


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
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**CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
IN TRANSITION:  
THE CHALLENGE TO US POLICY**

by

**Lee C. Fischbach  
Gabriel Marcella**

**5 November 1976**

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## FOREWORD

Central America and the Caribbean constitute a subregion of particular importance to the United States. Because of the area's proximity and the conviction that nation-states stand a better chance of maintaining their security, the memorandum considers the development and maintenance of viable nation-states, favorably disposed to the United States, essential. The authors assert that the United States should play a more active role in the promotion of national development to protect its interests and that neglect could perpetuate security liabilities too close to home.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.  
Major General, USA  
Commandant

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS**

**MR. LEE C. FISCHBACH** joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1964. He graduated from West Virginia University and holds a bachelor's degree in political science. Mr. Fischbach is currently completing graduate studies in political science at Shippensburg State College. In addition to his current studies of the Latin American region, he has contributed to several studies on tactical nuclear warfare strategy and on precision guided munitions concepts.

**DR. GABRIEL MARCELLA** joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1974. He graduated from St. Joseph's College with a bachelor's degree in Latin American studies, earned a master's degree in history from Syracuse University, and a doctorate in Latin American history and politics from Notre Dame. His foreign studies include a Fulbright-Hayes fellowship to Ecuador. Dr. Marcella's professional background includes teaching Latin American studies at Chestnut Hill and Rosemont Colleges, Temple University, the University of Indiana, and Notre Dame. He has written articles and book reviews for several professional journals.

**CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN TRANSITION:  
THE CHALLENGE TO US POLICY**

The Central American and Caribbean areas constitute a subregion of particular importance to the United States.<sup>1</sup> In the past this area has earned a reputation as a "trouble spot" due to its foreign dependence, the fragility of its local sociopolitical institutions, and geographic proximity to the US mainland. While it is often argued that this subregion does not involve the types of strategic interests that, individually or collectively, vitally influence US national security, recent involvement in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959-62), and the Dominican Republic (1965) indicates that this area ranks exceedingly high on the agenda for US concern.

Central American and many Caribbean states will continue to loom significant as residual dependencies of the United States, particularly so in the Caribbean as the British and Dutch loosen their political and security ties there. Their status will, to restate a truism, be affected by the dynamics of internal socioeconomic and political change, and by the extensive courting of a number of suitors—specifically, Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Japan, the European Community, and, on a more subdued plane, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and certain Eastern European countries. These characteristics and processes will influence the area's emerging ideological pluralism. Moreover,

historically the United States has remained uninvolved in the political problems of those entities which retained their status as colonies and clients of European nations. Thus, in the Caribbean, the newly-independent states will be open to ideological and elite challenges; in Central America the political struggle is against ideologically cohesive and well-entrenched elites, and is not significantly influenced by the removal of a colonial overlord. This basic differentiation makes more challenging the definition and implementation of a regional policy since the development and maintenance of viable nation-states that are favorably disposed towards it are goals of fundamental importance to the United States. The United States would have to reexamine closely the political map of the hemisphere, if, in the dimmest of scenarios, one or more Central American or Caribbean countries acquired the characteristics of a Socialist state with close ties to Cuba. Currently Guyana is trending in the direction of a one-party Socialist state. The appearance of such a scenario would grant further legitimacy to the validity of the Cuban model.

As is becoming increasingly evident in world affairs, the choice of models is not simple; it is not confined to the implantation of a Cuban strain. Political developments in Peru and Portugal suggest that regimes committed to reform and national development may often opt for an eclectic form of authoritarianism, and that the short-term developments may result in a situation of political flux whose final resolution cannot be anticipated.

In the meantime, all Central American states (with the exceptions of Costa Rica and Belize), and certainly Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, feature nondemocratic political systems within environments of socioeconomic underdevelopment. At the same time, all are committed to national development, though somewhat differentially.

Throughout Central America and in many of the larger Caribbean countries, the United States is the major trading partner, the major dispenser of foreign aid, and the preeminent source of technology.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, the United States is, by virtue of the Rio Treaty, at the same time the acknowledged protector of the region from extrahemispheric and, on a diminishing level, intrahemispheric security threats.<sup>3</sup> Thus, in an area which indisputably lies within its sphere of influence, the United States is obligated to preserve its interests within an environment increasingly fraught with risks and challenges.

## TRENDS IN POLITICAL CHANGE—CENTRAL AMERICA

Central America is beset with a number of problems that make troublesome a transition to viable nation-statehood. Monocultural and export oriented agricultural economies combine with highly stratified social structures and closed political systems to make sustained and balanced development problematic. Aggravating social problems—such as poor nutrition, insufficient housing, and inadequate education— are perceived as sources of concern for the viability of the various political systems. (For basic data on socioeconomic indicators, see table 1). Costa Rica, long trumpeted as a bastion of democracy, is an exception to this rule.

The United States traditionally has been heavily committed to development programs through foreign aid for the various countries, programs whose goals have been the improvement of living conditions, increased agricultural production, industrialization, and some redistribution of income. Additional improvements require structural changes, especially agrarian and tax reform, for which a broad political consensus has yet to develop.

Costa Rica possesses the institutional capability to peacefully resolve internal difficulties, though it appears well on its way to becoming a full blown welfare state.<sup>4</sup> Belize, due to the festering boundary problem, is vulnerable to Guatemalan territorial pretensions as well as to Cuban ideological blandishments; the latter is also a possibility for Jamaica and Guyana.

Elsewhere in Central America, the continuing political struggle between those who oppose and those who favor substantive political, economic, and social change is the principal source of conflict. Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras possess the structural characteristics for enduring and durable conflict.<sup>5</sup> These broad characteristics are:

- An endemic cultural and historical pattern of social and political violence frequently legitimized for bringing about change.
- Inequitable distribution of real income and landed wealth.
- Related inadequate and frequently stagnating agricultural productivity.
- Oligarchical political systems that fail to articulate and aggregate interests for the masses.
- Marxist guerrilla activity in Guatemala and Nicaragua of a recurring character. Although this activity does not promise to

overthrow or even destabilize the political systems involved, it calls attention to social injustices and the inadequacy of the status quo.

- Putatively modernizing military-led governments committed to the goals of development, who frequently undertake cosmetic reforms designed for short-term rather than long-term redistribution objectives. Honduras is a possible exception to this characteristic.

- Elitist and authoritarian governments operating in political cultures (particularly in Nicaragua and Guatemala) that lack institutionalized alternatives for resolving political disputes and are technically incapable of engineering development.

- Pervasive conservatism and acceptance of the status quo by major sectors of society.

- Highly stratified social structures wherein mobility is precluded to the majority of the population. The cumulative effects of these characteristics mean that basic national problems will continue substantially unresolved for the foreseeable future. The Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, Salvadorean, and Honduran political systems may make differential and deferential commitments to development, but it will be exceedingly difficult for them to institutionalize a political process that successfully will achieve their developmental goals without overt conflict.<sup>6</sup>

In this emerging environment, social radicalism holds some attraction to reformers in power or aspiring toward it. The Brazilian and Peruvian models of development will be sources of emulative tension among those elites who favor centrally directed modernization, those who seek to retain the basic characteristics of the current sociopolitical system, and those who desire more radical structural changes. Although the latter are in a distinct minority, their presence at times energizes conservative coalitions to take preemptive measures in collusion with conservative elements of the military, supported by like-minded social sectors such as the landowners. Low levels of conflict involving coups and countercoups, coordinated as well as spontaneous violence, land seizures, political assassination, and rural unrest symptomize the tension generated by the pressures for reform and by conservative negativism.

This transition to social, economic, and political development will be a traumatic experience for societies accustomed to continuation of the political stalemate. For example, the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua will be subjected to stresses never before felt as a result of the weakness and inefficiency of its present elitist political system. As some argue,

Somoza has not institutionalized a political program and movement that can effectively undertake national development and bring about the semblance of greater popular political participation.<sup>7</sup> Although pressures emanating from the United States and the world may force Somoza to attempt liberalization of his regime, an opening to the left is politically difficult to manage, involving, as it inevitably must, an effort to play the electoral game. Currently, Nicaragua exhibits traits of a leftward-leaning political system encased in a country with a traditional authority system and weakly-based political parties; thus, it has some of the makings of a post-Salazar Portuguese-style political process.<sup>8</sup> While no one is predicting the demise of the Somoza regime, the 1981 elections may usher in some significant and unpredictable changes.

Similar crosscurrents and pressures affect the military-led governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. On the surface it appears that Honduras is more genuinely committed to substantive reforms under the regime of younger military officers. Yet Honduras, as well as the other three countries, will not be spared Hobson's dilemma, for violence and conflict will accompany either alternative—maintenance of the status quo or consciously directed change. Moreover, the spillover effects of conflict in one country are not to be discounted in an area notoriously vulnerable to outside influence and interference.

#### TRENDS IN POLITICAL CHANGE—THE CARIBBEAN

With few exceptions, the political entities which comprise the Caribbean share a common heritage of long and turbulent colonial rule, slavery, and sugar plantation economies. Except possibly for Cuba, all of these mini-states face a plethora of internal problems which portend serious challenges to their future well-being, and in some cases, their very existence. Compounding the special social, economic, and political problems is the resurgence of the historical rise in commodity prices, in particular food and nonrenewable resources such as oil. While unabated worldwide inflation creates great pressure on all governments, the effect on the smaller dependent countries, particularly those which are for the most part without self-sustaining resources, threatens to be overwhelming. Although diverse in respect to race, culture, government, and language, these small territories share several particularly distressing characteristics.

Economically, Caribbean states suffer either from total lack of significant natural resources or rely on a few marketable commodities;

additionally, all have limited domestic markets for industry, extremely high rates of unemployment, and rampant inflation.

Socially and culturally, the people of the predominantly black Caribbean continue to languish amidst a value system created by white European colonial powers and nurtured and emulated by the current nonwhite power elite. As a result, there has been no real sense of national identity or purpose, until recently. Although political power has finally been wrested from whites throughout most of the Caribbean, this has not yet resulted in the realization of the elusive social and cultural values which the majority of the populations associate with their search for national identity.

Undercurrents of racial friction exist in most Caribbean territories, primarily as a result of the traditional privileged economic and social position of whites and mulattoes; additionally friction has resulted from polarization between the politically dominant blacks and the underrepresented East Indians in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Surinam. Extremist black power groups, thought to pose a serious threat in the early 1970's, have not brought about any serious breakdown of law and order. Terrorist activity in the Caribbean has been sporadic, sometimes sensational, but of little consequence; none seriously threatens any of the current governments.

With the exception of Communist Cuba, the dictatorship in Haiti, and the personalistic regime in the Dominican Republic, all of the independent states of the Caribbean have parliamentary systems of government. Few, if any however, have a unifying ideological political basis except for Cuba.<sup>9</sup> While Jamaica espouses a program of democratic socialism (which retains the existing parliamentary democracy and a commitment to a role for private enterprise), it is not certain to what extent Prime Minister Michael Manley and his People's National Party are prepared to pursue Jamaican socialism.<sup>10</sup> Although the major opposition is conservative, pressure from the radical wing of Manley's own party could force him farther to the left. Not unlike Jamaica, but of far more significance as far as the possibility of the creation of another Cuba, are the political currents in Guyana. Here there is also a trend toward socialism, but on a much more ambitious and increasingly authoritarian plane.<sup>11</sup> Under the tutelage of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, the ruling People's National Congress has come to dominate the government. Unlike the situation in Jamaica, there is no well-organized conservative party opposition in Guyana, while the major left-wing party—the People's Progressive Party led by

Marxist ex-Premier Cheddi Jagan—has been seriously weakened by Burnham's espousal of a similar Marxist-Leninist philosophy.<sup>12</sup>

Although only time will tell how well and how long Caribbean societies will be able to cope with their internal problems within a democratic framework, current indications are that the trend toward single-party rule accompanied by measure to suppress discontent may prevail. Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Associated States are under the firm control of a single leader or party. In the absence of effective political opposition, and given the inability of these governments to satisfy the aspirations of large segments of the population, the prospects for violence and disorder loom large. Even now in Jamaica, where effective party opposition does exist, institutionalized violence between politically aligned gangs is increasing and shows no sign of abatement.

#### THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

Since the cold war, US policy for Central America and the Caribbean has sought to insulate the area from ideological currents hostile to the United States without overt intervention (the Dominican Republic adventure of 1965 notwithstanding) in the countries deemed vulnerable. A policy of containment, in large part posited on the assumption that the threat to the stability of the area derives from sources external to the subregion, has been applied in order to preserve the subregional contours of the inter-American system.<sup>13</sup> Socialist Cuba accordingly has been subjected to a type of quarantine—some of which was self-imposed as the result of Cuban fears about the insecurity of the revolution. Moreover, containment was most effective during periods of American hyperactivity and involvement in foreign contingencies (Guatemala 1954, Lebanon 1958, Vietnam 1961-75, Dominican Republic 1965—to cite some examples) which underscored American resolve to protect the Free World from the menace of world communism.

In recent years a number of world and domestic trends and currents have altered the environment for hyperactivity. Briefly stated these are: detente; the emergence of a multipolar world; the emergence of internal distaste for foreign military involvement, a development related to the reorientation of US domestic priorities; new forms of international power embodied in economic resources; the post-Vietnam dialogue on

CENTRAL AMERICA	POPULATION-- 1974-1980	PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL POPULA- TION GROWTH RATE (1960-74 AVERAGE)	GDP (1973) (MILLIONS)	ANNUAL GDP GROWTH RATE (1960-73 AVERAGE)	PERCENTAGE OF LITERACY	ETHNIC COMPOSITION
Guatemala	5,356,000 6,321,000	2.8	\$2,320.9	6.0	37.9 (1964)	Indian, mestizo, white, black
El Salvador	3,942,000 4,846,000	3.5	1,180.3	5.4	59.5 (1971)	Mestizo, white
Honduras	2,645,000 2,996,000	3.1	811.3	4.6	52.8 (1973)	Mestizo, white, black, mulatto
Nicaragua	2,085,000 2,460,000	2.8	935.5	6.3	57.8 (1971)	Mestizo, white, black, mulatto
Costa Rica	1,934,000 2,323,000	3.1	1,211.2	6.3	85.7 (1963)	White, mestizo, black
Belize	136,000 ---	2.9	81 (1972)	---	Over 89% (1960)	Black, mulatto, Indian, white, oriental
PRINCIPAL CARIBBEAN STATES						
Barbados	240,000 243,000	0.2	148.9	3.7	97.4 (1960)	Black, mulatto, white
Dominican Republic	4,555,000 5,407,000	2.9	2,053.7	6.5	67.2 (1970)	Mestizo, mulatto, white, black
Haiti	4,516,000 4,997,000	1.7	437.1	1.3	28-30 (1971)	Black, mulatto, white
Jamaica	1,984,000 2,169,000	1.5	1,562.5	5.4	81.9 (1960)	Black, mulatto, Indian, white
Trinidad-Tobago	1,076,000 1,219,000	1.9	1,760.0 (est. 1974)	4.5 (1974)	89 (1960)	Black, East Indian, mixed, white
Ceylon	792,000 ---	2.4	273.7	---	80 (1960)	East Indian, black, white, Amerindians, Chinese
Suriname	407,000 ---	2.3	310.0 (1972: GNP)	---	84	Black, Hindustani, Indonesian

Source: Abstracted from Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, Annual Report 1974*, and US Agency for International Development, *Economic Data Book for the Countries of Latin America, 1975*.

TABLE 1. SELECTED COUNTRY DATA--CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

the efficacy of US nation-building efforts in societies of distinct cultural and political hue; the rapprochement with the People's Republic of China; the economic resurgence of Western Europe and Japan; and the schisms in world communism.

These developments have helped create an environment conducive to the interplay of a greater number of actors and variables in world affairs. This is particularly true in the Central American and Caribbean region. The region itself is experiencing a unique historical transition whose general outlines may be sketched as follows: the withdrawal of the traditional European security presence (England and Holland); the de facto reintegration of Cuba into the subsystem; the emergence of newly independent former colonies, some as ministates; a region-wide commitment, albeit differentially expressed, to the goals of nation-building; the emergence of Venezuelan petroleum importance throughout the region; a Latin American outcry against the inadequacies of the present inter-American system; the slow but certain discrediting of rightist authoritarian regimes traditionally closely linked to the United States; a resurgence of racial and ethnic tensions in some parts of the former British Caribbean; and the waning of consensus in favor of collective security embodied in the 1947 Rio Treaty.

The transition to a new world and regional environment promises to provide unique opportunities for Caribbean and Central American states to indulge proclivities for independent participation in subregional affairs never before available to most of them. Indeed, they may be forced to indulge them to secure their individual state interests, however amorphous their articulation. Moreover, the same transition promises to provide opportunities for increased outside power competition and for the emergence of new linkages.

Cuban political, economic, and ideological influence in the Caribbean will certainly expand. Such expansion is consistent with the de facto reintegration of Cuba into regional affairs and Cuban foreign policy objectives seeking to weaken and negate US influence in the area.<sup>14</sup> Although recent Cuban propaganda reflects a change in revolutionary rhetoric to a more moderate discussion of international political and economic issues,<sup>15</sup> it would be unsafe to assume that Cuba has abandoned her revolutionary zeal. Given a particularly promising revolutionary group or movement, Cuba is capable of rapidly providing support—witness the example of its involvement in Angola.

In addition, a low-level but perceptible sphere of influence

competition within the region by Mexico, Cuba, and Venezuela will become increasingly evident, particularly in the Caribbean where most of the newly independent states will eventually be forced to choose between some type of alignment, either among themselves or with a regional hemispheric power. Finally, tension within the myriad political systems related to the strains of socioeconomic development is likely to occasionally erupt into violence and politically related conflict, invalidating the original assumption that the greater threat to the stability of the area derives from external sources.

The suggestion of conflict scenarios brings up the imponderable of their impact upon the United States. At a minimum the totality of US interests would be adversely affected, particularly such intangibles as the inter-American system, favorable disposition towards the United States, and the character of bilateral relations. Economic interests are certain to suffer. These, some argue, are not worth the legendary hill of beans. The measurement of the impact of conflict upon traditional US political/strategic interests hinges upon an assessment of the environment which the United States would like to have in the "trouble-spot" region. It is quite certain that political change is accelerating and that new forms may emerge from the current and projected flux. This raises serious questions: Does the United States desire stability at all costs? Does the United States prefer viable nation-states capable of meeting their internal needs and capable of attending to some fundamental security responsibilities even if we dislike some dimensions of the regimes? The preference for an environment of stability has some advantages. It preserves the status quo—a better known commodity than a society in transition to an unpredictable variety of options, some of which may run counter to the preference for stable and friendly neighboring societies. The choice is not, however, a prerogative of the United States. The internal dynamics of the region assert the choice in the direction of viable nation-states.

The United States has a limited capacity to favorably influence the direction of change. The United States is already committed to help many of the countries of the region achieve the goal of nation-building through the rhetoric and substance of multilateral and bilateral assistance. This commitment is born from a combination of pure self-interest and the humanitarian motivation to help societies improve the well-being of their citizenry. Yet foreign aid, combined with the social and political impact of economic and technological revolution on developing societies, often constitutes a disturbing element. The

strongly-held position that political, economic, and social development should be accomplished only through participatory evolutionary change fails to note that conflict and social change are traveling companions.<sup>16</sup> The alternative of accepting and tacitly supporting regimes that oppose reform and national development in fact preserves for the United States the perennial dilemma of dealing with the "trouble-spot" concept—an exercise that in the long run promises to become a zero sum game.

#### GUIDELINES FOR A CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN POLICY

Traditional US policy toward the Central America and Caribbean subregion is exemplified by the historic pattern of intermittent interventions and periods of neglect. The area has been considered of vital concern to the United States, but evidence of such concern has been displayed only when circumstances arise which pose a security threat to the United States, and only when relatively little can be done to avert conflict short of direct intervention or military support. Strategies built upon concepts of intervention or nonintervention, however, contribute little toward the long-term solution of the ingrained socioeconomic problems of the area where internal conflict is manifest. Accordingly, it is recommended that the United States play a more active role in the promotion of integrated national development throughout the area.<sup>17</sup> This would not only contribute to the long-range goal of the creation of viable nations, but would provide tangible evidence of a genuine concern for the welfare of the people of the region, and confirm—far better than rhetoric—the special US interest in maintaining its influence in competition with Cuba. Such a role, for example, could be of mutual advantage, and, given the small size of the economies involved, be achieved at relatively low cost, by:

- supporting improvement in the economic rationality of such faltering regional institutions as the Central American Common Market and CARICOM (Caribbean Community);<sup>18</sup>
- assisting in the implementation of a program for regional cooperation in development of national seabeds and maritime resources;
- removing nontariff barriers to regional exports and legislation of other measures which would improve access to US markets; and,
- expediting the economic recovery of Puerto Rico. The depressed economy of Puerto Rico, evidenced by high inflation and

**unemployment, is a liability in US-Caribbean relations, particularly since some Caribbean countries look upon Puerto Rican-US ties with disdain.**

**There is no guarantee that a more active US role in helping to redress some of the region's socioeconomic problems will result in any short-term solutions, and there is always the risk that such efforts may result in an increase in the index of instability even when administered with the greatest of care.<sup>19</sup> Although certain countries—most notably the Central American states, the Dominican Republic and, to a lesser extent, Haiti—are more amenable to closer ties with the United States, the newer independent and emerging ministates of the English-speaking Caribbean will continue to evince a high degree of autonomy in the formulation of their domestic and foreign policies. While the above guidelines may be more or less effective depending upon the individual country concerned, all urge a higher level of US concern and activity than heretofore displayed, and thus a heightened awareness by the United States of its interests in the Caribbean and Central America.**

## ENDNOTES

1. For the purposes of this paper, Central America includes Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. With the exception of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, the Caribbean entities considered include all of the insular territories plus Guyana and Surinam on the north coast of South America.

2. With the exception of Caribbean-produced bauxite and refined oil—which currently provide respectively about 75 percent and approximately 10 percent of total US requirements—and some potentially significant copper (Costa Rica and Panama) and petroleum (Guatemala) deposits in Central America, economic interests in the region, although important, do not represent a major contribution to the economic well-being of the United States. While US investment in Central America and the Caribbean represents only about 5 percent of total US foreign direct investment, and only about 3 percent of total US world sales, trade and investment matters that appear of peripheral concern to the US economy are often of great importance to the individual countries of this region. Exports from the United States, for example, constitute about half of the import business of Honduras, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, and a third or more of that of Jamaica, Surinam, Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. US imports from the region represent over 60 percent of the total exports from Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas; 50 percent from Honduras; 40 percent from Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, and Cost Rica; and 30 percent or more of the goods shipped from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Surinam. Among the Leeward and Windward Islands of the Eastern Caribbean, US economic interests are much less with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, and the Netherlands Antilles. Otherwise, France dominates the trade of its three overseas departments—Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana—while Great Britain continues as an important trading partner with its colonies as well as with Grenada, Barbados, and the Associated States.

3. Proximity alone makes the Central American and Caribbean area strategically important to the United States. Other strategic interests include: the security of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, two dependencies which in effect make the United States an integral part of the Caribbean Basin; maintenance of military bases and facilities located throughout the Caribbean; continued access to the major maritime routes which pass through key straits and narrows, in particular the sea lanes encompassing the Venezuelan to US East Coast petroleum routes, as well as other trade routes from the United States to the Panama Canal; and continued nondiscriminatory access to certain strategic material resources such as bauxite from Jamaica and Venezuelan oil, some of which is refined at Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the Netherlands Antilles.

4. For a Costa Rican's interpretation, see Samuel Stone, *La Dinastia de los Conquistadores: La Crisis del Poder en la Costa Rica Contemporanea*, especially pp. 307–358.

5. For a somewhat similar perspective in Latin American political systems, see the perceptive taxonomy presented by Kalman H. Silvert in Kalman H. Silvert

et al., *The Americas in a Changing World*, pp. 62-77, especially pp. 67-70. Silvert categorizes Guatemala and the Dominican Republic as prenational, having a classbound patrimonial rule, traditional in a slowly modernizing social setting. Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti as classbound patrimonial with little social modernization.

6. For recent interpretations of Guatemalan politics see Danilo Barillas, *Democracia Cristiana y Su Posicion ante El Ejercito de Guatemala Hoy*; also the somewhat dated but perceptive interpretation of Kenneth F. Johnson, *Guatemala: From Terrorism to Terror*.

7. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Somoza Family's Power is Pervasive," *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1975, p. B13. See also Kenneth F. Johnson and Philip L. Paris, "Nicaragua," in *Political Forces in Latin America: Dimensions of the Quest for Stability*, ed. by Ben C. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970, pp. 115-130; Charles W. Anderson, "Nicaragua: The Somoza Dynasty," in *Political Systems of Latin America*, ed. by Martin C. Needler, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970, pp. 109-131; for El Salvador see, Paul R. Hoopes, "El Salvador," in *Political Forces in Latin America*, pp. 95-114, and Charles W. Anderson, "El Salvador," in *Political Systems of Latin America*, pp. 70-91.

8. On Portugal see Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 250-270.

9. Knud Caesar, "The Caribbean—A New Political Factor," *Aussen Politik*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1975, p. 236.

10. Ralph Blumenthal, "Three Political Killings Stir New Fears Over Jamaica's Course," *The New York Times*, February 4, 1976, p. 4.

11. "Opposition Protests as Constitution is Amended," *Advocate-News (Bridgetown)*, December 20, 1974, p. 3, as transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report, Latin America*, January 5, 1976, pp. VI-V2.

12. "Deputy Prime Minister Says Socialism is Goal," *Advocate-News (Bridgetown)*, August 16, 1975, p. 2, as transcribed in FBIS, *Daily Report, Latin America*, August 26, 1975, p. T1; "Burnham, Jagan Hold Informal Talks," *Guardian (Trinidad)*, November 19, 1975, p. 1, as transcribed in FBIS, *Daily Report, Latin America*, November 25, 1975, p. V1.

13. The Inter-American system is largely an ideal of American foreign policy that has striven to maintain harmony and collective security through the formal instrumentality of the 1947 Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance as well as the unwritten compacts and ideals that support the concept of a "special relationship" between the United States and Latin America.

14. "Cuba Tries to Organize Former British Colonies," *The Times of the Americas*, January 7, 1976, p. 3.

15. "Latin American and Caribbean Communist Party Declaration Text," *Granma Weekly Review (Havana)*, June 22, 1975, pp. 4, 5, as transcribed in FBIS, *Daily Report, Latin America*, July 2, 1975, pp. A1-A18.

16. This is a major thesis advanced by Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal work *Political Order in Changing Societies*, particularly the discussion of "Political Order and Political Decay," pp. 1-92.

17. In the words of Bayless Manning, "... the building of nationhood, economic modernization, and internal social restructuring," "Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976, p. 282.

18. Alan Riding, "Economics, a Caribbean Subject, Too," *The New York Times*, November 23, 1975, Sect. 4, p. 5; "CARICOM Cracks," *To The Point International*, July 26, 1975, pp. 33, 34.

19. For an example of the destabilizing effect of the US aid program in the Dominican Republic, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos*, pp. 57, 58.

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→ should prudently play a more active role in the promotion of national development in order to protect its security interests. To neglect the area, as it frequently has in the past, could perpetuate security liabilities too close to home.

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