974); Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10 (October 1969); and Department of the Army, Staff Officers Field Manual: Organization and Procedures, FM 101-5 (July 1972).

(2) All military units have a capability to perform some civil affairs functions. Within existing resources this capability will be exploited.

(3) The Army will maintain the capability to perform the full range of civil affairs functions.<sup>3</sup>

The above doctrine supports the following:

a. The assigned civil affairs mission of the Army is to--

(1) Support military operations by fostering the optimum degree of political, economic, and social stability in areas of military operations.

(2) Fulfill obligations imposed on military forces by international law, customs, and current agreements.

(3) Further the international interests of the United States, as defined in current policy.

b. All Army units have the capability to perform some civil affairs functions, and all units will develop and maintain that capability to the degree necessary to support the Army's civil affairs mission.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, the following guidelines are listed

to assist all personnel and units in meeting their civil affairs responsibilities:

a. Civil affairs activity is a function of command.

b. Civil affairs operations in conditions short of open hostilities, or under combat conditions in which the local government maintains its viability and operational capability, will consist primarily of assistance to allied or friendly governments and forces in a host-guest relationship. Civil affairs training will be oriented toward those situations in which the local government institutions remain operational.

c. Active Army civil affairs units are responsible for providing civil affairs support to unilateral Army, joint, or unified command operations which require detailed planning and specialized

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<sup>3</sup>DA, FM 41-10, p. 1-2.

<sup>4</sup>DA, AR 350-25, p. 1-2.

personnel for nonmobilization contingencies.

d. US Army Reserve civil affairs units are maintained to support the requirements of the Services during mobilization contingencies.

e. All commanders are responsible for developing and maintaining within their units the capability to provide civil affairs support to military operations. The content and duration of the training necessary to fulfill the requirement are at the commander's discretion. . . .<sup>5</sup>

Evident in the doctrine and mission statements is that the term civil affairs includes much more than responsibility for the care of refugees. To meet the responsibility associated with support of refugee operations, one civil affairs battalion, the 96th, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is currently on active duty. Its 4 companies and a headquarters element comprise a total of 115 people, 50 officers and 65 enlisted men and women. Each company has a small team that is specifically designed to support refugee operations.<sup>6</sup> Each of these specific teams has the following capabilities:

[Coordinates] the administrative processing and control of displaced persons, refugees and evacuees; supervises establishment, administration and operation of camps; advises on repatriation, resettlement or movement of displaced persons, refugees and evacuees within the assigned area.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup>DA. AR 350-25, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup>96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N. C., "After Action Report: Operation New Arrivals, Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa." (7 August 1975), pp. 1-5; and 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N. C., "Situation Up Date, 221730 April 1975 Through 102400 May 1975" (n.d.), pp. 1-4.

<sup>7</sup>Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Organization, TOE 41-500H (June 1972, with seven changes; Change 7, 1 September 1975), p. 10.

The largest team authorized under Department of the Army Table of Organization and Equipment 41-500H comprises 3 officers and 4 enlisted men,<sup>8</sup> but the battalion deployed a task force of 40 personnel to Guam. The force included 25 men from the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, also stationed at Fort Bragg. During Operation New Life the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was required to operate on Guam, plus in two separate camps in the United States.

#### Hypothesis and Issues

The hypothesis of this study is that current U.S. Army doctrine and training pertaining to refugee administration and operation are inadequate. The issues dealt with in this study include the following:

- Should there be greater emphasis on doctrine and Armywide training in refugee affairs for all Army personnel?
- Should the Army add additional active duty civil affairs units to its force structure?
- Should Army procedures for dealing with the creation and management of refugee centers rely on ad hoc arrangements?
- Should the Army provide short-term liaison and training visits between selected officers and enlisted personnel and members of civilian agencies that are normally involved in the management of civilian emergencies?
- Should the Army minimize the presence of security forces in a

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<sup>8</sup>DA, TOE 41-500H, p. 27.

civilian crisis?

- Should the Army, in the interest of reacting to emergencies such as political and natural disasters, which create large numbers of refugees, devote greater research and development resources to the design of prepackaged material and equipment and to expanding or refining troop lists of units?

- Should the Army increase its emphasis on making its personnel more aware of and sensitive to ethnic and cultural characteristics of other societies?

- Should the Army and other government agencies establish policies for and adopt the practice of hiring refugees in disaster situations?

#### Methodology and Sources

This study used the historical method of research in combination with the author's personal experience in Operation New Life. Primary effort was devoted to presenting as objectively as possible a description and analysis of what actually took place at Camp Orote.

The research is based on the eyewitness account and personal notes of the author, who served in the dual positions of Deputy for Refugee Affairs and Camp Coordinator of Camp Orote from 28 April 1975 to 10 June 1975. In addition, after action reports of the various military organizations that participated in the operation and personal interviews were extensively used. Other primary source materials were operation

orders, messages to commanders and civilian agencies, and letters and memorandums prepared by military and civilian staffs.

Secondary sources were used mainly for background information and to emphasize the importance of the study to Army doctrine and training. Case studies of other disasters and books and materials on refugee operations were consulted. A variety of Army publications, including regulations and field manuals, were used to assess the doctrine on civil affairs and civil-military operations. Particularly extensive use was made of the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance study on civil military operations that was conducted at Fort Bragg and reported in two volumes.<sup>9</sup>

#### Application

As a result of this study, it is hoped that other studies will be conducted, thereby allowing the comparative method of research and analysis to be used to produce generalizations about policies and procedures of administering and organizing refugee centers. While it is unlikely that the example found in this study will repeat itself, it is highly likely that the U.S. Army will be called upon to deal with refugees in the future.

United States military history is replete with examples of the Army's role in assisting the civilian population during times of need or

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<sup>9</sup>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Civil Military Operations (U)," Vol. I: "Executive Report" and Vol. II: "Final Report" (Fort Monroe, Va., 1974). (Doc. AD B003805L and Doc. AD B003806L, Defense Documentation Center.)

crisis. Armed Forces involvement during natural disasters includes the San Francisco earthquake, 1906, Hurricane Audrey in Cameron, Louisiana, 1957, the Alaskan earthquake, March 1964, and the Guatemala earthquake, February 1976.<sup>10</sup> The Army can also expect to be called upon to assist refugees resulting from man-made disasters such as military operations, wars of insurgency, and political repression.<sup>11</sup>

While this study examines only one camp, most of the problems associated with handling people in a crisis are similar enough that lessons learned as a result of the experiences at Camp Orote have an application to other crisis situations that involve large numbers of people. Therefore, the results of this study should be taken into account by any Army effort to develop general principles or methods that pertain to civil-military operations and, in particular, refugee control and administration. However, the material and the lessons learned apply to both military and civilian agencies.

#### Scope and Limitations

This study includes the activities and functions of all organizations that were involved in the refugee operation. However, the

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<sup>10</sup>Howard Kunreuther and Fiore S. Elissandra, "The Alaskan Earthquake: A Case Study in the Economics of Disaster," Institute for Defense Analysis, Economic and Political Studies Division, S-228 (n.p.: Department of the Army, Office of Civil Defense, February 1966), pp. 11-33 (Doc. AD 645536, Defense Documentation Center); and Kerner Turner, "Survivor Describes Terror of 'God's Earthquake' [Guatemala]," Kansas City Star, 20 February 1976, p. 18.

<sup>11</sup>Jonathan Schell, The Village of Ben Suc (New York: Vintage

primary focus is on Army capabilities and efforts in terms of administering and operating Camp Orote. All major activities are discussed, but emphasis is placed on "what" and "how" tasks were accomplished and on the structure and functions of the organizations that were involved.

In an attempt to understand the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army's role in operating the camp, the ambiguity in which the Army was compelled to operate cannot be overemphasized. At no time did anyone in camp know how long the camp would remain open or know from hour to hour the number of refugees that would be processed in or out of camp. In addition to these ambiguities, the military staff had to overcome the unique challenges posed by a lack of resources, the inadequacies of military units and personnel selected for the operation, and the immensity of the effort. At its peak, the camp reached a population of more than 39,000.

Due to a lack of documentation, this study does not include an account of important decisions made by high military headquarters and other agencies of the United States Government outside of the camp. Those decisions obviously had an effect on the efforts of military and civilian personnel at Camp Orote.

Finally, due to the ambiguities inherent in the operation and the overwhelming need to provide massive and at times spontaneous support to thousands of evacuees, there was just not sufficient time

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Books, 1967); and Harry F. Walterhouse, A Time To Build: Military Civic Action, Medium for Economic Development and Social Reform (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 9-132.

available to disengage from the operation, however slightly, to construct a range of courses of action prior to implementing policies that affected camp operations or to arrive at comprehensive day-to-day evaluations of operations.

The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter II is a discussion of deployment of Army personnel to Guam, camp structure, organization of units, and unit missions. Emphasis is placed on the initial problems of integrating personnel of Army elements with Navy personnel, who operated Camp Orote from 23 April 1975 through 1 May 1975, and on the immediate concerns of camp construction, mess operations, and medical support.

Chapters III and IV, 1-7 May and 8 May through 12 June, respectively, concern the military and civilian organization and structure associated with receiving, processing, and caring for a refugee population that grew to more than 39,000 in 20 days. These figures are large when compared to the camps established in the United States. For example, Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, received a total of 19,337 refugees during the period 28 May through 24 July, a total of 58 days.<sup>12</sup>

Problems associated with the reduction of the population and the redeployment of Army personnel, 13 June through 3 July, are discussed in Chapter V. Finally, conclusions and the recommendations for further study and investigation are presented in Chapter VI.

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<sup>12</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "SITREP [Situation Report]" (15 May 1975), p. 2; and 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, "After Action Report," p. 3.

## CHAPTER II

### DEPLOYMENT PRIOR TO ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND AT CAMP OROTE, 23-30 APRIL 1975

#### Military Organization and Command Relationships

Acting in response to messages as early as 20 April 1975 from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the United States Army Command Support Group (USACSG) and the United States Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH) verbally tasked the 25th Infantry Division to provide support for Operation New Life.<sup>1</sup> By 24 April the division had its first elements on the ground in Guam. The commander of the support and transportation battalion and 10 cooks from the 25th Division were deployed to coordinate future support and to assist in messhall operations at Camp Asan.<sup>2</sup> Camp Asan, which was operated by marines stationed on Guam, was one of the first camps to receive refugees.

On 26 April the 25th Division received its first written tasking message from the Commander, USACSG. It required the deployment of a command element and troops to Guam. Colonel John D. O'Donohue, Commander, 45th Support Group, Guam, was tasked to command and control all

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<sup>1</sup>25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (n.d.), pp. 1-3 & incl. 1-3.

<sup>2</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), p. 2.

Army elements deployed to support Operation New Life, to "accept tasking from CINCPACREP [Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative], Guam," and to "respond within capabilities in furtherance of Operation New Life."<sup>3</sup>

Prior to deployment of the command element and troops, the only Army unit on Guam was the 515th Ordnance Company, a unit which actively assisted Navy and Marine units when the first refugees arrived on Guam. Personnel from the 515th Ordnance Company also provided major assistance to the 45th Support Group when it arrived.

The 45th Support Group headquarters element and attached personnel left Hawaii on 27 April and arrived on Guam early the next morning. Figure 1 shows the command relations and tasking channel for the group. Colonel O'Donohue's contact within the command structure on problems at Camp Orote was Colonel G. M. McCain, Commander, Marine Barracks, Guam. Colonel McCain was "designated Coordinator of Guam Refugee Camps with responsibility to CINCPACREP, Guam," Admiral G. Steve Morrison, U.S. Navy, "for overall coordination of military support of Guam refugee camps."<sup>4</sup> While this command relationship did not change throughout the operation, it did not preclude Colonel O'Donohue and other commanders from dealing directly with Admiral Morrison or members of his staff when they considered it necessary to do so.

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<sup>3</sup>Commander, U.S. Army Command Support Group, "US Army Support for Operation New Life (U)," Message (260359Z April 1975), pp. 1-3. (See Appendix A.)

<sup>4</sup>Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative, Guam, "Operation New Life: Base Commanders' Guidance" (28 April 1975), pp. 1-2. (See No. 17 of 42 unclassified messages in Appendix B.)



Elements of the 1st Medical Group and the 1st Battalion of the 5th Infantry and more than 90 enlistees of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) from both the 25th Infantry Division and the USASCH arrived on 28 April. The women provided needed skills in the clerical and medical fields. Once those units were on the ground, it was only a matter of hours before coordination and planning took place with the commander and staff of the 30th Naval Construction Regiment (NCR). The commander of the 30th NCR had been given responsibility for the operation of Camp Orote until the 45th Support Group became ready to assume full responsibility for the mission. During the planning and coordination for takeover of Camp Orote, other Army personnel and equipment arrived daily from Hawaii, the Far East, and military posts throughout the Continental United States.

Once on the ground, units had to be reorganized to fit their assigned mission. The 45th Support Group, augmented with more than 300 cooks, the medical group, the WAC, and an infantry battalion, was not organized to operate a refugee camp. It was therefore reorganized based on the functional areas the Seabees operating the camp had already established. These included camp security, administration, construction, and repairs and utilities. It was obvious that an infantry battalion would not be able to support the camp without assistance. Due to the rapidly growing population and the increased duties in all functional areas, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, was sent a message requesting trained civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP)

teams to augment the 45th Support Group.<sup>5</sup> The reply indicated that a 40-man task force of civil affairs and PSYOP personnel would arrive the first week in May.<sup>6</sup> This delay meant that the infantry battalion had to assume responsibilities such as media operations, the processing of refugees, and organization of a camp government. Civil affairs units normally perform those duties.

### Administration and Construction

#### Administration

To provide the necessary administrative services, the Seabees had established a command and staff structure to meet the needs of the refugee population and military personnel. Based upon their organization, the 45th Support Group was organized into a staff that included a deputy, a chief of staff, and four principal staff sections. Colonel O'Donohue's deputy was the Refugee Affairs Officer and the coordinator between the Seabees commander at Camp Orote and the infantry battalion commander. The 45th Support Group headquarters provided personnel services for the infantry battalion, the medical group, and the attached cooks. Colonel O'Donohue's staff performed all liaison activities with Admiral Morrison and his staff, civilian agencies, and Navy units (see Fig. 2). The infantry battalion was responsible for camp operations,

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<sup>5</sup>Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative, Guam, "Refugee Control: Operation New Life (U)," Message (282230Z April 1975), p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "Augmentation to 45th Support Group, Guam," Commander's message (030100Z May 1975), p. 1.

and the 1st Medical Group was responsible for the refugees' medical needs.

Commander, Submarine Squadron Fifteen  
 Marine Barracks, Guam  
 Naval Air Station, Agana  
 Naval Communications Station, Guam  
 Naval Magazine, Guam  
 Naval Station, Guam  
 Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam  
 Officer in Charge of Construction, Marianas  
 Public Works Commission, Guam  
 30th Naval Construction Regiment  
 Naval Supply Depot, Guam

FIGURE 2.--Naval Activities in Support of Operation New Life.

Source: 45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), incl. 9.

To facilitate the assumption of complete control on 1 May 1975, the infantry battalion integrated its units into the functional areas the 30th NCR operated. The mission given the battalion was:

a. Phase I: Upon receipt until 291200 April 1975, prepare to assume operations, administrative [sic] and security of Camp Orote under direction of camp commander. Interface selected leaders with counterparts in Seabees at Camp Orote upon arrival. Be prepared to provide required support as outlined in subordinate paragraphs.

b. Phase II: Effective 291200 April 1975 integrate team structure with Seabees operation. Assume operation of Camp Orote 301200 April 1975 [later changed to 010730 May 1975].<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "OPORD [Operation Order] 1-75" (291100 April 1975), p. 1.

Annexes to Operation Order 1-75 covered mission requirements for supply, security, inprocessing, sanitation, tents, labor, service support, and general operational instructions. To accomplish the above mission requirements, the battalion commander organized his companies to support major operational functions. For example: The combat support company was responsible for administrative type functions such as processing refugees, locator service, and reuniting families.

The Seabees experienced many processing problems in controlling refugees during the period 24-30 April because the camp population was increasing so fast. Table 1 shows the growth in population during the first few days of camp operations. While the population was growing daily, there also existed the requirement to outprocess an average of 2,500 refugees each day.<sup>8</sup> A locator system had not been established, so maintaining an accurate count of the population was difficult. One must keep in mind, however, that during that phase of the operation the Seabees were as much involved with camp construction as with administration. Further, they had neither personnel nor equipment resources to keep up with the growing camp population. Despite these shortcomings, no significant security problems were evident.

#### Construction

The size of the construction effort is evident in Plate 1. The Seabees were tasked to turn an abandoned airstrip, Orote Point, into a

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<sup>8</sup>George Gonsalves, Jr., Deputy for Refugee Affairs and Camp Coordinator, Camp Orote, Guam, "Personal Notes" (2 May 1975).


TABLE 1.--Refugee Population During Period  
30th Naval Construction Regiment  
Controlled Camp Orote

Date	Population
26 April 1975 . . . . .	4,320
27 April 1975 . . . . .	5,028
28 April 1975 . . . . .	9,063
29 April 1975 . . . . .	12,098
30 April 1975 . . . . .	16,010

Source: George Gonsalves, Jr., Deputy for Refugee Affairs and Camp Coordinator, Camp Orote, Guam, "Personal Notes" (2 May 1975).

tent city that was sufficient to keep up with the influx of refugees. Later they were tasked to build facilities to accommodate 50,000 people. The construction effort of the Seabees included building messhalls, showers, latrines, security fences, tent floors, a water system, and all administrative structures. Civilian contractors were called upon to assist in many of the construction requirements. They built a telephone system and assisted the Seabees by constructing South Sea Asian huts to be used as offices, warehouses, and buildings for two hospitals.

The construction planning was difficult because no one was able to predict how fast the camp population would grow or how long refugees would remain at Camp Orote. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) decisions pertaining to refugee processing were changed daily in both camp and Washington, D. C. The changes were not due to decisions by the INS in Guam, but to policy changes in Washington, D. C. As a consequence, camp personnel had no warning as to what the daily and



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outprocessing numbers would be for any 24-hour period. Such indecision caused the construction and supply effort to be difficult and costly in terms of personnel and equipment.

### Supply and Mess Operations

#### Supply

The 1st Battalion of the 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, relieved the Seabees of most of the supply distribution functions prior to 1 May. The Seabees were then free to concentrate on supply requisitioning, coordination, and construction.

The refugees arrived on Guam with very few, if any, of the personal resources necessary to maintain their health or well-being. Due to the lack of facilities not yet established, refugees with gold or United States currency were not able to purchase foodstuffs, clothing, and personal items during their first days on Guam. The only exceptions to this were refugees who were identified as American citizens. They had free access to facilities outside of camp prior to the building of permanent post exchange facilities in camp.

#### Mess Operations

Of all the operations in camp, messhall operations were the most completely integrated prior to the change of command. The Seabees did not have enough cooks to operate the single messhall that fed more than 5,000 refugees three meals a day. The maintenance of field ranges was also a serious problem. Seabees were not familiar with the design of

Army field ranges, so Army cooks were required to be on duty at the Navy messhall 24 hours a day to insure that the ranges remained in operating condition. The Seabees completed the construction of a second messhall by 30 April, but the camp population then exceeded 16,000 refugees. Table 2 shows the date Camp Orote's eight messhalls first served refugees. The increase in the number of messhalls was to meet the demands of the growing population and the camp's physical expansion.

TABLE 2.--Date Each Camp Orote Messhall  
First Served Refugees

1975	Messhall Number
24 April . . . . .	2
30 April . . . . .	1
1 May . . . . .	3
3 May . . . . .	4
6 May . . . . .	5
7 May . . . . .	6
12 May . . . . .	7
14 May . . . . .	8

Source: Camp Coordinator's Office, Camp Orote, Guam, "After Action Report" (10 June 1975), p. 8.

#### Medical and Sanitation Support

##### Medical Support

The medical support the Seabees provided consisted of a small dispensary and a mobile dental facility. Each refugee who arrived in Guam was examined at the airport or the dock. Refugees with a serious medical condition or a contagious disease were sent directly to the Navy

hospital. Because of the lack of space at the hospital, families were not allowed to remain with patients who were admitted.

The 1st Medical Group was operational within 24 hours of its arrival on Guam. By 0930 on 30 April, the 423d Medical Clearing Company was treating patients.<sup>9</sup> The primary mission and strength of each medical unit are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3.--Primary Mission and Strength of Medical Units Deployed to Guam in Support of Operation New Life

Unit	Primary Mission	Strength
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment		
1st Medical Group	Command and Control	39
Army Medical Laboratory	Clinical Laboratory Support	12
<u>Medical Clearing Company:</u>		
423d	Outpatient Medical Care	137
702d	Outpatient Medical Care	134
<u>Medical Detachment:</u>		
49th	Medical Maintenance Repair	6
73d	Veterinary Food Inspection	6
155th	Epidemiology Service	9
172d	Environmental Sanitation	15
440th	Ambulance Support	25
714th	Entomology Service	9
Total:		392

Source: 1st Medical Group, Guam, "After Action Report" (25 June 1975), p. 5.

<sup>9</sup>1st Medical Group, Guam, "After Action Report" (25 June 1975), incl. 1.

### Sanitation Support

The maintenance of adequate standards of cleanliness in latrines and messhalls was closely related to the medical effort. Medical personnel established the standards and conducted sanitation inspections.

Sanitation problems in messhalls during the first week were primarily the result of a forced 24-hour operation. The messhalls could not be closed long enough to effectively clean the serving areas. To overcome this shortcoming, fire trucks were used to spray down serving areas. Thus, messhalls were closed only 20 to 30 minutes daily.

Latrines presented two separate problems for the Seabees. One was to get the latrines cleaned at least twice each day; the other was to build latrines fast enough to keep up with the growing population. Medical personnel established the requirement that there be a single latrine for every 25 people.<sup>10</sup> However, due to the lack of latrine facilities, refugees relieved themselves in the woods and near sleeping areas and messhalls.

The Seabees were assisted in their latrine sanitation effort by vehicles with sump pumps. The latrines were wooden structures with 55-gallon drums that were cut in half and used to collect waste material. Each latrine had to be emptied and cleaned twice daily. It was obvious throughout the first week that the camp's sanitation problems would worsen as the population grew.

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<sup>10</sup>1st Med Gp, pp. 37-38.

The 45th Support Group became keenly aware of the preceding problems during its first few days on Guam. In terms of human life, the problems were so great and the danger so serious that the Army's effort, like that of the Seabees, would involve a 7-day week operation with every man working at least 14 to 16 hours per day. Due to the limited manpower that was available and concern over the basic welfare of the refugees, the Seabees, while in command, gave little consideration to their service and recreational needs.

## CHAPTER III

### CAMP DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION, 1-7 MAY 1975

#### Military and Civilian Organization and Structure


The transfer of command from the Navy to the Army at Camp Orote was officially recorded at 0730 1 May 1975.<sup>1</sup> Figure 3 illustrates the command relationships with all existing units under control of the 45th Support Group 1-7 May 1975. The organization shown remained in effect until another infantry battalion arrived on Guam on 7 May. The assumption of command by Army personnel was extremely smooth, because Army efforts were well integrated with the Navy's operation prior to the command change. By 1 May all tasking orders, both verbal and written, were very specific.<sup>2</sup> The notes below from Colonel John D. O'Donohue's after action report provide a summary of the specific tasks.

- (a) Mess for all refugees.
- (b) Billeting, using general purpose medium tents and cots.
- (c) Supply items for evacuees such as toilet paper, blankets, cots, soap, etc.
- (d) Sanitation to include latrine cleaning and trash haul.
- (e) Medical support to include outpatient care, preventive medicine and veterinary.

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<sup>1</sup> 45th Support Group, Guam, "SITREP [Situation Report]" (1 May 1975), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative [CINCPACREP], Guam, "Operation New Life" (23-30 April 1975). (See Nos. 1-29 of 42 unclassified messages in Appendix B.)



\*Operational Control, Commander in Chief, Pacific.

Source: 45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), incl. 11, tab A.

FIGURE 3.--Operational Organization, 45th Support Group, 1-7 May 1975.

- (f) Coordination with civilian agencies.
- (g) In/out processing of evacuees to include billet assignment and flight manifesting.
- (h) Locator service in order to locate evacuees in camp.
- (i) Security.
- (j) Repair and utilities of all camp facilities to include tents.
- (k) Recreation for the refugees.<sup>3</sup>

Other important tasks during the operation included the establishment of a school system and the operation of baby care centers. A plan was also developed for the evacuation of Camp Orote in the event of a tropical storm or a typhoon.<sup>4</sup>

On 3 May the 45th Support Group was alerted that a large influx of refugees would arrive in three ships from the Philippines on or about 8 May. This increase in refugees was expected to raise Camp Orote's population from 16,698 on 3 May to more than 30,000. With men already working 7 days a week and 12 to 16 hours each day, additional soldiers would be required just to handle added security and sanitation problems. A request for additional support was obviously required. The 3 May message for assistance, as extracted below, provides an insight into what tasks would be required and expected with the impending increase in population.

2. Augmentation required as follows:

A. One infantry battalion (minus).

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<sup>3</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), pp. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "OPLAN 1-75 (Operation WINDY)" (261300 May 1975). (Typhoon and tropical storm evacuation plan.)

- (1) Headquarters to provide command, control, and support for the below listed units. HQ company limited to (88) eight eight personnel.
- (2) Three rifle companies with company headquarters to include as many personnel as possible within force restrictions of 600 personnel.
- (3) Battalion deploy with fifteen M151s and 13 2½-ton vehicles.

B. Support element consisting of following:

- (1) Maintenance contact team.
- (2) One (1) each light truck platoon.
- (3) FSE . . . to operate TF level supply in CL II, IV and IX.
- (4) A property book team.
- (5) A movements control element.
- (6) A communications element to support camp internal communications structure.

C. Camp coordination HQ personnel to augment present structure consisting of:

- (1) S-1: One (1) officer, two (2) admin NCO, one (1) admin clk/dr.
- (2) S-2: One (1) MI officer (03/04) C1 oriented, two (2) CPS NCO, one clk/dr.
- (3) S-3: One (1) S-3 officer (03/04), one (1) MP officer (03/04) for internal security, one (1) OPNS NCO, one (1) MP NCO, two (2) clk/dr.
- (4) S-4: One (1) engr officer (03/04), two (2) supply NCO, one (1) supply clk/dr.
- (5) HQ Sec: One (1) NCO (E-8, MOS 11G).

3. Mess personnel (100 each).

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5. Mission includes: Twenty-four hour, seven days per week support of Camp Orote to include camp sanitation and maintenance and security of the total population. Extend[ed] operations of camp (50,000 plus) involves operating all normal functions required of a small city. Reliance on refugee infrastructure is not feasible at this time because of the transient nature of operations and possible debilitated condition of new arrivals.<sup>5</sup>

The additional units and equipment of the requested battalion arrived 7 May. To facilitate the arrival of the additional battalion, a detailed tasking order was published on 4 May.<sup>6</sup> Information received indicated the battalion would not arrive prior to the large influx of refugees, so personnel were ordered to continue operations under the existing organization.

The prescribed mission requirements and the experience gained while working with Seabees for one week made it obvious to the camp staff that major changes would be required as the camp continued to grow in size. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Infantry was already reorganized into five major functional areas: social welfare, public health, support and supply (mess and details), public safety, and personnel processing. A captain was responsible for each area. Despite changes in organization and structure, every attempt was made to maintain unit integrity.

The battalion's efforts were doubly difficult because it had to continue all normal housekeeping operations. Vehicle and equipment

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<sup>5</sup> 45th Support Group, Guam, "Augmentation to 45th Support Group, Guam," Commander's message (030100Z May 1975), pp. 2-8.

<sup>6</sup> 45th Support Group, Guam, "OPORD [Operation Order] 2-75" (041900 May 1975).

maintenance, guard duty, and routine personnel actions could not be suspended. The double burden often overtaxed the battalion's primary mission. Sometimes refugee processing and care suffered because of the battalion's organizational and skill deficiencies.

Two of the major areas of concern for the 45th Support Group's headquarters staff and the commander of the infantry battalion were the support and liaison requirements with public and private civilian agencies. By the end of the first week in May, these agencies included:

(1) US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS): INS processing of evacuees bound for United States and the formulation of an immigration policy for these evacuees.

(2) Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM): processing of Vietnamese evacuees to Europe and Asian countries.

(3) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): processing of approximately 1000 Vietnamese repatriates.

(4) American Red Cross: distributing clothing and comfort items, organizing and operating locator and postal service, and augmentation of recreational services.

(5) Canadian Immigration: processing Vietnamese wanting to reside in Canada.

(6) Government of Guam Department of Labor: assisting evacuees who desired to remain in Guam to find employment and sponsors.

(7) Office of Civil Coordinator (OCC): representing the State Department agencies involved in family reunification programs and other processing problems.<sup>7</sup>

Other agencies included the United States Information Service (USIS), the Agency for International Development (AID), the U.S. Public Health Service, the Center for Disease Control, the International Rescue

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<sup>7</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 7.

Committee, the International Committee for the Red Cross, and the Catholic Relief Agency.<sup>8</sup>

To assist the battalion in its operational and coordination responsibilities, the staff of the 45th Support Group was organized into two functional staff sections. One supported all Army personnel. The other staff section, which the Deputy for Refugee Affairs supervised, provided guidance solely for the operation of Camp Orote and coordination with the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative, Guam, and with civil agencies in support of Operation New Life.

The Deputy for Refugee Affairs, in addition to his staff supervision role, also controlled an operational element called Civil Affairs Task Force #2 (CATF #2). It consisted of personnel from the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion and the 96th Civil Affairs Company who arrived from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 3 May 1975. The task force was responsible for most of the coordination with civilian agencies, the infantry battalion, medical units, and refugee camp administrators.

#### Administration, Security, and Construction

##### Administration


The 45th Support Group's primary concerns during its first week of controlling Camp Orote centered on processing refugees, constructing facilities to meet the needs of a growing population, and handling the

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<sup>8</sup>Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative, Guam, "Organization and Functions of the Office of Civil Coordinator," Message to Secretary of State, Washington (120350Z May 1975), pp. 1-14. (See Appendix C.)

refugees' security and health problems. The staff decided to meet these requirements by obtaining the active support of the refugees themselves since there was a shortage of United States manpower. It was agreed that a refugee organization working for the camp staff could effectively assist in locating families, moving people in the camp, meeting schedules, and solving personal problems.

Organizing a "refugee government" that would respond to the needs of the refugee population and the camp staff thus became the primary mission of CATF #2. Figure 4 depicts that portion of the CATF #2 organization that was tasked to form a camp government. The Deputy for Refugee Affairs briefed many refugee leaders about the proposal after they gathered in a single room. Among those in attendance were lawyers, physicians, and former senators, high-ranking civilian public officials in the executive branch of the government of South Vietnam, general officers, and province chiefs. All of the refugees present were volunteers who were recruited by a general appeal to the total camp population. Informal leaders who emerged during the first few days of the operation were used to bring those who were interested in assisting the camp staff to the meeting. At the meeting a slate of candidates was decided upon and everyone was told to return that evening for the election. Refugee leaders thus established their organization for a camp government by holding an election to select a mayor, a council of five, and four camp area leaders. Each area leader appointed a leader for every block of tents in his area. A more detailed picture of



Source: Camp Coordinator's Office, Camp Orote, Guam, "After Action Report" (10 June 1975), incl. 2.

FIGURE 4.--Portion of Civil Affairs Task Force #2.


Camp Orote than Plate 1 (page 19) is shown in Plate 2.

This camp government was permitted to exercise only a small degree of authority over the refugees. Its principal roles were to provide the camp commander and his staff feedback on the effect of camp policy, to recruit volunteer labor, and to assist civilian agencies in the administration of their programs in camp. The major difficulty encountered with the camp government was keeping personnel in key positions long enough for them to gain some influence over the camp population, because, during this phase, most of the refugees outprocessed within five days of arrival at Camp Orote. The camp government played a particularly important role in keeping the population informed of the many policy changes that occurred during the first week of operation.

Providing information to massive numbers of confused people who were in serious need of direction to simply survive was a difficult task. As an example of the turnover in population which caused the constant daily confusion, on the morning of 5 May the camp population was 19,323, but, before 24 hours elapsed, 2,815 were outprocessed and 5,348 were inprocessed.<sup>9</sup> A newspaper and bulletin boards were established, and CATF #2 operated a public address system with refugee volunteers as a supplementary means of informing the population of important schedules and requirements. However, due to the sheer size of the camp, none of the information systems reached all of the population. The camp population grew at a pace that was beyond the capabilities of available

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<sup>9</sup>45th Support Group, "SITREP" (5 May 1975).



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public address system resources.

Refugees were called to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service area for speedy processing out of camp. Those who arrived in camp first were to be processed out first, thus keeping the length of stay for any one person or family to a minimum. The ever-changing requirements set forth by the INS in Washington, D. C., upset this plan time and again. Also, people were difficult to locate because an effective locator system had not yet been established. A locator system, while important, was not considered a high priority requirement.

Medical units comprised the only Army element in camp that was prepared by organization for the large number of refugees. They handled large numbers of people and had no problems associated with priority for treatment. The primary administrative assistance the medical units required during the first week was that associated with construction and interpreters to work in the hospital.

#### Security

Closely related to the lack of information systems was the lack of security and control systems. Due to the size of the camp (it was more than two miles from the front gate to the rear tent areas), numerous refugees lost their way in the maze of tents shown in Plate 2. In addition, there was no organized police system. Only the Navy Intelligence Service (NIS) performed necessary police functions. Operating in civilian clothes and mainly covertly, NIS personnel conducted investigations and were the only ones authorized to make arrests. The decision

not to use military police as the security force was based on the following considerations:

- To avoid any appearance that force was required to control the refugee population.

- To maintain unity of command.
- To keep the manpower requirements to a minimum.
- To keep United States uniformed presence at a minimum.

The refugees were considered bona fide United States citizens and were therefore protected by American civil law. However, since military personnel were running the camp, the refugees' legal rights and the question of legal jurisdiction for misdemeanors were ineffectively and inconsistently administered. The camp's military security force, which the infantry battalion provided, had no authority to search refugees and civilians. If evidence indicated a necessity to search, the camp commander requested that the Navy Intelligence Service obtain a search warrant from a Federal or a Guam judge.

The question of whether there should be a gate to control the access of refugees to the military post proper was another unsolved problem during the first week. In fact, the large volume of policy letters to camp commanders during the first few weeks mainly concerned the handling of refugees and their access to military and civilian staff personnel.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>CINCPACREP, Guam, "Operation New Life." (See Nos. 2, 5-7, 10, 19, 28, & 30 of 42 unclassified messages in Appendix B.)

Incidents that involved refugees during this period were few and minor. The two examples of serious cases that follow, however, demonstrate why the camp staff requested that its limited expertise in security matters be supplemented.

[5 May 1975] Theft of \$20,000 in gold involving Korean victim and suspects--referred to FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and US Atty [attorney]; being handled with Korean Consulate.

[7 May 1975] Extortion of money (\$600) from refugee by US citizen to get refugee out of VN [Vietnam]. Jewelry previously given American returned to victim. Suspect no longer in camp. Prosecution unlikely.<sup>11</sup>

Security problems increased as the population continued to grow and as refugees remained in camp for longer periods. From the first week in May until the camp closed, security matters consumed more and more staff time and effort.

#### Construction

The construction effort during this phase of the operation revolved around the demand for maintenance resources other than those normally required in other areas. Building new facilities and maintaining existing facilities at the same time posed numerous problems. The lighting system demanded that the Seabees provide a 24-hour maintenance capability. Drainage problems at shower and washing points required the use of heavy equipment that was required for the primary construction effort. During this period of camp development it seemed that all

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<sup>11</sup>George Gonsalves, Jr., Deputy for Refugee Affairs and Camp Coordinator, Camp Orote, Guam, "Personal Notes" (10 May 1975).

construction needed to be done at once.

Although by this time the 30th Naval Construction Regiment had only construction and limited supply functions, the construction demands of the growing camp were beyond its maximum efforts. The regiment had the missions of building roads, latrines, and shower units; constructing South Sea Asian huts for office and warehouse use; installing the fencing that was required around camp and security areas; setting up tents and messhalls; digging drainage ditches; and constructing a lighting system, to include both street and tent lights.

The above projects were the most pressing at the time. The minor construction and the massive maintenance effort required for a camp population that had reached 29,895 by 7 May were on-going routines. For example, the Seabees and a civilian contractor built tent floors, yet neither met the production schedule for laying floors in all tents that housed refugees. Floors were necessary to keep the refugees' personal property off the ground, for Guam was in the typhoon season. (Ironically, it rained very little during the entire operation.)

#### Supply and Mess Operations

##### Supply

In addition to the construction and maintenance effort, the Seabees were responsible for requisitioning major bulk items such as blankets, cots, mattresses, trash cans, and construction material for small projects. Army personnel were responsible for requisitioning and distributing all other supply items, which included, for example,

consumables such as toilet paper, diapers, soap, baby food, and baby bottles. Baby care centers located throughout the camp were used to distribute the high-turnover consumable items.

Adequate water supply was a problem at the start of Operation New Life because the rainy season had not started as expected. The influx of refugees and the heavy use of water only added to this problem. All available media were used in a water conservation campaign that was started during the first week of operation. Water trailers parked at key locations throughout the camp distributed water. Refugee families were issued plastic containers for transporting water to their tent areas and for use as storage.

A supply problem that is peculiar to refugee or disaster relief operations was the distribution of clothes and comfort items by volunteer agencies. When a central clothing distribution center was set up in camp, the refugees, in eagerness to obtain their "fair share" of merchandise, all but rioted. Consequently, a decentralized system that created four locations throughout the camp was established. Each location was under the control of refugee area leaders. This distribution system was so successful it was followed throughout the operation.

#### Mess Operations

Five messhalls in operation by 6 May created both supply and personnel problems. The storage and distribution of large amounts of food and other supplies required to feed the population became a major issue. Table 4 provides an example of the numbers involved in providing

a single item during mess operations.

TABLE 4.--Example of Numbers of Paper Plates Issued To Feed Camp Orote's Population

1975	Population	Paper Plates Issued	
		Messhalls	Per Person
26 April	4,320	25,920	6.0
30 April	16,010	96,060	6.0
1 May	17,048	102,288	6.0
3 May	16,698	100,188	6.0
6 May	20,047	120,282	6.0
7 May	29,895	158,444	5.3
12 May	27,213	144,228	5.3
14 May	38,608	204,622	5.3
21 May	37,895	200,844	5.3
1 June	34,016	146,269	4.3*

\*The decrease to 4.3 paper plates issued per person, which began 22 May 1975, produced a cost saving and demonstrated an increase in efficiency.

Source: Camp Coordinator's Office, Camp Orote, Guam, "After Action Report" (10 June 1975), p. 9.

The number of cooks was sufficient to supervise mess operations and prepare food, but not to act as "kitchen police" or as servers in food lines. The only solution was to recruit refugee volunteers. That did not work very well, however, because the cleanup tasks were undesirable and extra food as a reward was not effective. This situation presented the messhall personnel a problem they did not solve during the first few weeks of Operation New Life.

Medical and Sanitation SupportMedical Support

Both clearing companies were operational through 7 May, and medical evacuation to the naval hospital, 10 miles away, was a matter of routine. The clearing stations (hospitals) were in separate locations and thus readily available to a majority of the population. The first groups of refugees to arrive in camp were in good health and did not cause a serious concern to the medical staff. It was obvious, however, that refugees arriving later were not as healthy and that a preventive medicine effort was absolutely necessary. Therefore, right from the beginning, the preventive medicine staff was very active and very much involved in all phases of camp development and construction.

The fact that no serious medical problems developed during the first weeks of operation did not mean the medical staff was not busy. By 7 May, 6,898 patients, including a high of 1,922 on that date, had been treated at the two clearing stations.<sup>12</sup> Due to the high percentage of children in camp and the fact that 18 per cent of them were under six years of age, most of the patients were children.

Volunteer refugee physicians assisted in the medical effort. Their skills and abilities contributed significantly to the medical care the refugees received.

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<sup>12</sup>1st Medical Group, Guam, "After Action Report" (25 June 1975), ph. 2, incl. 2.

### Sanitation Support

As stated elsewhere in this study, the actions taken to improve sanitation conditions throughout the camp related closely to the medical effort. The closest coordination possible existed between the medical and camp headquarters staffs. The entire sanitation effort dealt with four major conditions: latrine cleaning and construction, messhall cleanliness and garbage sump construction, problems of trash collection and removal, and general camp cleanup. On an average day the combined effort of a civilian contractor and military personnel removed more than 50 truckloads of trash. As a result of the undesirable work and the high turnover of refugees, very little refugee assistance was available in either trash removal or latrine cleaning.

As early as 5 May, about 80 military personnel were organized into 4 ground crews that worked around the clock in 12-hour shifts. Although they committed themselves to the huge task of camp cleanup, the job was simply too monumental to permit attainment of standards the camp staff and the preventive medicine personnel established for overall cleanliness.

The least glamorous assignment was, of course, the latrine cleaning detail. The portable wooden latrines were difficult to clean, and their construction could not keep up with the needs of the growing population. On 5 May, when the camp population exceeded 19,000, the situation report indicated: "There is a critical shortage of latrine facilities in the camp. The 420 latrine holes are adequate for support

of only 5,380 refugees in camp."<sup>13</sup>

Sanitation problems in mess areas became nearly unsurmountable as the population increased. The long hours of operating made cleaning difficult, but the drainage problems were even more serious. The rock sumps built for the messhalls were quickly plugged with rice from the cooking and washing operations. This caused large pools of water with decaying food and cleaning materials to develop near the messhalls. Medical personnel termed this condition a serious health hazard, but resources were not available to solve the problem.

Drainage deficiencies in the shower and clothes-washing areas also caused serious sanitation and safety problems. The buildup of water in sumps prompted the breeding of mosquitoes, and one Vietnamese boy nearly drowned when he fell into an overfilled sump.

Of all the problems encountered during the first week of the Army's control of Camp Orote, the most serious and difficult yet to be solved were those concerned with sanitation.

#### Military and Civilian Services

In the first week of Operation New Life it was difficult to identify "nice to have" services as opposed to services "required" for a growing population with extremely limited resources. It was apparent to the camp staff that refugees would be held in Camp Orote longer than expected due to the inability of camps in the United States to receive

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<sup>13</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (5 May 1975).

them any faster. Thus, to maintain high refugee morale, more services than anticipated were required.

Baby care centers that had been established by the 30th Naval Construction Regiment continued to perform an important service for the refugees. They also served as temporary dispensaries through which expendable medical supplies and consumables were issued.

Religious leaders from the military and civilian communities in Guam were active in camp. Together with religious leaders among the refugees, they made a significant impact on what was unquestionably a religious-oriented refugee population. In many cases the minister who conducted the religious services and many of the worshipers were from the same hamlet or village.

Recreational services, while limited, were available to the majority of the population. A beach within the camp boundary was a popular area for many of the young people. It provided most of the services found at a beach area: showers, picnic tables, playground equipment, and an excellent swimming area. Outdoor movie theaters, operated by the psychological operations detachment, became one of the first and most widely used recreational outlets for the people. By 4 May, three movie screens were constructed and used nightly. A sight not uncommon to see was some 2,000 people sitting on the ground and watching a movie.

The public address system used to locate people and families also provided music at night. Refugee volunteers were encouraged to

transmit news items over the public address system, and this means of communication became an important service to the population. The camp's daily newspaper was effectively used to provide instructions and policies, to dispel rumors, to pass on news and health messages, and to convey features about the United States. Appendix D contains typical material found in the camp newspaper during the operation.

The Red Cross provided three important services during the first week of operation: mail and locator assistance, supply and distribution of clothing and comfort kits, and operation of a nursery. The locator service was important, for it helped in reuniting families which had been separated since they left South Vietnam. It was not uncommon to find husbands and wives being united after separations of more than a month. The clothing the Red Cross provided to some families was absolutely necessary, for many refugees fled South Vietnam with only the clothes on their backs. The nursery the Red Cross established was as important to the medical group as it was to the refugees. Mothers who were patients in the hospital were able to leave their children in the nursery. The nursery was also used as a temporary holding area for lost children until they were reunited with parents or relatives. Additionally, it became an unanticipated and convenient area to house the several children who were abandoned by parents, relatives, or guardians.

A camp exchange service was established for the refugees. The exchange allowed refugees with United States currency to buy some food and personal comfort items. No Vietnamese currency was accepted. The

refugees either brought United States currency from South Vietnam or acquired it from their sale of gold to dealers who made purchases in Camp Orote.

The requirement to allow the refugees to exchange gold demanded the operation of a banking facility in camp. Admiral Morrison, during this phase of Operation New Life, granted approval for gold dealers and bankers to operate in camp. The first of several gold dealers in camp was Deak and Company. The quantity of gold exchanged was astonishing. On 4 May, for example, during a 4-hour period the refugees exchanged more than \$430,000.00 in gold for United States dollars.<sup>14</sup> The banks in camp allowed refugees to deposit United States dollars in personal savings accounts and to purchase traveler's checks.

All services provided were designed to serve the refugees in the most effective way practical and to allow them to process out of camp to the United States as soon as possible.

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<sup>14</sup>Gonsalves (6 May 1975).

## CHAPTER IV

### CAMP OPERATIONS AND REFUGEE CONTROL 8 MAY 1975 THROUGH 12 JUNE 1975


#### Military and Civilian Organization and Structure

As scheduled, the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry arrived on 7 May 1975, with most of its required Modification Table of Organization and Equipment. Additional cooks and staff personnel required to augment the Camp Coordinator's Office were with the battalion. Because transportation assets were extremely limited, the battalion bivouacked close to its duty area.

The arrival of the battalion and augmentee personnel caused the camp commander to review all tasks and to redefine the functions, organization, and structure of all units except the 1st Medical Group. The reorganization that resulted from the review of functional requirements is depicted in Figure 5. The Camp Coordinator's Office and the major units were given the following tasks:

(1) Camp Coordinator: The camp coordinator (Deputy for Refugee Affairs) was the Commander, 45th Spt Gp's principal executive agent for command of the camp and coordinated the activities of the camp staff.

(2) Camp S1: The S1 was responsible for coordinating in/out processing of evacuees, coordinating operations of the Naval Exchange (NEX), banking and gold buying facilities and the hire and payment of evacuees under the civilian hire program.



<sup>a</sup>Became Camp S3 on 18 May 1975.

<sup>b</sup>Also Cdr, CATF #2. <sup>c</sup>OPCON, CINCPAC.

<sup>d</sup>Volunteer personnel.

Source: 45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), incl. 11, tab B.

FIGURE 5.--Operational Organization, 45th Support Group, 8 May 1975 Through 12 June 1975.

(3) Civilian Liaison Element: This section was responsible for interface with all civilian agencies, evacuee visits to the Naval Hospital to see sick relatives, and family reunification.

(4) Camp S3: The camp S3 was primarily concerned with writing plans (civil disturbances and typhoon evacuation), camp security and the operation of an administrative holding area (Area E).

(5) Camp S4 [Engineer]: The camp S4 was responsible for staff supervision of repair and utilities activities.

(6) Civil Affairs Officer [S5]: The CDR, CATF 2 was responsible for supervising media operations, establishing a civilian administrative government and establishing an educational program.

d. The subordinate elements of the 45th Spt Gp and their primary missions were:

(1) 1st Medical Gp: The CDR, 1st Med Gp was responsible for providing outpatient care, preventive medicine and veterinary support to the camp. . . .

(2) 1st Bn, 5th Inf: The CDR, 1-5th Inf was responsible for the operation of the supply yard, mess halls, in/out processing, operation of the baby care centers, cleaning of latrines and locator service.

(3) 1st Bn, 27th Inf: The CDR, 1-27th Inf was responsible for security, repair and utilities, trash haul, recreation and entertainment, and fire prevention.<sup>1</sup>

The engineer company (D, 411th), a reserve unit stationed on Guam, was called to active duty on a voluntary basis on 12 May. Its primary responsibility was to provide technical assistance to the Commander, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, and to provide manpower in the repairs and utilities functions at camp.

Of all the major Army units, only Civil Affairs Task Force #2

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<sup>1</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), pp. 8-9; and see Appendix E, Camp Orote's Key Personnel.

(CATF #2), the engineers, and the 1st Medical Group were given tasks and responsibilities that were reasonably similar to their stated military functions and duties. The responsibilities of the infantry battalions included functions that were in no way related to the normal missions of an infantry battalion. Infantrymen are not trained to operate baby care centers, to act as police officers in a civilian population, or to process large numbers of civilians through a refugee camp. Those were indeed unusual missions for infantry battalions.

The most difficult tasks for the camp coordinator centered on coordinating the tasks of the two infantry battalions and the civilian agencies and on the establishment of construction priorities. The lack of coordination between the infantry battalions caused the camp coordinator to act as a mediator on several occasions. For example, while the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry was tasked to set up tents for the refugees, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Infantry began assigning refugees to the very same tents before they were ready to receive refugees. Each battalion, disregarding the missions and schedule of the other, attempted to establish its own mission priorities.

Another problem involved the two infantry battalions and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a civilian agency. The INS established specific criteria for indicating whom they wanted in the processing line and in what order. The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, controlled the callup for processing and insured that those in line met the requirements. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, on the other hand,

provided gate guards and controlled the refugees in line. To settle the frequent arguments between refugees in processing lines and soldiers who were monitoring the processing often required mediation by all three entities.

Conflicts between the camp coordinator's staff and the two battalions were as much related to the organizational structure as to the mission itself. The camp coordinator had staff responsibility in camp, but he did not have command authority. Some responsibilities of the Camp Orote commander demanded that he be away from camp most of the time; therefore, he was not on the scene to make decisions in a timely manner. This required the camp coordinator to make decisions that affected all operations even though he had no opportunity to consult the camp commander. The infantry battalion commanders often resisted the decisions that affected their operations which were not made personally by the camp commander. As a result, practically all verbal decisions or orders from the camp coordinator met resistance which, in turn, affected the reaction time and cooperation between military and civilian agencies. Because the infantry battalion commanders did not always see a positive relationship between supporting a refugee camp and their normal mission of maintaining combat effectiveness, their attitudes adversely affected their willingness to support camp operations. The camp commander, Colonel John D. O'Donohue, touched on this problem when he said:

The 45th Support Group Headquarters was composed of personnel from nearly as many different units as there were people on the staff. Working relationships had to be established, lines of

authority, responsibility negotiated and personalities amalgamated while performing a unique, unprecedented mission. An associated problem was the lack of an administrative organization to handle the influx of personnel not assigned to a deployed unit.<sup>2</sup>

Problems of coordination and cooperation were not unique to the military. Civilian personnel and agencies experienced some of the same problems in their relationships with the military and with each other. The personnel most influential in camp operations were from the INS and the Office of the Civil Coordinator (OCC). Mr. Norman L. Sweet, the senior civil coordinator, coordinated the efforts of all civilian agencies on Guam and Wake Island. As the senior civilian on Guam with responsibility for the operation, his counterpart among the military was Admiral G. Steve Morrison, Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative, Guam. Attention of the OCC staff was primarily concerned with activities at Camp Orote, the largest and one of the most primitive in the Pacific. The specific mission of the OCC was:

Assist INS with pre-screening of refugees and help resolve ambiguous INS cases. Assist camp commanders by helping to resolve camp administrative problems. Assist military medical teams by identifying sick and/or injured refugees and by advising on preventive medicine and health education measures. Carry out in-camp surveys re[garding] INS category grouping, attitudinal studies, locator system evaluations, etc. Identify and assign interpreter/translators and other cadre personnel for Guam, Wake and CONUS [Continental United States] refugee centers. Coordinate the activities of voluntary agencies and multinational organizations. Perform liaison with the Guam Government re[garding] the refugee relief effort. Improve morale of the refugees. Assist in-processing movement to third countries of refugee applicants. Assist in the movement of TCN [third country national] evacuees to their own

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<sup>2</sup>45th Spt Gp, p. 22.

countries and ensure the proper placement of orphan refugees.<sup>3</sup> However, civilians from the OCC had been operating in camp and the first refugees had arrived before the above specific mission was received on 12 May. This example of the lack of clear and timely mission statements for civilian agencies caused coordination problems with military counterparts. Without clear lines of responsibility and authority, no single agency welcomed outside direction.

One example of conflict between civilian and military personnel involved the refugees' entry into and exit from camp. The military personnel had specific responsibility for refugee protection and refugee accountability. The OCC staff was responsible for locating very important persons among the refugees and for reuniting families. Both functions involved moving refugees from one camp to another on Guam and moving refugees to specific camps in the United States. For example, the INS was responsible for insuring that "each and every Vietnamese and Cambodian evacuee under the guidelines and priorities" was "eligible to continue to the United States."<sup>4</sup> Yet, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, also had an interest in who could enter or leave camp because it was responsible for camp security and control of the main gate.

#### Transferring refugees between camps or to the United States

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<sup>3</sup>Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative, Guam, "Organization and Functions of the Office of Civil Coordinator," Message to Secretary of State, Washington (120350Z May 1975), pp. 9-10. (See Appendix C, par. 3A.)

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 13. (See Appendix C, par. 3H.)

often required close coordination between at least four major agencies: the camp coordinator's staff, the OCC staff, INS personnel, and camp security personnel. All of the coordination required took place, by necessity, during a time of mass confusion and while rules were being published and changed daily. Messages No. 33 and No. 41 in Appendix B provide examples of actions that were taken to clarify responsibility and authority to move people into or out of camp.<sup>5</sup>

Construction priorities, the other major problem of the camp coordinator's staff, also involved getting both civilian and military agencies to cooperate. Each agency had its own list of priorities for construction and none was anxious to lower its priorities to facilitate the start or completion of another. This problem, like others that were associated with the relationships among military and civilian agencies and personnel, is further amplified in subsequent discussions of other functional areas.

#### Administration, Security, and Construction

##### Administration

Staff effort during this phase of Operation New Life was directed toward getting the camp government to operate more effectively, toward improved processing procedures, and toward developing plans to protect the population should a typhoon strike Guam.

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<sup>5</sup>Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative, Guam, "Operation New Life: INS Policies" (010143Z April [May] 1975) and "Operation New Life: Guidance" (151035 May 1975). (See Nos. 33 and 41 of 42 unclassified messages in Appendix B.)

The effectiveness of the recently "elected" camp government was important because security, sanitation, and morale problems could not be solved without the assistance and cooperation of the refugee leadership and the general population. The primary difficulty was prevailing upon elected and appointed leaders to remain in camp long enough to become effective. Incentives had to be developed to persuade them to remain in camp beyond their normal processing date. That was not an easy task, for life at Camp Orote provided few positive incentives. Living in a tent in a dusty city and standing in line three to four hours for a meal were not very rewarding (see Plate 3). To overcome some of the negative aspects, the following rewards were offered the leadership:

- A separate tent for housing (also served as an office).
- A position at the head of the food line at each meal.
- Control over some of the goods provided the population.
- A position at the head of the INS processing line.

The incentives were never really great enough to insure stability among the refugee leadership. It was not until 15 May, when the population stabilized at a peak of 39,331, that a measure of stability within the camp government became evident.<sup>6</sup>

Closely related to leadership stability and the population's acceptance of leadership authority were the identification and selection of leaders from the population. Previous camp experience had revealed

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<sup>6</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "SITREP [Situation Report]" (15 May 1975), p. 2.



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that self-appointed leaders who surfaced but were not accepted by the population were pressured into resigning. As a result, ineffective leaders never remained in office very long.

Another area of concern to the camp government and the camp coordinator's staff was planning for camp evacuation in the event of a tropical storm or a typhoon. The summer period on Guam is considered typhoon season and, with approximately 40,000 refugees living in tents, the possibility that an evacuation would be required was exceedingly high. Thus, emergency plans were developed, with the assistance of Admiral Morrison's staff, to evacuate the camp population to designated buildings located throughout the naval base.<sup>7</sup> Each building was pre-stocked with food, water, and medical supplies to support a certain number of refugees and military staff. The fact that only 21 buses were available meant that the majority of the population would be marched to their shelter locations. The buses were designated for use in transporting small children, pregnant women, and sick people.

The concern to protect the population during a storm made it important that refugees, especially children, pregnant women, and the sick, be processed out of Camp Orote and off the island of Guam as quickly as possible. This resulted in gaining the cooperation of INS personnel to outprocess pregnant women and young children as soon as possible. Locating and accounting for young children and pregnant women

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<sup>7</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "OPLAN 1-75 (Operation WINDY)" (261300 May 1975). (Typhoon and tropical storm evacuation plan.)

required a population census (see Table 5). Once that was accomplished, INS processed families with young children and pregnant women as soon as practical.

TABLE 5.--Census Recapitulation, 27 May 1975

Area	Refugees	Children Under One Year of Age	Women Seven Months Pregnant	Family Units	Tents
A	7,286	92	45	798	462
B	11,918	486	24	1,794	835
C	8,650	350	24	1,356	797
D	9,814	314	74	1,380	729
Total	37,668	1,242	167	5,328	2,823

Source: J. Biese, Jr., "Census Recapitulation for Camp Coordinator, Camp Orote Point," Memorandum for Record (27 May 1975). (Civil Affairs Task Force #2 personnel, assisted by the refugee camp government, took the census.)

Giving young mothers and expectant mothers priority in the INS line violated the first-in-first-out policy and was not without incident. Everyone was anxious to be transferred to camps in the United States and, as a result, pregnant women received a lot of pressure to give up their priority positions in the INS outprocessing line. It was not uncommon for a pregnant woman to claim total strangers as members of her extended family, thus allowing them to gain a priority position in the outprocessing line. The pregnant women often charged each person claimed about 20 United States dollars. In one case a man dressed himself as a pregnant woman in an attempt to gain a priority position in the line. The change in policy for processing through INS and the

attempt by military personnel to define who would be allowed to accompany and outprocess with young children and pregnant women are examples of a problem the military and INS staffs faced continually. The crux of the matter centered on the conflict that arose from the need to protect the lives of children and pregnant women in the event of an emergency and the equal need to insure that family members traveled together to the United States. Due to a lack of facilities and the pressure of time, it was not always possible to accomplish both objectives.

Related to the problems of processing refugees through INS were problems associated with processing refugees to third countries. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) released the following information:

Guam: Some 1,000 refugees have been registered for emigration to France, Canada, Australia. Smaller groups are going to Belgium, Switzerland, Britain, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan, Iran, Zaire, and the Ivory Coast. . . . Between 4,000 and 5,000 eventually will leave Guam for countries other than the United States.<sup>8</sup>

The processing of refugees to third countries required separate processing lines and separate areas in camp for those already processed but awaiting transportation to their selected country. Canada processed more than 3,000 refugees, but, before the Canadians left camp with their quota, one problem almost caused an international incident. While the Canadians were setting up in camp, they complained that the buildings required for their needs were not being built fast enough. They

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<sup>8</sup>Pacific Daily News (Guam), 16 May 1975, p. 3.

informed the admiral's office they would leave Guam and the refugees if their demands were not met. However, their demands were met after the camp coordinator rescheduled some priorities.

### Security

After the population began to stabilize, security problems were more evident to both the camp staff and the refugees. Incidents that earlier went unreported were brought to the attention of the security force. Security problems increased primarily because refugees in other camps who could not meet INS outprocessing requirements were sent to Camp Orote and were compelled to remain in camp for an extended period. Most of the refugees in this category soon faced a shortage of money, a condition that further compounded their growing despair. Money was important to the refugees. Without it, they could not purchase personal comfort items from the Naval Exchange. The lack of money and the need for personal items combined to produce frustration and low morale as well as a number of minor thefts and other minor security problems.

The extent of crime prior to 8 May is difficult to document because the Naval Intelligence Service (NIS), which operated covertly, was the only agency that maintained a record of incidents. Moreover, the NIS investigated only serious offenses or felonies. Responsibility for camp security was transferred on 8 May from the 1st Battalion of the 5th Infantry to the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry. From that date forward, a record of security violations was maintained.

Company C of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, performed typical

military police duties, excluding the power of arrest. In doing so, the company controlled the access and egress of visitors and vehicles and established 24-hour roving vehicle and walking patrols and 17 permanent guard posts throughout the camp.<sup>9</sup> To assist the guards in communicating with the refugees, joint patrols, each with three refugee volunteers, were put into operation on 27 May. As a means of distinguishing the security patrol, each member wore a white plastic construction-worker type helmet.<sup>10</sup> This distinctive item of equipment proved to be of great value, for the refugees quickly recognized the "white hat" as a symbol of assistance.

Continued increases in the number of security problems and incidents necessitated the establishment of a holding area for refugees with adjustment problems. The plan to establish the holding area became a controversial issue and resulted in the formation of a committee on law and order. The committee membership included the staff judge advocate from Admiral Morrison's staff, the camp coordinator, the NIS chief, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, the senior INS representative, and a representative from the OCC. Permission to build the holding area was granted only after considerable consultation with the State Department and the INS in Washington, D. C., and upon the receipt of guidance from them.

One of the issues dealt with whether military personnel would be

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<sup>9</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 14.

<sup>10</sup>The Army purchased the helmets from the Seabees engineer unit.

authorized to hold refugees in the area against their will and without a trial or federal court order. Consideration was given to making the military security personnel deputies of the INS, but it was believed that would not be necessary if the holding area was on federal property and the gate remained open. Plate 4 is an interesting view of Camp Orote before the holding area was built.

When the decision was made to build the administrative holding area, the Seabees began construction according to a design the camp coordinator provided. Within four days, on 31 May, the holding area was completed. Called Area E (but mislabeled Section E in most documents), it became the fifth area of the camp and was located west of Area A (see Plate 5, which also shows Areas B, C, and D). The holding area was under Colonel O'Donohue's control. Even though all camp commanders on Guam were authorized to send refugees to Camp Orote, Colonel O'Donohue was the only commander authorized to place a refugee in the holding area. The excerpt below provides one view of how Area E was described.

Section [Area] E: canvas jail at Tent City . . .


. . . Admiral G. Steve Morrison has ordered that no person may be confined to the area for longer than 24 hours. . . .

Persons confined in the area are also free to walk out although if they do so they leave without their papers and their evacuee status card which are taken by security upon arrival at Section [Area] E and which are necessary to leave the island or be employed.


Thus far three men have been confined in the area for wife beating, two for shoplifting, two for theft of Red Cross clothing and one minor girl . . . for "promiscuity."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Pacific Daily News (Guam), 4 June 1975, pp. 1 & 3.



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TENT CITY "OPERATION NEW LIFE"  
NAVAL STATION, GUAM, M.I.  
Thành phố lều "CHIẾN DỊCH LẤN SINH"  
Căn Cột Hải Quân GUAM (Quân đảo Marianas)

RCA, 54 SUPPLY, CAMP OPS, IMMIGRATION  
INPROCESSING, CAMP CDR, S-1  
CHỈ NHẬN VIỆN THÔNG, THIẾT LỄU, ĐIỀU HÀNH,  
DI TRƯC, NHẬP TRỤ, TRẠI THƯỜNG, NHẬN VIỆN.

CANADIAN IMMIGRATION  
Hours: 9:30 AM - 6:00  
SỞ DI TRƯ GIẢ VISA HAI  
Mở cửa: 9g30 - 6g chiều

US STATE DEPARTMENT  
IMMIGRATION INFORMATION  
Hours: 9 AM - 6 PM.  
PHÒNG THÔNG TIN DI TRƯ  
HỒNG NGỎI GIẢM  
Mở cửa: 9g sáng tới 6g tối.

MAIN ENTRY  
CÔNG CHÍNH

- RED CROSS (Clothing issue Store)
- HỒNG THẬP TỰ (Nhà phát quần áo)
- LOST BAGGAGE AREA  
US Coast Guard tel: 339-3149  
Hours: 7 AM to 7 PM
- BABY CLINICS  
Hours: 24 Hours  
TRẠM Y TẾ NHI ĐỒNG  
Mở cửa: Suốt ngày đêm
- US OFFICIAL INFORMATION BOARDS  
(Painted Yellow)  
BẢNG THÔNG TIN CHÍNH QUYỀN  
(Bảng sơn vàng)

- MOVIES: CHIÊU ĐỒNG
- PLAYGROUNDS: SÂN CHƠI
- MEDICAL HRS: 24 HRS.
- DENTAL HRS: 9 AM - 9 PM
- Y KHOA: SỐT NGÀY ĐÊM
- NHÀ KHOA: IT 9g sáng - 9g tối
- MESS HALL HOURS: 7 AM to 11 AM  
1 PM to 9 PM
- NHÀ ĂN: mở từ 7g sáng - 1g trưa  
lưu ý chiều - hoạt từ
- SEA/EE CONSTRUCTION AREA  
Khu công trình TAO TÁC

- ROMAN CATHOLICS: Sunday all Sections - 6 AM and 6 PM  
Every Day: Section 6 and 8 - 6 AM and 6 PM
- PROTESTANT: Sunday - 9 AM and 10:00 PM (All Sections)  
Every Day: Section 13, 27-A-28 - 8 PM
- BUDDHIST: Section 24-A-30 - All Day

- LỄ CÔNG GIÁO: Chủ Nhật - 2 lễ 6g sáng và 6g chiều (tất cả các khu)  
Hàng ngày: Các Khu 6 và 8 - 2 lễ 6g sáng và 6g chiều
- LỄ TIN LÀNH: Chủ Nhật - 2 lễ - 9g sáng và 8g tối (tất cả các khu)  
Hàng ngày: Khu 13, 27-A-28 - 8g chiều
- GIÁO PHẬT: Khu 24-A-30 - suốt ngày

While the above extract provides a good description of the type of person who was placed in Area E and the degree of control security personnel exercised, official guidance as to refugees who could be placed there included the following categories:

- a. Evacuees awaiting trial for suspected offenses who have been released back to military custody by civil authorities.
- b. Evacuees suspected of offenses for which civil authorities will not accept jurisdiction.
- c. Evacuees suspected of offenses for which investigative procedures are underway.
- d. Evacuees paroled to the compound by local civil courts.
- e. Evacuees who camp commanders, for good cause, consider a threat to persons, property or self.
- f. Placement of any evacuee into or removal from Area E will be recommended by the Chief Security Officer with concurrence of Orote Point Camp Commander or their designated officer representative (X0, S3, S4 or Night Staff Duty Officer).
- g. Evacuees who fall into the category of a threat to persons, property or self shall be placed in Section [Area] E only if it can be reasonably determined that after counseling by security personnel said evacuee will in the immediate future pose such a threat. . . .
- h. Families of evacuees who are placed into Section [Area] E may, if requested by the family, enter Section [Area] E. Families may, once inside, opt to leave Section [Area] E. . . .<sup>12</sup>

In accordance with the above categories, the camp commander possessed the flexibility necessary to separate a refugee from the general population without resorting to a long legal process.

The incident summary in Table 6 indicates that the crime rate

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<sup>12</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "Administrative Holding Area (Section E) SOP [Standing Operating Procedures]" (12 June 1975), pp. 1-2.

remained fairly constant throughout the operation. However, the opinion of military and civilian personnel and agencies working with refugees on Guam was that Area E did act as a deterrent to the minor offenses that were common. By 5 June the majority of refugees at Camp Orote remained in camp at least 20 days. Additionally, any population increases from then on were mainly due to the arrival of problem cases from other camps. The lack of a measurable increase in incidents was therefore seen as a positive sign for all programs and the existence of Area E.

TABLE 6.--Summary of Incidents, Thursday, 8 May 1975, Through Sunday, 8 June 1975 (Arrests May or May Not Have Been Made)

1975	Incident					Total	Average Population
	Theft	Assault	Narcotics	Prostitution	Other		
8-10 May	15		1		5	21	28,630
11-17 May	26	4	1	2	16	49	34,936
18-24 May	27	6			11	44	37,649
25-31 May	23	7			11	41	36,824
1-8 June	18	6			24	48	28,055
Total	109	23	2	2	67	203	33,631

Sources: Camp Coordinator's Office, Camp Orote, Guam, "After Action Report" (10 June 1975), incl. 4; and 45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), incl. 12, tab A.

The camp coordinator, in an interview on Guam television, was asked about the extent of crime at Camp Orote. His reply, supported by military and civilian personnel in camp, was that the "crime rate" was lower than that of a United States city with a population in excess of

30,000. Would the "crime rate" have been lower if military police rather than infantrymen were responsible for camp security? Should security personnel have been allowed to carry weapons in camp? The answers to both questions are difficult to support positively in terms of the data available. Yet, the plan to keep the appearance and use of force to a minimum seems to have been a good and successful one.

### Construction

Priorities for construction continued to cause problems for the camp staff because more agencies were competing for the engineer resources. Civilian agencies demanded buildings for office and warehouse space. Schools and recreational facilities had to be built for the refugees. Messhall construction continued to receive high priority until the final messhall was completed on 14 May. Latrine construction reached a peak of 100 built per day just to meet the growing needs of the population. As a result of constant use and cleaning, no latrine remained serviceable beyond a 10-day period. Therefore, all latrines were removed, burned, and replaced every tenth or eleventh day. Plate 6 shows soldiers cleaning a latrine and a row of latrines.

The 30th Naval Construction Regiment was relieved of most of the repair and maintenance functions as a result of the increased efforts of Company A of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, and Company B of the 411th Engineers. The infantry and reserve engineer companies devoted most of their repairs and utilities effort to repairing latrines, showers, wash points, broken water lines, and routine electrical problems.



6-1587

Again, the most serious problems in construction during this phase of Operation New Life related to sanitation. Some of the problems are discussed below in the section entitled Medical and Sanitation Support.

### Supply and Mess Operations

#### Supply

An appreciation of the effort required to support Camp Orote can be gained by examining a sample of the types and amounts of supplies and equipment used up to 16 May. For example:

The following amount of camp materials. . . do not include consumable supplies:

- 51,943 cots
- 3,490 16 by 32-Foot tents and 619 10 x 12-Foot tents
- 73,239 blankets
- 296 field ranges
- 24,133 mess kits
- 5,272 mattresses
- 2 field kitchens
- 3,816 garbage (GI) cans
- 6,261 five-gallon water cans
- 3,840 sleeping bags
- 2,832 spoons
- 60,620 towels
- 900 pillows
- 4 walkin reefers and reefer vans
- 41,600 coils of rope
- 2,430 reams of memo paper
- 5 water buffaloes (water tanks)
- 15 public address systems<sup>13</sup>

The above figures are not completely accurate because sufficient supply personnel were not available to maintain accurate accounting procedures.

<sup>13</sup>Pacific Daily News (Guam), 16 May 1975, p. 6.

Also, it must be noted that 40 days of operation at Camp Orote remained and that the partial listing above does not include items that required the largest supply effort, items such as construction materials, food, and other consumables.

A shortage of plastic knives, spoons, and forks caused serious problems for the camp's administrative staff. The shortage was throughout the Pacific and made the procurement of plastic eating utensils virtually impossible. Metal utensils were also difficult to purchase. More importantly, they would have been difficult to clean three times daily for approximately 30,000 people. After discussions with medical and supply personnel, it was decided to purchase chopsticks. The chopsticks were issued for refugee retention, and each refugee used his pair at every meal. Although the decision to use chopsticks appears quite simple, it involved the coordinated efforts of and decisions by the refugees, camp staff, and medical, supply, and mess personnel. Can one use chopsticks to eat canned pears served on a paper plate? The answer is yes.

The lack of trained personnel accentuated problems of supply accountability, distribution, and storage. A critical shortage of qualified forklift operators meant that untrained infantrymen had to drive and maintain the forklifts. Although the personnel were equal to the task of moving massive amounts of supplies, they damaged several forklifts in the process and maintained the equipment poorly. In Colonel O'Donohue's words:

Since the number of supply personnel at 45th Support Group was less than ten and these individuals were required to maintain a supply room, document register, receive supplies, etc., an adequate number of personnel were not available to run the Class I and consumable issue points at Orote Point. This mission was tasked to 1-5th Infantry and further tasked to a rifle company. This unit did not have the expertise in supply procedure.<sup>14</sup>

Plans for camp consolidation were initiated during this phase of the operation. Cots, tents, and other issued supplies were recovered and accounted for, but this effort diverted personnel from equally important daily tasks and slowed the eventual reduction of military personnel.

#### Mess Operations

Problems associated with an attempt to vary the refugees' diet challenged the efforts of mess personnel.<sup>15</sup> Plans to introduce fresh vegetables and fruit into the daily diet were restricted because of three major reasons. First, all messhalls could not serve vegetables at every meal. Second, there was a lack of chill storage space on Guam. Third, the quantity of fresh vegetables and fruit on the island was insufficient for Camp Orote's needs. Consequently, every messhall in the camp served fresh vegetables three times each week at only one meal. Fresh fruit was never served.

Meal cards were issued to insure that people ate only at a messhall in their area and to prevent people from eating at the messhall

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<sup>14</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 24.

<sup>15</sup>Hugh O'Neill, "Mess Hall Operations," Memorandum for Camp Coordinator (24 May 1975).

that served vegetables at a particular meal. Prior to instituting the meal card system, refugees were able to eat at any one of eight mess-halls. Because they usually attempted to eat at a messhall that served vegetables, the messhalls soon ran out of vegetables. On one occasion a near-riot ensued when the refugees started pulling up tent pegs from a mess tent because the messhall ran out of vegetables. However, military security personnel and refugee leaders stopped the "riot."

Population decreases also influenced mess operations. On 6 June, Messhall No. 8 was closed. The food service supervisor shifted its cooks to other messhalls, which improved operation in both the food management and supply areas.

#### Medical and Sanitation Support

##### Medical Support

The medical caseload continued to be significantly large during the early weeks of this period. However, on 3 June, a low of "only" 2,009 patients were treated.<sup>16</sup> The large number of patients treated and the few major medical problems encountered during this period are indicative of the professional service the medical personnel provided.

Among the problems in Camp Orote that caused some concern for the medical personnel and the civilian community on Guam were two cases of identified typhoid and two others with strongly suspected symptoms. Typhoid did not cause as great a degree of concern in camp as it did

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<sup>16</sup>1st Medical Group, Guam, "After Action Report" (25 June 1975), ph. 2, incl. 2, pp. 1-4.

among Guam's general public. The public expressed a negative reaction toward the refugees and there was some fear of an epidemic.<sup>17</sup>

Due to the discovery of five cases of hemorrhagic dengue fever among the refugees, the preventive medicine staff undertook a massive surveillance program to determine the number and the distribution of the mosquito species. No positive results were obtained by a "joint-service program to survey both camp populations and civilian communities for mosquitos, larvae and adults."<sup>18</sup> In spite of the negative results, the Air Force made four weekly aerial spray flights over populated areas adjacent to all refugee locations.

Another camp incident that caused some concern occurred "on 30 May when approximately 150 persons were hospitalized and/or treated for staphylococcal food poisoning."<sup>19</sup> The source of the food poisoning was quickly identified as improperly prepared and stored powdered milk that was served in one of the messhalls. The incident was cleared up without serious injury to any refugee.

Conjunctivitis affected military personnel as well as the refugees. The disease was common to refugees who arrived by ship from Vietnam, and on 14 May 3,030 men, women, and children were treated for conjunctivitis.<sup>20</sup> Because of the close contact between soldiers and refugees, more than 50 military personnel contracted the disease as

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<sup>17</sup>Pacific Daily News (Guam), 7 June 1975, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>1st Med Gp, p. 32.

<sup>19</sup>1st Med Gp, p. 30.

<sup>20</sup>1st Med Gp, p. 12.

early as 18 May. At that time all soldiers worked seven days per week. Consequently, the loss of 50 men from the work force impacted adversely on all operations. While the problem among United States military personnel did not become more serious, conjunctivitis among the military was reported as late as 14 June.<sup>21</sup>

Even though all medical personnel remained busy, the camp's population decrease permitted the closure of one hospital and prompted the development of plans to redeploy medical personnel to the United States.

#### Sanitation Support

By 8 June, even with 25,000 latrine inspections conducted and more than 250 bacteriological analyses performed by preventive medical personnel, latrine sanitation problems remained as serious as ever. A civilian contractor had been hired on 6 June to clean latrines and to remove trash from the camp, but within two days it was obvious the job was too large for a single civilian contractor. Thus, to meet even the minimum standards the preventive medicine personnel established, military personnel were required to continue latrine cleaning duties (see Plate 6, page 69). By 8 June, military personnel in Camp Orote had disposed of more than 900,000 gallons of human waste.<sup>22</sup>

Messhalls remained an area of concern for preventive medicine

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<sup>21</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (14 June 1975), p. 2.

<sup>22</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (8 June 1975), p. 3.

personnel even though the population decreased to a total of 27,818 by 5 June. The sumps at Messhalls 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 were rebuilt for the second time because garbage created flooding conditions around the messhalls. This problem was solved only after a meeting of the camp commander, the commander of the 30th Naval Construction Regiment, the preventive medicine officer, the camp coordinator, and Admiral Morrison. The continual existence of sanitation problems indicated that preventive medicine personnel would be among the last to depart Guam.

#### Military and Civilian Services

Camp Orote's population peaked at 39,331 on 15 May and remained in excess of 30,000 until 5 June (see Appendix F). Recreation, health, and personal services therefore remained important in maintaining high refugee morale.

Infantrymen and Vietnamese volunteers operated 15 baby care centers that were located throughout the camp. The centers were also used as locations for the distribution of the following consumable items: baby bottles, baby food, diapers, soap, toilet paper, minor first aid items, and sanitary napkins. It was most interesting to see infantrymen issuing some of the supplies to the refugees and mixing baby formulas for them.

As indicated in Chapter III, religious services were an important morale factor for the refugees. An estimated 10,000 refugees attended one Sunday service which the Catholic Bishop of Guam conducted near Gab Gab Beach (see Plate 3, page 57).

Another service religious leaders provided was called the "sewing" center. It consisted of a tent with four sewing machines that agencies in Guam donated. Refugee volunteers operated the center, which was used mostly for altering some of the free clothing the Red Cross issued.

The recreational program received wide support from military personnel, the Red Cross, refugee volunteers, and Guam's Consolidated Recreation Office. Activities during this phase were expanded. They included organized softball and soccer, volleyball, puppet shows, band concerts, dance and musical shows, bus tours throughout Guam, and water sports at Gab Gab Beach. Male and female military personnel and Red Cross volunteers acted as lifeguards at the beach. As many as 8,000 of the refugees used the beach facility on a single day.<sup>23</sup> By mid-May, movies were shown nightly at five outdoor theaters. Each location usually drew more than 2,000 people per showing.

The Boy Scout program received the largest support from the civilian community in Guam. This excellent activity provided a positive outlet for about 200 young teenagers.

A system devoted to reuniting families was another morale-enhancing activity. The Red Cross, the civil liaison element in the Camp Coordinator's Office, and the civil coordinator's staff placed major emphasis on reuniting refugee families that were dispersed in camps on Guam and Wake Island and in the United States. "The result of

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<sup>23</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (18 May 1975), p. 1.

this program was the reunification of over 6000 refugees with family members in other camps on Guam and approximately 340 refugees with families on Wake Island."<sup>24</sup>

The camp coordinator's personal experiences in this effort provide a sample of experiences other personnel working in camp shared. The camp coordinator's refugee interpreter was a young man who had also served with him in Vietnam as an interpreter in an American unit. The refugee was separated from his wife and two children. When it was determined they were located at a camp in the United States, the refugee interpreter was sent from Guam to join his family. The camp coordinator also helped to reunite the family of the former chief of Phuoc Long Province. His family passed through Camp Orote a week prior to his arrival, but he and his family were later reunited at a camp in the United States.

A final area that grew in importance as the camp population increased during the early weeks of this period was educational support for the refugees. Teachers from Guam's university and public schools, refugees who had been teachers in Vietnam, and male and female military personnel volunteered for this effort. An article in the Pacific Daily News (Guam) discussed the program and commented on the excellent performance of military, Vietnamese, and civilian teachers. "Some 30 volunteer teachers were obtained and over 2,000 children and adults

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<sup>24</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 10.

attended classes daily."<sup>25</sup> Guam's school system provided most of the equipment required to establish classrooms--blackboards, audiovisual supplies, and books. Classes were conducted in South Sea Asian huts that were located in four areas of the camp. Instruction for adults and children included classes in English, geography, civics, and American history. Instruction in American culture was offered for the adult refugees.

All of the services provided played a major role in maintaining the refugee's dignity and morale as he waited to be processed and transferred to the United States.

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<sup>25</sup>Pacific Daily News (Guam), 10 June 1975, p. 3.

## CHAPTER V


### REFUGEE POPULATION REDUCTION AND MILITARY PERSONNEL REDEPLOYMENT, 13 JUNE 1975 THROUGH 3 JULY 1975

#### Military and Civilian Organization and Structure

The final change to military organization (see Fig. 6) was made in response to the reduction of the refugee population. Significant changes included elimination of the camp coordinator's position and withdrawal of one infantry battalion. Thus, all former members of the camp coordinator's staff began working directly for the camp commander, Colonel John D. O'Donohue, who had assumed more personal control of Camp Orote by 13 June 1975. The organization of the 1st Medical Group changed because some members of the 423d Medical Clearing Company were redeployed on 15 June.

Most of the civilian agencies in camp also based their personnel reductions on the refugee population reduction. However, some civilian agencies did not use this criterion because their activities were based on function rather than on population strength. For example, when the Canadian Immigration team reached its quota of about 3,000 refugees, it terminated its operation and left Guam.

Redeployment of military personnel began on 7 June, when 6 officers and 104 enlistees from the 1st Battalion of the 5th Infantry were



<sup>a</sup>Also Camp S4. <sup>b</sup>Also Cdr, CATF #2. <sup>c</sup>OPCON, CINCPAC. <sup>d</sup>Volunteer personnel.

Source: 45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), incl. 11, tab C.

FIGURE 6.--Operational Organization, 45th Support Group, 13 June 1975 Through 3 July 1975.

redeployed to their home station in Hawaii. At that time the number of refugees in camp was 22,405. Colonel O'Donohue, in making every effort to keep the military strength and resources at an absolute minimum, deployed men and equipment as soon as conditions allowed. The peak strength of 1,870 military personnel on 15 May was reduced to 1,510 on 8 June and to 899 on 23 June.<sup>1</sup> However, final redeployment of major headquarters did not occur until after the last refugee left camp at 2300 hours on 24 June.<sup>2</sup>

Prior to redeployment of major headquarters, civilian agencies and military personnel processed more than 90,000 refugees through Camp Orote. This figure includes the "major part of the CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific] program to provide humanitarian aid to those 112,000 persons who escaped from the Republic of Vietnam during its final days."<sup>3</sup> Numerous refugee comments indicated gratefulness for the military and civilian effort at Camp Orote. Mr. Pham Van Tuoc, a refugee teacher, made the following representative comment in a letter he wrote 16 June 1975:

Have been living in this camp for about one month, we know that the responsibility of the US is worthy [of] praise, and the soldiers did the jobs that we don't think [we] could have done such as cleaning the camp or pumping the red room [latrine].

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<sup>1</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "SITREP [Situation Report]": (15 May 1975), p. 10; (8 June 1975), p. 5; and (23 June 1975), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. (24 June 1975), p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report: Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), p. 1.

The discipline and guide lines given to the soldiers make them do their jobs well. Because of discipline we have seen the orderly organization of the civilization and development of your society.

. . . We send to you, your command staffs, all military personnel and all the American people who are serving to help in Operation New Life our greatest thanks.<sup>4</sup>

The fact that the above sentiment came from a refugee who remained in a temporary, overcrowded camp more than 30 days indicates satisfaction, high morale, and thankfulness in spite of unfavorable conditions.

Because large numbers of refugees remained in Camp Orote through 24 June (the last group to leave numbered more than 3,400), all services provided the refugees were required up to the last day of operations. The final large-scale military and United States civilian redeployment therefore began about 27 June. The 1st Medical Group redeployed by air transportation between 27 June and 2 July. The Civil Affairs Task Force redeployed on 30 June in one C-5A aircraft. The 45th Support Group headquarters and the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry redeployed on 3 July, nine days after the last refugee was transferred from camp.<sup>5</sup>

#### Administration, Security, and Construction

##### Administration

The population reduction was difficult because a scheduled withdrawal was virtually impossible. The reduction of refugees from camps throughout Guam depended on the availability of aircraft and space

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<sup>4</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (17 June 1975), pp. 6-7.

<sup>5</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," pp. 19-20.

for refugees in United States camps. Since the availability of both was highly unpredictable, long-range forecasting upon which to base a camp reduction plan was impossible. Because of poor conditions in Camp Orote and the forthcoming threat of the typhoon season, the only plan certain of success was transferring Camp Orote's refugees to other camps on Guam.

Three serious problems in addition to the processing itself were:

- How to devise a refugee "work program" (a plan to hire refugees to work in camp).
- How to manage a growing number of refugees who wanted to return to Vietnam.
- How to deal with refugees who wanted to go to United States camps other than the ones assigned them.

To reduce both military and civilian personnel in camp and still maintain services to support 19,048 refugees as of 13 June required that the refugees assume more responsibility for camp operations than in the previous weeks. An effort to hire refugees had been started in late May but was still not in full swing. Eventually, a letter to all commanders and sections stated that Camp Orote would employ contract hire personnel and provided specific instruction on working conditions, pay procedures, and unit or section responsibility for work assignments and supervision.<sup>6</sup> The plan called for the hiring of 750 Vietnamese refugees to

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<sup>6</sup>Camp Coordinator's Office, Camp Orote, Guam, "Instruction for

support camp operations. Authority was granted to hire only 350, but it was impossible to hire even that number because of restrictions imposed by the agency that authorized the funds, the Special Action Task Force in Washington, D. C. As Colonel O'Donohue later wrote:

. . . Restrictions were placed upon such hiring that U.S. citizens had to be given first chance at established jobs, followed by Vietnamese who were former U.S. employees. Additionally, job positions had to be requisitioned through logistics channels and procured through the civilian employment office in a manner that required more than 300 man-hours to coordinate and effect. Payment was made by a Class A Agent of the Naval Finance Office.<sup>7</sup>

Due to the above restrictions and the administrative problems encountered, only 104 refugees were actually hired. The rather high- or mid-level administrative positions filled by local hire personnel were interpreters, medical assistants, and refugee civil government jobs.<sup>8</sup> Jobs that could have been filled by unskilled refugees, who were most in need of employment, were given to civilian contractors who employed citizens of the United States and Guam.

Thus Camp Orote could not hire enough refugee personnel to perform kitchen chores. This situation impacted adversely on refugees who were most in need of employment and also on the smooth operation of daily camp activities. As a result, refugee volunteers, whose presence could not be counted upon, performed kitchen chores. The "turnover of

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the Monitoring and Payment of Contract Hire Individuals," Letter (5 June 1975).

<sup>7</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 33.

<sup>8</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 9.

KP's [kitchen police] was uncontrollable, preventing required food handler certificates from being issued and inviting spread of disease."<sup>9</sup> As evident by the above, refugee volunteers were called upon to perform many jobs in camp, and it must be recorded here that the reduction of military personnel continued at a satisfactory pace largely because of the limited refugee volunteer effort.

Yet, the objective of hiring refugees and employing volunteers was based on much more than simply replacing military and civilian labor or on placing money in the hands of those in need. The most important goal was to provide a "job" for the refugee so as to improve his morale and self-image. Having to live in a crowded camp, sometimes for longer than 30 days, without an opportunity to make a contribution toward the support of one's self or family neither enhanced self-respect nor abided by the cultural significance the Vietnamese placed on work.

The refugees most affected by the limited-hire policy were the ones who were required to remain in camp the longest. They were refugees who refused to be sent to the United States and those who asked specifically to be returned to Vietnam. The fact that a number of refugees desired to return to Vietnam should not have been a surprise to the military and civilian leadership in camp. As early as 1 May, Lieutenant Colonel Jean A. Sauvageot, on loan from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College to work for the Office of Civil Coordinator, alerted the civilian staff that some refugees wanted to return to

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<sup>9</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 34.

Vietnam.<sup>10</sup> This fact was not made known to Camp Orote's military staff until 3 May, when 45 male refugees asked for an interview with a newspaper reporter so they could make known their wish to return to Vietnam and be reunited with their families.<sup>11</sup>

By 10 June more than 1,000 men, women, and children had indicated a desire to return to Vietnam. A representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees processed them, and they were assigned to a separate area in camp. They immediately became a problem for the camp staff because they required separate handling and housing. Neither the camp staff nor the United Nations representative knew when they would be able to return to Vietnam, but the United Nations representative indicated that the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam would most likely approve their return on a case-by-case basis. Because approval in this manner would obviously require some time, plans were made to transfer all refugee "repatriates" in Camp Orote to other camps on Guam. The first increment of 700 were transferred to Camps G, J, and Hawaii Dredging on 22 June, with the remainder of about 500 being transferred on 23 and 24 June.<sup>12</sup> All

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<sup>10</sup> Interviews with Jean A. Sauvageot, LTC, U.S. Army, regarding his Operation New Life experiences on Guam 26 April 1975 through 21 May 1975 and 12-21 September 1975 (1-21 May 1975 and 9 November 1975).

<sup>11</sup> Sunday Star Bulletin and Advertiser (Honolulu), 4 May 1975, p. A-16.

<sup>12</sup> 45th Spt Gp, "SITREP": (22 June 1975), p. 1; and (24 June 1975), p. 1.

repatriates were eventually placed in a single camp, Camp Asan.<sup>13</sup>

During the final weeks of Operation New Life at Camp Orote, some refugees who were scheduled to be processed to the United States refused to be assigned to certain camps. For example, they considered the weather in Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, too cold, and rumors that it was an Indian reservation caused them to believe they would be subjected to treatment similar to that experienced by American Indians who live on reservations. An intensive information program in all camp newspapers convinced the refugees that Fort Indiantown Gap was not an Indian reservation and that they could expect excellent treatment there.

On approximately 17 June a serious discrepancy was discovered in the number of refugees who had been outprocessed and were awaiting transportation from Camp Orote and the number of refugees who still required outprocessing. A new population census revealed that about 2,500 refugees instead of 5,000 refugees still required outprocessing. The discrepancy was due mainly to the poor locator system that was initially established in camp and to the large numbers of refugees who were transported from camp to third countries. The records of refugees who were released to third countries were simply not processed through the camp locator system.<sup>14</sup> Coordination and liaison between the camp

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<sup>13</sup>Interview with LTC Sauvageot (9 November 1975), who said that the number of refugees who desired to return to Vietnam exceeded 1,600 by September 1975 and that they were transported from Guam on the Thuong Tin 1, a Vietnamese commercial ship.

<sup>14</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP": (17 June 1975), p. 2; and (18 June 1975), p. 2.

staff and third country representatives was poor.

### Security

The security effort, which included fire prevention measures, continued until the last refugee left camp. However, consolidation of the population toward the center of camp near the majority of services-- bus depots, operational messhalls, main routes in and out of camp, and administrative offices--permitted a reduction of the security effort. Yet, because the camp was so large and many areas were not cleared of equipment and tents, the continued employment of security personnel to patrol the majority of the camp remained necessary. Because many camp areas that were in the process of being dismantled could not be closed off and because refugees continued to cook meals inside and near empty tents, the reduction of security personnel and fire fighters was kept to a minimum.

Minor refugee offenses continued to the last days of Operation New Life. Unauthorized gold buying was reported as late as 18 June, at which time action was taken to forbid offending personnel and companies entrance to camp.<sup>15</sup> Some offenders represented companies in Guam, and others were private citizens who were trying to make a profit. On 20 June, with the population at 9,888, 5 Vietnamese refugees were in the administrative holding area and 5 incidents had been reported during the preceding 24-hour period. "Four were considered minor and one was an

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<sup>15</sup> 45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (18 June 1975), p. 1.

assault."<sup>16</sup> On the day before the camp closed, two minor incidents and one attempted theft were reported.

On the whole, records indicate that the Vietnamese refugees were extremely law-abiding. The 90,000 refugees who processed through Camp Orote caused only 240 recorded incidents and only 6 of those caused serious concern. Three of the six incidents involved United States citizens who took food out of camp.<sup>17</sup> Not one incident caused by a refugee at Camp Orote was considered serious enough to prosecute.

#### Construction

During the refugee population reduction, major construction projects consisted of upgrading messhalls and latrines. However, most of the construction personnel who were working on repairs and utilities projects--the 30th Naval Construction Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry--were devoting much of their time to camp consolidation. All equipment not in use was removed as soon as possible in order to eliminate security and sanitation problems.

#### Supply and Mess Operations

##### Supply

Reduction of the population nearly eliminated supply problems that were experienced earlier. Supply accountability, inspection of equipment for turn-in, and removal of supplies and equipment from camp

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<sup>16</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (20 June 1975), p. 1.

<sup>17</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 13.

received the greatest emphasis. Refugee volunteers assisted with the equipment cleanup and turn-in effort by collecting 3,000 cots on 17 June and picking up 3,400 cots on 24 June. On 23 June, 135 volunteer refugees were put to work throughout the camp in the area of supply and camp cleanup.

#### Mess Operations

As of 14 June, 4 messhalls remained in operation to serve 18,525 refugees, and messhalls were closed as the population further decreased. The mess operation was one of the most sensitive areas in camp and the one area that could most affect the population's morale. The messhalls had the personal attention of the camp commander and the camp coordinator throughout Camp Orote's existence. By 24 June more than 5,000,000 pounds of food had been served at Camp Orote, with each messhall having served an average of 10,000 meals per day.

#### Medical and Sanitation Support

##### Medical Support

Proper preventive medicine procedures were not being attained even in the last weeks of Camp Orote's operation. The preventive medicine officer, the commander of the 172d Medical Detachment, the camp commander, many representatives from the personnel office, and the civilian contractor responsible for cleaning latrines held a meeting on 14 June to discuss the contractor's inability to meet the health standards set forth in his contract. Medical personnel conducted a

demonstration during the discussion to illustrate the proper method of cleaning latrines. However, the contractor never did meet established standards and, as a result, military teams continued to help him clean latrines up to the last days of the camp operation.

Medical support to the camp terminated only after the last refugee left camp on 24 June. The workload of the medical staff is illustrated by 92,699 recorded outpatient visits and 32,736 immunizations administered during the operation. As indicated in Chapter IV, the most common medical problem of the refugees was conjunctivitis, with 37,189 cases treated.<sup>18</sup> Most of the victims contracted this highly contagious disease while they were aboard ships that brought them from Vietnam. A representative medical ward is shown in Plate 7.

#### Sanitation Support


Even with the reduction of military personnel and refugees, the tasks of cleaning latrines and removing trash proved nearly unsurmountable. One of the last daily situation reports prepared for Camp Orote includes the following statement: "Latrine cleaning situation remains unsatisfactory despite the addition of a military team to supplement the contractor operation."<sup>19</sup>

Soldiers and volunteer refugees removed trash during the last week Camp Orote had a refugee population. By the time camp was closed,

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<sup>18</sup>1st Medical Group, Guam, "After Action Report" (25 June 1975), pp. 12 & 29.

<sup>19</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (22 June 1975), pp. 2-3.



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soldiers, refugees, and civilian contractor personnel had removed more than 2,700 truckloads of trash (both military dump trucks and civilian stake trucks).<sup>20</sup>

#### Military and Civilian Services

Morale-enhancing services for the refugees continued until the camp closed. The issue of which services should be continued for the refugees proved troublesome as camp operations drew to a close. While services such as baby care centers were considered necessary to maintain the health and welfare of the population, justifying the continued availability of recreational and entertainment facilities was difficult. For example, to what extent does the lack of these kinds of facilities make life so unbearable that serious health and security problems increase as a result of poor morale and inactivity? The question was never answered objectively, but the subjective response rested on an attempt to balance the need to return military and civilian personnel to their primary missions and the requirement to provide traditional humanitarian civil-military support.

Baby care centers are examples of a service that was provided as long as the need existed. On 22 June 3 centers still remained operative because 170 babies were among the camp population of 6,495.<sup>21</sup> The last baby care center was closed when the last baby left camp on 24 June.

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<sup>20</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 14.

<sup>21</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP": (21 June 1975), p. 1; and (22 June 1975), p. 1.

Recreational activities were phased out rather than discontinued abruptly. Athletic equipment and facilities were available to the refugees until the last few days of camp operations. A "soccer game . . . played between the Vietnamese and the South Pacific Games team [on 21 June] ended in a 2 to 2 tie."<sup>22</sup> Civil Affairs Task Force #2 provided movies in two separate camp areas as late as 18 June. Bus tours of Guam had been inaugurated during the second week of June, and the last one, with more than 300 touring refugees, was conducted on 22 June.<sup>23</sup>

The Red Cross, which operated the mail service and provided clothing to the refugees, remained active. It distributed clothing to more than 2,600 people on 21 June. The last issue of the camp newspaper bore the date 24 June 1975, but it was published a day earlier to facilitate closing the presses prior to the closing of camp.<sup>24</sup> The educational services were among the very last to be terminated, for "Orote Point University officially closed its doors" on 24 June.<sup>25</sup>

A flag lowering ceremony was conducted on the morning of 24 June to mark the official end of Camp Orote's services to refugees from Vietnam. Camp Orote experienced

the largest wave of humanity to hit Guam since U.S. marines and

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<sup>22</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (21 June 1975), p. 1.

<sup>23</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP" (22 June 1975), p. 2.

<sup>24</sup>45th Spt Gp, "SITREP": (21 June 1975), p. 1; and (23 June 1975), p. 1.

<sup>25</sup>45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report," p. 14.

soldiers stormed ashore in 1944. The tent city held as many as 40,000 residents at a time during its 66 days of operation, making it the largest city on Guam. It once boasted two newspapers, a bank, daily church services, a fleet of hot dog stands, eight dining halls, five outdoor theaters, and its own Zip Code.<sup>26</sup>

The author of the preceding excerpt failed to mention other significant aspects of Camp Orote. The "city" also included two hospitals, a bus station, a "canvas jail," a total of three banks, and a school system.

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<sup>26</sup>"Guam's 'Tent City' Being Dismantled," Honolulu Star Bulletin, 25 June 1975.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the major conclusions and recommendations derived from this study. Only problem areas judged important enough to prompt additional study and emphasis on the part of Department of the Army and which are supported by evidence herein are included. The issues raised in Chapter I are addressed, and the conclusions and recommendations are presented in each of this chapter's sections.

#### Military Organization and Structure

*The four major changes in military organization and structure from the time of deployment to redeployment were the consequences of varying responses to the changing refugee situation, lack of knowledge among commanders on how to operate a refugee camp, and, most significantly, a result of deficiencies that are inherent in ad hoc organizational arrangements and an inadequately expanded or refined troop list. Properly qualified personnel were either not identified or not provided in adequate numbers to operate the camp with professional efficiency.*

As indicated in Chapter I, the Army has been called upon in the past to attend to large numbers of civilians and refugees in crisis situations. However, the lessons of those experiences have not been

well incorporated into training literature and the importance of those experiences has not been emphasized to commanders. During operations at Camp Orote, the only military unit trained to work with a civilian or refugee population was the Civil Affairs Task Force. As demonstrated in this study, however, the unit was too small to provide sufficient services required in camp.

The 1st Medical Group, while not experiencing the inadequacies of the infantry battalions, did experience some equipment and personnel deficiencies. Equipment to handle the large numbers of women and children was never entirely adequate. Nor were there sufficient pediatricians and general medical officers on the staff. The use of surgeons and cardiologists as pediatricians and general medical officers indicates an expensive waste of medical talent.

Other units, both the Army's and the Navy's, were generally capable of responding to the problems they encountered primarily by expending a great wealth of equipment and personnel resources. Working men 12-to-16-hour days for long periods of time affected their efficiency and their ability to maintain a positive attitude toward the refugees. Additionally, untrained supply personnel and vehicle operators created supply distribution and maintenance problems. For example, unqualified drivers caused increased maintenance requirements and damaged vehicles and equipment. Much of this was due to men performing duties that were not in any way related to their military occupational specialties. The problems posed by unqualified supply personnel are

discussed below in the section that deals with supply and mess operations.

Given the preceding kinds of inadequacies, it is apparent that commanders are not abiding by current Army doctrine which directs them to prepare their units to provide civil affairs support to military operations. This writer therefore recommends that Department of the Army:

- Emphasize its civil affairs doctrine and provide additional and more specific guidance and training materials to units to support that doctrine.
- Reassess its procedures for creating and managing refugee centers, particularly its reliance on ad hoc arrangements and inadequately refined troop lists, in favor of providing skilled civil affairs personnel for such operations.
- Reassess its civil affairs capability. It appears that more than one active duty civil affairs battalion in the force structure is required.

#### Military and Civilian Coordination

The coordination and cooperation between military and civilian personnel and agencies during the first few weeks of Operation New Life in Camp Orote was generally dysfunctional. So much effort was devoted to trying to understand one another that mission accomplishment was inhibited. Although members of the Office of Civil Coordinator had considerable experience in working with United States military personnel

and Vietnamese refugees, their experience did not prevent a breakdown in communication between the civilians and military who worked in Camp Orote. In large measure, the prime cause of poor communication was a lack of clear statements of the organization and functions of civilian agencies. As a consequence, the military did not fully understand the role of those agencies from the outset. Not until 12 May 1975, some 19 days after the operation commenced, was a statement published concerning the organization and functions of the civilian agencies (see Appendix C).

Moreover, similar communication breakdowns occurred between volunteer and government contract agencies and military personnel. Soldiers could not relate to civilian agencies because they did not understand the civilian roles and organizations and they did not share a commonality of experience with their civilian counterparts. Military personnel found it difficult to supervise a civilian function because they knew little or nothing about the function of the civilian being supervised. For example, without some knowledge of the banking business and how gold dealers operated, military personnel were hard pressed to establish proper rules for these activities in camp.

Most of the problems of poor communication could have been overcome by a better understanding of the organization and functions of civilian agencies. Consequently, this writer recommends that the U.S. Army identify the civilian agencies that are most likely to be involved in civilian emergency situations with the aim of:

- Exchanging liaison and training visits between the identified agencies and selected military civil affairs personnel.
- Providing training literature about the organization and functions of the identified agencies to all military personnel.

#### Administration, Security, and Construction

The major administrative problem was ineffectual communication. It was difficult to get the Vietnamese to do what military and federal civilian personnel wanted them to do and to understand policies and procedures, not because they were recalcitrant or inattentive but because staff communication was often distorted. The primary cause of this deficiency rested with United States personnel who either did not fully appreciate the Vietnamese's cultural differences or were subject to prejudices and preconceived notions about Vietnamese people.

Early in the operation, families that were chosen for processing did not arrive at designated locations because they were often mistakenly separated by United States personnel who did not understand what made up a family unit (the Vietnamese kinship system). Also, United States personnel frequently displayed behavior insensitivity toward the desires and anxieties of the refugees, thus causing hostilities and misunderstandings.

As the camp population grew, the need for security forces became more apparent. The question of whether to employ trained military police personnel rather than the more typical question of the size of a security force posed the primary security problem. In the absence of

definitive guidance from military sources, Admiral G. Steve Morrison decided to employ an untrained, unarmed security force rather than military police in order to maintain a low "police" profile in camp. Due to the lack of data, whether this decision was effective in reducing the crime rate was never measured.

Construction difficulties can be categorized as general and specific. The general problem of establishing construction priorities for both permanent and temporary projects was quickly overcome by the establishment of a construction priority review committee which determined work schedules. However, two specific problems--determining the need for extensive permanent messhall sumps and determining an acceptably designed latrine--were not surmounted until late in the operation. Without clear instructions relative to the duration of the operation, the decision relative to the quality and the extent of resources to be committed to the construction of messhall sumps was held in abeyance longer than would have been prudent in a less ambiguous environment. Furthermore, the latrine construction effort was also beset by cultural misunderstandings on the part of United States personnel. The refugees refused to use latrines that did not provide privacy for the individual; therefore, the design of latrines was altered to accommodate their culturally induced need for privacy.

This writer recommends that the U.S. Army:

- Increase training in ethnic and cultural characteristics for all of its personnel, thereby enhancing the soldier's sensitivity to and

understanding of foreign cultures and his ability for intercultural communication.

- Allocate research and development resources to the design of prepackaged material and equipment to be used to support that aspect of civilian emergencies which deals with refugees.

- Conduct research to determine the effect of the presence of armed and unarmed military police vis-à-vis the use of personnel less specialized in security procedures for a crisis that involves civilians.

#### Supply and Mess Operations

The lack of effective supply accountability and distribution raised considerable problems throughout Operation New Life in Camp Orote. Such problems were the direct result of not deploying sufficient numbers of qualified military supply personnel to effectively process and transport daily the large quantities of supplies needed to sustain this operation and the ambiguities relative to the size and duration of Operation New Life. While the shortage of qualified supply personnel was never entirely overcome, a partial solution to the problem was that of employing refugees to assist with the handling and distribution of supplies at clothing, equipment, and consumable item issue points.

Mess operations were beset by two important problems: a shortage of refugee volunteers and poor sanitary conditions that were the result of inadequately designed messhall sumps. To feed the thousands of refugees who ate in the messhalls each day, Army mess teams required additional assistance. Thus, to provide help, a request to hire

480 refugees to work as serving and cleanup crews was submitted but disapproved. Therefore, the camp government was asked to recruit and provide volunteers to perform these duties. However, there were never sufficient numbers of volunteers to support mess operations.

In both of these situations, the authority to hire refugees to at least partially offset the lack of qualified military personnel and to provide incentive for performance of necessary tasks would have increased morale among the refugees by enhancing their self-image and financial security.

This writer, therefore, recommends that the U.S. Army:

- Identify and deploy sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to adequately support emergencies that create large numbers of civilian refugees.
- Develop specific policies that permit the hiring of civilian refugees who result from man-made or natural disasters.

#### Medical and Sanitation Support

Medical support during Operation New Life in Camp Orote was generally excellent. In addition to the poor sanitary conditions and the massive preventive medicine effort, however, the capability of medical personnel to administer to the immediate medical needs of the refugees was made more difficult due to a lack of appropriate specialty medical personnel. For example, as previously mentioned, cardiologists and surgeons assumed the duties normally performed by pediatricians and general medical practitioners.

Four factors that contributed to the poor sanitation conditions in Camp Orote were:

- The poor performance of the contractor who was hired to clean latrines. Correcting his performance was not within the capability of the camp staff, and the camp was closed before Admiral Morrison's staff could take any action against the contractor.
- An adequate number of latrines could not be provided until the final weeks of the operation. The problem was solved when the camp population decreased and when the design was corrected.
- Inadequately designed latrines. The resulting problems could have been eliminated if the staff had a greater understanding of how culture factors influence attitudes and behavior. As discussed earlier, the Vietnamese would not use a latrine that did not offer privacy.
- The construction of messhall sumps.

The need for adequate medical and sanitation support cannot be overemphasized. This writer therefore recommends that the U.S. Army:

- Identify and deploy medical personnel in consonance with the demands imposed by emergencies that involve civilians.
- Stress the importance of training its personnel to recognize how cultural factors influence both the attitudes and the behavior of all people.

#### Military and Civilian Services

The problems that developed over the banks and gold dealers in camp were administrative in nature. By and large, the recreational,

educational, and entertainment services provided for the refugees were considered adequate in terms of quality and appropriate in terms of cultural acceptance. Significant problems relating to these services did not develop during the operation.

To a considerable degree the adequacy and appropriateness of services provided were directly related to an understanding of the recreation and entertainment needs of the Vietnamese. A similar understanding may be crucial to decisions that may affect the type, amount, and acceptability of services in a crisis situation in another culture. This writer recommends that the U.S. Army devise lists of services that would be both culturally accepted and required for use in the event of civilian emergencies.

#### Commentary

The majority of recommendations made in this study suggest that U.S. Army doctrine is not adequate to assist the commander in operations that require the support of refugees. But more important, the doctrine that is available and the training to support that doctrine are not emphasized to Army commanders. In reference to this study and when all is said and done, perhaps one can say that the operation was a success. In part this was due to a large United States time involvement with the Vietnamese people. However, future crises may occur that create refugees with whom the United States has had but little experience.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

MESSAGE 260359Z APRIL 1975, FROM COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY COMMAND SUPPORT  
GROUP, TO COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, HAWAII

45TH SPT GP 5  
FILLER

PRIORITY

PTTUZYUW RUHHHMA0518 1821906-UUUU--RUHJPBA,

ZNR UUUUU

P 011925Z JUL 75

FM CDRUSACSG FT SHAFTER HI //MOCG-OP//

INFO CDR 45TH SPT GP GUAM

O 260359Z APR 75

FM CDRUSACSG FT SHAFTER HI //MOCG-OP//

TO CDRUSASCH FT SHAFTER HI

CDR 25TH INF DIV SCHOFIELD BKS HI

INFO DA WASH DC //DAMO//

CDRUSAFIGHT SEOUL KOREA

CDRUSABJ CP ZAMA JAPAN

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI //J5//

CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI //LTC KAIL//

MAC SCOTT AFB IL

CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI

CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA

BT

UNCLAS

CINCPAC FOR J5

SUBJ: US ARMY SUPPORT FOR OPERATION NEW LIFE (U)

PAGE 2 RUHHHMA0518 UNCLAS

A. JCS 4671/230606Z APR 75

B. DA 240124Z APR 75

C. CINCPAC 230139Z APR 75

D. CINCPAC 240213Z APR 75

E. CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI 232321Z APR 75

F. CINCPAC 250402Z APR 75

1. REF A THRU E ESTABLISH NEW LIFE AS A HUMANITARIAN EFFORT ON GUAM TO  
RECEIVE AND PROCESS REFUGEES FROM RVN AS THEY MAKE THE TRANSITION FROM  
WAR ZONE TO SAFEHAVENS. REF F TASKS THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CINCPACREP

GUAM/TTPI WITH PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN ACCOMPLISHING THAT FUNCTION. THIS IS AN EXECUTE MESSAGE.

2. FOR CDR 25TH INF DIV:

A. PROVIDE TASK FORCE COMPOSED OF 500 MALE PERSONNEL TO CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI FOR APPROXIMATELY 90 DAYS TO ASSIST IN PROCESSING, TRANSITION, AND MAINTAINING ORDER AMONG VIETNAM REFUGEES ON GUAM. DEPLOY ALL PERSONNEL TO ARRIVE 28 APR 75 GUAM TIME. (FEMALE PERS TO ACCOMPANY AS SPECIFIED BY CDRUSASCH.)

B. PROVIDE 15 MAN TF HQ FROM 45TH SPT GP TO:

- (1) COMMAND ALL US ARMY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED.
- (2) ACCEPT TASKING FROM CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI AND RESPOND WITHIN

PAGE 3 RUHHMA0518 UNCLAS

CAPABILITIES IN FURTHERANCE OF OPERATION NEW LIFE.

3. FOR CDRUSASCH: ASSIST CDR 25TH INF DIV IN DEPLOYMENT OF TF IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEW LIFE.

4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. ESTIMATED DURATION OF OPERATION IS 90 DAYS.

B. SUMMER UNIFORM PRESCRIBED. FATIGUES [sic] WILL BE DUTY UNIFORM. SUMMER CIV CLOTHING FOR OFF-DUTY MAY BE TAKEN. PERSONNEL WILL TAKE MIN ESSENTIAL PERSONAL EFFECTS.

C. NO WEAPONS, GAS MASKS OR OTHER COMBAT EQUIPMENT WILL BE TAKEN.

D. PERSONNEL/FINANCE SPT TO BE DETERMINED BY CDRUSASCH.

E. FORCE WILL INCLUDE 10 COOKS BUT NO KITCHEN EQUIPMENT.

F. FORCE SHOULD INCLUDE MEDICAL AID MEN FOR INTERNAL SUPPORT. AID STATION WILL NOT BE TAKEN. MEDICAL SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED BY CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI.

G. MINIMUM ESSENTIAL 1/4 TON AND 1-1/4 TON TRUCKS MAY BE TAKEN FOR INTERNAL CONTROL. NO 2-1/2 TON TRUCKS OR TRAILER OF ANY TYPE WILL BE TAKEN.

H. SUFFICIENT RADIOS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL MAY BE CARRIED.

I. MAILING ADDRESS AS DETERMINED BY CDRUSASCH.

PAGE 4 RUHHMA0518 UNCLAS

J. CDRUSASCH: COORDINATE AND POM PROCESS ALL ARMY EW FROM CINCPAC, TAMC, USASCH, AND ACC-HAWAII.

K. FUNDING BEING HANDLED UNDER DISASTER RELIEF CONCEPT (DOD DIRECTIVE 5100.40) SECSTATE/USAID WILL REIMBURSE. COSTS ALLOCABLE TO "OPERATION NEW LIFE" SHOULD BE SEPARATELY IDENTIFIED FOR LATER REIMBURSEMENTS.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL: ALL US ARMY PERSONNEL TDY TO GUAM IN SUPPORT OF CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI WILL BE ATTACHED FOR RATIONS, QUARTERS, ADMINISTRATION AND MILITARY JUSTICE TO CDR 45TH SPT GP. CDR 45TH SPT GP WILL ACCEPT TASKING FROM CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI AND RESPOND WITHIN CAPABILITIES. CINCPAC WILL EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CDR 45TH SPT GP THROUGH CDRUSACSG. CDRUSASCH WILL EXERCISE COMMAND LESS OPCOM OVER

CDR 45TH SPT GP THRU CDR 25TH INF DIV.  
BT  
#6518

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APPENDIX B

THE 42 UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGES FROM COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
PACIFIC REPRESENTATIVE, GUAM

<u>No.</u>	<u>Time/Date</u>	<u>General Subject</u>
1	230615Z Apr 75	Evacuation of refugees from Vietnam
2	230655Z Apr 75	Classification and legal status of refugees
3	240106Z Apr 75	Refugee support
4	240245Z Apr 75	Operation Refugee Support Center, Guam*
5	240930Z Apr 75	Quarantine requirements
6	250845Z Apr 75	Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) guidance
7	250845Z Apr 75	INS, status of refugees
8	260313Z Apr 75	Contact point regarding financial matters
9	260945Z Apr 75	Contracting authority
10	261052Z Apr 75	Camp personnel control
11	270130Z Apr 75	Marriage guidance
12	270515Z Apr 75	Legal service available to camp commanders
13	280200Z Apr 75	Designation of Messages 1-12 as Operation New Life Guidance messages
14	280420Z Apr 75	Handling of refugee baggage
15	280450Z Apr 75	Concept plan for sealift of RVN evacuees*

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\*Message classified; not in Appendix B.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Time/Date</u>	<u>General Subject</u>
16	280035Z Apr 75	Recreation program assistance to commanders
17	280730Z Apr 75	Command authority over encampment sites
18	290425Z Apr 75	Dental treatment for refugees
19	290645Z Apr 75	Absentees from military service among refugees
20	290455Z Apr 75	Offenses involving refugees
21	291010Z Apr 75	INS processing update guidance
22	291110Z Apr 75	Immunizations for outgoing evacuees
23	290045Z Apr 75	(Subject classified)
24	300130Z Apr 75	Care and feeding of infants
25	300325Z Apr 75	Red Cross locator service
26	300329Z Apr 75	Water conservation
27	300200Z Apr 75	Sale of alcoholic beverages in camp prohibited
28	280430Z Apr 75	Ingress/egress to refugee encampments
29	302200Z Apr 75	Shortage of wooden cargo pallets
30	010200Z May 75	Seeking or accepting bribes
31	010143Z May 75	INS policies
32	051127Z May 75	Laundry and/or dry cleaning services
33	052211Z May 75	Retention of Vietnamese volunteer interpreters
34	062345Z May 75	Designation and disposition of refugees to third countries
35	062330Z May 75	Designation and disposition of refugees to Guam
36	130830Z May 75	Water conservation
37	150130Z May 75	A CINCPACREP message reissued as Nr 37

<u>No.</u>	<u>Time/Date</u>	<u>General Subject</u>
38	160059Z May 75	Direct personnel support to Operation New Life
39	170558Z May 75	Security procedures
40	(No message)	
41	190201Z May 75	Responsibilities and authority of personnel of Office of Civil Coordinator
42	202315Z May 75	Munitions and weapons recovery
43	222237Z May 75	Ingress/egress to refugee camps
44	261155Z May 75	Disposition of evacuees who commit crimes or create disturbances in camps
45	261155Z May 75	Corrected copy of Message Nr 44
45	280429Z May 75	Maintaining integrity of legitimate family units incident to hospitalization



01. 03 252525

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

TWX-1

AND THE COST AS DETERMINED BY REPORT OF SURVEY FOR ITEMS OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT UNAVOIDABLY DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMICAL REPAIR. COSTS TO BE REPORTED ARE NOT LIMITED ONLY TO OMM FUNDED BY ITBBS- ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IS CONTAINED IN PARAS 2201, 6201-6202 OF UNCLASSIFIED NAVSO P-3013 AND PARAS 035510-035514, 073555 OF NAVCOMPT MANUAL- JOB ORDERS SHOULD BE SO STRUCTURED AS TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE IDENTIFICATION OF COSTS INCURRED, I. E. LABOR, SUBSISTENCE, SUPPLIES, TRANSPORTATION, ETC.

2. ANY TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL DUTY (TAD) INVOLVED IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUBJ OPERATION MUST FIRST BE APPROVED BY COMNAVMAIANAS, WHO WILL ISSUE ACCOUNTING DATA AND TANGO NUMBER ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

3. FUNDS REQUIRED IN EXCESS OF AMOUNT AUTHORIZED MUST BE REQUESTED IN ADVANCE FROM COMNAVMAIANAS. WEEKLY REPORTS OF COSTS INCURRED ARE TO BE MADE TO COMNAVMAIANAS BY COB MONDAYS FOR PREVIOUS WEEK.

4. ACCEPTED COPIES OF THE 140'S SHOULD BE RETURNED TO COMNAVMAIANAS FOR FURTHER FORWARDING TO NRFC SAN DIEGO.

5. DESPITE THE REQUIREMENT FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, ACTIVITIES ARE REMINDED THAT THE NEED TO PROVIDE PROMPT NOTICE TO A CONTRACTOR DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE MAKING OF CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS BY OTHER

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DISTR:

ORIGINATOR'S OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE SIGNATURE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>
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DD FORM 173  
1-1587

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE CANCELED

TWX-12-

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03 03 1131515

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

TWX-1

THAN AUTHORIZED CONTRACTING PERSONNEL

FROM:

B. CONTACT POINT AT CONNAVARIANAS REGARDING FINANCIAL MATTERS

TO:

INCIDENT TO SUBJECT EVOLUTION IS LT. W. LONG CODE R12 PHONE

347-52375-

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V  
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DISTR:

SEARCH FOR CONTACT OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SEARCH FOR CONTACT OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

SIGNATURE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 13  
1587

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED

TWX-1-3

(11)





02	03	LLBLSS							
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS									

SHELTER AREAS DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF OPS.

4. I HAVE ORDERED THAT CO. MARRKS DISCHARGE HIS SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE EXCEPT IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES; IF SUCH UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES DEVELOPE, THE USE OF FORCE WILL BE MINIMIZED, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO HUMAN LIFE. SECURITY FORCES UNDER MARINE BARRACKS WILL NOT BE ARMED WITH FIREARMS, NIGHT STICKS HOWEVER ARE AUTHORIZED.

5. GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF FORCE IS CONTAINED IN REF A, AND YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO ITS DICTATES. COPIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM SJA (06) THIS HDQTRS.

6. COPIES OF ARTICLES 79 TO 135 OF REF B ARE AVAILABLE TO ALL MAJOR AREA COMMANDS. THESE PROVISIONS SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL COMIZANT ACTION OFFICERS, INCLUDING LEGAL OFFICERS, ASAP. WHERE HOSTS ARE CURRENTLY UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE LTR OF THE CONVENTION, ITS SPIRIT SHOULD BE OBSERVED.

7. THE U.S. ATTY HAS PRIMARY COG OVER ALL INFRACTIONS OF THE LAW. INITIAL COMMAND ACTION SHDULD BE IN FORM OF ISOLATING TROUBLE MAKERS FROM OTHER EVACUEES. SUCH ISOLATION AND A REPORT OF THE OFFENSES OF WHICH AN EVACUEE IS ACCUSED SHALL BE MADE TO THIS

STRT:	
PREPARED BY (NAME, GRADE, SYMBOL AND PHONE) SIGNATURE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>

DD FORM 173

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED

TWX-2-2

16

OR. OF LIAISON

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

TWY 2

- ADQUARTERS FOR FURTHER LIAISON WITH U.S. ATTY.
- 8. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE RESIDENT AGENCY, N-I- IS TASKED WITH PROVIDING INVESTIGATIVE FORCES AS APPROPRIATE AND WITH PROVIDING ALL LIAISON WITH FBI.
- 9. ALL COMMANDS ARE ADVISED THAT REF 8 IS FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND I HAVE REQUESTED FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.
- 10. RADM MORRISON SENDS.

DISTR:	
FROM: (UNIT, GROUP, COMMAND, ADDRESS, PHONE NO)	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO: (UNIT, GROUP, COMMAND, ADDRESS, PHONE NO)	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SYMBOL AND TELETYPE SYMBOL AND PHONE	UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173 6-1987

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED

TWY-2-3

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 P 240126Z APR 75  
 FM CINCPACFLT TO TPTI MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 BT

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INCLAS //N034221/  
 OPERATION NEW LIFE-GUAM REFUGEE SUPPORT **N03**  
 REQUIREMENTS OTHER THAN SUBSISTENCE WILL BE PROCESSED AS NORMAL  
 EXCEPT THAT THEY SHOULD BE MARKED "NEW LIFE"; REQNS SHOULD BE PRE-  
 SENTED TO CUSTOMER SERVICES DURING WORKING HOURS AND DUTY OFFICE  
 AFTER HOURS;  
 PROJECTED REQNS AND ABOVE NORMAL REQNS (OTHER THAN SUBSISTENCE)  
 OR NEXT 30 DAYS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO NSD GUAM PH 332-2290 OR  
 339-6274;  
 NSD GUAM HAS ESTABLISHED "NEW LIFE COORDINATION CENTER" FOR  
 COORDINATION AND INFORMATION AT PHONE NUMBERS 332-2290 AND 339-6274  
 WHICH WILL BE MANNED CONTINUOUSLY; SPECIFIC QUESTIONS SHOULD BE  
 ADDRESSED TO APPLICABLE DEPARTMENTS;  
 A SUBSISTENCE MESSAGE WILL FOLLOW;  
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APR 24 08 11 75

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TWX-4

Guidance Message 4

From: CINCPAC REP GUAM M. I.

To: ALL MIL ACTS GUAM

DTG: 240245Z APR 75

REF: CINCPAC HONOLULU 240213A PAR 75

SUBJ: Operation Refugee Support Center - Guam (OPERATION NEWLIFE) (U)

CLASSIFICATION CONF

This msg is held at the Camp Coordinator's Office.

1587

TWX-4-1

240930Z APR 75

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

*TWX 5*

FROM: CINCPAC-REP GUAN-TTPT: MARIANAS-HARBORS-HANDS

TO: ALMELACTS GUAM MARIANAS

*ah*

UNCLAS //NOFORN//

OPERATION ~~NO 5~~ *NO 5*

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE FOLLOWING CLASSES OF EVACUEES WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO QUARANTINE.

A. U.S. CITIZENS WHO POSSESS VALID ~~U.S.~~ U.S. PASSPORTS.

B. U.S. CITIZENS WHO POSSESS VALID ACTIVE ~~U.S.~~ U.S. MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARDS.

C. U.S. RESIDENT ALIENS WHO POSSESS VALID ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS ~~II-1511~~.

2. RELEASE OF OTHER CLASSES OF EVACUEES FROM QUARANTINE AND DOCUMENTATION PROVING SUCH RELEASE IS BEING COORDINATED BY NAVY INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER. GUIDANCE WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

3. INS CONCURS.

4. QUESTIONABLE CASES WILL BE REFERRED TO NRMC FOR RESOLUTION. THIS HQTRS WILL MAKE FINAL DETERMINATION RE QUESTIONABLE CASES IF REQUIRED.

DISTR:

<small>REPORTING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, AND DATE</small> A. J. CARMONIS - LCDR - USN - 06 14-5203	<small>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</small>
<small>REPORTING OFFICER'S OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE</small> <i>[Signature]</i>	INTERNAL ROUTING: 00/01/SDO/NE <i>BOOK</i>
<small>REPORTING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE</small> <i>[Signature]</i>	<small>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</small> UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173  
6-1587

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

*TWX-5-1*

*19*



twx-7

APR 25 15 00z 75

15/17

ZNY  
ZNR UUUUU  
O P 250845Z APR 75  
FM CINCPACREP GUAM/TIPI MARIANAS ISLANDS  
TO ALMEDIAS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
INFO CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

READDED TO

UNCLAS //

NO 7 CINPAC E/4

- OPERATED BY NEW LIFE REFUGEE STATUS
- A. CINCPAC REP GUAM/TIPI 240930Z APR 75:
  1. THIS ORDER HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (I.N.S.) AS FOLLOWS: "REFUGEES WITHOUT PAROLEE PAPERS ARE TO BE HELD TO THE REFUGEE CAMPS".
  2. REP A ORDERED THAT U.S. CITIZENS WITH U.S. PASSPORTS/MILITARY I.D. AND U.S. RESIDENT ALIENS WITH VALID ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS BE ALLOWED FREE MOVEMENT OUT OF ENCAMPMENTS.
  3. THOSE EVACUEES IN "PAROLEE" STATUS WITH PAPERS WILL BE ENCOURAGED STRONGLY TO REMAIN IN ENCAMPMENTS.
  4. PRINCIPLE PROBLEM IS U.S. CITIZENS WHO ATTEMPT TO FORCE WAY OUT WITH ALLEGED DEPENDENTS AND THOSE DEPENDENTS HAVE NO PAPERS IDENTIFYING THEM AS U.S. CITIZENS OR U.S. RESIDENT ALIENS. FORCE WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE USED TO RESTRAIN THESE RECALCITRANT REFUGEES.
  5. OUR BEST GUIDANCE IS TO EXPLAIN TO STUBBORN PARTIES THE I.N.S. ADVICE PUBLISHED IN THE NOTICE TO ALL EVACUEES ESTABLISHING PROCESSING PRIORITIES. (1. EVACUEES IN POSSESSION OF FORM I-94 AND/OR U.S. EMBASSY LTR. 2. THOSE WITH CLOSE RELATIVES WHO HAVE PROOF IN FORM OF LTR. 3. OTHERS.) IF REFUGEES FIT INTO PRIORITY 1 OR 2 ADVISE THEM THAT I.N.S. WILL BE ATTEMPTING TO EXPEDITE THEIR LEGAL DEPARTURE. IF UNABLE TO RESON WITH THEM, TAKE NAMES EXPLAINING THAT IF THEY LEAVE YOU INTEND TO REPORT THIS ILLEGAL CONDUCT TO I.N.S. WHO WILL CONSIDER THEIR ILLEGAL ACTIONS IN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO GRANT PERMISSION TO ENTER CONUS.
  6. IF PHYSICAL ISOLATION OF RECALCITRANTS IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT VIOLENCE, A COOLING-OFF PERIOD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.
  7. FIRMNESS WITHOUT FORCE IS THE KEY MEASURE.
  8. FOR CINCPAC: PASS TO J73.

21502

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6-1587

twx-7-1

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01 01	1161345 00 00		260745Z	APR 75

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

*TWX-9*

FROM: CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS F 3 0 0 //NO7300// *NO.9*

OPERATION ~~NEULIFE~~ -- CONTRACTING AUTHORITY *up*

A. ~~CINCPACREP~~ GUAM MI 230615Z APR 75

1. ~~EFFECTIVELY~~ IMMEDIATELY, ANY SERVICE REQUIRED FROM GOVGUAM WILL BE CONTRACTED BY EITHER CAPT M. T. MOONEY, OICC OR CAPT J. H. CHESHURE NSD OR THEIR SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

2. ALL REQUESTS FOR SUCH SERVICES WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CAPT J. LAPOLLA IN4 THIS HDQTRS FOR COORDINATION.

3. ANY ACTIVITY WHO HAS ENTERED INTO ANY CONTRACT WITH GOVGUAM, OR WHO AS REQUESTED ANY SERVICES WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED (BY GOVGUAM) AS A CONTRACT, DURING OPERATION NEULIFE, REPORT THOSE SERVICES RENDERED TO THIS HDQTRS ASAP.

4. REQUESTS FOR FURTHER SERVICES MAY INCLUDE ITEMS SUCH AS POLICE SERVICES WHICH MIGHT USUALLY BE CONSIDERED AS FREE PUBLIC SERVICE.

5. WHEN EMERGENCY OR IMMEDIATE CONTRACTING IS REQUIRED, THIS HDQTRS, (OPERATION NEULIFE COMMAND CENTER), WILL COORDINATE.

6. YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO PARA 5 REF (A).

J. <i>[Signature]</i> 5025-44E 349-5203	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS BOOK <i>[Signature]</i>
U. <i>[Signature]</i> 5025-44E 349-5203	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <i>NO.9-1</i> FOUO

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

01 03 111200Z 00 00 UUUU 17583 261052Z APR 75

TWX10

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS

NEW LIFE REFUGEE CAMP PERSONNEL CONTROL NO. 10

- 1. ALL REFUGEE MOVEMENTS BETWEEN REFUGEE CAMPS AND FROM CAMPS TO PROCESSING CENTERS WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE CINCPAC REP GUAM COMMAND POST BEFORE MOVES ARE COMMENCED.

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ORIGINATOR'S NAME, TITLE, GRADE, SYMBOL AND PHONE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
J. H. BEASLEY, CAPT, USN, N3	EN1N/20/ED/13 E30GS/10/00

TO: (SYMBOL, GRADE, SYMBOL AND PHONE)	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
<i>James W. Beasley</i>	UNCLASSIFIED

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

TW-15-111

TWX-10-1

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JOINT MESSAGE FORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION																	
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EFTO		270130Z	APR 75																
<p><i>7WX-11</i></p> <p>FROM: <del>CINCPACREP GUAM TTPI GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS</del></p> <p>TO: <del>ALMELAGTS GUAM MAREANAS ISLANDS</del></p> <p>INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI</p> <p>UNCLAS E F T O //NO1751// <b>NO. 11</b></p> <p>OPERATION <del>WELIFE MARRIAGE GUIDANCE</del></p> <p>A. COMNAV MARIANAS INST 1752-26</p> <p>1. ATTENTION ALL REFUGEE SHELTER COMMANDERS</p> <p>2. CINCPACREP GUAM HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS INQUIRIES CONCERNING MARRIAGE BY EVACUEES. IN ORDER TO ASSIST COMMANDERS THE FOLLOWING POLICY AND GUIDELINES ARE SET FORTH. EXISTING REGULATIONS ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING PERMISSION TO MARRY AN ALIEN WILL BE ADHERED TO IN CASES INVOLVING SERVICEMEN WHO WISH TO MARRY ALIEN EVACUEES. MEMBERS OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MUST COMPLY WITH REF A WHICH PROVIDES FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SERVICE MEMBER AND THE PROSPECTIVE SPOUSE, MARRIAGE COUNSELING OF BOTH PARTIES, EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL ABILITY TO PREVENT THE SPOUSE FROM BECOMING A PUBLIC CHARGE, AND WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PARENT OR GUARDIAN OF AN UNDERAGE SPOUSE. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS ARE SET FORTH IN REFERENCE (A).</p> <p>B. SERVICE MEMBERS IN THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE SHOULD CONSULT NAVY</p>																			
DISTR.		EFTO																	
<p><i>[Signature]</i></p> <p>A J ARMSTRONG CDR, 06, 5260</p>		<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>INTERNAL ROUTING BOOK</p> <p><i>02/10</i></p>																	
		<table border="1"> <tr><td>NS</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>SDO</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>OB</td><td>C</td></tr> <tr><td>SLK</td><td>I</td></tr> <tr><td>MI</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>ROUTER</td><td>1/1</td></tr> <tr><td>SUPVR</td><td>1/1</td></tr> <tr><td>MDC</td><td></td></tr> </table>		NS		SDO		OB	C	SLK	I	MI		ROUTER	1/1	SUPVR	1/1	MDC	
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*7WX-11-1*

**TWX 11** JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: **UNCLASSIFIED**

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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

LEGAL SERVICE OFFICE (NLSO) GUAM (3549-5263/5264) FOR COORDINATION OF REQUIREMENTS WITH THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

4. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, ALL APPLICANTS FOR A MARRIAGE LICENSE ON GUAM WHETHER SERVICE PERSONNEL OR NOT MUST COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ON GUAM:

A. THERE IS A FIVE-DAY WAITING PERIOD BETWEEN SUBMISSION OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE. THIS REQUIREMENT MAY BE WAIVED BY WRITTEN ORDER FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM.

5. UPON REQUEST BY BASE COMMANDER, NLSO WILL COORDINATE WITH GUAM OFFICIALS.

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LISTEN

REFERRED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE 2-15-77 TWX-11-2	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
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(12)

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UUUU			270515Z APR 75

*TWX-12*

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS E F T O //N05800// **NO. 12**

OPERATION ~~LEGAL~~ LEGAL SERVICES

1. ATTENTION ALL REFUGEE ENCAMPMENT SITE COMMANDERS.
2. LEGAL SUPPORT, ADVICE, AND ASSISTANCE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO CAMP COMMANDERS FROM ALL U.S. MILITARY SERVICES. NAVAL LEGAL SERVICE OFFICE, GUAM (PHONE 349-5260/5261 THRU 5264) HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS FOCAL COORDINATING POINT FOR LEGAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES. AUTHORIZED SERVICES WILL BE PROVIDED FOR REFUGEES UPON REQUEST OF CAMP COMMANDERS.
3. CINCPACREP GUAM STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, LCDR ARMSTRONG, (PHONE 349-5260) CONTINUES TO ACT AS OVERALL COORDINATOR.

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DISTR:

<p>DATE: 06 APR 75</p> <p>A J ARMSTRONG, LCDR, 06, 5260</p> <p>SIGNATURE: <i>A J Armstrong</i></p>	<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>INTERNAL ROUTING BOOK <i>ib</i></p> <p>031</p>
<p>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</p> <p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	

DD FORM 173 158

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

**TWX-12-1**

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FOR MESSAGE CENTER	COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY
DATE TIME	MONTH YR
280200Z	APR 75
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS	

TWX-13

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NOB320//

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR. 13

- A. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 230615Z APR 75
- B. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 230655Z APR 75
- C. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 240106Z APR 75
- D. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 240245Z APR 75
- E. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 240930Z APR 75
- F. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 250645Z APR 75
- G. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 250845Z APR 75
- H. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 260313Z APR 75
- I. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 260945Z APR 75
- J. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 261052Z APR 75
- K. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 270130Z APR 75
- L. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 270515Z APR 75

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REFS A THRU L ARE DESIGNATED OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE MSGS  
 NR'S 1 THRU 12. THEY GIVE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND AUTHORITY AND  
 ALMILACTS GUAM SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THEIR CONTENTS.

DISTR:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS INTERNAL ROUTING <i>Wid</i> BOOK <i>Wid</i> <i>031</i> <i>Q3</i>	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS INTERNAL ROUTING BOOK UNCLASSIFIED
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DD FORM 173 6-1587

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED. TWX-13-1

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

UNCLASSIFIED

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		DATE	TIME	MONTH	YR		

TW413

THEY HAVE BEEN RESEARCHED, COMPILED AND ARE REITERATED AS FOLLOWS:

A. REF ~~33333A~~ STATES ALL TAD IN CONJUNCTION WITH NEULIFE MUST BE APPROVED BY THIS HQ.

B. REF B TASKS CO MARBKS WITH SUPPORTING CO'S IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR EVACUEES AND SHELTER AREA, DURING INITIAL PHASE OF OPS. REF B STATES THE U.S. ATTY HAS PRIMARY COG OVER ALL INFRACTIONS OF THE LAW. REF B TASKS NISR WITH PROVIDING INVESTIGATIVE FORCES AND PROVIDING LIAISON WITH FBI.

C. REF C DIRECTS ALL PROJECTED RQMTS AND ABOVE NORMAL REQUIREMENTS (OTHER SUBSISTANCE) FOR NEXT 30 DAYS TO BE SUBMITTED TO NSD GUAM (332-2290 OR 339-6274).

D. REF D READDRESSED CINCPAC 240213Z APR 75 WHICH DESIGNATES RADM G. S. MORRISON AS COORDINATOR, RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, DIRECTING AND COORDINATING ALL ACTIONS CONCERNED WITH MILITARY SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES TRANSITING GUAM.

E. REF E STATES FOLLOWING CLASSES OF EVACUEES WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO QUARANTINE: (1) U.S. CITIZENS WHO POSSES VALID U.S. PASSPORTS. (2) U.S. CITIZENS WHO POSSESS VALID ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS (I-151). REF E FURTHER STATES FINAL DETERMINATION

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DD FORM 173

REPLACES FORM 173-1 OF WHICH WILL BE USED.

TW4-13-2

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JOINT MESSAGE FORM UNCLASSIFIED

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TWY-13

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

REGARDING QUESTIONABLE CASES WILL BE DETERMINED BY THIS HQ.

F. REF F IS DIRECTION BY INS TO HOLD EVACUEE PERSONNEL WITHOUT PAPERS WITHIN CAMP COMPOUNDS.

G. REF G STATES EVACUEES IN PAROLEE STATUS WITH PAPERS SHOULD BE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO REMAIN IN ENCAMPMENTS. FORCE WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE USED TO RESTRAIN RECALCITRANT REFUGEES. IF PHYSICAL ISOLATION OF RECALCITRANTS IS NECESSARY, A COLLING OFF PERIOD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. INFORM THEM THEIR NAMES WILL BE TAKEN IF THEY LEAVE AND WILL BE TURNED OVER TO LEGAL AUTHORITIES.

H. REF H DIRECTS ALL OPERATION NEWLIFE FINANCIAL MATTERS BE REFERRED TO LCDR CHASE, NSD CODE 50 {339-3259 OR 6533}.

I. REF I DIRECTS ALL CONTRACT SERVICES REQUIRED FROM GOVGUAM TO BE COMPLETED BY CAPT MOONEY, OICC OR CAPT CHESHURE, NSD OR THEIR DESIGNATED REPS. REF I FURTHER STATES THESE REQUESTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CAPT LAPOLLA, (N4, THIS HQ) FOR COORDINATION AND THAT ANY PERSON ALREADY ENTERED INTO CONTRACT SHOULD REPORT IT TO COMNAV-MARIANAS.

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J. REF J DIRECTS ALL REFUGEE MOVEMENTS BETWEEN AND FROM CAMPS TO PROCESSING CENTERS TO BE COORDINATED THROUGH CINCPACREP GUAM

DISTR:

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OPERATIONAL SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
OPERATIONAL SYMBOL AND PHONE	
SECURITY	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DD FORM 173 6-1977 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

TWY-13-3

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
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TWY-13

COMMAND POST PRIOR TO MOVE.

K. REF K SETS FORTH THE GUIDELINES AND POLICY PROCEDURES FOR MARRIAGES- REF K FURTHER STATES THAT ARMY AND AIR FORCE SERVICE MEMBERS WILL CONSULT WITH NL50 FOR COORDINATION AND STATES THAT NL50 WILL COORDINATE WITH GOVGUAM OFFICIALS.

L. REF L DESIGNATES NL50 AS FOCAL POINT FOR LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE REFUSEES AND FURTHER TASKS THE SJA, CINCPACREP GUAM STAFF AS OVERALL COORDINATOR.

2. RECOMMEND YOU MAINTAIN A SEPARATE FILE OF ALL OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE MSGS AND MAINTAIN THEM IN SEQUENTIAL ORDER NUMBER.

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DD FORM 173

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

TWY-13-4

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TWX-14

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE, NR. 14

1. THE COAST GUARD IS WORKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE TO COORDINATE THE DELIVERY OF FRUSTRATED BAGGAGE TO THE CORRECT COMPOUND.
2. UNCLAIMED BAGGAGE IS BEING HELD BY FLT NO. AND/OR BAGGAGE CLAIM NO. AT ANDERSEN AND THE COAST GUARD DEPOT.
3. REQ COMPOUNDS CALL 342-4119 OR 344-7260 TO REPORT MISSING BAGGAGE CLAIM AND/OR FLT NO. REPORT UNCLAIMED NO. BAGS TO SAME NO.
4. UNTAGGED BAGGAGE SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE OWNER.

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	INTERNAL ROUTING: 00/01/SD0{3}/03/07/N1/M3
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DD FORM 173  
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REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

TWX-14-1

TWX-15

Guidance Message 15

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM/TIPI M. I.

TO: ALL MIL ACTS GUAM

DTG: 280450Z APR 75

REF: CINCPACFLT 270943Z APR 75

subj: CONCEPT PLAN FOR SEALIFE OF RVN EVACUEES (U)

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

This msg is held at the Camp Coordinator's Office.

2-15X7

TWX-15-1

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		DATE TIME	GROUP
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS		280035Z	APR 75

TWX-16

FROM: CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NOBT//

OPERATION NEELIFE GUIDANCE NR 16

1. ATTENTION ALL REFUGEE ENCAMPMENT SITE COMMANDERS.
2. RECREATION PROGRAM/ENTERTAINMENT SUPPLY AND PROGRAM ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO CAMP COMMANDERS UPON REQUEST.
3. CONSOLIDATED RECREATION OFFICE, GUAM, 349-5213/14/15 DESIGNATED COORDINATION POINT FOR RECREATION SERVICES FOR REFUGEES ENCAMPMENTS.
4. CONTACT MR. T. JELCICK, OVERALL COORDINATOR 349-5213.
- CONTACT MR. T. HOFSTETTER 342-2128/355-5137 ASAN NORTH TO ANDERSON.
- R. E. BARRICKLOW 339-8219/8173 ENCAMPMENTS SOUTH OF ASAN.

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DISTR:

MR. T. JELCICK, ASST FORCE REC DIR

349-5213/14/15

U. J. WILCE, USN, N27

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

*BOOK*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

TWX-16-1

UNCLASSIFIED

01 03 1181737 00 00 UUUU 20730Z APR 75

TWX-17

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM//TTPI MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NEEDS//

OPERATION NEWLIFE -- BASE COMMANDERS -- GUIDANCE NR 17

- A. CINCPAC HONOLULU HI 230139Z APR 75
- B. CINCPAC HONOLULU HI 230655Z APR 75
- 1. REFERENCES A AND B VEST RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN CINCPAC REP GUAM//TTPI FOR THE DIRECTION AND COORDINATION OF OPERATION NEWLIFE.
- 2. THIS MSG DELINEATES COMMAND LINES OF AUTHORITY OVER REFUGEE ENCAMPMENT SITES ESTABLISHED ON GUAM.
- 3. CDR 3RD AIR DIV IS REQUESTED TO PROMULGATE APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES AN ADMINISTER REQUIRED REFUGEE CAMPS AND SUPPORT FACILITIES AT AAFR. DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY CINCPACREP GUAM WILL BE PROVIDED TO 3RD AIR DIV FOR INFO. REQUEST THIS HQTRS BE PROVIDED WITH ALL DIRECTIVES SO PROMULGATED BY 3AD.
- 4. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CO, MARBKS GUAM, COLONEL G. M. MCCAIN, IS DESIGNATED COORDINATOR OF GUAM REFUGEE CAMPS WITH RESPONSIBILITY TO CINCPAC REP GUAM//TTPI FOR OVERALL COORDINA-

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GRAPHERS SYMBOLS FROM DATE

A J ARMSTRONG, LCDR, 06, 5206

G S MORRISON, RADM, 00, 5200

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

031

INTERNAL ROUTING

BOOK

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 138 1-587 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED

TWX-17-1

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

PR	ORIGINATOR	CLASS	CR	DATE	TIME	ZONE
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TION OF MILITARY SUPPORT OF GUAM REFUGEE CAMPS. THE COORDINATOR'S OFFICE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT THIS HQTRS.

5. COMMANDING OFFICERS/COMMANDERS OF ACTIVITIES ON WHICH GUAM REFUGEE CAMPS ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED (EXCEPT AAFB) WILL REPORT TO CINCPACREP GUAM THROUGH THE COORDINATOR FOR ALL MATTERS RELATED TO ESTABLISHMENT, OPERATION, ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SITES.

6. ENCAMPMENT SITES AND COGNIZANT COMMANDERS ARE DESIGNATED AS FOLLOWS:

- |                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| NAS                              | CO NAS  |
| NCS BARRIGADA                    | CO NCS  |
| ASAN ANNEX                       | CO MARBKS                                       |
| RCQ                              | CO NAVSTA                                       |
| NMCB SPORTS ARENA                | CO NAVSTA                                       |
| NAVSTA GYM                       | CO NAVSTA                                       |
| OROTE PT (TENT CITY)             | CO 30TH NCR THENCE CDR 45TH<br>SUPP GP/25TH DIV |
| NIMITZ HILL                      | LCDR WYLIE                                      |
| HAWAIIAN DREDGING CONST. CO. BKS | CO NAVMAG                                       |

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UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED

707-17-2

62

JOINT MESSAGE (JRM)

UNCLASSIFIED

BLACK COMBAT CO. BKS  
 J & G COMBAT CO. BKS  
 MINERON/COSRON  
 TOKYU HOTEL

CO NAVFAC  
 CO VR-1  
 CO NAVSTA  
 CO NCS

- 7. THE ABOVE DESIGNATED COMMANDERS/COMMANDING OFFICERS MAY DELEGATE SUBORDINATE OFFICERS AUTHORITY AS CAMP COMMANDERS. THIS DESIGNATION MUST BE IN WRITING. THE NAME, RANK, SERVICE BRANCH AND DUTY STATION OF THE DESIGNATED CAMP COMMANDER WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY MSG TO THIS HDQTRS/INFO TO ALMILACTS.
- 8. DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED BETWEEN CAMP COMMANDERS AND THE COORDINATOR GUAM REFUGEE CAMPS.

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DISTR:

<small>DATE, TIME, AND NAME OF THE MESSAGE, FROM, &amp; DATE</small>		<small>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</small>	
<small>MESSAGE SYMBOL AND PHONE</small>		<small>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</small> <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	

DD FORM 173-208 REPLACES FORM 173-101 WHICH WILL BE OBSOLETE TWX-17-3

JOINT MESSAGEFORM						UNCLASSIFIED		
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	1191425	PP	PP	UUUU		DATE	TIME	MONTH
						290425Z		APR 75

TWX-18

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS


UNCLAS //NOFORN//

OPERATION NEULIFE GUIDANCE NR-1877

1. DENTAL TREATMENT THROUGH MILITARY SOURCES IS LIMITED BASICALLY TO EMERGENCY/HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT.
2. COORDINATION FOR DENTAL TREATMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:
  - A. DENTAL DEPT, ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE WILL COORDINATE DENTAL TREATMENT FOR PERSONNEL BILLETED AT ANDERSEN (PHONE: 366-3298).
  - B. THE HEAD, BRANCH DENTAL FACILITY, U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION (CAPTAIN W. C. SULLIVAN, DC, USN) WILL COORDINATE ALL DENTAL TREATMENT FOR NAS AND BILLETS IN THE GENERAL VICINITY NORTH TO ANDERSEN AFAB (PHONE: 344-8238).
  - C. THE COMMANDING OFFICER, U. S. NRDC WILL COORDINATE DENTAL TREATMENT FOR ALL EVACUATION BILLETS SOUTH OF NAS, EXCLUDING ASAN ANNEX. ASAN ANNEX IS MANNED BY AIR FORCE DENTAL PERSONNEL (COMMANDER R. C. HIRST IS CDO, PHONE: 339-3175).

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DISTR:

QUANTIFIED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE LT KENNEDY, NRDC	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 07/01/03/SDO INTERN. ROUTING / BOOK 031 4/83
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE 	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE	OPERATOR REF ID	PRECEDENCE	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE	COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY			
						DATE - TIME	MONTH	YR	
27	02	02	1191435						

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

TWX-18

- D. DENTAL SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR NAVY SPONSORED TREATMENT IS THROUGH NDBC (LT KENNEDY, PHONE: 339-5266/3175).
- 3. A LARGE REQUIREMENT FOR TOOTHBRUSHES, TOOTHPASTE AND OTHER RELATED ITEMS EXIST.
- 4. DENTAL MATERIALS WILL BE CONTROLLED AND DISTRIBUTED BY NAVREGDNCEN. EVACUEE CAMP COMMANDERS WHO HAVE REQUIREMENTS SHOULD CONTACT LT KENNEDY AT NAVREGDNCEN (339-5266/3175).

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<p>RELEASER'S NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE &amp; DATE</p> <p>YOUR NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE</p> <p>SIGNATURE</p>	<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</p> <p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>
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TWX-18-2

DD FORM 173

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.



JOINT MESSAGEFORM						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
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*twy-20*

FROM: CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS E F T O //003620//

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR-20

1. ATTENTION ALL REFUGEE ENCAMPMENT SITE COMMANDERS.
2. INVESTIGATION OF OFFENSES INVOLVING EVACUEES. ANY SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENSE IN WHICH AN EVACUEE IS INVOLVED, OR SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, EITHER AS A SUSPECTED PERPETRATOR OR VICTIM SHALL BE REFERRED WITHOUT DELAY TO THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, OR IN THE CASE OF ANDERSEN AFB, TO THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, FOR FULL INVESTIGATION OR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, LIAISON AND REFERRAL, AS APPROPRIATE, TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES.
4. GENERALLY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND JUSTICE REGARDING CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED ON BOARD MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, SERIOUS OFFENSES COMMITTED BY PERSONNEL NOT SUBJECT TO THE UCMJ, OR BY PERSONNEL SUBJECT

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DISTR:

DATE: 29 APR 75 0455Z  
 NAME: R. J. Bliss  
 ADDRESS: 6515 N358, 339-7220

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 BOOK *WJW*  
 031  
 06 *[Signature]*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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NO.	ORIGINATOR	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE	COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY			
02	02	291455			DATE	TIME	MONTH	YR

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE UCMJ IN WHICH THE VICTIM IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE UCMJ, WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR INVESTIGATION BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WITH A VIEW TOWARD PROSECUTION BY THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. IF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DECLINES INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION, EVEN THOUGH THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION MAY NOT BE SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION IN MILITARY COURTS, NIS OR OSI MAY CONTINUE THE INVESTIGATION IF RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE ISSUE IS NECESSARY AS A BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BY CAMP COMMANDERS.

5. INVESTIGATION OF MINOR OFFENSES WILL NOT NORMALLY BE CONDUCTED BY NIS OR OSI WHICH MAY DECLINE INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION IN FAVOR OF INVESTIGATION BY COMMAND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES, E.G., AF SECURITY POLICE, USN BASE POLICE, MAA'S, ETC., OR ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY BY OTHER COMMAND PERSONNEL.

DISTR:

OFFICER NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE  OFFICER NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS  SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>UNCLAS</b>
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TWX-20-2

DD FORM 173

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED

69

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE	DATE/TIME OF RELEASE	PRIORITY	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER	DATE - TIME	MONTH
01 of 02	114201G	0100	UUUU			291010Z	APR

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

*TWX-21*

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NO4444//

~~OPERATION NEULIFE INS PROCESSING UPDATE GUIDANCE NR 21~~

PASS TO ALL CAMP COMMANDERS

1. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE INS OUTPROCESSING TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT, INS TEAMS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AT AAFB "TIN CITY", CAMP ASAN, OROTE POINT, MINERON ONE/COSRON THREE COMPLEX, NAS COMPOUND, NAVSTA SPORTS ARENA, AND NCS BARRIGADA/BLACK CONST CAMP.
2. FOR THOSE SMALL CAMPS {I-E., J & G CONST, HAWAII DREDGING, BOQ-1 AND OTHERS} A MOBILE INS TEAM HAS BEEN CREATED CONSISTING OF TWO INSPECTORS AND APPROX 4 CLERKS. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS TEAM WILL BE OPERATIONAL IN THE AFTERNOON OF 30 APRIL 75. THE TEAM WILL SERVICE EACH CAMP UNTIL EVERYONE IS PROCESSED IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE - J & G CONST CAMP, HAWAII DREDGING, BOQ-1, AND THE TOKYU HOTEL AND BCQ WHEN NECESSARY.
3. TO INSURE THAT THE INS MOBILE TEAM CAN BEGIN WORK IMMEDIATELY

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DRYER TYPE FRAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
CDR W.R. WESTLAKE, USN, CODE 04	04 (2-44)
SENDER NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
<i>W.R. Westlake</i>	UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173 1-58 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED. *TWX-21-1*

JOINT MESSAGEFORM							SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS										

TWX-21

UPON ARRIVAL, CAMP CDRS WILL SEE THAT THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT IS PROVIDED: DEDICATED WORKING SPACE, SEGREGATION AREA, TABLES, CHAIRS, A TYPEWRITER, SUFFICIENT MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN LINE CONTROL AND VIETNAMESE INTERPRETERS. CAMP CDRS MAY ALSO ASSIST BY PASSING OUT I-94 FORMS TO BE FILLED OUT BY EACH INDIVIDUAL PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF PROCESSING. THESE FORMS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED AHEAD OF TIME.

4. AAFB "TIN CITY" IS CURRENTLY SLATED TO BECOME THE PRIMARY STAGING POINT FOR CLEARED PERSONNEL FROM ALL OTHER CAMP SITES. AT THE PRESENT TIME THE TOKYU HOTEL WILL BE THE SECONDARY HOLDING AREA, BUT OTHER CAMPS MAY ALSO BE DESIGNATED.

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SIGNATURE 6-1587 TWX-21-2	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

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JOINT MESSAGE FORM						UNCLASSIFIED		
PRIO	DATE FOR RELEASE TIME	PRIO	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE	/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
ZZ	01 01	1192110	PP	PP	UUUU	291110Z	APR	75
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS								

*TWX-22*

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 GOV GUAM

UNCLAS //NOB320//

IMMUNIZATIONS FOR OUTGOING EVACUEES - OPERATION NEULIFE GUID-NR-22

1. U.S. NAVY, AIR FORCE AND ARMY MEDICAL UNITS WITH USPHS REGION IX AND CDC PERSONNEL AND IN CONSULTATION WITH GOVGUAM PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE MEASLES, RUBELLA, AND ORAL POLIO INNOCULATIONS TO APPROXIMATELY 8,000 EVACUEE CHILDREN AGES ONE THRU FIVE. ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, USPHS, CDC PERSONNEL WILL BE ORGANIZED IN TEAMS TO PROVIDE THE INNOCULATIONS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF DR. BOB SHAW OF EPMU NR SIX. WRIST BANDS WILL BE PROVIDED TO SHOW THAT INNOCULATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS WELL AS NOTATION MADE ON THE FIELD MEDICINE CARD ACCOMPANYING THE PATIENT. IMMUNIZATIONS WILL BEGIN WITH EVACUEES AWAITING IMMINENT DEPARTURE. ALL PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY AGENCIES INVOLVED. ONLY MILD REACTIONS, IF ANY, ARE ANTICIPATED.

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CDR PITTINGTON

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

*[Signature]* TWX-22-1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
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(3)

TWX-23

Guidance Message 23

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM/TTPI M. I.

TO: ALL MIL ACTS GUAM

DTG: 290045Z APR 75

SUBJ: (C)

CLASSIFICATION: CONF

REF: N/A

This msg is held at the Camp Coordinator's Office.

TWX-23-1

JOINT MESSAGEFORM										UNCLASSIFIED		
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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS												

*TWX-24*

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NOFORN//

~~OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR 24~~

1. IN RESP TO MANY INQUIRIES CONCERNING CARE AND FEEDING OF INFANTS. SUGGEST CAMP COMMANDERS SEEK GUIDANCE FROM CAMP MEDICAL OFFICERS.
2. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY NRMIC PEDIATRIC SERVICE:
  - A. INFANTS: FIRST DAY, IN CAMP - CLEAR LIQUID SOUP, KOOL AID. SECOND DAY, HALF STRENGTH FORMULA 2 TO 7 DAYS AFTER ARRIVAL. IF DIARRHEA IS NOT PRESENT FULL STRENGTH FORMULA MAY BE USED. FEEDINGS OF FORMULA SHOULD NOT EXCEED 32 OZ PER DAY. STRAINED BABY FOOD AND CEREAL MAY BE GIVEN. 3 TO 4 JARS PER DAY OF MEAT, VEGETABLES AND FRUIT.
  - B. TODDLERS: FORMULA AS ABOVE WITH MILK (WHOLE OR POWDERED) AND BABY FOOD OR TABLE FOODS LIGHTLY SEASONED.
3. FORMULA IS AVAILABLE FROM NRMIC (IN SHORT SUPPLY AT PRESENT) PHONE 344-9246. BOTTLE ARE NOT AS YET AVAILABLE SO CONSERVE AND REUSE WHAT IS AVAILABLE.
4. MSD GUAM WILL BE PROVIDING BABY FOOD.

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DISSEM:

1. NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE, DATE J. AULD, LT, MSC, USN, 344-9340 ALMO, 29 APR 75 NRMIC	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 00/01 <i>WJ</i> <i>031</i> BOOK <i>WJ</i> <i>23</i>
2. NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE <i>[Signature]</i>	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173 4-75 REPLACES TWX-24

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				UNCLASSIFIED			
DATE	ORIGINATOR	PRECEDENCE	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE	COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY	
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Z 01 01	1201325	PP	PP	UUUU		300325Z	APR 75

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

*Twy-25*

FROM: CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NOFORN//

OPERATION=NEWLIFE GUIDANCE-NR-25-4

1. CONSOLIDATED NAVY-RED CROSS EFFORTS HAVE ESTABLISHED AN EVACUEE LOCATOR DESK AT NAVAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, GUAM RED CROSS CENTER.
2. ALL QUESTIONS, REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, ETC., SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THAT OFFICE. VOLUNTEERS ARE WORKING AROUND THE CLOCK TO ANSWER ALL REQUESTS.
3. AT THIS POINT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IF THE EVACUEES SOUGHT ARE ON ISLAND; HOWEVER, IT WILL BE THREE-TO-FOUR DAYS UNTIL EXACT LOCATION CAN BE ESTABLISHED.
4. LOCATOR DESK NUMBERS ARE 344-7127/7128.

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RECIPIENT NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE H LANKFORD, ENS, N33112, 5212	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS <i>231</i> BOOK <i>1261</i>
SENDER NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE <i>[Signature]</i> M J WYLIE, LCDR, 03, 5202	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173 1-57 REPLACES FORM 173 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGE FORM					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS								

*TWX-26*

FROM: CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NO1330//

OPERATION-NEWLIFE-GUIDANCE-NR-26

1. OPERATION NEWLIFE IS OVERLOADING THE ISLAND WATER SYSTEM FOR MEETING NORMAL REQNTS. ALL COMMANDS ARE REQUESTED TO INSTITUTE STRICT WATER CONSERVATION MEASURES.
2. NEW SUBJECT. ALL PWC/30 NCR PIPEFITTERS, PLUMBERS AND UTILITIESMEN ARE BEING UTILIZED TO INSTALL NEW WATERLINES AT OROTE. COMMANDS WITH MINOR PLUMBING PROBLEMS ARE ENCOURAGED TO UTILIZE LOCAL SELF-HELP WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

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DISTR.

ORIGINATOR NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE J R FAULK, LCDR, PWC CODE 110 333-2408	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS BOOK <i>[Handwritten initials]</i>
DESTINANT NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE W J MYLIE, LCDR, 03, 5202	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173 1-75

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				UNCLASSIFIED			
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01 01	1201200	PP PP	UUUU			DATE TIME	MONTH YR
						300200Z	APR 75

TWX-27

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NOFORN//

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR 27

1. CBAMP CDRS ARE NOTIFIED THAT, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE SALE OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES WITHIN EVACUEE CAMPS IS PROHIBITED.

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DISTR:

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE A. J. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN, PB 349-5203 <i>A. J. Armstrong</i>	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS INTERNAL ROUTING: BOOK <i>031</i> <i>031</i>
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE <i>[Signature]</i>	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS							

*Twx-28*

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NOFORN//

OPERATION: NEW LIFE - GUIDANCE NR-28-1

- A. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 240930Z APR 75
- B. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 250845Z APR 75
- 1. ATTN ALL CAMP COMMANDERS.
- 2. YOUR ATTN IS DIRECTED TO REFS A AND B WHICH SET FORTH GENERAL POLICY RE REFUGEE STATUS.
- 3. TO CLARIFY THE RULES FOR CAMP CDRS AND THEIR SECURITY FORCES, THE FOLLOWING APPLY:
  - A. UNLIMITED INGRESS/EGRESS TO REFUGEE ENCAMPMENTS WILL BE ALLOWED TO TWO CATEGORIES OF REFUGEES:
    - {1} U. S. CITIZENS
    - {2} U. S. RESIDENT ALIENS
  - B. TWO DOCUMENTS CAN PROVE U. S. CITIZENSHIP
    - {1} U. S. MILITARY I-D. CARD
    - {2} U. S. PASSPORTS - CHECK EXPIRATION DATES ON THESE DOCUMENTS, IF EXPIRED THESE DOCUMENTS ARE NOT VALID.

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DISTR:

NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICER A. J. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN, 06 <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS INTERNAL ROUTING: 04 <i>W</i> BOOK <i>[Signature]</i> OBI <i>[Signature]</i> COMREQ OK IUS
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173 1-75 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGE FORM						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
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03	1181430							
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS								
TWX-28								
<p>C. ONE DOCUMENT CAN PROVE U.S. ALIEN RESIDENCY: ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS, FORM "I-151". THESE DOCUMENTS ARE MARKED "ALIEN REGISTRATION CARD" AND CONTAIN A PHOTO, NAME</p> <p style="text-align: right;">! FORM I-151 POSSESSED BY AN INDIVIDUAL MUST BE VERIFIED BY AN INS AGENT BEFORE CONSIDERED VALID.</p> <p>D. REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN CONDITIONALLY PAROLED TO THE UNITED STATES (NOT GUAM SPECIFICALLY) WILL BE STRONGLY DISCOURAGED INGRESS/EGRESS TO CAMPS (SEE REF B RE PERSUASION VICE FORCE).</p> <p>E. REFUGEES POSSESSING FOREIGN (NON-U.S.) PASSPORTS AND VISAS MAY BE ALLOWED EGRESS. INS VERIFICATION MUST BE OBTAINED.</p> <p>NON REFUGEE PERSONNEL ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS WILL BE ALLOWED INGRESS/EGRESS IF THEY FALL INTO THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:</p> <p>A. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND THEIR SPOUSES WHO POSSESS VALID U.S. MILITARY/DEPENDENT I.D. CARDS.</p> <p>B. EMPLOYEES OF ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY WHO POSSESS VALID I.D. AS REQUIRED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPT/AGENCY.</p> <p>C. AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS POSSESSING A BLUE PRESS CARD ISSUED BY COMNAV Marianas.</p>								
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D. GOV GUAM PERSONNEL ESCORTED BY MILITARY OFFICER, OR  
 POSSESSING WHITE COMMUNIST CARD SIGNED BY COL MCCAIN.

E. AMERICAN RED CROSS PERSONNEL POSSESSING VALID I.D., OR  
 BADGE AND UNIFORM. CAMP CDRS MAY VERIFY.

F. CLERGYMEN, AS APPROVED BY FORCE CHAPLAIN.

G. U.S. CIVILIANS FALLING INTO NONE OF THE ABOVE CATEGORIES  
 MAY BE PERMITTED ON A ONE TIME BASIS BY THE CAMP CDRS.

5. CAMP COMMANDERS ARE EXPECTED TO EXERCISE JUDGMENT WITHIN THE  
 FOREGOING GUIDELINES. BORDERLINE/QUESTIONABLE RULINGS ARE  
 TO BE REFERRED TO COL MCCAIN.

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DD FORM 173

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DL 03 331200 PP RR UUUU 010200Z MAY 75

TWX-30

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU, HI

UNCLAS 0105310//  
OPERATION NEWLIFE GUIDANCE MR 30

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE WIDELY DISSEMINATED AMONG U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WORKING IN REFUGEE CAMPS AND WITH REFUGEES.
2. U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO SEEK OR ACCEPT BRIBES OF MONEY OR ANYTHING ELSE OF VALUE FROM REFUGEES IN RETURN FOR ASSISTING THEM IN OBTAINING FAVORABLE TREATMENT IN IMMIGRATION OR OTHER SPECIAL FAVORS MAY BE PROSECUTED UNDER TITLE 18 U.S. CODE SEC 201 WITH A MAX PUNISHMENT OF FIFTEEN YEARS IMPRISONMENT AND FINE OF THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT OF BRIBE OR \$20,000.00 WHICHEVER IS GREATER. THEY ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION UNDER ARTICLE 134, UCMJ WITH A MAX PUNISHMENT OF DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE, CONFINEMENT AT HARD LABOR FOR THREE YEARS, AND TOTAL FORFEITURES OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES, REDUCTION TO E-1.
3. REFUGEES WHO OFFER OR PAY BRIBES MAY BE PROSECUTED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT, UNDER 18 U.S. CODE SEC 201.

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CDR J.C. BEADIS, CDR, JAGC, USN  
344-5522

COL. McCANN  
OK [Signature]

LTJG G. PATSON, CAPT, USN  
[Signature]

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TWX-31

*May*

FROM: CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NOFORN//

OPERATION LIFE - INS POLICIES - GUIDANCE NR 31

1. ATTN CAMP CDRS.
2. NUMEROUS REQUESTS ARE BEING RECEIVED OFFERING SPONSORSHIP FOR VIETNAMESE REFUGEES. ROUTE ALL FUTURE REQUESTS RECEIVED ON GUAM TO THE AMERICAN RED CROSS REPS AT CAMPS, COPY TO THIS HDQTRS.
3. CAMP CDRS ARE DIRECTED TO ADVISE REFUGEES THAT POTENTIAL SPONSORS IN U.S. MUST FILE APPLICATIONS FOR SPONSORSHIP WITH THE NEAREST U.S. REGIONAL IMMIGRATION OFFICE. THIS PROCEDURE IS ONLY ONE ACCEPTABLE TO INS. SPONSORSHIP DECISIONS WILL EVENTUALLY BE MADE DURING FINAL PROCESSING AT CENTERS IN CONUS. PROCESSING FOR PAROLE ON GUAM MAY BE POSSIBLE AWAITING FURTHER GUIDANCE. REFUGEES DESIRING PAROLEE STATUS ON GUAM RPT THEIR DESIRE TO CAMP CDR AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTS.
4. INS POLICY ON PAROLED STATUS.
  - A. INS PROCESSING ON GUAM IS ONLY AN INITIAL SCREENING WHICH GIVES THE REFUGEE AN I-94 FORM WITH SPECIFIC CONDITIONS THAT THE FINAL PROCESSING FOR A FULL PAROLE STATUS WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S.

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U. S. STONING, 06, 5206 U. S. EDLAKA, 04, 5203	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS BOOK <i>031</i> UNCLASSIFIED	<table border="1"> <tr><td>N3</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>SDO</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>ROUTER</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>SUPVR</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>MDC</td><td></td></tr> </table>	N3		SDO		ROUTER		SUPVR		MDC	
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NAME OF THE REFUGEE CENTERS.

B. UPON ARRIVAL CONUS REFUGEES WILL BE DIRECTED TO ONE OF THREE

CAMPS:

1. CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

2. FT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

3. EELIN AFB, FLORIDA

C. CURRENT RULING INDICATES COMPLETELY INADMISSABLE REFUGEES WILL REMAIN IN GUAM, AWAITING FURTHER GUIDANCE FM HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

D. DISPOSITION OF THIRD COUNTRY REQUEST. ANY REFUGEE--VIETNAMESE, U.S. CITIZEN OR THIRD COUNTRY BORN NATIONAL--DESIRING MOVEMENT TO AREAS OTHER THAN CONUS MUST SHOW EVIDENCE OF ACCEPTANCE INTO THE COUNTRY IN QUESTION. SUCH EVIDENCE MAY INCLUDE A PASSPORT, VISA, OR OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE (INS WILL VERIFY) ALONG WITH THE NECESSARY AIRLINE TICKETS. THIRD COUNTRY REFUGEES MUST REMAIN AT CAMP UNTIL IMMEDIATELY PRIOR DEPARTURE OF THEIR FLIGHT. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE A WAITING PERIOD IN GUAM OUTSIDE OF A CAMP. THIS CATEGORY WILL BE GIVEN PRIORITY FOR OUT PROCESSING PURPOSES. AMER RED CROSS WILL ASSIST CAMP CDRS.

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Refugee Affairs Off  
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RHHLGWC T COMSUBRON FIFTEEN  
RUHISAA T FAIRECONPON ONE  
P 250300Z MAY 75  
FM CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
BT

UNCLAS //NO4266//

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR 32

1. ALL REFUGEE CAMPS DESIRING BULK LAUNDRY AND/OR DRY CLEANING SERVICES FROM THE NAVY EXCHANGE LAUNDRY SHOULD CONTACT MR. LARRY IBAY AT 332-1223 TO PROVIDE BILLING INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTING DATA BEFORE ANY BULK LAUNDRY AND/OR DRY CLEANING SERVICES CAN BE ACCEPTED FOR PROCESSING.

2. ENCAMPMENT SITES MUST CITE BILLING INSTRUCTIONS OR APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTING DATA ON NAVSOP FORM 48. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE NAVY EXCHANGE BE GIVEN AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE ON LARGE LAUNDRY OR DRY CLEANING REQUIREMENTS.

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FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
XMIT 3RD AIR DIVISION

UNCLAS // ~~NEEDED~~ // OPERATION NEWLIFE GUIDANCE NR 33

RETENTION OF VIETNAMESE VOLUNTEER INTERPRETORS

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, MR. LOUIS T. SHOOK AS FORCE CIVIL PERSONNEL OFFICER, AND HIS DESIGNEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO DIRECT THE RETENTION IN ANY CAMP OF VIETNAMESE EVACUEES IDENTIFIED AS VOLUNTEER INTREPRETORS. ONCE IDENTIFIED, VOLUNTEERS WILL NOT BE MOVED TO ANY OTHER LOCATION OR PROCESSED FURTHER WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE FORCE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE OR THE COMNAVMARIANAS OPERATION NEWLIFE CONTROL CENTER. AUTHORITY IS ALSO GRANTED TO NEGOTIATE THE RELOCATION OF VOLUNTEERS, AS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE OPERATIONS.
2. THE COMNAVMARIANAS OPERATION NEWLIFE CONTROL CENTER MAY, OF COURSE, AUTHORIZED THE RELOCATION OR PROCESSING OF SUCH DESIGNATED INDIVIDUALS BUT WILL COORDINATE WITH THE FORCE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICER TO ASSURE RETENTION OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF INTERPRETERS SOMEWHERE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.

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DEPARTMENT NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE CDR BEAMON, RMD, <i>R. B. Beamon</i>	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS BOOK
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FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NO3120//

OPERATION NEULIFE GUIDANCE NR 35

DESIGNATION AND DISPOSITION OF SPECIAL CATEGORY "NEULIFE" GROUP

1. REFUGEES DESIRING TO BE PROCESSED FOR PAROLE ON GUAM HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED A "SPECIAL GROUP." AS A RESULT THEY DO NOT HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE INITIAL INS SCREENING PRESENTLY UNDERWAY FOR TRANSIT TO THE CONTINENTAL U.S.

2. ALL CAMP COMMANDERS SHOULD MAKE THIS FACT KNOWN TO THE REFUGEES IN THEIR CAMPS IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE (BULLETIN BOARDS, PA ANNOUNCEMENTS, NEWSPAPER, ETC) AND OBTAIN THE NAMES OF ALL THESE INDIVIDUALS.

UPON ASCERTAINING THE NAMES, CAMP COMMANDERS SHOULD REQUEST BUSY TRANSPORTATION FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS TO THE J&G CONSTRUCTION CAMP. THE J&G CAMP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED THE PROCESSING POINT FOR THIS SPECIAL GROUP, AND CAMP COMMANDERS SHOULD TRANSFER REFUGEES AS SOON AS THEY MAKE THEIR DESIRES KNOWN.

4. PLEASE NOTE THAT DUE TO THE ROTATION OF PEOPLE IN THE VARIOUS CAMPS THIS WILL BE A CONTINUING ACTION ON THE PART OF THE CAMP CDRS.

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*JWT-37*

FROM: CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

UNCLAS //NO0000//

TAD/TDY PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION AND PERMANENT ON-ISLAND PERSONNEL  
 IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEW LIFE

- A. CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 140943Z MAY 75
- 1. REF ID IS REISSUED AS OPERATION NEULIFE GUIDANCE (NR 37)

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NAME: *[Signature]*  
 LCDR M. J. BYLIE

OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO: ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 USS HECTOR  
 USS BRONSTEIN  
 USS FLINT

UNCLAS //NOFORN//  
 OPERATION NEULIFE GUIDANCE (NR 33)  
 DIRECT PERSONNEL SUPPORT TO OPERATION NEULIFE

1. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TIMELY RESPONSE TO HIGHER AUTHORITY REGARDING DIRECT PERSONNEL SUPPORT TO OPERATION NEULIFE, FOLLOWING DATA IS REQUIRED ON A WEEKLY BASIS COMMENCING 23 APR 75 (FIRST REPT PERIOD 23 APR - 29 APR 75):

A. COMMAND STRENGTH BY OFFICER/ENLISTED/U.S. GOVT CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

B. ESTIMATED MAN/WEEKS EXPENDED IN SUPPORT OPERATION NEULIFE (OFFICER/ENLISTED/U.S. GOVT CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES)

C. TOTAL MAN/WEEKS AVAIL (OFFICER/ENLISTED/U.S. GOVT CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES).

2. INITIAL REPORT REFLECTING PREVIOUS WEEKS IS REQUIRED ASAP AND NLT 162200Z MAY. WEEKLY FOLLOW-ON REPORTS REQUIRED NLT 1200L WEDNESDAY OF EACH WEEK.

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ZNR UUUUU

PHHLGWC T CONSUBRON FIFTEEN

RUHISAA T FAIRECCANOM ONE

P 170222Z MAY 75

FM CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

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UNCLAS //AN75400//

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR 33

A. CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 293455Z APR 75

B. CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 270515Z APR 75

C. MCM 1969 (REV.), PARA 152

D. CINCPACREP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 260425Z APR 75

1. REF A, OPERATION NEWLIFE GUIDANCE NR 22, REQUIRED IMMEDIATE REFERRAL OF SERIOUS OFFENSES INVOLVING EVACUEES TO NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS) OR IN THE CASE OF ANDERSEN AFB TO OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS (OSI) FOR INVESTIGATION, REF B, OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR 12 DESIGNATED NAVAL LEGAL SERVICE OFFICE GUAM (NAVLEGSVCOFF) AS FOCAL POINT FOR LEGAL SERVICES;
2. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR COMMANDERS WITH RESPECT TO SEARCHES IN REFUGEE ENCAMPMENTS,
3. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW MAKES IT QUESTIONABLE WHETHER A COMMANDING OFFICER CAN AUTHORIZE THE SEARCH OF INDIVIDUAL EVACUEES OR OTHER CIVILIANS EVEN THOUGH THESE EVACUEES ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED

PAGE 02 RUHPSGG2471 UNCLAS  
ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

4. IT IS THEREFORE ADVISABLE TO OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT FROM FEDERAL OR GUAM JUDGES BASED UPON A AFFIDAVIT IN CASES IN WHICH PROSECUTION IN A FEDERAL OR TERRITORIAL COURT IS CONTEMPLATED, IF THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE IS A MINE ONE AND PROSECUTION IN A COURT OF LAW IS NOT CONTEMPLATED A SEARCH WARRANT NEED NOT BE OBTAINED;

5. REF (D), OPERATION NEWLIFE GUIDANCE NR17, DESIGNATES THE COGNIZANT COMMANDERS OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS ON GUAM, THESE DESIGNATED COMMANDERS ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE PRIMARY SEARCH AND SEIZURE AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C); IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THOSE COMMANDING OFFICERS CURRENTLY EXERCISING PRIMARY SEARCH AND SEIZURE AUTHORITY OVER AREAS UPON WHICH REFUGEE CAMPS ARE CURRENTLY LOCATED (BOTH U.S. GOVERNMENT AND CONTRACT PROPERTIES) SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DELEGATE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AUTHORITY -- IN WRITING -- TO THE APPROPRIATE REFUGEE CAMP COMMANDER, PARAGRAPH 7 REF (D)

6. CAMP COMMANDERS AND COMMANDING OFFICERS WILL STILL RETAIN THEIR POWER TO AUTHORIZE SEARCHES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND GOVERNMENT PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (D) AND AUTHORIZE ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS OF AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL FOR PURPOSES OF MAINTAINING

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 CLEANLINESS, SAFETY, HEALTH, AND HIGH STANDARDS OF SANITATION;  
 7. IF CAMP COMMANDERS DESIRE TO SEARCH THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF  
 INDIVIDUAL EVACUEES OR OTHER CIVILIANS THEY SHOULD CONTACT NIS  
 (PHONE: 330-7252) OR OSI (PHONE: 363-2988), IN CASES ON ANDERSEN  
 AFB, FOR INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE.  
 8. NIS/OSI WILL COORDINATE WITH NAVLEGSVCOFF OR 43CS SJA AND THE  
 U.S. ATTORNEY TO DETERMINE IF A WARRANT IS REQUIRED AND IF NECESSARY  
 SUBMIT THE AFFIDAVIT TO THE FEDERAL OR LOCAL JUDGE FOR A SEARCH  
 WARRANT ALLOWING NIS/OSI/OSI OR GUAM POLICE TO CONDUCT THE SEARCH.  
 10. REF (C) ENUMERATES THOSE SEARCHES WHICH ARE LAWFUL, THE ABOVE  
 GUIDANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO LIMIT ANY AUTHORIZATION CITED IN REF  
 (C); WHEN IN COURT, CONTACT NAVLEGSVCOFF;  
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 RUHISAA T FAIRECONRON ONE  
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 P 190201Z MAY 75

FM CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

BT

UNCLAS //NOFORN

OPERATION NEALIFE GUIDANCE (NR 41)

1. THE FOLLOWING CONSTITUTES SPECIFIC GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY OF PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR,

2. AUTHORIZED ENTRY/EXIT TO REFUGEE CAMP AREA,

A. ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR, COMNAVMAIRAS, WHO ARE AUTHORIZED TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF REFUGEE PERSONNEL, HAVE BEEN ISSUED SPECIALLY DESIGNED IDENTIFICATION TAGS, THESE TAGS ARE 1"X3" PLASTIC PIN-ON BADGES, EACH BADGE IS ENGRAVED WITH WHITE LETTERING AS FOLLOWS:

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR

COMNAVMAIR

(NAME OF BEARER)

B. ALL OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR PERSONNEL BEARING THE ABOVE DESCRIBED BADGE ARE TO BE PERMITTED ENTRY AND EXIT TO ALL REFUGEE CAMP

PAGE 02 RUHGS665417 UNCLAS

AREAS,

C. IN THE EVENT MISREPRESENTATION IS SUSPECTED, OR IF THE PERSON BEARING THE OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR BLUE BADGE APPEARS TO BE EXERCISING BAD JUDGMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS DUTIES, REPORT THE INCIDENT TO THE CAMP COMMANDER, GIVING NAME, DATE, TIME AND PLACE. THE CAMP COMMANDER WILL REPORT THE INCIDENT THROUGH THE CAMP COORDINATOR WHO WILL COORDINATE APPROPRIATE ACTION THROUGH CINCPAC REP GUAM AND THE CIVIL COORDINATOR.

3. AUTHORIZED MOVEMENT OF REFUGEE PERSONNEL TO AND FROM ANY CAMP AREA,

A. THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO PERMIT THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEE PERSONNEL TO OR FROM ANY CAMP AREA, SUCH MOVEMENT MAY BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION, THIRD COUNTRY APPLICANT PROCESSING, TRANSFERRING SPECIAL RISK REFUGEE PERSONNEL, TRANSPORT OF A THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL, OR ANY OTHER PURPOSE DEEMED APPROPRIATE BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR PERSONNEL.

4. THE OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR REFUGEE TRANSFER FORM, WHEN

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 COPIED AND SIGNED BY THE AUTHORIZING OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR  
 OFFICER, IS THE ONLY AUTHORIZED DOCUMENT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEE

PAGE 03 RUMSGG5417 UNCLAS  
 PERSONNEL TO OR FROM A CAMP AREA; (NOTE: THE ONLY EXCEPTION WILL BE  
 A MOVEMENT OF REFUGEE PERSONNEL FROM ONE CAMP TO ANOTHER THAT HAS  
 BEEN ARRANGED BETWEEN THE TRANSFERRING CAMP COMMANDER AND RECEIVING  
 CAMP COMMANDER AND APPROVED BY EACH COMMANDER PRIOR TO THE MOVE.)  
 C, BELOW LISTED OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR PERSONNEL ARE THE  
 ONLY CIVILIAN OFFICERS AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL  
 COORDINATOR REFUGEE TRANSFER FORM, PERMITTING REFUGEE PERSONNEL  
 MOVEMENT:

- 1, MR. NORMAN L. SWEET - SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATOR
- 2, MR. WILLIAM E. PAUPE - DEPUTY CIVIL COORDINATOR FOR  
 REFUGEE WELFARE AND VOLAG COORDINATOR
- 3, MR. ROBERT BROUGHAM
- 4, MR. CHARLES BROWNE
- 5, MR. JACK FAIRCLOTH
- 6, MR. JAMES F. HANKS
- 7, MR. ROBERT GILSON
- 8, MR. ROBERT METCALF
- 9, MR. TIBOR NAGY
- 10, MR. ELOY SANDOVALL
- 11, MR. ROBERT TRAISTER

PAGE 04 RUMSGG5417 UNCLAS

- 12, MR. WILLIAM BACH
  - 13, MR. ANDREW SACHIANNO
- D, CAMP COMMANDERS, CAMP DUTY PERSONNEL AND Sentries SHALL PER-  
 MIT MOVEMENT OF REFUGEE PERSONNEL BY OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR  
 PERSONNEL BEARING THE IDENTIFICATION BADGES DESCRIBED IN PARA 2A  
 ABOVE UPON PRESENTATION OF A COMPLETED OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR  
 REFUGEE TRANSFER FORM LISTING THE REFUGEES TO BE TRANSFERRED AND  
 SIGNED BY ONE OF THE OFFICIALS NAMED IN PARA 3C ABOVE. A COPY OF THE  
 REFUGEE TRANSFER FORM WILL BE GIVEN TO THE SENTRY AT THE TRANSFERRING  
 CAMP FOR THE FILES OF THE CAMP COMMANDER; THE ORIGINAL REFUGEE  
 TRANSFER FORM WILL BE GIVEN TO THE CAMP COMMANDER OF THE RECEIVING  
 CAMP.  
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RHHLGWC T USS PROTEUS

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FM CINCPACREP GUAM TTPI MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

BT

UNCLAS //A780272//

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCE NR 42

MUNITIONS AND WEAPONS RECOVERY INCIDENT TO OPERATION NEW LIFE

A, DODINST 4140.35A

B, NAVMATINST 8322.1A

C, OP-5

1, NAVAL MAGAZINE, GUAM, HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS THE CENTRAL REPOSITORY ON GUAM FOR ALL ORDNANCE ITEMS INCLUDING MUNITIONS AND WEAPONS RECOVERED DURING OPERATION NEW LIFE. THE ORDNANCE ITEMS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN ARE DEFINED BELOW:

A, SENSITIVE ITEMS WHICH ARE DEFINED IN REF A AS INDIVIDUAL OPERATED WEAPONS AND THEIR AMMUNITION WHICH ARE PORTABLE AND/OR CAN BE FIRED WITHOUT SPECIAL MOUNTS OR FIRING DEVICES WHICH HAVE POTENTIAL USE IN CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND ARE VULNERABLE TO THEFT, INCLUDED ARE END ITEMS OF CONVENTIONAL AND GUIDED MISSILE AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES WHICH HAVE INDIVIDUAL ITEM, UNIT OF ISSUE, CONTAINER OR PACKAGE WEIGHT OF 62 POUNDS OR LESS WITH POTENTIAL USE IN CIVIL

PAGE 02 RUHGSGG9564 UNCLAS

DISTURBANCES AND ARE VULNERABLE TO THEFT; ALSO INCLUDED ARE SUCH ITEMS AS BLASTING CAPS, DEMOLITION CHARGES, IGNITERS, FUZES, ORDNANCE TIMING DEVICES, MACE AND FLARES;

B, WEAPONS, SMALL ARMS WHICH ARE DEFINED IN REF B AS:

- (1) AUTOMATIC RIFLES
- (2) CARBINES
- (3) FLAME THROWERS (PORTABLE)
- (4) LAUNCHERS, GRENADE
- (5) LAUNCHERS, ROCKET (PORTABLE)
- (6) LINE THROWING GUNS
- (7) MACHINE GUNS/CANNONS (ALL TYPES INCLUDING AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUNS)
- (8) MORTARS
- (9) PISTOLS (ALL TYPES INCLUDING SIGNALLING)
- (10) RECOILLESS WEAPONS
- (11) REVOLVERS
- 1 RIFLES
- (12) SHOTGUNS

TWX-42-1


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(14) SUBMACHINE GUNS  
 C. AMMUNITION WHICH IS DEFINED IN REF C AS A CONTRIVANCE CHARGED

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 WITH EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS, PYROTECHNICS, INITIATING COMPOSITION OR  
 CHEMICAL MATERIALS FOR USE IN CONNECTIONS WITH DEFENSE OR OFFENSE  
 INCLUDING DEMOLITIONS, TRAINING, CEREMONIAL, OR NONOPERATIONAL  
 PURPOSES, THIS INCLUDES ALL TYPES OF PROJECTILES, CARTRIDGES,  
 GRENADES, BOMBS, MINES, TORPEDOES, TORPEDO WARHEADS, PROPELLANT  
 POWDER CHARGES, PYROTECHNICS, ROCKETS, MISSILES, SPECIAL WEAPONS,  
 CHEMICAL, SMOKE OR INCENDIARY AMMUNITION, OR OTHER "MADE UP"  
 EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.  
 D. ANY ITEMS NOT OTHERWISE IDENTIFIED OR WHICH ARE SUSPECTED OF  
 FALLING WITHIN ANY OF THE ABOVE CATEGORIES.  
 2. THE DISCOVERY OF ANY OF THE ORDNANCE ITEMS DEFINED IN PARA 1  
 ABOVE INCIDENT TO OPERATION NEW LIFE WILL BE IMMEDIATELY REPORTED TO  
 NAVMAG, GUAM 339-2227 OR 339-6217. NAVMAG/EOD PERS WILL RESPOND FOR  
 COLLECTION AND CONTROL DEPENDING UPON THE NATURE OF THE ITEMS. IT  
 IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMAND DISCOVERING THE ORDNANCE  
 ITEMS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR THEM UNTIL THEY ARE TURNED OVER TO  
 NAVMAG/EOD PERSONNEL.  
 3. COMMANDS CURRENTLY IN POSSESSION OF ANY ORDNANCE ITEM(S) DEFINED  
 IN PARA 1 ABOVE WILL COORDINATE WITH NAVMAG GUAM TO ARRANGE PHYSICAL  
 TRANSFER OF THE ITEM(S) TO THE NAVAL MAGAZINE USING APPROPRIATE

PAGE 24 RUMGSGG9564 UNCLAS  
 TRANSFER DOCUMENTATION. ALL ORDNANCE ITEMS TURNED INTO NAVMAG,  
 GUAM UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DIRECTIVE WILL BE RETAINED AT THE  
 NAVAL MAGAZINE PENDING POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION, ACCOUNTING, CONTROL  
 AND FINAL DISPOSITION.  
 4. SPECIAL SITUATIONS WILL BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE BASIS BY  
 CINCPACREP GUAM/TTP1.  
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 ZNR 00000  
 RHHLWAC T CONSIDEROM FIFTEEN  
 RHHLWAC T USG PROTEGE  
 RUMJBA T FAIRECONPON ONE  
 RUMJPA T RMOB FOUR  
 F 22237Z MAY 75

FM CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

BT

UNCLAS //A5512//

OPERATION NEWLIFE GUIDANCE (NO 43)

A. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 267438Z APR 75  
 B. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 247930Z APR 75  
 C. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 250645Z APR 75  
 D. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 192271Z MAY 75  
 E. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 300325Z APR 75

1. REF A, OF NEWLIFE GUIDANCE NR 28 RE INGRESS - EGRESS TO ALL REFUGEE CAMPS IS CANCELLED. INGRESS - EGRESS WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE TMR WHICH SETS FORTH GENERAL POLICY AND GUIDANCE. THE CAMP CDRS ARE DIRECTED TO PROMULGATE DIRECTIVES AND GUARD ORDERS TO SUPPLEMENT THIS GUIDANCE, TAILORING APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES AND ORDERS TO INDIVIDUAL CAMPS. REFS B AND C REFER.  
 2. UNLIMITED INGRESS/EGRESS TO REFUGEE ENCAMPMENTS MAY BE ALLOWED TO TWO CATEGORIES OF REFUGEES, SUBJ TO CAMP CDR REGULATIONS.  
 (A) U. S. CITIZENS: TO CAMPS IN WHICH THEY RESIDE;  
 (B) U. S. RESIDENT ALIENS: TO CAMPS IN WHICH THEY RESIDE.

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3. DOCUMENTATION,

- (A) TWO DOCUMENTS CAN PROVE U. S. CITIZENSHIP  
 (1) U. S. MILITARY I.D. CARD  
 (2) U. S. PASSPORTS -- CHECK EXPIRATION DATES ON THESE DOCUMENTS, IF EXPIRED THESE DOCUMENTS ARE NOT VALID.  
 (B) ONE DOCUMENT CAN PROVE U. S. ALIEN RESIDENCY: ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS, FORM "I-151". THESE DOCUMENTS ARE MARKED "ALIEN REGISTRATION CARD" AND CONTAIN A PHOTO AND NAME.  
 4. OTHER CATEGORIES OF REFUGEES MAY BE ALLOWED LIMITED INGRESS - EGRESS.  
 (A) REFUGEES POSSESSING FOREIGN (I.E., NON-U.S.), INCLUDING VIETNAM) PASSPORTS, IF THEY ALSO POSSESS U.S. VISA, MAY BE ALLOWED EGRESS.  
 (B) REFUGEES POSSESSING FOREIGN PASSPORT AND A FOREIGN VISA MAY BE ALLOWED EGRESS ONLY IF THEY POSSESS COMMERCIAL CARRIER TICKET TO APPROPRIATE FOREIGN COUNTRY. THIS CATEGORY MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN AUTHORIZED ESCORT.  
 (C) REFUGEES PAROLED TO GUAM MAY BE ALLOWED EGRESS, AFTER -

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- (1) RECEIVING INS CLEARANCE  
 (2) SATISFYING GOVQUAM PUBLIC HEALTH REQUIREMENTS; AND

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- (3) RECEIVING GOVQUAM CLEARANCE  
 (D) REFUGEES POSSESSING CONDITIONAL PAROLE TO THE 50 U.S. STATES HAVE NOT BEEN PERMITTED INGRESS/EGRESS BY INS. THIS CATEGORY WILL BE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO REMAIN IN CAMPS. (SEE REF C RE PERSUASION VICE FORCE).  
 (E) INGRESS/EGRESS FOR MOVEMENT BETWEEN CAMPS WILL BE COORDINATED BY CAMP COORDINATOR, CAMP CDR, CIVIL COORDINATOR AND CINCPAC-REF COMMAND CENTER ON AN AS OCCURRING BASIS. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE GIVEN REF D. CAMP COORDINATOR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ESTABLISHING AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM WHEREBY DEPARTURE CAMP/DESTINATION CAMP/EVACUEE LOCATION DESK ARE ADVISED OF ALL SUCH MOVEMENTS. REF E REFERS.  
 (F) REFUGEES IN THE CUSTODY OF HIS PERSONNEL DISPLAYING PROPER CREDENTIALS SHOULD BE ALLOWED INGRESS/EGRESS INTO AND FROM REFUGEE CAMPS. HIS IS SUBJECT TO CAMP LOCATOR RULES.  
 5. NON REFUGEE PERSONNEL ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS WILL BE ALLOWED INGRESS/EGRESS IF THEY FALL INTO THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:  
 A. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY WHO POSSESS VALID U.S. MILITARY I.D. CARDS.  
 B. EMPLOYEES OF ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY WHO POSSESS VALID I.D. AS REQUIRED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPT/AGENCY.

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- SPECIFIC GUIDANCE RE CIVIL COORDINATOR PERSONNEL IS CONTAINED REF  
 C. AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS POSSESSING A BLUE PRESS CARD ISSUED BY COMNAVMIARIANAS.  
 D. ANY PERSON ESCORTED BY A MILITARY OFFICER; IF MILITARY OFFICER VOUCHES THAT SUCH PERSON IS NOT A REFUGEE AND IS ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS.  
 E. ANY PERSON POSSESSING WHITE COMNAVMIARIANAS ENTRY CARD.  
 F. CLERGYMEN AND AGENTS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, IN GENERAL SHOULD POSSESS A WHITE COMNAVMIARIANAS ENTRY CARD. OTHERS MAY BE ALLOWED INGRESS/EGRESS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES AS DETERMINED BY CAMP COMMANDERS. COORDINATOR WILL BE THROUGH FORCE CHAPLAIN. CHAPT WARDAGE.  
 G. VOLUNTEER AGENCIES, ALL VOLUNTEER AGENCIES DESIRING TO WORK IN REFUGEE CAMPS MUST REGISTER WITH THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR. THAT OFFICE WILL PROVIDE CAMP COORDINATOR WITH CONSOLIDATED LIST OF REGISTERED VOLUNTEER AGENCIES. REGISTERED AGENCIES MUST SUBMIT REQUEST FOR INGRESS/EGRESS TO CAMP CDRS FOR COORDINATION. AGENCIES ARE RESPONSIBLE TO CAMP CDR FOR VERIFICATION OF VOLUNTEER PERSONNEL.

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- H. U.S. CITIZENS FALLING INTO NONE OF THE ABOVE CATEGORIES MAY BE PERMITTED INGRESS - EGRESS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CAMP CDR.
5. VEHICULAR TRAFFIC MAY BE REGULATED BY THE CAMP COORDINATOR AS PROVIDED IN PARA 1 ABOVE; SIX CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES WILL BE ALLOWED INGRESS - EGRESS SUBJ TO THOSE REGULATIONS WHICH MAY RESTRICT VEHICLES TO CERTAIN AREAS OF CAMP:
- A. OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT VEHICLES;
  - B. VEHICLES WITH BLACK DECAL STATING "PERSONAL GUEST OF COMNAV-MARIANAS";
  - C. VEHICLES WITH COMNAV-MARIANAS "PRESS" VEHICLE PASS;
  - D. CONSULAR VEHICLES;
  - E. VEHICLES WITH CIVIL COORDINATOR VEHICLE PASS;
  - F. VEHICLES WITH CAMP COORDINATOR VEHICLE PASS;
7. CAMP CDRS ARE EXPECTED TO EXERCISE JUDGMENT WITHIN THE FOREGOING GUIDELINES. BORDERLINE QUESTIONS MAY BE REFERRED TO THE CAMP COORDINATOR.
- BT  
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7/1/54

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ZNR 00000

RHHLGWC T COMSUBCOM FIFTEEN

RHHLGWC T USS PROTEUS

RHHISAA T FAIRHCOACOM ONE

RUHJPBA T NMCC FOUR

P 261159Z MAY 75

FM CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

BT

UNCLAS //NOFORN//

OPERATION NEW LIFE GUIDANCES (NR 44)

DISPOSITION OF EVACUEES WHO COMMIT CRIMES OR CREATE  
DISTURBANCES IN CAMPS

A. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 292455Z APR 75

B. CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 131007Z MAY 75

1. IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM WHEREBY EVACUEES INVOLVED IN  
CRIMINAL OFFENSES OR DISTURBANCES MAY BE EFFECTIVELY PROCESSED BY  
ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL MEANS, A HOLDING/COUNSELING AREA IS BEING  
ESTABLISHED AT NAVAL STATION OROTE POINT TEMPORARILY TO SEGREGATE  
PERSONNEL IN THESE CATEGORIES UNTIL AN APPROPRIATE DISPOSITION CAN  
BE DETERMINED. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS FACILITY WILL BE  
OPERATIONAL BY 29 MAY 75. THIS MSG PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR THE  
TRANSFER OF EVACUEES TO THIS HOLDING/COUNSELING AREA.

2. REFERENCES A AND B DISCUSSED PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING  
OFFENSES IN WHICH EVACUEES BECOME INVOLVED WHILE ON BOARD MILITARY  
INSTALLATIONS, NAMELY THAT SERIOUS OFFENSES BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY

PAGE 02 RHHNSGG6641 UNCLAS

TO NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS) OR OFFICE OF SPECIAL  
INVESTIGATIONS (OSI) AS APPROPRIATE. INASMUCH AS GOV GUAM HAS  
INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION AT EVACUEE CAMPS NOT PHYSICALLY LOCATED  
ON MILITARY RESERVATIONS OR PROPERTY, ALL OFFENSES INVOLVING  
EVACUEES AT OFF-INSTALLATION CAMPS SHOULD NOW BE REFERRED TO GOV UAM  
POLICE FOR INVESTIGATION AND FURTHER DISPOSITION.

3. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF CAMP CDRS TO DEAL WITH  
PROBLEMS INVOLVING LESS SERIOUS OFFENSES COMMITTED BY OR AGAINST  
EVACUEES THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION WILL  
BE IN EFFECT COMMENCING 29 MAY 75:

A. SECURITY INVESTIGATORS FROM COMNAV MARIANAS WILL BE AVAILABLE  
TO CAMP CDRS AT OROTE POINT AND ASAN ANNEX TO CONDUCT INITIAL  
INVESTIGATIONS FOR EVACUEE-RELATED OFFENSES. OFFENSES DETERMINED  
BY SECURITY INVESTIGATORS TO BE IN THE FELONY CATEGORY WILL BE  
REFERRED TO NIS. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS OF MINOR INFRACTIONS OR  
MISDEMEANORS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE CAMP CDR CONCERNED FOR  
EVALUATION AND DISPOSITION. HE WILL FORWARD A COPY TO NIS AND  
CINCPAC REP GUAM REFUGEE CAMP COORDINATOR, COL MCCAIN.

END

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DESIGNATED MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY UNIT TO IMMIGRATION SERVICE FOR OUT-  
 OF PROCESSING; UPON COMPLETION OF THAT PROCESSING, THE CAMP COMMANDER

PAGE 03 RCHGSGG4867 UNCLAS  
 WILL REQUEST THE COMMAND CENTER TO TRANSFER THE FAMILY UNIT TO THE  
 ENPLANING AREA (TIN CITY/AAFB); IN THE EVENT THAT A MEMBER OF  
 MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY UNIT ARE NOT CLEARED BY I.N.S., THE NAVAL  
 REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, GUAM WILL BE ADVISED BY THE CAMP COMMANDER  
 AND THEN INFORM THE RECEIVING MEDICAL FACILITY.

C, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, TIN CITY,  
 ANDERSEN AFB, GUAM MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO EXPEDITIOUSLY PROCESS THE  
 FAMILY UNIT REFERRED UNDER THE OUTLINED CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THERE  
 SHOULD OCCUR ANY UNUSUAL DELAY IN TRANSPORTING THE REMAINING MEMBERS  
 OF THE FAMILY UNIT TO THE APPROPRIATE CONUS RECEPTION CENTER, IT IS  
 REQUESTED THAT THIS BE REPORTED TO THE NAVAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER  
 WHICH WILL SO INFORM THE CONUS HOSPITAL.

4. THE ABOVE PROCESSING PROCEDURE IS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH PROCES-  
 SING OF LEGITIMATE INTACT FAMILY UNITS AT THE CONUS RECEPTION CENTERS  
 AND TO REDUCE THE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS OF CONTACTING AND REUNITING  
 FAMILY MEMBERS THAT HAVE BEEN INADVERTENTLY SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF  
 HOSPITALIZATION.

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ZNR 00000  
RHHLGWC T CONSUBCOM FIFTEEN  
RHHLGWC T USS PROTEUS  
RUHISAA T FAIRCONCOM ONE  
RUHJPBA T NMCF FOUR  
P 261155Z MAY 75  
FM CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
BT  
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THIS IS A CORRECTED COPY  
CORRECTED PORTION UNDERLINED  
AS PER SVC RUHGSGG541  
UNCLAS /P 261100Z MAY 75  
//42//

OPERATION NEX LIFE GUIDANCES (NR 45)  
DISPOSITION OF EVACUEES WHO COMMIT CRIMES OR CREATE  
DISTURBANCES IN CAMPS  
A, CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 290455Z APR 75  
R, CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS 131207Z MAY 75  
1, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM WHEREBY EVACUEES INVOLVED IN  
CRIMINAL OFFENSES OR DISTURBANCES MAY BE EFFECTIVELY PROCESSED BY  
ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL MEANS, A HOLDING/COUNSELING AREA IS BEING  
ESTABLISHED AT NAVAL STATION GROTE POINT TEMPORARILY TO SEGREGATE  
PERSONNEL IN THESE CATEGORIES UNTIL AN APPROPRIATE DISPOSITION CAN  
BE DETERMINED. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS FACILITY WILL BE  
OPERATIONAL BY 29 MAY 75. THIS MSG PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR THE  
TRANSFER OF EVACUEES TO THIS HOLDING/COUNSELING AREA,  
2, REFERENCES A AND R DISCUSSED PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING  
OFFENSES IN WHICH EVACUEES BECOME INVOLVED WHILE ON BOARD MILITARY  
INSTALLATIONS, NAMELY THAT SERIOUS OFFENSES BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY

PAGE 02 RUHGSGG541 UNCLAS  
TO NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS) OR OFFICE OF SPECIAL  
INVESTIGATIONS (OSI) AS APPROPRIATE. INASMUCH AS GOVGUAM HAS  
INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION AT EVACUEE CAMPS NOT PHYSICALLY LOCATED  
ON MILITARY RESERVATIONS OR PROPERTY, ALL OFFENSES INVOLVING  
EVACUEES AT OFF-INSTALLATION CAMPS SHOULD NOW BE REFERRED TO GOV UAM  
POLICE FOR INVESTIGATION AND FURTHER DISPOSITION;  
1, IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF CAMP CDRS TO DEAL WITH  
PROBLEMS INVOLVING LESS SERIOUS OFFENSES COMMITTED BY OR AGAINST  
EVACUEES THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION WILL  
BE IN EFFECT COMMENCING 29 MAY 75:  
A, SECURITY INVESTIGATORS FROM COMNAVAMARIANAS WILL BE AVAILABLE  
TO CAMP CDRS AT GROTE POINT AND ASAN ANNEX TO CONDUCT INITIAL  
INVESTIGATIONS FOR EVACUEE-RELATED OFFENSES. OFFENSES DETERMINED  
BY SECURITY INVESTIGATORS TO BE IN THE FELONY CATEGORY WILL BE  
REFERRED TO NIS. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS OF MINOR INFRACTIONS OR  
MISDEMEANORS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE CAMP CDR CONCERNED FOR  
EVALUATION AND DISPOSITION. HE WILL FORWARD A COPY TO NIS AND  
CINCPAC REP GUAM REFUGEE CAMP COORDINATOR, COL MCCAIN.

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3, CAMP CDRS AT NAS, ACS, BARRIGADA, NAVSTA AND AAFB SHOULD CONTINUE TO REFER SERIOUS OFFENSES (FELONIES) TO NIS OR OSI AS

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APPROPRIATE LAW REF A.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT COPIES OF ALL REPORTS BE PROVIDED TO THE APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY AND THE CINCPAC REP GUAM REFUGEE CAMP COORDINATOR.

C, ALL OFFENSES OCCURRING AT OFF-BASE CAMPS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO GUAM POLICE AS INDICATED IN PARA 2 ABOVE. CAMP CDRS WILL REPORT SUCH INCIDENTS ASAP TO NIS AND CINCPAC REP GUAM REFUGEE CAMP COORDINATOR, INDICATING DESCRIPTION OF THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE; IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS INVOLVED AND DISPOSITION; INDICATE ACTIONS TAKEN BY GOV. GUAM.

4, CAMP CDRS MAY AUTHORIZE THE TRANSFER OF CANDIDATES IN THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES TO OROTE POINT FOR ADMISSION INTO THE HOLDING/COUNSELING FACILITY. CONCURRENCE OF THE OROTE POINT CDR IS REQUIRED.

A, EVACUEES AWAITING TRIAL FOR SUSPECTED OFFENSES WHO HAVE BEEN RELEASED BACK TO MILITARY CUSTODY BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES.

B, EVACUEES SUSPECTED OF OFFENSES FOR WHICH CIVIL AUTHORITIES WILL NOT ACCEPT JURISDICTION.

C, EVACUEES SUSPECTED OF OFFENSES FOR WHICH INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES ARE UNDERWAY.

D, EVACUEES PAROLED TO THE COMPOUND BY LOCAL CIVIL COURTS.

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E, EVACUEES WHICH CAMP CDRS, FOR GOOD CAUSE, CONSIDER A THREAT TO GOOD ORDER, DISCIPLINE OR SECURITY OF THEIR CAMP OR A THREAT TO PERSONS, PROPERTY OR SELF.

5, ALL PERSONNEL TRANSFERS WILL BE COORDINATED BETWEEN THE TRANSFERRING AND RECEIVING CAMPS AND THE CINCPAC REP GUAM COMMAND POST BEFORE MOVES ARE COMMENCED. TRANSFERS OF EVACUEES TO OROTE POINT FOR THESE ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY THE TRANSFERRING CAMP CDR AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED WITH A COPY OF THE PERTINENT INCIDENT REPORT OR A MEMORANDUM FROM THE CAMP CDR EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE EVACUEE IS BEING TRANSFERRED.

6, EVACUEES BEING REFERRED TO OROTE POINT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS MAY BE ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR FAMILIES SHOULD THEY AND THEIR FAMILIES DESIRE. THE FACT THAT SUCH TRANSFER ACTION HAS SEPARATED AN EVACUEE FROM HIS OR HER FAMILY MUST ALSO BE NOTED IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN REUNITING FAMILIES IN THIS CATEGORY ONCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL PROCESSING IS TERMINATED.

7, LENGTH OF DETENTION IN THE HOLDING/COUNSELING AREA AND FURTHER DISPOSITION WILL BE DETERMINED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. OROTE POINT CAMP CDR WILL REQUEST PERMISSION OF CINCPAC REP GUAM (VIA

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 RHHLGAC T USS PROTEUS  
 RUMISAA T FAIRECONRON ONE  
 RUMJPPA T NMCG FOUR  
 P 280429Z MAY 75

FM CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 TO ALMILACTS GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS  
 RT

UNCLAS //NOFORN

OPERATION NEALIEF GUIDANCE (NE 45)

MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF LEGITIMATE FAMILY UNITS INCIDENT TO  
 HOSPITALIZATION

1. SECSTATE WASHINGTON DT 122258Z MAY 75

1. REF (A) EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO  
 BE MADE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON BETWEEN MEMBERS OF A FAMILY UNIT  
 WHEN ONE MEMBER IS HOSPITALIZED.

2. IN THOSE CASES WHEN A MEMBER MUST BE TRANSFERRED TO A CONUS MEDI-  
 CAL TREATMENT FACILITY, THE NAVAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER (NRMC) WILL  
 INITIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS PROCESSING AND ONWARD  
 TRANSPORTATION OF THE LEGITIMATE FAMILY UNIT TO THE CONUS RECEPTION  
 CENTER NEAREST THE RECEIVING MEDICAL FACILITY. CONCURRENT TRAVEL OF  
 MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY UNIT ON THE MED-EVAC FLIGHT WILL BE ARRANGED BY  
 NRMC WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND SO INFORM THE FAMILY, THE CAMP COMMANDER  
 AND THE COMNAVAMRIANAS COMMAND CENTER, IN THOSE CASES WHEN THE  
 FAMILY UNIT CANNOT ACTUALLY ACCOMPANY THE HOSPITALIZED MEMBER, ACTION

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WILL BE TAKEN AS DIRECTED IN PARA 3 OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS HEREBY DIRECTED:

A. NAVAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, GUAM, ADVISE THE APPRO-  
 PRIATE MILITARY CAMP COMMANDER BY LETTER OF THE MEDICAL EVACUATION OF  
 PATIENTS ASSIGNED TO THAT CAMP, NAMING THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGITIMATE  
 FAMILY UNIT. THE CAMP COMMANDERS SHALL BE ADVISED IN THE EVENT THAT  
 MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY UNIT WILL NOT ACCOMPANY THE PATIENT ON THE  
 MED-EVAC FLIGHT. NRMC WILL ALSO PROVIDE A LETTER TO THE SENIOR MEM-  
 BER OF THE FAMILY UNIT DIRECTING THAT THEY REPORT TO THE MILITARY  
 COMMANDER FOR I, N, S, PROCESSING AND ONWARD TRANSPORTATION TO TRAVEL  
 AT, OR ABOUT THE SAME TIME, AS THE HOSPITALIZED MEMBER. NRMC WILL  
 CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION THROUGH THE CAMP COMMANDERS WHO  
 WILL ASCERTAIN FROM THE COMMA  
 D CENTER THE TIMES OF DEPARTURE,  
 ARRIVAL AND DESTINATION OF THE AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED; NRMC WILL THEN  
 INFORM BY MESSAGE, THE CONUS HOSPITAL RECEIVING THE PATIENT;

B. THE MILITARY CAMP COMMANDER SHALL, UPON BEING NOTIFIED BY THE  
 NAVAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, LOCATE AND EXPEDITIOUSLY ASSIST ALL

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TWX-45

COMMAND CENTER DUTY OFFICER) TO RETAIN REFUGES FOR A PERIOD  
OF 24-HOURS, A DAILY REPORT OF ALL PERSONS HELD, THE  
REASON HELD, DAY ADMITTED AND TOTAL HRS HELD AS OF 1200 WILL BE  
SUBMITTED TO THIS HQTRS AND THE CAMP COORDINATOR NLT 1200 DAILY,  
MON THRU FRI,  
3. CAMP OPS CONCERNED SHALL RETAIN WITNESSES TO OFFENSES COMMITTED  
IN THEIR CAMPS UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED TO RELEASE SUCH WITNESSES BY  
OSI, NIS, OR THIS HQTRS AS APPROPRIATE,  
BT  
#5641

NNNN

NTCC AREA HEADQUARTERS  
SUPERVISOR  
IP/RE 46 44

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APPENDIX C

MESSAGE 120350Z MAY 1975, FROM COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC REPRESENTATIVE, GUAM, TO SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

120350Z MAY 75

FROM: CINCPAC REP GUAM MARIANAS ISLANDS

TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE FOR IATF

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR, GUAM AND WAKE ISLAND

A. STATE 101525

1. IN FULFILLING MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATOR (CC) FOR GUAM AND WAKE ISLAND, I HAVE ESTABLISHED FULL LIAISON WITH THE MILITARY INSTALLATION COMMANDER AND HAVE INTERFACED COMPLETELY ALL CC ACTIVITIES WITH THE OPERATIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMAND ON BOTH GUAM AND WAKE ISLAND. IN ADDITION, I HAVE ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATION, WITH THE PERSONNEL LISTED IN PARA 2 AS ON-BOARD STRENGTH AS OF 1800 HOURS MAY 9:

I. OFFICE OF THE SENIOR COORDINATOR - FSR-1 NORMAN L. SWEET

- A. CHIEF OF STAFF: VACANT WAS LTCOL HARRY T. JOHNSON
- B. ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL - MISS ANNIE SNELLING
- C. SECRETARIAT: MRS. AUDREY GOODENOUGH

II. SENIOR DEPUTY FOR POLITICAL/CONSULAR AFFAIRS - FSO-2 RICHARD PETERS.

W. E. PAUPE, DSCC [TYPEWRITTEN SIGNATURE; END OF PAGE 1]

- A. ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL - MISS MARY KECK
- B. CONSULAR AFFAIRS

III. DEPUTY FOR REFUGEE WELFARE AND VOLUNTARY AGENCY COORDINATION -  
FSR-2 WILLIAM E. PAUPE.

- A. SECRETARY: MISS ELSIE GOODRIDGE
- B. USIS: ROBERT GARRITY
- C. INS: ED O'CONNOR
- D. AID: NORMAN L. SWEET
- E. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE/DHEW - DR. DELMAR RUTHIG
- F. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, USPHS - DR. MIKE MERSON
- G. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE: AMBASSADOR CECIL LYON
- H. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS - MR. JERRY CORON
- I. CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES - MR. FRANK PAVIS
- J. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN [sic] MIGRATION -  
MR. S. K. CHRISTENSEN
- K. (LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT ONLY)
  - 1. UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
  - 2. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS
  - 3. CANADIAN IMMGRATION [sic] SERVICE

[PAGE 3]

- 4. AUSTRALIAN IMMGRATION [sic] SERVICE
- 5. OTHER MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS, OTHER GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS, ETC.

2. ON-BOARD PERSONNEL AS OF 1800 HOURS, MAY 9:

A. AID.

- 1. NORMAN L. SWEET
- 2. WILLIAM E. PAUPE
- 3. PETER BARRETT
- 4. CHARLES BRADY
- 5. IGNATIUS C. BRADY (WAKE ISLAND)
- 6. ROBERT BROUGHAM
- 7. CHARLES BROWNE
- 8. MELVIN R. CHATMAN
- 9. JACK FAIRCLOTH
- 10. AUDREY GOODENOUGH
- 11. ELSIE GOODRIDGE
- 12. JAMES F. HANKS
- 13. JOSEPH JACOBS
- 14. ROBERT LANIGAN

[PAGE 4]

- 15. WALTER R. MARTINDALE

16. ROBERT METCALF
17. TIBOR NAGY
18. WILLIAM NIESE
19. HUGH O'NEIL
20. THOMAS R. O'DELL
21. LEROY PURIFOY
22. JOSEPH SALVO
23. ELOY SANDOVAL
24. WILLIE C. SAULTERS
25. LTC JEAN SAUVAGEOT
26. ANNIE SNELLING
27. EDWIN TOLLE (WAKE ISLAND)
28. JACK WILLIAMSON
29. ARCHIBALD WITHERS
30. WILLIAM BACH

TOTAL: 30

B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

1. RICHARD PETERS

[PAGE 5]

2. ALFORD COOLEY
3. ROBERT TSUKAYAMA
4. HAROLD HEILSNIS
5. JAMES WHITTEN
6. ANDREW SACHIATANNO
7. MARY KECK
8. CHARLES CURRIER
9. CHARLES LAHIGUERRA
10. BRUCE BEARDSLEY (WAKE ISLAND)

TOTAL: 10

C. US PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1. DELMAR RUTHIG, MD | 6. DON STENHOUSE     |
| 2. MIKE MERSON, MD   | 7. MARCUS HORWITZ    |
| 3. FORINE LOSO       | 8. PAUL ARNOW        |
| 4. LAWRENCE SOBERA   | 9. DONALD A. ELIASON |
| 5. JOHN HEDRICK      | 10. WYNN HEMMERT, MD |

TOTAL: 10

## D. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

1. AMBASSADOR CECIL LYON
2. JAMES CARROLL MORRIS

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TOTAL: 2

## E. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS.

1. JERRY CORON
2. JOHN FONG
3. SANTOS DE LA PENA
4. DANIEL PREWITT
5. RALPH NORRIS
6. BILL WOHLFORTH
7. MAYNARD HAMILTON

TOTAL: 7

## F. CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES.

1. FRANK PAVIS
2. STEPHEN LEE
3. FATHER MCVEIGH

TOTAL: 3

## G. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

1. MR. S. K. CHRISTENSEN
2. MISS I. WIKLUND
3. DR. M. KARaulNIK
4. MISS M. VISCHER

TOTAL: 4

## H. UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

1. MR. GEORGE GORDON LENNOX
2. MR. NGUYEN TANG CANH

TOTAL: 2

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## I. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS

1. DOMINIQUE GROSS

TOTAL: 1

## J. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

- |                         |                           |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. ED O'CONNOR          | 42. THOMAS H. SUMPTER     |
| 2. THOMAS E. BRANAGAN   | 43. JOHN TIERMEY          |
| 3. RICHARD CARLETON     | 44. JACQUELYN VON SCHAPPE |
| 4. RAYMOND N. CARPENTER | 45. WILLIAM WATSON        |
| 5. GEORGE P. CARTER     | 46. SIVERA BLAND          |
| 6. ELNORA I. CHESTANG   | 47. UNA CAREW             |
| 7. JUAN CINTRON-DIAZ    | 48. CONNIE COSTLEY        |
| 8. GENE R. DAVENPORT    | 49. VIGINIA DELIZ         |
| 9. STANLEY DEDINAS      | 50. JEAN DONOGHUE         |
| 10. MICHAEL G. DEVINE   | 51. LINDA DOTSON          |
| 11. GARY J. EDELSON     | 52. SUSAN DUGAS           |
| 12. JOHN W. ELDRED      | 53. BARBARA ELLIS         |
| 13. CONSTANCE K. FITCH  | 54. JUDY FARBER           |
| 14. HARVEY FLAXMAN      | 55. JAMES GLYNN           |
| 15. AVELINO V. GEAGA    | 56. JACQUELINE HOGAN      |

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- |                           |                        |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| 16. DONALD GRAY           | 57. JUDY JASAN         |
| 17. ALFREDO P. GUERRERO   | 58. PATRICIA KRAKAUKAS |
| 18. THOMAS J. HAMMOND     | 59. FRANK KUBOTA       |
| 19. THOMAS KANTOS         | 60. NANCY KUTYNA       |
| 20. BERNARD S. KOWALSKI   | 61. OLGA LAWLER        |
| 21. GEORGE H. LUND        | 62. JUNE LILLIS        |
| 22. RUSSELL D. MANCHESTER | 63. GWYNNE MACPHERSON  |
| 23. VIRGIAN A. MILLER     | 64. ROSE MARIE MURRO   |
| 24. RICHARD MORRIS        | 65. MARCIA PHILLIPS    |
| 25. ANOTOLE MOSKOLENKO    | 66. TERRY QUIGLEY      |
| 26. KIM L. OGDEN          | 67. LOLITA RIOS        |
| 27. JACQUELINE D. OLIVIER | 68. JOSE RIVERA        |
| 28. LARRY L. OLSON        | 69. JUDITH ROBERGE     |
| 29. JEFFREY PITMAN        | 70. GLORIA RODRIGUEZ   |
| 30. BOBBY R. POND         | 71. IRMA SALDANA       |
| 31. DURWARD POWELL        | 72. ELLIOTT SEARLES    |
| 32. THOMAS PROKOPOWICZ    | 73. ROBERT SHULSKIE    |
| 33. TERENCE J. PHILLIPS   | 74. SHERIAN TERRELL    |
| 34. WENDELL RICHIE        | 75. KATHRYN TRAINOR    |

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- |                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 35. YVON A. ST. HILAIRE | 76. PAMELA TRICE      |
| 36. JAMES SELBE         | 77. CHARLOTTE VALENTA |
| 37. RONALD E. SANDERS   | 78. DEBBIE WALKER     |
| 38. MICHAEL L. SHAUL    | 79. VELMA WAYLAND     |
| 39. J. J. SHEEHI        | 80. CHERYL WESLEY     |

40. WAYNE SHINSHIRO  
41. PAUL E. STRACK

81. CARLENE WHITCOMB  
82. KIM WOLFER

TOTAL: 82

H. USIS.

1. JOHN HOGAN  
2. ROBERT MUELLER

TOTAL: 2

3. MISSION STATEMENTS OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR AND ITS OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS:

A. STATE/AID - ASSIST INS WITH PRE-SCREENING OF REFUGEES AND HELP RESOLVE AMBIGUOUS INS CASES. ASSIST CAMP COMMANDERS BY HELPING TO RESOLVE CAMP ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS. ASSIST MILITARY MEDICAL TEAMS BY IDENTIFYING SICK AND/OR INJURED REFUGEES AND BY ADVISING ON PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AND HEALTH EDUCATION MEASURES.

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CARRY OUT IN-CAMP SURVEYS RE INS CATEGORY GROUPING, ATTITUDINAL STUDIES, LOCATOR SYSTEM EVALUATIONS, ETC. IDENTIFY AND ASSIGN INTERPRETER/TRANSLATORS AND OTHER CADRE PERSONNEL FOR GUAM, WAKE AND CONUS REFUGEE CENTERS. COORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. PERFORM LIAISON WITH THE GUAM GOVERNMENT RE THE REFUGEE RELIEF EFFORT. IMPROVE MORALE OF THE REFUGEES. ASSIST IN-PROCESSING MOVEMENT TO THIRD COUNTRIES OF REFUGEE APPLICANTS. ASSIST IN THE MOVEMENT OF TCN EVACUEES TO THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND ENSURE THE PROPER PLACEMENT OF ORPHAN REFUGEES.

B. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE. RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MEDICAL EVALUATION INSPECTION OF REFUGEE POPULATIONS ON-BOARD SHIPS AND IN REFUGEE PROCESSING/HOLDING CENTERS. ASSISTS THE MILITARY MEDICAL COMMAND IN THE CARE AND TREATMENT OF REFUGEES AND MAKES RECOMMENDATION RE PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE MEASURES.

C. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE. LOCATE AND IDENTIFY CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL REFUGEES WHO HAVE RELATIVES OR SPONSORS IN THE UNITED STATES OR GROUPS OF REFUGEES WHO WERE EMPLOYED BY AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND, WHEN NECESSARY, PROVIDE HOUSING AND COST OF

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INLAND TRANSPORTATION FROM PORT OF ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES AND HELP

THESE REFUGEES TO FIND SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT. ASSIST THE ICEM REPRESENTATIVE IN COORDINATING PROCESSING OF REFUGEES GOING TO COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES.

D. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS. THE MISSION OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS IS TO ASSIST AND SUPPLEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY IN THE CARE AND WELFARE OF THE REFUGEES. AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE AMERICAN RED CROSS WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT NEEDED BY ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN OPERATION NEW LIFE. PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS WILL PROVIDE COMMUNICATION SERVICES, NURSING AND HEALTH SERVICES, SAFETY SERVICES, SUPPLEMENTAL FOOD AND CLOTHING, ETC., ENCOMPASSED IN A GENERAL PROGRAM TO MEET THE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES.

E. CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES. CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS) AND THE MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES (MRS) ARE DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE (USCC) WHICH IS THE OFFICIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE U.S. BISHOPS. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HAS DECIDED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SPONSORSHIP AND RESETTLEMENT OF A

[PAGE 12]

YET UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT CRS OVERSEAS PERSONNEL BE LOANED TO THE MRC FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTING UP A PROCESSING SYSTEM ON GUAM. WHEN IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DETERMINED THAT THE REFUGEES WOULD BE SENT TO THE MAINLAND AND PROCESSED THERE, ORDERS WERE RECEIVED TO STANDBY FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. TO DATE, THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING AND WHILE ON STANDBY STATUS THE CRS PERSONNEL ARE COOPERATING WITH ICEM AND IRC IN THE TASK OF IDENTIFYING AND PROCESSING THOSE REFUGEES DESTINED FOR COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES.

F. USIA. RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR AND THE MILITARY COMMAND FOR CIVIL AND RELATED MILITARY ASPECTS OF HANDLING AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES. THIS INCLUDES INTERNAL CAMP INFORMATION PROCESSES AND OTHER MORALE FACTORS, TASK FORCE INPUT TO PRESS BRIEFINGS AND GENERAL PRESS RELATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS. TASKED TO PROVIDE NARRATIVE REPORT AND ASSIST WITH PERIODIC REPORTS ABOUT THE GUAM REFUGEE OPERATIONS AND TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION IN THE PREPARATION OF THE CAMP NEWSPAPER.

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G. ICEM. RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING THE WORK OF THE ENTITIES TRYING TO IDENTIFY THE REFUGEES WISHING AND HAVING THE POSSIBILITIES TO

RESETTLE IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.S., LIAISON WITH INS, CONSULATES, SELECTION MISSIONS, ETC. OBTAINING VISA AUTHORIZATION FOR REFUGEES FROM COUNTRIES NOT REPRESENTED IN GUAM BY CONSULATES OR SELECTION MISSIONS. ASSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS. ASSISTING CONSULATES AND SELECTION MISSIONS TO THE EXTENT REQUESTED. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE PRESELECTION, DOCUMENTATION AND TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS. ARRANGING TRANSPORTATION OF REFUGEES NOT MOVED UNDER GOVERNMENT AUSPICES. IN COOPERATION WITH VOLUNTARY AGENCIES MAKING AVAILABLE TRAVEL LOANS FOR REFUGEES UNABLE TO MEET SUCH COSTS EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THEIR SPONSOR.

H. INS. THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE DURING THE VIETNAMESE EVACUATION PROCESS IS TO PERFORM THE IDENTIFICATION AND TO MAKE THE FINAL DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER EACH AND EVERY VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN EVACUEE UNDER THE GUIDELINES AND PRIORITIES IS ELIGIBLE TO CONTINUE TO THE UNITED STATES. AT GUAM INS WILL PARTIALLY EXECUTE FORM I-94 (PAROLE FORM) WHICH ALLOWS EACH INDIVIDUALS [sic] TO PROCEED TO FINAL PROCESSING IN

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EVACUATION CENTERS ON THE MAINLAND. BEFORE DEPARTURE INS CHECKS TO SEE THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL DEPARTING HAS HIS PROPERLY FILLED OUT I-94.

4. LOCAL HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION, AND U.S. DIRECT-HIRE AND VN LOCAL NATIONAL PERSONNEL, FINANCE, T&A, TRAVEL ORDER, IDY, ETC., SPECIFIC QUERIES AND PROBLEMS SUBJECT SEPTTEL.

5. SWEET SENDS.

## APPENDIX D: A CAMP OROTE NEWSPAPER, WITH TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH



Số 11

NGÀY 14 THÁNG 5 NAM 1975

**MỤC ĐÍCH**

CUNG CẤP TIN TỨC THƯỜNG XUYÊN VÀ CHÍNH XÁC  
GIÚP CÁC TRẠI VIÊN CẢM THẤY NGÀY BỚT DÀI VÀ  
ĐÊM BỚT LẠNH.

**TIẾT KIEM NƯỚC**

Nhu cầu nước ngọt sử dụng trên đảo đã gia tăng  
rê gôm theo số lượng người di cư ngày một thêm  
đông đảo, nhất là tại trại OROTE POINT và tại  
trại ASAN. Các nơi này đều dùng nước tại bồn  
nước FENA, cũng như hầu hết tại cư dân ở trung  
tâm GUAM.

Khi nào số lượng nước trong bồn còn đủ dùng thì  
các máy bơm mới có thể bơm nước tới các người  
sử dụng.

Nay Bộ Chỉ Huy Hải Quân Hoa Kỳ yêu cầu tất cả  
những người sử dụng nước của bồn FENA, bất luận  
là quân nhân, dân chúng hoặc người di cư, đều  
cần triệt để cố gắng tiết kiệm nước tới mức tối  
thiểu. Sự tiết kiệm này sẽ giúp chúng ta có đủ  
nước sử dụng ngày đêm mà không cần phải hạn chế  
theo giờ giấc, và đồng thời giúp cho các sơ cứu  
hỏa có đủ nước cần thiết khi dùng tới.

Yêu cầu các trại viên triệt để áp dụng các biện  
pháp sau đây để tiết kiệm nước :

1. Khóa ngay vòi nước sau khi dùng xong.
2. Nếu được, nên dùng xô hoặc thùng đựng nước  
để giặt giũ, tắm rửa con trẻ, và chứa nước  
tại lều. Xin đừng dùng hộp đựng thức ăn cũ  
hoặc thùng chứa rác để chứa nước, vì làm như  
vậy sẽ đem lại nhiều bệnh tật nguy hại.
3. Chỉ nên dùng số nước vừa đủ dùng. Nếu tất  
cả chúng ta đều biết sử dụng nước một cách  
vừa phải thì trại có thể cung cấp nước đủ  
dùng cho tất cả mọi người ngày cũng như đêm.

**SÂN CHƠI CHO TRẺ EM**

Để cho các em khỏi phải chơi đùa trên  
đường lộ rất là nguy hiểm, chúng tôi đã cho  
thiết lập những sân chơi an toàn dành cho các  
em. Các sân chơi đã được tổ chức tại các nơi  
sau đây :

- Giữa khu 11 và 20; 30 và 31; 4 và 5
- Sau khu 10 A; khu 25
- Khu 18
- Kế bên nhà ăn số 2.

**TRẠM Y TẾ NHI ĐỒNG**

Các trạm y tế nhi đồng chuyên cung cấp thực-  
phẩm cho trẻ em dưới 3 tuổi được đặt tại các  
nơi sau đây :

- Giữa khu 7 và 8
- Giữa khu 19, 20 và 21
- Giữa khu 30 và 31
- Khu 39
- Khu 27
- Khu 17
- Giữa khu 25 và 26
- Giữa khu 14 và 15
- Khu 24
- Sau khu 2
- Giữa khu 12 và 13
- Khu 13
- Giữa khu 32 và 33
- Khu 34
- Giữa khu 23 và 33

Khi đi lãnh sữa xin nhớ mang theo bình sữa để  
chúng tôi rửa và khử trùng hợp cách trước khi  
đổ sữa cho các em bú. Chúng tôi yêu cầu quý bà  
đừng pha thêm bất cứ một loại thực phẩm nào vào  
sữa do chúng tôi cung cấp, vì loại sữa này đã  
được pha chế đúng theo y khoa để giúp con em  
quý bà mau lớn và mạnh khỏe. Nếu có bạn nào có  
thiện chí muốn tình nguyện giúp việc tại các  
trại chăm sóc hải nhi xin đến trình diện tại  
Hội Hồng Thập Tự khu 17. Các bạn sẽ được giới  
tới các trạm cần sự tiếp tay của quý bạn.

**SỞ DI TRÚ GIA NÃ ĐẠI**

Các người đã lập thủ tục nhập cảnh Gia Nã Đại  
xin nhớ dùng dụng các xe buýt đậu trước khu 27,  
mà phải tới bãi đậu xe buýt cạnh Sở Di Trú Gia  
Nã Đại tại khu 19, tại đó có xe đưa tới điểm  
khởi hành đi Gia Nã Đại.

**QUẦY THÔNG TIN**

Trong khu 10 có đặt một Quầy Thông Tin của Sở  
Di Trú Ngoại Kiều thuộc Bộ Ngoại-Giao. Quầy-  
Thông-Tin này mở cửa từ 9 giờ sáng đến 9 giờ  
tối.

## TÔN GIÁO

Thánh lễ được tổ chức mỗi ngày hai buổi :

- 7 giờ sáng và 6 giờ chiều. Xin mời tất cả tín hữu tới tham gia đông đảo.
- Thánh lễ Tin Lành tổ chức hàng ngày vào 4 giờ chiều tại lều 27-A-28.
- Chùa thờ Phật tại lều 24-A-50 mở cửa suốt ngày để các tín đồ tới chiêm bái.

Giáo sỹ phụ-trách về văn-đề tôn-giáo tại trại thỉnh cầu các vị chức sắc các tôn giáo đến ghi danh tại lều giáo vụ trong khu 27 (cạnh nhà gõ số 6).

Giáo sỹ phụ-trách về giáo vụ của trại mong muốn được giúp đỡ quý tín hữu trong tất cả mọi nhu cầu về tôn giáo. Vậy nếu các tín hữu có điều gì khó khăn xin cứ đến lều của người, quý bạn sẽ được giúp đỡ.

## ĐIỆN THOẠI

Tại bên ngoài Hội Hồng Thập Tự có đặt một bộ máy điện thoại để sử dụng liên lạc trên nội địa đảo GUAM, và để gọi cho bạn bè, thân nhân và người đỡ đầu bên Hoa Kỳ bằng lối gọi mà người bên Hoa Kỳ trả tiền (collect call).

Các máy điện thoại này không gọi được tới các quốc gia khác, ngoài Hoa Kỳ.

## PHÒNG HỎA

Cần lưu ý các biện pháp sau đây để tránh hỏa-tai :

1. Không được sử dụng lửa bên trong hoặc gần lều vải.
2. Cần thận trọng tắt lá khi hút trong lều hoặc trên giường.
3. Vì đây là mùa nóng nên cần đặc biệt đề phòng hỏa hoạn.
4. Khi có hỏa hoạn :
  - Nếu gần nơi có điện thoại gọi báo ngay số 22222.
  - Nếu không có điện thoại thì phải báo ngay cho bất cứ quân nhân Hoa Kỳ nào gần nhất.

## AN NINH LƯU HÀNH

Trên các đường xá trong trại hàng ngày lưu-thông người bộ hành đã nhiều xe cộ cũng lắm. Vì vậy quý bạn cần đặc biệt chú-ý mỗi khi đi băng ngang đường. Chúng tôi ao ước sẽ không có tai nạn nào xảy ra trên đường lộ. Phụ huynh cần lưu ý con em phải nhìn trước, nhìn sau để biết chắc là không có xe trước khi đi băng ngang qua đường.

## TIN TỨC Y KHOA

Các phụ huynh nên đem ngay các con em từ 1 tới 5 tuổi tới phòng chích thuốc đặt tại khu 8, (đối diện xe chữa răng) để Bác Sĩ chích thuốc ngừa bệnh. Các em nào khi mới tới trại đã chích thuốc rồi thì khỏi chích lại.

Điều kiện của Hoa Kỳ bắt buộc các trẻ em loại tuổi này phải chích ngừa trước khi được chấp thuận cho du nhập Mỹ Quốc. Sau khi chích ngừa Bác Sĩ sẽ cấp cho một giấy chứng nhận để sử dụng khi lập thủ tục đi Hoa Kỳ.

Đây là thuốc ngừa để bảo vệ con em các bạn chống lại bệnh sốt liệt và ban đỏ. Xin các bậc phụ huynh để chúng tôi giúp đỡ quý vị trong vấn đề phòng ngừa này.

## VỆ SINH

Hiện nay trong các nhà lều đều có treo các bao Plastic dùng để bỏ rác và giấy bẩn. Yêu cầu quý bạn bỏ rác và giấy bẩn vào các bao đó để bảo vệ sinh chung. Xin đừng tháo lấy các bao để dùng vào việc riêng. Xin quý bạn tiếp tay với chúng tôi để bảo vệ sức khỏe của chính các bạn và của tất cả các trại viên khác.

## HỘI HỒNG THẬP TỰ

Chi nhánh Hội Hồng Thập Tự được đặt tại trại này là nhằm mục đích thỏa mãn các nhu-cầu của người Việt-Nam tạm trú trong trại. Vậy để giúp họ có đủ yếu tố cứu xét, mỗi khi tới chi nhánh Hội Hồng Thập Tự xin quý bạn nhớ mang theo cả thẻ cá nhân màu vàng (EIC).

## CÂU LẠC BỘ

Nhân viên Câu Lạc Bộ muốn mượn nơi đây để bày tỏ lòng cảm tạ quý bạn đã bỏ công nhật giúp rác rưởi trong nhà ăn và bỏ vào các thùng rác đặt quanh đó. Việc làm này đã khiến họ rất cảm mến, và họ mong mỗi quý vị tiếp tục giúp đỡ họ như vậy để bảo toàn sức khỏe chung của quý bạn. Đồng thời họ cũng yêu cầu quý bạn đừng đem treo hoặc dán các niêm yết tìm thân nhân quanh hàng rào nhà ăn, vì hàng ngày nhân viên nhà ăn đã phải bỏ thêm nhiều thời giờ để đi lượm các tấm bìa hoặc giấy này rời bừa bãi xuống mặt đất.

## HÃY TRÔNG CHỪNG TRẺ EM

Nhiều trường hợp trẻ lạc đã xảy ra tại trại. Sự kiện này đã tạo nên nhiều lo âu sợ-hãi cho cả các trẻ em lẫn người lớn. Vậy để tránh những nỗi lo buồn kể trên xin các bậc phụ-huynh lưu-ý giữ con em đừng để chúng một mình lang thang nơi đất lạ.

ISSUE 11

14 MAY 1975

### WATER CONSERVATION

Fresh water consumption on the Island of Guam has increased greatly in proportion to the large refugee population, especially at Orote Point and Asan Annex. These areas receive fresh water from the Fena Reservoir, as does most of the Central portion of Guam. While there is sufficient fresh water in the reservoir, current use of fresh water is taxing the distribution facilities and pumps which deliver the water to its users. The Navy is presently asking everyone who uses fresh water from Fena Reservoir--military, civilian and refugees--to conserve fresh water as much as possible. Conservation of fresh water will enable us to provide water service around the clock without going on water hours, and also maintain adequate levels of water for our fire departments.

### SANITATION

Plastic Bags have been placed in the latrines for your use. Please use these bags to place your trash in. This will help us to protect your health. Do not remove these bags for your own personal use. Help us to protect your health and the health of all camp members.

### CANADIAN IMMIGRATION

People who are processed for immigration to Canada should not catch the bus in front of Section 27. They will catch a bus near the Canadian Immigration office in Section 19. This bus is only for those who have been processed for departure to Canada.

### RED CROSS

The Red Cross is here to serve the needs of the Vietnamese people. When you go to the Red Cross for assistance, please bring your Evacuee Information Card. They need information from this card in order to help you.

### (WATER CONSERVATION CONTINUED)

The people in the camp should follow a few simple rules to help us conserve our water.

1. Turn off water faucets when not in use.
2. When possible use containers to hold water for washing clothes, children or for carrying water to the tents to use. Do not use food cans from the Mess Halls or trash cans as this could cause illness.

3. Use only the amount of water you need.  
If we all use water wisely then we will be able to provide water to all people at all hours.

#### MESS HALLS

The Mess Hall personnel wish to thank you for the job you have done thus far with picking up the trash. Please continue to pick up all trash you see and place it in a trash can. This is for the protection of your health. They also ask that you please refrain from posting signs on fences and tents. These signs fall off and add to the trash problem.

#### TELEPHONES

Telephones are located outside the Red Cross building. These phones are to be used only for local calls on Guam and for collect calls to Families, Sponsors or friends in the United States. Calls to countries other than the United States will not be made on these telephones.

#### BABY CLINICS

Baby clinics to feed your children who are under 3 years old are now located from the following Sections:

- Between Section 7 and 8
- Between Section 19, 20 and 21
- Between Section 30 and 31
- In Section 39
- In Section 27
- In Section 17
- Between Section 25 and 26

#### IMMIGRATION PROCESSING

THE FIRST CATEGORY TO PROCESS THROUGH IMMIGRATION ARE THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAVE SPONSORS.

Sponsorship is proven by:

1. A letter with envelope from a sponsor in the United States or Guam.
2. A telegram promising support.
3. Proof that an individual has sufficient funds or has a trade that will provide a livelihood.

#### WATCH YOUR CHILDREN

Many children in the camp are becoming lost from their relatives. This causes much worry on the part of the child and the relatives. Please keep watching your children and protect them from the anxiety of being alone in a strange place.

## RELIGIOUS

MASS will be held daily at 7 AM and 6 PM in Section 6. All personnel are invited to attend.

Protestant Services are held daily at 4 PM in tent 27-A-28.

A Buddhist Temple has been opened for your use in Tent 24-A-50.

The camp chaplain requests that all clergy and religious leaders please register at the chaplain's tent located in Section 17 next to Building 6.

The camp chaplain wishes to help you with all your religious needs. If you have a spiritual problem, please come to his tent to receive help.

## FIRE PREVENTION

To insure there are no injuries due to fires there should be:

1. No fires in or around the tents
2. Caution in putting out cigarettes while smoking in tents or on cots.
3. Care is needed to insure no fires because of the dry conditions.
4. If a fire should occur, if a phone can be reached dial 22222.  
If a phone can't be reached, report the fire to the nearest U.S. military personnel.

## MEDICAL NEWS

Parents! If your child has not been given shots by the camp doctors, please bring them to the shot tent located in Section 8 across from the dental trailer. All children between the ages of 1 to 5 must have these shots before they are allowed to go to the United States. The medical person who gives your child the shots will also give you a paper saying your child has had his shot. Keep this with you for processing. These shots will protect your child from polio and measles. We want your child to be healthy and happy. Please let us help in this way.

## INFORMATION BOOTH

In Section 10, there is a State Department, Immigration Information booth. They are open from 9 AM to 9 PM.

## TRAFFIC SAFETY

There are many people and much traffic on the roads in the camp. Please be careful when crossing the roads. We wish to have no injuries due to traffic accidents. Tell your children to be sure there are no cars or trucks on the road before crossing.

## PLAYGROUNDS

So that your children will not have to play on the streets, which is dangerous, the camp has set up playgrounds for them where they will be safe from the traffic. These playgrounds are located in the following areas:

Between Section 11 and 20

Behind 10A

Between Section 30 and 31

In Section 18

Near Mess Hall #2

Behind Section 25

Between Section 4 and 5

Between Section 14 and 15

In Section 24

Behind Section 2

Between Section 12 and 13

In Section 13

Between Section 32 and 33

In Section 34

Between Section 23 and 33

Please bring your baby bottles with you so that we can clean them and fill them for your babies. We ask that you please do not add anything to the formula that the medic will give your baby. This formula is prepared to keep your children healthy and happy. If you wish to volunteer to work in the baby centers, please report to the Red Cross building in Section 17. They will send you to the baby clinic which needs your help.

APPENDIX E

KEY ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF  
OPERATION NEW LIFE ON GUAM

[Source: 45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report:  
Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), incl. iii]

45th Support Group

Commander	COL John D. O'Donohue
Chief of Staff	MAJ Norman K. Kobayashi
Command Sergeant Major	CSM Earl M. Smythe
S1	SFC John Benevente
S3	CPT Kirk S. Fitzgerald
S4	MAJ William A. Henry

Camp Coordinator's Office

Commander	LTC George Gonsalves, Jr.
Executive Officer	MAJ Earl M. Yamada
S1	CPT Rovert Woodworth
S2 (Civil Liaison Element)	CPT Charles A. Bateman
S3	CPT Kirk S. Fitzgerald
S4	MAJ William A. Henry
S5	MAJ John Biese

1st Medical Group

Commander	COL Charles C. Eaves
Executive Officer	LTC Will J. Cummings
Cdr, 423d Clearing Company	LTC Lowman Gober
Cdr, 702d Clearing Company	LTC George Powell
Preventive Medicine	LTC Alfred M. Allen

1-5th Infantry

Commander	LTC Michael L. Ferguson
Executive Officer	MAJ Richard Meriaux

1-27th Infantry

Commander	LTC John D. Drew
S3	MAJ John M. Herold

APPENDIX F

DAILY POPULATION OF CAMP OROTE, THURSDAY, 1 MAY 1975  
THROUGH TUESDAY, 24 JUNE 1975

[Source: 45th Support Group, Guam, "After Action Report:  
Operation New Life" (28 July 1975), incl. 12, tab A]

<u>May 1975</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>June 1975</u>	<u>Population</u>
1 . . . . .	17,048		
2 . . . . .	18,285		
3 . . . . .	16,698		
4 . . . . .	16,554	1 . . . . .	34,016
5 . . . . .	19,323	2 . . . . .	32,069
6 . . . . .	20,047	3 . . . . .	31,903
7 . . . . .	29,895	4 . . . . .	30,599
8 . . . . .	29,890	5 . . . . .	27,818
9 . . . . .	27,583	6 . . . . .	24,867
10 . . . . .	28,416	7 . . . . .	22,405
11 . . . . .	23,366	8 . . . . .	20,760
12 . . . . .	27,213	9 . . . . .	19,647
13 . . . . .	39,203	10 . . . . .	19,469
14 . . . . .	38,608	11 . . . . .	19,622
15 . . . . .	39,331	12 . . . . .	18,905
16 . . . . .	38,558	13 . . . . .	19,048
17 . . . . .	38,271	14 . . . . .	18,525
18 . . . . .	38,241	15 . . . . .	17,761
19 . . . . .	38,358	16 . . . . .	17,464
20 . . . . .	38,229	17 . . . . .	17,456
21 . . . . .	37,895	18 . . . . .	12,586
22 . . . . .	37,141	19 . . . . .	11,362
23 . . . . .	36,090	20 . . . . .	9,888
24 . . . . .	37,592	21 . . . . .	8,533
25 . . . . .	37,631	22 . . . . .	7,073
26 . . . . .	37,495	23 . . . . .	4,140
27 . . . . .	37,668	24 . . . . .	0
28 . . . . .	37,183		
29 . . . . .	36,982		
30 . . . . .	35,820		
31 . . . . .	34,988		

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