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
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**THE CHANGING MORAL DIMENSION
OF STRATEGY**



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THE CHANGING MORAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

by

Chaplain (Colonel) Charles F. Kriete

5 November 1976

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FOREWORD

The interaction of strategy, war, and national values is a phenomenon which has concerned and sometimes confused the western democracies, especially since the end of World War II. This memorandum contends that the potential power of our central cultural values is such that they are the decisive dimension of strategy, when mobilized either in support of or in opposition to the political objectives of military operations. The author asserts that the global strategies of the United States, particularly the military power and planning which support them, will be successful in gaining public support only to the degree which their objectives are perceived to be congruent with the democratic values our people hold. He concludes that these values, in military strategy, form the center of gravity of our strategic posture, and that our military operations depend on them for success.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CHAPLAIN (COLONEL) CHARLES F. KRIETE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1975. A graduate of Heidelberg College and Union Theological Seminary, he has done additional graduate work at the New School for Social Research and has completed the National Training Laboratories program for specialists in organization development. Before graduation from the US Army War College in 1975, Chaplain Kriete was the Director of Plans, Programs and Policies in the Office, Chief of Chaplains. He is a pastor of the United Church of Christ.

THE CHANGING MORAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

A paper which alleges a moral dimension of strategy and proceeds to discuss it is in trouble: consensus of moral judgment on almost any issue in a pluralistic society is certainly temporary at best, and many would deny even its possibility. Others who might admit its possibility would deny it any relevance to strategy or policy formation. Nevertheless it is the thesis of this paper that American military strategy will succeed in reaching its objectives only to the degree that those objectives reflect congruence with our dominant cultural values. This is by way of claiming that the moral dimension of strategy is becoming more relevant to military success than has been formerly perceived.

In this connection, the word "moral" requires clarification, since it means so many things to so many people. In a general sense, it refers to feelings, opinions, and norms of behavior that citizens perceive as relevant to those public and private courses of action which require choices or judgments. The word can also refer to the content of a specific set of proscriptions which demand specific courses of action, and by which they are to be judged good or evil. For the purpose of this paper however, the moral dimension of strategy simply means those values which express the way that most citizens in a given culture

think that things ought to be. In America those values have an identifiable content, which has been described and which will be detailed later.

"Moral" is an ambiguous word for another reason. Americans tend to apply their own personal moral norms to the policies and actions of nations in a simplistic way, confusing moral issues with moralistic judgments. Those individual norms are not as easily realizable as the idealist imagines, when applied to international relations; public officials, unlike individuals, are not free to renounce the nation's self-interest. The requirement to protect the national interest involves officials in a means-ends dilemma of such complexity that prudence is apt to be a greater virtue than the individual's moralistic sense, however defined, would allow.

Thus Charles Frankel, philosopher and former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, raises the question of means and ends in foreign policy as one of "whether it is better to be decent and lose or practical and win."¹ He would also support its reversal, asking whether it is not equally relevant to inquire if it is better to be practical and lose or to be decent and win, since there is in America a belief, often held to stem from our Puritan past, that justice is bound to triumph in the long run. Seymour Lipset, the noted sociologist, describes our moralistic tendency well in an article he calls "The Paradox of American Politics."² Nor is he the first observer to note the peculiar role that moral values play in American life and national strategy. With characteristic insight and irony, the late Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian whose *Moral Man and Immoral Society* powerfully influenced a generation of American strategists including Dean Acheson and George Kennan, pointed out the ethical paradox of patriotism, regardless of whether based on secular or religious content—its transmutation of individual unselfishness into national egoism.³ This phenomenon, in his view, makes hypocrisy the most significant moral characteristic of nations in carrying out controversial policies. Such a hypocritical situation can be dangerous for strategy makers because it renders the mobilization of national effort and will vulnerable to changes in the perception of strategy as it unfolds. This is especially so in a democracy where freedom of opinion and its expression is itself a normative cultural value protected by law and custom. Frankel says:

For better or worse, a foreign policy will not be effective over the long run

if public opinion does not support it; and since public opinion cannot be expected to have an informed judgment on each specific decision taken day-by-day, its assent has to be to the general tendency and direction of the policy—to its guiding principles. This is a prudential principle, but it is also one that goes to the integrity and vitality of a democratic system.⁴

Niebuhr also pointed out that the individual's unselfish impulses are not free from the taint of self-interest. In national crises, therefore,

... the nations's claim to uniqueness comes into ... conflict with the generally accepted impression that the nation is the incarnation of universal values. This conflict can be resolved only by deception. In the imagination of the simple patriot, the nation is not a society, but Society. Though its values are relative they appear, from his naive perspective, to be absolute.⁵

In a world with ever more rapid communications and increasingly significant international forums for the formation of world opinion, national self-deception is increasingly difficult to sustain. The powerful impulse to self-righteousness which results from national self-deception complicates the task of diplomacy, especially its military aspects; war dramatically calls into question the absolute character of a free nation's perception of its values, yet depends on them most heavily and mobilizes them most effectively.

The interaction of war and national values is a phenomenon to which military strategists of the western democracies can profitably pay closer attention. Most of the public debate over national defense policy has, and still does, center on weapons systems and budgets, and invites the unanswerable question "how much is enough?" Yet the potential power of value concerns is such that they can be, when mobilized either in support of or in opposition to military power, the decisive dimension of strategy. Our Vietnam experience reinforces the opinion that, regardless of one's feelings or value judgments on its outcome, the way a population perceives the moral dimension of strategy, as Niebuhr states it, has a powerful influence on who wins and who loses. So far, Communist strategists appear to have learned better than we that the moral dimension of strategy is changing the perception of international conflict. The late Hannah Arendt, perhaps the best known western student of revolution, criticizes the notion that war is a form of relations between governments, in an interesting way:

In the contest that divides the world today, those will probably win who

understand revolution, while those who still put their faith in power politics in the traditional sense of the term and, therefore, *in war as the last resort of all foreign policy* (italics added) may well discover in a not too distant future that they have become masters in a rather useless and obsolete trade.⁶

While her view of war as "the last resort of *all* foreign policy" is too sweeping, there is much to commend her reasoning for this predicted obsolescence. It is, in her view, that the revolutionary cause of freedom is the only one which can possibly justify the prosecution of violence in the minds of most of the people who are called on to fight wars. Counterrevolutionary enterprises, on the other hand, require commitment to values that are essentially regressive, and quite contrary to our own dominant ideas of freedom and equality.

Both Niebuhr and Arendt agree that political violence, in the form either of war or revolution, requires for its successful pursuit the mobilization of a consensus of values which amounts to a moral consensus on the legitimacy of both its objectives and the means by which these objectives are pursued. This insight is not uniquely civilian, or political; it has been clearly expressed by Major General Robert H. Gard in Adelphi Paper 103:

Military forces must be employed in a manner consistent with societal values; for in modern democracies, legitimacy of means has become a paramount factor.⁷

Homogenous societies, especially those whose governments have eliminated or neutralized political opposition, find it relatively easy to mobilize and appeal to normative cultural values. Societies in which communication is open, which safeguard pluralism with legal sanctions, and which normally tolerate a high degree of political dissent find it much more difficult to develop and maintain a consensus of commitment to the legitimacy of strategic objectives. In developing the thesis that the moral dimension of strategy is becoming more important, we must examine the nature of national strategy, both political and military; the content of those cultural values which are peculiarly American and which we have chosen to call moral; and the ways that strategy and values interact.

STRATEGY

Strategy is a somewhat elusive concept. It has had sharply divergent

meanings, ranging from how to win a war or game to life-planning exercises. Webster's most inclusive definition is "the art of employing plans . . . toward a goal," but he prefers "The science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war."⁸ While that definition recognizes the intimate connection between military and nonmilitary factors in strategic thinking, it still assumes a distinction between strategy and policy. Liddell Hart is typical of the classical military strategists who support such a distinction. He differentiates "strategy" from "grand strategy"; the former is what the military leader does with the means given him by the state to carry out the war policy which the government has formulated. The state's war policy itself constitutes grand strategy.⁹ He does note, however, that "the two categories, although convenient for discussion, can never be truly divided into separate compartments because each not only influences but merges into the other."¹⁰ He is also concerned, however, to note that "... while grand strategy should control strategy, its principles often run counter to those which prevail in the field of strategy."¹¹

He says this because he believes that military leaders have tended to misunderstand the father of modern military strategy, Clausewitz. Clausewitz has been read both as an advocate of total war, a philosopher who could tolerate "no substitute for victory," and also as a proponent of limited wars fought for less grandiose political objectives. That he has been understood by American military philosophers in the first sense will be clear to all who recall MacArthur's appeal for "victory" when defending his actions as Supreme Allied Commander of UN Forces in Korea before Congress. Russell Weigley makes the point clearly in his book *The American Way of War*,¹² labelling the majority of American leaders as "strategists of annihilation."

The distinction between strategy and grand strategy is important because it raises the issue of the proper relationship between war and political goals. Clausewitz's theory of war makes two main assumptions. The first is that international relations are distributive—a win/lose situation among alliances or individual states in which the gains of one side are proportionate to the antagonist's losses. The second is that winning is the sole criterion by which possible courses of action are to be judged. In the context of these assumptions, he makes a distinction between the aim of war, which is military, and its purpose, which is

political. The (military) aim of any war is generally the overthrow of the enemy, to force him to yield to his opponent's will. The (political) purposes vary from war to war, while its aim is always the same. He also notes a strong tendency for the aim of war to displace its purpose, since he assumes war to be a struggle of polar opposites in which every gain for one side is a commensurate loss for the other, and in which all resources must be mobilized in support of the sought-for victory. This escalation, however, appears to be his explanation of the *theory* of war, not its actual practice. Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, colleagues in European conflict and peace research, in a very provocative analysis of Clausewitzian philosophy, clarify his notion of the relation of purpose and aim (the subquotes in this passage are from *On War*, (Penguin Edition).

No other statement by Clausewitz is more widely quoted than the assertion that war is a 'continuation' and an 'instrument' of politics, and none is more often misunderstood. It is not some sort of Bismarckian 'Blood and Iron' philosophy that he gives voice to, neither is it an article of prudent statecraft, or an affirmation of the moral legitimacy of war. It is meant to be a scientific statement about the nature of war.

What it affirms is, first, that war always has a political purpose—war arises out of a social and political context—and, second, that after war has taken over and the aim has displaced the purpose, still it is 'by no means an independent thing, in itself.' When war erupts, its own laws of escalation and uncompromising struggle do not completely take command.

'Our own power, the enemy's power, allies on both sides, the characteristics of the people and their Governments respectively, etc.' are of a political nature and determine the form war takes. The limits of war are still set by policy, which penetrates the entire act of war. Should war, following its natural bent and losing sight of political demands, reach extremities and divorce means from ends, this 'extreme effort would be wrecked by the opposing weight of forces within itself.'

Because of this complete subjection to politics, war does not normally assume its 'absolute form,' but remains, in Clausewitz' words, 'a half-and-half thing': 'war [as it actually occurs] may be a thing which is sometimes war [as it appears in theory] in greater, sometimes in a lesser degree.' This gives its meaning that the expression utmost use of force in attacking or defending the centre of gravity. There may be no logical limit to the force one may think of using, but there certainly is a political one ...

War and politics, as much as the offence and defence, stand in a complex

and intimate relation of mutual determination in which policy must adapt itself to the general conditions of war, as war must to those of policy. But the relation is not a symmetrical one. War is ultimately subordinate to politics, as is the offence to the defence, and this subordination is never more absolute than when war approximates to its pure form.¹³

It is just because of this subordination of war to politics that the moral dimension of war is so important, both in its limited and its total form.

One suspects that the debate over total versus limited war is really a debate over the relationship between its aim and its purpose. Part of the confusion lies in another key Clausewitzian concept—that of the “center of gravity.”

Military thinkers have tended to read Clausewitz’s concept of the center of gravity in terms of his emphasis on the offensive, his many injunctions regarding the maneuvering and employment of forces in the field, and his insistence on the need to destroy enemy forces. The logical inference from such a reading is that the enemy’s center of gravity lies in his military capability. That such a narrow view is not Clausewitz’s point is obvious from the following passage: after discussing the meaning of the phrase “overthrow the enemy” and noting by historical example that it does not necessarily mean destroying armies or conquering territory, he says:

We see that here, too, the result cannot be determined from general causes; the individual causes, which no one knows who is not on the spot, and many of a moral nature which are never heard of, even the smallest features and accidents, which only appear in history as anecdotes, are often decisive. All that theory can say here is that the main point is to keep the predominant conditions of both parties in view. Out of them a certain center of gravity, a center of power and movement, will form itself, upon which everything depends; and against this center of gravity of the enemy the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed.¹⁴

The chapter from which this is quoted clearly makes the moral dimension of strategy a military as well as a political calculation.

It is the “predominant conditions” of both parties to the war out of which a center of gravity forms itself. Its primary characteristic is that “it must be able to be preserved intact in order for resistance to continue,” as Boserup and Mack point out:

This center of gravity is that point at the heart of the defense which, if it

holds out enables the defense to continue the struggle even if weakened, and which, if it falls, must necessarily lead to the collapse of the entire defense whether for reasons of morale or for material reasons.¹⁵

The political purpose of the war controls the degree to which military power can be mobilized in support of its aims. Clausewitz says, "The compulsion which we must use toward our enemy will be regulated by the magnitude of our own and his political demands."¹⁶ This, in spite of the fact that the (military) aim tends to displace the (political) purpose of the war. He clearly sees the political goal as the controlling factor in this key passage:

Theory demands, therefore, that at the beginning of every war its character and main outline shall be defined according to what the political conditions and relations lead us to anticipate as probable. The more nearly, according to this probability, its character approaches the form of absolute war [i.e., the nature of its political purpose] the more its outlines embrace the mass of the belligerent states, and draw them into the vortex—so much the more closely its events will be connected and so much the more necessary it will be also not to take the first step without thinking of what may be the last.¹⁷

Clausewitz is claiming that the purpose and the aim of war stand in a mutually dependent relationship; that the separation between military and political policy is a false and counterproductive one which can lead to disaster; and that the more nearly the purpose of a war approaches a requirement for the total mobilization of a society, the more this connection must be taken into account.

How then to distinguish between the military and nonmilitary dimensions of national strategy? Perhaps our need to make that distinction is outmoded. If Hannah Arendt is right about revolution—and the history of "wars of national liberation," Mao Tse Tung, and Truong Chinh's perceptions and application of Clausewitz tend to indicate that she is—then our traditionally sharp separation between political goals and military aims is self-defeating. While it is not possible to sort out in this short paper all the strategic options and alternatives proposed by various political and military figures during the course of our involvement in Vietnam, there is evidence to support this report by Henry Brandon, a British reporter well-connected in Washington during the 1960's:

But at the same time a basic disagreement had set in among members of

the US Government over what the struggle was about, whether it was primarily a military problem, and whether a stable and viable South Vietnam would best be secured by the defeat of the guerrillas or by the American-imposed aid machine. The military saw it as a war to be won. General Earle G. Wheeler, who had succeeded Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed the war, saying, 'It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.'¹⁸

There is evidence in an article by John B. Henry in *Foreign Affairs*, No. 4, Fall 1971, that the military leaders of the Vietnam era including General Wheeler also had a strong appreciation of the political factors affecting Vietnam problems. But I can find no evidence that they ever saw the center of gravity of the other side, or of our own operations for that matter, in any other than military terms.

This was certainly not true of our opponents. In 1966 General Van Tieng Dung, Chief of the Vietnamese Peoples' Army (VPA) General Staff, published a pamphlet titled *After Political Failure the US Imperialists Are Facing Military Defeat in South Vietnam*. He continually refers to the "military effect" of "covert political strategy" to be used by the revolutionary side. Applied to the situation between the protagonists, Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) strategy is aimed at the center of gravity of our defense, which is *not* the ARVN/US military field force. In a passage which reflects pure Clausewitz, he says:

... the American imperialists cannot but rely on a professional army and modern weapons to secure military superiority in order to crush the resistance of the South Vietnamese (i.e., VC) Army and people. But the factors that create *military superiority* [emphasis added] reside not only in the number of troops and the quantity of weapons each side has at its disposal but also in its rear, in the *political situation within and without the country*, [emphasis added] the fighting spirit of its Army and people, its own ability to conduct its war, etc.¹⁹

In another prescient paragraph, written two years *before* the TET offensive, he echoes Clausewitz again:

Should the US imperialists increase their expeditionary force, and protract and extend the war, they would face greater political upheavals at home and abroad. The more GI's are wiped out, the greater and more prolonged the burden imposed on the American people will become, and the sharper

the contradictions among the US ruling circles, and the more weakened the US rear. The US imperialists will further lose the initiative in all respects, unable to find a way out . . . It is obvious that the most decisive factor to bring about military superiority is the political factor which is determined in its turn by the character of the war (whether just or unjust-ed). *In any war, the military aspect more than any other depends directly and profoundly on politics.*²⁰

As Boserup and Mack note, the relation between means and purpose is mediated by the aim in a war that is properly coordinated. The strategic space is expanded well beyond what our traditional separation of politics and military operations conceive, but its purpose and aim are still governed by the general rules of strategy. Action on the political as well as military plane is a genuine strategic move in the Clausewitzian sense, relying on one's own "forces" and exploiting the weakness of the enemy. They remind us that

Clausewitz constantly refers to 'human factors' as resources in war, and explicitly recognizes such immaterial digests as 'unity of interests' and 'public opinion' as possible centers of gravity, hence as suitable points of attack by military or other means.²¹

This interpretation of the Clausewitzian relationship between political purpose and military aim has been exacerbated, not reduced, by instruments of mass destruction. Nuclear instruments are in any social sense the ultimate weapon, capable of paralyzing an entire society and destroying its culture as we know it. As such, they seem to be the center of gravity of any viable defense against other nuclear powers. That appearance, however, is an illusion. An instrument, as Boserup and Mack note, only becomes a weapon when it plays a role in a particular strategy. Otherwise it is simply a piece of equipment.²²

Nuclear weapons can be useful, useless, or a boomerang, depending on the strategy in whose service they are employed. The strategy of deterrence makes them useful, but only in a very limited sense. In a confrontation with an essentially equal nuclear adversary, they are useful only so far as the purpose of the strategy makes the fear of their use credible to the enemy. The weaknesses of such a symmetrical policy are rather obvious from a Clausewitzian standpoint:

. . . if it is assumed that inhibitions of a political, social and cultural nature are normally more decisive in holding back the hand on the nuclear trigger than is fear, then a policy of responding to threats with counterthreats

becomes nothing less than disastrous, for no policy is more likely to weaken those inhibitions. Instead of a symmetric response, countering like with like, an asymmetric one comes to seem most appropriate.²³

Even in a confrontation with an essentially equal nuclear adversary, the credibility of nuclear deterrent power depends on the enemy's perceptions of his adversary's will to employ them—suggesting that, once again, Clausewitz is still correct; the center of gravity is *not* in the weapon system but in the total social, cultural, and political situation of the confrontation.

If Clausewitz is still relevant, and if the above analysis of his concepts of purpose, aim, and center of gravity are correct, we need to take a look at the American culture to see what its cultural values are, and how they might impact on the future development of national strategy.

MORAL VALUES

Cultural (moral) values are decisive to the formulation and prosecution of national strategy because the process by which they are formed is so closely linked to those social interactions which constitute the process of personal growth, and which determine who people think they are. Questions and issues of personal identity are the most powerful of the motivating forces which influence human behavior. Individuals do not arrive at conclusions about who they are in a vacuum. They learn to identify themselves through a very complicated process of relating to others—first, by imitation primarily, to their parents and siblings; then to their extended families, later through their experiences with both private and public groups and institutions. In this process they identify themselves with or align themselves against certain groups, and finally come to perceive themselves as “somebody,” and as members of a nation-state. The nation-state then embodies as tradition those values which the majority of its members perceive to be common to the society. They are often institutionalized not only in its history and documents, but also in its living organizations.

The process of developing this identity on the individual level includes choices we make about how to properly behave, what to believe, and how human affairs ought to be regulated and conducted. At the group level we accept or reject a consensus, often ill-defined but yet quite real, about these choices which we call values. These

values then influence later choices and decisions, such as attitudes taken on issues of public and political significance, to include how the nation ought to conduct its business at home and abroad. Robert Kennedy, my colleague in the Strategic Studies Institute, has developed a thesis which outlines the details of how this process works in the formation of a spirit of nationalism.²⁴ The satisfaction of individual needs by the external environment, which is composed of individuals and groups, results in the formation of value judgments (attitudes and beliefs). An individual will tend to internalize his environment to the extent that it satisfies his needs. Moreover he will internalize, in the form of attitudes and beliefs, the values of the environment which serve his physio and psychogenic requirements. Such values, along with needs, serve as the ingredients of a perceptual screen through which all activities external to the self (in the environment) are judged. Value systems thus come to be a primary element of each person's perceptual screen, since they are the mechanism providing content for familiarity, identification, rejection, and internalization. Niebuhr has observed one aspect of this process in describing the moral dimensions of patriotism in wartime, one of the values we will address:

Unquestionably, there is an alloy of projected self-interest in patriotic altruism. The man in the street, with his lust for power and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and the necessities of social life, projects his ego upon his nation and indulges his anarchic lusts vicariously.²⁵

Niebuhr's is a somewhat intuitive approach to an observed social phenomenon. The scientific approach to a study of social values is still in its infancy. Consequently a great deal of effort is expended by scholars on precise definitions as a prerequisite for careful measurement. The only level at which agreement has been reached is a very general one, not much beyond the dictionary usage of "something held in esteem for intrinsic or utilitarian reasons."²⁶ For our purposes a precise definition is not required. Social values are those commonly held beliefs, arising both from tradition and from institutional norms, which help us to choose from among possible courses of action that one which promises the most satisfaction. Our concern is with motivation and therefore with identity; consequently, for this paper, values are those commonly held attitudes about the way things ought to be and the basis on which we decide the desirability or undesirability of possible courses of public action.

Robin Williams, a noted theorist of social change, has attempted to categorize American social attitudes. His research identifies 15 "value configurations."²⁷ They are more integrative than definitive, but a listing is necessary for our purposes. He finds that we have a central stress upon personal *achievement and success*, which values action and the mastering of one's environment. *Activity and work* are a related category of behavior important to Americans, who display a marked drive to actively shape and control their environment. Americans also have a *moral orientation*, a tendency to judge events and conduct in terms of an absolute standard of good and evil, variously understood. A closely-related outlook, *humanitarianism* describes the American emphasis on disinterested concern and helpfulness, to include personal kindness and sympathy for the underdog. *Efficiency and practicality* are also highly valued, as are *progress* and *material comfort*. One of the most deeply embedded and high-prized value is *equality*, whether of status or opportunity, as a universal and inherited right, with its corollary *freedom*, in the sense of liberty and independence. Another dimension of experience is tapped by our tendency to value *conformity*, at least to demand and enforce it by sanction in terms of social behavior in an external sense. *Science and secular rationality* are also values deeply embedded in the American social psyche, as are *nationalism/patriotism* and *democracy*. The latter means, among other things, the rejection of aristocratic and monarchical principles, to be replaced by a "participant, civic minded" culture. Our culture is also permeated by a heavy emphasis on the importance of *individual personality*, viewed as something of intrinsic worth safeguarded by the Bill of Rights itself. We have also been characterized from our very beginnings by *racism and related group-superiority* themes, widespread and deeply held, but on a regional basis in terms of their particular content.

These 15 "value orientations" describe the specific content of our normative cultural value system, according to Williams. A summary classification, at a grosser level, would look like this:

In the first place, there are the *quasi-values* or *gratifications*, taken at a hedonistic or psychological level, implicit in the entire analysis and especially important in the section on 'material comfort.' Second, we may identify the *instrumental interests* or *means values*; for example, wealth, power, work, efficiency. Although these interests may become values in themselves, it is convenient to consider them primarily as instrumental to the achievement of other values. Third, we have the *formal-universalistic*

values of Western tradition: rationalism, impersonal justice and universalistic ethics, achievement, democracy, equality, freedom, certain religious values, value of individual personality. Fourth, there is a class of particularistic, segmental, or *localistic evaluations* that are best exemplified in racist-ethnic superiority doctrines and in some (not all) aspects of nationalism.²⁸

It is readily apparent that not all these value orientations are mutually compatible or supportive. Williams is careful to point out the complexity of the interaction modes among them; they nearly defy description, a problem intensified by the pluralistic character of the society as well as the values themselves. Gratifications are frequently in competition with, if not antithetical to, the instrumental interests. More seriously, for our purpose, the "formal-universalistic values of Western culture" may be practically incompatible. For instance, more freedom means less equality; achievement (and recognition for it) reduces our sense of being equals; the more impersonal justice is, the less it can take into account the worth of individual personality; rationalism conflicts with some basic religious values for more than a few of the major religious traditions; freedom, democracy, equality, universalistic ethics, and many others are quite incompatible with doctrines of ethnic superiority. Any society as pluralistic as ours must expect such diversity in its value orientations, and indeed our political institutions were purposefully designed to cope with just such a situation, according to *The Federalist*.²⁹

The need to make choices among various possible behavior alternatives, and the tendency of those choices to follow patterns which are peculiar to particular cultures, led Talcott Parsons, a very influential social theorist, to categorize those cultural values which govern behavior choices in terms of "pattern variables." What he calls pattern variables describe the dilemmas members of any culture have in five different types of situations requiring choice; the gratification-discipline dilemma, the private versus collective interest dilemma, the choice between "types" of value standards (universal versus particular), the choice between "modalities" of the social object (the choice between judging on the basis of performance or status), and the choices which depend on one's degree of interest in the object of the choice.

Seymour Lipset, another well known sociologist, has adapted these pattern variables as a framework within which to analyze the United States in comparison with three other Western democratic

cultures—England, Canada, and Australia. He finds that American cultural values are oriented toward achievement, equalitarianism, universalism, and specificity.

More than any other modern non-Communist industrial nation, the United States emphasizes achievement, equalitarianism, universalism, and specificity. This combination of variables is functional for a stable democracy. The normative system allows or encourages the upper classes to accept improvements in the status and power of the lower classes *without feeling morally offended*. Since all men and groups are expected to try to improve their positions vis-a-vis others, success by a previously deprived group is not resented as deeply as in countries whose values stress the moral worth of ascription. Similarly, the emphasis on equalitarianism, universalism and specificity means that men can expect, and within limits do receive, fair treatment according to their merits. Lower class individuals and groups desiring to change their social position *need not be revolutionary*. The dominant values of the society legitimize their aspirations . . . Class consciousness lies fallow, because [it] is in part an adaptation to the behavior of the upper class in societies characterized by ascription, elitism, particularism and diffuseness. The latter values imply that *men must stay in their class positions and that they will be treated by others and will treat each other diffusely in terms of class status*. American values reject treating an individual in terms of class status, but support interaction with him in terms of his role as a worker in one situation, a suburban dweller in another, as a member of the American Legion in a third, and so forth.³⁰

Put differently, American value orientations evidence an overwhelming tendency (more so than the other democracies studied) to judge people and events by a universal moral standard, to ascribe virtue to achievement at the expense of status (we believe people because they have performed well, rather than because they hold office), to believe that each man is as important as every other (I am as good as you are even though you may be a general and I a private), and to value functions rather than position. These are not easy value orientations for an army to live with, since its hierarchical nature, authoritarian practices, personnel policies, and even its function (inevitably requiring violence)—all express value orientations which are both legitimate and necessary,—but quite antithetical to those of the culture in which it lives.

These orientations are in some sense the content of the perceptual screen through which the American public perceives and evaluates foreign societies because, as Niebuhr pointed out, we tend to absolutize our own cultural values. The value "patriotism" is not only a part of

the content of this perceptual screen, it is also in some ways a product of the way the perceptual screen works. Our universalistic orientation tends to subordinate patriotism/nationalism to the values of humanitarianism, efficiency, practicality, equality, freedom, democracy, and the cult of individual personality—these are the *content* of our patriotism, which is something of a separate and dependent virtue in our culture. Our universalistic orientation tends to inhibit the “my country, right or wrong” response to international issues, and our pluralistic (constitutionally safeguarded) nature both encourages and protects those who dissent from official policy.

Students of cultural values have noted a decline in patriotism/nationalism in recent years, and some predict a further decline in the future. Nicholas Rescher conducted a questionnaire study in 1966 on *Changes in US Values*, with the help of the RAND Corporation. It was circulated among 75 high level scientists and science administrators, whose work permitted them some claim to status as futurologists. Question 2 of the survey listed 40 values (all of Williams' categories were used and expanded in detail) and asked respondents to predict what directions a public change in those values might take.

One striking aspect of the responses to this question is the respondent's firm anticipation of substantial changes with respect to the espousal of specific values: With respect to half the items (eighteen of twenty-seven) the consensus is for a probable change. Almost always, the anticipated change is in an upward direction; there are only three exceptions, the subjects of these downward trends being items 7 (“self-reliance”), 20 (“devotion to family”), and 31 (“patriotism”).

A second striking feature of the responses are their optimism: almost always when a change is anticipated the majority of those who anticipate it regard this as a good thing. This being the rule, there are only three cases of anticipated value changes regarded as desirable by less than half the respondents: items 7 (decline of “self-reliance”), 20 (decline of “devotion to family”), and 29 (increased emphasis upon “novelty”). This last item was the only case in which the increase in a presently held value was viewed as desirable by less than half of those who anticipate its coming about. The only instance of a presently held value whose decline is foreseen with favor is item 31 (“patriotism”). (One trusts the respondents construed this with jingoistic overtones.)³¹

The significance of the finding is not just the decline of patriotism—it is the connection between the anticipation of a positive

increase in the more traditionally democratic values and the decline of patriotism. The surveyed group, of course, represents a very selective profession heavily committed to the values of rationalism and progress.

It would be a mistake to discount these results, however. Daniel Yankelovich as done a longitudinal survey (covering a seven-year interval on an annual basis) published under the title *The New Morality: A Profile of American Youth in the Seventies*. His findings tend to confirm Rescher's, but from a totally different population sample—both college and noncollege youth 17-24 years of age. He says:

Changing Attitudes Toward War as National Policy

The Vietnam War and the New Values on campus have combined to leave a permanent mark on the views of American young people regarding war as an instrument of national policy. Four years ago, in 1969, six out of ten high school students, members of the working class, the unemployed, and other young people under the age of 25 felt that it was worthwhile to fight a war to counteract aggression (67 percent), contain communism (69 percent), protect our national interests (66 percent), and fight for our honor (59 percent). At least half felt it was also worthwhile to fight a war to protect our allies or maintain our position of power in the world. Today, only one out of two of noncollege youth consider counteracting aggression (53 percent), containing communism (50 percent), or protecting our national interests (49 percent), fighting for our honor (43 percent), or maintaining our position of power in the world (40 percent). The two largest differences between the viewpoints of noncollege and college youth are in their attitudes toward wars to contain communism (noncollege 50 percent, college 30 percent) and fighting for our honor (noncollege 43 percent, college 19 percent). (Tables 23-7 and 24-5).³²

From the standpoint of military strategy it is not important to know whether these value orientation shifts are temporary or permanent, short or long range. The impact they have on strategy is the same; the recent behavior of Congress in the foreign policy field is evidence of the seriousness with which they must be taken by strategists. With that in mind, we must now turn to a more specific consideration of the impact of these values on strategy.

STRATEGY AND VALUES

Walter Millis, Raymond Aron, Bernard Brodie, and a host of others³³ have outlined the history and development of war, both as a social phenomenon and as a mechanism for political change. All have

pointed out than in the 20th century, war has tended to require the mobilization of the total resources, both human and material, of participating nations; and that the military aims have frequently displaced the political goals of those nations. Even those military actions America has fought since the end of the Second World War, in which we did not make an effort to mobilize totally and which we called "limited wars," were not limited in the same sense that the European wars of the 18th century and earlier were. The North Koreans and the North Vietnamese had essentially unlimited purposes; our own political purposes in those encounters were either unclear or subject to change as the fighting gathered momentum. Both encounters fomented great debates within our society about their purposes, during and after their prosecution. Arendt, as indicated, believes that "the end of war is revolution." By that she seems to mean not only that the outcome of war is revolution, but also that revolution is a more effective political instrument than war. She notes that wars, no matter what the proclaimed goal of the protagonists may have been, since World War II have generally resulted in the overthrow or displacement of the nonrevolutionary governments which pursued a war policy. In the case of the western democracies, displacement refers to a constitutional process and might more accurately be called a change of parties in power. World War II saw the victorious Allies change all the axis governments as well as those of the countries which Germany had occupied. The Labor Party also came to power in England, many believe as a result of the war. Korea and Vietnam both resulted in a change in American governing parties, and in both cases the war was the overriding political issue. Perhaps these changes are a rough estimate of which side won what was, in each case, an essentially military statement by the time American involvement ended. The French experience in Vietnam and Algeria also bears out her thesis, and the Arab-Israeli wars of the sixties do so in part.

Arendt's thesis claiming the displacement of war by revolution confirms Clausewitz's theory of war. Clausewitz saw relations between states as a continuum of sometimes competing and sometimes coalescing interests, not as absolutely opposite conditions. That is the meaning of his famous dictum about war and politics. Niebuhr once observed that the most stable peace we can know in history is still a very delicate balance of tendencies toward war. But America's cultural past and her privileged position both in time and in space, protected while she developed by the preoccupation of the great powers with

other interests and the ocean barriers which helped keep her free from the fear of invasion, have served us badly in their conjunction. We have learned to make a nearly absolute distinction between the states of war and peace as *conditions* in human affairs, rather than recognizing them as poles on the continuum of international relations which, like flowers and seeds, contain each other's genes.

This nearly absolute distinction has also had its impact on civil-military relations within our culture. The citizenry and our historic documents view the military establishment in peacetime as a necessary evil, and in wartime as a heroic class—at least that was the tendency until the Korean War. Military leaders are expected to keep themselves strictly subordinate to civilian authorities in peacetime. In wartime one hears admonitions that politicians must not interfere with the generals' conduct of the war—certainly from MacArthur and his supporters in Korea, and as lately as "A Soldier Reports" by General William C. Westmoreland,—although much more subdued in the latter than the former. This dichotomy in our cultural orientation between war and peace has served to obscure the primacy of political purposes in war, and has encouraged the absolutizing of military aims once the shooting begins, without any healthy or searching examination of the ways they need to be connected to insure success. "Winning" the war has been seen by the military, and often to a high degree by political administrations as well as large segments of the electorate, as the total overthrow of enemy forces, removal of the "bad" enemy government, and substitution of a group of governors more congenial to American value orientations. These are not really political purposes: unconditional surrender is a statement of a military aim, not a political purpose. The legacy of World War II, and the political confusion of Europe in its aftermath (Russia filled the vacuum that our lack of political purpose created, and we hurried to build NATO with the Marshall Plan) have served to confuse us ever since about the political purposes of war.

Henry Brandon reports an exchange during the Johnson Administration which illuminates the problem of purpose and aim in controlling the violence of war and making it serve some useful social purpose. After the TET offensive, the President sought a review of the war from elder statesmen outside his administration:

Then the senior statesmen had lunch with the President. Dean Acheson, who sat next to Mr. Johnson, offered to lead off the discussion, and

Johnson agreed. Acheson warned him that what he was going to say might cause pandemonium, but again the President encouraged him. Acheson then summed up his impressions of the discouraging briefings they had had, the heavy military losses, the damage to the Saigon Government's authority, and the disarray in the pacification program.

To Acheson's surprise, his views were shared by more among those present than he had expected. The one who mattered most, because he too had been a strong supporter of the war, was McGeorge Bundy. He summed up for those supporting Acheson's views and admitted, in self-flagellating mood, that 'for the first time in my life I find myself agreeing on this issue with George Ball.'

General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was unconvincing in his presentation of his own views and in his inability to define his objectives in the war. (He later pointedly asked what sort of a 'jerk' had briefed the 'wise men.' Some of them thereafter worried about the briefers' future.)

When the President was asked what his objectives were, he was not very persuasive either. He simply repeated what he had already enunciated in public speeches.³⁴

What is significant in this exchange, confirmed by other reporters,³⁵ is the lack of ability of both civilian and military authorities to articulate to each other an achievable political purpose and a clearly consistent military aim. Perhaps because of this confusion, we were not clear about the enemy's center of gravity. The bombing advocates, in general with the President, saw the center of gravity as North Vietnam's willingness to persist in the south. What the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops were jealously preserving, however, and the strategy which gave the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) his desperate problem, was the relationship between the Viet Cong and the local peasants. Their regular NVA units sought to keep MACV off balance to preserve this center of gravity, which rested more on "moral" (in the sense of "value") than on material considerations. On the other hand, both our political purposes and our military aims, when they were articulated, were couched in the less than convincing terms of the Korean War—resisting aggression and safeguarding freedom. The lack of concreteness in such terminology makes them more slogans than bases for effective military planning and strategy.

That both the wars in Korea and Vietnam have been ambiguous in terms of American public acceptance of their political purposes is a somewhat mild description in view of the political turmoil they occasioned. One possible reason is the plain fact that neither conflict

clearly represented a struggle for values that Americans hold deeply as their own cultural heritage. Granted that Asian cultural values are quite different from our own, both wars were defended by the American Government in power as struggles by an attacked country for the right of self-determination. Over the course of the fighting, however, public opinion shifted as the reporting of events made it clear that the dominant characteristics of the governments we were supporting were largely ascriptive, diffuse, particularistic and elitist in character (to use Lipset's categories). As it became more difficult for the people who had to pay for the war in blood and treasure, and in Vietnam for the soldiers themselves,³⁶ to identify with the cultural values of those whose cause we supported, the sacrifices of the fighting became pointless and the cause of self-determination hypocritical. Once this hypocrisy began to be exposed, the moral foundations of the cause began to erode. In the case of Korea a compromise with the enemy was possible; in Vietnam it was not, and the fighting efficiency of US forces apparently deteriorated. Political pressures within the society erupted to the point where abandonment of the cause, albeit through face-saving gestures, became politically necessary.

The universalistic dimension of the American cultural value orientation describes that tendency our public has to *judge* behavior by an unconditional standard of right and wrong, not necessarily to follow that standard. The other three dimensions (egalitarianism, achievement, and specificity) do little more than describe the various ways and modes in which our personalism and egalitarianism show themselves. When the question "what is worth fighting for?" finally arises, any answer which does not appear to be consistent with those values will lack credibility, especially in the long run. We are a *nonascriptive* society. Elected public officials and appointed military leaders both have to earn their credibility by performance. It does not come built in, and the duration of public legitimacy for the war policy can be very short indeed. Distinctions between short wars and long wars are misplaced—the issue is legitimacy, not endurance. To the extent that South Vietnamese society was portrayed as one in which social privilege was based on rank or nepotism rather than achievement and ability; allied public officials were portrayed as more concerned for personal gain than public service; peasants portrayed as regimented and persecuted for their political or religious views; and an elitist view of colonialism seemed to predominate, the regimes we supported were discredited in the public view and not worth fighting for. From a

thoroughly pragmatic standpoint, therefore, the value dimension of strategy is at the least, important, and at the most, decisive.

CONCLUSION

Clausewitz's theory about the interrelatedness of political purpose, military aim, and center of gravity in the phenomenon of war; the necessity of clearly perceiving the specific ways they connect in the formulation of national strategy; and the relevance of moral values to the whole process, pose more questions than answers for a pluralistic democracy and its military strategists. The values of constitutional democracies, unlike the crusading moral fervor of revolutionary movements of the 20th century with their rigid thought control apparatus and discipline, do not permit the luxury of the kinds of controls on our institutions and the media of mass communication that make the maintenance of national discipline in wartime easier. Yet the increasing importance of the moral dimension of strategy more than ever requires a consensus of moral values to support that strategy if it is to have a reasonable chance of success. These considerations raise at least three questions for us in thinking about national strategy in the post-Vietnam era.

The first is how to achieve harmony and compatibility among the three key strategic considerations, purpose, aim, and center of gravity. Assuming that strategists and policymakers are themselves wise, learned, and broadly experienced men, a problem endemic to the harmonizing process is language. The language of strategy tends to be military currency. Diplomacy and politics each has its own lingo, and bridging the gap requires not only patience and tact on the part of collaborators, it also requires that they be able to articulate conflicting points of view in such a way that all sides of each issue are truly appreciated and considered, so that when decisions are reached they represent, not a consensus, but the best risk available. Another problem not unrelated to that of language is the bureaucratic compartmentalization of the government in such a way that those charged with formulating and carrying out military strategy and policy would be derelict in their obligations to their own respective services if they freed themselves from the parochial outlook on strategy that is the heritage of each of our separate services, and is in some ways necessary to the formulation of sound joint strategy and planning. Our governmental machinery seems prone to produce bureaucratic

compromises more often than clear-cut decisions, resulting in vague and diffuse statements of the purpose which invite usurpation by military aim in the gathering momentum of war once it starts. Statements of political purpose which violate the principles of sound strategy, on the other hand, often result in restrictions on military operations which dilute rather than concentrate effort, and increase the difficulty of focusing on the enemy center of gravity. We need a forum for strategy formation which represents service, state department, and domestic political expertise, but which is free from *institutionalized* loyalties and interests. Not every political purpose is realizable by military action; if the thesis of this paper is correct, however, only minor goals are realizable by military, diplomatic, or political action alone.

A second question, closely related to the first, is how to orchestrate the mobilization of consensual goals for national strategy. Our electoral process makes national strategy vulnerable to major shifts at frequent intervals, and subject to a great many domestic political pressures at all times. Some would argue that this is a good thing in a world that changes as rapidly as ours, and there is merit in that argument. However considerable time is required for the public to digest and understand the general direction and tendency of national strategy, which provides a basis for evaluation of its specific twists and turns. This cumbersome process is further complicated by the number of voices analyzing policy and helping to shape public opinion about it. A great deal depends on the ability of administration and defense officials to articulate policy goals in understandable terms that are someplace between slogans and doctoral dissertations. Central to the question is the credibility of public officials in gaining and maintaining legitimacy for national strategy decisions. Success in mobilizing such support depends, in the final analysis, less on rhetorical brilliance than on clearly articulated and perceived congruence between the policy proposed and national moral values.

Which introduces the third question raised by the contention that the moral dimension of strategy has become more important. How do we define the point at which moral values become relevant to national strategy? Some claim that moral values cannot have *any* relevance to political or strategic issues; that the realm of international affairs is by nature amoral. Others claim a simple congruence, and want foreign policy to be based on the Sermon on the Mount. Still others recognize the problem as one of means and ends, and are sure that in any given case the end justifies the means. This last is an interesting position, and

potentially the most viable. On the one hand, it recognizes the relevance of moral judgments; means have to be justified even if only by the ends they serve. On the other hand it frequently assumes a necessary and inevitable hiatus between what is desirable and what is possible, and sanctions too easily the commission of great crimes in the name of holy causes. The fact is that there is no way to justify *any* means, criminal or saintly (other than sacrificial love, which is possible only for individuals having no responsibility save to themselves) except by appeal to the ends they are intended to serve. Most means-ends disputes debate the appropriateness and necessity of the means when, in fact, a more productive and enlightening debate could be carried out over the ends. If moral values are in fact decisive for national strategy to succeed, then their proper application is first to the *goals* of that policy. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has pointed out that the purpose of national values is "to illuminate and control conceptions of national interest."

If a course [of action] in foreign affairs implies moral values incompatible with the ideals of the national community, either the nation will refuse after a time to sustain the policy, or else it must abandon its ideals. A people is in bad trouble when it tries to keep two sets of books—when it holds one scale of values for its internal policy and another to its conduct of foreign affairs.³⁷

That statement is a surprisingly close parallel to Clausewitz's comment about and emphasis on "moral quantities," and the center of gravity. In practical terms for us, it means that future military strategies developed by the United States must have a political purpose and a military aim which are clearly perceived to be consistent with democratic social values. Military operations themselves also will have to be planned and executed to support such values.

It is either the genius or the curse of revolutionary movements in our century that they are perceived by their adherents, and by many disinterested parties, as being capable of preserving the necessary connection between their values and their strategy. Those values, and that strategy, are in most, but not all, ways very different from our own. Unless we can equal their wisdom, we who are professional soldiers may well discover that Arendt was correct, and that we have become masters in a rather obsolete and useless trade.

ENDNOTES

1. Charles Frankel, "Morality and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Headline Series No. 224*, February 1975, p. 3.
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Paradox of American Politics," *The Public Interest*, Number 41, Fall 1975, pp. 142-165. Lipset says: "Moralism is an orientation Americans have inherited from their Protestant past. This is the *one* (sic) country in the world dominated by the religious traditions of Protestant 'dissent'—the Methodists, Baptists, and other sects. The teachings of these denominations called on men to follow their conscience, with an unequivocal emphasis not to be found in those denominations which evolved from state churches (Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and Orthodox Christians)," p. 143.
3. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 91.
4. Frankel, p. 36.
5. Niebuhr, p. 96.
6. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, p. 8.
7. Major General Robert H. Gard, Jr., United States Army, "The Future of the Military Professions," *Adelphi Papers No. 103*, 1973, p. 4.
8. "strategy," *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, p. 2256.
9. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, pp. 333 ff.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 366.
12. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War*. In his introduction, the author notes that "In the history of American strategy, the direction taken by the American conception of war made most American strategists, through most of the time span of American history, strategists of annihilation. . . . Once American military power became great enough to make the destruction of the country's enemies an object worth contemplating, a central theme of the history of American strategy came to be the problem of how to secure victory in its desired fullness without paying a cost so high that the cost would mock the very enterprise of waging war. . . . When in the most recent . . . wars even limited victories have threatened to demand an intolerable cost . . . the use of combat has had to seem less and less a rationally acceptable means for the pursuit of national objectives." (p. xxii). The last sentence of the book strikes this pessimistic note: "Because the record of non-nuclear limited war in obtaining acceptable divisions at tolerable cost is also scarcely heartening, the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end." (p. 477).
13. Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, *War Without Weapons*, pp. 162-163. Clausewitz is hard to understand and open to several interpretations, particularly on the issues of total and limited war. Book VIII, Chapter 6, B, however, is very clear in insisting on the primacy of the political purpose over the military aim. Among other passages, this one stands out: "The subordinations of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible."
14. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Jolles' translation), p. 386.
15. Boserup and Mack, p. 160.

16. von Clausewitz, p. 574.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 574.
18. Henry Brandon, *Anatomy of Error*, p. 23.
19. General Van Tien Dung, Chief of VPA General Staff, *After Political Failure The U. S. Imperialists Are Facing Military Defeat in South Vietnam*, pp. 12-13.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
21. Boserup and Mack, p. 171.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Robert Kennedy, *Nationalism: A Salient Force*, December 2, 1974.
25. Niebuhr, p. 93.
26. Webster, p. 2530.
27. Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*, pp. 452-499.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 501.
29. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, Number 10, pp. 77-84, and Number 51, pp. 320-325. Madison is the real author of both these papers.
30. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Value Patterns of Democracy: A Case Study In Comparative Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4, August 1963, p. 517.
31. Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, editors, *Values And The Future*, p. 135.
32. Daniel Yankelovich, *The New Morality*, p. 88.
33. See the bibliography for a listing of authors and works dealing with this subject.
34. Brandon, pp. 133-134.
35. Substantially the same account can be found in *The Best And The Brightest*: by David Halberstam. Unfortunately neither he nor Brandon disclose their sources for the anecdote, as is customary with reporters. *The Pentagon Papers*, edited by Neil Sheehan, also contains material which indicates that the administration's purposes were difficult to translate into concrete military aims.
36. Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, *Beyond Vietnam: Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army*, prepared for the 16th Annual Convention, International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 1975.
37. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "National Interests and Moral Absolutes," *Skeptical*, Special Issue Number 8, July-August 1975, p. 36.

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reflects a historical perspective on the philosophy of war which has lead American planners especially to misperceive the intimate relationship between war and politics which Clausewitz, and now Marxist societies in general applying his insights, understand well. The American political system tends to support the notion that there should be a high degree of autonomy in the pursuit of military objectives, and in general tends to reflect any requirement to link military goals with national values. The processes by which national values are formed however, lie so deeply embedded in the development of human personality that these values have perculiar power and impact on the formation of public opinion. Global strategies of the United States will be successful in gaining public support only to the degree that their objectives are perceived as congruent with the democratic values held by the public. These values, in military strategy, form the center of gravity of our strategic posture, and our military operations depend on their strength for success.

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