Qualitative Constraints on Conventional Armaments: An Emerging Issue.
Abstract
The report addresses the question of whether or not qualitative, constraints on conventional armaments are desirable, feasible, and acceptable ways of promoting U.S. national security objectives. Discussion centers around possible U.S.-SU agreements and emphasizes the arms control implications of new-generation conventional arms, which include precision-guided munitions and remotely piloted vehicles. Incentives for constraints include (a) enhancement of U.S.-SU security and that of their allies; (b) prospects for resource economies; (c) elimination of catastrophic instabilities. The most restrictive form of qualitative constraints would prohibit development, testing, production, and operational deployment of weapons systems that fit into an agreed-upon performance category. Combined qualitative-quantative constraints, however, have aspects that may be more acceptable to the United States. Over the short and medium term, it is important to consider constraints on large, traditional, penetration weapons systems that are becoming more expensive and more vulnerable to precision weapons.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 1976
- Accession Number
- ADA033533
Entities
People
- J. Digby
- S. J. Dudzinsky Jr.
Organizations
- RAND Corporation