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RALLYING POTENTIAL AMONG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

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FOREWORD

This report is one of a series of Rand studies that examine the organization, operations, motivation, and morale of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces that fought in South Vietnam.

Between August 1964 and December 1968 The Rand Corporation conducted approximately 2400 interviews with Vietnamese who were familiar with the activities of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army. Reports of those interviews, totaling some 62,000 pages, were reviewed and released to the public in June 1972. They can be obtained from the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce.

The release of the interviews has made possible the declassification and release of some of the classified Rand reports derived from them. To remain consistent with the policy followed in reviewing the interviews, information that could lead to the identification of individual interviewees was deleted, along with a few specific references to sources that remain classified. In most cases, it was necessary to drop or to change only a word or two, and in some cases, a footnote. The meaning of a sentence or the intent of the author was not altered.

The reports contain information and interpretations relating to issues that are still being debated. It should be pointed out that there was substantive disagreement among the Rand researchers involved in Vietnam research at the time, and contrary points of view with totally different implications for U.S. operations can be found in the reports. This internal debate mirrored the debate that was then current throughout the nation.

A complete list of the Rand reports that have been released to the public is contained in the bibliography that follows.

(CRC, BJ: May 1975)

Bibliography of Related Rand Reports

For a description of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project and interviewing process, the reader should first consult W. Phillips Davison, *User's Guide to the Rand Interviews in Vietnam*, R-1024-ARPA, March 1972.

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RM-5486-1 Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join, J. C. Donnell, December 1967.

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RM-5522-1 Inducements and Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors, L. Goure, August 1968.

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PREFACE

From the beginning of the Vietnam conflict, the sometimes rising, sometimes falling number of defectors from Viet Cong forces and the much smaller number of defectors from the North Vietnamese Armed Forces (NVA) have been the center of interest, leading to such a major and unorthodox effort as the Chieu Hoi "Open Arms" program. That program has shown considerable success, but on the whole--at least so far--has not fulfilled the more optimistic expectations attached to it, perhaps not even so much with respect to the number of VC defectors produced, as with regard to the effect such defections have had on the course of events. More disappointing all along have been defector figures of NVA soldiers. Despite the obvious circumstantial reasons keeping that figure low (for example, NVA soldiers do not know "their way around" in South Vietnam, and have special reasons to fear retribution against their families), so far little data have been systematically collected on why NVA soldiers prove so defection-proof on the whole, despite considerable blandishments on our part.

In this Memorandum, we attempt to analyze this vexing matter, as well as to define just what the chances might be of increasing the number of NVA defectors and to what approaches they might be responsive. Although the study presents no easy prescriptions for turning NVA soldiers into defectors, it fills in our knowledge of that enemy soldier, helping to round out the picture we have of him from other Rand studies and reports.

This study of NVA defectors and POWs was begun at Rand's Saigon office in October 1969. The South Vietnam Government's Chieu Hoi Ministry, responsible for the Open Arms program, was briefed on its results in early December. Eleven experienced interviewers were available: six from the Systems Development Corporation (SDC) and five officers from the Vietnamese Armed Forces' Combat Development and Test Center. The expertise of the SDC interviewers was a most important factor in gathering good data. All but one had previously worked several years for Rand; all were knowledgeable of NVA and POW, having interviewed hundreds of them. Their performance greatly reduced the interview, logistical, and particularly the protocol problems that usually severely handicap research efforts in this theater. This study, although not part of, complements Rand's earlier Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study which produced some 2400 interviews with Viet Cong and NVA soldiers between 1967 and 1968.

SUMMARY

North Vietnamese Armed Forces (NVA) personnel seldom defect (rally) to the other side. Between 1963 and 1970, fewer than 2000 NVA (hoi Chanh) took advantage of the Allies' Chieu Hoi "Open Arms" offer. By contrast, about 150,000 Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) defected over the same period. Because the NVA is the more formidable enemy, any increase in its rate of defection is highly desirable; this work attempts to discover flaws in the NVA's armor of high morale that can be exploited to our advantage.

To determine the characteristics that distinguish the NVA defectors from their fellows, 100 NVA defectors were interviewed at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon, and 100 POW forming the control group were interviewed at the Bien Hoa prison camp, 15 miles outside the Capital.

The answers to questions by the POW and hoi chanh are grouped into three categories: areas in which statistical tests showed no difference between defector and POW responses; areas of attitudinal differences between the two groups; and summaries of answers to a series of questions asked only of the hoi chanh.

Between the hard-core NVA communist who will never desert and the individual who wants no part of communism is a group of people with varying intensities of allegiance to the "just cause." The allegiance of a few of these can be eroded by the hardships, the deaths, and the bombings. Using the POW summaries to represent the opinions of all NVA, their apparent vulnerabilities may be recast as shown:

1. Five percent think of rallying or deserting when they are ill, and two-thirds of them are seriously ill at some point in the service.
2. Seven percent had close relatives in the south, most of them probably because of the changed circumstances following the Geneva Agreement, including the land reform.
3. An undetermined percent (probably 3 to 5 percent) had family members killed or punished during the land reform.
4. Twenty-six percent report an increase in anxiety with increasing combat experience.

5. Twenty-nine percent report medical supplies as inadequate, 16 percent report medical attention as inadequate or poor.
6. Fourteen percent report feelings of discouragement, fear of death, or thoughts of deserting while sick or wounded.

Using the lowest percentage as a boundary, it would seem that at least 5 percent of NVA would rally if given the proper encouragement and opportunity, nearly ten times the number to date. The impact of 5 percent is greater than the number implies. First, 5 percent of a "monolithic" facade can be of destructive dimensions. Second, the data show that the NVA rallier is an older, more responsible person. He comes from the upper ranks and has greater responsibilities, functioning as squad leader and higher. Thus in terms of influence, duties and responsibilities, the NVA rallier tends to come from the leaders, not the rank and file.

Additional data include the results of several preliminary analyses and some suggestions for future study.

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I. RALLYING POTENTIAL AMONG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

In early November 1969, the Chieu Hoi Ministry, through the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, requested that the Combat Development and Test Center (CDTC), with support from ARPA, help them with a variety of problems relating to the Open Arms Program. The most urgent of these was the *NVA Problem*: Why don't NVA defect to the other side and what can be done to overcome this?

Because of its urgency and suitability for training CDTC staff in social science research methods, the NVA Problem was selected. Significantly, the Chieu Hoi Ministry wanted this information to help them develop their TET propaganda campaign, beginning in early February 1970. This added to the program's urgency. We constructed a questionnaire* containing those items indicated by earlier studies to be hoi chanh (defector) characteristics, plus other items gleaned from the experiences of professional interviewers, four members of the Rand VC Motivation and Morale interviewing team. Each of them had from two to five years experience interviewing hoi chanh defectors.

One hundred NVA hoi chanh were interviewed at the National Center in Saigon and a control group of 100 NVA POW were interviewed at the Bien Hoa prison camp. All subjects rallied or were captured during 1969, the majority after 1 May.

The subjects were grouped so that the age distribution of the hoi chanh approximated that for all NVA hoi chanh who rallied during 1969. The POW age distribution approximated that of all NVA POWs captured during 1969. The chi-square test** was used to determine whether or not each sample approximated the parent population. In the case of the hoi chanh, the approximation was quite successful. It was less

*The Appendix to this Memorandum contains the questionnaire.

**For a detailed description of the chi-square (χ^2) test, see P. G. Hoel, *Introduction to Mathematical Statistics*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1960, pp. 163-168.

so for the POW sample, which contains fewer members aged 18 to 20 than would be desirable. Even so, the difference between the sample and the parent population was not statistically significant.

The rank distributions (enlisted men, non-commissioned officers and officers) of the two samples also were compared with their parent populations. Again, the defectors' distribution fitted well, while the prisoner sample had a paucity of enlisted men. The difference was not statistically significant.

We were unable to obtain the age and rank distributions of all NVA personnel. This would have been the preferred method of matching. For present purposes we must assume that the POW interviewed are a random sample and reasonably representative of the parent NVA population. The VC and the NVA have relatively few support troops; hence almost all NVA, except headquarters personnel, participate in combat. Headquarters personnel (15 to 20 percent of the total) appear to be less likely to be captured, as reflected in the Bien Hoa sample, which contains only ten percent.

The NVA, constituting 60 percent of the estimated 300,000 communists in South Vietnam, rarely rally or defect. Between 1963 and November 1969 only 1730 NVA--less than 1 percent--did so. By contrast, during the same period, over 150,000 Viet Cong rallied. The consensus among knowledgeable people is that the major reason for the low rate is the NVA's excellent morale. Everyone who has spoken with the NVA--if only for a few minutes--vouches for the excellence of their morale, which is not accidental.

The NVA gives careful attention to troop indoctrination. During his three months of basic training, each individual is given a minimum of two weeks of political indoctrination. As a result, each knows exactly why he is fighting, and each comes south anticipating that he may "die gloriously" for the cause. There is continuous, ongoing indoctrination throughout each man's military career. Every NVA company has a political officer whose authority is second only to the company commander's. It is his responsibility to insure that morale is kept high; he gives special attention before each campaign to assuring that each man enters battle in the proper fighting spirit.

Added to these morale bolstering functions are the "three-man cells" and the "self-criticism" sessions. Contrary to what might be expected, most NVA soldiers speak enthusiastically about the three-man cell. Often heard is the phrase, "We are like brothers, even closer than brothers." When a cell mate shows lack of enthusiasm, lowered spirit, homesickness, fear of death or discouragement, his fellows within the cell make every effort to help him overcome this. If they are not successful they will seek help from the squad leader. If the squad leader cannot resolve the problem, he takes it to the political officer. In those rare cases when the problem does not yield to one of these, the individual is removed from the fighting group so he cannot infect the others.

The NVA also uses a series of check and control points through which the individual must pass in order to get to the other side. The penalty for getting caught is severe--often death. This control is bolstered by stories of what the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) will do to anyone who makes the mistake of yielding to their blandishments in the "Open Arms" campaign. According to the NVA cadres, he will be beaten, tortured, and eventually killed.

Another control is the threat of retaliation against a deserter's family. Many NVA report having personally seen families suffer: reduced food rations, ostracism, and loss of employment are frequently involved. In some cases a sign is hung in front of the house: "Home of a traitor." Because of the strong Vietnamese family ties, such retribution can be particularly effective. Unlike his southern counterpart, the NVA soldier cannot move his family to a secure area before rallying.

Some authorities believe that the primary reason that more than 99 percent of all NVA troops refrain from defecting is *belief in their cause*, so much so that the thought of defecting rarely occurs to the great majority. Support for this assumption is strongly indicated in Table 21, by the answers to the question by both POW and hoi chanh about why they thought their NVA comrades did not defect. Of the prisoners of war, 35 percent answered "belief in their cause." Another

23 percent answered "hatred of the Americans," while another 17 percent answered that their fellows did not defect because they "expected victory," and another 12 percent because they came from a "hard-core" family. If these percentages are combined, it would appear almost all POW interviewed expressed themselves in some phrase that can be interpreted as "believe in their cause." Interestingly enough, 83 percent of the NVA hoi chanh deserters answered the same question with statements that fall in the "just cause" category.

To summarize, because meticulous attention is given to the factors of indoctrination and subsequent tight control of troops (some of it by fear techniques), 99 percent of all NVA troops do not desert. Nor can patriotism be discounted, as witness the high percentage of just cause answers. It is thus foolish to believe that any campaign will cause them to rally in wholesale fashion. Nevertheless, some NVA do rally, and the remaining part of this Memorandum is concerned with identifying those characteristics that distinguish the NVA rallier from his comrades. These are weak points on which a propaganda campaign can be focused. Comparison with the motives for the higher percentage of Viet Cong desertions provides an area for future study.

II. AREAS OF NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOI CHANH AND POW

This section covers areas in which no substantive differences were apparent between the responses to the same questions by POW and hoi chanh. These are unprofitable areas for propaganda. It is difficult at best to get NVA to rally. We wish to invest propaganda effort only where some chance for success exists, however slight. It is unlikely at this time that any wholesale NVA defections can be induced by even the most expert and skillfully aimed propaganda; but the chance that the NVA's fighting spirit can be softened to even a slight degree appears to constitute a worthwhile objective.

SINGLE VERSUS MARRIED

Table 1 shows that there is no significant difference between the marital status of the two groups. Both have equal proportions of single and married men.

Table 1

MARITAL STATUS OF HOI CHANH (HC) VERSUS PRISONERS (POW)

Marital Status	HC	POW
Married	40	36
Single	<u>60</u>	<u>59</u>
	100	95 ^a

$\chi^2 = .02$ ns (not statistically significant)
df = 1
p $\approx$.90

^aTotals will vary from sample to sample because an occasional subject was not asked all the questions.

The chi-square test is not statistically significant (ns); and "p" must be smaller than 0.05 before we will reject the hypothesis of random variation. All chi-square computations for one degree of freedom are corrected for continuity.

Our conclusion is that marital status is an unprofitable area for propaganda.

PARENTS LIVING OR DEAD

This table illustrates the advantage of a control group. Our first sample of hoi chanh data made us certain this would be a good item for inclusion, as indicated by the large number having one or more parents dead. We reasoned that this would considerably reduce the individual subject's anxiety over having his family punished were he to defect. Table 2 shows little difference between hoi chanh and POW.

Table 2

PARENTS LIVING OR DEAD

Parents Living or Dead	HC	POW
Both alive	43	36
Both dead	24	20
Father dead	23	28
Mother dead	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
	99	92

$$\begin{aligned}X^2 &= 1.4. \text{ ns} \\df &= 3 \\p &\approx 0.75\end{aligned}$$

The interesting aspect of these data is the large discrepancy between 'father dead' and 'mother dead'. The high incidence of male parents 'dead' derives from one of three reasons: the father having been killed in the land reform, killed while fighting in the Viet Minh, or killed by the Viet Minh for fighting for the French.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

The data in Table 3 indicate that communist party members rally as frequently as non-party members.

Table 3

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Party Membership	HC	POW
Member	14	13
Probationary	11	6
Youth	48	48
None	27	28
	<u>100</u>	<u>95</u>

$$\begin{aligned} X^2 &= 1.40 \text{ ns} \\ df &= 3 \\ p &\approx .80 \end{aligned}$$

Because of their selection and training, we would expect party members to rally much less frequently than non-party members; but this is the third study in which we have found no differences in the rate. Because a party member's defection distresses the communists much more than that of a non-party member, this equal susceptibility is heartening.

A special study of why party members rally with such frequency is included in Sec. VI.

EDUCATION

Our original hypothesis was that ralliers would be better educated than non-ralliers; this is not supported by the data. There are no significant differences in education between hoi chanh and POW.

Table 4

EDUCATION COMPLETED

Grade	HC	POW
1-3	10	6
4-6	28	38
7-9	50	39
10-12	14	12
	<u>102</u>	<u>95</u>

$$\begin{aligned} X^2 &= 3.78 \\ df &= 3 \\ p &\approx .25 \end{aligned}$$

These data contrast sharply with several studies we have made of the Viet Cong. In every instance, the median educational level of the VC was less than 2 1/2 years.

There is no question but that NVA are better educated than their southern allies in the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). The NVA sample showed only one person illiterate, while 5 to 15 percent illiteracy rates are not uncommon among Viet Cong samples, despite the VC claim that illiteracy is being eliminated.

The difference in education between NVA and Viet Cong may have implications affecting the preparation of propaganda. The better educated NVA undoubtedly have a higher reading ability, which could be reflected in the propaganda leaflets. Good readers can tolerate a good bit more verbal sophistication than people of limited education.

RELATIVES IN THE SOUTH

Three times as many ralliers as POW had relatives in the south. A detailed discussion of this appears in Sec. IV.

Table 5

YEAR THE FAMILY MOVED SOUTH

Year of Move	HC	POW
Before 1954	9	6
1954-1956	47	12
	<u>56</u>	<u>18</u>

$$\begin{aligned}X^2 &= 1.56 \text{ ns} \\df &= 1 \\p &\approx .20\end{aligned}$$

It is interesting that most of the relatives of both the POW and hoi chanh now living in the south moved there during the period following the 1954 Geneva Agreement. The move was not a happy one; rather, it was forced on them or undertaken because life under communism was unpalatable.

ILLNESS

While the data indicate no difference in the relative frequency of illness of hoi chanh and POW, the large number of people who suffered one or more illnesses is important.

Table 6

ILLNESS

Illness	HC	POW
Malaria	70	67
Other	11	16
None	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>
	103 ^a	105 ^a

^aTotal is over 100 because of multiple illnesses, "malaria" and "others."

Note that 164 of the 100 POW and 100 hoi chanh are or have been sick. Two-thirds have had malaria, considered to be a serious illness because it is often fatal (reportedly 3 to 5 percent die) and removes the person from combat. The average duration of incapacitation from malaria is about one month, and it almost always recurs.

Illness figures are more serious than the numbers imply: such maladies as simple headaches and digestive upsets are usually reported under "never sick." The question asked was "Were you *often* sick?" Hence, the data represent multiple occurrences, especially common with malaria.

WOUNDED

The most interesting of the several questions asked about wounds is "Were you ever wounded prior to the time you were taken prisoner (or rallied)?"

Table 7

PREVIOUSLY WOUNDED

Wounded	HC	POW
Never	38	49
Once	23	33
Several.....	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>
	71	89

$$\begin{aligned} \chi^2 &= 1.70 \\ df &= 2 \\ p &\approx .60 \end{aligned}$$

Nearly 50 percent of both ralliers and prisoners had been previously wounded one or more times. When these data are combined with those on illness, it is apparent that most of the subjects had been either sick or wounded. The importance of this will become evident when we discuss the differences between POW and hoi chanh.

The recovery time given in Table 8 indicates the disastrous effect of being wounded. There are no figures for the ratio of wounded to dead, or died of wounds after action.

Table 8

HEALING TIME OF WOUND

Weeks	HC	POW
1-3	11	14
4-6	9	8
7-9	7	5
10+	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>
	32	39

$$\begin{aligned} \chi^2 &= 2.97 \\ df &= 3 \\ p &\approx .25 \end{aligned}$$

Median recovery time is 4 to 6 weeks. The NVA tends to push the sick and wounded back into fighting as quickly as possible. Several ralliers gave being "forced to work or fight while still ill or not

fully recovered from a wound" as a reason for rallying. Battles were reported as the greatest single cause of wounds (36 percent). Twenty-one percent said they were wounded by air attack. These two reasons account for more than half (57 percent) of the wounds reported. The remaining sources of approximately equal frequency are artillery, sweep operations, and others. Although the largest number of wounds result from combat in battle, the air and artillery attacks are more feared.

III. AREAS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS

This section deals with questions where statistical tests revealed substantive differences between the responses of ralliers and prisoners regarding social rank. We think these represent potential weak spots in NVA morale, and that they should be exploited. They are described in detail.

SOCIAL CLASS

Though the party line of Asian communism boasts of a "classless society," it is difficult to think of a culture more conscious of social class. All people are classified by their social origin, and all are aware of this. This is seen when one communist is asked to describe another. Inevitably, the response is structured: "He's forty-two years old, middle farmer..." or "he's a poor farmer, thirty-eight years old..." The reason for this social class consciousness is both real and motivating: unless one's background is that of the lower classes (poor farmer, landless or proletarian), the odds of becoming a somebody in the organization vary from slim to nonexistent. Opportunities for advancement are given to the poor. At one point in the history of Vietnamese communism, the only way a person from the upper social classes could make it with the party was to renounce his background, give up his property and work at manual labor for three years. After that, the party would review his case. With this in mind, it is easy to hypothesize that the upper social classes would contribute a disproportionately high number to the ranks of the hoi chanh. This trend may be seen in Table 9.

Table 9

SOCIAL CLASS

Social Class	HC	POW
Bourgeoisie	2	--
Landowner	7	--
Rich Farmer	3	--
Middle Farmer	47	34
Poor Farmer	32	55
Landless	3	2
Proletarian	--	3
	<u>94</u>	<u>94</u>

To test Table 9 data, it was first necessary to insure the stability of the computations by combining some of the categories. We have followed the convention that expected values should be at least 5.0. The three upper classes, bourgeoisie, landowner and rich farmer, were combined into one category--"upper classes." Similarly the three lowest classes, poor farmer, landless and proletarian, were combined. The results of this computation are shown in Table 10.

Table 10
SOCIAL CLASS

Category	HC POW	
Upper classes	12	--
Middle farmer	47	34
Lower classes	35	60
	94	94

$$\begin{aligned} \chi^2 &= 20.67 \\ df &= 2 \\ p &< .001 \end{aligned}$$

The details of this computation show the bulk of the χ^2 sum coming from the upper and lower social classes; that is, these frequencies are most divergent from their expected values.

RELATIVES IN THE SOUTH

As noted in Sec. II, many NVA have relatives in the south. Most of them moved there after the 1954 Geneva Agreement (see Table 5). In almost every case, this move resulted in personal loss to the family. If they were lucky enough to sell their property, it was for only a fraction of its value. Worse, families were split apart. Thus, we have a source of dissatisfaction with the communist program going back to 1954.

An estimated 1,300,000 people moved south. This is nearly 10 percent of the population of North Viet Nam (estimated 14-15 million); this fact formed the basis for three questions.

Table 11 shows the answers to the first of these, "Do you have relatives in the south?"

Table 11

RELATIVES IN THE SOUTH

Relatives	HC	POW
Close	27	7
Distant	29	14
None	41	74
	<u>97</u>	<u>95</u>

$$\begin{aligned}X^2 &= 26.45 \\df &= 2 \\p &< .001\end{aligned}$$

As can be seen, the greatest differences between POW and hoi chanh were in "close" relatives. Hoi chanh have four times as many close relatives (brothers and sisters, parents, parents' brothers and sisters, and grandparents) as do the POW, who claim "no relatives in the south" nearly twice as frequently as do hoi chanh. The data show that the hoi chanh have more than twice as many ties in the south as the POW. Also, most such refugee families appear to have severed their allegiance to the north.

For the purposes of this Memorandum, we must assume that the prisoners are a representative sample of all NVA. If this is so, we may address propaganda to a large audience. More than 20 percent of the POW have relatives in the south, of which 7 percent are close relatives. It is doubtful that this factor alone would provoke rallying, but in combination with other factors such as fear of death, dissatisfaction, and so on, it is apparently effective in some cases, because the hoi chanh have more than twice the number of relatives in the south as the POW.

Two additional questions revealed that most (80 percent) of the defectors hoped to meet their relatives in the south; also, they hoped their relatives would help them to readjust. The propaganda implications are obvious.

AGE, RANK AND FUNCTION

A frequent criticism made by the denigrators of the Chieu Hoi program is that "They only get the scuff," implying that the typical defector is rank and file and thus not worth having. While most ralliers *are* rank and file, it is also true that the vast majority of the NVA parent population is rank and file. The critical question is whether we are getting a larger proportion of this rank and file than exists in the parent population. If the parent population contains 80 percent rank and file, and the Chieu Hoi Centers are averaging 95 percent rank and file, the criticism is just. If we are getting fewer than 80 percent, the criticism is unjust. Accordingly, three tests were directed toward determining how much "scuff" there really was. Our own operational definition of scuff is individuals who are young, of low rank, and low in responsibility. The results of the comparisons are shown in Table 12, 13 and 14.

Table 12

AGE DISTRIBUTION

Age Group	HC	POW
17-23	34	48
24-29	34	26
30-40	<u>32</u>	<u>20</u>
	100	94

$$\chi^2 = 6.05$$

$$df = 2$$

$$p \approx .07 \text{ marginal}$$

Our POW sample is deficient in young people, but it still contains half again as many as the hoi chanh sample. Because the statistical test was marginal, it was repeated, using the data of all NVA captured during 1969. This time the test was highly significant: $\chi^2 = 12.19$, $p = .001$. Both samples showed the same results--the hoi chanh have fewer younger people and more older people than the NVA population, particularly in the 30-40 age group.

The two groups were also compared by rank and by function, with the results shown in Tables 13 and 14.

Table 13

COMPARISON BY RANK

Rank	HC	POW
Privates	47	69
Corporal and Higher.....	46	25
	93	94

$$\begin{aligned} \chi^2 &= 9.43 \\ df &= 1 \\ p &< .001 \end{aligned}$$

Table 14

COMPARISON BY FUNCTION

Function	HC	POW
Rank and File	50	61
Cadre ^a	49	34
	99	95

$$\begin{aligned} \chi^2 &= 3.18 \\ df &= 1 \\ p &= .05 \end{aligned}$$

^aCadre = assistant squad leader or higher.

Tables 13 and 14 both show the same trends. NVA hoi chanh tend to be higher than POW in both rank and function. Both groups contain the same proportion of officers (9 percent); the difference is that the hoi chanh sampling contains twice as many NCOs as the POW sample (40 percent versus 18 percent). Comparatively few hoi chanh volunteered for military service, 6 percent as compared with 25 percent of the prisoners, $p < .001$. Yet the hoi chanh sampled are higher in rank and function than the POW.

Tables 12, 13 and 14 show that the NVA hoi chanh is older, of higher rank, and has greater responsibility than the average POW; and

thus the scuff theory is not supported. The "solid citizen" appears more prone to rally. It is well-known that the defection of the old, high-ranking cadre is most disruptive to the communist organization; thus, the impact on the organization is greater than the numbers suggest. The implications suggest that propaganda should be directed to the older, more responsible NVA, as they appear more prone to rally.

SICK AND WOUNDED

Several questions were asked about the effects of being sick and/or wounded, conditions that have affected a substantial portion of the NVA. Two-thirds have had malaria and nearly half had been wounded. The three questions concerning sickness and wounds (covered in Tables 15, 16 and 17) show dramatic differences between the hoi chanh and the POW.

The first question was "When you were sick, did you think of rallying or deserting?"

Table 15

WHEN SICK--THINKING OF RALLYING OR DESERTING

	HC	POW
Yes	39	3
No	<u>39</u>	<u>60</u>
	78	63

$$\begin{aligned}X^2 &= 31.97 \\df &= 1 \\p &< .001\end{aligned}$$

The second question was "When you were wounded, did you think of rallying or deserting?"

Table 16

WHEN WOUNDED--THINKING OF RALLYING OR DESERTING

	HC	POW
Yes	28	0
No	<u>11</u>	<u>47</u>
	39	47

$$\begin{aligned} \chi^2 &= 46.82 \\ df &= 1 \\ p &< .001 \end{aligned}$$

The two tables indicate that the POW rarely think of rallying when sick or wounded. By contrast, the hoi chanh often does. Table 17 tabulates answers to the question, "When sick or wounded, what did you think of most?"

Table 17

THINK OF MOST WHEN SICK OF WOUNDED

Subject	HC	POW
Home-family	45	35
Death	9	9
Desert/rally	19	2
Discouragement	28	5
Health/get well	8	36
Idealistic ideas	--	14
Nothing at all	<u>--</u>	<u>13</u>
	109	114

$$\begin{aligned} \chi^2 &= 75.78 \\ df &= 6 \\ p &< .001 \end{aligned}$$

Both groups think of home and family in equal proportions and with greatest frequency. What distinguishes the two is that ralliers think of rallying or desertion, and express ideas indicating discouragement and war-weariness. By contrast, the POW think of getting well and getting back to their outfits, if they think of anything at all.

Answers to two additional questions on health disclose other differences between hoi chanh and POW. The first concerns their opinions on the adequacy of medical supplies.

Table 18

MEDICAL SUPPLIES

Opinion	HC	POW
Adequate	28	56
Inadequate	<u>57</u>	<u>23</u>
	85	79

$$\begin{aligned}X^2 &= 21.10 \\df &= 1 \\p &< .001\end{aligned}$$

The second question is related to the adequacy of the medical treatment.

Table 19

MEDICAL TREATMENT

Opinion	HC	POW
Adequate-good	48	65
Inadequate-poor	<u>36</u>	<u>12</u>
	84	77

$$\begin{aligned}X^2 &= 13.01 \\df &= 1 \\p &< .001\end{aligned}$$

The POW staunchly defend the quantity of medical supplies available and the adequacy of medical attention. Strangely, though the hoi chanh downgrade the adequacy of medical supplies, more than half state that the medical attention is adequate. This is consistent with our previous interviewing experiences: NVA medical treatment is considered by the subjects to be good, evaluated in terms of the limited facilities and supplies. The medics apparently try to make up with TLC (tender loving care) for deficiencies in supplies and facilities. This suggests that propaganda should be directed against

supplies and facilities rather than against treatment.

Because nearly all NVA have been either ill or wounded, this area appears to be a fertile one for propaganda. Questions for future inquiries include: What is the relative incidence of infectious diseases--ARVN versus VC/NVA? What is the relative wounded/mortality rate? What is the average fighter's life expectancy? How good is the treatment for serious wounds? These questions are among many that should be profitable sources for study and exploitation.

COMBAT FEARS

The communists seek to instill in their soldiers the pattern of aggressive, fearless behavior in combat. They use the word "enthusiastic" to describe the desired state of mind, and a variety of indoctrination techniques and propaganda are directed toward achieving this. As anyone who has fought against the NVA will testify, the training is successful.

To determine hoi chanh characteristics in this area, we asked the question, "As you participated in combat, did you become more distressed/anxious or less distressed/anxious?"

Table 20

EFFECTS OF COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Effect	HC	POW
More anxious	78	20
Less anxious	<u>10</u>	<u>56</u>
	88	76

$$\begin{aligned}X^2 &= 63.30 \\df &= 1 \\p &< .001\end{aligned}$$

Statistically, this question more than any other differentiates between the groups. That everyone fears combat is well known, but this study shows that this fear tends to increase among combat-exposed hoi chanh and decrease among the POW. The important thing is

that fear of combat increases after exposure in about one quarter of the NVA (as evidenced by replies of the POW), and that these are potential hoi chanh. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of a phrase used in World War II--"Getting more and more nervous in the service?" Then go the hoi chanh route.

REASONS FOR NOT RALLYING

Although almost every questionnaire probes to find the things that provoke people into rallying, few are concerned with the opposite question--"What factors prevent people from defecting?" We asked both groups this question: "Why is it that the people in your unit don't want to rally?" Multiple answers were encouraged. The results are shown in Table 21.

Table 21

REASONS FOR NOT RALLYING

Reasons	HC	POW
Will win war	29	20
Believe in just cause	50	50
Don't know GVN policy	21	4
Hate Americans	23	33
Come from hard-core family	21	4
Other	20	20
Don't know	9	10
	<u>173</u>	<u>141</u>

χ^2 = inappropriate to this Table

Both hoi chanh and POW agree that the leading reason their comrades don't rally is that they believe in "a just cause" and in ultimate victory. Both of these are core topics of their indoctrination, as is hatred for Americans. Americans are always referred to as "American imperialists," the communist version of "damnyankee."

The two groups differ in that hoi chanh believe that their friends have not been educated to the GVN policies; hoi chanh do not hate

Americans to the extent that POW do and hoi chanh believe that one of the reasons the "other people" do not rally is that their family tradition is communistic.

The last item (comes from a hard-core family) does not appear exploitable; the first two do.

INFORMATION SOURCES

The final set of distinctions between the two groups is related to sources of information about the Chieu Hoi program, about equally divided between leaflets and air broadcasts. It is interesting that only about 5 percent of the hoi chanh and none of the POW admitted to having heard Government of Vietnam (GVN) radio broadcasts. But the greatest difference was that 20 percent of the prisoners claimed that they had never seen (or heard of) any propaganda. This is strange, because the Ho Chi Minh Trail is reported to be two feet deep in leaflets! A closer check revealed that--like good soldiers--many did not read the leaflets because the cadres instructed them not to.

IV. QUESTIONS ASKED ONLY OF THE HOI CHANH

The findings of the previous sections resulted from statistical comparisons of the answers to questions asked both POW and hoi chanh. The questions discussed in this section were asked only of hoi chanh. Some of these were designed to enlarge and expand the previous data. Others were asked to obtain information usable to establish hypotheses for future testing. Several were fishing expeditions for material potentially profitable for propaganda use.

The following two items should be examined in conjunction.

<u>"Why didn't you rally sooner?"</u>	Frequency
Lack of opportunity	67
Have doubt about the chieu hoi policy	18
Still believe in communism	15
Didn't know where to go	3
Fear of capture	<u>1</u>
	104*

<u>"What were the circumstances in which you rallied?"</u>	Frequency
During duty assignment, while getting food ...	32
During combat	20
At the beginning of a campaign	13
While ill or wounded	13
Lost contact with unit	6
Captured	3
Miscellaneous	<u>11</u>
	98

Comparison of the replies to these two questions indicates that it might be helpful were the propaganda to suggest to potential defectors the best situations for rallying. While it appears that this would tip our hand, we can be sure that the cadres know the situations the troops can best use to rally; we want to be sure that the rank and file also know about these.

* Variation from 100 is due to multiple responses.

<u>"Has anybody in your company rallied before?"</u>	Frequency
Yes	30
No	64
Don't know	7
	<u>101</u>

<u>"Have you heard of anybody in other units rallying?"</u>	Frequency
Yes	57
No	36
Don't know	8
	<u>101</u>

Despite its rarity, rallying occurs in the NVA with sufficient frequency to cause definite controls to be set up to thwart it.

<u>"Does anybody in your unit intend to rally?"</u>	Frequency
A few	44
Many	21
None	6
Don't know	30
	<u>101</u>

<u>"In your opinion what was the reason these people wanted to rally?"</u>	Frequency
Hardships	51
Dissatisfaction; especially with their treatment by the cadres	40
Fear of death, bombing and shelling	37
Tired of war	31
Lack of medicine and medical care	15
Lost confidence in final victory	14
Lost confidence in just cause	13
Want to reunite with family	9
Believe in chieu hoi policy	3
Believe in Government of South Vietnam (GVN) policy	2
Other	13
	<u>228</u>

<u>"What are the reasons why people do not dare rally?"</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
Our families in the north would suffer	43
Don't yet believe in the chieu hoi policy	37
Afraid of being caught and punished	28
Not able to find the way out	20
Closely watched	14
Fear of being ill-treated by the GVN	6
Other	14
Don't know	10
	<u>172</u>

Fear of family punishment is not imaginary. Families of ralliers and deserters do suffer and many ralliers and POW report having personally seen this. The families' food rations are reduced or eliminated entirely, and they are ostracized. If they are working on a government job, they are fired. Thus, propaganda designed to arouse homesickness is double-edged, as it also calls the NVA soldier's attention to the fact that the family would suffer.

Even if a person firmly intends to rally, there is no certainty that he will be able to accomplish his defection successfully. Rallying is both difficult and dangerous. Answers to the following question show it is much feared by NVA troops.

<u>"When you planned to rally what difficulties did you think you would encounter?"</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
Fear of being jailed, beaten or tortured by the GVN	43
Fear of being killed by the GVN	35
Fear of being caught and punished by the NVA	32
Fear that the family in the north will be ill-treated or lose food allowance	25
Fear of being killed by the NVA	22
Didn't know the situation, or didn't know how to defect	3
Tight control of 3-man cell	2
Don't know	2
	<u>164</u>

Notice that fear of ill-treatment, punishment and/or death account for nearly 80 percent of the reasons.

<u>"What do you plan to do when you leave the Chieu Hoi Center?"</u>	Frequency
Join an armed propaganda team	38
Learn a trade (Most wanted to learn mechanics; next most popular jobs were vehicle driver or tailor.)	18
Join the ARVN	7
Get a job	7
Undecided	5
Be a Kit Carson scout	3
Farm	2
Miscellaneous	<u>1</u>
	81

<u>"What did you wish for most while you were still in the NVA?"</u>	Frequency
To have peace; to end the war	24
To return home; to return north	20
To desert, to rally, to escape, to stay alive ...	18
To unite Vietnam	5
To learn a trade	4
Other	<u>2</u>
	81

Note that 27 percent of the hoi chanh report they thought most about deserting/rallying.

<u>"What did you worry about or fear most?"</u>	Frequency
Fear of death, war, fighting	48
Did not fear anything	7
Getting sick	5
Never see family again	4
Worry about family	3
Get caught when rallying	3
Left behind when wounded	1
Live under communism	<u>1</u>
	72

It is not without reason that the VC/NLF cadres spend more time eliminating fear of death in combat than on any other topic. Note that this is the overwhelming fear among the hoi chanh.

<u>"What bothered you most when you were still with your NVA unit?"</u>	Frequency
Cadres' attitudes (favoritism, demanding)	21
No individual freedom; harsh discipline	18
Criticized or forced to work when sick	10
Hardship, lack of food	10
Too much political indoctrination	8
Away from home	1
Nothing	<u>5</u>
	73

Several studies were made of the hoi chanh's dislikes. All agree with these findings. The hoi chanh most dislike the tight control and the cadres, who enforce the tight control. We often wonder what the answer would be to the plea, "Tired of tight control and harsh discipline? Join us. We run a sloppy outfit!" Alas, we are doomed never to find out.

<u>"Before you rallied, did you suspect the policies of the North Vietnamese Government and the VC in the south?"</u>	Frequency
Yes	58
No	<u>15</u>
	73

<u>"Why did you suspect the policy?"</u>	Frequency
False propaganda	47
Prolonged war	6
Heavy casualties	5
Better life and more freedom in the south ...	2
Miserable life in the north	<u>1</u>
	61

All these responses come under the heading of false propaganda. The NVA have been told repeatedly that the north has controlled three-fourths of the South Vietnamese people and four-fifths of their land, and that the war will soon end. When they come south they discover that what they have been told is not true. One possible theme for our propaganda: "If it's true that the south is almost completely 'liberated,' why do you have to live in the jungle?"

Several hoi chanh had a chance to observe liberated villages, generally while getting food supplies, and discovered that life in these miserable places was still better than what they had in the north. The affluence of Saigon, where all NVA hoi chanh are sent, provided a genuine cultural shock. Another source of distress to the NVA is that they are told that they are coming south to "drive out the American imperialists." Instead they find themselves fighting fellow Vietnamese, not Americans.

The answers to this block of questions emphasize that propaganda should stick scrupulously to the truth. The least hint of falseness completely destroys its value. An analysis of false NVA propaganda would be a profitable exercise.

The ralliers were also asked for suggestions on how to improve propaganda. Their responses are enlightening:

<u>"In your opinion, what propaganda topics affected the morale of you and your comrades?"</u>	Frequency
Casualties, hardships, suffering	24
Government of Vietnam humanitarianism: good treatment	21
Love towards family and country	16
Unjustified sacrifice	4
Communism's mistakes and deceptions	4
Hoi chanh talks and radio broadcasting	3
Government of Vietnam military strength	3
Freedom in the south	1
	<u>76</u>

<u>"In your opinion, what topics have no effect or have an adverse effect?"</u>	Frequency
Anything that hurts the fighter's pride, threats	22
Use of southern accent and terms	3
Bombing right after broadcast	3
Revealing the names and ranks of ralliers	3
Money, rewards	2
Bad behavior of speakers during broadcast	1
	<u>34</u>

We need to explore these areas more thoroughly, particularly those concerning what *not* to do.

Note that offering rewards has an adverse effect, because this hurt the soldier's pride; it was interpreted as an attempt to buy them.

<u>"What other topics have the most effect?"</u>	Frequency
Explain good treatment of ralliers	15
Describe free and happy life in south	8
Appeal to the troops to stop fighting	8
Provoke homesickness by having female appeals and singing	5
Point out true face of communism: cruelties and killing of people	5
HCV appealing to NVA	4
NVA ralliers appealing to NVA	2
	<u>47</u>

V. ADDITIONAL DATA

Having a data bank enables hunches to be tested to determine whether they are strong enough to serve as hypotheses for formal search. This led to some interesting findings. We stress that none of the following is offered as firm and final; rather the topics could profitably be studied more rigorously in future research.

WHY DO PARTY MEMBERS RALLY WITH SUCH FREQUENCY?

Because party members are carefully selected and thoroughly indoctrinated, they should rarely (if ever) rally. But this study gave the same results as two previous, unpublished studies on southerners: party members rally with as great a frequency as non-party members (see Table 3). This happy piece of information is apparently firm. Of course, the last people the Viet Cong (NLF) want to have rally are the elite party members.

To determine why these rally, we first looked at the answers to the questions pertaining to why people rally, and compared party-member with non-party member defectors. The statistical tests showed only random differences. Party members rally for the same reasons as non-party members--the hard life, dissatisfaction, fear of bombing and death, and being tired of war.

Finding that party members rally for the same reasons as non-party members suggests the possibility that party members had been exposed to the unpalatable elements longer than had non-party members, and thus had more time to grow dissatisfied.

Two comparisons were made. The first indicated that the party members had been in the NVA service longer than non-party members, 38 versus 25 months. The F-test of this finding was only marginally significant, and we cannot be certain that the results constitute a true difference.

But we also asked the question, "How long have you been in the south?" Here the findings were unequivocally different: party members who rally have been in the south much longer than non-party member ralliers (13 months versus 7 months). The F-test is significant

beyond the 0.01 level. These results suggest that selection and training factors that militate against the rallying of party members is offset by the members' longer exposure to the things that tend to drive them out of the organization.

SOME EFFECTS OF THE LAND REFORM

While scoring the data, we noticed that several hoi chanh rallied immediately after entering the south. Accordingly, we isolated the interviews of the five respondents who rallied within six weeks after entering South Vietnam. During the land reform, the fathers of four had been killed for being landlords. The parents of the fifth were punished for the same reason. A profitable question for the future would be "Were any of your family ever killed or punished by the communists?" A follow-up question would be: "Were any of your family forced to leave the north?"

FREQUENCY AS AN INDEX OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF A RESPONSE

We made several attempts to obtain a more rigorous analysis of the reasons why people do and do not rally. Because this analysis is involved and lengthy, it is not included in this Memorandum. But one of its results should be mentioned: frequency of a response is not a satisfactory index to the relative importance of a professed reason for rallying or not rallying. One reason for rallying may be given by an overwhelming majority of the respondents, but this is not equivalent to saying that the reason is overwhelmingly important. Thus, though everyone complains about the mosquitoes and very few about the tigers, it is the fear of tigers that drives people out of the forest!

In the analysis mentioned in the previous paragraph (with but one exception among several attempts) there was no correlation between the frequency that an item was mentioned and its rank-ordered position of importance. The relative frequency of a response is not a satisfactory index of importance.

VI. DISCUSSION

As suggested by the findings, the ranks of the NVA represent a continuum of allegiance to its cause. At one end is the devout communist who, often blindly and unreasonably, accepts the party doctrine whatever it may be. He will never desert. At the other end is the individual who wants no part of communism. Typical of the latter is the person who has had members of his family killed during the land reform. Between these two extremes is a group of people with varying intensities of allegiance to the "just cause." A few of these are people whose allegiance can be eroded by the hardships, the deaths and the bombings. We would like to recast their apparent vulnerabilities, using the POW summaries to represent the opinions of all NVA:

1. Five percent think of rallying or deserting when they are ill and two-thirds of them are seriously ill at some point of time in the service.
2. Seven percent had close relatives in the south, most of them probably because of the changed circumstances following the Geneva Agreement, including the land reform.
3. An undetermined percent (probably 3 to 5 percent) had family members killed or punished during the land reform.
4. Twenty-six percent report that their anxieties increased with increasing combat experience.
5. Twenty-nine percent report medical supplies as inadequate; 16 percent report medical attention as inadequate or poor.
6. Fourteen percent report feelings of discouragement, fear of death, or thoughts of deserting while they were sick or wounded.

Using the lowest percentage as a boundary, it would seem that at least five percent* of NVA would rally if given the proper encouragement and opportunity, nearly ten times the number to date. The impact

* There were three prisoners who indicated that they planned to rally. These three cases were not included in the calculations. They represent 3 percent of the POW sample.

of five percent is considerably greater than the number implies: first, five percent of a 'monolithic' facade can be of destructive dimensions, i.e., the facade is no longer lithic. Second, as shown by the data, the NVA rallier is an older, more responsible person. He comes from the upper ranks (particularly the NCO) and has greater responsibilities, functioning as squad leader and higher. Also, a considerably larger number of party members defect than would be expected. Thus, in terms of influence, duties and responsibilities, the NVA rallier tends to come from the leaders, not the rank and file.

Thus it seems that NVA rallying could be substantially increased, as there are plenty of likely candidates among them.

Appendix
QUESTIONNAIRE

Date: _____
Place: _____
Interviewee: _____
Category: _____

1. When were you born?
2. Where is your native town?
3. Are you married?
 1. Married
 2. Unmarried
4. Are your parents still living?
 1. Both living
 2. Both deceased
 3. Father deceased
 4. Mother deceased
 5. Unknown
5. If deceased
 1. When?
 2. What circumstance?
6. What was your occupation before joining the NVA?
 1. Student
 2. Farmer
 3. Factory worker
 4. Government official
 5. Other (specify)
7. Of what social class was your family?
 1. Land owner
 2. Rich farmer
 3. Middle farmer
 4. Poor farmer
 5. Sharecropper
 6. Small bourgeois
 7. Proletarian
8. When did you join the NVA?
9. What was your military service status?
 1. Volunteer
 2. Draftee
 3. Recalled
 4. Other
10. What was your last unit?

11. What was your rank?
 1. Private
 2. Corporal
 3. Sergeant
 4. Master sergeant
 5. Aspirant
 6. Second lieutenant
 7. First lieutenant
 8. Captain
 9. Senior captain
 10. Higher
12. What was your title?
 1. Combat soldier
 2. Three-man cell leader
 3. Assistant squad leader
 4. Squad leader
 5. Assistant platoon leader
 6. Platoon leader
 7. Assistant company commander
 8. Company political officer
 9. Company commander
 10. Assistant battalion commander
 11. Battalion political officer
 12. Battalion commander
 13. Other (specify)
13. Were you a party member, probationary party member, or group member?
 1. Party member
 2. Probationary party member
 3. Group member
 4. Not yet affiliated
14. When were you affiliated to the Group?
15. When did you become probationary party member?
16. When did you become official party member?
17. What is your educational level?
 1. Illiterate
 2. Can read and write
 3. First grade
 4. Second grade
 5. Third grade
 6. Fourth grade
 7. Fifth grade
 8. Sixth grade
 9. Seventh grade
 10. Eighth grade
 11. Ninth grade
 12. Tenth grade
 13. Higher

18. Do you have any relatives or friends in South Vietnam?
 1. Grandparents, uncles, aunts (paternal or maternal), brothers, sisters.
 2. Uncles, cousins, distant relatives
 3. Close friends
 4. None
19. If yes, when did they go to South Vietnam?
 1. Before 1954
 2. In 1954
 3. Unknown
20. When you decided to rally, did you wish to meet your relatives or friends?
 1. Yes
 2. No
21. Did you wish to have their support?
 1. Yes
 2. No
 3. Not yet decided
22. When did you leave for South Vietnam?
 1. Date
 2. By what means?
23. When did you arrive in South Vietnam?
24. When did you rally? (or when were you captured?)
25. Were you often sick?
 1. Malaria
 2. Beri-beri
 3. Skin disease (jungle rot, 'crud')
 4. Dysentery
 5. Asthma
 6. Stomachache
 7. Other disease
 8. Rheumatism
 9. Not sick
26. What did you think of most when you were sick?
27. Did you think about rallying when you were sick?
 1. Yes
 2. No
28. Were medical supplies available for treatment of your sickness?
 1. Sufficient
 2. Short
29. How satisfactory was the medical care for your sickness?
 1. Very satisfactory
 2. Satisfactory
 3. Unsatisfactory
 4. Very poor

30. Were you wounded at the time of your rally (or capture)?
 1. Yes
 2. No
31. How many times were you wounded before you rallied (or before you were captured)?
 1. None
 2. One time
 3. Twice
 4. More than twice
32. How were you wounded?
 1. Seriously
 2. Slightly
33. In what circumstances?
 1. Artillery bombardment
 2. Air strikes
 3. During sweep operations
 4. In combat
 5. Others (specify)
34. How long did you have to undergo medical treatment before you could resume combat duties?
35. What did you think of most when you were wounded?
36. Did you think of rally when you were wounded?
 1. Yes
 2. No
37. Did you feel that you became less afraid as you gained combat experience, or did you feel that you become more frightened?
 1. Less frightened
 2. More frightened
38. When did you have an intention to rally?
39. What was the motive that made you first think of rallying?
40. Did you discuss your intention to rally with anybody?
 1. No
 2. Yes (with whom)
41. What was their reaction?
42. When you planned to rally, what difficulties did you think that you would encounter?
 1. On the GVN side
 2. On the Communist side
43. How did you think you would overcome those difficulties?
 - 1.
 - 2.
44. How many alternatives did you have in mind? (specify)
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.

45. What was the circumstance of your rally?
46. Why didn't you rally sooner?
47. Was there anybody from your company who rallied before you did?
 1. Yes
 2. No
48. Do you know anybody from friendly units who rallied before you did?
 1. Yes
 2. No
49. What was the reaction of the unit when someone rallied?
 1. Reaction of leaders?
 2. Reaction of unit comrades?
50. In your opinion, what were the reasons for their rally? (Answer list not shown to subjects)
 1. Lose confidence in final victory
 2. Tired of the war
 3. Believe in the Chieu Hoi policy
 4. Fear death, bombs and shells
 5. Dissatisfied
 6. Hardships
51. In your opinion, does anybody in the unit have an intention to rally?
 1. Many
 2. Few
 3. Nobody
 4. Unknown
52. If yes, what are the reasons that they do not dare rally? (Answer list not shown to subjects)
 1. Fear of discovery by colleagues and punishment
 2. Unable to find way out for rally
 3. Closely watched
 4. Family living in North Vietnam loses political privileges
 5. Not yet believe in Chieu Hoi policy
 6. Fear of being re-educated (brain washed) by the GVN
 7. Others (specify)
 8. Unknown
53. In your opinion, why the other troops in your unit did not want to rally?
 1. Believe in final victory
 2. Believe in just cause
 3. Have no chance to study GVN policies
 4. Hate Americans and determined to fight to the end
 5. Come from hard core Communist family
 6. Others (specify)
 7. Unknown
54. How did you learn of Chieu Hoi Program?
 1. Radio
 2. Aerial broadcast
 3. Outpost broadcasting
 4. Propaganda leaflets, posters
 5. Other means (specify)
 6. Never heard of

55. By what means have you most learned of the Chieu Hoi Program?
 1. Radio
 2. Aerial broadcast
 3. Outpost broadcasting
 4. Propaganda leaflets, posters
 5. Other means (specify)
56. Through radio and aerial broadcasts, in your opinion what topics have affected the morale of yourself and your colleagues most? Why?
 1. Yourself
 2. Your colleagues
57. In your opinion, what topics have no effects or have adverse effects? Why?
58. What other topics, do you think, have more effect? (specify) Why?
59. What types of propaganda leaflets have most affected the troops in your unit? Why?
60. What types of propaganda leaflets have no effects or have adverse effects? Why?
61. Besides the above propaganda leaflets, what other types do you think can create more effects on the morale and thoughts of the troops in your unit? (specify) Why?
62. What measures have been taken by your unit to prevent cadre and troops from rallying?
63. What action would be taken against a person who has an intention to rally?
 1. In the battlefield
 2. In bivouac area
 3. Caught in the act of rallying
64. Was there any case noted in your unit? Please give details.
65. Please enumerate three main reasons for your rally
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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66. Reasons for not rallying, ranked in order of importance:
67. Reasons for rallying, ranked in order of importance:
68. What are you planning to do after leaving the Chieu Hoi Center?
69. Is it the type of work that you have been dreaming?
70. What did you wish most while you were still in the unit?
71. What did you fear most while you were still in the unit?
72. What was the thing that bothered you most while you were still in the unit?

73. Before your rally (or capture), did you ever suspect the policies of the North Vietnamese Government and the Viet Cong in the South?
74. Do you think that your colleagues have the same suspicion?
75. Why did your colleagues and you suspect their policies?

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