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and Civil Interest Groups in China,
1956 -1971**

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
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William W. Whitson

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INTRODUCTION

This Paper, based on a longer study of interest groups in China between 1956 and 1971,^{*} focuses primarily on alternative ways of *defining* Chinese interest groups and secondarily on *describing* their behavior. For our purposes, the terms *elite interest group* and *faction* will be used interchangeably to mean a group of leaders whose sense of corporate loyalty and collective behavior is influenced *primarily* by certain shared affiliations and interests. It is important to note that an elite interest group may not necessarily have a formalized organizational structure. Indeed, its members may be leaders of different organizations while yet being so deeply influenced by common interests and goals as to respond to crises as a collectivity. An interest group is thus presumed to be defined first by a corporate loyalty to shared values and goals.

The study hypothesizes the existence of interest groups engaged in a competition for power on China's domestic stage. The problem for research and analysis has been to identify and evaluate indicators of interest group existence and behavior. Without such indicators, scholars, policymakers, and strategists can only select isolated cases and scenarios from competing Chinese political signals to prove flat assertions about the existence and roles of interest groups in domestic Chinese political behavior.

In brief, the research strategy assumed that formal position in military and civil hierarchies reflects political power and that approximately 1400 positions (400 military, 1000 civilian) reflect the most significant formal -- and informal -- political power distribution in

^{*}William W. Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971*, The Rand Corporation, R-1091-DOS/ARPA, May 1973.

China. One problem was then to determine time periods when occupants of those positions were relatively stable. Another problem was to analyse each incumbent's career to determine indicators of possible corporate or interest-group affiliation, that is, generation, provincial origin, field-army affiliation, military-region tenure, professional functional experience, etc. A third problem was to collate those indicators by some means which would reveal the existence of an interest group or faction.

With respect to the first problem, four time periods were selected for analysis of key positions. The first period, 1956-1958, was the climax of the influence of P'eng Te-huai, the Minister of Defense who had led the PLA for most of its campaigns in Korea and fostered the modernization of the armed forces under Soviet auspices and according to Soviet forms and procedures. By the 1956-1958 period, leaders and units had returned from Korea and the tumult of the Korean War period at home had subsided to the extent that the Eighth Party Congress could be held in September 1958. Late 1958 is thus a period when temporary compromise had been reached over many controversies that had driven the previous eight years of personnel assignments, crisis management, and domestic and foreign policies. The 1956-1958 distribution of power among assumed interest groups is therefore taken as a base from which all later changes are measured.

The second period examined is the 1965-1966 period. During the eight years between 1958 and 1966, the purge of P'eng Te-huai, the Great Leap experiment in economic development, the Socialist Education Campaign, and the Learn from the PLA Campaign had all reflected turmoil over policy issues and administrative pace and style. Personnel changes during those eight years were one means by which contending interest groups could express their preferences and could measure their defeat or victory over issues in bureaucratic controversy. In spite of those personnel changes, by late 1965, the failure of the domestic Chinese political conflict system to satisfy the personal preferences of Mao Tse-tung generated a new convulsion, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR). However, before the GPCR generated a new round of personnel appointments, the calm before the storm provides the analyst with an opportunity to compare one hierarchy with the base period.

The third period for elite analysis, 1969, followed the ending of the GPCR and the Ninth Party Congress. Despite the fact that the Ninth Party Congress (convened in April 1969) included a compromise slate of political leaders, it clearly reflected a new set of compromises over the issues of policy, pace, and style that had ravaged the bureaucracy during the GPCR. Temporarily, personnel shifts that had taken place during the GPCR would therefore seem to be fixed long enough for leaders of contending interest groups to review their relative political status prior to another round of material and human resource allocations.

The fourth period studied was the late summer of 1971, when it seemed clear that the 1969 compromise had all but collapsed. Domestic and foreign issues of priority of threat (both internal and external), correct resource allocations (among contending weapons systems, among industrial sectors, and among geographic areas), and administrative pace and style had generated a new round of personnel changes that culminated in the removal, in September, of Lin Biao, the Defense Minister and Mao's heir apparent. This study plots shifts as of the summer of 1971, since the data thereafter have proved unreliable; it is clear, however, that 1971 was not a period of calm. Although a later period, perhaps 1973-1974, will provide a more stable hierarchy suitable for comparison with the 1969 leadership, the mid-1971 shifts were plotted to demonstrate changes that further altered the 1969 balance of power among contending interest groups.

With respect to the second problem, salient career indicators of possible corporate or interest-group affiliation, it is clear that indicators are useless if they rely on ambiguous data or if data are not available. To the extent that information is ambiguous or difficult to obtain, related judgments must be suspect.

Next we must be skeptical of data that relate primarily to broad attitude patterns or abstract ideological affiliations. We may acquire certain hunches about such data and their relevance to specific interest groups; but the history of political behavior in China in the twentieth century does not provide persuasive evidence of unambiguous Chinese *ideological* affiliation and behavioral motivation,

especially where crucial issues of pace and style of social change are concerned.

We felt more confident of data related to corporate or personal affiliation and loyalty than data indicating loyalty to abstractions. That is, data which helped identify a Chinese leader's affiliation, either with a personality or an organization, seemed more useful to our search for interest-group existence and behavior.

Some data are more relevant to local interest groups, attitudes, and values than to central or national interest groups. That is, facts may be classified according to their relevance to geographic area. This is not to say that data of local or central authority relevance are more or less useful. But its limitations should be appreciated in the context of a search for data which are neither too precise nor too broad -- an objective which must be used to measure the utility of all information categories.

Finally, one set of data may have secular validity; that is, it may have long-term relevance to the question of loyalties, motivations, and interest-group affiliation and behavior. Other data may be very time-specific, sensitive only to immediate and short-term issues. Such data may be useful, indeed essential, for short-term predictions within the context of trends established by materials with longer-term implications.

We examined personnel shifts among 1400 positions from 1956-1958 to 1971-1972, primarily in terms of factors with the following shared characteristics:

1. Data which are available and relatively specific
2. Data which suggest loyalty primarily to a corporate group and secondarily to a personality
3. Data which are primarily suggestive of local loyalties
4. Data which have long-term significance for interest-group behavior

The indicators of party-military position, field-army affiliation, military-region affiliation, Korean War participation, ministry-service

affiliation, professional function (commander versus commissar), and generational affiliation fulfill at least three of those characteristics.

The third problem of collating the data for purposes of identifying interest groups was simplified in part by earlier studies and by the fact that personnel assignments in 1956-1958 still reflected long- and near-term political-military history. Based on these studies, four alternative concepts of possible factional behavior were examined: the field-army faction; the military-region faction; the functional (civil-military and commander-commissar) faction; and the generational faction. While all of these share many ingredients of possible corporate loyalty, each focuses on a special ingredient: shared pre-1954 history (field army); post-1954 geographic localism (military region); bureaucratic function; and shared generational experiences. Each of these will be examined briefly in turn.

FIELD-ARMY FACTIONS

Prior to the fifteen-year period under study, approximately 1400 senior Chinese civil and military leaders had pursued careers with one unique characteristic: Less than 15 percent of the high command had served in more than one stream of institutional evolution, as shown in Table 1. That is, the five field armies which defeated the Nationalists between 1945 and 1949 had evolved through essentially independent processes of development over the previous twenty years. Among 85 percent of seven hundred key military leaders analyzed in 1969, an officer who had first joined a unit, for example, from the Ouyüwan Soviet (Central China) in 1928 had become a senior commander or commissar in the Second Field Army in 1949. An officer who had joined Ho Lung in central Yunnan in 1928 had become a senior commander in the First Field Army by 1949.

Table 1

INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE HIGH COMMAND

1927—1930 (RED ARMY PERIOD) Hsiang-O-Kin Soviet	1931—1936 SECOND FRONT ARMY	1937—1945 (8th ROUTE ARMY PERIOD) 120th Division	1946—1954 (LIBERATION ARMY PERIOD)	1955—1968
Red Fourth Corps (West Hunan) Red Sixth Corps (West Hupeh)	Red 2nd Army Red 6th Army	Shensi-Sichuan Military District Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Military District 358 Brigade 359 Brigade	1st FIELD ARMY (North-West China Military Region)	Military Regions Shanghai Lanchow Szechwan
O-YU-WAN Soviet	FOURTH FRONT ARMY	129th Division		
Red New Fourth Corps	Red 4th Army 4th Corps 9th Corps 30th Corps 31st Corps 33rd Corps 25th Corps 28th Corps	Shensi-Hopeh-Honan Military District 385 Brigade 386 Brigade	2nd FIELD ARMY (Central China Military Region)	Chongku Wuhan Tibet Kunming
Red Fifteenth Corps	(Stay behind group in Kiangsu) Red 7th Corps (Fang Chih-Min)	New 4th Corps North-Kiangsu Military District North Huai River Military District Central Kiangsu Military District Southern Kiangsu Military District Hupei-Henan-Anhui Military District Central Anhwei Military District Kiangsu-Chekiang Military District	3rd FIELD ARMY (East China Military Region)	Nanking Poochow
CHEN YU-LI (KIANGSU) Soviet	FIRST FRONT ARMY	115th Division		
Red Third Corps Red Fourth Corps Red Fifth Corps Red Seventh Corps Red Twentieth Corps	Red 1st Army Red 3rd Army Red 9th Army	Hopeh-Jehol-Liaoning Military District Shantung Military District 343 Brigade 344 Brigade Independent Regiment Shensi-Chahar-Hopeh Military District Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military District	4th FIELD ARMY (Manchuria Military Region) NORTH CHINA FIELD ARMY ("9th") (North China Military Region)	Shanghai Canton Tsinan Inner-Mongolia Peking

Translated into American experience, the American senior military and civil leadership of 1956 would be comparable to China's if the officials of each of the six American continental armies and the states in which they reside had served together (and nowhere else) for twenty years. Even if the continental armies were suddenly deactivated, we may imagine the strong informal bonds of shared victories and defeats which would remain active among former comrades, especially if deactivation did not actually remove civil and military leaders from the geographic locale which their old army had occupied.

Any analysis of civil and military factional behavior in China after 1954 must, therefore, start from the historical fact that the Communist conquest of China forced highly mobile field-army


civil-military factions to settle down to the tasks of local administration after 1950. Between 1950 and 1958, many military men assumed civil roles in local government and Communist Party positions. In so doing, many of them unquestionably altered perspectives which had been more appropriate for commanders or commissars concerned with combat. Nevertheless, they continued to work closely with former comrades from the same field-army faction and, as we shall see, tended to replace themselves from within their own ranks.

Given this broad historical context of in-group informal relationships prior to 1956-1958, this section examines the power status of each field-army faction from 1956 to 1972 based on an examination of the pre-1950 careers of 1400 Party, government, and military officials to make judgments about each man's probable affiliation with a field-army faction. Without ascribing particular weight to his emotional commitment to his faction, we assume that an individual would be inclined to "vote" according to the collective preferences of his faction, especially at the local and provincial levels; such preferences would normally be articulated by a caucus of senior officials at each level, who in turn are likely to be influenced profoundly by the next higher level of factional representatives.

Although we have distinguished between Party, government, and military positions in our analyses of the data, it is clear that many individuals often occupied positions in all three elites. However, since we are interested in changing factional representation in each position, double-counting is not considered a problem. That is, even if a man simultaneously occupies a Party, a government, and a military position in the same province, we credit each position with the factional background of the incumbent. We then take the combined strength of government, Party, and military incumbents in all positions as a measure of factional representation.

Our data suggest that the domestic political process in China between 1956-1958 and the end of 1971 appears to have been a five-faction political system in transition to a multiregional system.* In

* See Table 1 and Fig. 1 for the military regions and political base areas occupied by each field army in 1954. The next section will discuss the concept of the military-region faction in greater detail.





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|---|---------------------------------------|
|  | First Field-Army Political Base Area |
|  | Second Field-Army Political Base Area |
|  | Third Field-Army Political Base Area |
|  | Fourth Field-Army Political Base Area |
|  | Fifth Field-Army Political Base Area |

Fig. 1 --- Chinese Communist military regions and field-army political base areas

1950 each faction consisted of *both* civil and military figures who had served together in a single field-army institutional stream. By virtue of their occupation of areas portrayed in Fig. 1, each field-army faction acquired a geographic base and resources with which to compete for influence and power among other factions and at the center. Between 1950 and 1971, the power of each faction shifted, as reflected in its new pattern of representation on key civil and military positions.

In general, interfactional balance prevailed until 1958. The period from 1960, when Lin Piao became Defense Minister, to 1966 brought subtle changes, mostly in key military posts. The pace of change increased suddenly and dramatically between 1966 and 1971, when the purge of Lin Piao brought an end to a major era of political conflict -- and started a new one.

Our data indicate that the early beneficiary of these shifts was the Fourth Field-Army faction, led by Lin Piao. It appears that the Lin group, as early as 1960, began to install their own representatives in key positions within other factional base areas, while striving for increasing power at the center. Over the fifteen-year period, Lin's associates increased their total representation in key central military posts from 24 percent in 1956 to about 40 percent by the summer of 1971. They were not equally successful in the civil sphere, however, the balance among the five factions at the center remaining approximately the same throughout that period.

Outside of the center, instead of confronting the wealthier factions in metropolitan China, Lin's Fourth Field-Army faction concentrated on the border regions, beginning in 1960 after Lin assumed the role of Defense Minister. The principal victims of this post-1960 political offensive were the First and Second field-army factions. In the northwest, with its relative wealth of nuclear weapons facilities, oil, and other (undiscovered) resources, the First Field-Army faction lost about half of its representatives in key military and civil posts. Most of these losses were sustained during the Cultural Revolution, when two-thirds of the military posts (thirty-eight positions) changed hands. By 1971, the Fourth faction had gained about 25 percent of all posts in the base area, that is, the Sinkiang and Lanchow military

regions, at a time when the First faction still retained only about 38 percent of all key civil and military posts in the two regions. Reflecting its increasing interest in competing with the Fourth, the powerful Third Field-Army faction (led by Hsü Shih-yu, Commander of the Nanking Military Region) had gained 13 percent of the key posts in the northwest by the summer of 1971.

As early as 1962, during the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Fourth faction manifested an interest in acquiring greater influence over Tibet, which the Second Field-Army faction had conquered and had brought to heel during the 1950s. The Second faction, which from 1954 on had numerical dominance over two of China's wealthiest regions (Szechuan Province and Hupeh-Honan provinces), began to experience increasing pressure from the Fourth by the late 1960s, when the Cultural Revolution brought a loss of 20 percent of all military positions, almost all of these being seized by Fourth faction representatives, especially in Szechuan and Kweichow provinces. In the civil sphere, the successes of the Fourth were almost as dramatic, the Second's status declining from about 98 percent to only about 60 percent of key civil posts by the summer of 1971.

Despite their sophistication and central position in Peking, the Fifth Field-Army faction also lost power at the hands of the Fourth (and others) during the fifteen-year period. We estimate that, up to 1966, the faction had probably never held more than 50 percent of the key military posts in the base area and about 80 percent of the civil posts. During the Cultural Revolution, inroads by other factions reduced the Fifth's representation to less than 35 percent of the key military posts and about 55 percent of the civil posts. No other faction actually dominated the base area by the summer of 1971; but each faction had at least 6 percent of the key civil-military positions in the area.

While the First, Second, and Fifth factions were struggling to maintain their power status in their own power bases between 1956 and 1971, the Third and Fourth were quietly engaged in a contest for allies and more representation in key jobs. Split between the northeast and southeast (see Fig. 1), the Fourth probably suffered from a disease that was

eroding a sense of *national* commitment everywhere -- regionalism. (We will address that phenomenon in more detail below.) Furthermore, the Fourth lost power in its own power bases, perhaps because it had to dispatch reliable members to new posts in adversary regions. Holding nearly 70 percent of the key military posts in both the Shenyang and Canton military regions in 1956-1958, the Fourth lost steadily in Shenyang from 1960 on and held only 56 percent of all posts in both regions by the summer of 1971. During the Cultural Revolution, when it appears that the Fourth made its greatest political strides, its decline in Shenyang was temporarily abated. But after 1969, it continued. Likewise in the civil sphere, the Fourth's status declined from 79 percent of all key civil posts in 1956 to 66 percent in 1971.

In contrast with the Fourth, the Third succeeded in maintaining its hold over its own power base during the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution and afterward. While the Fourth was apparently attempting to expand its power across China, especially into the northwest and southwest, the Third seemed to be satisfied with consolidating its strength, while resisting incursions by Fourth faction representatives into one or two of its weaker provinces. By 1971, the Third still retained nearly 70 percent of both civil and military posts in its base area, the losses being greatest in the civil arena.

Table 2 summarizes the trends outlined above. It employs data from 1966 as the base year, because data from the 1956-1958 period frequently are inadequate or unreliable.

In addition to the trends already discussed, two other themes need underlining: the factional character of both the military and the civil bureaucracy in China and the increasing power of "unknowns" in the changing pattern of factional affiliations.

The theme of military factionalism deserves some emphasis only because it has not generally received the attention accorded civilian (Party and government) interest groups. The military in China somehow are assumed to be unhesitatingly loyal to the center, in contrast with more opportunistic civilian politicians. If our data mean anything, it is that military, as well as civil, leadership is deeply riven by issues of loyalty, expressed through both internal and external policy and pace of change.

Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG CHINESE FIELD-ARMY PARTIES, 1966-1971
(in percentages of all positions at each level)

	1st FA	2d FA	3d FA	4th FA	5th FA	Center	Unknown	Totals
Center								
Mil 1966	13	18	11	31	6	6	15	100
Civ 1966	8	13	15	15	13	36	0	100
Mil 1971	5	16	12	38	7	6	16	100
Civ 1971	5	13	13	19	8	15	28	100
1st FA Base								
Mil 1966	69	8	2	21	0	0	0	100
Civ 1966	69	6	1	5	9	5	5	100
Mil 1971	38	6	13	27	3	0	13	100
Civ 1971	38	2	12	19	1	4	24	100
2d FA Base								
Mil 1966	5	71	3	7	2	2	10	100
Civ 1966	2	88	2	4	2	2	0	100
Mil 1971	5	35	9	17	2	3	29	100
Civ 1971	5	57	3	13	1	5	16	100
3d FA Base								
Mil 1966	4	2	77	13	0	0	4	100
Civ 1966	2	1	86	5	2	2	2	100
Mil 1971	4	2	69	17	2	0	6	100
Civ 1971	0	4	68	4	2	2	20	100
4th FA Base								
Mil 1966	6	11	6	71	0	0	6	100
Civ 1966	2	4	7	79	4	2	2	100
Mil 1971	0	6	6	57	0	0	11	100
Civ 1971	1	2	9	66	1	0	21	100
5th FA Base								
Mil 1966	6	11	18	9	47	0	9	100
Civ 1966	11	8	5	2	63	11	0	100
Mil 1971	4	14	12	12	33	0	25	100
Civ 1971	4	13	6	6	57	7	7	100

With respect to the theme of unknown affiliations, the figures in Table 2 underscore the increasing percentages of men in power whose background data preclude reasoned judgments about affiliation, especially field-army factional ties. In general, we would argue that these unknowns are younger men who entered the Party or the PLA in the late 1930s and early 1940s (fourth and fifth generations^{*}). Although they may have served with the field armies during their final conquest of China in the late 1940s, their sense of loyalty is likely to be more focused on the geographic locale of their past twenty years' service, rather than on a defunct institution like the field army (or even the "old boy network" of the field-army faction). It is significant that nearly 15 percent (or more) of the incumbents in key military posts at the center and in the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth field-army factions in the summer of 1971 were unknowns. As a measure of relative military stability, this indicator would award high marks only to the Third faction, which we will discover had deliberately delayed the advance of youth to high position. As a measure of relative civil stability, only the Fifth faction power base deserves notice, since 15 percent or more of the civil positions in all others (including the center) had fallen under the influence of unknowns.

MILITARY-REGION FACTIONS

It was suggested earlier that China's internal political process between 1956 and 1971 may have been in transition from the system of five field-army factions outlined above to one of multiregional factions. The large field armies were deactivated in 1954, with the reorganization of the PLA after the Korean War. Thereafter, the three-division "army" (chün) became the principal ground force operational command, directly under the control of a military-region headquarters. At the same time, Air Force and Navy units were being organized under the local operational control of air defense districts and three major Fleet headquarters. There were no intervening levels of military bureaucracy

^{*}The fourth generation of civil and military leaders entered the Party (PLA) between August 1937 and December 1941. The fifth generation entered between January 1942 and August 1945. See the discussion of generations below.

between the General Staff in Peking and the military regions, air defense districts, and Fleet headquarters.

In the civil bureaucracy, although provincial authorities within each military region acquired varying amounts of power to solve local problems and deal directly with Peking, Peking twice felt the need to interpose intermediate regional Party subbureaus between the province and the center and twice deactivated these civil offices, while leaving military-region headquarters intact after 1953.

The original thirteen military regions were reduced to eleven after the Cultural Revolution; the remaining eleven military regions apparently inherited increasing power over human and material resource allocations at the provincial and local levels. We may thus treat the military region as a *political* entity, and not strictly a military power center, since there has been no revival of regional party subbureaus.

Table 1 and Fig. 1 portray some of the overlapping relationships between the two systems (field-army and military-region). The leadership of the emerging regional loyalty system obviously has derived (in most cases) some reinforcement of post-1953 shared, regionally-oriented values from pre-1953 shared field-army experiences. Much more narrowly geographic in concept, the notion of a military-region civil-military faction postulates a political system of eleven (in 1970-1971) military-region factions, sharing in some obvious respects a sense of obligation to older field-army informal loyalty systems, but now more deeply committed to local interests. Contrasting the two concepts, the field-army faction would have interregional and national implications, each faction sending its representatives to the center and to other regions in attempts to seize, or at least maintain, a fair share of power. While a similar process might characterize the division of China into contending military-region civil-military factions, all regions would be more likely to focus on issues "at home," while attempting to defend key political positions against outsiders.

For our purposes, we labeled a key leader an outsider if he had been appointed to the post under examination less than two generations before. Since the concept of a political-military generation in China

is related to political crisis periods, an insider would be someone who had been appointed to a military region during one crisis period, had survived through the next one, and had remained in the military region (though not necessarily in the same post) in the third. A measure of a military-region faction's viability and independence would thus be its ability to resist outsider interference and appointments. Furthermore, by this definition, since the focus of loyalties is presumed to be the military region, field-army origins (especially for younger officers) diminish in importance. Thus, officers from several different field-army systems may all be insiders, if they have been in the military region long enough.

Table 3 shows the nationwide status of insiders versus outsiders at the center and in each military region in late 1971. It offers several interesting theses. First, it seems clear that military-region *civil* bureaucracy has been much more successful in defending itself against outsider invasion than the military bureaucracy (especially in the northeast, the northwest, and the southwest). In all except one military region (Kunming), insiders held more than 60 percent of the available posts in the civil hierarchy. Conversely, in three of the military regions, at least 50 percent of the military posts were held by outsiders (Sinkiang, Kunming, and Wuhan). We know that those regions were subjected to repeated invasion during the Cultural Revolution -- invasions which apparently succeeded in seriously eroding their traditional local interest-group status.

On the other hand, Table 3 also underscores the relative power of insiders in eight military regions where they held more than 60 percent of both civil and military posts in late 1971: Lanchow, Chengtu, Nanking, Foochow, Canton, Shenyang, Peking, and Tainan. These figures, while arguing for the existence and increasing importance of military-region factions, also suggest a reinforcement of the older field-army loyalty system in those instances where leaders have been both long-term affiliates of a field army and long-term residents of the field army's geographic center of power.

It is the notion of a field-army faction's geographic center of power that deserves our attention, because it provides a geographic

Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG MILITARY REGION INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS IN CHINA IN 1971
(in percentages of key elite positions)

Field-Army Faction	Military										Civil								
	Insiders					Outsiders					Insiders				Outsiders				
	Personnel Changes 1956-1971		Status in 1971	Personnel Changes 1956-1971		Status in 1971	Personnel Changes 1956-1971		Status in 1971	Personnel Changes 1956-1971		Status in 1971	Personnel Changes 1956-1971		Status in 1971				
	Outgoing	New		Outgoing	New		Outgoing	New		Outgoing	New		Outgoing	New					
First																			
	Lanchou	80	67	68 ^a		20	33	32	91	81	73	9	20	27					
	Sinkiang	88	14	29		12	86	71	83	63	63	17	37	37					
Second																			
	Chengtu	88	70	60		12	30	40	93	84	79	7	16	21					
	Kunming	87	61	38		13	39	62	85	66	57	15	34	43					
	Wuhan	87	67	50			33	50	95	85	69	5	15	31					
Third																			
	Foochow	63	61	75		37	39	25	100	85	68	0	15	52					
	Nanking	96	90	89		4	10	11	90	93	100	10	7	---					
Fourth																			
	Canton	94	94	91		6	6	9	97	52	82	3	8	18					
	Shenyang	82	64	61		12	36	39	95	93	88	5	7	12					
Fifth																			
	Peking	86	85	93		14	15	7	94	87	76	6	13	24					
	Tsinan	100	93	78		0	7	22	82	93	86	18	7	14					
Center		44	23	42		56	77	58	84	48	33	16	52	67					

^aItalicized figures show representation in each field-army faction's "core" military region.

bridge between the older field-army and the newer military-region civil-military loyalty system. Our data suggest that, between 1950 and 1960, each field-army faction gained dominance over a province or provinces with the greatest wealth and the largest population in the power base (one to three military regions; see Fig. 1) which they occupied during and after the civil war. Thus, within each of the major power bases, each occupying field-army faction appears to have gained and held majority representation in the "core" military region (underlined) and in the richest province or provinces, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

FIELD-ARMY CONTROL OF CHINESE MILITARY REGIONS AND PROVINCES AFTER 1954

Field-Army Faction	Military Region	Core Province	Marginal Province
First	<u>Lanchou</u> Sinkiang	Kansu	Tsinghai* Shensi* Ninghsia Siakiang*
Second	<u>Chengtu</u> Wuhan Kunming Tibet	Szechuan* Honan Hupeh*	Kweichow* Yunnan* Tibet*
Third	<u>Nanking</u> Foochow	Chekiang Kiangsu Anhwei Shanghai Fukien	Kiangsi*
Fourth	<u>Canton</u> Shenyang	Kwangtung Hunan Liaoning Kirin	Kwangsi Heilungkiang*
Fifth	<u>Peking</u> Inner Mongolia <u>Tsinan</u>	Hopeh Tientsin Shangtung	Peking* Shansi Inner Mongolia*
Totals	13	16	13

* Provinces under greatest pressure from outsiders during the Cultural Revolution.

Figure 2 shows core and marginal military regions and provinces of high stability in China, if we define stability in terms of the continuing strength of insiders. The map reflects what happened after 1956. Under pressure from the Fourth Field-Army faction's great political offensive, several military regions and provinces became cockpits of increasing political (and ultimately even military) conflict, battlegrounds in which personnel shifts experienced such wide swings between insiders and outsiders that the political fate of specific marginal provinces (military districts) and regions hung in the balance.

At the regional level, Northwest and Southwest China bore the brunt of the Lin Biao effort after 1960 to enlarge the political domain of the Fourth Field-Army faction. Correspondingly, the Tibet, Sinkiang, and Kunming military regions experienced a major invasion by outsiders. Ultimately, Tibet was incorporated into the Chengtu Military Region. In Sinkiang, from a 1966 status when insiders occupied 100 percent of both military and civil posts, outsiders had seized 71 percent of the military posts and 37 percent of the civil posts by 1971. During the Cultural Revolution and immediately afterward, 86 percent of the key military replacements in Sinkiang Military Region came from outsider ranks (see Table 3). Likewise in the Kunming Military Region, insider control of key military posts had dropped from 67 percent in 1956-1958 to about 38 percent in 1971. Their control of civil posts had dropped from 100 percent in 1956-1958 to 57 percent in 1971.

In two other military regions, Wuhan and Shenyang, personnel shifts during the fifteen-year period reflected an assault on the local power structure by outsiders, especially during the Cultural Revolution. From a 1956-1958 high of insider control in Wuhan (80 percent of military posts and 83 percent of civil posts), insiders retained only 50 percent of military posts and about 70 percent of civil posts in 1971. In Shenyang, insiders were reduced from 89 percent (1956-1958) to 61 percent (1971) of military posts, while retaining about 88 percent of civil posts.

During the fifteen-year period, key posts on the Central Committee and the State Council at the center changed hands with such frequency, principally after 1965 (during the Cultural Revolution), that 77 percent




Fig. 2 -- Chinese military regions and provinces
of high political stability, 1956-1972
(hatched areas)

(182 persons) of the replacements were outsiders. Insider control of civil posts was reduced from 57 percent in 1956-1958 to only 33 percent in 1971. They lost status in their occupancy of military posts during the same period, retaining only 42 percent of the positions by 1971.

At the provincial level, the post-1960 conflict for power among field-army factions and incumbents versus outsiders brought unusual instability to the marginal areas, that is, areas which were either too poor or already too divided to resist outsider invasion. (Provinces which were under the greatest pressure from outsiders are indicated by an asterisk in Table 4.) It was in those provinces initially (pre-Cultural Revolution) that the Fourth Field-Army faction attempted to install its own military representatives. It was from among these provinces that pro-Fourth faction leaders first responded in early 1967 to the call for the establishment of revolutionary committees to replace provincial governments. After the Cultural Revolution, those provinces were generally the last to establish new Party committees, reflecting the persistence of the power struggle in areas where no faction could claim clear dominance. In core provinces dominated by a single faction, the early establishment of a committee, usually with only one (first) secretary, could be accomplished without fanfare. Conversely, in all marginal provinces (except Kiangsi), Party committees were established late (after March 1971) and required either a new Party secretary, a second secretary, or both, reflecting the need for compromises among contending factions within those provinces.* These relationships are shown in Table 5.

Despite the Fourth Field-Army faction's success in installing representatives in key positions in various provinces, our data suggest that core military regions and provinces successfully resisted significant erosion of insider power, thus underscoring the theme that military-region factions may already have succeeded field-army factions as the units of significant corporate loyalty in contemporary China's politics.

* I am grateful to my colleague Dr. George Sung for bringing these correlations to my attention.

Table 5

PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEES IN CHINA AFTER 1969

Established before March 1971			Established after March 1971		
<u>Province</u>	<u>New 1st Secretary</u>	<u>Compromise 2d Secy Needed</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>New 1st Secretary</u>	<u>Compromise 2d Secy Needed</u>
Anhui			Fukien		X
Chekiang			Heilungkiang	X	X
Honan			Hopeh	X	X
Hunan			Hupei		X
Kansu			Inner Mongolia	X	
Xiangsi			Kweichow	X	
Kiangsu			Ningsia		X
Kirin			Shangtung	X	X
Kwangsi			Shensi	X	
Kwangtung			Sinkiang		X
Liaoning			Szechuan		X
Peking		X	Tibet	X	
Shanghai		X	Tientsin		X
Shansi			Yunnan	X	X
Tsinghai		X			

Indeed, Table 3 shows that insiders accounted for the overwhelming majority of the significant political personnel changes -- both outgoing and replacement -- in the most stable military regions. In the Nanking, Canton, and Tsinan military regions between 1956 and 1971, more than 90 percent of the turnover among both civil and military leaders occurred among insiders. In the Peking Military Region more than 85 percent of outgoing and replacement civil and military personnel during the fifteen-year period were insiders. In the Lanchow, Chengtu, and Foochow military regions, insiders accounted for about 60 percent of military replacements and more than 80 percent of civil replacements. These data suggest that the stability of leadership *within* key military regions and their resistance to outsider invasion over the past fifteen years reflect the emergence of a new loyalty system based on powerful regional leaders who can offer more than Peking can in the way of reliable career returns to subordinates. In short, it would appear that Peking has been placed in the position

of a power broker, capable of negotiating elite shifts through compromise, arbitration, and sometimes coercion, but certainly dependent on the support of a shifting network of regional allies for agreement on effective operating policies.

It seems likely that field-army factional ties still provide some basis for reaching compromises based on shared values and experiences. Indeed, the close working relationship between the elites of the Second and Third field armies during the Sino-Japanese and civil wars would argue for their continuing mutual interest in protecting their political power stretching from East China across the Yangtze Valley to West and Southwest China. This group (Second and Third combined) has succeeded in making major inroads into the northeast where Ch'an Hsi-lien, an affiliate of the Second Field-Army faction, is the Commander of the Shenyang Military Region and First Secretary of the Liaoning Party Committee.

Nevertheless, our data suggest the waning of field-army factional significance as the older generations pass from the political scene and younger men with longer experiences in local and regional politics assume key posts. It is therefore appropriate to examine briefly the generational cleavage in China's internal politics.

GENERATIONAL FACTIONS

It seems unlikely that individual and collective motivations in Chinese politics may be structured effectively or usefully in terms of large generational groupings. Loyalties to more localized and personal groups would probably be of higher priority among the alternative motivations of key leaders in China. Nevertheless, successive generations of Chinese leaders have shared certain crises together and have experienced certain unique failures and successes which separate them from later generations. On the assumption that shared crises may define a generation, the following periods of entry into the Party or the PLA have been employed to distinguish China's evolving leadership.*

* For more details on the concept of political-military generations in China, see William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1973, Chapter Nine.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Date of Entry into CPC or PLA</u>
First	Before May 1928
Second	June 1928 - November 1931
Third	December 1931 - July 1937
Fourth	August 1937 - December 1940
Fifth	January 1941 - August 1945
Sixth	September 1945 - October 1950
Seventh	November 1950 - September 1954
Eighth	October 1954 - September 1959
Ninth	October 1959 - December 1963
Tenth	January 1964 - January 1967
Eleventh	February 1967 - March 1969
Twelfth	April 1969 - September 1971

Generational differences in perceptions and attitudes deserve our attention because they must have a profound influence over Chinese elite choices among policy alternatives as an older generation gives way to younger men. For example, the third and fourth generations (which entered the Party between November 1931 and December 1940) generally received more extensive formal education than the second, which came principally from among the peasants of the Central Yangtze Valley. Moreover, the fourth generation, which originated principally in North China, began to enter the Party and the Red Army when the Long March had ended in late 1936. The fifth generation entered the Party during the 1942-1944 Cheng Feng Movement, a rectification campaign which suddenly accented the poor peasant as the preferred candidate for Party membership. The fifth generation generally is not as well educated as the first, third, or fourth, or as the sixth, which entered during the civil war (1945-1950).

Table 6 shows the approximate distribution in 1971 of those six generations of Chinese leaders among 1400 key military and civil positions at the center and in the eleven military regions. It is noteworthy that, at the center, the civil bureaucracy still contains a high percentage of aging first generation leaders; however, in the military hierarchy the percentage of second generation leaders is higher. The third generation, on the other hand, holds only about 25 percent of military posts at the center.

A different picture prevails in the military regions. In those regions where the Fourth Field-Army faction held traditional power or

Table 6

DISTRIBUTION OF GENERATIONS OF CHINESE LEADERS IN 1971*

		Generation, Date of Entry into CPC or PLA, and Average Age in 1971					
		1 pre-1928 66	2 1928-31 62	3 1931-37 58	4 1937-40 56	5 1941-45 52	6 1946-50 48
Center							
	Mil	29	44	25	2		
	Civ	55	23	16	4		2
Lanchou MR							
	Mil	4.5	30	61	4.5		
	Civ	4	38	58			
Sinkiang MR							
	Mil			100			
	Civ	22	64	7	7		
Chengtu MR							
	Mil	8	77	15			
	Civ	22	17	35	17		9
Kunming MR							
	Mil	21	50	29			
	Civ	15	40	45			
Wuhan MR							
	Mil		41	53	6		
	Civ	4	41	55			
Foochow MR							
	Mil	11	89				
	Civ	24	19	43		9	5
Nanking MR							
	Mil	19	81				
	Civ	8	8	50	30		4
Canton MR							
	Mil	11	33	56			
	Civ	19	22	52	2		
Shenyang MR							
	Mil	5	33	62			
	Civ	4	28	48	20		
Peking MR							
	Mil	4.5	50	41	4.5		
	Civ		35	55	6	4	
Tainan MR							
	Mil	45	33	11	11		
	Civ	35	27	19	19		
Totals							
	Mil	16	37	42	5		
	Civ	40	23	30	4	1	2

* In percentages of the sample of those leaders whose generational status could be ascertained.

had been successful in introducing a strong representation during the 1958-1971 period, more youthful assumption of power is striking. In the home regions of Canton and Shenyang, both civil and military leaders of the third generation held nearly 55 percent of positions sampled. In the Shenyang Military Region, the fourth generation already held about 20 percent of available civil positions. In the Sinkiang and Lanchow military regions, the latter the traditional home region for the First Field-Army faction, the third military generation also held more than 60 percent of available military posts in mid-1971. In the Peking and Wuhan military regions, there was an evident thrust toward younger civil as well as military leaders.

In those regions where the Fourth faction had less impact during the GPCR, the power of the third generation had yet to gain from the second, which still remained dominant, especially in the military field. Thus, the Third Field-Army faction in Foochow and Nanking military regions retained older military leaders in key military posts (the majority were second generation), while permitting younger civil leaders to acquire power in the civil bureaucracy.

It is noteworthy that first generation leaders retained 55 percent of civil posts at the center in 1971 (down from 74 percent in 1956-1958). However, nationwide, the first generation had been reduced to 40 percent of all key civil posts by the summer of 1971. The third generation had increased its civil representation to 30 percent, while holding 42 percent of all key military posts.

The significance of these data relates primarily to a major issue confronting Chinese leaders: the question of succession. Besides being an issue for palace politics, it is more broadly an issue of generational perspective on many other issues, including nuclear weapons, threat priorities, priorities of resource allocations, etc. The data in Table 6 would suggest that the Third Field-Army faction (probably supported by and supporting Chou En-lai) has disagreed with the Fourth faction on the question of pace of generational advancement. Given the current ascendancy of the Second and Third field-army factions since the death of Lin Biao in late 1971, we might conclude that second generation experiences and perspectives are likely to characterize not only the

policies of the Third faction locally, but also those national policies over which Third (and Nanking-Foochow) faction representatives may be expected to have influence for the near future.

CIVIL-MILITARY FACTIONS

It has been a popular illusion among China analysts to divide Chinese politics between civil and military leaders. The unwritten premise has been that "the military" somehow wish to gain and hold ascendancy over "civilians." By this point, it should be clear, however, that the military have been no less vulnerable to factionalism than the civil polity. Indeed, it would appear that civil-military *unity* at the regional level has been more important in explaining China's internal political scene than civil-military *conflict* at the national level.

Nevertheless, it is important to describe briefly the apparent status of the military in China in the summer of 1971. After the Korean War, it appears that a civil-military dichotomy may have been exacerbated as civil leaders grappled with pressing administrative problems, while military leaders sought to modernize their forces. The Cultural Revolution changed all that. The collapse of the Party structure forced many professional military leaders to substitute for purged civil leaders in essentially civil roles. Despite the effort after 1969 to rebuild the Party and revive civil ascendancy over the military, our statistics suggest that the military still held significant power in both civil and military posts in late 1971.

Table 7 portrays shifts in civil-military power within the *civil* bureaucracy between 1956 and 1971. The most striking aspect of the situation in 1971 is the fact that approximately 40 percent of all key civil posts were in the hands of professional military men in all except four military regions: Chengtu, Wuhan, Foochow, and Shenyang.

Compared with the 1956-1958 status of the military in civil roles, this change was a striking expression of the success attending Lin Piao's post-1960 effort to pack certain elite groups with military leaders. Indeed, the most dramatic shifts in civil-military division of power occurred in those regions where Fourth Field-Army faction

Table 7

**DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS
IN CHINA'S CIVIL BUREAUCRACY
(in percentages of all civil posts)**

Field-Army Faction	Military-Region Faction	Military					Civil	
		1956-58		1971			1956-58	1971
		Cdrs	Cmsrs	Cdrs	Cmsrs	Total		
First	Lanchou	8	8	33	25	58	74	42
	Sinkiang	--	38	21	43	74	62	26
Second	Chengtu	--	46	16	30	46	54	64
	Kunming	--	13	35	15	50	87	50
	Wuhan	--	9	10	22	35	91	65
Third	Foochow	--	11	20	18	38	89	62
	Nanking	6	13	20	21	41	81	59
Fourth	Canton	--	28	10	34	44	72	56
	Shenyang	--	6	18	15	33	94	67
Fifth	Peking	--	12	19	31	50	88	50
	Tsinan	--	16	33	11	44	84	56
Center		13	14	27	17	44	73	56
Total Elite		8	16	24	22	46	76	54

outsiders were most aggressive. Although they may not ultimately have been successful in establishing their dominance of the region, their effort demanded a countereffort by insider military leaders (probably united with insider civil leaders) which left the region in 1971 much more firmly in the hands of powerful military leaders. Thus, in the First Field-Army faction power base (Lanchou and Sinkiang military regions), civil leaders in majority control of civil posts in 1956-1958 were replaced by a majority of military leaders by 1971. Likewise in the Kunming Military Region, civil leaders lost 37 percent of the civil posts to military leaders during the fifteen-year period. An overview of the statistics confirms the judgment that civil leaders lost between

20 and 40 percent of key civil posts to the military everywhere *except* the Chengtu Military Region, where civil leaders actually gained 10 percent.

Another theme revealed in Table 7 is the increasing power of professional commanders -- as opposed to commissars -- in civil roles. It is evident that commanders played only marginal roles in civil functions in 1956-1958, sharing power with commissars at the center and in two military regions (Lanchow and Nanking). By 1971, professional commanders (almost none with any commissar experience) were playing civil administrative roles in all military regions -- a trend which was reflected in a diminution of ideological emphasis in many dimensions of Chinese "style" after 1969, paced by an increasing concern with "pragmatic" calculations and administrative policies. This shift in status for the professional commander in the civil sphere matched an even more dramatic shift in the military sphere, where professional commanders held about 70 percent of all key military posts in 1971.

TRENDS IN LATE 1972

Employing the foregoing concepts of factional allegiance and behavior in China's domestic political process, we may examine available statistics as of late October 1972 to speculate about domestic political problems and trends.

In the context of the succession question which now consumes the interest of observers and participants alike, can Chou En-lai succeed in replacing the current generation of older military leaders in civil roles with younger civil leaders? Furthermore, can he reverse the trend toward regionalism -- a goal that possibly may be achieved only by displacing age with youth? Can Chou -- apparently in alliance with senior civil and military leaders of the Third Field-Army faction (probably also supported by leaders of the Second) -- piece together an effective *federal* system for China's domestic political process?

The resolution of China's authority crisis seems to be in doubt. The advent of younger leaders in key civil and military posts would tend to defuse their frustration and would remove from office incumbents

who have traditionally practiced a personal style of local and regional politics in favor of a more centrally-oriented generation of younger technocrats -- a class which Lin Piao and his Fourth Field-Army faction apparently wished to sponsor. Such a trend has been in evidence within the military: The vast majority of the sixty-one key leaders who have disappeared since May 1971 have been from the three oldest generations. However, among thirty-five new Party secretaries (out of 158) who had disappeared before April 1972, twenty-six (71 percent) were drawn from the third and younger generations, thus underlining a possible widening generation gap between civil and military leaders. The post-1971 political process apparently focused on the purge or punishment of Fourth Field-Army faction civil and military leaders -- and more broadly on the field-army factional system itself. Within the military hierarchy at the center, 45 percent of the thirty senior military leaders who disappeared between the 1971 purge of Lin Piao and October 1972 were drawn from the Fourth Field-Army faction. None disappeared from the Third Field-Army faction, a total of 22 percent disappeared from the First, Second and Fifth, and 29 percent of the disappearances were "unknown." In the provinces and military regions, officers from the Second (10 percent), Third (17 percent), and Fourth (23 percent) field-army factions and the unknowns (43 percent) accounted for the majority of the thirty disappearances. In the civil sphere, the majority of the thirty-five disappearances occurred among the Second (17 percent), Third (23 percent), and Fourth (32 percent) factions.

In contrast with the apparent erosion of the field-army loyalty system, a deepening of regionalism is reflected in the apparent dominance of insiders. In the civil sphere, by the time Party secretarial posts had been filled in 1971, only 28 out of 158 were occupied by outsiders. By April 1972, eleven (40 percent) of those had disappeared.

The great majority of military disappearances occurred among affiliates of four military-region factions: the Canton faction (which lost four leaders at the center and five in the provinces); the Nanking faction (which lost none at the center, but five in the region); the Shenyang faction (which lost two at the center and two in the region);

and the Wuhan faction (which lost one at the center and four in the region). Out of a total of sixty-one disappearances (equally balanced between the center and the regions) since May 1971, eighteen were of unknown military-region affiliation and twelve had been involved in central politics too long for them to be tarred with a regional brush.

As in the past, insiders accounted for the majority (54 percent) of the political action. However, given the fact that only twenty-eight out of 158 secretaries were outsiders, the disappearance of eleven (or 40 percent) of them by April 1972 tends to confirm the trend toward regionalism in the hiring and firing of civil leaders.

It is that trend combined with the civil-military dichotomy that deserves our final comment. Seventy-one percent of the secretaries ousted from civil posts by April 1972 had been drawn from the military ranks. Since ninety-seven professional military leaders occupied civil secretarial posts when the 158 posts were first filled, the disappearance of twenty-five of these (contrasted with the removal of only eight of the sixty-one civilians) suggests a trend toward revived displacement of professional military leaders by civilians in such roles.

The age of these civil leaders (still numbered primarily among the "Long Marchers") may be contrasted with the emphasis on younger military leaders, whose probable commitment to modernizing military technology *may* inspire a corresponding commitment to the central administration of a better-integrated national military economy.

In short, Chou's strategy (hardly unique in China's long history) may be to capture the loyalty of young military commanders (instead of commissars, whom Chou has disdained for at least forty years), while paying short-term homage to age among his contemporaries in the civil bureaucracy. In doing so, however, he must rely temporarily on the essential support of the most powerful military regional commanders: Ch'en Hsi-lien in Shenyang, Hsü Shih-yu in Nanking, and Ting Sheng in Canton. He must also look to foreign levers for assistance. Among

these, trade and technology from advanced economies may become crucial in persuading or coercing his aging allies and adversaries at the regional level, their representatives at the center, and their youthful successors. Little time would seem to remain for resolving the questions of pace, rewards, and punishments. The pace of personnel changes must therefore be expected to remain high as Chou stages the last great political campaign of his career, punctuated by pointed references to the thoughts of Chairman Mao.