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
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TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 281

January 1976

DISCONNECTED SOLUTIONS

by

W. F. Lucas

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## DISCONNECTED SOLUTIONS

BY W. F. LUCAS<sup>1</sup>

1. Introduction. In the book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern introduced a theory of solutions (or stable sets) for multi-person cooperative games in characteristic function form. A longstanding conjecture has been that the union of all solutions of any particular game is a connected set. (E.g., see [3].) This announcement describes a twelve-person game for which this conjecture fails. The essential definitions for an  $n$ -person game will be reviewed briefly before the counterexample is presented. A sketch of the proof is presented here, and the details will appear elsewhere.

2. The Model. An  $n$ -person game is a pair  $(N, v)$  where  $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  is the set of players and  $v$  is a characteristic function on  $2^N$ , i.e.,  $v$  assigns the real number  $v(S)$  to each subset  $S$  of  $N$  and  $v(\emptyset) = 0$ . The set of imputations is

$$A = \{x: \sum_{i \in N} x_i = v(N) \text{ and } x_i \geq v(\{i\}) \text{ for all } i \in N\}$$

where  $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$  is a vector with real components. For any  $S \subset N$ , let  $x(S) = \sum_{i \in S} x_i$ . For any  $X \subset A$  and nonempty  $S \subset N$ , define  $\text{Dom}_S X$  to be the set of all  $x \in A$  such that there

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exists a  $y \in X$  with  $y_i > x_i$  for all  $i \in S$  and with  $y(S) \leq v(S)$ .

Let  $\text{Dom } X = \bigcup_{\emptyset \neq S \subset N} \text{Dom}_S X$ . A subset  $V$  of  $A$  is a solution if

$V \cap \text{Dom } V = \emptyset$  and  $V \cup \text{Dom } V = A$ . The core of a game is

$$C = \{x \in A: x(S) \geq v(S) \text{ for all nonempty } S \subset N\}.$$

For any solution  $V$ ,  $C \subset V$  and  $V \cap \text{Dom } C = \emptyset$ .

A characteristic function  $v$  is superadditive if  $v(S \cup T) \geq v(S) + v(T)$  whenever  $S \cap T = \emptyset$ . The game below does not have a superadditive  $v$  as is assumed in the classical theory, but it is equivalent solutionwise to a game with a superadditive  $v$ . (See [1, p. 68].)

3. Example. The 13 vital coalitions for our example consist of  $N = \{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12\}$  and elements from three classes:

$$B = \{\{1,2\}, \{3,4\}, \{5,6\}, \{7,8\}, \{9,10\}, \{11,12\}\},$$

$$S = \{\{1,3,6,7,9,11\}, \{1,4,5,7,9,11\}, \{2,3,5,7,9,11\}\},$$

$$T = \{\{1,3,8\}, \{1,5,10\}, \{3,5,12\}\}.$$

And  $v$  is given by:  $v(N) = 6$ ,  $v(S) = 1$  for all  $S \in B$ ,  $v(S) = 4$  for all  $S \in S$ ,  $v(S) = 1$  for all  $S \in T$ , and  $v(S) = 0$  for all other  $S \subset N$ . For this game  $A = \{x: x(N) = 6 \text{ and } x_i \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \in N\}$ . Consider also the six-dimensional hypercube

$$B = \{x \in A: x(S) = 1 \text{ for all } S \in B\}.$$

The core  $C$  is the intersection of  $C(S)$  and  $C(T)$  where

$$C(S) = \{x \in B: x(S) \geq 4 \text{ for all } S \in S\},$$

$$C(T) = \{x \in B: x(S) \geq 1 \text{ for all } S \in T\}.$$

$C$  is a proper superset of the convex hull of the six vertices of  $B$  which have  $x_i = 1$  for  $i$  equal to five of the six odd indices 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11, and  $x_{i+1} = 1$  when  $i$  is the remaining odd numbered player. Let  $\text{Dom}_B X = \bigcup_{S \in \mathcal{B}} \text{Dom}_S X$ . Note that  $\text{Dom}_B C \supset A - B$ , and hence any solution  $V$  for our game is a subset of  $B$ .

4. Outline of Proof. First, note that any component of an  $x \in B$  has a maximum value of  $x_i = 1$ . Consequently, the following three sets are contained in any solution  $V$ , i.e., they are subsets of  $\cap V$ :

$$E = \{x \in B: x_i = x_j = 1 \text{ for } i \neq j \text{ and } \{i, j\} \subset \{1, 3, 5\}\},$$

$$F = \{x \in C(T): x_p = 1 \text{ for } p = 7, 9 \text{ or } 11\},$$

$$P = \{(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)\}.$$

Next, we can show that  $UV$  must be a disconnected set. Let  $G = \{x \in B: x(\{7, 9, 11\}) \leq 1\}$ ,  $G^0 = \{x \in B: x(\{7, 9, 11\}) < 1\}$ , and  $P' = \{x \in G: x_2 = x_4 = x_6 = 1\}$ . Throughout this section the indices  $i, j$  and  $k$  represent some ordering of the distinct indices 1, 3 and 5. The subset  $H$  of  $E$  consisting of the three triangular regions

$$H_i = \{x \in G: x_{i+1} = x_j = x_k = 1; x_7 + x_9 + x_{11} = 1\}$$

is in  $\cap V$  and  $\text{Dom}_S H \supset G^0 - (E \cup P')$ . The subset  $J$  of  $F$  consisting of the three triangular regions

$$\begin{aligned}
 J_1 &= \{x \in F: x_1 = x_7 = x_9 = 1, x_3 + x_5 + x_{12} = 1\}, \\
 J_3 &= \{x \in F: x_3 = x_7 = x_{11} = 1, x_1 + x_5 + x_{10} = 1\}, \\
 J_5 &= \{x \in F: x_5 = x_9 = x_{11} = 1, x_1 + x_3 + x_8 = 1\}
 \end{aligned}$$

is also in  $\cap V$  and  $\text{Dom}_T J \supset B - C(T) \supset P' - P$ . So any  $x \in UV - P$  either has  $x \in E$  or  $x \in B - G^0$ , i.e.,  $x_i = x_j = 1$  or  $x(\{7,9,11\}) \geq 1$ . Such  $x$  are clearly disconnected from the singleton  $P \subset \cap V$ .

Finally, it is necessary to demonstrate that this game does possess at least one solution.  $V' = C \cup E \cup F \cup P$  is in any solution  $V$ , and  $V'$  can be enlarged to a solution in two steps. First, include the set of imputations  $L$  in  $C(T) - (V' \cup \text{Dom } V')$  which is simultaneously maximal with respect to all three of the relations "Dom<sub>S</sub>" for  $S \in S$ . Clearly  $L \subset \cap V$ . Next, pick a particular  $S^i = \{i+1, j, k, 7, 9, 11\} \in S$  and then add in those elements  $L^i$  in  $C(T) - (V' \cup L \cup \text{Dom}(V' \cup L))$  which are maximal with respect to the relation "Dom<sub>S<sup>i</sup></sub>" and are at the same time symmetrical in the sense that  $x_j = x_k$ . It requires some detail to describe the sets  $L$  and  $L^i$  explicitly, and to verify that the resulting sets  $V^i = V' \cup L \cup L^i$  are solutions for our example. These will appear elsewhere.

5. Remarks. At one time it was apparently believed that proving the union of all solutions connected could be a major step in showing that every game has a solution. It is now known [2] that a solution need not exist for every game. On the other hand, it is possible that results on disconnecting  $UV$  might be useful in the resolution of important open questions about whether solutions

always exist for games with full-dimensional cores, with empty cores, or which are constant-sum.

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
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